Chess and The Art of Negotiation Ancient Rules For Modern Combat PDF

Chess and the Art of
Negotiation:
Ancient Rules for Modern
Combat
Anatoly Karpov and Jean-Francois

Phelizon
with Bachar Kouatly
Praeger
Chess and the Art of Negotiation
Ancient Rules for Modern Combat
Anatoly Karpov and Jean-François Phelizon

with Bachar Kouatly
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Karpov, Anatoly, 1951-
Chess and the art of negotiation : ancient rules for modern combat / Anatoly Karpov
and Jean-François Phelizon with Bachar Kouatly.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–275–99065–6 (alk. paper)
1. Chess. I. Phélizon, Jean François. II. Kouatly, Bachar. III. Title.
GV1449.5.K35 2006
794.1—dc22 2006020994
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available
Copyright © 2006 by Economica
All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be
reproduced, by any process or technique, without the
express written consent of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2006020994
ISBN: 0–275–99065–6
First published in 2006
This is a translation of the original French edition, published as:
Psychologie de la Bataille
©Ed. Economica, 2004
This book also has been translated into chinese as Due Yi © Citic, 2005
Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www.praeger.com
Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this book complies with the

Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984).
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction ix
Prologue: Establish and Maintain a Winning Position 1

Chapter 1: Preparing for Battle 11
Chapter 2: Select a Style and Approach 31

Chapter 3: Indirect Approach: Strength against Strength 53
Chapter 4: Lateral Approach: Playing with Finesse 73
Chapter 5: After Victory, Look Ahead 97

Appendix: World Chess Champions 109
Notes 111
Acknowledgments
We would like to extend our special thanks to Nicholas Philipson, our

editor, for his complete support of this project, and for his constant
encouragement, advice, and guidance. Our deepest appreciation
also goes to Elva Lègére Clements and Dorothy Wackerman for their
editorial comments, and to Christine Hammond for her help with
whatever needed to be done.
Introduction
In this book, two masters in their respective areas of expertise—

Anatoly Karpov, former World Champion and grand chess master,
and Jean-François Phelizon, CEO of Saint-Gobain Corporation—
come together to share their insight into how the ancient game
of chess can be a blueprint for success in today’s business world.
Ever since the game was believed to have been played for
the first time in sixth-century India, chess has been an intellectual
duel employing strategy, tactics, and psychology. Many of the lessons
learned by students of the game can be applied to a variety of business
management scenarios, especially negotiation.
Chess and the Art of Negotiation takes the form of a fascinating
dialogue between Mr. Karpov and Mr. Phelizon, moderated by Bachar
Kouatly, himself an international chess master. In this give-and-take
approach, the reader can get a better insight into the experiences
and thought processes of these experts as they convey both chess and
business theory and real-world applications.
Chess offers executives timeless lessons in a take-charge busi-
ness approach that is aimed at winning. In business, negotiations can
reach the intensity of war, hence the reference to “combat” in the
subtitle. Analogies can be made on many levels, with opposing sides
being called “adversaries” or “opponents,” and approaches being re-
ferred to in military terms such as “frontal,” “oblique,” and “lateral.”
x Introduction
Mr. Phelizon makes numerous references throughout the dialogue

about the strategies of the great Chinese general Sun Tzu, author
of The Art of War, a book studied by nearly every military strategist.
While every parallel cannot be drawn among chess, business, and
combat—the fact that each side starts at an equal advantage on the
chessboard and not in business and battle, for example—many of
the same principles can be applied to each endeavor.
What sets Chess and the Art of Negotiation apart from other
business management books is found in its focus on psychology.
Both chess and business negotiation rely heavily on understanding
the psychology of the opponent as one of the most important keys
to success. Considering the psychological profile of the opponent
and capitalizing on his or her strengths and weaknesses—and under-
standing and dealing with one’s own strengths and weaknesses—will
usually be what distinguishes a successful person in chess, business,
or battle.
The style of a business executive or chess player can differ
widely. There is the confrontational (getting something without giv-
ing in exchange) and the concessionary (being ready to offer some-
thing in exchange for what is wanted) styles. Approaches, as men-
tioned above, can range from direct or frontal (taking no account
of the other’s needs) to indirect or oblique (using the strengths and
weaknesses of the other to one’s advantage) to lateral (making the
opponent negotiate before he even fights). Knowing what style and
approach will work best for each individual situation is essential, such
as working toward a long-term alliance rather than a negotiation with
a single, one-time objective.
By reading Chess and the Art of Negotiation, the reader will find
out
r Why it is always better to negotiate after your opponent has eaten

but you’ve barely touched your meal
r Why it is best to negotiate in your own time zone
r Why humility can win out over ego
r Why you should never go into a fight alone
r How adverse advisors can break a logjam in negotiations
r How to seal the deal before the first word is exchanged
r How La Fontaine’s Fables are invaluable tools to grasping an op-
ponent’s psychological profile
Introduction xi
By implementing the wisdom found in Chess and the Art of

Negotiation, what will the reader gain? Progressing through the topics
of preparation for the battle, choosing the style and approach of the
engagement, and participating in the actual negotiations, and the
aftermath, the reader will be the silent listener to the conversation,
the one who will gain a unique insight into the strategy and tactics of
two men at the top of their game.
PROLOGUE
Establish and Maintain a Winning

Position
Anatoly Karpov’s story. – Jean-François

Phelizon’s career and interests. – Finding
common ground. – Uncertainty in
negotiations and chess. – Putting “battle
logic” into place.
What greater victory can there be than convincing your enemy he cannot win?
Michel de Montaigne
Kouatly – In what way is a chess match like a negotiation? In what

way is a negotiation like a chess match? In either case, what are the
possible approaches? And finally, how is the psychological dimension
inherent in all confrontations taken into account? The following five
informative conversations, led by Anatoly Karpov and Jean-François
Phelizon, try to answer these questions in many ways. First because
they have stories, experiences, and personalities that are very differ-
ent; second because they agree on the conclusions that are the basis
for all tactical action; and finally because they both seem to favor
finesse over force.
Anatoly, your personal story almost reads like a novel.
Karpov – Yes, I started playing chess very young, when I was just a
little boy. First with my father, then with my friends, who often were
four or five years older than I. In the beginning, naturally, I was far
from thinking about a world championship title, but I loved chess
and I could play day and night, hours and hours on end.
I think the first book I owned was about chess. I was eight years
old and it was a book written by the great Cuban player Capablanca.1
I was already a second-level player, almost first level. It probably seems
strange today, but in 1959 it was extremely difficult to get books in
Zlatoust, the town where I lived, especially books about chess.
Kouatly – That was the time of Gosplan2 . . .
3
4 Chess and the Art of Negotiation
Karpov – Yes, it was still Gosplan. In order to find books on chess, you
had to go to Chelyabinsk, the capital of Southern Oural province.
But bookstores only received a few at a time and they were always out
of stock, because there were so many chess amateurs.
At nine, I was already the best player in Zlatoust. I was sent
to the Botvinnik3 School. Of the seven students who were enrolled
at this school, some of whom were older, I was without argument
the one with the most determination and energy. I would often play
all night until 7:00 in the morning and still get to the first class at
10:00 am, bright-eyed and rested.
The first time I traveled abroad was in 1966 and I was fifteen.
I had the opportunity to participate in a match in Sweden and we
traveled in a group. The same year I also went to Groningen in
Holland but this time alone. I could barely speak English and it was
quite an adventure.
Back then, you couldn’t just leave the country. You needed an
authorization from the Sports Ministry and the Protocol Department.
I had been given a passport with a visa and some travelers’ checks
drawn on a Russian bank. But no one in Holland wanted them and it
was merely by coincidence that I found the only Dutch bank willing
to cash them. I got on the Moscow-to-London train, which made a
stop at Amersfoort, where I was supposed to change trains. But what
train should I take? Groningen wasn’t posted anywhere. I was all
alone on the platform, hopeless and lost. Finally, someone put me
on a train and told me to “change in Zwolle.” I still remember it. And
there again I was completely lost. Finally, I managed to arrive at my
destination.
Kouatly – How were you able to secure championship matches?
Karpov – Well, it wasn’t easy. At that time, there were many great chess
players in the U.S.S.R. and not a lot of room for new talent. Coming
from deep Russia, I had no backing. I had to start by becoming an
international master.
In 1968, I entered the University of Moscow, and in 1969 I
won my first tournament. That same year, I qualified for the World
Junior Chess Championship, where I came in first. I remember that
my trainer, someone with good sense, said to me, “Anatoly, because
you play very well, you have become an international master, but
Establish and Maintain a Winning Position 5
there is still more road to travel before becoming a grand master.

You can get there, but you must go step by step.” He then got me
interviews with people at the Ministry of Sports.
Kouatly – Maybe you should specify that in the U.S.S.R., chess has
always been considered a sport.
Karpov – Yes, it is considered a sport just like swimming, gymnastics,

or weight lifting. One day in August 1969, I asked to participate in
a tournament organized by IBM that was to be held in Amsterdam
in July 1970. A few weeks later, I was seen by the Sports Minister. He
was holding a little notebook that he briefly consulted and then said
to me, “No one is yet signed up for this tournament, so we can put
your name down.” I was ecstatic.
Unfortunately, in the spring of 1970 I received a phone call
from one of the minister’s people telling me that “Spassky4 will be
playing in Amsterdam and you will not be part of his team.”
At the same time, Venezuela sent me an invitation to a tour-
nament that hadn’t been planned in the budget. So the first re-
sponse from the Ministry of Sports was that no one from the U.S.S.R.
would participate. But [Alexei] Kosygin had signed an agreement
with Venezuela promoting cooperation in the areas of sports and
culture. At that time I was living in Leningrad, a city from which it
was very difficult to obtain travel authorization out of the U.S.S.R.
The first time I requested permission to go to Venezuela, the Com-
mission replied that they didn’t know who I was and that I would
need to stay at least a year in Leningrad before they would consider
my application.
In Moscow, the Ministry of Sports had approved my request
and had even obtained a visa for me. But the Leningrad Commission
still had to give the green light for my travel, which it categorically
refused to do.
Everything was at a standstill. The whole affair, as I learned
later, went all the way up to Kosygin, who called the minister and
said, “What is going on at your ministry? We just signed an agree-
ment with Venezuela and they’re telling me that the U.S.S.R. won’t
send any representatives to a tournament that they’re organizing?”
The minister answered, “Leningrad is creating the road block. The
Commission doesn’t want to give Karpov his exit authorization.” So
Kosygin simply said, “Forget Leningrad and send Karpov,” and I got
my authorization the very next morning!
Kouatly – And that’s how your international career started.
Karpov – It was in Caracas that I became an international grand mas-

ter. I was the youngest ever. From then on in Russia I was considered a
rising star. In any case, I never had any trouble after that participating
in tournaments abroad. In 1971, I won two important tournaments,
Moscow and Hastings, and continued to progress up the classifi-
cation ranks. After that, I played against Polugaevsky, Spassky, and
Korchnoi.5
Finally I became the second-ranked player in the world on
February 28, 1973, and world champion on April 3, 1975, after
Fischer refused to defend his title. Naturally, as world champion
my life completely changed, because in the U.S.S.R. the authorities
have always considered chess as one of the most prestigious sports.
Kouatly – Jean-François, you’re not a chess master, but you do have

much experience in the business world. You’ve also led many theo-
retical discussions on strategy.
Phelizon – Compared to Anatoly, my story is much less involved. On

a personal level I lived many years in foreign countries. I spent most
of my childhood in South America and I’ve also lived in Tunisia,
Spain, and the United States, where I currently reside. My academic
training is both in economics and science.
For years I was fascinated by information technology. I bought
my first computer at the end of the 1970s before the advent of mi-
crotechnology. It was an old PDP8 that the computer department of
an automobile manufacturer had sold me by weight instead of throw-
ing it away. My family still remembers this monument that towered
in the foyer and on which my children practiced their biorhythms. It
consumed huge amounts of electricity and it couldn’t be used at the
same time as other home appliances. Should I admit that the correct
resolution of research algorithms took priority? Thirty years later,
I’m still not sure my family has forgiven me for all the interrupted
clothes washings!
On a professional level, as the CFO and then Senior Vice
President of one of the major French industrial groups, I’ve been
fortunate to conduct important negotiations dealing mainly with di-

vestitures or acquisitions. So, I have lived through those special times
in a manager’s life when surrounded by his team and trying to reach
a certain goal. In some cases, it is a goal that could involve billions of
euros. In those situations, you must reach agreement on dozens and
dozens of items that are part of the transaction, and obviously you
need to mobilize all your intellectual and tactical resources.
Finally, and this is almost another life, I am the author of a
few books dealing with strategy—that is to say, strategy in general. As
such, I’ve studied in depth the great theoreticians of strategic and
tactical action, from Sun Tzu to Von Clausewitz and from Foch to
Liddell Hart.6 What impressed me most is without a doubt Sun Tzu,
the great Chinese general who lived during the troubled time of the
Springs and Autumns.7 I’ve reread his little book The Art of War over
and over—–and even published an annotated translation. I’m also
fond of another Chinese text, the Thirty Six Stratagems, which is less
well known than Sun Tzu’s but throws light in a very special way on
the ins and outs of tactical action. In reality, The Art of War is to Thirty
Six Stratagems what strategy is to tactics.
Kouatly – One evening, about a year ago, the three of us met at Jean
Pavlevski’s, the president and founder of Economica. It was at the end
of dinner that Jean-François threw out the idea of this book on the
“psychology of battle.” What did you have in mind?
Phelizon – For a long time, I had noticed that there was an abundance
of literature on the technique of chess, but there didn’t seem to be
anything on the psychology of the game. And in my opinion, Anatoly
is the one grand champion chess player who is the master of its
psychological aspect. For my part, I had always noticed that in the
business world and more broadly in all negotiations, it’s precisely
the psychological aspects that are the most important. Actually, all
negotiations are a “game” just like a chess match. By game, I mean
that the universe of negotiation is closer to the world of chess than of
war. Both adversaries must follow a certain number of rules. This is
not the case in war where most normal rules are abolished and where
an imperative need to kill is invoked.
That is why the term “economic warfare” seems to me to
be totally inappropriate. In the business world, naturally there is
fighting, but there is no war. Consequently, you should never consider
your adversary an enemy. A negotiation will never come to fruition

as long as a common ground of understanding with the other party
cannot be found. This point can never be forgotten.
So, a negotiator will have no hesitation resorting to the
Japanese concept of nemawashi.8 He knows how to create personal
relationships with the participants so he can establish, sometimes
informally, as many points of agreement as possible.
Incidentally, it is good to prepare topics of conversation for
the break periods. Topics are endless: studies, family, vacation, cars,
even golf. You have a better chance of succeeding by engaging your
adversary in conversation than by being condescending and aloof.
You should also make an effort to appear approachable. You should
open up somewhat to elicit a little friendship; however, not so much
that you seem transparent.
Karpov – It is clear that chess is not a model for the military world,
the business world, or the political world. Why? Because in chess,
the pieces always start from the same positions. Consequently, each
player’s chances of winning are more or less the same. His skill and
ability will make the difference. In the real world, however, it is
extremely rare to find a balanced starting situation where the chances
of winning for both parties are about equal.
That being said, the study of the psychology of chess can offer
useful parallels in general to someone in business or politics. First,
the number of possible combinations in chess is immense.9 Even the
most powerful computers cannot calculate all the variations. That
is how things are in real life. The combinations are infinite and
situations cannot be reduced to equations. Chess is not a science but
an art. Or, as I often say, chess is “an art, a science, and a sport.”
A second similarity between chess and the business world re-
lates to the uncertainty that the protagonists face with the future. At
some point during the confrontation, the adversary holds a decisive
advantage. But, his attention might drift; he might lose concentra-
tion. Actually, he believes in his heart that the game is over. But as we
were discussing, anything can happen until the score sheet is signed.
In other words, even when victory is only moments away, nothing is
assured.
Phelizon – Yes, everyone knows that it’s the last 100 meters of a race
that are the hardest to run.
A GAME THAT BELONGS TO ALL10

It’s true that I knew firsthand the mysterious attraction of this royal game, the only
game invented by man that escapes the tyranny of accident, the only one where you
owe your victory to your intelligence only, or more precisely, to a form of intelligence.
But isn’t it highly unfair to call chess a game? Isn’t it also a science, an art, or something
else that, like the coffin of Mahomet between heaven and earth, is suspended between
one and the other, and embraces an incredible number of contradictions?
Its origin is lost in the dawn of time, but is forever new. Its process is
mechanical, but only shows results thanks to the imagination; it is closely limited by
a fixed geometric space but its combinations are limitless. It follows a continuous
development but stays sterile; it’s a thought that leads nowhere, mathematics that
establish nothing, an art that leaves no work, an architecture without matter. Yet is
more durable, in its way, than books, or any other monument, this singular game for
all people and all times, a gift from which god no one knows, to alleviate boredom, to
sharpen the spirit, and to stimulate the soul.
Where does it begin, and where does it end? A child can learn the basic rules,
a neophyte can try his hand at it and within the limited square of the board acquire
a unique kind of mastery if he has received the special gift. Patience, a sudden vision,
and technique join in very specific proportions to make discoveries, as in mathematics,
poetry, or music—by perhaps simply mixing them a different way.
In a negotiation, it isn’t the signing of the agreement that

represents the last 100 meters but the cashing of the check. That’s
why a transaction cannot be deemed concluded until payment has
been made.
Karpov – I would like to mention a third point. On a chessboard in

each camp, there are thirty-two pieces of unequal value. The pawns
don’t look like much and often they are considered of negligible
importance. These pieces however are very precious; they are the
soul of chess as Philidor11 used to say.
They defend and support more prestigious pieces like the
bishop or the knight, who in turn support and defend the king and
the queen.
But aren’t there pawns in everyday life? Don’t they support
the intermediate levels, and finally the entire command structure?
I think so. And I think that the position of the king depends on
whether the positions of the pawns are strong or not.
Kouatly – In real life, it is true that the pawns often make the differ-
ence.
Karpov – Well, in any case, they’re the ones who do all the work.
Phelizon – In chess as in any negotiation process, the goal is to put in

place the elements of a “battle logic.” Tactics in the end are universal.
Or more accurately, it transcends disciplines and situations. But this
logic responds to other, more emotional considerations like the pro-
tagonists’ temperaments, what they like and dislike, or the strategists’
desire to successfully implement the strategies they’ve defined.
Which means, parenthetically, that if software programs can
in some instances help make a decision, they are certainly insuffi-
cient, for they cannot grasp what I call the “psychological profile of
the opponent.” Actually, it is almost impossible to win a battle or lead
a negotiation without first making the effort to understand what your
opponent wants.
Karpov – Yes, it seems to me that as important as it is, an analysis

of the conflict is not enough to win. It is absolutely necessary—of
that I’m sure—but the mechanics of a battle cannot be rationalized
100 percent.
Kouatly – Of course, everyday life isn’t the same thing as a game of

chess. However, there are more similarities than differences in how
to fight a chess game and negotiate an agreement, or more generally
lead a battle.
This little book aims to show the importance of psychological
factors in confrontational situations. We will start by discussing the
battle preparation phase. Then we will study the different possible
approaches: the power approach, direct or indirect, and the lateral
approach. Finally, we will explore what comes after the battle.
Naturally, Anatoly and Jean-François won’t be discussing the
psychology of battle strictly from a theoretical viewpoint. They will
constantly refer to concrete experiences or famous examples from
the history of chess, literature, or history in general.
CHAPTER 1
Preparing for Battle
Physical preparation: eat, sleep, exercise, stay

local. – Preparing intellectually. – Know the
opponent’s history, psychological profile. – Make a
list of absolute priorities. – Don’t go into it alone.
– Neutralize the opponent’s advantages. –
Advancing on the road to agreement. – Scoring
early success. – Effect of surprise. – Role of time in
play and negotiations.
Researching facts is the nerve of all negotiation.
Richard M. Nixon
Kouatly – Before thinking about going to battle, you must first pre-
pare. The same applies to negotiating. You must be prepared. Should
the importance of preparation be proportionate to the size of the
stakes?
Phelizon – Unfortunately, the higher the stakes, the more responsi-

bility you are usually carrying. Therefore you often have less time to
get prepared. A major negotiation always comes in addition to all the
other myriad routine items that still need to be dealt with, even after
delegating as much as possible, of course.
In the business world, it is very common that the main nego-
tiator holds a very important position within his company: he’s the
CEO or CFO. That isn’t good, since it means that he can’t concen-
trate 100 percent on what he’s doing. Naturally, he has other things
on his mind: managers to meet, investment decisions to make, plants
to visit, results to publish, analysts to convince, etc. Ideally, a negoti-
ation should be the negotiator’s full-time job. But he should hold a
position of enough responsibility that he can speak for his company.
Kouatly – Anatoly, how do you physically prepare for a tournament?

