Study and Reports On The Vat Gap 2017 PDF
Study and Reports On The Vat Gap 2017 PDF
Study and Reports On The Vat Gap 2017 PDF
TAXUD/2015/CC/131
In consortium with
CPB IFS
DIW IPP
DONDENA PWC
ETLA ISER
IEB
Acknowledgements
This report was written by a team of experts from CASE (Center for Social and Economic
Research, Warsaw), directed by Grzegorz Poniatowski, and composed of Mikhail Bonch-
Osmolovskiy and Misha Belkindas. Research assistance was provided by Adam Śmietanka. The
Project was coordinated by Marta Smagowicz.
We also acknowledge discussions with several officials of tax and statistical offices of the
Member States, who offered valuable comments and suggestions. All responsibility for the
estimates and the interpretation in this report remains with the authors.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Contents
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
List of Figures
Figure 1.1. Change in VAT Revenue Components (2015 over 2014) ............................................. 16
Figure 2.1. VAT Gap as a percent of the VTTL in EU-27 Member States, 2015 and 2014 ............. 17
Figure 2.2. Percentage Point Change in VAT Gap (2015 over 2014).............................................. 17
Figure 2.3. VAT Gap in EU Member States, 2011-2015 ................................................................. 18
Figure A1. Components of Ideal Revenue, VTTL, and VAT Collection ........................................... 64
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
List of Tables
Table 1.1. Real and Nominal Growth in the EU-28 in 2015 ............................................................ 11
Table 1.2. VAT Rate Structure as of 31 December 2014, and Changes during 2015 ..................... 13
Table 1.3. Change in VAT Revenue Components (2015 over 2014) ............................................... 15
Table 3.1. Belgium: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 21
Table 3.2. Bulgaria: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (BGN
million)............................................................................................................................................ 22
Table 3.3. Czech Republic: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015
(CZK million) ................................................................................................................................... 23
Table 3.4. Denmark: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (DKK
million)............................................................................................................................................ 24
Table 3.5. Germany: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 25
Table 3.6. Estonia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 26
Table 3.7. Ireland: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 27
Table 3.8. Greece: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 28
Table 3.9a. Spain: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 29
Table 3.9b. Spain: Alternative Estimates ........................................................................................ 30
Table 3.10. France: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 31
Table 3.11. Croatia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2015 (HRK
million)............................................................................................................................................ 32
Table 3.12a. Italy: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 33
Table 3.12b. Italy: Alternative Estimates........................................................................................ 34
Table 3.13. Cyprus: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2015 (EUR million)
........................................................................................................................................................ 35
Table 3.14. Latvia: VAT Revenue VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 36
Table 3.15. Lithuania: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (LTL
million)............................................................................................................................................ 37
Table 3.16. Luxembourg: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015
(EUR million) ................................................................................................................................... 38
Table 3.17. Hungary: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (HUF
million)............................................................................................................................................ 39
Table 3.18. Malta: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million)............................................................................................................................................ 40
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Table 3.19a. Netherlands: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015
(EUR million) .................................................................................................................................. 41
Table 3.19b. Netherlands: Alternative Estimates .......................................................................... 42
Table 3.20. Austria: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million) ........................................................................................................................................... 43
Table 3.21. Poland: VAT Revenue VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (PLN
million) ........................................................................................................................................... 44
Table 3.22. Portugal: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million) ........................................................................................................................................... 45
Table 3.23. Romania: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (RON
million) ........................................................................................................................................... 46
Table 3.24. Slovenia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million) ........................................................................................................................................... 47
Table 3.25. Slovakia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million) ........................................................................................................................................... 48
Table 3.26. Finland: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR
million) ........................................................................................................................................... 49
Table 3.27. Sweden: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (SEK
million) ........................................................................................................................................... 50
Table 3.28. United Kingdom: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015
(GBP million) .................................................................................................................................. 51
Table 4.1. Policy Gap, Rate Gap, Exemption Gap, and Actionable Gaps ....................................... 54
Table A.1. Source of revisions of VAT Gap estimates .................................................................... 57
Table A.2. Data Sources ................................................................................................................. 60
Table B1. VTTL (EUR million) .......................................................................................................... 65
Table B2. Household VAT Liability (EUR million) ........................................................................... 66
Table B3. Intermediate Consumption and Government VAT Liability (EUR million) ..................... 67
Table B4. GFCF VAT Liability (EUR million)..................................................................................... 68
Table B5. VAT Revenues (EUR million)........................................................................................... 69
Table B6. VAT Gap (EUR million) .................................................................................................... 70
Table B7. VAT Gap (percent of VTTL) ............................................................................................. 71
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Executive Summary
This analysis serves as the Final Report for the DG TAXUD Project 2015/CC/131, “Study and
Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States”, which is a follow up to the reports
published in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016.
We present new estimates of the VAT Gap and the Policy Gap for the year 2015, as well as updated
estimates for the years 2011-2014. This report provides first estimates of the VAT Gap for Cyprus,
using the newly revised national accounts data from the Cyprus Statistical Agency.
The VAT Gap is the difference between the amount of VAT revenue actually collected and the
theoretical amount that is expected to be collected, given the observed information on the
country’s economy and the actual VAT legislation. The amount of VAT total theoretical liability,
known as VTTL, is calculated using the so-called “top-down” approach: the national VAT rate
structure is imposed on the national accounts expenditure and investment data at the most
detailed level possible to derive expected liability.
VAT Gap cannot be treated as a straightforward equivalent of VAT fraud. Apart from VAT fraud
and tax evasion and avoidance, the VAT Gap can be influenced by bankruptcies and tax arrears,
as well as reporting problems in national accounts.
An important change in the VAT rules in 2015 came with the introduction of the MOSS regime,
which changed the way VAT was invoiced for exported electronic services. VAT structure remained
unchanged in most countries, with only three Member States changing the level and scope of VAT
rates.
Nominal VAT revenues increased on average by 4.5 percent in the EU-27—a combination of
revived economic growth (2.9 percent) and an increase in VAT compliance (2.4 percent).1
In nominal terms, in 2015, the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States amounted to EUR 151.5
billion. The VTTL accounted for EUR 1,187.8 billion, whereas VAT revenue was EUR 1,035.3 billion.
