The Massacre of the 600 Moros (March 5-7, 1906)

What really happened at Bud Dajo1?

RT Oliveros, Ph.D2

2016 is the 110th anniversary of the Moro Massacre at Bud Dajo, Jolo, Sulu. Studies
on the battle of Bud Dajo have always been sketchy and murky, and do not provide a clear
picture of the events that led to the massacre at Bud Dajo in March 1906. What follows is an
attempt to trace the events that led to this one-sided battle that cost the lives of hundreds of
Moros and outraged Americans in the United States, also cutting short the career of General
Leonard Wood as Governor of the Moro Province (1903-1906). Previous studies give the
impression that this incident took place in a period of only three or four days, but the Moro
community (ummah) that formed in Bud Dajo can be traced back at least ten months earlier
to the end of Datu Pala’s resistance. However, the seeds of resistance can be seen three years
earlier in the Panglima Hassan resistance at Luuk. It was a continuation or extension of the
Panglima Hassan’s resistance of November 1903, the Laksamana Usap resistance of January
1905, and the Datu Pala uprising of spring 1905. After Datu Pala’s failed uprising the
remnants of the three resistances gathered at Bud Dajo. For the 800 Moros at Bud Dajo, it
was their last stand.

During the time of the failed leadership of Sultan Kiram II, Panglima Hassan was the
first Moro leader to rally the datus and the Moros to resist the antislavery law and, more
importantly, American sovereignty in Sulu. For the Moros of Luuk, Jamal-ul Kiram II
ceased to be their sultan because of his collaboration with the Americans. They now realize
that the sultan’s judgments were not infallible. Only when the sultan was acting in the ideal
manner was God’s will was manifested through him. God was sovereign, and the sultan was
sovereign so long as he sticks to the ideals of Islam.3 Since Kiram failed in this regard,
Panglima Hassan had inculcated in the Moros that the only way to preserve God’s
sovereignty was to resist American sovereignty through sabilillah, to fight in the name of
Allah. Moros blamed Sultan Kiram for the death of Panglima Hassan.

After the deaths of these three Moro leaders, just about every Moro from Luuk was
ready to continue their struggle. After Datu Pala’s death in May 1905, his followers
retreated to Bud Dajo to continue the struggle of their datu. Impassioned to resist the
American sovereignty signified by the imposition of the Cedula Act, former sakop(s) of
Panglima Hassan and Datu Laksamana Usap, both from Luuk, joined forces with the
sakop(s) of Pala who were already at Bud Dajo. Moros from Patikul also joined them.4
1 Bud means Mountain. Bud Dajo is an extinct volcano 2,100 above sea level.

2 Excerpts from dissertation: Moro-American Conflict [1899-1913]. Temple University, Philadelphia,

2005.
3 Kiefer, The Tausug Polity and the Sultanate of Sulu: A Segmentary State in Southern Philippines , 1981,
p.35.

4 Datu Hassan of Luuk, a spy of Maj. Scott, and Panglima Gumbahali, probably an eyewitness, who
was interviewed by students of Gerard Rixhon of Notre Dame of Sulu.
 By mid-1905, other Moros who objected to the Cedula Act began organizing
opposition to the American government on a larger scale. An excerpt from Silsilah sin Lupa
Sug (History of Land of Sulu)5 state: “... the Sayrulla6 or residence certificate was imposed on
the people especially the old ones. The old one then said: ‘Don’t get Sayrulla for in the last
day (hereafter) you will ride on a pig, but instead we will clear Bud Datu. We will fight
against the Americans on that mountain. All of us will go up that mountain.’ So all went to
climb Bud Datu7 to fight.”

Bud Dajo

Bud Dajo was six kilometers from Jolo, the capital of Sulu. The Moros trekked the
crater of Bud Dajo for what they considered their last stand. Hagedorn described them as
“eight hundred Moros, who have sought refuge in the crater of Bud Dajo ... remnants of two
or three revolts ... rebels against the poll tax, die-hards against the American occupation,
outlaws recognizing no datto and condemned by the stable elements among the Moros
themselves.”8 The supposedly “stable elements” were the sultan and his loyal datus, who
were worried and angered by the disobedient Moros at Bud Dajo “because they represented
successful defiance of their [the chief’s] traditional authority.”9

The Bud Dajo Moros were determined to create a separate. So an Islamic village was
set on top of Bud Dajo. They brought their wives and children up to the mountain with
provisions. “With sufficient water in the extinct volcano, they planted rice and potatoes and
ventured out during the day to obtain other supplies. In a seemingly impregnable position
behind large fortifications, they became bolder in their opposition to American authority.”10

5 See Appendix F.

6 Taosug spelling of cedula.

7 From the history of Sulu (Silsilah sin Lupah Sug). The silsilah ends with this sentence: “The number

of the Americans and Taosugs who were killed in the battle were like sticks wherein if combined together they
were enough to make a broom. This is the end of the battle of Bud Datu between the Taosugs and the
Americans.” If indeed this battle is the major military encounter between Americans and Taosugs, it is highly
probable that the one who translated and transcribed this silsilah had committed a gross error in referring to
the location Bud Datu. Historically it should be Bud Dajo. Although there is a hill named Bud Datu in Sulu,
there is no record of a major battle having occurred on it during the American occupation. If there is one
mentioned in history books, it is always the battle at Bud Dajo, which has captured the imagination of
historians, and raised so much publicity and outrage in the United States.

