VOL.

404, JUNE 20, 2003 495

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

*
G.R. No. 142820. June 20, 2003.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN

D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-
SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149,
respondents.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Nullity of Marriage;

Judgments; Foreign Judgment; The court could modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory.—The court
could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become
executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or altera-

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

496

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

tion transpired after the judgment has become final and executory
and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice
or when supervening events warrant it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before the courts can
give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment have been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court.—As a general rule, divorce
decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable
in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody,
care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by
the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to
the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim
of a party.—It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction,
our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness
of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Manuel C. Moyco for petitioner.
     Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for private respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a)

grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by public
respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial
court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained
abroad by petitioner.
In this special civil
1
action for certiorari, petitioner
assails (a) the order dated September 30, 1999 of public
respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding
Judge of Makati Regional Trial

_______________

1 Rollo, p. 15.

497

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 497

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

2
Court, Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 3
for
declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order dated
March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The
assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order
dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of
resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the
spouses and the custody of their children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and
resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg,
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified 4
on
February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of
their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine
on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively. 5
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. 6On February 6, 1997,
petitioner filed a motion 7to dismiss, but it was denied by
the trial court in its order dated May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion 8
for
reconsideration, but was also denied in an order dated
August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On
November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition
and remanded the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from
the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese,
promulgated on December 16, 1997. The decree provides in
part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513,

has ruled through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance
on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980
before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

_______________

2 Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga signed as Executive Judge.

3 Rollo, p. 16.
4 Records, pp. 5-6.
5 Id., at pp. 1-4.
6 Id., at pp. 19-28.
7 Id., at p. 147.
8 Id., at p. 165.

498

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Roehr vs. Rodriguez
The parental custody for the children
     Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
     Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
is granted to the father. 9
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to

Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or
suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated
dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an
order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Private
respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with
a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between petitioner and
private respondent.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the
ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the
instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang
Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had
already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated
by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on
December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree
of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its
order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation
10
of the
mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code, endowing the
petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine law.

_______________

9 Rollo, p. 33.
10 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
E.O. No. 227, dated July 17, 1987.)

499
 VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 499
Roehr vs. Rodriguez

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the

assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July
14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of
their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order

dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was
opposed by respondent and considering that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment
thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though
the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because
he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by
his/her national law, and considering further the effects of the
termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article
50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the
property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of
their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside
with respect to these matters which may be ventilated in this
Court. 11
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on

October 19, 1999, which was denied
12
by respondent judge in
an order dated March 31, 2000.
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:

1. PARTIALLY SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER

DATED JULY 14, 1999 DISMISSING THE
INSTANT CASE IS NOT ALLOWED
13
BY 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
2. RESPONDENT MARIA CARMEN RODRIGUEZ
BY HER MOTION FOR PARTIAL
RECONSIDERATION HAD RECOGNIZED AND
ADMITTED THE DIVORCE DECISION
OBTAINED BY HER
14
EXHUSBAND IN
HAMBURG, GERMANY.
3. THERE IS NOTHING LEFT TO BE TACKLED BY
THE HONORABLE COURT AS THERE ARE NO
CONJUGAL ASSETS ALLEGED

_______________
 11 Supra, note 1.
12 Supra, note 3.
13 Rollo, p. 6.
14 Id., at p. 8.

500

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

IN THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF

MARRIAGE AND IN THE DIVORCE PETITION,
AND THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN HAD
ALREADY BEEN AWARDED
15
TO PETITIONER
WOLFGANG ROEHR.

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused

her discretion in issuing her order dated September
30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated
July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused
her discretion when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact
that petitioner has already obtained a divorce
decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order

of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her
previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion.—After the hearing, the court may

dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the
amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the
reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly
the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited

to dismissing the action or claim, denying the motion, or
ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC
can validly reconsider its order dated July 14, 1999 because
it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
 Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section
7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The

trial court may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a
new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the
motion. If the court finds

_______________

15 Ibid.

501

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 501

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment

or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend
such judgment or final order accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for
a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues
as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or
only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a
new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable
without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest.
(Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a

partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained
finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the
trial court’s decision of July 14, 1999 can16 still be modified.
Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals, we held that the
court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same
has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired
17
after the judgment
has become final and executory and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest18
of justice or when
supervening events warrant it. In our view, there are even
more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case,
judgment has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999,
despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a
divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany. 19 20
In Garcia v. Recio, Van21 Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., and
Llorente v. Court of Appeals, we consistently held that a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner.

_______________

16 G.R. No. 108338, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 546, 561.

17 David v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115821, 13 October 1999, 316
SCRA 710, 719.
18 People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, 29 September 1999, 315 SCRA 461,
463.
19 G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
20 No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.
21 G.R. No. 124371, 23 November 2000, 345 SCRA 592, 601.

502

502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

22
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,
where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a
foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German
court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by
either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental
custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be
valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent
the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy
mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners
in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but
the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of
23
the children, must still be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.—The effect of a judgment of

a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment

is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

_______________

22 G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653, 663.

23 Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra at 602.

503

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 503

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to

challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in
this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim 24
of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private
respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the
rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were
summary. As to what was the extent of private
respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the
German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce
decree itself25states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings nor 26
has she given her opinion to the Social
Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by
two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist
27
 27
her in said proceedings. More importantly, the divorce
judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German
Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived
separately for three years, the marriage is deemed
irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue
as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding
that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the
children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for
hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care,
support and education mindful of the best interests of the
children. This is in consonance with the provision in the
Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is
always the paramount consideration
28
in all questions
concerning his care and custody.

_______________

24 Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493,

19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110.
25 Rollo, p. 57.
26 Ibid.
27 Id., at pp. 55-56.
28 Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116773, 16 January 1997,
266 SCRA 317, 321, citing Art. 8, P.D. No. 603, The Child and Youth
Welfare Code.

504

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Roehr vs. Rodriguez

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that

public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction
when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning
property relations between petitioner and private
respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in
Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati,
subject of this case, that: “[p]etitioner and respondent have
not acquired any conjugal or community property 29nor have
they incurred any debts during their marriage.” Herein
petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule
that a court shall
30
grant relief warranted by the allegations
and the proof. Given the factual admission by the parties
in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted
for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in
this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in
controversy.
 In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to
determine the issue regarding the custody of the two
children born of the union between petitioner and private
respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming
cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the
parties, which is not at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and
March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over
the issue between the parties as to who has parental
custody, including the care, support and education of the
children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr.
Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the
trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Bellosillo (Chairman) and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

_______________

Art. 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount.—In all questions regarding the

care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.
29 Rollo, p. 19.
30 JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124293, 20
November 2000, 345 SCRA 143, 154.

505

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 505

Lanzaderas vs. Amethyst Security and General Services,
Inc.

     Austria-Martinez, J., On official leave.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.—A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothe a

divorcee with the legal capacity to remarry—he must still
adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign state’s
personal law governing his status, or at the very least, he
should still prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage. (Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 [2001])

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