Expressed as a percent of VTTL, the VAT Gap share dropped to 12.8 percent, down from 14.1
percent in 2014. In absolute values, the VAT Gap dropped by EUR 8.7 billion and is at its lowest
level since 2011. The share of the VAT Gap in the VTTL decreased in 20 Member States, and
increased only in 7 out of the total 27 Member States (EU-28 excluding Cyprus:
The smallest Gaps were observed in Sweden (-1.42 percent)2, Spain (3.52 percent), and Croatia
(3.92 percent). The largest Gaps were registered in Romania (37.18 percent), Slovakia (29.39
percent), and Greece (28.27 percent). Overall, half of the EU-27 Member States recorded a Gap
below 10.8 percent.
1
Figures are not additive.
2
Possible reasons for negative VAT Gap are use of cash vs accrual revenues, underestimation of GFCF
liabilities, or incompleteness of national accounts.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Introduction
This Report presents the fifth follow-up of the “Study to quantify the VAT Gap in the EU Member
States”, which was conducted by Barbone et al. in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. 3 This update
contains new VAT Gap estimates for 2015, as well as updated estimates for 2011-2014. It also
includes the first ever VAT Gap estimates for Cyprus.4
The VAT Gap is essentially the difference between expected and actual VAT revenues. One of the
primary interests in the VAT Gap lies in its connection to VAT fraud, an important political and
economic issue across Member States and for the EC. Numerous measures to tackle different
forms of VAT tax evasion are discussed, debated, and implemented by EU Member States and the
EC, such as the extension of the reverse charge mechanism, the recapitulative statement of intra-
EU supplies, and the quick VAT fraud reaction mechanism (QRM), among others.
However, the VAT Gap estimates presented in this report should not be directly interpreted as
VAT fraud estimates.5 Other factors such as bankruptcies, tax arrears, and reporting problems in
national accounts can contribute positively to the VAT Gap. Therefore, the VAT Gap should be
more cautiously treated as an upper bound estimate of VAT non-compliance, as well as a general
index of the VAT system efficiency and tax administrations capacity to collect VAT.
The structure of this report resembles that of the previous publications. Chapter I of the report
presents the main economic and policy factors that affected Member States during the course of
2015. It also includes a decomposition of the change in VAT revenues into base, effective rate, and
tax compliance components. The overall results are presented and briefly described in Chapter II.
Chapter III provides detailed results and outlines trends for individual countries coupled with
analytical insights. In Chapter IV, we examine the Policy Gap and the contribution that VAT
reduced rates and exemptions have made to this Gap. Annex A contains methodological
considerations on the VAT Gap and the Policy Gap. Annex B provides statistical data and a set of
comparative tables.
3
The first study of the VAT Gap in the EU was conducted by Reckon (2009); however, due to differences in
methodology, it cannot be directly compared to these latter studies.
4
Cyprus VAT Gap estimates were omitted in the previous publications due to the absence of national
accounts data.
5
VAT evasion – generally comprises illegal arrangements where tax liability is hidden or ignored, i.e. the
taxpayer pays less tax than he/she is supposed to pay under the law by hiding income or information from
the tax authorities; VAT fraud - is a form of deliberate evasion of tax which is generally punishable under
criminal law. The term includes situations in which deliberately false statements are submitted or fake
documents are produced; VAT avoidance – acting within the law, sometimes at the edge of legality, to
minimise or eliminate tax that would otherwise be legally owed. It often involves exploiting the strict letter
of the law, loopholes and mismatches to obtain a tax advantage that was not originally intended by the VAT
legislation.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
2015 marked the third year of recovery since the economic crisis of 2011. Combined real GDP
growth in the EU was 2.2 percent in 2015, up from 1.7 percent in 2014 and 0.2 percent in 2013.
At the same time, nominal final consumption increased by approximately 4 percent and nominal
GFCF by roughly 6 percent (see Table 1.1).
The highest growth rate of 26 percent in Ireland stands out as an accounting artefact, which
occurred when several multinational companies moved their headquarters to Ireland and
appeared on the investment balance sheet. The nominal final consumption expenditure in Ireland
increased at a much moderate rate of 4 percent. For the remaining Member States, excluding
Greece, real GDP growth rates were positive and ranged from 0 percent (Finland) to 7.3 percent
(Malta).
The only country to experience a downturn in 2015 was Greece, with negative growth in final
consumption as well as investment and intermediate consumption.
Table 1.1 also illustrates a well-known general fact about the nature of investment: changes in
investment are much more variable than changes in consumption, both across countries and
across time. In this example, it would hold true even if we compare variations without taking
extreme GFCF growth rates into account (i.e. as in Ireland and Malta). If we were to examine the
variation of GFCF over time for a particular sector: investment by government, households, or
financial enterprises, among others, the picture would look even more complicated. It is mainly
because of this feature that it is necessary to revise VAT Gap estimates whenever new information
on actual investment figures becomes available.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
One of the most important changes in 2015 was the EU-wide change in regulation regarding “place
of supply” of electronic services.6 Before 2015, VAT charged on electronic services was invoiced
to the country where the provider of services is registered, like for any other good. Since 2015,
however, the VAT is to be paid to the country of customer residence. A voluntary MOSS system
6
Council Directive 2008/8/EC – place of supply of services and subsequent regulations (Council
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1042/2013 – place of supply of services; Council Implementing Regulation
(EU) No 967/2012 – obligations under the one-time registration scheme (MOSS); Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) No 815/2012 - standardised information for registrations and returns).
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
was set up in each EU country to facilitate VAT accounting. During the transitional period, the
countries could retain 30 percent of the VAT revenues generated under the old regime. This
change had a profound effect on the countries with a large export of electronic services, such as
Luxembourg and Malta. The methodological issues regarding the introduction of the MOSS system
concerning VAT Gap estimations are discussed in Section a of Annex A.
Luxembourg was one of the three Member States that implemented changes to the VAT rates
structure, partly to counteract the loss of revenue due to MOSS. Except for the super reduced
rate, all other rates in Luxembourg were raised by two percentage points.
In Greece, the government raised the rates in July 2015 as part of the bailout agreement with the
EU. In particular, rates were raised for several of the food products and for hotels and
accommodation services. Additionally, Greece’s mainland rate was established on several of the
islands, where a 30 percent lower rate had been in use before.
The Czech Republic has introduced a lower 10 percent reduced rate for special items, such as
pharmaceuticals, vaccines, and baby food (see Table 1.2).
Another noticeable change in VAT rules in 2015 was the expansion of the reverse charge
mechanism across several countries (the process began in 2013-2014). In particular, the
application of the reverse charge was extended in the Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovenia. Importantly, the introduction of the reverse charge can have a negative temporary effect
on VAT revenues due to delays in tax collection.
