Mauricia Alejandrino v. CA was in effect calling for the partition of the property.

However,
under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may only be
effected by (1) the heirs themselves extra-judicially, (2) by the
The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named court in an ordinary action for partition, or in
Marcelino, Gregorio,Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator
lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of thespouses, the property himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.
should have been divided among their children, however, the
estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance 2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and
with the procedures.Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) Laurentia became the basis for
allegedly purchased portion of the lots from her brothers, the segregation of the property in favor of Nique However,
Gregorio’s, Ciriaco’s and Abundio’s share. It turned out, however, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered
that a third party named Nique, the private respondent in this before the trial court and it became the basis for the order for
case, also purchased portions of the property from Laurencia, segregation of the property sold to Nique. Mauricia does not deny
Abundio and Marcelino. However, Laurencia (the alleged seller the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
to Nique) later questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the
and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in favor absence of notarization of the document and the non-publication
of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia thereof.
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew
the same. 3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public
instrument.
Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the
property that had been declared by the trial court (Quieting of Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
title case) as his own by virtue of purchase. the estate reflectedthe intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia
to physically divide the property. Both of them had acquired the
The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the Extra- shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them
Judicial Settlement between Mauricia and Laurencia. that needed to settle the estate. The fact that the document was
not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two
ISSUE: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made Yes of them. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document to be valid between the parties.
1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent
is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and
partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right. Laurencia was within her
hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The legality of
Laurencia’s alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino
spouses was upheld in the Quieting of title case which had
become final and executory by Laurencia’s withdrawal of her
appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a motion for the segregation
of the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, he
 7. VALMONTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 108538 January 22,
1996 ISSUE: The petitioner, Lourdes A. Valmonte, was served a summon
through her husband and counsel Alfredo D. Valmonte and whether
FACTS: such summon was validly served to Mrs. Valmonte is the issue in this
petition.
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners
Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222 DECISION: There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes. The
Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action
Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a
his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As
his residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where he holds petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the
office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila. Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with
Rule 14, § 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines,
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a
filed an action for partition against former and her husband. She alleged newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as
that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order
14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address
defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem
served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., sufficient.
Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant
Lourdes Arreola Valmonte’s spouse holds office and where he can be In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
found. He husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes. This
Philippines. The summons was served on her husband. mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside
the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides. The service of summons on
Petitioner in a letter referred private respondent’s counsel to her
petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court
husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her
as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed
should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner
sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to
Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his
be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in
summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not
default for her failure to file an answer.
authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process
server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, §
17. As provided in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting
default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance
such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her
in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s motion. RTC
Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60)
denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in
days after notice.
default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this petition.
 Applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion
of the subject land on which it stands is deemed constituted as a family
8. Arriola v. Arriola home by the deceased and the petitioner Vilma from the moment that
began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. Therefor
the house cannot be forced to sale by the respondent because family home
Fidel Arriola who married twice died and is survived by his legal heirs: John is exempt on such sale.
Nabor Arriola (respondent), his son with his first wife, and Vilma G. Arriola,
his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners). On
February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of
the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his
heir John, Vilma and Anthony in equal shares of one-third each without
prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any. However,
the parties failed to agree on how to divide the property and so the
respondent proposed to sell it through public auction. The petitioners
initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house standing on
the subject land because it is a family home.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject house is a family home.

RULING:

Yes. The subject house is a family home that it cannot be sold through
public auction.

Based on Article 152, the Family Home, constituted jointly by the husband
and wife or any an unmarried head of the family is the dwelling house
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

Article 153, the Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law.

Article 159, the Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reason.
 10. JULITA ROMBAUA PANGANIBAN et al. (Petitioners) vs. has the absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the common
JULITA S. OAMIL property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this
undivided interest, except as to purely personal rights. The effect of any
Julita Oamil (Respondent) filed a complaint for specific performance such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him
with damages in the RTC, praying that Partenio Rombaua (Partenio) be upon the partition of the property.
ordered to execute a final deed of sale over the parcel of land which was
the subject of a prior Agreement to Sell executed by and between them. Under Article 497 of the Civil Code, in the event of a division or
partition of property owned in common, assignees of one or more of the
There are two properties in contention, the 21st St. portion and the Canda co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common
St. portion acquired by Partenio and his deceased first wife Juliana and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they
during their marriage. Petitioners and their father Partenio are cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been
acknowledged co-owners of the subject property to the following fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition
extent: one-half to Partenio as his conjugal share, and one-sixth each of presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or
the remaining half to petitioners and Partenio as the surviving heirs of assignor to maintain its validity.
Juliana.
The trial court could not award the 21st St. portion to Partenio, since the
The trial court (RTC) ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale over the
court in Special Civil Action specifically awarded the Canda St. portion
portion of the realty subject matter of this case in favor of Oamil and to
to him. The decision in Special Civil Action, which became final and
surrender the possession thereof to Oamil. RTC awarded Canda St.
portion to Partenio. Appellate court (CA) ruled that the 21st St. portion executory, should put an end to the co-ownership between Partenio
is the conjugal property of Partenio, disregarded the prior final and and the petitioners, and the award made to each co-owner of
executory decision in Special Civil Action, which declares that Partenio specific portions of the property as their share in the co-ownership
is entitled to the Canda St. portion. should be respected.