Are you careful about your sleeping requirements, your nutrition?
Karpov – Physical preparation is extremely important for a chess

player and—I suspect also—in the worlds of business and politics.
13
I am often surprised at how little attention businesspeople or diplo-

mats devote to this aspect of physical preparation. In all these are-
nas, they need to concentrate for long periods of time in difficult
and sometimes hostile environments. Only a perfectly fit person can
stand such concentration under that kind of pressure.
In the chess world, I think that Botvinnik was the first one to
stress the importance of physical preparation before a tournament.
Throughout his entire life, Botvinnik took great care of himself.
Fortunately, he enjoyed excellent health and his form was dazzling.
He was still world champion at forty-six.
During the 1950s, being concerned with physical preparation
was a brand new concept. Fortunately, medicine quickly supported
this sport of chess. Scientists started doing tests during the Tel Aviv
chess tournaments and continued during the Tokyo chess tourna-
ments. They were quite surprised to see that the Russian chess team
was very athletic and was in excellent health. Even if the players didn’t
excel at any particular sport, they all jogged, worked out, skied, swam,
and did gymnastics. For myself, I ski, swim, and do gymnastics. I also
started playing tennis.
Kouatly – So, the scientists realized that the better physical condition
the player is in, the better his chances of winning tournaments. Has
the same realization been made in business?
Phelizon – No, doctors don’t perform this type of study and gyms are
not a common sight in most corporate locations—except maybe in
California. There must be, however, a correlation between physical
condition and performance, especially when dealing with a difficult
negotiation. Since all essentially intellectual battles play out also on
the physical level, you can only recommend to a negotiating team to
drink little, get enough sleep, reduce caffeine consumption, and, if
possible, get some exercise.
Let’s not forget that “wearing out the opponent” is an effective
tactic that deserves consideration. History has lost count of the num-
ber of defeats that are the direct result of the exhaustion of the
leaders or their troops. On that issue, the repeated effects of jet lag
can turn out to be disastrous. Anyone can see that an “intercontinen-
tal” negotiation (and by that I mean one between an American team
and a European or Asian team) takes a completely different course
depending on whether the meetings always take place at the same
location or not. For example, if every week an American team must
Preparing for Battle 15
spend a day negotiating in Europe, it will eventually concede more

to the opposing team than if the meeting locations alternate be-
tween Europe and the United States. So, not coincidentally, English
bankers insist that all meetings take place in London.
If you want to acquire a company in Europe and you are based
in the United States, try to cross the Atlantic as little as possible. Ask
your opposing negotiating team to come to the United States. If they
accept, don’t hesitate to entertain them at the finest restaurants. You
will reap the benefits. If they refuse, then just tell them that to be fair,
the location of the meetings should alternate. Naturally, you should
try to negotiate the points that are important to you when you have
the home advantage. This way you will have at least created a certain
balance between the teams.
Of course, if you agree to always travel, you will be handi-
capping yourself. It’s easy to imagine the physical condition of the
American who after eight or ten hours of flight and six or eight hours
of time zone difference arrives in Europe and sits down immediately
to the negotiating table—or in front of a chessboard.
Karpov – Naturally, he’s completely out of it. He eats anything and

drinks cup after cup of coffee to keep going. But coffee isn’t enough
to remain alert. After this type of treatment, a person doesn’t really
know where he is. He can even have trouble correctly appreciating
the situation in which he finds himself.
Phelizon – Let me add that it’s always better to negotiate after a meal.
By this, I mean a meal where your opponent eats and drinks well,
whereas you have barely sipped at your wine. Anyone will notice
that ideas are clearer when you’re hungry and that you’re more
aggressive. Conversely, you are more flexible after a good meal and
less likely to want to fight.
Karpov – One day, I was playing a match in London and the orga-
nizers had invited Margaret Thatcher to the opening ceremony. She
and I had the chance to talk for a few moments. She told me that the
most difficult political debates she had were in Parliament and she
added, “When I go to Parliament, I never eat a thing. In the morning
I have a cup of coffee or tea. I concentrate better and my reactions
are quicker when on an empty stomach.”
In chess, a game can last a long time (five hours, for example).
You must always remember that if you eat too much before the game,
your game will not be very aggressive, especially at the beginning. On

the other hand, if you don’t eat enough, you risk losing your abilities
by the end of the match, for lack of energy.
Kouatly – Fighting a battle demands patience, determination, en-

durance (hence the importance of physical conditioning)—and a
certain sense of humor. But physical preparation isn’t enough. You
must also prepare intellectually, which is much more difficult.
Karpov – Intellectual preparation for chess is difficult and compli-

cated. Many different factors come into play because the players
themselves are very different from each other. The most important
point concerns information in general. First, you need to know ev-
erything going on in the world of chess. Only then can you establish
your repertoire of openings and decide which positions are favorable
for you and not your opponent.
It’s strange, but sometimes you start a game without giving
yourself all the advantages. For example, your right wing (the king’s
wing) may be excellent but so is your opponent’s left wing (the
queen’s wing) and you find yourself almost even again. That’s when
you feel like concentrating on a different area of the game, where
you think your opponent isn’t as strong as you are. Your position
may not be ideal, but you feel it’s better than his. You can’t consider
this change of tactic without having deeply studied your opponent’s
game and habits, as well as the history of your own games as well.
This entire preparation phase amounts to what Jean-François
called the opponent’s “psychological profile.” Then it’s up to you to
adapt to this portrait using your own talents. In the final analysis,
you must define your game plan, as much by using some of the
teachings that have impressed you as by the adverse reactions you
can anticipate.
THE GAME PLAN1

At the core of chess strategy is what is called the game plan. It is difficult to play a
game calculating only one or two moves in advance. From the opening, the player has
a specified game plan for a specified time and tries to stick to it.
Circumstances and situation changes on the board force him to correct the
initial plan, sometimes giving it up to adopt another plan. Normally, you change plans
when you go from one stage of a game to another, especially when you get to the final
moves.
Practice shows that the chosen opening determines the game plan, or more
precisely, the structure of the pawns at the beginning. The realization of this plan
comes in the middle of the game. Usually, you have a separate plan for the final moves.
Therefore, the plan plays an important role: it is the link between the opening and the
middle of the game.
In order to have a successful strategy in chess, or as it’s called

a positional game, you must know how to choose an action plan, move
your pieces precisely, and anticipate the moves to come.
As to tactics, or combination game, the player is faced with
localized confrontations. The precise analysis of the variables, a clear
understanding of the position, and the possession of an arsenal of
technical means then take on their full importance.
Kouatly – Of course, your opponent might also be tempted to put

together your psychological profile.
Karpov – You should definitely assume that he is doing the same

analysis on you as you have done on him. So, he could certainly
guess what you plan to do. But if he stresses you or puts you under
pressure, you will need to adapt, modify your tactical moves, and
perhaps even change your game plan. The decisions you then make
should be based on your knowledge of your opponent’s psychological
profile.
Phelizon – Being prepared is compiling facts, believing in principles,

and establishing priorities. Compiling facts means not just numbers
but an intimate knowledge of the opponent: his motivation, his or-
ganization, his likely objectives. Believing in principles shouldn’t
be confused with taking a position. Groucho Marx used to say,
“Here are my principles. If you don’t like them, I can change.” You
shouldn’t fall into that trap. Pragmatism applies to tactical positions
and moves. Principles should remain unchanged and always indicate
the path you follow. Priorities can only be established in relation to
principles.
Before starting to negotiate, you should make two lists: one
with points you won’t relinquish under any circumstance, and one
with points that you want to obtain from the opponent. The first
list contains absolute priorities, which if not satisfied, become deal

breakers. The second list contains negotiable priorities. Absolute
priorities are often satisfied by easing up on the negotiable priorities.
When preparing mentally, you must let go of all arrogance
and all naı̈veté. To be humble to the experience is truly the supreme
commandment of the mind. Let’s remember La Fontaine making
fun of that arrogant and naı̈ve rooster: “I think this is a fine pearl,”
he says as he shows it to the jeweler, “but the smallest grain of wheat
would be more to my liking.”2 It is simply preferable not to go into
battle when you think you know. To be content to think you know
can be fatal. So, preparing mentally means being sure, sure of the
opponent’s situation, his positions, and intentions.
Kouatly – Can you sometimes overestimate your opponent?
Phelizon – Yes, of course. When I say be sure, I should specify, be sure

of the actual strengths of the situation and the motivations in play.
Nothing is worse than a false certainty. It can make you commit the
most serious mistakes. Therefore, never forget that the other party
may not be as well prepared as you are. That perhaps he doesn’t know
you as well as you think. That his vision of priorities and objectives
may not be as clear as yours.
Kouatly – But all the certainties you mention refer mostly to the past.
Phelizon – Yes and knowing past facts, obviously, is not enough. But
who would buy a company without doing an in-depth due diligence?
Who would wage a battle without checking to see how the oppo-
nent’s forces are aligned? Who would start a fight without consider-
ing the strengths or weaknesses of the opponent? Jesse Unruh, one of
Richard Nixon’s political adversaries, was the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and would often say that money is the nerve of pol-
itics. “Well,” said Nixon one day, “I would like to paraphrase Jesse and
say that researching facts is the nerve of all negotiation.”3 In reality,
if mental preparation can help determine the strength you’re facing,
as precisely as possible, on all levels, it will minimize any potential
effect of surprise by your opponent.
Kouatly – Let’s assume that you are determined not to let yourself be
led by your ego. Therefore you are not obsessed with being right.
You know the objective you’re going after. You’re familiar with not
only your research, but also with what motivates the person you’re
speaking with and how the opposing organization functions. You
have a clear vision of your principles and priorities. Finally, you’ve
created two lists: one for required elements and one for desired
elements. Are you ready?
Karpov – No, not yet, because you never go into the fight alone. A
back room is always necessary. In the past, at world championships,
the support teams were made up of a half-dozen technicians whose
job it was to analyze the games and do research. But I was an innovator
and added a cook and a psychologist. I thought that the cook was
an important element to the team, not only because championships
lasted a long time (two or three months), but also because analysis
and research can take place at all hours of the day or night. You also
have to factor in the time zone difference and the vagaries of hotel
cooking that more often than not is absolutely inadequate. The cook
therefore was supposed to satisfy all the culinary needs of the team,
at any time, at their request.
Naturally, the first time I asked to include a cook on the team
(it was for a championship that I was playing in the Philippines), I
had some difficulty justifying it to the Soviet administration. After
much discussion with the Federation and the Ministry of Sport, an
inspector finally came to Manila to see the situation for himself. He
noted that I had a comfortable apartment in a five-star hotel, and
that the hotel had a Japanese restaurant, a Filipino restaurant, and
even a French restaurant.
“So, why do you need to add a cook?” he asked, a little an-
noyed. I told him that the food at the hotel was excellent for inspec-
tors and tourists but that it didn’t suit people who were playing a
world chess championship. “In addition,” I said, “the hour before a
game is very important. You need extreme concentration. You can’t
be wasting energy calling back room service that hasn’t arrived.” And
I prevailed.
Kouatly – Why add a psychologist?
Karpov – This was in 1974 in Moscow. Viktor Korchnoi, a player I

knew well, was my opponent. I knew that it was very important for
him to feel that he had an “advantage.” But what was this advantage?
During the third game, I realized that someone in the crowd

kept staring at me. I had no idea what his strange looks meant. But
I could feel this man looking at me all the time, when I played,
when I was thinking, when I got up, and when I walked around the
stage. After the game, I asked my trainer who this strange person was
who had almost disrupted me. He responded that it was Korchnoi’s
psychologist.
I immediately decided that I had to neutralize this “advan-
tage” Korchnoi had given himself. I decided to incorporate a psy-
chologist in my team also. I called my doctor in Leningrad. He said
my request wouldn’t be easy to satisfy. Then, he remembered that
among his friends when he was a medical student, there was one
who became a psychologist and was assisting Russian cosmonauts. “I
think he works on sleep disorders.” He added, “He’s a real scientist.
He lives in Moscow.” I asked him to get in contact with him, which
he did. The following day, the psychologist called me. I spoke with
him at length and he agreed to join us without delay.
Obviously, it wasn’t really for me that I added this new advi-
sor. Psychologically speaking, I am solid. It was more to show Korch-
noi that by covering this psychological component he had lost his
“advantage.”
Since then, my psychologist has attended many of my matches
and has become very well known in the chess world.
Kouatly – It has often been said that Korchnoi employed not only
psychologists but also parapsychologists.
Karpov – Yes, but I don’t think they were very useful to him. In any
case, I’ve never had any use for that kind of person.
Kouatly – Are there also psychologists on mergers and acquisitions

negotiating teams?
Phelizon – No, absolutely not, but perhaps that’s a shame. Naturally,

all negotiators are supposed to use psychology to some extent, but
how much? It probably would be a very good idea to ask a professional
who is adept at observing and deciphering behavior to report to the
negotiating team leader between sessions: to tell him how his offer
is received, if he feels the opponent is bluffing, how he sees the roles
being played out within the opposing team. I can imagine the benefit
he could bring, not only in assisting but in creating a certain unease

within the other team. I like this idea and maybe someday I can
test it.
Kouatly – It would be a good example of cross fertilization between

the business world and the chess world, but in your opinion what is
the ideal composition of the usual back office?
Phelizon – I would say that the ideal team is made up of an advisor

(someone who is trustworthy and challenging or who can interject
common sense), accountants able to pick apart not only what the
finance department has recorded, but all the rest (contingent and
off balance sheet), a business lawyer backed by a solid technical team,
and a banker, especially if there are financing problems (often the
advisor is the lawyer or the banker).
But, putting together a good team isn’t enough. You must also
observe the opposing team and even “tag” them. And you should
never forget that your best potential ally is the opposing team’s
advisor.
Kouatly – What do you mean by that?
Phelizon – Sometimes the negotiating process gets blocked. Neither

side is willing to budge from its position and everything is at a stand-
still. They might even have realized they faced a serious disagree-
ment. A good way to unblock the situation is for one of the advisors
to send a message to his counterpart saying something like, “If your
client would be willing to accept this point of contention, then per-
haps mine would be willing to let go of this one.” These unofficial
exchanges are very important because they help determine what is
essential to the opposing party, or better, to understand what they’ll
never accept.
Kouatly – All combat follows rules—and if possible, the rules are

accepted by both sides. By that I mean written rules, naturally, but
also other implicit rules, often imposed by the players themselves.
Karpov – The rules specific to chess are obviously known to all. What
is less known, however, are the rules governing tournaments, and
some of these are more or less explicit.
In world championships there are always many details to settle

between the two players. One of the camps will sometimes even try to
modify the rules to their advantage. That was the case with Fischer,
who tried a little too often to change tournament rules.4 In 1975 in
particular, since he likes tropical countries, he wanted a Southeast
Asian country, the Philippines, to host the championships. He must
have known how allergic I am to hot and humid climates. He also
insisted that the reigning world champion need only hold a two-point
difference with the challenger to keep his title. Obviously, this wasn’t
acceptable and since he dug into his position, the championship did
not take place and he lost his title.
Kouatly – I think once in Reykjavik, Fischer was so suspicious that he

insisted on opening the envelopes determining the color choice for
the first game. After that he continued to make diva-like requests,
from details on the strength of the indirect lighting to emptying the
first nine rows because the spectators bothered him.
Phelizon – The business world also has its rules. And I don’t just mean
the laws and regulations that are imposed on all business leaders. But
rather, I would like to elaborate a little on the implicit rules that all
parties present in a negotiation usually respect.
Negotiating is advancing on the road to agreement. But an
agreement isn’t reduced to a “yes” or a “no.” It’s made up of all kinds
of clauses. One of the first implicit rules is that you do not renege on
a point that has been accepted. At the very least, it would be unfair.
The second rule is more of an ethics consideration. There
exists a business ethic where some things are not acceptable. Some
of the things that are strictly forbidden by the code of ethics and
in general by the establishment are as follows: conducting fictitious
negotiations to obtain information; stealing plans or confidential
documents; and spying on the offices or homes of your opponent,
thereby threatening his privacy. In most Western countries, these
actions are severely dealt with by courts of law.
I would like to add something that is often forgotten: when
you are the seller, usually you can only modify the asking price down-
ward. And when you are the buyer, usually you can only modify the
purchase price upward. To deviate from this common sense attitude
would not be negotiating in good faith and could certainly constitute
a deal breaker.
Apart from this commonly accepted ethical code, all else is

fair game, naturally. Among accepted practices would be speaking
with the clients and suppliers of the other company, analyzing the
quality of its products and services, studying financial reports and
research documents, or even “turning” some of its managers.
THE MOMENT THE ACCOMPLISHED PLAYER AWAITS5

Negotiations always start with a period of great confusion. The outcome is far from
certain—each party tries to obtain a lot and asks for more than is reasonable with the
expectation of having to give up some things in the future. Various demands come to
light, whose only purpose is to test the opponent’s position. It is only after a time,
when the main thrusts of the parties present are exposed, that a clearer and much
more delicate phase begins, one during which the outcome will be decided. Everyone
has already given up what they were resigned to lose and refused what they were
determined not to accept at any price. All that remains is the loose and imprecise
problem of the other issues that will be shared. This is the moment the accomplished
player waits for.
Kouatly – Do the rules apply equally to both parties present?
Phelizon – Usually, yes. But what Anatoly was saying about Fischer can
also be seen in some negotiations. By that I mean the upper hand
that some sides try to gain by making demands. When the owner of
a business enters into a discussion with the representatives of a tech
company, both parties are not really playing on the same field. That’s
how when Nelson Pelz sold Triangle to Péchiney or Barry Diller sold
USA Networks to Vivendi, the natural advantage of a member of the
“jet set” over an ordinary salaried manager probably biased certain
behaviors. It is true that deals were made, but the sellers definitely
had the advantage.
When one side is in a position to dazzle the other with yachts
and private jets, you can’t really say that the rules of the game are
even.
Kouatly – This is the heart of the psychological aspect of battle.

Doesn’t the one who succeeds in “impressing” the other have victory
in sight?
Karpov – In chess, we say that the hardest thing to establish and main-
tain is a “winning position.” It’s hard to maintain because a reversal
of the situation is always possible. If you hesitate to take advantage
of a winning position, your opponent can take the advantage back,
especially by regrouping his forces to the rear. That’s when you run
the risk of losing your advantage.
Phelizon – In the business world, the advantage an opponent takes

over the other can be the result of different factors. I mentioned
personal fortune, which might make the most seasoned executives
lose their head. Experience is another important factor. I would like
to tell the story of the aborted meeting which took place at the
beginning of 1939, between a French-British delegation and a Soviet
delegation. Had this meeting been successful, the U.S.S.R. might
have entered World War II long before 1942.
These are the words of General Beaufre: “The Soviet delega-
tion, used to working in committees through its government role in
the Russian state, had much more experience in the kind of nego-
tiating in which we were about to engage. It was noticeable at the
very first session, where Marshal Vorochilov6 immediately asked a
few questions relating to process: agenda, presidency, minutes, pow-
ers; all issues well known to the Russians and to which it appeared
we had given no thought. Therefore, we agreed to all his proposals.
This was all strictly routine, but Vorochilov, already quite at ease, was
emerging as the leader of the discussions.
The question of verification of powers gave him another
chance to score a success. He rose and solemnly read a document in-
dicating that the Soviet mission had the power to sign military treaties
for peace and against aggression; he then asked the other heads of
mission to present their powers. General Doumenc presented his
mission orders indicating that he was authorized to treat all military
issues. This vague expression fortunately contained the word ‘treat,’
which in a larger sense could seem to have the same value as Marshal
Vorochilov’s powers.
When it came to Admiral Drax, he had to admit after much
hesitation that he had no written powers, but that it must seem
evident to Marshal Vorochilov that the British government wouldn’t
have sent him without any real powers, even though he actually had
no document.”
This story shows once more that if both parties are not on
equal footing, the negotiation can only be biased.
Kouatly – We have seen that an upper hand can give the decisive
advantage. Surprise can also. As the saying goes, “A surprised man is
a man half defeated.”
Phelizon – It is undeniable that an attack is more efficient when cou-

pled with the effect of surprise. Napoleon would not have won the bat-
tle of Austerlitz without the surprise effect caused by Murat’s charge.
It is also clear what effect a surprise attack can have on public opinion.
I am reminded of Pearl Harbor or the terrorist attack on September
11, 2001, in New York. The same applies to the business world. If you
say to one of your competitors from the onset, “Name your price. I’m
going to buy you regardless,” that can have more effect than subtle
and lengthy approach maneuvers.
Let’s say that surprise, because it disorients the opponent,
acts as a catalyst to victory.
Kouatly – Can a surprise be impromptu or does it need to be carefully

prepared?
Karpov – It should be prepared well in advance and kept a secret. I

remember in 1987 in Seville, Kasparov used an opening that I wasn’t
expecting but that I knew well, having prepared a variation of it a few
years earlier. Strangely enough, Kasparov must have been surprised,
judging by the fact that he thought for over an hour and a half for
the first ten moves.
Phelizon – I would like to refer for a moment to the Chinese tradi-

tion that distinguishes ordinary strength (zheng) from extraordinary
strength (qi)7 . The first one enables you to contain your adversary—
for example by encircling him—and the second one to distract him—
for example by flanking him. A zheng move is relatively predictable.
It conforms to the order of things. But a qi move is unpredictable,
surprising, or contrary to the norm.
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu suggests attacking with the zheng
and winning with the qi. For him, diversion moves are almost always
required and you must always have some in reserve. These are the
moves that enable you to deal the winning blow, right where the
opponent feels no threat or is not prepared. Sun Tzu compares the
two forces, zheng and qi, to two intertwined rings. “Who can say,” he
writes, “where one starts and the other ends?”8
Therefore, the interchangeable use of these strengths offers

an infinite variety of possibilities. Surprise can also come from an
attack in force that the enemy considers unlikely. But this combina-
tion of strengths has consequences on how to conduct a battle; even
when you consider a frontal attack, you must always carefully prepare
for one or more diversion moves.
Kouatly – How can you create a surprise effect in chess when every-
thing is “on the table”?
Karpov – You can create a surprise, for example, by choosing a dis-

concerting opening. I must explain the word “disconcerting.” Expe-
rienced chess players know all the possible openings and there are
no new ones. But they prefer some to others. This means they have
their little habits, which of course are well known to their opponents.
The surprise can come precisely from the fact that you’ve added a
variation to your usual repertoire of opening moves. You can use it
knowing that it will “displease” your opponent. By showing him that
you are well aware of what he likes and doesn’t like, you have a good
chance of taking him by surprise.
Naturally, if you’ve prepared something new, you must know
how to choose your moment: when everyone is a little tired, when
the teams need rest, etc. By creating surprise, you will force the team
to analyze at the worst possible moment what you intend to do. Is
this a new strategy you’re implementing? Is this a diversion move? Is
it merely a move designed to provoke? The team will have to work
very hard to understand and then find a countermove, and that’s
how you will be able to get the advantage. I’m sure that in business,
this kind of tactic is widely used.
THE MOMENT OF UNCERTAINTY9

I’ve always noticed that in negotiating, the element of surprise is a valuable asset for
those who know how to use it. Each team comes with a set of ideas and arguments
established in advance. There is nothing in their plan that hasn’t been turned over and
examined twenty times. So, anything new, even favorable, disrupts this preconceived
order and creates a moment of uncertainty, which the quicker mind uses to his
advantage before the others.
Kouatly – Therefore, it is because the element of surprise breaks the

concentration or disconcerts that it can create success.
Phelizon – Yes, surprise is nothing other than a creator of uncertainty.