Across the EU, the standard VAT rate varied from 17 percent in Luxembourg to 27 percent in
Hungary. The median standard rate remained at 21 percent. However, the median effective VAT
rate was equal to 12.5 percent.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Table 1.2. VAT Rate Structure as of 31 December 2014, and Changes during 2015
The value of actual VAT revenue can be expressed as the product of three components:
Actual Revenue = Net Base * Effective Rate * Compliance Gap, where Effective Rate is the ratio of
theoretical VTTL to the Net Base. The Net Base (which is the sum of final consumption and
investment by households, NPISH, and government), in turn, is calculated as the difference
between Gross Base, which includes VAT, and VAT revenues actually collected.
7
Ratio of VTTL and tax base. See methodological considerations in Section d in Annex A.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Table 1.3 presents the decomposition of the total changes in nominal VAT revenues into these
three components: change in net taxable base, change in the effective rate applied to the base,
and change in the compliance gap (Table 1.3 does not include Cyprus, for which the figures for
2014 are not available).
The highest contributing factor to the increase in revenues was growth in nominal net base: across
the EU, this was about 2.9 percent. In two Member States, Greece and Croatia, the base shrank
by 2.4 and 1.2 percent, respectively.
Malta and Luxembourg experienced the biggest negative change in effective rate, an effect
generated by the loss of VTTL due to the MOSS regime introduction. The biggest positive increase
in the effective rate—by 8.5 percent—was in Greece, which had made changes in its VAT rate
structure. The 6.5 percent increase in the effective rate in Croatia, despite any changes to the VAT
legislation, is explained in greater detail in the footnote.8
Excluding Malta and Luxembourg, the EU average increase in the effective rate was just 0.6
percent.
Finally, increase in VAT compliance was the second major contributor to the growth in revenues,
in total 1.5 percent in the EU-27.
8
The increase in the effective rate in Croatia occurred as a result of the combination of a stagnant gross
base, a stagnant VTTL, and a simultaneous increase in nominal revenues. Subsequently, the net base,
calculated as the difference between the gross base and the VAT revenues, has contracted, and the effective
rate has increased.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Change in
Change in VAT Change in Base Change in
Member State Effective Rate
Compliance (%) (%) Revenue (%)
(%)
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10% BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
-20%
-30%
The VAT Gap measured in this study was estimated using essentially the same methodology as in
the previously cited VAT Gap studies. The VAT Gap is defined as the difference between the VAT
total tax liability (VTTL, sometimes also known as VAT total theoretical liability) and the amount
of VAT actually collected. We compute VTTL in a “top-down” approach by deriving the expected
VAT liability from the observed national accounts data, such as supply and use tables (SUT). In
particular, VAT liability is estimated for final household, government, and NPISH expenditures;
non-deductible VAT from intermediate consumption of exempt industries; and VAT from GFCF of
exempt sectors. We also account for country-specific tax regulations, such as exemptions for small
business under the VAT thresholds (if applicable); non-deductible business expenditures on food,
drinks, and accommodation; and restrictions to deduct VAT on leased cars, among others. The
precise formula is given in Section d in Annex A.
The availability and quality of SUT data varies greatly country by country and year by year. In the
course of our computations, some expenditure and investment figures, which are not available
for the latest years, are estimated using industry- and sector-specific growth rates and taxable
shares. 9 This requires the frequent revision of previous estimates whenever actual national
accounts data is published or new information on the taxable investment becomes available.
In nominal terms, in 2015, the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States amounted to EUR 151.5
billion. The VTTL accounted for EUR 1,187.8 billion, whereas VAT revenue was EUR 1,035.3 billion.
In relative terms, the VAT Gap share dropped to 12.8 percent down from 14.1 percent in 2014,
and is at its lowest value since 2011. In absolute values, the nominal VAT Gap has dropped by EUR
8.7 billion and is at its lowest value since then. Of the EU-27 (excluding Cyprus), the VAT Gap share
decreased in 20 countries and increased in only 7—namely, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Greece,
Luxembourg, Finland, and the UK (see Figure 2.2).
9
The SUT are estimated using the RAS method, an iterative scaling procedure whereby a matrix is adjusted
until its column sums and row sums equal to pre-specified totals. The GFCF VAT liability is estimated based
on national accounts investment data in the specific sector combined with the shares of investment taxed
at different rates, which, in turn, are derived from ORS.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
The smallest Gaps were observed in Sweden (-1.42 percent), Spain (3.52 percent), and Croatia
(3.92 percent). The largest Gaps were registered in Romania (37.18 percent), Slovakia (29.39
percent), and Greece (28.27 percent). Overall, half of the EU-27 Member States recorded a Gap
below 10.8 percent (see Figure 2.1).
The biggest decline in the VAT Gap share occurred in Malta, as the result of a 17 percent decline
in VTTL due to the effect that the introduction of the MOSS regime had on the e-gambling industry.
The second biggest decline in VAT Gap (5.7 percentage points) occurred in Romania.
Figure 2.1. VAT Gap as a percent of the VTTL in EU-27 Member States, 2015 and 2014
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
SE HR ES EE SI LU FI NL AT DE IE BE DK UK PT FR HU CZ LV BG MT PL IT LT EL SK RO
-5%
Figure 2.2. Percentage Point Change in VAT Gap (2015 over 2014)
5
3 3
1 1 1
0 0
0
MTRO ES EE HU BG IT SI PT SE AT DE NL FR LT SK LV HR
0 PL 0 UK DK FI BE IE EL LU
0 CZ
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-2 -2 -2
-3
-3 -3
-5 -4
-5
-6
-10
-15
-17
-20
Source: own calculations.
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Figure 2.3. VAT Gap in EU Member States, 2011-2015
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Table 2.1. VAT Gap Estimates, 2014-2015 (EUR million)
Total 977121 1137342 160220 14.09 1033822 1185230 151408 12.77 -1.31
EU-2710
Total 1035339 1186869 151530 12.77
EU-28
Median 10.92 10.85
10
EU-28 without Cyprus.