ISSUE:
Whether co-ownership still exist between Partenio and the Petitioners.

RULING:
No. The decision in the Special Civil Action pertains to the partition
case between Partenio and the Petitioners, which ruled that the 21st
St. portion was distributed to the Petitioners and the Canda St. was
given to Partenio.

Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right

belongs to different persons. During the existence of the co-ownership,
no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community
property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the
co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the
entire land or thing. Before partition in a co-ownership, every co-owner
 11. Republic of the Philippines At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of
SUPREME COURT facts:
Manila
xxx xxx xxx
THIRD DIVISION
1. That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor are
G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990 the pro-indiviso co-owners of the properties cited and
described in the complaint;
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and SOCORRO Z.
FRANCISCO, petitioners, 2. That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land
vs. covered by TCT No. T-1319; approximately twelve (12)
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-1320; and the entire
of Cavite, Tagaytay, Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject of
ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO, and expropriation proceedings instituted by the National
ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO, respondents. Housing Authority (NHA) now pending before this Court in
Civil Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioners.
3. That based on the evidence presented by the herein
Leonardo M. Zaballero for private respondents. parties in the aforecited expropriation cases, the current
valuation of the land and the improvements thereon is at
P95,132.00 per hectare;

CORTÉS, J.: 4. That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written

notice from the defendants and the intervenor that the
On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and damages, docketed as VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
Civil Case No. TG-572, seeking to enjoin private respondents Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero, BUSINESS CORPORATION had offered to buy the latter's
Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party their pro-indiviso shares as co-
owners in eight parcels of registered land (covered by TCT Nos. A-1316 to A-1322) located in the
share in the properties listed in the complaint subject to the
province of Cavite, with an aggregate area of about 96 hectares. Petitioner claimed that under Article following terms:
1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners, had a preferential right to purchase these shares from
private respondents for a reasonable price.
1. The selling price shall be net at TWELVE
& 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex parte application
meter, or a total price of NINE MILLION
for a writ of preliminary injunction, on the ground that petitioners' registered
(P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total area of
notice of lis pendens was ample protection of their rights.
SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES ONLY;
On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the summons and copies
2. A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY
of the complaint. Private respondents then filed their answer with
(30%) PERCENT of the selling price, or a
counterclaim, praying for the partition of the subject properties. Private
minimum downpayment of TWO MILLION
respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero filed a motion for intervention dated
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
April 29, 1980, adopting therein her co-respondents answer with
(P2,700,000.00) PESOS;
counterclaim.
3. The balance of the purchase price to be
payable within THREE (3) YEARS from the
 date of downpayment in THREE (3) PLAINTIFFS
EQUAL, ANNUAL PAYMENTS with
interest at the legal rate prevailing at the 1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical
time of payment; partition;

4. The balance shall be covered by a BANK 2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly
GUARANTEE of payments and shall not excessive;
be governed by Art. 1250 of the Civil Code.
3. That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right
(Cf. Annexes 1, 2 and 3, for an amount of not more that P95,132.00 per hectare,
Answer) which is the fair and reasonable value of said properties;

5. That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the 4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive
plaintiffs were requested: right was suspended upon the filing of the complaint;

a) To exercise their pre-emptive right to DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR

purchase defendants' and intervenor's
shares under the above-quoted terms; or 1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is
P12.50 per square meter;
b) To agree to a physical partition of the
properties; or 2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon
their failure to exercise the same within the period
c) To sell their shares, jointly with the prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
defendants and the intervenor, to the
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND 3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION at the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive, it
price and under the terms aforequoted. would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs to sell their
shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
6. That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION, whose sincerity,
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION is ready, willing and capacity and good faith is beyond question, as the same
able to purchase not only the aliquot shares of the was admitted by the parties herein;
defendants and the intervenor, but also that of the plaintiffs,
in and to all the properties subject of this case, for and in 4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95
consideration of the net amount of TWELVE and 50/100 hectares may be physically partitioned without difficulty in
(P12.50) PESOS per square meter and under the afore- the manner suggested by them to plaintiffs, and as
quoted terms; graphically represented in the subdivision plan, which will
be furnished in due course to plaintiffs' counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.]
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.]
Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered a pre-trial order
The parties laid down their respective positions, as follows: dated July 9, 1980 granting petitioners a period of ten days from receipt of
the subdivision plan to be prepared by a competent geodetic engineer Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were willing
within which to express their approval or disapproval of the said plan, or to to allot their shares in the subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de
submit within the same period, if they so desire, an alternative subdivision Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that they did not
plan. know of any other party who was willing and able to purchase the subject
properties under more favorable conditions than that offered by VOLCANO
On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent to the counsel for LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
petitioners a letter enclosed with a subdivision plan.
However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries posed by
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to the pre-trial order, respondent trial judge, petitioners filed a motion for clarification as to the
contending that the question of reasonable value of the subject properties true identity of the third party allegedly willing to purchase the subject
remains a contentious issue of fact ascertainable only after a full trial. properties.
Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre- emptive right to purchase private
respondents' shares in the co-ownership after due determination of the On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected petitioners' motion
reasonable price thereof. on the ground that it was irrelevant.

Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for petitioners Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a pleading captioned
another subdivision plan prepared by a geodetic engineer. Still, no definite "Compliance and Motion", (1) reiterating the relevance of ascertaining the
communication was sent by petitioners signifying their approval or true identity of the third party buyer, VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS
disapproval to the subdivision plans. AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
RESORTS, INC., (2) expressing their view that there is actually no bona
In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties, fide and financially able third party willing to purchase the subject
private respondents filed a motion dated December 16, 1980 requesting properties at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and, (3) once again
that petitioners be required to formally specify which of the two options insisting on their pre-emptive right to purchase the shares of private
under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: that respondents in the co-ownership at a "reasonable price", which is less than
petitioners' shares in the subject properties be sold to private respondents, that computed excessively by the latter at the rate of P12.50 per square
at the rate of P12.50 per square meter; or that the subject properties be meter. Petitioners therein prayed that further proceedings be conducted in
sold to a third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. (claimed to order to settle the factual issue regarding the reasonable value of the
have been erroneously referred to in the pre-trial as VOLCANO subject properties.
SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION) and its
proceeds thereof distributed among the parties. On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order denying
petitioners' motion. The judge ruled that petitioners did not possess a pre-
Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for the purpose of emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares in the co-ownership.
determining the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code, Thus, finding that the subject properties were essentially indivisible,
respondent trial judge issued an order dated February 4, 1981 which respondent trial judge ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject
directed the parties to signify whether or not they agree to the scheme of properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil Code. A notice of sale
allotting the subject properties to one of the co-owners, at the rate of was issued setting the date of public bidding for the subject properties on
P12.50 per square meter, or whether or not they know of a third party who April 13, 1981.
is able and willing to buy the subject properties at terms and conditions
more favorable than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order.
INC. The order contained a series of questions addressed to all the parties, Respondent trial judge reset the hearing on petitioners' motion for
who were thereupon required to submit their answers thereto. reconsideration to April 6, 1981, and moved the scheduled public sale to
April 14, 1981.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at
filed the present petition for certiorari, alleging that the respondent trial bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and damages
judge acted without jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of its discretion against private respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing his order dated March 16, 1981 third party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code
which denied petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private finds no application to the case at bar.
respondents' pro-indiviso shares and which, peremptorily ordered the
public sale of the subject properties. On April 8, 1981, this Court issued a There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private
temporary restraining order enjoining the sale of the subject properties at respondents had acknowledged the pre-emptive right of petitioners to
public auction. purchase their shares at a "reasonable price". Although it appears that
private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to
With the comment and reply, the Court considered the issues joined and petitioners, the offer was made at a fixed rate of P12.50 per square meter
the case submitted for decision. [See Pre-trial Order dated July 9, 1980, Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo,
pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that private respondents had agreed, without
The Court finds no merit in the present petition. qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot
insist on a right to purchase the shares at a price lower than the selling
The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's order dated March 16, price of private respondents.
1981 is ultimately premised on petitioners' claim that they had a pre-
emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co-owners, Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents
private respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is this same claim from alienating their pro-indiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a co-
which forms the basis of their complaint for injunction and damages filed owner of a property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the New Civil
against private respondents in the court a quo. Code, thus:

This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
on co-ownership do not grant to any of the owners of a property held in part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
common a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co- he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
misplaced. Article 1620 provides: personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
redemption in case the shares of all the co-owners or of division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging
only a reasonable one. his ideal share in the property held in common. The law merely provides
that the alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the portion of the
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right property which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership
of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the [See Mercado v. Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472;
share they may respectively have in the thing owned in PNB v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34404, June 25, 1980,
common [Emphasis supplied]. 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
75884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as earlier discussed,
that the remaining co-owners have the right to redeem, within a specified
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated
period, the shares which may have been sold to the third party. [Articles
his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal
1620 and 1623 of the New Civil Code.]
redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is invoked only after the shares
of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the co-
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent trial judge petitioners adopted the position that the subject properties were incapable
committed no grave abuse of discretion when he denied petitioners' claim of physical partition. Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But
of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro- after petitioners inexplicably refused to abide by the pretrial order issued
indiviso shares. by respondent trial judge, and stubbornly insisted on exercising an alleged
pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares at a "reasonable
Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial judge's order price", private respondents relented and adopted petitioner's position that
for the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to the the partition of the subject properties was not economically feasible, and,
provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code. After a careful examination consequently, invoked the provisions of Article 498 of the New Civil Code
of the proceedings before respondent trial judge, the Court finds that [Private respondents' "Motion To Allot Properties To Defendants Or To Sell
respondent trial judge's order was issued in accordance with the laws the Same Pursuant To Article 498 Of The Civil Code", Annex "D" of the
pertaining to the legal or juridical dissolution of co-ownerships. Petition; Rollo, pp. 46-49].