Many tactical successes are the result of the opponent’s uncertainty.
It is clear that a faulty analysis of the situation increases de facto
the condition of uncertainty in which you find yourself, and that an
accurate analysis reduces that uncertainty. Because it creates trouble
with the opponent’s analysis, surprise leads them to indecision or
bad decisions. Indecision creates irresolution.
Kouatly – Isn’t launching a hostile takeover a typical surprise move?
Phelizon – Yes, of course. When buying a company, the executives

of the company in play often adopt a warlike attitude. Henry IV
said that you had to be the hammer or the anvil. In most financial
transactions (mergers and acquisitions), it is the same. You are either
the hunter or the hunted. You need to establish a position of hunter,
predator, or attacker. From that standpoint, a hostile takeover is
nothing more than a duel requiring careful planning, very diverse
talents, sufficient financial means, and which in the end, is won by
surprise.
Sometimes the announcement of a hostile takeover destabi-
lizes the executive team to such an extent that they are incapable
of counterattacking. The company I work for once decided to buy a
British company, through a hostile takeover if necessary. Our banker
called the company’s board members on a Saturday afternoon to
advise them of our intentions. As you can imagine, many financial
transactions happen during the weekend. Of course, the board mem-
bers were very surprised by this move.
In any case, an appointment was made for the following
evening in London. The meeting began in a very hostile environ-
ment. “This is our offer,” we announced to the board of the targeted
company. “Considering the current stock market value, we consider
it reasonable. Either you accept it, and within the framework of a
friendly takeover we proceed to the discussion of some practical is-
sues of interest to you, or you turn it down and we launch a hostile
takeover for the company. It will be up to you then to explain to your
shareholders why you didn’t consider our offer.” (In Great Britain, di-
rectors are held responsible if they refuse an offer that fairly assesses
the company they represent.) After many breaks in the session, an

agreement was finally reached at 4:00 am. The operation lasted less
than thirty-six hours.
Kouatly – In order to surprise the enemy, the time factor needs to be

managed. This is crucial in chess since the game has a specific time
limit.
Karpov – Time not only comes into play during a game, but before
and after a game throughout the two or three months that a tourna-
ment lasts. You could say that a game is to a negotiating session what
a tournament is to the entire negotiation.
Using your time wisely between each session is critical, for
that’s when both teams analyze what just took place and prepare
for the next sessions. They pick apart the opponent’s strategy, try to
understand his past and future reactions, advise the player, and even
guide his decisions.
So for me, time is a little like the third player in the game.
Time can be an ally or an adversary; it all depends on where you
stand. In the business world, it seems to me that time is more often
an ally, because you can always decide later. In chess, that is not the
case. Having time as an ally is more difficult.
Kouatly – What do you mean by that?
Karpov – First you have to ask this very simple question: “Am I in
charge of this situation short-term?” or to put it otherwise “Do I have
time or not?” When time is of the essence, you cannot try to analyze.
You can only count on your intuition and experience. So, rapid play
chess requires completely different abilities than classic chess. It is
somewhat like in the business world, when you don’t really have a lot
of time to think, but you “see,” meaning you know, that a decision
needs to be made. You don’t try to find the best solution, or make
the best decision. It would be better if you could take the time to do
the research but you can’t because you would lose precious time.
When on the other hand you are not constrained by time,
you have the freedom to consider the situation long term. You can
examine the ins and outs and make totally informed choices or make
the best decision with all the facts.
ZADIG WAS RIGHT10

The great magician first asked this question: What is the longest and shortest of things
in the world, the fastest and the slowest, the easiest to divide and the vastest, the most
neglected and the most regretted, without which nothing can be done, that devours
all that is small and revives all that is big? Itabad was the first to speak and said a man
like him did not understand enigmas and it was enough for him to win with his spear.
Some said the answer was fortune, others the earth, still others said light. Zadig told
them it was time. And he added, nothing is longer since it measures eternity; nothing
is shorter since we never have enough for our projects; nothing is slower to one who
waits; nothing is faster to one who enjoys; it can be as big as infinity and be divided
infinitely; all men neglect it, and regret its loss; nothing is done without it; it makes
you forget what is unworthy of posterity and immortalizes great things. The assembly
agreed that Zadig was right.
Managing time is also sequencing events. In today’s chess

tournaments, any game started must be finished within the day. That
was not the case in the old days. When a game was adjourned it was
extremely important to choose your final position. If your move was
obvious, it was better to make it. But if you faced a difficult choice,
with three or four options heavy with consequences that you were
considering, it was better to suspend the game and use the coming
night to analyze the possible options in detail with your advisors.
On our team, we always respected the following rule: at ad-
journment time, if you were holding a “winning position,” you should
suspend the game as quickly as possible. But if you weren’t in a “win-
ning position,” you should hold on as long as possible. I think that
Botvinnik was the first to formulate that rule.
Kouatly – And it seems to me this rule transfers as is to negotiations.
Phelizon – It’s obvious that it is better to suspend a session when

you’ve just won an important point. And the contrary is also true
that you should be ready to prolong discussions when you feel you
are getting nowhere.
The logic of the give and take can be very subtle. Often you
fight for a minor point, not because you really care, but because you
want to trick your opponent into thinking that it is really important

to you. The other side starts to wonder why, and little by little con-
centrates on this issue that seems close to your heart. That’s when
you can start to make your offer.
In exchange for this minor point that you will give up with
much regret, you insist on obtaining another point in contention,
which actually is very important to you and that you casually put on
the table. This is the heart of the seventeenth stratagem (“throwing
a brick to pick up jade”).11
Karpov – I’ve experienced that kind of situation, not at a chessboard,

but when discussing conditions and details of a tournament. You
don’t give a fig for one point, but you know you are going to run
into problems elsewhere. So you pretend to give in on a point that
is of no importance to you—you give in while pretending to do
your opponent a favor—but it’s only to gain the advantage in the
upcoming discussion.
Kouatly – I wonder if the preparation phase of a battle might just

boil down to always giving yourself room to maneuver, in other words
having options to trade.
Phelizon – Preparing means establishing rules, defining your tactics,

but also remaining flexible, just like water which always finds a way
to run downhill.
For me, strategic action derives from the direction imposed
on the entire group, and in that sense, strategy is nothing more
than a collective rule. On the other hand, tactical action must be
continuously adapted to the actions, movements, and plans of the
enemy as they are discovered. In other words, it must remain fluid
and unpredictable whatever the circumstances. What characterizes
strategy therefore is continuity, whereas what characterizes tactics is
flexibility.
I think this distinction between strategy and tactics is essential
and should serve as the foundation of any battle or war. In any case,
it seems to me much more pertinent than the classic definitions of
strategy and tactics that are in a way dovetailed: “the organization
of a military operation” for one and “the execution of a military
operation” for the other. In reality, tactics is not a smaller part of
strategy. It is just a different essence.
CHAPTER 2
Select a Style and Approach
Confrontational style. – Concessionary style. – Provocation

as a tool. – Concession vs. submission. – Direct or frontal
approach: warlike behavior. – Indirect or oblique approach:
more efficient, less immediate. – Lateral approach: most
subtle. – Fool you twice. – Conciliatory resistance. – Keeping
the energy up. – Risk of the direct approach.
You should never let your enemy feel the weak side, where with a little pressure,
the sword can pierce.
C. A. Saint-Beuve
Kouatly – When you start to fight, determination, endurance, and

knowledge of the environment make the difference. Even allowing
for sufficient battle preparation, you still have to determine a style
and an approach.
Phelizon – I think two styles and three approaches can be distin-

guished. What is a style? That’s what results from the personalities
of the protagonists, rarely from the circumstances in which they find
themselves.
To make it simple, I would say there is a confrontational style
and a concessionary (nonconfrontational) style. The first describes
people who always want to get something without giving anything
in exchange. The second describes those who are always ready to
offer something in exchange for what they want. Naturally, you can
find crossovers in these two styles. Sometimes, depending on circum-
stances, a person might be confrontational or offer compromise in
turn. But more often than not, these styles denote a personality trait.
Confrontational people tend to bring all the discussions back
to their point of view, without trying to understand or even listen to
the others. They seek to defeat their opponent rather than convince
him. They never forget that less for the opponent means more for
them and more for the opponent means less for them. They won’t
33
hesitate to bluff, dramatize, impose their conditions, retract them-

selves, intimidate, threaten, or bully. They actually often cover their
inflexibility with aggression.
On the contrary, the compromising personality prefers to
re-center the discussions into a long-term perspective, without ever
sacrificing the essentials. They will always try to listen and under-
stand, at the risk of not disclosing their intentions. They will strive
to convince you that more for you can also translate to more for them,
and less for them to less for you. They will try to put you at ease, use
humor, make your life easier, take good care of you, in a phrase “put
you in their pocket.”
At the risk of simplifying things, every time you make a de-
mand without offering anything in exchange, you provoke the other
party and come closer to a confrontational style. Every time you make
an offer without asking for anything in exchange, you submit to the
other party and come closer to a concessionary style.
Kouatly – It seems to me that the very nature of chess makes it con-

frontational since the object is to defeat your opponent. Conversely,
the nature of negotiation must be conciliatory since you must reach
an agreement with your adversary.
Karpov – Some chess champions enjoy provocation. Botvinnik was

particularly aggressive. Kasparov1 and Korchnoi are also, but a little
less than Botvinnik. It feels like they have to unleash torrents of hate
for their opponent to be at the peak of their form. I guess a boxer
might act the same.
At the other extreme, there is Spassky. He hates confronta-
tion. His best games are the ones he played against opponents who
were his friends. I would put all the other champions between those
extremes represented by Botvinnik and Spassky. For my part, I have
no trouble finding myself across from a player who likes to provoke.
I have to say that I don’t enjoy playing against a friend as much, since
I know that if I win it will affect him.
Kouatly – When you are being challenged, it’s always easier to face
an enemy than a friend.
Karpov – Jean-François said that in the business world, you fight, but
you never wage war and that you should never think of your opponent
Select a Style and Approach 35
as the enemy. In the chess world it is the same thing. There are no
enemies, there are merely opponents. I can have a good or a bad
relationship with a given player, but that’s not important, for he is
never an enemy. The only thing that bothers me, as I’ve said, is
playing against one of my true friends.
So, it’s not having a “friend” or an “enemy” across the board
from me that changes anything. Rather it’s having someone you know
well professionally, or not well at all.
Spassky played many times against Petrosian2 and knew him
well. One day he told me he knew exactly when Petrosian was about
to launch an attack on the board. Petrosian couldn’t help himself
from stalking quietly around the stage like a tiger ready to pounce
on his prey.
Kouatly – Isn’t provocation a tactic often used by negotiators?
Phelizon – Of course. During a negotiation, you want to try to get the

opposing party off balance, provoke him. Anger will certainly make
him commit a mistake. By appeasing him afterward, you can lead
him more easily to your point of view.
Conversely, you must be careful not to respond to his provo-
cation. He’s probably trying to make you lose control. In that case,
you need to try to bring the discussion back into the framework of
what you’ve said before. But be careful not to say more than you
already did.
Of course, you can decide to be as aggressive as he is or
perhaps even more. Your behavior might calm him down, but you
could also run the risk of simply breaking off the negotiations or your
relationship with him. Some confrontational personalities cannot
tolerate the aggressiveness of others.
Kouatly – So, what should you do when confronted with an adversary

who is consistently aggressive?
Phelizon – One of the most aggressive moves you can make is to

hang up on someone. One day I was faced with such a situation.
An extremely persistent businessman was very insistent on obtaining
a favor from the company which I had no intention of granting.
After I explained to him more than once that his request could not
be satisfied, he got angry and hung up on me. I called him back
immediately and said, “I don’t know what happened. I think we must

have been disconnected.” He was silent for a moment, then started
on a different topic that we were to discuss, in a tone that suddenly
had become almost friendly.
Generally, though, I would say that in order to deal with an
aggressive opponent, you must first start by understanding his mo-
tives. Perhaps he is aggressive because he does not want to negotiate,
or because he just disapproves of doing business with you, or simply
because he lacks experience and is afraid of being taken advantage
of. So he starts by expressing his unreasonable demands, or makes
brash statements like, “you can take it or leave it.”
With someone like that, you must show that it’s not by intim-
idating you that he will have the upper hand. You have to hold tight
during his “tantrums” and on the contrary let go a little when you see
him calm down. You must teach him the benefits of a trade-off and
sometimes you must even accept losing a little so that he will want to
repeat the experience.
In a formal setting, I think that against a very aggressive op-
ponent, you must force yourself to speak in a calmer manner than
him, ignore his threats, not respond to his outbursts, talk slower,
not cut him off, and when he’s finished with his diatribe, add to
the dramatic climate even more by staying silent for a few seconds
before responding. This attitude of “resistant conciliation” usually
bears results.3
Kouatly – Is “resistant conciliation” a way of showing that you can

make concessions without submitting?
Phelizon – Precisely. Submitting is accepting to be dependent. There

is therefore a world of difference between concession and submis-
sion.
I remember a negotiation that took place under the most
conciliatory terms in which neither party had accepted to submit to
the other and where an agreement was very quickly reached.
In France, as you might know, some privately held companies
inherited what has been called as “cross shareholding.” That was
the case for the company while I was CFO. Uncoupling these par-
ticipations was not an easy job. But, it happened once at lightning
speed. It was in 1997 and the president had agreed in principle to a
buyout of about 200 million euros. All that needed to be done was
to finalize the process. That was the task with which I was charged,
in conjunction with my counterpart, a banker I knew well. Due to
our calendars, and also for confidentiality, we agreed to meet on a
Saturday morning. My counterpart had a number in mind, and I
had another, but we were very close. We quickly decided to split the
difference. We phoned our respective presidents who gave us their
immediate approval. The “negotiation” hadn’t lasted an hour.
This example of “speed negotiation” demonstrates that when
both parties are ready to compromise, the endless discussions that
usually precede all negotiations (and whose purpose sometimes is
merely to tire the opponent) are needless. After all, time is of the
essence, as the saying goes.
Kouatly – Anatoly, what do you think of this distinction between con-

frontational and conciliatory styles? I think that the British usually
refer to “red” for confrontational and “blue” for concessionary. Does
this distinction apply to chess players’ styles?
Karpov – In the framework of a negotiation, the distinction is perti-

nent, but doesn’t really apply to chess. When playing a match, you
can’t be just “conciliatory” or “confrontational.” What happens is
that you might be aggressive because your opponent annoys you, or
decides to make a concession because you’re tired.
Kouatly – During a match, it seems that often a player will exchange

a piece for another. Wouldn’t that characterize a concessionary style?
Karpov – For me, such moves don’t indicate a style. Chess isn’t about
exchanging pieces, but taking them. Sure, sometimes you have to
sacrifice one of your pieces to take another you judge more impor-
tant, but this is because the setup of the game dictates it, not because
you are more concessionary.
That’s how you might sacrifice your bishop for a knight. Nor-
mally, you shouldn’t do that because it’s said that the bishop is worth
more than the knight. But in some circumstances, it is the opposite,
and the knight is in a much better position than the bishop. At the
end of a game, for example, it is better to have a queen and a knight
than a queen and a bishop.
The position of the pieces does have considerable importance

and sometimes to win a position you must sacrifice important pieces.
In that sense chess resembles a negotiation.
Kouatly – Let’s look now at approaches. Jean-François, you said you

distinguish three approaches. What are they?
Phelizon – The direct approach, the indirect approach, and the lat-
eral approach.
The direct or frontal approach derives typically from martial
or warlike behavior. This is the most immediate way to conduct your
strategy. The goal is to make the enemy’s forces surrender. Your plan
takes no account of the other and consists of playing your all in a
sort of double or nothing. “I engage the battle: heads I win—the
opponent can only lay down his arms; tails I lose—I’m the one who
has to lay down mine.”
The indirect or oblique approach is more difficult to imple-
ment. The object is to use the opponent’s forces by detouring them,
even subverting them or taking advantage of its weaknesses (which
amounts to the same thing). To be able to take the strengths and
weaknesses of the other into account and use them to your advantage,
you must not only know the ins and outs of his actions, but also be
able to penetrate his strategic vision. That is why the indirect ap-
proach, though more efficient than the direct approach, is also less
immediate.
The lateral approach is, without argument, the most subtle
of the three. It is essentially suggestive and amounts to causing the
opponent to act despite his intentions in a way which will in any
event make him vulnerable. Therefore you should put him on the
defensive by a stratagem, or make him negotiate before he even
fights. This way he is led to change his own plan, or adopt a new plan
different from the one he had prepared.
A business leader would take a direct approach when he
says to one of his direct reports: “You are fired”; he would take an
indirect approach when he says to one of his suppliers: “I would like
to increase my business with you but you are much too expensive”; he
would take a lateral approach when he says to the head of a company
he wants to buy: “Don’t engage a battle with me as I will buy your
shares anyway.”
Kouatly – Now let’s look at each of the three approaches you cite.
The most immediate, the direct approach, consists of using force.
This is the one we will focus on in the following conversation.
Phelizon – Usually symbolizing the behavior of the strong toward the

weak, the direct approach stems from impulse and seems to be the
fastest way to fight a battle. La Fontaine illustrated this very well in
the fable “The Wolf and the Lamb”: “The arguments of the strongest are
always the best . . .” “Might makes right.”4
But a negotiation is different. When negotiating, the object
is not to convince yourself of your own reasons, but to show the
opposing party that it is in their interest to finalize a deal. Therefore,
it is not good enough to make offers to your adversary; you must get
him to accept them.
In the movie The Fugitive, there is a scene where Tommy
Lee Jones, the FBI agent, has Harrison Ford backed up against a
precipice. Harrison Ford is unjustly accused of murdering his wife
and yells to the lawman, “You’re wrong to want me dead. I am inno-
cent.” Jones replies that he doesn’t care, and doesn’t want to know if
Harrison is guilty or innocent. His only job is to capture him. Just as at
the negotiating table, it isn’t important to know who’s right or wrong.
That’s not the issue. The important thing is to end up cooperating.
Kouatly – Wasn’t the direct approach inspired first by Rome?
Phelizon – Yes, the Romans perfected the art of the frontal attack,
but we shouldn’t forget the Greeks. In ancient Greece, phalanges
consisted of an elite, heavily armed Hoplite corps, lined up one be-
hind the other, advancing in tight formation, giving no opportunity
to flee. The carnage resulting from the direct collision of two pha-
langes was actually an economic response: reduce the ravages of
prolonged warfare to a winner-take-all duel, and by a brief and direct
assault, reach a decision at once rapid and unequivocal.
Kouatly – In what way is the direct approach in essence confronta-

tional?
Phelizon – It tends to ignore the opponent, whom you know nothing

about and to whom you don’t even want to speak. Let me also add
that it doesn’t take into account the time factor any more than the
economic or psychological factors. That’s why a frontal attack must
be led quickly.
But, when you say speed, you are also saying cost. The direct
approach is not particularly cheap. More precisely, it can only succeed
under very specific circumstances, that is, when the forces at your
disposition are clearly superior to those of the opponent (at least
three times greater, say military tacticians), which is rarely the case.
The combats of medieval knights, trench warfare, massive bombing,
the search for a dominant economic position, and hostile takeovers
all resort to direct approach.
Kouatly – So, the direct approach or “red” style— which is widely

used since it is truly the essence of combat— is not an approach
particularly useful in a negotiation, nor for that matter in a chess
match.
Karpov – In chess, if two players are approximately of equal strength,

the one adopting a style that is too confrontational would immedi-
ately give himself a heavy handicap. Obviously, it does happen that
in simultaneous games, or when the players are mismatched, the
strongest one might adopt a direct approach. But, in that case you
cannot really call that a “game.”
Phelizon – The “red” style is often a characteristic of someone with

an inflated ego. But vanity is like a drug and the one whose pride is
the most satisfied isn’t usually the one who makes the best deal. This
doesn’t mean, however, that he cannot achieve his goals.
As an example, take someone who wants to buy something at
any cost. He would barely listen to the seller and would merely say, “I
have a lot of money; I’m in a hurry and I want your company. Name
your price. Whatever it is, I accept.” It may sound absurd but some
recent acquisitions, even some large ones, seem to have followed
this pattern. Of course, such an attitude on the buyer’s part can
certainly be considered arrogant. This behavior sometimes typifies
the large corporation versus the small enterprise. Money is power
and the other must submit. But if the small enterprise can play its
hand correctly it can certainly make a great deal in the shadow of the
large corporation. In the same way a large corporation can prosper
in the shadow of a government.
But, when the power is about equal, pride rarely pays. I would
therefore recommend that a negotiator banish the “me” in a discus-
sion and use “we” (not the royal “we,” but the true “we”). Rather than
saying, “I have a problem with this point and I can’t accept it,” it would
be better for him to say, “We have a problem here, let’s try to resolve
it together.” After all, if there is a problem, it can only be resolved by
dealing with the opposing party. In general, I would suggest to the
negotiator that he listen carefully to what is being said, and indicate
at regular intervals that he understands the message being delivered
by repeating in his own words what he’s just heard. This is how, with
a little skill, he can discover his opponent’s real motivations, which
is the best way to insure the success of his mission.
Kouatly – Anatoly, you were saying a moment ago that the “red” or
confrontational style was not recommended. There are, however,
players who are very confrontational. What can you do then?
Karpov – One way to respond is by being extremely conciliatory, to

disarm the opponent. That’s what Tal5 did when playing Botvinnik
for the 1960 World Championships. Botvinnik was very meticulous
and never left anything to chance. In his opinion, a chess match
started long before the first game. When he began speaking with
Tal about the organizational details for the world championship, Tal
responded that he didn’t want to discuss it and would accept all of
Botvinnik’s conditions: location of the match, number of games, etc.
Tal was young. He probably wanted to show his opponent that he
wasn’t afraid of him and he could play under any conditions. He was
a little like the buyer that Jean-François mentioned just now: “Tell
me your terms and whatever your price, I will meet it.”
Kouatly – Tal won that championship.
Karpov – Yes, but the following year, in 1961, he showed the same
lack of concern and lost.
Kouatly – So the direct approach can only be used once because you
can only take your opponent by surprise once?
Phelizon – “True, true, false,” as the proverb goes.6 Sometimes you

can fool someone twice. Three times is much rarer. Usually, you
don’t negotiate the same way with people you will deal with in the
future (union representatives, bankers, suppliers) and people you
don’t expect to see again (founders of a company who are selling to
retire, for example). In the first instance, you must absolutely “leave
something on the table” when you’re done. In the second instance,
it isn’t necessary.
HOW THE FOX ATE PINÇART THE HERON7