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III. Individual Country Results
This Chapter reviews the individual results for each EU-27 Member State, highlighting statistical
trends and the most important changes in the particular VAT systems. The results are presented
in the following order:
Country Page
Belgium 21
Bulgaria 22
Czech Republic 23
Denmark 24
Germany 25
Estonia 26
Ireland 27
Greece 28
Spain 29
France 31
Croatia 32
Italy 33
Cyprus 35
Latvia 36
Lithuania 37
Luxembourg 38
Hungary 39
Malta 40
Netherlands 41
Austria 43
Poland 44
Portugal 45
Romania 46
Slovenia 47
Slovakia 48
Finland 49
Sweden 50
United Kingdom 51
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Table 3.1. Belgium: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
35000 20%
Belgium 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 30000
14%
25000 12% 12% 15%
VTTL 29604 31229 31057 30496 30869 20000 10%
11%
10%
o/w liability on 15000
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Table 3.2. Bulgaria: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (BGN million)
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Table 3.3. Czech Republic: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (CZK million)
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Table 3.4. Denmark: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (DKK million)
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
5182 5230 5222 5327 5419
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
page 24 of 72
Table 3.5. Germany: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
5634 5694 5891 5801 6053
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
o/w net adjustments 1363 1274 1384 1317 1310 The VAT Gap for Germany decreased 1 percentage point during 2015, or
about EUR 2.5 billion. This amount comprised 29 percent of the total EU
VAT revenue 189910 194034 197005 203081 211616
decrease in the VAT Gap.
VAT GAP 20589 23991 24649 24898 22366
In 2014, Germany toughened penalties for late returns and unpaid VAT
VAT GAP as a percent due and introduced a reverse charge on mobile phones. No substantial
of VTTL 10% 11% 11% 11% 10% changes were made to the rate structure in 2015.
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Table 3.6. Estonia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
15 16 26 28 29
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
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Table 3.7. Ireland: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
VAT GAP as a
16% 16% 12% 9% 10%
percent of VTTL
page 27 of 72
Table 3.8. Greece: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
VAT GAP as a These two opposing factors resulted in EUR 1 billion of additional VTTL.
percent of VTTL 34% 29% 33% 25% 28% However, actual revenues increased by only EUR 200 million. Hence, the
VAT Gap increased by 3 percentage points, from 25 to 28 percent.
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Table 3.9a. Spain: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
VAT GAP as a
13% 10% 12% 8% 4%
percent of VTTL
page 29 of 72
Table 3.9b. Spain: Alternative Estimates
Note: Adjusting revenues for the continuing reduction in the stock of claims and adjusting the VTTL for the difference between national accounting and tax
conventions in the construction sector based on the data received from Spanish Tax Authorities led to a downward revision of the VAT Gap for the entire period
2011-2015.
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Table 3.10. France: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1292 1379 1426 1561 1577
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
VAT revenue 140552 142527 144490 148454 151622 In January 2015, France extended electronic audit filing to non-resident
VAT companies. Previously, this was only required from resident
VAT GAP 12115 19853 18218 21981 20113
companies.
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL 8% 12% 11% 13% 12%
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Table 3.11. Croatia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2014-2015 (HRK million)
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Table 3.12a. Italy: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
page 33 of 72
Table 3.12b. Italy: Alternative Estimates
Note: the estimates above are based on adjusted revenues for the changes in outstanding stocks of net reimbursement claims (to better approximate accrued
revenues) and Italy’s own estimates of illegal activities, namely illegal drugs and prostitution activities.
page 34 of 72
Table 3.13. Cyprus: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2015 (EUR million)
VTTL 1639 Thanks to the finalisation of national accounts and figures in the ESA10
standard, estimates for Cyprus are included in the VAT Gap Report as of
o/w liability on
2015.
household final 1034
consumption Cyprus’ VAT Gap in 2015 is estimated to be 7 percent, which is 3
percentage points below the EU average.
o/w liability on
government and
27
NPISH final
consumption
o/w liability on
intermediate 416
consumption
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Table 3.14. Latvia: VAT Revenue VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w net adjustments -65 -102 -105 -117 -116 The previously published estimates for Latvia were revised in the
current report due to the publication of updated SUT and national
VAT revenue 1374 1570 1690 1787 1876
accounts data.
VAT GAP 658 498 523 420 411
There were no substantial changes to VAT legislation in 2015.
VAT GAP as a
Earlier in 2014, a new register of “high risk” entities was created with an
percent of VTTL 32% 24% 24% 19% 18% obligation for the tax authorities to provide information on such
individuals to the commercial register.
page 36 of 72
Table 3.15. Lithuania: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
74 68 66 69 73
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
o/w net adjustments -110 -126 -129 -174 -206 The VAT Gap in Lithuania continues a downward trend since 2012,
having decreased by another 2 percentage points in 2015.
VAT revenue 2444 2521 2611 2764 2888
The rate for accommodation was lowered to 9 percent in 2015.
VAT GAP 1021 1117 1075 1052 1037
VAT GAP as a
29% 31% 29% 28% 26%
percent of VTTL
page 37 of 72
Table 3.16. Luxembourg: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w net adjustments 1041 1247 1453 1601 862 Standard, reduced, and parking rates were increased by 2 percentage
points in 2015 to partly offset the anticipated loss of revenue.
VAT revenue 2879 3164 3429 3732 3432
Total liability contracted by about 5 percent in 2015; however, actual
VAT GAP 140 137 115 90 202
revenues dropped 8 percent. The VAT Gap increased to 6 percent of the
VAT GAP as a VTTL.
5% 4% 3% 2% 6%
percent of VTTL
page 38 of 72
Table 3.17. Hungary: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (HUF million)
Hungary 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 5000000 21% 22% 25%
21%
4000000 17% 20%
VTTL 3026487 3351065 3407061 3629657 3834330
14%
3000000 15%
o/w liability on
2000000 10%
household final 2160869 2381684 2439438 2524595 2612814
1000000 5%
consumption
0 0%
o/w liability on 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
government final 122279 116969 122358 133364 139925 GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
o/w net adjustments 28201 67815 52935 50859 47475 In 2015, Hungary continued to introduce additional anti-fraud
measures:
VAT revenue 2379253 2627571 2693555 3011162 3307312
All intra-EU movements of goods by road transport must be
VAT GAP 647234 723495 713506 618495 527019
declared in the electronic EKAER system;
VAT GAP as a A domestic reverse charge was introduced for steel
percent of VTTL 21% 22% 21% 17% 14% products; and
The threshold for reporting domestic recapitulative
statements is lowered for invoices from HUF 2 to 1 million.
VAT GAP change
-7 pp
since 2011
page 39 of 72
Table 3.18. Malta: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
page 40 of 72
Table 3.19a. Netherlands: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w net adjustments 469 487 514 508 507 During the course of 2015, the 6 percent reduced rate for the
renovation and repair of buildings was increased to the standard 21
VAT revenue 41610 41699 42424 42708 44879
percent rate. There were no other substantial changes implemented in
VAT GAP 4563 4272 4742 4342 3872 the VAT structure.