It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the
prayed for, inter alia, the partition of the subject properties in the event that subject properties should not be partitioned, and private respondents
the petitioners refused to purchase their pro-indiviso shares at the rate of continued to manifest their desire to terminate the co-ownership
P12.50 per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge
purchase the other co-owners' pro-indiviso shares, private respondents' acted within his jurisdiction when he issued his order dated February 4,
counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties is recognized by law, 1981 requiring the parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of
specifically Article 494 of the New Civil Code which lays down the general determining whether or not the legal conditions for the applicability of
rule that no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case.
reads as follows:
Art. 498 provides that:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them who
is concerned. shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
distributed.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for
a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article is
valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement. resorted to when (1) the right to partition the property among the co-owners
is invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the property, it
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of the New Civil
shall not exceed twenty years. Code] would prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of
Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the co-owners are not in
Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by law. agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire
property upon reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the queries
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. posed by respondent trial judge and to insist that hearings be conducted
in order to ascertain the reasonable price at which they could purchase
private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and
None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at bar.
Motion" dated February 27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-
Private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties
60].
was therefore entirely proper. However, during the pre-trial proceedings,
Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to respondent
trial judge that the parties could not agree on who among them would be
allotted the subject properties, the Court finds that respondent trial judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the holding of a public
sale for the subject properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per
square meter), and the distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the
co-owners, as provided under Article 498 of the New Civil Code.

Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need for further hearings

in the case because it is apparent from the various allegations and
admissions of the parties made during the pre-trial proceedings, and in
their respective pleadings, that the legal requisites for the application of
Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case. No factual
issues remained to be litigated upon.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

temporary restraining order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
 ISSUE:

12. HEIRS OF SORIANO V. CA and SPOUSES ABALOS (wrong May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor

case) thereof?

A person may be declared the owner of a property but he may not be entitled
to possession.The exercise of the rights of ownership is subject to limitations RULING/RATIO:
that may be imposed by law. Although declared to be the lawful owner, such
No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the
owner cannot automatically evict the physical possessor of the land unless it
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to
has been determined that no rights of the possessor will be violated by such
actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. A judgment of
eviction.
ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and does not automatically

FACTS: include possession. This is especially true in the case at bar wherein petitioner
is occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. The
A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the disputed property in court says “allegedly” due to the fact that there is still a pending case in the
this case. Said land was originally owned by one Adriano Soriano, DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board) on the
subsequently it was leased for a period of 15 years to the Spouses David and issue. The issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest by final
Consuelo with RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be resolved. The Tenancy
as caretaker/tenant of the property during the duration of the lease. Upon the Act, which protects the rights of agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of
death of Adriano the lot he owned was divided into TWO and given to his heirs. rights by the lawful owners. The exercise of the rights of ownership yields to
One of the lots inherited was sold to the Spouses ABALOS, here. The other the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since the rights of Soriano
lot was also bought by the Spouses Abalos although not completely (only ¾ of to possess the land are still pending litigation in the DARAB he is protected
the lot). The lots in question were subsequently registered in the name of the from dispossession of the land until final judgment of said court unless
Spouses Abalos. The courts later declared them to be the undisputed owners Soriano’s occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.
thereof. Soriano questions their ownership of the land and so filed cases
against the spouses. Currently Soriano is still in possession of the land
claiming rights of “Security of Tenure” as a tenant of the land.
  WON that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
CONDOMINIUM ACT contrary to law considering that under Sec. 12-D, No.
2, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of P.D. 957, what
FACTS:
should be given for free are only off-street parking
 May 23, 1983 GOAL and NHA entered into an
spaces and not indoor parking areas.
Agreement whereby NHA extended to GOAL a loan of
 WON that the payment of P10,000.00 as moral
P4.425 million for the construction of GEMIN I
damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages
Condominium at 941 Gonzales ST., Ermita, Manila.
plus P5,000.00 as attorney's fees is too much of a
 1984 GOAL and Mason entered into a Contract
penalty.
Agreement for construction of the condominium within
one year at the cost of P4.3 million. In the latter part of
RULING:
the same year, the contractor abandoned the project
Petition is denied.
with only 60% of it is finished.
1. Court cannot sustain the petitioner. There is no one else to
 1985 GOAL offered the condo units for sale with the
blame but itself. Upon full payment of the agreed price,
private respondents as buyer.
petitioner is mandated by law to deliver the title of the lot or
 1989 private respondents filed a complaint against
unit to the buyer. Both the Contract to Sell of petitioner and
GOAL lleging the illegal construction of the fifth floor
private respondents, and Sec. 25 of P.D. 957 state -
of GEMIN I Condominium, the failure to deliver the
Sec. III (Contract to Sell). - Title and Ownership of
title of private respondent Folomeno Teng despite his
Unit. Upon full payment by the vendees of the full amount of
repeated demands, and the failure to provide adequate
the purchase price stipulated under Sec. III hereof, the
parking spaces for the unit owners.
assessments and expenses under Sec. IV and otherwise upon
 March 31, 1989 OAALA rendered its decision ordering
compliance by the VENDEES of all obligations therein, the
GOAL to stop the construction, to deliver the title of
VENDOR will convey to the VENDEE all rights and interests
private respondent Teng, and to provide adequate
of the former and to the Unit, subject hereof together with the
parking space for the unit owners.
interest in the common area and in the Condominium
 Petitioners appealed to the CA but the appeal was
Corporation appurtenant to such unit .
denied.
Sec. 25, P.D. 957 - Issuance of Title. - The owner or
developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer
ISSUE:
upon full payment of the lot or unit x x x x In the event a
 WON the CA erred in not finding the true facts of the
mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the
case that greatly affected its decision, and its decision
issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall
being contrary to law.
redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof
within six months from such issuance in order that the title
over any paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the Sec. 39. Penalties - Any person who shall violate any of the
buyer in accordance herewith. provisions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that
may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall, upon conviction,
2. Petitioner is wrong. It has for purposes of its own construed be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand
off-street to mean not including indoor. On the other hand, the (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten
law does not exclude indoor parking. What it specifically years: Provided, that in the case of corporations, partnership,
excludes is street parking. Therefore, parking may be in the cooperatives, or associations, the President, manager, or
basement or, in the absence thereof, in the first floor. Administrator or the person who has charge of the
Furthermore, at this point, a definition of terms may be administration of the business shall be criminally responsible
necessary. In a condominium, common areas and facilities for any violation of this Decree and/or the rules and
are portions of the condominium property not included in the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
units, whereas, a unit is a part of the condominium property Petitioner can hardly be excused for its failure to comply with
which is to be subject to private ownership.[5] Inversely, that the provisions of P.D. 957 by claiming ignorance of the
which is not considered a unit should fall under common areas requirements of the decree and that a mistake upon a doubtful
and facilities. or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
Hence, the parking spaces not being subject to private Being engaged in a business affected by P.D. 957, petitioner
ownership form part of the common area over which the should be aware of its provisions and its mandates which, as
condominium unit owners hold undivided interest. As such, can be readily perceived, are clear, simple and unmistakable.
petitioner cannot invoke Sec. I, Art. III, of the Bill of Rights
which provides that No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. Petitioner
alone does not own the parking area. The parking space is
owned in common by the developer and the unit
owners. Private respondents must be allowed to use the
parking area.

3. Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. - The Authority may

prescribe and impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos
for violations of the provisions of this Decree or any rule or
regulation thereunder. Fines shall be payable to the Authority
and enforceable through writs of execution in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court.
LUZ R. YAMANE, in her capacity as the CITY TREASURER OF MAKATI, denial of the protest filed with the local treasurer is to appeal the denial with the court
petitioner vs. BA LEPANTO CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, respondent. of competent jurisdiction. Afterwards, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.

Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the “Corporation”) is a Issue:

condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act,
which owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of the BA- a. Whether the RTC, in deciding an appeal taken from a denial of a protest by a local
Lepanto Condominium (the “Condominium”), situated in Makati City. Its membership treasurer under Section 195 of the Local Government Code, exercises “original
comprises the various unit owners. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of jurisdiction” or “appellate jurisdiction.”
its Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating
b. Whether or not the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium
expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as
corporations.
provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium.
Held:
The Corporation received a Notice of Assessment signed by the City Treasurer. The
Notice of Assessment stated that the Corporation is “liable to pay the correct city a. The review taken by the RTC over the denial of the protest by the local treasurer
business taxes.” The Notice of Assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of the would fall within that court’s original jurisdiction. The review is the initial judicial
business taxes assessed. The Corporation responded with a written tax protest cognizance of the matter. Moreover, labeling the said review as an exercise of
addressed to the City Treasurer. appellate jurisdiction is inappropriate, since the denial of the protest is not the
judgment or order of a lower court, but of a local government official. Republic Act
According to respondent, under both the Makati Code and the Local Government
No. 9282 definitively proves that the CTA exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction
Code, “business” is defined as “trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a
to review on appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in
means of livelihood or with a view to profit.” It was submitted that the Corporation,
local tax cases original decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their originally
as a condominium corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the
or appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, the provision also states that the review is
common areas of the Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners,
triggered “by filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to that provided
and to hold title to the parcels of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither
for under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.” Republic Act No. 9282,
was the Corporation authorized, under its articles of incorporation or by-laws to
however, would not apply to this case simply because it arose prior to the effectivity
engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it did collect from the unit owners
of that law.
were for capital expenditures and operating expenses.
b. No. Section 143 of the Code specifically enumerates several types of business on
The protest was rejected by the City Treasurer and insisted that the collection of dues which municipalities and cities may impose taxes. However, the Corporation does not
from the unit owners was effected primarily “to sustain and maintain the expenses of fall under such law. Moreover, nowhere in the Makati Revenue Code that would serve
the common areas, with the end in view of getting full appreciative living values for as the legal authority for the collection of business taxes from condominiums in
the individual condominium occupants and to command better marketable prices for Makati. We can elicit from the Condominium Act that a condominium corporation is
those occupants” who would in the future sell their respective units. In short, the precluded by statute from engaging in corporate activities other than the holding of the
petitioner avers that it is engaged in business for profit making. common areas, the administration of the condominium project, and other acts
necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of such purposes. Neither
Because of the denial of the protest, respondent filed an Appeal with the RTC of the maintenance of livelihood, nor the procurement of profit, fall within the scope of
permissible corporate purposes of a condominium corporation under the
Makati. However, the latter dismissed the case. As a recourse, respondent filed a
Condominium Act. None of these stated corporate purposes are geared towards
Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the CA. It was maintaining a livelihood or the obtention of profit. Even though the Corporation is
dismissed outright because only decisions of the RTC brought on appeal from a first empowered to levy assessments or dues from the unit owners, these amounts collected
level court could be elevated for review under Rule 42. However, it was reinstated by are not intended for the incurrence of profit by the Corporation or its members, but to
the CA because of Sec. 195 of the LGC stating that the remedy of the taxpayer on the shoulder the multitude of necessary expenses that arise from the maintenan
 jurisdiction on controversies arising between shareholders of the
SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. corporation.” the motion for reconsideration thereof having been
denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX, respondent Judge, filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that
the said orders be set aside.
PASAY CITY and AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY, respondents. (G.R. No. L-
ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have jurisdiction over the
claims filed by Sunset View, the condominium corporation.
52361 April 27, 1981)