In the shade of a willow to his left, the fox saw Pinçart who was fishing. He immediately
put his head down, lay flat, and wondered how to catch him.
What should I do? If I wait for him to come over to my side, I could wait a
long time and then I might miss him. I must find a ruse. I can’t stay here daydreaming
forever with nothing to show for my time.
He tore up some of the reeds that covered the riverbank and threw them in
the river. The reeds traveled down the stream toward the heron, who, seeing them,
raised his head and jumped back. Realizing that it was just some reeds, he pushed them
away with his beak and continued fishing.
Renard tore up another bunch and threw them also down the stream. The
heron was frightened and jumped. But he came back toward the reeds, felt them with
his foot and his beak, and scattered them. And seeing that again it was nothing but a
bunch of reeds, he went back to fishing.
Renard, laying on the cool grass, his senses alert, had observed the heron’s
behavior. This time he ripped up a big bunch of reeds, packed them together, threw
them in the water, and lay on top of them, covering himself with a few of the reeds
in order to hide. Floating this way, he drifted toward the heron, who, preoccupied by
fishing, wasn’t on guard.
Pinçart saw the floating reeds coming toward him, but he felt no fear, thinking
that it was just more reeds like the ones that had floated past him before. When Renard
got close, baring his teeth, he jumped up, grabbed the heron by the neck, and dragged
him under a hawthorn bush. With no concern for his cries, he strangled him. And when
he had strangled him, he ate him.
Kouatly – You just said that when you decide to take the offensive,
you break the dialogue with your opponent. But, sometimes you can
speak to him in an abrupt, definitive manner.
Phelizon – That is what is known as the ultimatum, the last word,

which is no more than a formal notice.
The vocabulary of the direct approach is usually directive, and

is by definition very precise. As linguists say, it is extensive but not
comprehensive. Without ambiguity, these words designate objects
and processes with precision. A directive statement’s purpose is to
clearly highlight, to force, and to constrain. Therefore, the vocabu-
lary of war is threatening and closed. As André Gluckman wrote, all
battle plans exhaust the possible options. It is clear-cut.
Consequently, directive words have a strong operational con-
notation. The language of the CEO, the officer, the financial exec-
utive launching a hostile takeover is enforceable and coercive. To
incite to action, an order must leave no room for interpretation. It is
therefore peremptory and restrictive.
Note that the person using directive language wants to incite
someone to action, but he doesn’t always persuade. You can execute
an order without approving of it.
Kouatly – What do you think of a negotiator who imposes a deadline

to reach an agreement?
Phelizon – You must be very sure of yourself, not to say presumptuous,

to impose a deadline in the course of a negotiation. I remember an
anecdote that illustrates how wise a negotiator Nixon was. It was at
the very end of the Vietnam War, during the discussions between
the Americans and the North Vietnamese. “Kissinger was euphoric.
He told Nixon that he intended to demand settlement before the
November elections. But Nixon was very cautious. He thought if
Kissinger included the election date in the negotiation calendar, that
very fact would weaken his position vis-à-vis the North Vietnamese.”8
In fact, in the “game” that is a negotiation, you must always
be aware of two things: the first is not to paint yourself into a corner
(for example when you advertise your objectives to the other party)
and the second is not to make your adversary lose face. Especially
if the opposing party reluctantly accepts a clause, you never should
crow about it.
Kouatly – Is “conciliatory resistance” also effective with confronta-

tional personalities who hide their game?
Phelizon – Yes, I think in that case you must always get back to the
essence of a negotiation, which is an exchange (or more aptly a
series of exchanges), and never consider giving something away for a

song.
In a negotiation, you can never give something for nothing
and you can never demand something at any cost. So, when you
make a statement that expresses only what you want, you seek to
get something for nothing and your attitude is aggressive. Not only
will your counterpart not give you what you seek, but you will have
weakened your position by revealing it.
Conversely, every time you make a statement where you give
something away without getting anything in exchange, your atti-
tude indicates submission. Not only will your opponent take for
granted what you offer, but he will try to get even more at your
expense.
Therefore, submission and aggression are both extreme be-
haviors and should be avoided at all costs. They are a little like chlo-
rine and sodium, two deadly substances when ingested separately,
but useful when combined in the form of table salt.
The counterpart to “conciliatory resistance,” which is much
more effective than submission, is “concealed aggression,” which is
much more effective than pure aggression.9 Conciliatory personali-
ties who resist and aggressive personalities who conceal really have a
better chance of getting what they want than by showing their real
nature.
The ideal, therefore, is to always manage to combine within
the framework of conditional offers what you want to get with what
you are willing to give. What a good negotiator says is, “If you give me
what I want, I will give you what you want.” He says it firmly, as to the
principle of the condition, and very compromisingly when it comes
to the nature of what he expresses. In a conditional offer, the “if ” is
not up for discussion, but the terms of the exchange must remain
hypothetical and indicative.
ADAPTING TO CIRCUMSTANCES10
During the time of Springs and Autumns, Prince Wu of Zheng planned on some day
annexing the Duchy of Hu. His military forces being limited however, he dared not
attempt a frontal attack. To appease the Duke of Hu, who was very suspicious, Prince
Wu offered him the hand of his most beautiful daughter. The Duke accepted and thus
became his son-in-law.
A short time later, the Prince called his ministers together and said:
“I plan to attack a foreign nation. In your opinion which is the one most
vulnerable?
One of the ministers answered that the obvious choice was the Duchy of Hu.
“What?” Exclaimed the Prince, pretending to be enraged. “How dare you
propose that we attack the Duchy of Hu when the Duke has married my own daughter?”
And he immediately had the minister beheaded.
When the Duke heard the news, he could no longer doubt the sincerity of
Prince Wu and felt that he no longer needed to exercise vigilance.
That’s when Prince Wu launched a sudden attack against the Duchy of Hu. He
took it over in the blink of an eye.
Kouatly – In the final analysis, even with the direct approach, every-
thing is a matter of compromise. Each side must make offers to the
other within the framework of their own “exchange logic,” taking
into account their remaining resources.
Phelizon – In the heat of the battle, however, you don’t necessarily

realize that you’re exhausting your resources. Therefore, the first
obligation of the negotiator, without question, is to conserve his
bargaining chips.
Let’s remember our physics class. To pass from a low orbit to
a high orbit, an electron must acquire energy. Conversely, to go from
a high orbit to a low orbit, it must release energy. The same applies
to negotiations. When one of the parties looks for a compromise,
scales back its demands, and declares itself ready for a concession,
its change of position is often accompanied by an energy discharge
that the other party needs to learn how to recognize and manage.
Karpov – I think that personal energy, that of the player or the ne-
gotiator, is often overestimated because fatigue comes on stronger
after the action than during it. During the action, you function on
nervous energy and you don’t feel fatigue as acutely. But it is there
sapping your resources.
Kouatly – How can your supply of energy be maintained at its peak

during a match?
Karpov – That is a very important question and the answer varies

from individual to individual. When you’re facing the ordeal of a
long match, you must have a plan in mind. Among other things, this
plan must cover how you expect to manage your energy since your
supply is not unlimited. All champions try to spread their energy

consumption out in a balanced way during a tournament, so that
they are not too weak in the beginning, stay strong throughout, and
not exhausted at the end.
The problem is that you sometimes find yourself in difficult
situations, with opportunities that you are not able to capitalize on
and results that you don’t anticipate. You might lose a game that you
normally would have won because you took unnecessary risks. So,
you get nervous and you use up a lot of energy. It’s difficult to settle
down: you are out of your comfort zone.
Chess players, when they face this kind of extreme tension,
start experiencing real physical and psychological problems, just
like negotiators working on nervous energy, trying to reach an un-
likely agreement with the opposing party. They don’t sleep as well.
Sometimes, they don’t sleep at all. In the worst case scenario, they
“crack.”
Of course, sometimes the temptation is to start taking med-
ication, but frankly, I wouldn’t advise doing that. Once in my life I
took a sleeping pill. It was in 1978. I was playing Korchnoi. We were at
the end of a tournament that had lasted 133 days. I was so exhausted
the last two nights that I couldn’t sleep. The doctor was with me and
suggested that I take two sedatives. I swallowed only half of one and I
did fall asleep. But the next day, I had a terrible headache, and even
though I had slept at least eight hours, I really wasn’t feeling well.
I was obviously having trouble concentrating and that day was very
difficult. So, after that less than satisfactory experience, I decided
that I would never take any sleep medication again, even if I stayed
up all night.
Later, completely by accident, I found a much more effective
way to replenish my strength which I have often used since. I tried it
out for the first time during my match with Anand, in 1998.11
It was at the end of the tournament. I only had a one-point
lead by the second to last game. I was defending position quite well.
Unfortunately, when I realized that this particular defense had given
me back the advantage, my mind relaxed, I made a mistake and I lost
the game.
But I still had two games to play. I was really feeling my loss
and was having trouble sleeping. I got the idea to take a long shower,
alternating the water temperature: very hot, then very cold, then very
hot again, and so on. I immediately felt much better and was able
to sleep. The next morning, I renewed the experience. I realized

that this technique of taking a shower while alternating water tem-
peratures managed to “perk” me up pretty well for a few hours.
Kouatly – It would seem to me that all demonstrations of strength

also require speed. Isn’t power the product of mass multiplied by
speed?
Karpov – Speed is crucial in chess, as is mobility. Of course, you could

win a “no pressure” game, if I may call it that, one in which you’ve
prepared all the moves. You could even win a second game that way.
But experience shows that preparing moves ahead of time is not a
good way to win. Even if in theory you have the advantage, it’s still a
battle that takes place on the chessboard. Your advantage exists only
if you are not a prisoner of what you had formulated in your mind.
If you are not able to deviate from your plan, you run the risk of not
being able to respond and if your adversary is aggressive, mobile, and
quick, he will have every opportunity to defeat you. In any case, he
will be the one leading the game.
Phelizon – It is clear that speed and strength are a winning combi-

nation. When you mount a frontal attack, you must have sufficient
means. Insufficient means can cost you dearly. From that perspective,
in order to be fully effective, a power move must be preceded by the
concentration of all available forces.
But you can multiply the effect of concentrating your forces
by swift execution. The direct approach therefore means concentra-
tion of forces and speed of execution, so that shock effect becomes
the main factor.
Military men say that the concentration of forces is nothing
without speed of execution. The philosopher Alain went even further
saying that any method that seeks to conquer by speed is really a
form of waging war. A business leader knows that even if he has
accumulated financial means, “time is of the essence.”
Kouatly – Isn’t Kasparov a believer in the direct approach?
Karpov – I know Kasparov very well, and I can tell you that he has
a very interesting personality. I have always greatly enjoyed talking
with him, and even if during his career he beat me more often than
I beat him, I always felt that our games were about equal. Kasparov is
very emotional. When we negotiated match conditions, he was only
firm in front of a large audience. When I was beating him, I knew
he was suffering. But in front of the press, the organizers, or anyone
who wasn’t a chess expert, he could play his part like an actor and
pretend not to be affected.
In fact, Kasparov isn’t an analytical thinker. He isn’t really at
ease when discussing specific points. But he hates his own vagueness.
And, when he isn’t sure, he becomes arrogant. He tried that with me
two or three times, but when I snapped back that he could keep his
arrogance for others, he calmed down quickly.
The arrogance Kasparov and some other players display is
no longer in vogue. I think that since World War II, we in Europe
and in the United States seem to no longer accept displays of power.
The press, especially, loses interest in anyone who is overbearing and
temperamental, even if he is a genius. The public interprets any kind
of aggressive behavior as insulting and considers any aggressor as
somebody unbalanced to say the least.
Kouatly – Would Kasparov be considered a “hidden aggressive” type?
Karpov – He always puts the pressure on, but sometimes bluffs. He

tends to present himself as the obvious winner because he already
knows everything. And if you haven’t been warned, you could be
impressed by a person who claims to never make a mistake.
As I said, Kasparov is an actor. He has crafted this personality
for himself during his career and it seems to have worked for him.
For a while, many grand masters did not want to play him because
they were convinced of his superiority.
Phelizon – In the business world there are also flamboyant people

who have forged the image of a winner for themselves. The press
idolizes them, because, just like alchemists, they seem to transform
the smallest endeavors into gold mines. Of course, it’s not easy to
post only successes, and often, the grandeur and extravagance of
these tycoons hide mountains of debt that the best analysts haven’t
been able to or haven’t wanted to uncover. So their fall is even more
spectacular. I don’t want to mention anybody in particular but we
all have in mind some of these tycoons and how they display their
grandeur.
Kouatly – Concentrating your forces somewhere means weakening

your position elsewhere. From that perspective, is the direct ap-
proach the most risky?
Phelizon – Yes, I’ve said it before, there is a bit of an “all or nothing”

aspect when you throw all your forces into a battle. If you win this way,
you win more and faster. But, if you lose, you lose much more. All
direct approaches are intrinsically risky, for any Goliath can meet his
David. Power creates arrogance and arrogance always implies some
form of weakness.
You must remember that any direct approach consists of
engaging your forces without considering those of your opponent
(meaning without knowing enough about them and mostly without
taking advantage of them). It searches to resolve, by seemingly sim-
ple means and the shortest route, conflicts that you believe cannot
be solved otherwise.
Kouatly – I get the impression that the use of direct approach often
results from an overdeveloped ego.
Karpov – Some people have overdeveloped egos. I would add how-

ever that self-confidence in itself is not always a handicap. It can
be an element of your inner strength. But when that confidence is
excessive, it shows a weakness of character and that is important.
As Jean-François was saying, vanity is like a drug. It keeps you from
accepting even the smallest personal defeat.
Kouatly – Do you think that ego was one of the reasons why Fischer
was reluctant to put his 1975 World Champion title back in play?
Karpov – Very possibly, I think.
Kouatly – What do you think of the direct approach? Are there cir-
cumstances where you would use it?
Karpov – I think it depends on how you feel and what your outlook
is. If you live secluded from the world, you can afford that luxury.
But, if you care about your reputation, your credibility, or if you are
at the height of your career, it is probably best not to use the direct
approach, even if you are stronger. There is an expression “Winners
can’t be wrong.” The public, however, has no qualms about judging

arrogant people.
Kouatly – As the Eastern proverb goes, “Better brief suffering than

long pain.”
Phelizon – Sainte-Beuve12 also wrote, “You should never let your en-
emy feel the weak side, where with a little pressure, the sword can
pierce.” I don’t think that the private equity firm, KKR, could ever
have bought RJR Nabisco (this was a $26 billion13 takeover) if they
hadn’t adopted a direct approach using massive fire power, involving
impressive capital, and particularly fast action.
In the business world there are usually many advantages to
being on the offensive. A company which is always the first to launch
a product on the market can forge the reputation of being an inno-
vative enterprise that others will have a hard time destroying. And
experience has shown that companies that have been able to take
the offensive before the others have often remained the leaders in
their sector (3M comes to mind, for example).
Kouatly – And what are the drawbacks of a direct approach? Is this a

“risk-taker’s approach?”
Karpov – Obviously. It appeals more to “cowboys.” In any case, it

attracts those who like to plow straight ahead, without looking left
or right. As we said, the direct approach assumes great fire power on
the part of the attacker and requires two qualities that only a trained
team can possess: precision and speed.
Phelizon – Anatoly is correct in saying that the direct approach is a

“cowboy” approach. I would add that one of the drawbacks is that it
consumes a lot of energy and resources.
Many losing and ill-planned operations can be cited, says the
military strategist Sun Tzu in essence, but there are not many skillful
ones that last long.14 So, if you decide to adopt a direct approach,
you must throw all your forces into the battle, go as fast as possible,
and, obviously, not stop in the middle.
I would like to close this topic by citing Napoleon, one of the
masters of the direct approach: “At the beginning of a campaign,
you must think hard about whether to attack or not. But when the
offensive has begun, you must sustain it until the very end; for, regard-
less of the loss of military honor, how deflated army morale will be,
or the courage you give to the enemy, retreats are more disastrous
and cost more in men and material than the bloodiest of engage-
ments. The difference is that, in a battle, the enemy loses about
evenly with you, whereas, in a retreat, you lose without him losing
at all.”15
CHAPTER 3
Indirect Approach: Strength against

Strength
Take advantage of opponent’s

weaknesses. – Tactical option of flight. –
Know when you can win. - Danger of
getting trapped. – “Pull when pushed,
push when pulled.” – Protecting your
territory. – Take the path of least
expectation. – Suggestive language with
indirect approach. – Computers lack
intuition. – David can win over Goliath.
At the end of the game, the player who has the most territory points wins.
Rules for the game “Go.”
Kouatly – In our last conversation, it was said that someone who en-
gages in a frontal attack could be seen as oblivious of reality. Assuming
he has prepared his attack, he knows the forces he’s facing but a little
like a boxer, he throws himself blindly at his opponent.
Another approach, probably smarter, can be one in which
the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy are used against him. We
will call this the indirect approach.
Phelizon – The indirect approach is usually indicated in a situation

of strength against strength. A perfect illustration of this for me is
the story of the Horaces and the Curiaces which took place during
the reign of Tullus Hostilius, the third king of Rome.1
The cities of Rome and Alba were in constant conflict. One
day, they agreed to what in the Middle Ages would be known as “the
judgment of God.” Romans and Albanians would pick champions
who would do battle in the presence of the two armies. The city
whose champions won would be declared the ruler of the other city.
Rome chose the three Horace brothers; Alba, the three
Curiaces, and the battle began. On the first clash, two Horaces fell
and all three Curiaces were injured. The surviving Horace, afraid
that he would fall against his three combined adversaries, fled in
order to split them up, convinced that they would follow at different
speeds depending on the severity of their injuries. His plan proved
correct. He turned suddenly, killed the Curiaces in succession, and
assured Rome’s triumph.2
55
What lesson can be drawn from this story? If the Curiaces

had stayed together, they would have won. But through an error in
judgment, they pursued at their own speed the surviving Horace and
this direct action proved fatal.
The indirect action of the surviving Horace, however, gave
him the victory.
Kouatly – In a negotiation, how can you use the opponent’s strengths

to your advantage—or take advantage of his weaknesses?
Phelizon – Let me just use a personal example. Once, I had to deal

with a very arrogant buyer. For its own reasons, a group wanted to buy
one of our affiliates over time, at a very attractive price for us. They
spoke of 500 million euros, 150 more than the next closest offer we
received. But we had limited confidence in the financial capabilities
of this group and after a few negotiating sessions I demanded a
bank guarantee for the amount that would be due to us after the
agreement of sale was signed.
The lead negotiator was very offended. He asked me in
essence why I didn’t trust him. He offered all kinds of references,
and loudly stated that he, too, could demand guarantees. He then
enumerated a list of issues on which he could have doubts. “How do
I know that your books are accurate? That your inventory is up to
date? That you have sufficient funds?” Of course, I stood my ground.
The group I work for doesn’t have the reputation of embellishing
the books.
Then, all of a sudden, angry and flushed, he yelled, “Your
stubbornness towards me is absolutely uncalled for. Since you have
decided to act in this disrespectful way towards me, I am breaking off
negotiations.” And, furious, he left the meeting with his team.
I was upset, but what was I supposed to do? All that we could
do was go home. But, the exit that we had witnessed just reinforced
our opinion that a bank guarantee was an absolute prerequisite for
this deal.
It turned out that it was only a false exit, or I should say a
bad move. A few days later, through a third-party attorney, the buyer
knocked on our door and we resumed our discussions. Of course
his grand exit put him in a very vulnerable position; now we knew
how badly he wanted to do this deal. I took advantage of this by
Indirect Approach: Strength against Strength 57
demanding a guarantee from a top-ranked bank and a few other

things, which he could no longer refuse.
Kouatly – The legend of the Horaces and Curiaces illustrates well

the effectiveness of fleeing, the height of indirect action. Flight is a
tactic recommended by many strategists.
Phelizon – The thirty-sixth stratagem does recommend flight when

in a situation that is all but lost.3 Chinese military authors thought
that in war, going forward should seem as natural as going backward.
Consequently, when you do not wish to engage in battle, you must
know how to give some ground. By avoiding a complete defeat, you
have a better chance of ultimately being victorious.
Karpov – I think that flight is always a tactical option that deserves

consideration. But it comes with an “if.” You must control the situa-
tion. Some players make strange decisions, play a bizarre game, open
all doors, but have no idea where they’re going. They are constant
losers because they do not control the situation.
Not too long ago, Spassky confided to me of an instance when
he was considering competing for the world championship (it was in
the 1960s and he was still young), he felt able to master any situation
on a chessboard, even under the most difficult circumstances.
Then he became world champion, wrote a book analyzing his
various games, and started getting a little older.4 At the age of forty-
five, he realized he wasn’t always able to control what was happening
on the chessboard. That’s normal. When you’re young and full of
energy, you can easily play a game with full attention from beginning
to end. Even if you lose, you understand fully why. But, with age,
you find it difficult to sustain your attention at peak level for long
hours. Your mental activity is up and down. You’re clear and focused
for a while, then you relax a little, then you’re focused again, and
so on.
Therefore, controlling the situation is always difficult. When
they’re young, the best players want to be in control of everything, all
the time, with every move they make. But they realize that doing that
is almost impossible. With time they learn to control the situation
at crucial moments even if they are less attentive when everything is
going “as usual.”
Kouatly – In tennis, they say that a champion is the one who finds in
himself sufficient resources to serve aces when he’s in trouble.
Karpov – That is a constant in all battles. When in combat, regardless

of the kind, you may find yourself in very diverse situations. First, you
need to start the fight concentrating on details, just to test your
strength or your adversary’s reactions. This phase is very important
for it enables you to prepare mentally for the upcoming events. If,
after the first skirmishes, you are convinced you have a handicap and
you’re going to lose, don’t take it too seriously. You can’t always win.
Try rather to understand the reasons for your probable defeat. You
will accept it more easily and, revitalized, will soon be able to get your
revenge.
If, to the contrary, you are firmly convinced that you can win,
then marshal all your resources and energy. Victory will enhance your
mental strength and comfort you with the idea that you are stronger
than your opponent. But if you know that you can lose, you run the
risk of experiencing a devastating psychological shock.
That’s how I have proceeded throughout my career. First, I
take stock as clearly as possible of the forces present. Then I accept
that I might lose. Mostly, I fight like a lion, without ever relaxing,
when I know I can win.
Kouatly – You have the reputation of being an uncompromising

player.
Karpov – Yes, I think I’ve always been considered a “tough” player.