VAT GAP as a
percent of VTTL 10% 9% 10% 9% 8%
page 41 of 72
Table 3.19b. Netherlands: Alternative Estimates
Note: These estimates are obtained under alternative assumptions regarding the limited right to deduct benefits in kind and business entertainment, which
are limited to EUR 227 per employee annually. To calculate a lower bound estimate of the VAT Gap, we assume that such deductions were applied to all
employees currently working in Netherlands.
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Table 3.20. Austria: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
VAT GAP 2795 2118 2730 2699 2357 There were no major changes in the VAT rules during 2015.
VAT GAP as a
11% 8% 10% 10% 8%
percent of VTTL
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Table 3.21. Poland: VAT Revenue VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (PLN million)
Poland 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 200000 27% 26% 30%
25% 25%
25%
VTTL 154570 159072 158351 163321 166694 150000 21%
20%
o/w liability on 100000 15%
household final 102061 108658 109749 112706 114645
10%
consumption 50000
5%
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
6737 6864 6716 7005 7269
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
o/w net adjustments 3996 4203 4195 2949 2308 Reverse charges on the sales of laptops, mobile phones, and tablets
were introduced in July 2015.
VAT revenue 122647 116265 116607 122671 125836
Several measures concerning tax compliance and efficiency were
VAT GAP 31923 42807 41744 40650 40858
introduced in 2014. In particular, the government consolidated
VAT GAP as a organisational functions and introduced a single database of tax
21% 27% 26% 25% 25%
percent of VTTL identification numbers.
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Table 3.22. Portugal: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
264 223 219 218 265
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
VAT GAP as a
13% 16% 16% 13% 11%
percent of VTTL
page 45 of 72
Table 3.23. Romania: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (RON million)
100000 43% 50%
Romania 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
37% 39% 39% 37%
80000 40%
VTTL 77123 79881 84547 89390 91569
60000 30%
o/w liability on
household final 46751 49115 49611 54031 55053 40000 20%
consumption 20000 10%
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
3943 4932 4502 4625 4658
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
VAT GAP as a In 2015, the VAT rate for touristic services was lowered to 9 percent.
37% 39% 39% 43% 37%
percent of VTTL There were no other substantial changes.
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Table 3.24. Slovenia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
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Table 3.25. Slovakia: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
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Table 3.26. Finland: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (EUR million)
o/w net adjustments 550 478 547 604 610 No systemic changes were introduced to the parameters of the Finnish
VAT system in 2015.
VAT revenue 17315 17987 18888 18948 18974
VAT GAP as a
5% 5% 5% 6% 7%
percent of VTTL
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Table 3.27. Sweden: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (SEK million)
VAT GAP as a Since 2015, import VAT is invoiced directly to the Tax Authority instead
3% 6% 2% 0% -1% of the Customs Authority.
percent of VTTL
VAT GAP change Possible reasons for negative VAT Gap: use of cash vs accrual revenues,
since 2011 -4 pp underestimation of GFCF liabilities, or incompleteness of national
accounts.
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Table 3.28. United Kingdom: VAT Revenue, VTTL, Composition of VTTL, and VAT Gap, 2011-2015 (GBP million)
consumption 50000 5%
o/w liability on 0 0%
government and 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2597 2556 2537 2618 3131
NPISH final GAP % VTTL Revenues
consumption
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
In this Chapter, we present an update of the series of estimates of the Policy Gap and its
components for the EU-28.
As discussed in 2016 Report, the Policy Gap captures the effects of applying multiple rates and
exemptions on the theoretical revenue that could be levied in a given VAT system. In other words,
the Policy Gap is an indicator of the additional VAT revenue that a Member State could
theoretically (i.e. in the case of perfect tax compliance) generate if it applied a uniform VAT rate
on all goods and services. Due to the idealistic assumption of perfect tax compliance, the practical
interpretation of the Policy Gap draws criticism. Nonetheless, the assumption of perfect VAT
collectability is indispensable, as interdependencies between tax compliance and rate structure
are not straightforward. Furthermore, the example of the negative VAT Gap in Sweden shows that
the assumption of perfect tax compliance is not as idealistic as it may seem.
The Policy Gap could be further decomposed into different components of revenue loss, as we
show in Section f in Annex A. Such elements are, for instance, the Rate Gap and the Exemption
Gap, which capture the loss in VAT liability due to the application of reduced rates, and the loss in
liability due to the implementation of exemptions.
Moreover, following Barbone et al. (2013), the Policy Gap and its components could be further
adjusted to address the issue of the extent to which the loss of theoretical revenue depends on
the decision of policymakers. Measures that exclude liability from the final consumption of
“imputed rents” (the notional value of home occupancy by homeowners), financial services, and
the provision of public goods and services, as charging them with VAT is impractical or beyond the
control of national authorities, are named the “Actionable Gaps”.
The estimates of the Policy Gap, Rate Gap, Exemption Gap, Actionable Policy Gap, and Actionable
Exemption Gap for the EU-28 Member States are presented in Table 4.1.
For the EU overall, the average Policy Gap level is 44 percent. In other words, VAT from final
consumption and investment, even in the case of 100 percent compliance, generates just slightly
more than half of what it could bring if taxed uniformly at the full rate. Of this 44 percent, 9
percentage points are due to the application of various reduced and super reduced rates (the Rate
Gap). Countries with the most flat level of rates in the EU, according to the Rate Gap, are Denmark,
Slovakia, Estonia, and Bulgaria. Installing a uniform Standard Rate would generate less than 3
percent of notional additional revenue in these countries. On the other side of spectrum are
countries with the highest Rate Gap: Cyprus’ revenue could increase by more than 30 percent,
and in Italy, Poland, and Spain by about 15 percent, if only the Standard Rate were applied.
The Exemption Gap, or the average share of Ideal Revenue lost due to various exemptions, is 35
percent in the EU on average. Member States with the highest Exemption Gap are Spain (44.93
percent), UK (43.44 percent) and Finland (43.25 percent), whereas the lowest value of the Gap
was observed in Cyprus (15.20 percent), Malta (15.65 percent) and Romania (20.20 percent). The
Exemption Gap in Spain is relatively high due to the application of other than VAT indirect taxes
in the Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla (see Section c in Annex A). The largest part of Exemption
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
gap is composed of exemptions on services that cannot be taxed in principle, such as imputed
rents, the provision of public goods by the government, or financial services. The remaining level
of “Actionable” Exemption Gap is about 8 percent, on average.