Held: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder in

the corporation. The Mater Deed determines when ownership of the
Facts:
unit and participation in the corporation vests in the purchaser.
The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporationis a
The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction.
condominium corporation within the meaning of Republic Act No.
The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred
4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with
accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of the
Declaration of Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project
purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit.
located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner is
Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit
the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited
who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as
common areas.
owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it
The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship
necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full
owned and operated by the spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida
purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and consequently
B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, “Solana”, in the Sunset View
is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial, Incorporated, as
In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred
assignor. The La Perla Commercial, Incorporated bought the “Solana”
only upon full payment of the purchase price.
unit on installment from the Tower Builders, Inc. The petitioner,
Private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence
Sunset View Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of
they are not shareholders and the SEC has no jurisdiction over the
assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares Realty.
claims.
The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action: (2) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature other action;
and (3) that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause. The petitioner filed its opposition.
The motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent Judge, pursuant
to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a “holder of a separate interest”
and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium
corporation; and that “the case should be properly filed with the
Securities & Exchange Commission which has exclusive original
SKYWORLD CONDOMINIUM OWNERS ASSO. VS SEC – 211 held by a condominium corporation, such corporation shall constitute
SCRA 565 1992 the management body of the project. The corporate purposes of such a
corporation shall be limited to the holding of the common areas, either
Facts:
in ownership or any other interest in real property recognized by law,
Two petitions were filed against the petitioner SCOAI, one of them to the management of the project, and to such other purposes as may
contesting the existence of the petitioner as an entity, and the other, for be necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of said
a writ of preliminary injunction praying that the petitioner be stopped purposes. The articles of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation
from exercising the prerogatives of a condominium corporation. The shall not contain any provision contrary to or inconsistent with the
first petition was filed on August 8, 1986 by CBC before the SEC provisions of this Act, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration
docketed as SEC No. 3035. The second was filed on October 9, 1986 of restrictions of the project. Membership in a condominium
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch V (Civil Case No. corporation, regardless of whether it is a stock or non-stock
915-R) by the respondent Baguio Skyworld Condominium Corporation corporation, shall not be transferable separately from the
(BSCC) which was organized at the instance of CBC and registered condominium unit of which it is an appurtenance. When a member or
with the SEC on September 19, 1986. stockholder ceases to own a unit in the project in which the
condominium corporation owns or holds the common areas, he shall
A hearing was conducted on September 11, 1989 by the PED with Mr. automatically cease to be a member or stockholder of the condominium
Norberto Ruiz as the hearing officer. The counsels of the two parties corporation.
were present. On December 12, 1989, the PED issued a resolution
ordering the revocation of the certificate of registration of the SCOAI. Ruling:
The resolution was prepared by Mr. Norberto Ruiz after studying the
Yes. The revocation was valid.The Court, thus, upholds the finding of
substantial evidence he received and the arguments of the parties in
the Commission that the indispensable requirement that all
the memoranda submitted by the parties to him. On the same date, the
incorporators of a condominium corporation must be shareholders
resolution was presented by PED Director Elnora Adviento before the
thereof was not satisfactorily complied with by the petitioner at the
Commission en banc which approved the same.
time a certificate of registration was applied for. (Section 5, Corporation
Issue: Code of the Philippines [Batas Pambansa Blg. 68]; Section 10,
Condominium Act [Rep. Act. 4726]. To be a shareholder, one must
WHETHER OR NOT THE REVOCATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF necessarily be an owner of a condominium unit. (Sunset View
REGISTRATION WAS VALID. Condominium Corporation v. Campos, Jr., 104 SCRA 295 [1981]). In the
case at bar, it was found by the SEC that only one, Angel Bautista, was
Law applicable: considered to be an owner of a unit in the Skyworld Condominium at
the time of incorporation.
RA 4726
Opinion:
Section 10. Whenever the common areas in a condominium project are
I agree with the SC, when the language of the law is plain and clear, not determine the exact valuation of the levied property. The Sheriff is left to his own
there is no room for interpretation. judgment. He should be allowed a reasonable margin between the value of the
property levied upon and the amount of the execution; the fact that the Sheriff levies
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST v. PR BUILDERS INC. (G.R. No. 156364) upon a little more than is necessary to satisfy the execution does not render his
actions improper.
The Petitioner and his spouse, both Dutch Nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell
with PR Builders, Inc. to purchase a 210-sq m residential unit in the respondent's In the absence of a restraining order, no error can be imputed to the Sheriff in
townhouse project in Batanagas. When PR Builder's failed to comply with their verbal proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to quash the levy filed
promise to complete the project, the spouses Hulst filed a complaint for recession of by the respondents with the HLURB. Sheriff’s, as officers charged with the task of the
contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees before the Housing and Land enforcement and/or implementation of judgments, must act with considerable
Regulatory Board (HLURB), which then was granted. A Writ of Execution was then dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice. It is not within the
addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas, but upon the jurisdiction of the Sheriff to consider and resolve respondent's objection to the
complaint of the respondent, the levy was set aside, leaving only the respondent's continuation of the conduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his
personal properties to be levied first. The Sheriff set a public auction of the said levied own, to suspend the auction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no discretion to
properties, however, the respondent filed a motion to quash Writ of levy on the postpone the conduct of the auction sale.
ground that the sheriff made an over levy since the aggregate appraised value of the
properties at P6,500 per sq m is P83,616,000. Instead of resolving the objection of 2. No. The HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine
the respondent's regarding the auction, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction since the value of the levied property. The Appraisal report, that was submitted, was based
there was no restraining order from the HLURB. The 15 parcels of land was then on the projected value of the townhouse project after it shall have been fully
awarded to Holly Properties Realty at a bid of P5,450,653. On the same day, the developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential units appraised had already
Sheriff remitted the legal fees and submitted to contracts of sale to HLURB, however, been built. Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through,
he then received orders to suspend proceedings on the auction for the reason that the projected value did not become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be
the market value of the properties was not fair. There was disparity between the equated with the fair market value.
appraised value and the value made by the petitioner and the Sheriff, which
should've been looked into by the Sheriff before making the sale. While an 3. No. Under Article 12, Sec.7 of the 1987 Constitution, foreign nationals, the spouses
inadequacy in price is not a ground to annul such sale, the court is justified to such Hulst, are disqualified form owning real property. However, under article 1414 of the
intervention where the price shocks the conscience. Civil Code, one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the
illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to
ISSUE: recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission, which was
1. Whether or not the Sheriff erred in the value that was attached to the properties granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private land
during the auction and as well as disregarding the objection made by the under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of
respondent's? the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent.
2. Whether or not the market value of the said property was inadequate? No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the
2. Whether or not the spouses Hulst's request for damages is actionable? agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. Further, petitioner
is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon, moral and exemplary damages
HELD: and attorney's fees.
1. No. According to the Rules of Court, the value of the property levied is not required
to be exactly the same as the judgment debt. In the levy of property, the Sheriff does
 the BOD because they are non-unit buyers because a condominium
corporation, being an association of homeowners, must be composed of actual
unit buyers or residents of the condominium project. Lim further alleged that
LIM VS. MOLDEX LAND INC., et al. the ownership of Moldex was only in the nature of an owner-developer and
only for the sole purpose of selling the units.
DOCTRINE: A non-member cannot be elected as a director or officer of a
corporation. ISSUES:

FACTS: 1. Whether the membership meeting is valid; and

2. Whether Moldex is considered a member of Condocor.
This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the RTC
which dismissed the complaint against the respondents for the annulment of
HELD:
the general membership meeting of 1322 Roxas Boulevard Condominium
Corporation (Condocor), annulment of election of Jeffrey Jaminola, Edgardo 1. No. The July 21, 2012 membership meeting was not valid. Any act or
Macalintal, Joji Milanes, and Clothilda Roman, as members of the BOD, and transaction made during a meeting without quorum is rendered of no
for accounting. force and effect, thus, not binding on the corporation or parties
concerned. Sec. 52 of the Corporation Code provides that “Unless
Mary E. Lim is a registered unit owner of 1322 Golden Empire Tower, a otherwise provided for in this Code or in the by-laws, a quorum shall
condominium project of Moldex Land, Inc. (Moldex), a real estate company consist of the stockholders representing a majority of the outstanding
engaged in the construction and development of high-end condominium capital stock or a majority of the members in the case of non-stock
projects and in the sale of the units thereof to the public. Condocor, a non- corporations.”
Moldex is a member of Condocor. Respondents are correct asserting in that a
stock and non-profit corporation, is the registered condominium corporation for
registered owner of a unit in a condominium project or the holders of duly
the Golden Empire Tower. Lim, as a unit owner of Golden Empire Tower, is a
issued condominium certificate of title, automatically becomes a member of
member of Condocor.
the condominium corporation, relying on Sections 2 and 10 of the
On July 21, 2012 Condocor held its annual general membership meeting. Condominium Act, the Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions and the
Moldex became a member of Condocor on the basis of its ownership of the By-Laws of Condocor.
220 unsold units in the Golden Empire Tower. During the meeting, an
Nonetheless, the quorum during the meeting should have been majority of
existence of a quorum was declared even though only 29 of the 108 unit
Condocor's members in good standing. Accordingly, there was no quorum
buyers were present. Lim objected to the validity of the meeting but was
during the meeting considering that only 29 of the 108 unit buyers were
denied, and Lim and all other unit owners, except for one, walked out of the
present. As there was no quorum, any resolution passed during the said
meeting. Nonetheless, the individual respondents and the other unit owners
meeting was null and void and, not binding upon the corporation or its
proceeded with the meeting and elected the new members of the BOD. All four
members.
individual respondents (Jaminola, Macalintal, Milanes and Roman) were voted
as members of the board, together with other 3 members, whose election was 2. Yes. Moldex is a member of Condocor. Respondents are correct
conditioned on their subsequent confirmation. asserting in that a registered owner of a unit in a condominium project
or the holders of duly issued condominium certificate of title,
Lim filed an election protest before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of the automatically becomes a member of the condominium corporation,
respondents and held that the presence or absence of a quorum in the subject relying on Sections 2 and 10 of the Condominium Act, the Master
meeting was determined on the basis of the voting rights of all the units owned Deed and Declaration of Restrictions and the By-Laws of Condocor.
by the members in good standing. Lim filed the present petition claiming that
the respondents, who are non-unit buyers, are not entitled to be members of
 In sum, the July 21, 2012 annual general membership meeting of Petitioner notes that R.A. 8799 merely transferred the Securities and
Condocor being null and void, all acts and resolutions emanating Exchange Commission's jurisdiction over cases enumerated under
therefrom are likewise null and void. Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to the courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court, and that there is nothing in R.A. 8799 or
CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM v. AUGUSTO H. BACULIO, GR No.
in A.M. No. 00-11 -03-SC which would limit or diminish the jurisdiction of
203678, 2016-02-17
those RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts.
Facts:
It insists that for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of the RTC, the
Concorde Condominium, Inc., by itself and comprising the Unit Owners different branches thereof (in case of a multiple sala court) should not be
of Concorde Condominium Building... a Petition for Injunction... against taken as a separate or compartmentalized unit. It, thus, concludes that
respondents New PPI Corporation and its President Augusto H. Baculio; the designation by the Supreme Court of Branch 149 as a Special
Asian Security and Investigation Agency and its security guards, Engr. Commercial Court did not divest it of its power as a court of general
Nelson B. Morales... and any and all persons acting with or under them jurisdiction.
(respondents).
Issues:
(1) to enjoin respondents Baculio and New PPI Corporation from
whether Branch 149 of the Makati RTC, a designated Special Commercial
misrepresenting to the public, as well as to private and government
Court, erred in dismissing the petition for injunction with damages for
offices/agencies, that they are the owners of the disputed lots and
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
Concorde Condominium Building, and from pushing for the demolition of