Why? Because when I’ve decided to fight for a prize I think is worth
it, I will do everything, absolutely everything I can to win. Nothing
will make me give up and everyone knows it.
Kouatly – What happens when both sides adopt an indirect

approach?
Karpov – Then there is a good chance that nothing will go the way
you want.
That’s what happened in 1978 when Korchnoi and I had to
determine where the next world championship would take place.
At that time, interested countries had to present their proposals to
the FIDE (World Chess Federation). The FIDE would then formally
inform the two players of the options and the players would then
indicate their preferences. Classification was very simple: 1 for the
country they preferred, 2 for their next choice, and so on. The coun-
try that won was the one with the lowest score.
I remember that seven countries were in the running. Three
of them—France, Italy, and a third I forget—weren’t very serious
about the prize money they were offering the winner. The four other
competing countries were Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and
the Philippines. I didn’t want to play in the Netherlands or in Austria
because their national federations were too close to Korchnoi. And,
just as in 1975 when it was Fischer’s choice, neither did I want the
Philippines. I knew that Korchnoi did not want the Philippines ei-
ther. My preference was Germany, for at that time I was very tied to
the German Chess Federation. Therefore, I placed Germany in first
place, a blank in second position, and the Philippines in third. Korch-
noi, for his part, naturally put Austria in first place, the Netherlands
in second, and the Philippines in third. When Campomanes, the pres-
ident of the FIDE, opened our response forms, he noticed that the
only country we had both mentioned was the Philippines, a country
that in reality neither of us wanted. So, he decided that the champi-
onships would take place in Manila.
Kouatly – So, you both lost.
Karpov – Yes. And then we started some indirect maneuvering where

we found ourselves trapped again.
Through third-party negotiators, Korchnoi and I started
thinking about how we could change this choice that satisfied neither
one of us. Representatives from the Austrian and German federation
got together and offered a new joint proposal. The match would
take place half in Austria and half in Germany. In addition, the prize
money would increase from $750,000 to $1 million.
The president of the German Federation called me to tell me
that Korchnoi agreed to say that he would claim responsibility for the
new proposal, but that he did not want to be the one to transmit it to
the FIDE. So, I wrote to the FIDE saying that the Austrian/German
proposal backed by Korchnoi was now my first choice. But then
Korchnoi made a mistake. Without paying attention, he wrote a let-
ter to the FIDE saying that this proposal initiated by me had his
support.
When the president of the FIDE compared our two letters,

he wasn’t happy at all. “What is this? Which one of you took the
initiative to change my decision? This is a setup!” Before we could
even react, he contacted President Marcos, who publicly assured him
of his support, and he let us know that in any case it was too late now
to make any changes.
And that’s how we both got trapped.
Kouatly – The indirect approach is obviously harder to implement

than the direct approach.
Phelizon – Yes, naturally, because its aim is to use the adversary’s

forces by turning them, even subverting them, or—and this amounts
to the same thing—taking advantage of his weaknesses. But to be
able to gauge the strengths or weaknesses of the opponent, you
must know not only the details of his actions, but also penetrate this
strategic vision. In addition, indirect action also means circumventing
the opponent’s will. At the very least, it supposes that you’ve considered
his plan, because yours will be exercised in relation to it, whereas in
direct action your plan is exercised independently of the adversary’s
reactions.
That is the reason this approach, even though more efficient
than the direct approach, is also less immediate. It cannot be adopted
without taking into consideration the time factor, or your opponent’s
probable reactions, or even some psychological factors. Just like di-
rect action, it derives from impulses, but its true motivator is the
impulses of the other party.
Kouatly – Isn’t the indirect approach inspired by the Japanese?
Phelizon – Even though most of the Japanese martial arts schools are
founded on an indirect approach when confronting an opponent,
many other sources of inspiration can be found. Aside from the ex-
ample of the Horaces and Curiaces that I cited earlier, the combat
between David and Goliath or the conquest of Mexico by Hernán
Cortés are famous examples of the indirect approach. Similarly, pub-
lic offerings that are only successful when the financial resources
of the target company can be used typically constitute an indirect
frontal approach. It is a skillful way to increase the financial means at
your disposal. You simply dip into the treasury of the target company
by securing the loan up front. That is what the financial engineers

do. Such a process is related to indirect action since it consists of
using the adversary’s resources to your advantage.
But, it is true that the indirect approach is essentially of
Japanese inspiration. In Japan, the masters of bujutsu5 have always
considered that the fundamental principles of martial arts should
be applied to take advantage of the idiosyncrasies of the opponent.
More precisely, by the principle known as unilateral, the opponent is
the main target of the attack or the counterattack and the goal is to
defeat him. In the principle known as bilateral, he is not only a target,
but also an instrument. Many possibilities have resulted which have
considerably enriched the art and culture of combat.
Hence, jiû-jitsu (literally the art of flexibility) is founded on
the opposition of gentleness and force (or elasticity and stiffness).
It recommends keeping the body full of ki, meaning psychic energy,
maintaining your limbs as supple as possible, and staying always alert.
There will come a time when, by consuming the least of your own
energy possible, you will be able to use the adversary’s strength against
him.
These two principles of unilateral and bilateral action were
used not only in individual combat. They were also often applied to
large-scope military operations by Japanese generals from medieval
times through World War II.
Kouatly – In judo classes you’re taught to “pull when you’re pushed”

and “push when you’re pulled.”
Phelizon – Professor Kano, the inventor of judo,6 used to often say,

“You must pull when pushed, and push when pulled.” In the first
case, when your opponent launches an attack by using his strength
against you, you must try to “bend” this force by deflecting it, and
dissipating its effects, before counterattacking. Your opponent then
will be practically deprived of reaction since he has just discharged
his energy against you. In the second case, when your opponent tries
to draw you to him, you can achieve the same “bending,” deflecting,
and dissipating effects. All you need to do is go with the movement
instead of resisting it. Correctly done, this maneuver will contribute
to destabilizing your adversary.
In Aı̈kido schools, the principle of indirect action is a little
different.7 It can be expressed this way: “Turn when you are pushed
and enter when you are pulled.” In the first case, an attack is neutral-
ized by creating a kind of centrifugal force around you that forces
your adversary to deflect his power from the center to the periphery.
In the second case, the power that is pulling you is neutralized by aim-
ing for your opponent’s center. This creates an imbalance between
the forces and improves conditions for a counterattack.
The difference between the principles of judo and Aı̈kido is
subtle. In both instances, you use the opponent’s power—pushed to
the extreme it could mean his strategies, even his ideas—to reinforce
your own strength. Noteworthy in these principles is the underlying
concept of adaptability. For, if you want to use the opponent’s power,
you must obviously adapt your methods and behavior to his. Asians
use the expression “riding the tiger”8 to symbolize this behavior.
Karpov – How the application of the “pull when you are pushed”
and “push when you are pulled” principles applies to chess is an in-
teresting question that needs some thought. In chess history, there
are famous battles that I think proceed from this principle. I’m re-
minded in particular of certain games between Tal and Korchnoi.
Tal loved combinations and played a very offensive game. He could
sacrifice pieces easily. Korchnoi was exactly the opposite. He often
took what we call “poison pawns.” And he could stay on the defensive
for a very long time and reverse the situation at the very last minute.
Kouatly – Actually Tal and Korchnoi had such opposing styles that
they seemed to almost dictate their approach.
Karpov – The games that Tal and Korchnoi played were always inter-
esting because they always fought without subterfuge, one constantly
sacrificing pieces and the other taking them. Actually Tal was always
the attacker, Korchnoi the defender, a little like Petrosian. One be-
lieved in his intuition and preferred the direct approach; the other
waited for a mistake to be made to react and preferred the indirect
approach. They complemented each other.
That being said, they were somewhat prisoners of their style,
and didn’t really concern themselves with what was going on in their
opponent’s mind, because they were convinced that their plan was
best. All the moves were well oiled. Tal said, “I attack.” Korchnoi
answered, “Go ahead, I’m waiting. My defense is in place. Regardless
of what you do I will be able to repel your attack.” Tal would then
continue, “You want to play defense? OK. You won’t be able to resist.”
And on and on. It was almost a dance. That’s why Tal was always happy
to attack Korchnoi’s king (although he didn’t like Korchnoi attacking
his). But Korchnoi was happy with Tal’s attack on his king, because
he was convinced that Tal would lose against his defense.
Of course, the behavior of these two players was a bit of a
caricature. Usually, players are supposed to think about the “why” of
their opponent’s moves, especially at the beginning of a game when
most of the variables are known.
A player is often asked why he takes so much time in thought
at the beginning of a game when precisely all the variables are well
known. It’s not that he’s afraid of forgetting something, it’s that he
has to remember all the theory, try to determine what his opponent
is thinking, and keep some element of surprise. If you wish, he has
to figure out how he will be able to “pull when he’s pushed” or “push
when he’s pulled.”
You’ll notice that these situations are exactly opposite but
entirely complementary. So you can go from one to the other with
relative ease. If, for example, you think your position is too vulnera-
ble, you can be tempted to abandon the approach you had chosen,
direct or indirect. By doing this, you would have to totally mod-
ify your plan, and therefore change the way you had been playing
the game up until then. There is a strong possibility of going from
defense to offense or vice versa, which is part of judo, or Aı̈kido
principles.
Kouatly – When should you adopt an indirect approach? Should the

power ratio be about one to one?
Phelizon – Yes, that’s about right. If you are definitely stronger than
your opponent, you can use a direct approach.
If you are as strong as him, the indirect approach makes the
difference, since you actually deflect a portion of the opponent’s
strength to your advantage.
But, as we will see further on, if you are definitely weaker than
the opponent, neither of these approaches is feasible. To have any
chance of winning, you will need to be more subtle.
For instance, suppose that you want to buy a company. If you
have all the financial means that you need, you will just buy it. If
you are just about having the money to buy it, you can refine your
business plan by using the treasury of your target to add to your

financial means. If you are definitely poorer or weaker than your
target, it is probably difficult for you to envisage buying it except if
you can convince their Board that there is a very good reason for you
and them to consider, say, a merger.
Kouatly – In the game of Go, you also use the strengths and weak-
nesses of the opponent.
RULES FOR THE GAME OF GO9

r The game is played on a checkerboard ( gô-ban) made up of 19 vertical lines and 19
horizontal lines.
r The two players have 181 black stones and 180 white stones for a total of 361 stones
for 361 intersections.
r The stones are placed alternatively by each player on any square of the gô-ban,
including the borders. All have the same value and are static and immobile, except
when captured and removed from the game.
r Any stone completely encircled by the opponent is taken prisoner and retired from
the gô-ban. The same applies to any group of adjacent stones.
r The object of the game is to surround as many open intersections (territories) with
your stones as possible, while losing the least possible (a stone captured from the
enemy equals an intersection and vice versa).
r At the end of the game the player who has the most territory points wins.
Karpov – Yes. Go players use black and white tokens on a board. The
game consists not only of creating but also of protecting a territory
as vast as possible. In order to accomplish that, it is imperative to
concentrate on the decisive battle(s), at the risk of weakening yourself
in the secondary zones, therefore accepting partial defeats. The game
of Go illustrates well the idea that the main purpose of a strategy is
not just to win the battle but the entire war.
This surrounding tactic is also applicable to chess, but with a
nuance. In chess, we say that when a piece has been locked in for a
long time, it can surge out with incredible strength once released.
Kouatly – Isn’t letting the opponent dig in also part of the indirect
approach?
Phelizon – Yes, if the opponent digs in to a specific position, he

weakens himself, and therefore you can take the advantage. That is
the other aspect of the indirect approach, which consists not only
of taking advantage of your opponent’s strengths but also of his
weaknesses.
Classical Chinese literature has often opposed the concepts
of “empty” and “full.” Over and over it is repeated that in order to
be victorious, you must know how to advance on the “empty” parts
of the enemy (meaning his weaknesses) and stop when you find his
“full” parts (meaning his strong points).10
Kouatly – We’ve stressed that the element of surprise greatly in-

creases the effect of a direct approach. How does it affect the indirect
approach? Is it as important to surprise the opponent?
Phelizon – In his World History of Strategy, the English historian

Liddell Hart writes that in effect, if a move made around the en-
emy front and directed against his rear amounts to following the
path of least resistance, its equivalent in the psychological domain
is the action least expected, or path of least expectation.11 The rela-
tionship between these two concepts is evident. In order to produce
its full effect, an attack on the “empty areas” must be unexpected.
Kouatly – So, rather than putting into play forces that confront each
other straight on, an indirect action works on the levers that operate
the opponent’s forces. Jean-François, you’ve told us that the type of
language that corresponds to direct action is directive. What would
you call the one that applies to indirect action?
Phelizon – That would be suggestive. In this type of language, the

object is less to dictate to the other than to take advantage of his
arguments. The one talking tries to stay inscrutable, veiled, there-
fore revealing nothing of objectives. This kind of language actually
stems from uncertainty. By always leaving something more to be said,
alternating moments when the hint is clearer with those when it is
more disguised, it enables the speaker to advance by stages. It makes
it easier to get the other to accept, to make him understand. When
you use the suggestive mode, the art consists less of convincing the
other by speaking to his reason than to make his will wobble, which is
to say weaken his resolve. In this, we clearly see the principles of the
indirect approach. Suggestive language is the perfect complement

to directive language. Direct language brings things brutally to light.
It forces. It commands. Indirect language, on the contrary, gives the
impression that the more transparent, the more redundant it seems,
the more it may contain hidden meaning. In other words, the less it
says, the more it hints.
THE OBLIQUE APPROACH12

The oblique approach allows both the one criticizing and the one arguing to stay covered
and inscrutable while at the same time giving unlimited attack power. By always having
more to say, since it alternates moments where the hint is more direct with moments
when it becomes more veiled, criticism contains within itself the principle of unending
oscillation. From a strategic point of view, the oblique approach translates into implicit
language. The indirectness of the path leads to depth of meaning.
For Chinese writers, directive language was used to expose

things without having to censure themselves. Suggestive language
was used to express things without daring to be too direct, as if afraid.
This way, they could make a sort of oblique language correspond to
a sort of oblique action recommended by strategists.
To summarize, sometimes you should be able to say: “You
will launch the attack tomorrow at 5 am” or “you have six months to
reduce your overhead by 20 percent”; sometimes it is better to say:
“Your honor and your reputation are in play in this offensive” or “If
I were you, I would launch a project aiming to reduce drastically the
overhead.”
Kouatly – In chess, games played against computers are often won

using the principles of indirect action. But, is playing against a com-
puter still playing chess?
Karpov – Certainly, no question about it, but it’s a different game. I

was always against the idea of opposing players to computers in tour-
naments. But, as far as matches are concerned, I have no objection.
Tournaments are different. Why? Because the techniques required
are very specific. There are ways to play against computers. Some
players are comfortable with them, others not at all.
Kouatly – I guess they find this type of conflict disconcerting.
Karpov – In the beginning, the programs were easily circumvented.

But they’ve been refined and their calculating power in particular has
exploded. Today, when you are up against a computer, you cannot
afford to take any chances. You must continue to perform detailed
analyses of the situation. Therefore, you cannot sacrifice a single
piece, you cannot try to innovate and you must try to keep the game
going as long as possible. Since current computers are capable of
doing millions and millions of operations per second, you cannot
hope to beat them in that area. You would waste your time and energy
for nothing. A computer calculates with ease (I would say that’s all
it does), but your brain is built differently. You must continually test
your analysis, verify that you haven’t made a mistake, and since your
energy is limited (unlike the one supplying the machine across from
you), you naturally have a handicap.
What computers lack are intuition and experience. Of course,
they can dig into databases, but a database is not the same as years
and years of accumulated experience. This is especially important
at the end of a game when tested experience is required to know
how to choose the pieces you want to keep. That’s how you decide
to finish the game with bishops, or knights, or a knight and a rook,
when there are many more pieces on the board that you are getting
ready to exchange. I think in that area players are much better than
computers.
To play without taking any risks during the game and only
start taking control at the end relates to the indirect approach in the
sense that computers only reveal their weaknesses at the end of the
game.
A POSITIONAL GAME LESSON13

While awaiting the victory of the IBM team, Kasparov, running low on time, checks the
clock before throwing the engineer across from him one of the famous killer looks
that are his trade secret and have deflated the morale of more than one flesh and
blood player. These brief moments of rebellion are followed by a sort of dejection.
Slumped in his armchair, stiff in his three-piece suit, his complexion gray, he appears
to be looking for help, his eyes vague. His Maginot line is taking water. As desperate as
it is, his resistance seems no longer effective. He knows he won’t prevail. Deep within
his defense the queen and rook of Deeper Blue twirl dangerously around him. Garry
Kasparov, the king in desperate straits, is mercilessly attacked. The vein on his forehead
pulses. In a flash, he shakes the engineer’s hand, signs his slip, gets up, and leaves the
camera’s field. A few flights down, the public applauds raucously and gives the IBM
team a standing ovation.
Kouatly – You describe the situation today, but software continues to

progress. What will it be like tomorrow?
Karpov – I’m not convinced that software can be significantly im-

proved. It would be real progress if computers could be self-teaching.
For example, if they could never make the same mistake twice. That
was Botvinnik’s idea when he started to work on a chess software
program.
He always said that using computers just to calculate was a
waste. Obviously it represented enormous technological progress,
but it didn’t enable the programmer to imitate a player’s brain. So,
Botvinnik created the basics for an auto-teaching program, but he
didn’t get very far.
It is true that software continues to make progress to the
extent that computers go a little faster every year. But the programs
are always built the same way. They calculate, and calculate, but don’t
learn. Computers will improve the depth of their calculations, but
the ramifications of possibilities are so extensive and exponential that
even machines that are ten times more powerful than today won’t be
able to make a significant difference. In any case, they will never be
able to “resolve” a game from beginning to end. Even supposing that
the person programming the chess software is a very great champion
himself (which is rarely the case), he would still have to be able to
transfer his intuition and experience to the machine for the program
to replace man. How do you do that? How do you teach something
like that to a machine?
I did say though that some players enjoy playing against com-
puters and others hate it. Actually those who hate it often just lose
their nerve. What they don’t like is to have “someone” across from
them who is in complete control of themselves, entirely confident.
They become obsessed wondering if they really did make the right
move or if they made a mistake. They focus on the fact that they
can’t make even the slightest mistake during at least four fifths of the
game and that’s what makes them nervous.
Phelizon – When you read in the news that a player is pitted against
a machine, it isn’t quite the truth. In fact, as Anatoly has said, he
is playing against a programmer who has “gelled” calculations and
processes through his software. This is why the fight is indirect: the
player is indirecly fighting against the programmer. Now, what makes
the game uneven is that the programmer has all the time he wants to
write the program whereas the player is constrained by the match’s
time limitations. Furthermore, it is extremely rare that these software
programs are available to the public. They remain black boxes that
the players can’t examine.
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ELIMINATIONS14

Often, a grand master has intuition. He thinks differently than a novice, or more
precisely, his references are different. It is always a surprise to see that in a match,
a grand master doesn’t necessarily use a higher level of analytical thinking than a
beginner. Truth be told, a grand master only considers a small number of moves. But
the way he looks at the chessboard functions like a filter. He doesn’t “see” bad moves
when evaluating a situation. A beginner blocks out only the illegal moves. He has
structured his perception of the game in such a way that he would never consider
moving a rook diagonally or a bishop in a straight line. The grand master has also
structured his perception of the board. But for him, bad moves are just as invisible as
illegal moves are to most players. You could call that an implicit elimination of some of
the branches of the tree of possibilities. In opposition to that, an explicit elimination of
these branches would imply considering all possible moves and after analysis, deciding
or not to take them into consideration.
That being said, as powerful as it may be, a computer is noth-

ing more than a calculating machine. It only appears “intelligent.”
This is especially clear when working on form recognition (or au-
tomatic translation). The human mind can interpret an imperfect
picture or understand an incomplete message. Anyone can under-
stand a telegram wishing you “est ishes for appiness” or a wine list
offering “Mondav Opu One.” But, imperfections surprise most pro-
grams. Machines don’t know how to treat semantic reductions. That
is why they cannot compare to the human mind.
Kouatly – So, chess programs that can rival a world champion are
not for anytime soon.
Karpov – Today, the best programs are grand master level, no more.
But, I would like to come back to what Jean-François was say-
ing about the imbalance between a player and a software program.
Today computers can access extremely large databases, and they dis-
pose of unimaginable volumes of information. They know every game
a player at a certain level has waged throughout his career. Players
have a certain knowledge of chess history, but they cannot memorize
everything in the databases. Therefore, they have a serious handicap.
On the other hand, computers have specific basics for open-
ings and endings. But most computers don’t “play” endings. They
just estimate the final position. They calculate that such a position
will win the game in 25 moves, another in 21, and yet another in 27.
So, the program doesn’t think. When its opponent moves a piece,
the computer, after performing all its calculations, simply says, “Ah!
If I do this, I am only 24 moves from victory.” By doing this, it always
plays the same way. It never forgets anything, but it doesn’t invent
anything either. . . .
To make matches interesting, programmers would have to
agree to communicate their databases, making them available to both
players, man and machine. This brings me back to what I was saying:
if this were to happen, unless the programmer himself is a champion,
I believe that the machine would clearly show its inferiority.
Phelizon – In any case the matches would be more interesting. All

the psychological dimensions of a battle would be present. Instead
of testing the player on the limits of his resistance (which is what
happens today), there would be a real duel between player and
programmer.
Kouatly – It seems that the appearance of information technology

in the back offices has changed the cards. It seems it should reduce
uncertainty. But doesn’t it minimize a player’s influence, even negate
certain elements of surprise?
Karpov – Because of microcomputers, there is a big difference be-

tween the chess played in the 1970s and what is played today.
When you analyze a game, very often you feel the need to
refer to something you’ve read. You know it’s probably such and
such page from such and such book, but you don’t remember the
exact content of the page. Back then, in order to be sure to find
the correct reference, you had to have enormous documentation.