The Actionable Policy Gap, a combination of the Rate Gap and the Actionable Exemption Gap, is,
on average, 16 percent. This figure shows the combined reduction of Ideal Revenue due to
reduced rates and the exemptions that can possibly be removed.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Table 4.1. Policy Gap, Rate Gap, Exemption Gap, and Actionable Gaps
A B C D E F G H
Policy Gap Rate Gap Exemption o/w Imputed o/w Public o/w Financial Actionable Exemption Actionable Policy Gap
(%) (%) Gap (%) Rents (%) Services (%) Services (%) Gap (C - D - E - F) (%) (G + B) (%)
BE 52.53 11.97 40.56 6.93 25.72 3.77 4.14 16.11
BG 27.95 2.27 25.68 9.78 8.20 1.15 6.55 8.83
CZ 38.77 5.50 33.27 8.27 15.40 2.29 7.30 12.81
DK 41.63 0.75 40.89 7.33 28.60 5.02 -0.06 0.69
DE 44.33 7.07 37.26 6.62 21.02 2.91 6.71 13.78
EE 36.07 2.56 33.51 7.06 14.84 1.98 9.63 12.19
IE 51.62 9.05 42.57 10.15 23.37 -0.33 9.37 18.42
EL 53.28 11.25 42.03 11.00 15.87 2.95 12.21 23.45
ES 59.53 14.59 44.93 10.91 18.85 2.77 12.40 27.00
FR 52.63 11.66 40.97 9.25 22.51 3.17 6.05 17.70
HR 36.05 8.80 27.24 8.28 14.47 1.63 2.86 11.66
IT 53.90 15.47 38.43 10.80 19.21 1.33 7.09 22.57
CY 45.04 29.83 15.20 9.22 17.98 -4.61 -7.39 22.44
LV 38.52 3.15 35.37 9.93 14.33 0.86 10.25 13.40
LT 28.27 4.01 24.26 5.26 12.38 -3.51 10.13 14.14
LU 42.25 16.25 26.00 4.96 26.56 -15.23 9.71 25.96
HU 42.10 4.61 37.49 7.14 16.35 3.72 10.29 14.90
MT 31.31 15.66 15.65 4.73 16.34 -12.66 7.24 22.90
NL 51.93 11.08 40.86 6.44 26.05 6.01 2.36 13.44
AT 45.61 10.99 34.62 7.01 21.73 2.35 3.53 14.52
PL 48.75 15.45 33.31 3.44 14.39 3.03 12.43 27.88
PT 50.75 11.58 39.17 8.68 20.03 2.99 7.47 19.05
RO 25.99 5.79 20.20 9.49 7.60 0.09 3.01 8.81
SI 46.81 11.68 35.14 6.62 16.40 2.68 9.44 21.12
SK 36.65 1.47 35.19 7.06 13.10 2.79 12.24 13.71
FI 50.33 7.07 43.25 11.29 22.25 4.70 5.01 12.08
SE 48.11 7.81 40.31 5.76 27.33 3.83 3.38 11.19
UK 52.45 8.68 43.77 11.40 20.13 3.68 8.56 17.24
EU-28 44.04 9.50 34.54 8.03 18.61 1.05 6.86 16.36
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
The Methodological Annex is structured as follows. Subsection a describes the impact of the
introduction of the MOSS system on the VAT Gap estimates. Subsection b discusses sources of
revisions to figures published in the 2016 Report. Subsection d, e and f repeat the overview of the
VAT Gap and Policy Gap estimation methodology, which remained the same as published in the
2016 Report (Poniatowski et al. 2016).
The new rule for taxation of electronic and digital services came into force on 1st January 2015.
Since the amendment of the rules, telecommunications, broadcasting and electronically supplied
services (including e-gambling) were taxed in the country where the customer (either business or
consumer) resided. In order to ease the compliance burden, each MS had installed an Internet
portal – the MOSS, the only place where the company would need to register and pay its VAT
liability.
Currently, Member States take the responsibility to remit VAT to each other Member State,
according to the customer’s residence. In the transition year of 2015, Member States were
allowed to keep 30 percent of the e-services VAT revenue for themselves.
From the VAT Gap perspective, the new rule had an impact on overall household consumption
liability, and on the special cases of Luxembourg and Malta.
1) The VAT liability estimates derived from the final consumption from USE tables actually
became more accurate. This can be illustrated by an example. Suppose, a household in
Germany had purchased a EUR 200 worth of digital services of which half was supplied
from Germany, half from Luxembourg.
Before 2015, the actual liability was split between EUR 16 paid to Germany and
15 euro paid to Luxembourg.
After 2015, all of the liability is paid to Germany (except for EUR 5 temporary
retention fee left to Luxembourg).
In both cases, SUT would attribute the whole amount of EUR 200 to the final household
consumption, implying EUR 31 of the VAT liability to Germany. Therefore, the household liability
estimates derived from SUT become closer to the actual liability under the new rule.
The overall effect of this correction to the household liability is rather small: taxable digital services
fall unto category “J69_J60: Motion picture, video and television programme production services,
sound recording and music publishing; programming and broadcasting services”, which on
average make up for just a half of the percent of total household consumption.
2) In the case of Luxembourg, the effect was quite substantial as Luxembourg with its lowest
statutory VAT rate in the EU was the top registration destination for digital services
companies. All in all, in 2014 Luxembourg derived additional EUR 1,200 million from the
VAT on e-services, making up almost one-third of the total VTTL. In order to account for
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
this additional revenue, in this, as well as in previous VAT Gap reports, we inflated the
VTTL estimates by the special adjustment, using the official “e-commerce” revenue
provided by the Authorities. As a result of the implementation of the new rules as of 2015,
the value of adjustment fell significantly. Luxembourg still kept a portion of the revenue
according to the transitional retention rate in 2015, but it is expected to decline in 2016
and further years.
3) In the case of Malta, the new rule had an effect via the third channel, namely the change
in the amount of non-deductible intermediate consumption of the gambling and games
of chance industry. Unlike other digital services, gambling and betting is exempt in all EU
Member States. Moreover, the intermediate consumption of these companies was to a
large extent non-deductible. Malta stands out from other EU Member States due to the
importance of e-gambling industry in the economy. Before the new rule, the IC of “R90-
R92 industry”, which includes gambling and betting together with creative arts, museums,
entertainment and other cultural services made up more than 47 percent of all
intermediate consumption liability in Malta.