the building which they do not even own... respondents Baculio and New Ruling:
PPI Corporation filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated April 25, 2012,
claiming that it is a regular court, not a Special Commercial Court, which The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction
has jurisdiction over the case. over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint
of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
Respondents claimed that the petition seeks to restrain or compel certain recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in
individuals and government officials to stop doing or performing the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
particular acts, and that there is no showing that the case involves a consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction
matter embraced in Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
which enumerates the cases over which the SEC [now the RTC acting as to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."
Special Commercial Court pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799]
As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the jurisdiction of
exercises exclusive jurisdiction.
the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, Section 6 (a) of P.D. No. 902-A empowered the SEC to issue
It noted that by petitioner's own allegations and admissions, respondents preliminary or permanent injunctions, whether prohibitory or
Baculio and New PPI Corporation are not owners of the two subject lots mandatory, in all cases in which it exercises original and exclusive
and the building. Due to the absence of intra-corporate relations jurisdiction
between the parties, it ruled that the case does not involve an intra-
corporate controversy cognizable by it sitting as a Special Commercial
Court.
However, jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate cases was and City Fire Marshal of Makati City, the Regional Director of the Bureau
transferred to Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional of Fire Protection, and the private security agency, on the other hand.
Trial Court when R.A. No. 8799 took effect on August 8, 2000.
Clearly, as the suit between petitioner and respondents neither arises
In GD Express Worldwide N. V., et al. v. Court of Appeals (4th Div.) et from an intra-corporate relationship nor does it pertain to the
al,[12] the Court stressed that Special Commercial Courts are still enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the
considered courts of general jurisdiction which have the power to hear Corporation Code, and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules
and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special of the corporation, Branch 149 correctly found that the subject matter of
proceedings the petition is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of Here, no clear and convincing evidence is shown to overturn the legal
jurisdiction over a particular case's subject matter is different from presumption that official duty has been regularly performed when the
incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the Clerk of Court of the Makati RTC docketed the petition for injunction with
subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of damages as an ordinary civil case -not as a commercial case - and,
jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of consequently, raffled it among all branches of the same RTC, and
Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court. eventually assigned it to Branch 149. To recall, the designation of the said
branch as a Special Commercial Court by no means diminished its power
the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its
as a court of general jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature,
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a
whether civil, criminal or special proceedings. There is no question,
matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
therefore, that the Makati RTC, Branch 149 erred in dismissing the
jurisdiction.
petition for injunction with damages, which is clearly an ordinary civil
Having clearly settled that as courts of general jurisdiction, the case. As a court of general jurisdiction, it still has jurisdiction over the
designated Special Commercial Courts and the regular RTCs are both subject matter thereof.
conferred by law the power to hear and decide civil cases in which the
In view of the above discussion, the Court finds no necessity to delve into
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as an
the other contentions raised by the parties, as they should be properly
action for injunction
addressed by the Makati RTC, Branch 149 which has jurisdiction over the
Applying the relationship test[18] and the nature of the controversy subject matter of the petition for injunction with damages.
test[19] in determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate
Principles:
controversy, as enunciated in Medical Plaza Makati Condominium
Corporation v. Cullen,[20] the Court agrees with Branch 149 that Civil
Case No. 12-309 for injunction with damages is an ordinary civil case, and
not an intra-corporate controversy.
A careful review of the allegations in the petition for injunction with
damages indicates no intra-corporate relations exists between the
opposing parties, namely (1) petitioner condominium corporation, by
itself and comprising all its unit owners, on the one hand, and (2)
respondent New PP1 Corporation which Baculio claims to be the owner
of the subject properties, together with the respondents Building Official