There were always a number of people on the team who did research
in the literature, even though it was time-consuming. I remember a
match with Korchnoi where we brought cases and cases of books on
chess—almost a ton. Among the books there was even an old one by
Capablanca dating from 1934 that I had brought along, because it
contained a lot of ideas and useful commentary.
Nowadays, all the literature fits on a microcomputer or at least
on a few CD-ROMS. There are very powerful search programs that
enable you to quickly find what you want. You can’t use them during
a game because games are not always adjourned, but the microcom-
puter is an incomparable analysis tool when you are preparing.
Kouatly – What happens when one player adopts the direct approach
and the other the indirect approach?
Phelizon – I would say that the Davids often win over the Goliaths.
Karpov – Or the judo practitioner usually holds more trump cards

than the boxer.
CHAPTER 4
Lateral Approach: Playing with

Finesse
No point in struggling. –
Psychologically disarm the
opponent. – Creating new solutions.
– Finesse vs. trickery. – Using
stratagem to win. – Determine the
breaking point. – Lateral approach
popular in economic world. –
Stratagems at the negotiating table.
– Approaches of Tallyrand, Kissinger,
Gromyko. – No leaks. – Thorough
analysis. – Prior preparation. –
Convince opponent to stop fighting.
Psychological handicaps are sometimes enough to decide the outcome of a
battle between two protagonists.
Paul Keres
Kouatly – All athletes know that competitions are won in the mind.
Rather than pitting physical strength against physical strength, there
is a third approach that Jean-François calls lateral, which favors the
psychological factors inherent to all confrontations, or as the military
say, morale.
Phelizon – That is obviously the most subtle approach, since, pushed

to its extreme, it consists of convincing the opponent that there is no
point in struggling, as he will without a doubt lose. Of course, every-
thing is in the “without a doubt.” When you are sure you are going
to lose, a negotiated surrender seems better that an unconditional
capitulation.
Kouatly – Doesn’t morale have to be at its lowest point to even con-

sider surrendering without a fight?
Phelizon – Of course, but this situation happens more often than you
think because it results from an objective analysis of strengths.
Kouatly – Why is that?
Phelizon – I would like to refer again to the classical Chinese au-

thors who recommend doing everything possible to avoid direct
confrontation with the enemy army. For them, a frontal attack, where
75
both armies proceed head on, is always risky and destructive. The art
of warfare consists, on the contrary, of depriving the adversary of his
defenses, sapping them from the inside, before any engagement even
takes place so that he crumbles on his own, his morale deflated. Sun
Tzu wrote, “The wise general is not the one who wins 100 victories in
100 battles, but the one who wins without fighting.”1
Since unnecessary and lengthy military operations are always
costly in both men and resources, it is by using this potential cost
that you might convince an adversary to surrender without fighting.
It is however better to address the very reasons for his hostility. That’s
why Sun Tzu recommends first attacking the enemy’s plans and his
strategy, then his alliances, his troops, and only then his strongholds.
The most successful general, he adds, is the one you don’t even
think of praising, since he defeats an enemy who is defeated in
advance.2
Therefore, if the lateral approach is usually the best ap-
proach, it is because it best demonstrates the principle of economy
of strength.
Kouatly – Using this as our premise, the next question is obviously

“how.” How can you convince the opponent that he will be “surely”
beaten?
Phelizon – Perhaps simply by words. As in the typical story of the fox

of the fable, who manages to outsmart the crow without striking a
blow. What does the fox want? He wants the piece of cheese that
the crow, perched in a tree, is holding in his beak. The fox cannot
adopt a frontal approach for fear the crow will fly away. So, he starts
flattering him and praising his beautiful song (no matter if what he
says is true or not). Thanks to this ruse, with this lateral approach, the
crow begins to sing and lets go of the cheese which the fox snatches
away.3
In the end, the fox defeats his opponent with his words. He
submits him to his ways without combat, which, as Sun Tzu believes,
is the ideal.
Karpov – In chess, convincing an adversary that he is beaten from the

start is not an easy task. I’m talking about very high-level champions,
of course. Journalists often ask if there is some kind of psychological
preparation to strengthen your self-control. The answer is no, except
Lateral Approach: Playing with Finesse 77
for rare instances. When it comes to technique, however, you arrive

in top form. Players who have won difficult contests are not easily
intimidated.
That being said, for this small number of players who make
up the elite at the world level, it is interesting to watch how a match
unfolds on the psychological level. From the start, each protagonist is
confident he can win. Just look at the famous games between Spassky
and Fischer, or some of my games against Korchnoi or Kasparov.
Consider in particular the famous world championship between
Capablanca and Alekhine.4 It was a very long match that lasted thirty-
six games (the winner was the first one to score six victories). Capa-
blanca kept saying that he would win and he was born to stay world
champion until he died. Alekhine, for his part, didn’t think for a
moment that Capablanca could beat him. Each was completely sure
of himself and convinced of his talent.
Kouatly – But “the art of war is the art of deceiving.”
Phelizon – Yes, that’s true. Long before Mahomet, Sun Tzu had said
it.5
Karpov – And that’s when the psychological aspect comes into play
between two uncontested champions.
In my case, after two or three games, I have a pretty good idea
of how an opponent I know feels about his positioning and what his
intentions are. His game is almost an open book for me and I know
how to influence him, even deceive him. I would guess that in the
business world, the same thing happens.
When you know the other party well, you probably have a
good idea what his intentions are. The arena is probably very much
like a chess championship. The best lawyers and the best bankers
assist veteran businesspeople. Both sides are usually talented and
convinced that they will end up signing an agreement that benefits
them. Neither one is ready to give up in advance. Obviously, that
doesn’t mean they won’t start maneuvering to psychologically disarm
the opposing team.
Phelizon – Since a negotiation consists of finding a compromise, the

final agreement reached is never considered ideal by the two op-
posing parties at the beginning. Both must give in a little. But, at
some point during the discussions, perhaps you say, “I can accept
what’s being offered. I could try to get more, naturally, but maybe
it’s best if I stop now before he changes his mind.” That’s one way of
“surrendering.” When you find yourself in that situation, everything
happens as if—your opponent having used sufficiently convincing
arguments—you feel that it would be useless to continue the duel
since you have achieved the main objective you had set for yourself.
The goal of a negotiation is to agree on the exchanges. You
are always free to accept the terms or not. In chess, the situation is
more complex because the players are not seeking to reach agree-
ment on a compromise. They can play the cat and mouse game as
well.
Kouatly – But negotiators sometimes reach an agreement very

quickly.
Phelizon – In very rare instances, both opponents reach a mutually

satisfactory “happy medium” very quickly. I say in “rare instances”
because this kind of agreement is largely based on trust, or on infor-
mation that both parties agree to share. In that case, the protagonists
are a bit like poker players who would put all their cards on the table
right up front.
I think only once in my life was I able to reach this “happy
medium” very quickly. We were in discussions to acquire a large
enterprise whose majority shareholder was a bank. This bank needed
cash, but because the tax bureau had granted it special tax benefits,
it couldn’t sell the majority of its holdings before a specific date
which was relatively far into the future. On our side, we didn’t want
to purchase a minority. We wanted to have control of the company
from the very first day and consolidate the totality of their figures
into our accounts.
After numerous discussions, together we came up with the
following solution: we agreed to purchase a minority share on the
day we signed the contract, with the remainder of the shares two
years later. On his end, the seller agreed to vote with us at Board and
Shareholder meetings as soon as the contract was signed. Having
thus control of the company from day one, our accountants autho-
rized us to consolidate our participation by total integration into our
accounts. And since he had only sold a minority of his shares, the
seller continued to take advantage of the special tax benefits. He
paid taxes on the profit only, at a reduced rate, when we made the
second payment.
Karpov – You are right to emphasize that this story is not the norm.
If both parties put all their cards on the table before even starting
discussions, no battle would ever take place, and no deal could be
made. A confrontation would theoretically be impossible. Of course
you can make overtures during a battle or be frank during a nego-
tiation, if only to show goodwill. But not all can be disclosed. Your
opponent cannot know everything. You must keep some secrets to
yourself.
Kouatly – In the fable from La Fontaine, the fox appears to be what

he is: a sly operator. But are deceit, trickery, and cunning desirable
traits?
Phelizon – The lateral approach stems from the usual behavior of

the strong over the weak. “Need, the doctor of stratagem,” La Fontaine
wrote somewhere.6
The notion of stratagem is not just of Chinese7 inspiration,
it is also Greek, Arab, and Russian. The Greeks used the word mètis:
wisdom, prudence, trickery. For them, mètis is used when there is no
obvious solution, no tried and true recipe, no best way, but rather
where the discovery of each hidden issue requires the creation of
a new solution, an innovative approach. And let’s remember that
Mahomet described war simply as “a series of actions designed to
trick the enemy.”
Because it derives from persuasion, the lateral approach has
therefore been favored in many cultures. It has, however, been
treated with suspicion in the Western world, thus adding to its ambi-
guity. This ambiguity is demonstrated very well by the French word
malin, which characterizes not only the fox in the fable but also Dame
Weasel and many other characters La Fontaine brought so well to
life. The word malin comes from the Latin malignus,8 and means
both mean/evil and sly/crafty. Besides, there is a “gray area” between
finesse and trickery. In a thesaurus, what would we find under the
word crafty? Words as diverse as subtle, artful, sharp, which are in no
way pejorative, but also sly, tricky, cunning, which most certainly are.
In the Europe of the Middle Ages, the code of knight-
hood recommended the frontal attack, and stratagems, which
were associated with the behavior and methods of the devil, were
anything if not suspect.9 They are only found in popular literature
like the Roman de Renard. It is true, though, that Louis XI was an
exception. He owes his kingdom to the traps he constantly set for all
his enemies, Charles the Bold in particular. A few years later, Nicolas
Machiavelli renewed the antique tradition of using stratagems, but
with additional emphasis. He made the psychological battle a result-
ing dimension of the art of war. Machiavelli however has always been
viewed with caution. The adjective Machiavellian says it all.
Karpov – In Russian, we have the word khitryi which means skillful, in-
genious, hard to read, crafty. But khitryi also means unscrupulous, wily, or
devious. Combine all of these traits into one and you have a character
that could be embodied by Nikita Krushchev.
And among the chess players, I think that the word khitryi
could describe a player like Petrosian.
Kouatly – Is it a term you would apply to yourself ?
Karpov – Me? No, I don’t think so . . . only under certain circum-

stances . . .
Kouatly – Isn’t a good negotiator more or less Machiavellian?
Phelizon – He would certainly be better served by Hermes—the god

of language—than by Ares—the god of war. I mean that he must
constantly be able to create stratagems. The essence of negotiation
is acting with finesse. All negotiations are battles with specific rules.
What are those rules? Obviously, honesty associated with respect for
the other and what he says (you must create an atmosphere of trust
with your counterpart); maintaining the dialogue at all costs (you
must create channels for passing messages before the situation is
blocked); and time management (you must spring your arguments
at the right time to create the effect of surprise).
Kouatly – When you are short on means, or when you want to save
your means, isn’t creating a stratagem the best thing to do?
Phelizon – A stratagem is a hidden action designed to surprise the

enemy; either he doesn’t see it, or the seduction has made him
myopic, or he even harbors illusions.
The purpose of this hidden action is clearly to lure, maneu-

ver, or destabilize the other, by putting him in a position that he had
not planned on assuming from the beginning. The soldier’s maneu-
ver when operating by surprise, the hunter’s trap and ambush, the
navigator’s art in bringing his ship safely to port against winds and
seas, the lawyer’s skillful wordplay in using his counterpart’s argu-
ment against him, the banker’s or salesperson’s resourcefulness as
he speculates on the market, the politician’s careful prudence in de-
termining which way public opinion will go. Stratagems preside over
all the activities where a person “must learn to manipulate hostile
forces, too powerful to be directly controlled, but that can be used
despite them, without ever confronting them head on, to achieve the
planned result through an unforeseen path.”10
Karpov – As I said previously, it is through the introduction of new

variations that you create surprise in chess. But you don’t come up
with a variation every day. A good stratagem consists of revealing it
at the perfect moment. That’s what khitryi is all about: retaining your
“secret thrust,” as they say in fencing, until you need it.
Let’s just suppose, for example, that you come up with an
interesting idea. You’ve carefully prepared it during your training
sessions. Some particularly impatient players will want to use it im-
mediately. Others will prefer to wait. Or, more subtly, they will reveal
it a little at a time, just to see how their opponent reacts. For at the
beginning, your opponent pays close attention to everything you do.
Then he gets used to your style. So, perhaps around the fourth or
fifth game, it’s a good time to throw in the variation. If you do it
that way, he won’t overreact. He won’t sense the danger because you
will have made him used to the fact that your novelties are relatively
harmless. But this time, it’s different. Your opponent is caught short;
you have completely tricked him.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL HANDICAP11

I think that basically Spassky lost this match for psychological reasons. I don’t know
why, but he seemed unsure of himself in his openings and also in the execution of the
strategies he chose. I am convinced that in some games, Spassky lost confidence in his
own ability, with the inevitable result that his fighting spirit was dulled. Psychological
handicaps are sometimes enough to decide the outcome of a battle between two
protagonists.
That’s what I did with Seirawan12 during a game played in

the early 1980s. I wrote a detailed commentary about it in one of
my books.13 When I unveiled my variation, Seirawan didn’t have a
chance. He forfeited very quickly. I remember also a stratagem that
I used during a match against Timman14 in 1979 in Montreal. He
saw his defense fall apart in a flash. I won easily. In both cases, I had
“managed” the element of surprise.
In chess, that’s what a stratagem is: a move that surprises the
opponent and with which you hit him at the worst possible time,
when his forces start to fade.
Kouatly – There is nothing immoral about using a stratagem?
Phelizon – Well, at least nothing amoral. For contrary to a direct ap-

proach, the use of a stratagem is not meant to destroy the opponent,
but to blur his vision of future events, to create chance in his mind, in
a word to “de-structure” him in order to better appropriate his forces
and resources.
So, a stratagem aims at deflecting the opponent’s vision at
the conceptual stage, not at the execution stage. By tricking him
instead of destroying him, the goal is to inhibit him, to deprive him
of his ability to react, to paralyze him. Beware, though, tricking is
not lying. It is more like displacing the issue, displacing the focus, or
more specifically blinding the adversary by unveiling the peripheral
in order to better hide the important.15
Let’s listen to Liddell Hart analyze the extremely risky— but
successful—landing of Wolfe against the French rear forces above
Quebec: “Baiting the enemy to draw him out of his reinforced posi-
tion was not enough; he had to be led and dragged far from there.
Another lesson was learned by the unsuccessful feints he used to try
to prepare his direct action: mystifying the enemy was not enough,
the enemy also had to be distracted, this term implying that his intel-
ligence needed to be fooled by a diversion, and that simultaneously
his freedom of movement needed to be sufficiently implicated that
it would be impossible for him to respond with all his forces being
spread out.”16 Baiting, mystifying, distracting: these are the essential
elements of a stratagem.
Kouatly – Are you also saying that the best way to neutralize the enemy
is to affect his morale?
THE ART OF CALCULATING PROBABILITIES17

A ruse is tricking someone into thinking you are there when you are not, that you
have this or that plan when you don’t—and with such probability that to face an
imaginary danger, the opponent (whose forces are obviously limited) takes precautions
that weaken him elsewhere, especially where you plan on striking. A ruse is the ability
to make the enemy change his calculation of the probabilities.
Phelizon – War comes to an end usually when one of the camps

believes they’ve lost. As Tang Zhen states so well, “He who knows how
to sow confusion among the enemy, reaps the victory.”18 So, it is not
enough to concentrate your forces, surprise the enemy, and attack
him at the perfect spot, you must also break his spirit to deliver the
decisive blow.
As long as his spirit is not broken, as long as the opponent
does not admit defeat, nothing is decided. The reed of the fable
withstands the storm because it is flexible.
Against the imposing army of Napoleon, Alexander I was vic-
torious in the end because he refused to admit he was beaten. When
attempting to paralyze your enemy, you must therefore determine
his breaking point, where he will go too far. It is because he is con-
vinced that engaging or pursuing the conflict is pointless that the
enemy finally surrenders and accepts the terms you seek to impose.
In a famous book, Stefan Zweig gave a very good description of the
precise moment when the enemy’s resolve begins to teeter. That’s
when the battle reaches what von Clausewitz called the Kulminations
Punkt, that point when the attacker’s forces are barely enough to keep
him on the defensive while waiting for the opponent to unleash his
counterattack.
WHEN CZENTOVIC NO LONGER UNDERSTANDS19

But, before looking away, something new and unexpected happened, Czentovic looked
up and examined our ranks. He was obviously trying to figure out who was suddenly
resisting with such energy. From that point on, our excitement was unleashed. If up
until then we had no hope, the idea of breaking Czentovic’s cold arrogance now made
our adrenaline pump. Our new friend had already decided on the next move. My fingers
were trembling when I grabbed the spoon to knock on the glass.
It was at that moment that we savored our first victory. The champion, who
had always played standing up, hesitated, and then finally sat down. With regret he
let himself fall heavily into his seat: no mind, he no longer showed his superiority by
dominating physically over us. We forced him to get on the same level as us, at least
spatially. He thought for a few moments, bent over the chessboard, so that we could
barely see his eyes, under dark lids. . . .
Kouatly – Words that correspond to strength moves are directive and

primary. What type of words are used for the lateral approach?
Phelizon – To influence morale strength, the language must be

metaphorical, using words that speak to the imagination. It’s the
language that conjures up images, the language of parables and
promises. Unlike words that incite, these words have broad meaning
and little depth.
Why is a metaphor convincing? Because far from specifying
the future in great detail to make it predictable, which character-
izes direction and prescription, it targets emotions. Like Bonaparte
telling the soldiers of the Italian army that the “plains of the Pô river
are the most fertile in the world,”20 or the new owner of a business in
trouble, when he tells his employees that their “situation will improve
considerably” after the restructuring efforts that he is asking them
to accept. The same is true of many political leaders who have no
qualms about promising their supporters “happy days ahead.” Since
the human heart is only sensitive to pictures—“a picture is worth
a thousand words,” says an old Eastern proverb—metaphorical lan-
guage is the only one that registers and is therefore by its very nature
believable. This is the language a strategist must adopt when he wants
the other to listen to him (or when he sets out to seduce him). And
it’s through metaphor that he can reinforce the morale of his own
troops and destroy those of the enemy.
Kouatly – Anatoly, how do you see the lateral approach in chess?
Karpov – To answer your question, I will tell you a personal story.

I happened to be pretty close to Korchnoi and his family, because
for four years we both lived in Leningrad. I even had a chance to
secretly help him prepare for the qualifying match for the world
championships. Why secretly? Because, at that time, Korchnoi was
the leader of the Trade Unions team and I was playing for the Red
Army team. Korchnoi was supposed to play the qualifying match

against Geller, the leader of the Red Army team. My trainer who was
also Geller’s trainer was very close to Korchnoi. He told me that we
could absolutely not help Korchnoi, but that I, on the other hand,
could help him train, on the condition that it remain a secret. So, I
had played quite a bit with Korchnoi and thus got to know him very
well. I knew that he never left anything to chance and was the kind of
perfectionist who wanted to be fully trained, feel in perfect health,
be confident that he had all the energy he needed, and demanded
that all of the conditions of the match be set by him.
A short time after, in 1974, I had to play an official match
against Korchnoi. We disagreed on where the match should take
place. I didn’t really care, but I knew it was an important issue to
him. Korchnoi wanted to play in Leningrad, or in a Baltic region
city, Riga or Talinn. I wasn’t too keen on Leningrad, since that’s
where Korchnoi was born, had a lot of friends, and was much better
known than I. It must be said also that our living conditions were a
lot different in those days. Korchnoi lived in a large apartment and
I still didn’t have a place of my own.
Kouatly – So, what were the cities that you finally chose?
Karpov – I offered Moscow or any city in the south of the Soviet

Union. The authorities realized that this match was important since
the winner would play Fischer. Moscow was interested and was heard
from, through the intermediary of the Minister of Sports and the
Moscow Chess Federation. But Korchnoi was immovable. After con-
ceding a few points in my favor, he told me: “In exchange for all my
concessions, go to Moscow and tell the minister you are okay with
playing in Leningrad.”
And that’s what I did. I met the minister on a Tuesday morn-
ing at 9:30 and told him that we had agreed on the conditions for
the match, including time and location: Leningrad. The minister
replied that he accepted all the proposals except for the location.
“We understood that the match would take place in Moscow. It has
been a while since a major competition was held in Moscow. That’s
the main reason we would like it there.” I told him that my agreement
with Korchnoi was a package deal. He had conceded the start time,
which was very important to me, but that in exchange I had to give
him Leningrad even though I preferred Moscow.
When I got back to my hotel, Korchnoi called me. He said

that he knew that I had met with the minister. I told him that I had
submitted our agreement to him, including time and location. That’s
when he said to me, “You know, I’ve thought about it and I don’t want
to play at 5:00 in the afternoon as we had agreed. I want to start the
match at 2:00.”
Kouatly – So, he was putting the agreement back on the table.
Karpov – Absolutely. I repeated to him, just as I had told the minister

three hours earlier that our agreement was a package deal and that
if he changed the time, I would change the location. “That’s your
right,” was his answer. And we started to argue.
I went back to the Minister of Sports and immediately re-
quested an urgent meeting. “What is it?” asked the minister, sur-
prised. I recounted my telephone conversation with Korchnoi and
told him that as long as the start time for the match was kept at
5:00 pm, the location wasn’t that important.
Kouatly – And was it Moscow?
Karpov – His response was that he would be very happy to organize

the match in Moscow and that of course, it would start at 5:00 pm
and that everything else would be as we had agreed upon originally.
That’s the match where I noticed the psychologist on my opponent’s
team and decided to add one to mine.
In this episode, I let someone else decide an issue that was
important to my opponent. The end of the story is well known: I won
the match and became the world champion the following year after
Fischer defected.
Kouatly – Let’s talk now about the ins and outs of the lateral ap-
proach. Jean-François, I suppose this is the approach that is the most
used in the business world.
Phelizon – The lateral approach is very popular in the economic

world. After all, what is establishing a clientele if not making po-
tential buyers get used to consumer behavior that presents obvious
advantages to the seller?
You could almost say that everything in business is a

stratagem. Here are a few very commonly used marketing stratagems:
r The Brand Loyalty Stratagem—the goal of which is to create famil-

iarity, tie a specific consumer to a specific brand. It comes from the
evidence that repetition is often enough to convince.
r The Detergent Stratagem—the goal here is to attract customers
by offering something new, selling the same product under differ-
ent names or in different packages. For example, selling the same
detergent with different additives, and therefore different prices.
r The Airline Stratagem—which targets a weak spot. First you seg-
ment the market, then you exploit strong demand in a closed
segment, and therefore a need. For example, plane tickets bought
at the last minute for a peak time are sold at the highest price.
r The Drugstore Strategem—which consists of grouping an offer
including “good” and “bad” products, or selling a common product
expensively because you value a service that comes with it, for
example, by extending store hours.
r The Imitation Stratagem—which consists of closely analyzing the
competition (new products and new services) and putting out sim-
ilar products shortly after them. More colloquially, it’s “riding the
competition’s coattails” in all his innovations.
Here are a few more, often used at the negotiating table:
r The Friendship Stratagem—which consists of smothering your

counterpart with all kinds of considerate attentions to better attack
him after. In a sense it amounts to strengthening the relationship
to hide the competition.
r The Star System Stratagem—which consists of intimidating the
other, and sometimes even threatening him. The star takes up
the entire stage and doesn’t hesitate to flaunt his mood swings. By
impressing the others he hopes to get what he wants.
r The Detour Stratagem—which consists of allying yourself with a
friend of the other party. As I mentioned before, you make all
kinds of friendly overtures to the opponent’s lawyer or banker so
that, if needed, he can be a friendly messenger.
r The Hostage Stratagem—this is a very old stratagem. In ancient

times, it consisted of kidnapping your enemy’s most beautiful slave
to provoke negotiations. Nowadays, you need only buy a bunch of
company shares or entice a few key executives away before advising
the Board that you’re ready to negotiate.
Karpov – I think that all these stratagems, some of which are very
khitryi, can be applied to many other situations than those found in
the business world, and especially in chess.
Kouatly – More generally—what are the main ways to run a negotia-

tion?
Phelizon – When using the lateral approach, there are three main
ways to handle a negotiation. The first is the one used by Talleyrand.21
It consists of getting the other party to accept a principle and then
having him draw all the consequences with you. The second one is
the one used by Kissinger.22 It amounts to determining the points
of antagonism and then to bring them closer, degree by degree,
until an agreement is reached. Finally, the third is the one used by
Gromyko,23 where you start by demonstrating to the opponent that
the problem to be addressed is his problem, and then convince him
that you are willing to resolve it.
Kouatly – Other than stratagems, are there principles applicable to

all negotiations?
Phelizon – There are many authors who have offered suggestions.