Despite a large reduction in the estimated VTTL the amount of actually collected, revenue
in Malta did not show a decline in 2015. This could suggest, that the e-gambling industry
had previously found ways to deduct VAT even before the new rule was implemented.
Every year, the estimates of the VAT Gap are updated and revised backwards. There are three
different sources of such revisions:
1) Updates in the underlying national accounts data published by Eurostat: updates in VAT
revenues, new supply and use tables, revised industry specific growth rates, etc.
2) Updates in the estimated GFCF liability, based on the new information from the ORS
submissions on taxable shares of GFCF by five sectors: households, government, NPISH and
exempt financial and non-financial enterprises.
3) Revision of the parameters of the VTTL model: weighted average rates, pro-rata coefficients
and net adjustments, either due to new information from ORS or due to correcting errors in the
previous computation.
The breakdown of three different components of the revisions in 2014 figures are presented in
Table A.1.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Tank tourism from Germany, France and Belgium to Luxembourg – the adjustment of the VTTL
in Luxembourg due to fuel and services, which is exported from within the country to non-
residents, but still generate VAT. These transactions, which are subject to VAT, but not accounted
for in Eurostar increase the VTTL in Luxembourg. However, due to unavailability of data on the
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
share of tourism by their residence, amendments have not been applied to Belgian, French and
German figures.
Exemption Gap in Spain – both the Exemption Gap and the Actionable Exemption Gap in Spain
include the loss of ideal VAT due to non-application of VAT in the Canary Islands, Ceuta, and
Melilla. The value of both gaps would be reduced by 5.6 percentage points if this loss was excluded
the estimation.
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝐺𝑎𝑝
𝑉𝑅 = 𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿 × 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 × 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 × (1 − )
𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿
𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝐺𝑎𝑝
∆𝑉𝑅 ∆(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∆𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∆ (1 − 𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿 )
= × × ⁄ 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝐺𝑎𝑝
𝑉𝑅 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 (1 − 𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿 )
The “top-down” method that is utilised for VAT Gap estimation relies on national accounts figures.
These figures are used to estimate the VAT liability generated by different sub-aggregates of the
total economy. The VTTL is estimated as the sum of the liability from six main components:
household, government, and NPISH final consumption; intermediate consumption; GFCF; and
other, largely country-specific, adjustments.
In the “top-down” approach, VTTL is estimated using the following formula:
𝑁
Where:
Rate is the weighted average tax rate i.e. the effective rate,
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Propex is the percentage of output in a given sector that is exempt from VAT,
To summarise, VTTL is a product of the VAT rates and the propexes multiplied by the theoretical
values of consumption and investment (plus country specific net adjustments).
For the purpose of VAT Gap estimation, roughly 10,000 parameters are estimated for each year,
including the weighted average rates for each 2-digit CPA (i.e. 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 in the VTTL formula presented
above) group of products and services and the percentage of output in a given sector that is
exempt from VAT for each type of consumption (i.e. 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖 in the VTTL formula presented
above). For instance, for Education services (CPA no. 85) in Croatia, like for any other country and
group of products and services, we estimated weighted average rates in household, government
and NPISH final consumption, as well as the percentage of output that is exempt from VAT. The
main source of information is national accounts data and Own Resource Submissions (ORS), i.e.
VAT statements provided by the Members States to the European Commission. In a number of
specific cases where the ORS information was insufficient, additional data provided by the
Member States was used. As these data are not official Eurostat publications, we decline
responsibility for inaccuracies related to their quality.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
11
Household Budget Survey, Eurostat.
12
RAS method (use the definition from above)
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
We begin with the Notional Ideal Revenue that, by definition, should indicate an upper limit of
VAT revenue (i.e. the revenue levied at a uniform rate in the environment of perfect tax
compliance). As shown in Figure A1, ideal revenue is larger than VTTL and subsequently larger
than VAT collection. However, due to the existence of exemptions, it does not capture the entire
VTTL and tax collection. If no exemptions were applied, neither intermediate consumption nor the
GFCF of business sector would be the base for computing VTTL.
The problem arises when deciding whether investment by the non-business sector should be a
part of the VAT base. According to the OECD (2014), notional ideal revenue is defined as the
standard rate of VAT times the aggregate net final consumption. Multiplying the standard rate
and final consumption would yield, however, lower liability than in the case where a country
applied no exemptions, no reduced rates, and was able to enforce all tax payments. In real life,
VTTL is comprised partially from VAT liability from investment made by households, government,
and NPISH. In the case of the non-inclusion of this investment to the base, VTTL would be partially
extended beyond the ideal revenue despite “no exemptions” present in the system (see Figure A1
(c)).
Policy makers can see the upper limit of VAT revenue by considering all final use categories of
households, non-profit, and government sectors. Thus, in this report, Notional Ideal Revenue is
defined as the standard rate of VAT times the aggregate net final and net GFCF of the household,
non-profit, and government sectors, as recorded in the national accounts (interdependence
among the various concepts presented is shown in Figure A1).13
The Policy Gap is defined as one minus the ratio of the “legal” tax liability (i.e. the chunk of the
Notional Ideal Revenue that, in the counterfactual case of perfect tax compliance, is not collected
due to the presence of exemptions and reduced rates). The Policy Gap is denoted by the following
formula:
The Policy Gap could be further decomposed to account for the loss of revenue. Such components
are the Rate Gap and the Exemption Gap, which capture the loss in VAT liability due to the
application of reduced rates and the loss in liability due to the implementation of exemptions.
The Rate Gap is defined as the difference between the VTTL and what would be obtained in a
counterfactual situation, in which the standard rate, instead of the reduced, parking, and zero
rates, is applied to final consumption. Thus, the Rate Gap captures the loss in revenue that a
particular country incurs by adopting multiple VAT rates instead of a single standard rate (Barbone
et al., 2015).
13
National accounts for most countries report final consumption on a gross (i.e. VAT-inclusive) basis. Net
consumption is estimated on the basis of the gross consumption recorded in the use tables, from which VAT
revenues are subtracted.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
The Exemption Gap is defined as the difference between the VTTL and what would be obtained in
a counterfactual situation, in which the standard rate is applied to exempt products and services,
and no restriction of the right to deduct applies.14 Thus, the Exemption Gap captures the amount
of revenue that might be lost because of exempted goods and services. Note that the Exemption
Gap is composed of the loss in the VAT on the value added of exempt sectors, minus the VAT on
their inputs, minus the VAT on GFCF inputs for these sectors. Thus, in principle, the Exemption
Gap might be positive or negative (if the particular sector had negative value added, or if it had
large GFCF expenditures relative to final consumption) (Barbone et al., 2015).