Here is a sample of current thinking:
r When your opponent wants to attack, think instead about negoti-

ating. When he tries to negotiate, go on the attack.
r Try to draw him off his position and surprise him with unusual
arguments. That is the best way to discover his intentions.
r If you have the advantage and your opponent is tired, pressure him
to conclude without giving him time to regroup.
r Always be ready to negotiate but never negotiate without being
ready.
r Remember that even if an agreement needs to be reached in public,

it must always be negotiated in secret.
r Never unilaterally give away something you could use as a bargain-
ing chip.
r Never let your adversary underestimate your response to a threat.
r Never announce beforehand what you will not do.
r Always give your opponent a way to retreat without losing face.24
I think these principles are pertinent. I would like to stress, however,

the one I find the most important and that is never announce beforehand
what you will not do.
Kouatly – How can you guarantee a negotiation will remain secret

when, sometimes, dozens of people know about it?
Phelizon – You must be extremely clear, and sometimes even brutal

with the back-office teams. I recall that during one of the acquisi-
tions of a publicly held company, we made everyone who knew of
our discussions, even those only remotely aware, such as lawyers,
bankers, employees both hourly and nonsalaried, sign a letter re-
minding them of their nondisclosure obligations and specifying that
we would hold them personally and legally responsible in the event
of a “leak.” Result: nothing appeared in the press before the official
announcement.
Kouatly – In a chess game, just as in negotiation sessions, it seems

that you go through pressure periods where everything is at stake,
and more relaxed periods where you observe each other.
Karpov – During those difficult times where everything is at stake, you

must be very mindful of the signals that you unconsciously project
and the words you choose. Gestures sometimes betray optimism, con-
tentment, doubt, or fatigue. These are signs that a seasoned adversary
can exploit.
Phelizon – More generally, all negotiators know these “innings” that

indicate the alternating phases of construction and destruction.
Sometimes a negotiator has to be constructive, look for a compro-
mise, try to resolve an issue by being flexible. Sometimes he has
to be destructive, refuse a compromise, minimize the opponent’s

overtures and make him expose himself. All negotiations are led
with a savvy dose of these two contradictory attitudes that aim at
putting your opponent off balance.
Executive strategy books tell you not to play the game by your
competitor’s rules. Surprise him by changing the rules. “If you are
constantly being surprised by your enemy, the signal is clear: you have
a defensive strategy, you’re reacting. You must change. A proactive
strategy is one that constantly takes the enemy by surprise and puts
him on the defensive.”25
Kouatly – Does a chess player need to have a sense of compromise?
Karpov – No, I don’t think it has a place in a chess match.
Kouatly – Sometimes, a simple turnaround is enough to surprise your

adversary or escape a dangerous situation.
Phelizon – Of course. I once had to negotiate the sale of a major

business branch in my company. The opposing team was difficult
and discussions ran practically nonstop for a good twenty days. One
evening, the discussion covered the accounting for leasings in the
consolidated balance sheet. After a certain threshold, these were nor-
mally considered debts: but the threshold hadn’t been determined
during the preceding sessions.
So, I announced that some leasings didn’t appear on the bal-
ance sheet, emphasizing that the rents attached to these leasings
were recorded in the results. My counterpart did not take this well.
He started by saying that he was quite surprised by this announce-
ment, then gradually started to get angrier until finally he shouted
that all of this was a “disgrace.” He was angry and made a move
to get up. I could have let him, but I would have put myself in
a weak position and run the risk of being forced to have to con-
cede another point. Instead, as cool as a cucumber, I said, “I’m not
sure the word ‘disgrace’ really applies to this situation, or perhaps
I don’t understand all the subtleties of the English language.” Ev-
eryone at the table burst out laughing and the issue of leasings was
dropped.
Kouatly – Chinese authors could say that the art of negotiation

consists of transforming the “fulls” into “empties” and vice versa.
Phelizon – Yes, that’s another way of looking at the lateral approach.

We said before that it is more economical than the other two ap-
proaches. It is also the one that gives you the most freedom of ac-
tion. This is where the notions of “fulls” and “empties” come in. For
there are approximately two ways to disrupt your opponent’s anal-
ysis: dissuasion and suggestion. Dissuasion aims at decreasing your
adversary’s determination, therefore “emptying the full” by destroy-
ing his morale. Conversely, suggestion aims at creating illusion by
suggesting dangers to your opponent where they don’t really exist,
therefore “filling his voids” and making him worry.
Kouatly – When playing chess, you always try to plan a few moves
ahead. How does a player know that his analysis is more thorough
than his opponent’s?
Karpov – He can never be sure. For the mind doesn’t work like a
computer.
Actually, everything begins with the match preparation.
That’s when you determine your potential strengths and weaknesses
in relation to the player you face. That’s how you determine your
openings. After that, you go through an in-depth analysis of your
opponent. What are his favorite moves? How does he react to some-
thing new? What are his personality flaws? Then you begin to design
your attack plan, your strategy.
It’s only after all this that you can actually begin the in-depth
analysis. When you have decided how you will wage your battle, you
should be prepared to anticipate your opponent’s moves. You should
be able to get into his head, play like him. So, actually, there are four
parts: what you want to do, how your adversary will react, what you
think he wants to do, and how you will react. In the final analysis it
will be styles that you have to grasp.
When you are sitting across from a flesh and blood opponent,
his game should be as familiar to you as possible. And that’s how, and
only how, you can deepen your analysis.
Kouatly – How long on average does the preparation you describe

take?
Karpov – It is a lengthy and difficult job, and depends obviously on

the player you are meeting. It usually takes me between four to twelve
weeks of very intensive work.
Kouatly – To be able to anticipate a few moves ahead seems to me a

consistent factor in any battle.
Phelizon – Yes, people in the military say that the best strategist is
the one who is best prepared to anticipate a situation. If a stratagem
manages to influence destiny, it is because it is firmly ahead of events.
That’s how it manages to thwart the opponent’s moves almost as soon
as he conceives them. Conversely, the worst way to wage war is to
immobilize armies face to face, with no room to maneuver. Because
losing the freedom to act results in the loss of initiative.
Kouatly – Some personalities are more prone to analysis, some are

more intuitive. Do you find different playing styles from country
to country? Do Latin players like Capablanca play differently from
Anglo-Saxon players like Fischer or Kasparov?
Karpov – In chess, there are styles and approaches, but there are
also national characteristics. In Russia, these last years, we’ve had
very good players, but no exceptional players, which is a problem.
In Germany and Japan, high-level players can master technique but
they sometimes seem to have trouble when they find themselves in a
new situation. This is not the case for the Russians. For centuries, we
have always considered that laws were made to be broken. Perhaps,
that is why we tend to be so creative.
I don’t think that Kasparov has what could be called an Anglo-
Saxon style. True, he is very analytical, but he can also be creative.
His problem may be that he doesn’t like to take risks because he
is afraid to lose. If he faces a player for whose style he hasn’t been
able to get a feel, he can be so uncomfortable that he prefers to
forfeit.
Kouatly – Can you say something about the national styles of Indian
and Chinese players?
Karpov – The general consensus is that chess was invented in In-

dia. They had excellent players in the nineteenth century. There
were many less in the twentieth century, I am not really sure why.
Anand is an exception. He possesses prodigious memory and physi-
cal stamina. I think his weakness lies perhaps in preference for the
lateral approach. Like many Indians, he does not seem to like direct
confrontation. But lately I’ve noticed a change. He’s become a little

less kyitryi. . . .
For a long time, and still today, the Chinese have played
a very interesting form of chess with two teams of sixteen pawns
moving on a large board made up of nine by ten spaces with a “river”
that separates both camps.26 The Chinese therefore have really only
been playing international chess for about thirty years and have only
started participating in international competition since 1975–1976.
Today’s Chinese players are making rapid progress. One day they
should be at the highest level of world competition.
Kouatly – There is a final moment that ends all battles and negotia-
tions. What is the attitude of the parties at that moment?
Phelizon – The last session of a negotiation always has a very par-

ticular atmosphere. Both parties talk about deal breakers, but no
one really believes it. Then it’s up to the last issue in contention,
sometimes bitterly disputed, as if they wanted the game to continue.
I remember the last session of a negotiation, where, after a
number of weeks of discussion, everything was settled except the very
final price. It was a Wednesday, and it was about 3:00 in the morn-
ing. Everyone wanted to get some rest after a series of exhausting
“all-nighters.” The sale price I was asking was 5,650 million francs,
but I could go down to 5,600. The buyer had offered 5,600 but re-
fused to go any higher. We had taken several breaks and everyone
was dug into their position.
What should I do? Should I accept 5,600 or keep fighting?
As we were coming back into the room after a break, I approached
my counterpart and said in a confidential tone. “You say yes to 5,625
and I’ll take you all to dinner after the closing.” He looked at me for
a moment and shook my hand. A few weeks later both teams went to
dinner at one of the best restaurants in Paris. My bill was huge, but
it was well worth the 25 million francs I managed to “nibble” at the
last minute.
Kouatly – Listening to the both of you, I get the impression that the
lateral approach gets your vote.
Karpov – It doesn’t get all my votes, but it certainly shouldn’t be

ignored, far from it.
In order to become a chess player at the highest level, you

must be capable of finding original, winning moves at the right time.
What makes the difference between a good player and an excep-
tional player is his ability to vary his approach. Sometimes he’ll barge
ahead, sometimes he’ll “play” with the strengths and weaknesses of
his opponent, and other times he will be more subtle and employ a
stratagem. For me, this diversity in approach is what constitutes the
real strength of a player.
Phelizon – One of the advantages of the lateral approach is that it

doesn’t automatically lead to the destruction of the adversary, but
rather, as I’ve said, to his “destructuring.” By favoring the destruction
of his morale over his physical strength, the strategist kills two birds
with one stone. He doesn’t content himself with impeding the enemy;
he gets stronger at his detriment.
It is only too well known how efficient shadow combats can
be over time when they are led with determination. It is undeniably
true that no form of warfare exploits the weaknesses of an adversary
like guerilla warfare.
A CONFUSING RULE27
Fighters in the brush create contingencies: that’s the idea behind the ambush. Areas of
groves, woods, brush, gorges, when occupied by a moving population, spontaneously
apply this method of multiplying hazards far from any front or war zone. Regular
troops consider that these guerillas are not playing by the rules, even though they
follow with intelligence the laws of probability, which are the fundamental laws of any
confrontation be it in a game, sales, debate, politics, or war.
The lateral approach is more subtle and less immediate than

the direct approach, or even the indirect approach, because it pre-
supposes that you can convince the opponent to stop fighting. Obvi-
ously, that is only possible by taking into account the time factor and
all the psychological factors that could influence him.
But this third approach is more effective than the other two
and is a better response to the principle of economizing your strength
that Marshall Foch considered so important. That is the reason why
it is often adopted when you dispose of forces that are considerably
weaker than those of the opponent. In an open game, the balance of
forces is irrelevant and, just like David slaying Goliath, it is possible for
the weak to beat the strong. Furthermore, when using finesse, time
can be an ally. The lateral approach plays precisely on the progressive
whittling down, or attrition, of the enemy’s strength.
That being said, I agree with Anatoly when he says that the
lateral approach cannot get all the votes. First, it is difficult to im-
plement since the protagonists are on an even level from the psy-
chological standpoint. It is obviously easier to decide a war than to
convince your adversary that it is in his best interest to negotiate a
compromise. It also assumes excellent “intelligence,” not only as to
the moves of the opponent, but also as to his intentions and even
his beliefs. To create an illusion for someone, you must get at the
emotional level. Finally, and most importantly, the lateral approach
does not guarantee a sure win. Nothing says that the opponent will
let himself be convinced to throw in the towel. Even worse, he can
himself create confusion by his own finesse moves.
A battle of stratagems can quickly become a combat where
the clearest mind and the shrewdest intelligence prevail. In that
sense, the winner of the combat is the one who can best exploit a
paradoxical, disadvantageous, or even desperate situation.
The winner is the one who can best turn contradictions to
his advantage.
Kouatly – You mean by modifying the rules if necessary?
Phelizon – Playing with finesse is managing to detour the other’s will,

and use not only his physical forces but also his mind, his goodwill,
his own determination against him.
The lateral approach is essentially dissuasive or suggestive
and amounts to making the adversary react, which in any event will
make him vulnerable. For he will be forced to modify his strategy, his
own game plan, or at least adopt a new game plan different from the
one he originally devised.
CHAPTER 5
After Victory, Look Ahead
Digest victories and defeats, learn from them.

– Stay modest. – Extend thanks to the team. –
Keep motivation up. – Psychology can benefit
but not replace technique. – Learn substance,
form, and method. – Innovate. – Don’t lose
sight of the objective. – Chess and business:
intellectual labyrinth.
After victory, tighten your helmet cord.
Japanese proverb
Kouatly – Let’s take a look now at the situation after the battle. The
winning team starts by celebrating its victory. What next?
Karpov – After the victory, life goes on!

I am myself a bit of an exception among chess players.
Russians love to celebrate their victories. And they are not always
very objective when they explain the reasons for their victories or
failures. I’m not really sure why, but I have always been very differ-
ent. I am not very Russian when it comes to that. Actually, I’m a little
indifferent about winning, or losing; in any case I harbor no illusions
either way. I think I just know how to remain very pragmatic.
If I win, I try to understand why. If I lose, I tell myself there
will be other occasions to win in the future. I know that even if I won
ninety matches out of a hundred that I play, I would still have lost ten.
As soon as you begin the battle, you become somewhat philosophical
and realize that you can’t always win.
Also, all battles are not of equal importance. You must be able
to distinguish which are of consequence and which are not.
Kouatly – But you do celebrate your victories a little.
Karpov – For a long time, I never organized a party at the end of

a competition. I’m lucky in that I can regroup very quickly after
a big effort. That’s why I’ve been able to participate in so many
99
tournaments in my life while staying at the head of the group of

world-class players. After completing a tournament, I can go right
on to the next one almost without stopping. Spassky once said that
every time he competed in a world championship, he lost a year of
his life. That’s not how it’s been for me. Even after the most difficult
fights that I’ve had to wage during my thirty-year career, I’ve always
been able to get back to work within two or three weeks. Often,
someone will congratulate me on a recent victory that I’d almost
forgotten about because I was already engaged in a new battle.
I think that you can’t spend your life rehashing your victories,
or your defeats. You must learn to digest them and forget them.
I’ve long believed that a victory might be good for your image and
reputation, but won’t help insure your future career. So, as they say,
“After a victory, it is time to tighten your helmet.”1
Phelizon – La Fontaine also wrote, “An insolent victor works towards

his defeat.”2 After a confrontation, clearly both parties need to remain
realistic. And what does that mean? It means that a battle is at best
just one of the episodes that mark a history. So, for the losing camp,
it is a time to regroup. And for the winning camp, it is a time to think
about what comes next. Losing a battle is not the end of a story, and
neither is winning. There will always be other challenges.
Achieve and win are verbs that must be used with an object.
You cannot use “achieve” all by itself, nor “win” all by itself. You only
achieve a milestone in a career, and win within the framework of a
strategy. You must therefore know how to exploit a victory or a defeat.
Let’s remember Maharbal’s famous, foreshadowing reply to Hanni-
bal after the battle at Cannes: “The Gods did not give everything to
the same man. Hannibal, you know how to win, but not profit from
your victory.”3
THE BATTLE OF CANNES4

The next morning, Varron led his troops out of the camp and offered to fight; it was just
the battle Hannibal was hoping for. As was the custom for both parties, the infantry
was placed in the center and the cavalry on the wings, but Hannibal’s lineup, considered
closely, was unusual; he advanced the Gauls and the Spaniards who formed the center
of the infantry line, whereas he kept his elite African soldiers at the rear, placed at each
end of the line. The Gauls and the Spaniards created a sort of natural magnet attracting
After Victory, Look Ahead 101
the Roman infantry, and as anticipated, they were overrun, so that the Carthaginian
line which had been approximately convex turned concave.
Encouraged by this apparent first success, the Roman legionnaires crowded
into the breach; the backup grew denser and denser to the point where the Romans
could barely wield their weapons. And, even though they thought they had already
caved in the Carthaginian front, they were actually advancing deeper and deeper into
the enemy mass. At that moment, Hannibal’s veteran African troops converged on
the center from the two wings, a move that automatically resulted in enveloping the
Romans on each other.
This maneuver created a situation and a trap similar to the one experienced
at sea at Salamine; but at Cannes this maneuver was better prepared and calculated.
This move could be called “the tactic of collective jiû-jitsu,” jiû-jitsu being essentially
based on the indirect approach.
Duringthistime,ontheleftwing,Hannibal’sheavycavalryshreddedtheenemy
cavalry; then sweeping everything on the Roman rear guard, it scattered the other
wing’s cavalry which had been contained by the light Numidian cavalry, particularly
well suited to skirmishes. The pursuit having been entrusted to the Numidians, the
heavy cavalry dealt the final blow by charging onto the rear of the Roman infantry.
Already surrounded on three sides and too crowded, they offered no resistance at all.
At that point, the battle degenerated into a massacre: by Polybe’s account,
of the 76,000 men in the Roman army, 70,000 fell, among them Paul-Émile. Varron was
able to escape unharmed from the disaster for which he was responsible.
Kouatly – So, in essence, you both advise the winner to stay modest
and the loser to look up.
Karpov – Yes, in all instances, it is best to forget the battle and get
right back to hard work.
But this doesn’t just apply to chess or business. I would make
the same recommendation to a soldier, an athlete, a politician, or a
movie star.
Rather than bask in success, it is certainly better as
Jean-François said to be humble to the experience.
Kouatly – Are there often debriefing sessions after a winning negoti-

ation or a chess match?
Phelizon – In a large company, negotiations come one after the other.

Some go well, others not so well, and still others fail. After a successful
operation, I agree with Anatoly that showy events should be avoided
and that press releases issued by both sides at the conclusion of a

deal should always be accurate and succinct.
I also think that the team leader should assemble his team and
start by thanking everyone for their hard work. The back-office often
gives their all, if only by working long hours, and I think that should
be recognized. Next, he should go over the sequence of discussions
with their high points and the reasons for a decision having gone one
way or the other. The members of his team can then tell him what
they did or tried to do and discuss the difficulties they encountered
and how they could improve.
But, don’t get me wrong. While the debriefing session is im-
portant, it’s not as much to “give back to Caesar” as to keep the team
motivated and willing to perform the next time. Selecting and moti-
vating a team before, making few changes during, keeping it together
after, this is what I think the general attitude should be.
Karpov – After a match, of course I am happy to go have a drink

with my team and thank them for their help. But when everything
has gone well, I don’t conduct a debriefing with my colleagues. I
reserve the postmortems for the times when we have not done well.
Then we analyze every move in detail and draw conclusions for the
future.
Kouatly – Does the team psychologist participate in this meeting?
Karpov – No, these meetings are technical and would be of no inter-

est to the psychologist. I usually see him one on one, very little before
or after a competition; mostly between matches.
Kouatly – So, if the psychologist doesn’t participate in the match

preparation, his role is mainly tactical.
Karpov – In the chess world there are different kinds of competi-

tion. There are matches, tournaments, and games. In my life, I have
participated in more than 200 matches, eleven of which were world
championships, and countless tournaments. For quite a while I have
been convinced that psychology plays a major part in matches. It’s
different for a tournament. You meet many different players and ev-
erything is more technical, even if from time to time you can use some
stratagems, especially for opening moves. But, in a match, especially
at the highest levels of world championships, psychological aspects

are crucial and can determine the outcome of the confrontation.
You must therefore take into account these psychological
aspects when you are creating the general strategy you will deploy in
your game plan. And you must view them differently for every game
you play. What I mean by this is that there is a strategic psychology
and a tactical psychology. The first applies to the positional game.
It helps you determine the general framework for your action. The
second applies to the combination game. It helps you continue to
play, and especially keep the advantage. In order to combine all
these psychological aspects at each stage of the match, you must not
only establish a “psychological profile” of the opponent, but also
determine that of all those who assist him. By knowing what the op-
ponent’s advisor might recommend to his boss, you will be in a better
position to understand the ins and outs of the battle you are waging.
Kouatly – Simply put, which is better: excellent psychological anal-

ysis and average technique, or average psychological analysis and
excellent technique?
Karpov – There are many works of fiction in Russian literature. One

of them tells the story of a very creative and khitryi man who wanted
to be a millionaire. He arrived one day in a small village in Oural
and introduced himself to the local chess club as a grand master
from Moscow. Despite the fact that he barely knew how to move the
pawns on the board, he made an offer to the president of the club
to give a class to the best players in town before participating in an
exhibition match with them. The class was a great success because
the man was an excellent speaker. For two hours he showed his
captivated audience that if Peter is a good chess player and Paul a
bad one, nothing will make Paul win. The exhibition match on the
other hand was not such a success.
All of this is to demonstrate that psychology can be a great
benefit to technique but certainly not replace it.
During a famous match in Moscow, Capablanca played oppo-
site a much weaker but very cunning player. During one whole game,
this player made Capablanca think that the best he was hoping for
was a draw. When Capablanca suddenly realized this opponent was
actually on the verge of beating him, it was too late. He lost the
match—and confounded the odds.
Phelizon – In the business world, I don’t think that is the way it works.
If you have excellent psychology and average technique, you can
easily get rich. But if you have average psychology and excellent
technique, it’s a good bet that you’ll be doing the same job for the
rest of your life.
Kouatly – Jean-François, what advice would you give a beginner about

to jump into a negotiation?
Phelizon – I would make the distinction between substance, form,

and method. When it comes to substance, I would tell him that
credibility is a success factor that must be cultivated. You can easily
lose credibility by making promises that you won’t keep or threats
that you won’t enforce. But it can also be harmed by unrealistic
proposals, especially for price or service.
As to form, I would insist that any dollar issue can be negoti-
ated. You have to learn to be displeased with a number, regardless of
the amount, and systematically ask if the other party can do better.
What should constantly be going through your mind is, “This is all
well and good, but can you make another effort?”
Finally, when it comes to method, I suggest keeping two lists:
one for the issues both parties agree on and cannot be renegotiated,
and the other for the items in contention. Discussions should con-
centrate on exchanging points for others on the second list, with
each partial agreement completing the first list.
So, to sum up, it seems to me that in order to efficiently lead
a successful negotiation, you must concentrate on form as much as
substance, the way to lead discussions as much as the object of the
deal.
Kouatly – How about you Anatoly? What are the two or three pieces
of advice you would like to pass on to a young hopeful?
Karpov – What I would tell him is that you have to work hard and do
everything possible to be innovative. It is very important to develop
your own ideas. That is the best way to develop self-confidence.
I can’t remember how many new moves I came up with during
my thirty-year career. I always have one or two in reserve. There was
one that I had conceived for a specific opponent and that I kept to
myself for a long time, at least eight years.
So, study and innovate, but also fight. Study continuously as

if time was counted and always fight as if victory were unattainable.
STUDY AND FIGHT5

If you are trying to learn to play chess through books, you will soon discover that only
the opening and ending moves can give a complete schematic description of this game.
The game’s immense complexity right after that beginning defies all description. It is
only by seriously studying the way the masters play that you can fill the holes in your
knowledge.
Kouatly – More generally, it is possible to conceive of tactics that are

not at the service of strategy?
Phelizon – Strategy in the sense that I understand it should be the

ultimate concern of the one in charge. His job should be to constantly
review and assess, leading him to establish and refine his vision of
the future. This vision appears both improbable at the beginning
and necessary after the fact, but it will however become his destiny.
He will not stop putting it into the perspective of a strategic action.
Let’s take the example of a business that wants to grow in the
distribution sector: that’s the president’s vision. Putting this vision in
perspective might include the acquisition of a number of businesses
within the sector. But a specific acquisition will only be one episode
in the life of this business. That is how Compagnie de Saint-Gobain
acquired first Poliet and Lapeyre in France, then Meyer in Great
Britain, and finally Raab Karcher in Germany. These three “battles”
were led within a specific strategy: to make this group the European
leader in Building Products Distribution.
It has been my opinion for a while now that strategy should
be assimilated to a direction, a path taken together. The Chinese
character dào synthesizes the meaning of strategy in that sense.6 Dào
means road, path, doctrine—and by extension to lead or teach. And
what is strategic action if not advancing a group within the framework
of a “doctrine” meaning an action plan?
So, it is in light of the dào that one must understand what a
battle is. It is a collective action undertaken within the framework of a
given strategy. The consequence of all this is that you must never lose
sight of the object you pursue. Your opponent might try to lead you
astray, use rhetorical wizardry, or try to seduce you. In short, make a

lot of useless noise. No matter. This should not detract you from the
objective you set for yourself and that you must constantly consult,
like a compass.
Kouatly – Some directions are more respectable than others. Should

any kind of moral connotation be assigned to strategic action? Of the
three approaches we discussed together, is there one that you find
more “moral” than the others?
Phelizon – I am tempted to say that in the heat of action, morality is

silent. By this however, I don’t mean that a CEO can disregard ethical
behavior, quite the contrary. Nor can he consider using immoral
means to win. I only mean that when engaged in a battle, you are ipso
facto on ground that is not that of morality.
It would be a mistake to favor one approach over another
under the pretext that it is more “ethical.” Who is to say that in a
given context it is more ethical to destroy your enemy (direct action),
use his strength without him knowing (indirect action), or lead him
astray (lateral action)?
It is true that the natural human tendency is to use force.
The direct approach is at the same time more instinctive and more
“brilliant” than the others. Conversely, wisdom leads you more likely
to adopt a lateral approach, at least in the beginning. It is harder to
implement, but much more economical in means. This is how war
can be considered the last solution.
Kouatly – Whatever the approach used to wage a battle, it would seem

that the psychological components play a deciding part.
Karpov – Yes, I truly believe that and I hope that this little book has
been able to convince the reader that once the strategy is defined
and the game plan established, the high-level player must also show
a sense of finesse if he truly wants to win.
Phelizon – The three approaches that we have analyzed together as-

sume to varying degrees that you have a good knowledge of your
opponent. Therefore they cannot be chosen in a void.
Every action, even lateral, has a response. For example, antic-
ipation might be enough to prevent your opponent from pursuing
his objective and completely negate his preparations; dependency

might keep him from accumulating resources or objections to use
in his action or his rhetoric; division can disturb his movements as
he tries to concentrate his forces; avoidance can reduce his freedom
of movement and even perhaps dissuade him from attacking; delays
might in some instances foil the effect of surprise. In my opinion,
all of these parries, executed at the correct moment, are a show of
finesse. It is not enough for them to be used at the appropriate time.
They must also be adapted to the physical and mental state of the
opponent.
Karpov – An image that comes to my mind, linking chess, negotia-

tions, and business in general, is that of the labyrinth. Chess resem-
bles an intellectual labyrinth in the sense that every time you open
a door you find yourself faced with ten new doors that open onto
the unknown. What playing chess teaches you is that you don’t really
have to know what you should do, but you do have to know what
you should absolutely not do. That is how instinctively you will avoid
some of the doors in the labyrinth.
Negotiations or business in general is also like a labyrinth.
Every opened door gives way to more doors, every opportunity gives
way to new opportunities. And just like chess, it is more important
to determine with precision the opportunities you are not interested
in than those you are. If I could paraphrase the Nixon precept that
Jean-François cited earlier, “Always know ahead of time what you
don’t want.” It isn’t that easy and here again, only experience can
whisper which roads you should not take.
I think that these five conversations have amply demonstrated
that to have the best chance of winning, you must not only be well
prepared, well informed, and well versed in the tactical aspects of
combat, but you must also include the psychological profile of your
opponent in the battle plan, or the exchange. For only a sense of
finesse can assure the time and means management, without which
a victory or an agreement could only be the result of chance.
APPENDIX
World Chess Champions Recognized

by the World Chess Federation∗
1 Wilhelm Steinitz 1886–1894

2 Emanuel Lasker 1894–1921
3 Jose-Raul Capablanca 1921–1927
4 Alexandre Alekhine 1927–1935
5 Machgielis (Maz) Euwe 1935–1937
Alexandre Alekhine 1937–1945
6 Mikhaı̈l Botvinnik 1948–1957
7 Vasily Smyslov 1957–1958
Mikhaı̈l Botvinnik 1958–1960
8 Mikhaı̈l Tal 1960–1961
Mikhaı̈l Botvinnik 1961–1963
9 Tigran Petrosian 1963–1969
10 Boris Spassky 1969–1972
11 Robert James (Bobby) Fischer 1972–1975
12 Anatoly Karpov 1975–1985
13 Garry Kasparov 1985–1993
Anatoly Karpov 1993–1999
14 Alexander Khalifman 1999–2000
15 Viswanathan (Vishy) Anand 2000–2002
16 Ruslan Ponomariov 2002–
∗ For more details, please consult the World Chess Federation Web site at www.fide.com.
Notes
PROLOGUE: ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A WINNING POSITION

1. José Raul Capablanca (1888–1942) was world champion from
1921 to 1927.
2. Gosplan, abbreviation of Gossoudarstvennyı̈ Planovyı̈komitet:
Soviet department created in 1921 to create five-year economic devel-
opment plans and administer their execution.
3. Mikhail Moiseyevich Botvinnik (1911–1995) was the U.S.S.R.
champion seven times from 1931 to 1952, and world champion from
1948 to 1957, 1958 to 1960, and 1961 to 1963.
4. Boris Vasilievich Spassky (born in 1937) was world champion from
1969 to 1972, the year in which he relinquished the title to Bobby Fischer
in a widely publicized match.
5. Viktor Lvovich Korchnoi (born in 1931) was international grand
master in 1956. Despite never having won the world championship, he
is often considered one of the greatest players of the twentieth century.
6. Sun Tzu, ca. 500 b.c., famous Chinese general; Karl von Clause-
witz, 1780–1831, Prussian general and military strategist; Ferdinand
Foch, 1851–1929, French military leader and Allied Supreme Com-
mander during WW1; Basil Liddell Hart, 1895–1970, British military
historian and strategist.
7. 722–481 b.c.
8. The Japanese have a particular way of conducting meetings. De-
cisions are often the object of a consensus established ahead of time by
the protagonists, even before a formal decision meeting has been set.
112 Notes
This practice, called nemawashi (prior discussion), is designed to give

the main participants time to smooth over their differences.
9. The first ten moves of a match can be played in about 1.6
quadrillion ways.
10. Stephan Zweig, The Chess Player, Le Livre de Poche, 1991, pp. 22–
23.
11. François-André Danican Philidor (1726–1795) was a musical
prodigy and the best player of his time. At twenty-two, he published
Analysis of the Game of Chess, which has remained a classic.
CHAPTER 1: PREPARING FOR BATTLE

1. A. Karpov, Chess, Learning and Progressing, Economica, 1993, p. 97.
2. La Fontaine, Fables, I, 17.
3. See J.C. Humes, Nixon’s Ten Commandments of Leadership and Nego-
tiation, Touchstone, 1997, pp. 43–44.
4. Robert “Bobby” James Fischer (born in 1943) was the U.S. cham-
pion at fourteen, and the world champion from 1972 to 1975, when he
relinquished the title to Karpov for refusing to play under the rules of the
WCF (World Chess Federation), organizer of the world championships.
5. F. Walder, Saint-Germain or Negotiating, Gallimard, 1958, pp. 39–40.
6. Kliment Iefremovitch Vorochilov (1881–1969), politician and
marshal of the Soviet army, commanded the Northwest front of the
Red Army during World War II.
7. Zheng: balanced, normal, regular; qi: extraordinary, indirect,
special.
8. Cf. J.-F. Phelizon, Rereading the Art of War by Sun Tzu, Economica,
1999, V 10–11. This translation of the Art of War will be used herein.
9. F. Walder, op. cit., p. 19.
10. Voltaire, Zadig, or The Destiny, XIX. French writer, satirist, and
philosopher, Voltaire is remembered as a crusader against tyranny and
bigotry. He treated the problem of evil in his classic tale Zadig (1747),
which obliged him to go into exile in Potsdam, on the invitation of
Frederic II of Prussia, then in Geneva.
11. Cf. J.-F. Phelizon, Thirty Six Stratagems, Economica, 2001, pp. 117–
120.
CHAPTER 2: SELECT A STYLE AND APPROACH

1. Garry Kimovich Kasparov (born in 1963) took the world cham-
pion title from Karpov in 1985, but gave it back to him in 1993. Following
differences with the World Chess Federation, Kasparov created his own
organization: the PCA (Professional Chess Association), which twice
Notes 113
organized its own match for the world champion title: in 1993
(Kasparov–Short) and in 1995 (Kasparov–Anand). In 2003, Kasparov
still held the title from the PCA.
2. Tigran Vartanovich Petrosian (1929–1984) became world cham-
pion in 1963 by beating Botvinnik. Spassky took the title from him in
1969.
3. “Resistant conciliation” is inspired by the fourth stratagem: “wait
quietly while the enemy tires.” Cf. J.-F. Phelizon, Thirty Six Stratagems,
Economica, 2001, pp. 57–61.
4. La Fontaine, Fables, I, 8.
5. Mikhaı̈l Nekhemievich Tal (1936–1992) took the world champi-
onship title from Botvinnik in 1960, but he won it back in a grudge
match in 1961.
6. Cf. J.-F. Phelizon, op. cit., pp. 73–76.
7. Le Roman de Renard (modern version by L. Chauveau), Payot, 1924,
pp. 221–222.
8. J.C. Humes, Nixon’s Ten Commandments of Leadership and Negotiation,
Touchstone, 1997, p. 109.
9. “Hidden aggressiveness” is inspired by the tenth stratagem: “To hide
a dagger in a smile.” Cf. J.-F. Phelizon, op. cit., pp. 83–87.
10. Adapted from Springs and Autumns, chronicle attributed to Con-
fucius (551–479 b.c.).
11. Viswanathan Anand (born in 1969) was the world champion from
2000 to 2002.
12. C.A. Sainte-Beuve, Monday Talks (Causeries du Lundi), Garnier, S.d.,
t. I, p. 145.
13. Cf. B. Burrough and J. Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate, the Fall of RJR
Nabisco, Jonathan Cape, 1990; or H. Lampert, True Greed, NAL Penguin,
1990.
14. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Vol. II, p. 5.
15. Napoléon, Selected Texts (Textes Choisis), Plon, 1912, pp. 277–278.
CHAPTER 3: INDIRECT APPROACH: STRENGTH AGAINST STRENGTH

1. Tullus Hostilius, 672–641 b.c.
2. See Titus Livius, History of Rome, I, 25.
3. J.-F. Phelizon, Thirty Six Stratagems, Economica, 2001, p. 205.
4. Boris Spassky, Fifty-One Annotated Games of the New World Champion,
FDR Books, 1969.
5. The term bujutsu covers all martial arts in feudal Japan. See O.
Ratti and A. Westbrook, Secrets of the Samurai: A Survey of Martial Arts of
Feudal Japan, C.E. Tuttle, 1973, p. 15.
6. Jigoro Kano (1860–1938) founded his judo school in 1882.
114 Notes
7. The Aı̈kido school was founded by Morihei Ueshiba (1883–

1969).
8. See O. Ratti and A. Westbrook, op. cit., pp. 434 and 437.
9. The game of Go or wei qi in Chinese (“game of surrounding”)
was invented in China during the age of Springs and Autumns (722–
481 b.c.). Useful information can be found in Ma Xiaochum, The Thirty
Six Stratagems Applied to Go, Yutopian, 1996.
10. Sun Tzu masterfully demonstrated this opposition between empti-
ness (xu) and fullness (shi) in the sixth chapter of his book The Art of
War.
11. See B.H. Liddell Hart, World History of Strategy, Plon, 1962, p. 375.
12. F. Jullien, Detour and Access (Le D’etour et l’Accès), Grasset, 1995,
pp. 60–61.
13. Pierre Barthélemy, Le Monde, May 6, 1997.
14. Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Esher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid,
Basic Books, 1999, p. 286.
CHAPTER 4: LATERAL APPROACH: PLAYING WITH FINESSE

1. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Vol. III, p. 2.
2. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Vol. IV, pp. 11–16.
3. See Phedrus, Fables, I, 13; Le Roman de Renard (The Tale of Renard),
Payot, 1924, pp. 34–37; and of course La Fontaine, Fables, I, 2.
4. Alexander Alekhine (1892–1946), French player of Russian origin
became world champion in 1927 by beating Capablanca. He lost his title
in 1935 to Euwe, but took it back from him in 1937 and kept it until his
death.
5. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Vol. I, p. 18. See also Al-Muttaki, Words
Attributed to the Prophet (Paroles attribuées au Prophète), in G. Chaliand, World
Anthology of Strategy (Anthologie mondiale de la Stratégie), R. Laffont, 1990,
p. 462.
6. La Fontaine, Fables, X, 4.
7. In Chinese, the character—( jı̀), calculation, plan, stratagem, is
made up of two radicals, one of which means to know how to pronounce,
or count, and the other, either ten (the decimal system number) or the
five cardinal points (east, west, south, north, and center). By extension, jı̀
means calculate, combine (see L. Weiger, Chinese Characters, Dover, 1965,
p. 68).
8. Malignus, from the Latin word malus (bad, evil).
9. “That your words be: Yes? Yes! No? No! What you add comes from
the Devil” (Gospel according to St. Matthew, V, 37).
10. M. Détienne and J.-P. Vernant, Tricks of Intelligence (Les Ruses de
l’Intelligence), Flammarion, 1974, pp. 56–57.
Notes 115
11. Paul Keres, Chess Life, August 1974, referring to the eleventh game
of the 1974 world championship semifinals between Karpov and Spassky.
12. Yasser Seirawan (born 1960) qualified twice for the world chess
championships.
13. See Anatoly Karpov, Anatoly Karpov’s Best Games, Chrysalis Books,
1996.
14. Jan Timman (born 1959) was the chess champion of the
Netherlands eight times.
15. “To dupe is to take someone for a fool, tricking, and depriving at
the same time. The word dupe comes from French slang: it’s the same
word as huppe, which is the name of a bird (lark). Since this bird had
the reputation of not being very intelligent, crooks called their victims
“dupes” (G. Gougenheim, French Words in History and Everyday Life (Les
Mots français dans l’histoire et dans la vie), A. et J. Picard, 1966, t. I, p. 137).
16. B.H. Liddell Hart, World History of Strategy (Histoire mondiale de la
Strategie), Plon, 1962, pp. 106–107; The English General James Wolfe
(1727–1759) was mortally wounded at the battle of Abraham, a few days
before the surrender of Quebec.
17. J. Guitton, Thought and War (La Pensée et la Guerre), Desclée de
Brouwer, 1969, p. 156.
18. Tang Zhen, Writings of an Unknown Sage (Ecrits d’un Sage encore
inconnu), Gallimard-Unesco, 1991, p. 320.
19. Stefan Zweig, The Chess Player (Le joueur d’echecs ), Le Livre de
Poche, 1991, pp. 38–39. Czentovic is supposed to be a worldwide chess
champion in this famous novel.
20. Proclamation of March 27, 1796, Napoleon, Selected Texts, Plon,
1912, pp. 25–26.
21. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754–1838) embraced
the ideas of the Revolution in 1789 before becoming Minister of Exterior
Relations under Napoleon I (until 1807) and then under Louis XVIII
(in 1814 and starting in 1815).
22. Henry Alfred Kissinger (born 1923) was Secretary of State under
the Nixon and Ford administrations from 1973 to 1977. He was the co-
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 (along with Le Duc Tho, who
refused it).
23. Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko (1909–1989) was the U.S.S.R. For-
eign Minister from 1957 to 1985.
24. See R. Nixon, The Real War (La Vraie Guerre), A. Michel, 1980,
p. 286.
25. M. Robert and M. Devaux, Think Strategy (Penser Stratégie), Dunod,
1994, p. 155.
26. Chinese chess (xiáng qi) is an adaptation of the Indian game
chaturanga or the Persian game shatrang, which is the origin of the game
116 Notes
of chess as we know it today in the West. Xiáng qi or “the elephant game”

symbolizes also war between two armies and victory is attained by mating
the opposing king.
27. J. Guitton, Thought and War (La Pensée et la Guerre), p. 158.
CHAPTER 5: AFTER VICTORY, LOOK AHEAD

1. Quoted by E. P. Hoyt, Three Military Leaders, Kodansha, 1933, p.
71.
2. La Fontaine, Fables, VII, 13.
3. Titus Livius, Roman History (Histoire Romaine), XXII, 51. See also
G. Walter, The Destruction of Cartage (La Destruction de Carthage), Somogy,
1947, p. 347.
4. B.H. Liddell Hart, World History of Strategy (Histoire Mondiale de la
Strategie), Plon, 1962, pp. 35–36.
5. Sigmund Freud, “The Beginning of the Treatment,” in The Psycho-
analytical Technique (Le début du Traitement, dans La Technique Psychanaly-
tique), PUF, 1953, p. 80.
6. The character (dào) is made up of two radicals, one meaning to
go and the other forward (see L. Wieger, Chinese Characters, Dover, 1965,
p. 326).
About the Author
ANATOLY KARPOV, one of the greatest chess players of all time, be-
came a chess master at age 15 and the world’s youngest international
grand master in 1970. The winner of more than 130 international
chess tournaments and matches, he was World Champion from 1975
to 1985 and again from 1993 to 1999. He has written several books on
chess technique and strategy, including Anatoly Karpov’s Best Games
and an autobiography, Karpov on Karpov, and is currently establishing
a network of chess schools around the world.
JEAN-FRANÇOIS PHELIZON is President and CEO of Saint-Gobain

Corporation, the holding company for the U.S.- and Canadian-based
business of the French multi-national corporation, Compagnie de
Saint-Gobain, one of the world’s top 100 industrial companies. He
has published translations of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Thirty-Six
Strategems and is the author of several books on business strategy and
management, including Methods and Models for the Research Operation
and Strategic Action, published by the leading French business and
economics publisher, Editions Economica.
BACHAR KOUATLY is an international grand master of chess and

editor of the magazine, European Chess.

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Chess and the Art of

Anatoly Karpov and Jean-Francois

Ancient Rules for Modern Combat

Anatoly Karpov and Jean-François Phelizon

The paper used in this book complies with the

Prologue: Establish and Maintain a Winning Position 1

Chapter 2: Select a Style and Approach 31

Chapter 5: After Victory, Look Ahead 97

We would like to extend our special thanks to Nicholas Philipson, our

In this book, two masters in their respective areas of expertise—

Mr. Phelizon makes numerous references throughout the dialogue

r Why it is always better to negotiate after your opponent has eaten

By implementing the wisdom found in Chess and the Art of

Establish and Maintain a Winning

Anatoly Karpov’s story. – Jean-François

Kouatly – In what way is a chess match like a negotiation? In what

Kouatly – That was the time of Gosplan2 . . .

Kouatly – How were you able to secure championship matches?

there is still more road to travel before becoming a grand master.

Karpov – Yes, it is considered a sport just like swimming, gymnastics,

Kouatly – And that’s how your international career started.

Karpov – It was in Caracas that I became an international grand mas-

Kouatly – Jean-François, you’re not a chess master, but you do have

Phelizon – Compared to Anatoly, my story is much less involved. On

fortunate to conduct important negotiations dealing mainly with di-

your adversary an enemy. A negotiation will never come to fruition

A GAME THAT BELONGS TO ALL10

In a negotiation, it isn’t the signing of the agreement that

Karpov – I would like to mention a third point. On a chessboard in

Phelizon – In chess as in any negotiation process, the goal is to put in

Karpov – Yes, it seems to me that as important as it is, an analysis

Kouatly – Of course, everyday life isn’t the same thing as a game of

Preparing for Battle

Physical preparation: eat, sleep, exercise, stay

Phelizon – Unfortunately, the higher the stakes, the more responsi-

Kouatly – Anatoly, how do you physically prepare for a tournament?

Karpov – Physical preparation is extremely important for a chess

I am often surprised at how little attention businesspeople or diplo-

spend a day negotiating in Europe, it will eventually concede more

Karpov – Naturally, he’s completely out of it. He eats anything and

your game will not be very aggressive, especially at the beginning. On

Kouatly – Fighting a battle demands patience, determination, en-

Karpov – Intellectual preparation for chess is difficult and compli-

THE GAME PLAN1

In order to have a successful strategy in chess, or as it’s called

Kouatly – Of course, your opponent might also be tempted to put

Karpov – You should definitely assume that he is doing the same

Phelizon – Being prepared is compiling facts, believing in principles,

list contains absolute priorities, which if not satisfied, become deal

Kouatly – Can you sometimes overestimate your opponent?

Phelizon – Yes, of course. When I say be sure, I should specify, be sure

Kouatly – Why add a psychologist?

Karpov – This was in 1974 in Moscow. Viktor Korchnoi, a player I

During the third game, I realized that someone in the crowd

Kouatly – Are there also psychologists on mergers and acquisitions

Phelizon – No, absolutely not, but perhaps that’s a shame. Naturally,

he could bring, not only in assisting but in creating a certain unease

Kouatly – It would be a good example of cross fertilization between

Phelizon – I would say that the ideal team is made up of an advisor