In algebraic terms, we have the following:
Definitions:
𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿∗,𝐸
𝑇𝑖∗,𝐸 = 𝐶𝑖
𝑖
– effective rate for group i of products in the case where the standard rate instead
of the zero rate, parking rate, or reduced rate is applied (for final consumption and the GFCF of
non-business activities).
𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿∗,𝐸
𝑖 – liability from final consumption GFCF of non-business activities of group i of products,
in the case of the standard rate instead of the zero rate, parking rate, or reduced rate is applied.
Actual liability from intermediate consumption and GFCF of business activities is assumed.
𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿∗,𝑅
𝑇𝑖∗,𝑅 = 𝑖
– effective rate for group i of products in the event where exempt products within
𝐶𝑖
the group are taxed at the standard rate.
𝑉𝑇𝑇𝐿∗,𝑅
𝑖 – liability from final consumption of group i when exempt products within the group are
taxed at the standard rate. Actual liability from final consumption GFCF of non-business activities
is assumed.
𝜏𝑠 – statutory rate.
𝑖 ∈ (1; 65) – sectors of the economy.
Policy Gap:
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑁 ∗
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑁 ∗
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖
1−𝑃 =( )( 𝑁 )=( )
𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖
14
The additive decomposition of the Policy Gap into the Exemption and Rate Gap presented in this report
differs from that in Keen (2013). Keen (2013) defines the Rate Gap as the loss from applying reduced and
zero rates to the final consumption liability, measured as a percentage of the Notional Ideal Revenue. The
Exemption Gap measures unrecovered VAT accumulated in the production process as a percentage, on the
contrary, of final consumption liability. Due to these definitions, the Policy Gap can be split multiplicatively
into gaps attributable to reduced rates and exemptions. Since the numerator of the “[1 - Rate Gap]” and
denominator of the “[1 - Exemption Gap]” are equal, multiplication of these two components yields – VAT
revenue as a percentage Notional Ideal Revenue, which equals “[1 - Policy Gap]” (Barbone et al., 2015).
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Exemption Gap:
∗,𝐸 ∗,𝐸
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝐸 = ( )( 𝑁 )=( )
𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖
Rate Gap:
∗,𝑅 ∗,𝑅
∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑅 = ( )( 𝑁 )=( )
𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 ∑𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖
By definition we have:
𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁
Thus:
∗,𝐸 ∗,𝑅
∑𝑁 ∗
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁 𝑁 ∗
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 − ∑𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 2𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁 𝑁 𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 − ∑𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖 − ∑𝑖=1 𝑇𝑖 𝐶𝑖
𝑃 =1−( )=( )=( )
𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖 𝜏𝑠 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑖
= 𝑃𝑅 + 𝑃𝐸
Using the above convention, one can decompose the Rate Gap and the Exemption Gap into the
components indicating loss of the Notional Ideal Revenue due to the implementation of reduced
rates and exemptions on specific the goods and services. Such additive decomposition is carried
out for the computation of, as defined by Barbone et al. (2015), the Actionable Exempt Gap, which
excludes services and notional values that are unlikely to be taxed even in an ideal world.
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VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Source: own.
page 64 of 72
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
EU-26 (2011-
2013)
1051055 1083057 1095853 1137342 1186869
EU-27 (2014)
EU-27 (2015)
Source: own calculations.
page 65 of 72
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
EU-26 (2011-
2013)
676013 697797 703522 731701 767200
EU-27 (2014)
EU-27 (2015)
Source: own calculations.
page 66 of 72
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
Table B3. Intermediate Consumption and Government VAT Liability (EUR million)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Belgium 7435 7599 7697 7364 7538
Bulgaria 622 644 687 787 748
Czech Republic 3480 3402 3439 3254 3463
Denmark 7354 7673 7575 7671 7837
Germany 42634 43608 44992 46738 47634
Estonia 224 235 249 257 267
Ireland 2967 3461 3253 3666 3669
Greece 2877 2704 2304 2030 2243
Spain 10922 10526 11026 10753 10778
France 25902 27140 27655 28681 29076
Croatia . . . 936 1113
Italy 20279 19815 20378 20548 20463
Cyprus . . . . 443
Latvia 346 343 360 370 388
Lithuania 415 445 407 443 445
Luxembourg 593 606 642 722 938
Hungary 1924 1948 1860 1940 2035
Malta 458 479 511 559 336
Netherlands 12669 12916 13565 13677 13902
Austria 4404 4544 4646 4907 5077
Poland 7035 7118 6933 7344 7700
Portugal 3037 2870 2826 2868 2937
Romania 2787 2860 2755 3189 3096
Slovenia 472 471 490 508 518
Slovakia 1071 1166 1211 1258 1343
Finland 4262 4358 4749 4899 4921
Sweden 10764 11489 11592 11004 11493
United Kingdom 36720 38583 37160 40181 46754
EU-26 (2011-
2013)
211652 217004 218960 226554 237154
EU-27 (2014)
EU-27 (2015)
Source: own calculations.
page 67 of 72
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
EU-26 (2011-
2013)
141539 145354 150226 157235 163454
EU-27 (2014)
EU-27 (2015)
Source: own calculations.
page 68 of 72
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
EU-26 (2011-
2013)
906082 925531 935869 979135 1037354
EU-27 (2014)
EU-27 (2015)
Source: Eurostat.
page 69 of 72
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
EU-26 (2011-
2013)
146983 159538 161997 160220 151530
EU-27 (2014)
EU-27 (2015)
Source: own calculations.
page 70 of 72
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
EU-26 (2011-
2013)
13.98 14.73 14.78 14.09 12.77
EU-27 (2014)
EU-27 (2015)
Source: own calculations.
page 71 of 72
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States
References
Barbone, L., Belkindas, M., Bettendorf L., Bird R., Bonch-Osmolovskiy, M., Smart, M. (2013),
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Barbone, L., Bonch-Osmolovskiy, M., Poniatowski, G. (2014), 2012 Update Report to the Study
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TAXUD/2013/DE/321
Barbone, L., Bonch-Osmolovskiy, M., Poniatowski, G. (2015), 2013 Update Report to the Study
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Poniatowski, G., Bonch-Osmolovskiy, M., Belkindas, M. (2016), 2014 Update Report to the Study
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