8 Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood: A Biography, vol. II (New York: Harper and Bros.,
1931), p. 64.
9 Peter Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920
(1983), p. 161.

10 Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive--General Leonard Wood, 1978, 128.

This time, they were not ruled by the sultan nor by datus but by themselves, guided by a
council of religious leaders, the imams.

In an interview late in his life, Panglima Gumbahali11 mentioned the following

imams: Imam Sahuddin, Imam Harib, Imam Sanudida, and Panglima Imlan of Danag.
What can be ascertained in Gumbahali’s list is that all were imams. Imam Illih and Imam
Sahirun, neither of whom are mentioned on Gumbahali’s list, were commemorated in a
silsilah and a kissa. Illih’s martyrdom is celebrated in ‘Silsilah sin Lupah Sug,’ while Sahirun
is celebrated in the following kissa:12

Sayrulla dih kumaput (The tribe was gathered)

Sahirun mapantuk (Prophet Sahirun led the village)
Nag isun nagtayakkup (The tribe became one)
Piya bud naghahakut (And they were not afraid)

Hannbal Bara, associate professor of History at the Mindanao State University, Sulu,
has cited Imam Sahirun as a prophet-like spiritual leader at Bud Dajo. The tasks of an imam
were to lead people in prayer, officiate at weddings, pray for the dead, and receive the oaths
of those who would perform sabil. At Bud Dajo, the imams receiving these oaths prayed for
Allah’s blessings so the Moros would remain committed to their vows to perform sabil for
Allah and the ummah.

According Panglima Gumbahali, the Moros at Bud Dajo fortified their camp on four
sides; it was fortified along the rim of the crater five hundred yards wide and fifty yards deep,
two thousand feet above the sea.13 They had firearms: lantaka (cannon), sinapang (guns
captured or stolen from the Spaniards), and paltik or tud-tud (a locally manufactured gun).
They became so bold in their defiance of American sovereignty that they “reportedly began
raiding friendly villages burning houses and buildings (including the Army target range at
Jolo).”14 Small groups were organized by the Bud Dajo Moros to raid American military
outposts and villages that they considered to be friendly to the Americans.

By March 1906, the population of the Islamic village on top of Bud Dajo had swelled
to almost a thousand Moros.15 For months, Major Scott and Captain Reeves, Sulu district

11 Gerard Rixhon, the interviewer, comments that Gumbahali, who was over 100 years old and whose
health and memory were both receding, further noted that “...this account should not be taken on face value
because of the condition of the respondent (100+ years old). Names mentioned should be crosschecked with
other sources.”

12 See Appendix E for the complete transcription.

13 Hagedorn, 64.

14 Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, p. 160.

15 An estimate of the number of Moros at Bud Dajo cannot be verified because of contradicting figures
secretary, sent negotiators to convince the Moros to leave the mountain and obey the law.
They sent Datu Kalbi, Datu Julkarnain, and Panglima Bandahala to Bud Dajo to negotiate
and convince the Moros to end their resistance. They stayed for two days, pleading with
them to no avail.16 On the third day Datu Kalbi reported to Major Scott that the Moros at
Bud Dajo said “… they will never submit to America … they will fight until they can no
longer raise aloft the kris."17

By the first week of March 1906, General Wood, who was convinced that a decisive
action at Bud Dajo was necessary for future control of Moros of Sulu, dispatched 790 men in
a force that included the Army, the Navy and the Constabulary. “The assault units at Bud
Dajo were composed of 272 men of the 6th Infantry, 211 men of the 4th Calvary, 68 men of
the 28th Artillery Battery, 51 Sulu Constabulary, 110 men of the 19th Infantry and 6 sailors
from the gunboat Pampanga.”18 The battle began on March 5 as mountain guns were hauled
into position and forty rounds of shrapnel were fired into the crater to warn the Moros to
remove their women and children. On the March 6 and 7, Colonel J.W. Duncan commanded
the assault with strong support from detachment leaders under the command of Major
Bundy, Captain Rivers and Captain Lawton. General Wood and Tasker Bliss watched the
encounter from a distance.

An excerpt from a report of the Tausug version of the battle of Bud Dajo states that
in the silsilah [Gerard Rixhon], a Moro named Adam initially led the Bud Dajo resistance.
Panglima Gumbahali confirmed that there indeed was an Adam who initially led the
resistance but turned traitor when the Americans bribed him with two sacks of money and
gold. The silsilah narrates a similar account: “Adam and his men ... put logs on top of the
cliffs. A short while later, after they were through with their preparations, the Americans
came and went up the mountain through the way made by the people or the Taosug. When
the Americans were already half way to where the Taosug were, Adam cut off the rope
holding the logs. The logs rolled down to the Americans. For these, the captain ordered a
retreat. ... “
Langhorne's plan is to secretly offer a bribe and pardon to Adam, leader of the
smallest group, if he will convince his followers to "stand aside" as an American
column creeps up the South trail in the dead of night to surprise and annihilate the
other two groups at dawn. Langhorne recommends the attack should proceed
regardless of whether Adam can be persuaded to betray his compatriots or not.

presented by Victor Hurley, an American observer, and General Leonard Wood, commander of the assault and
eyewitness at Bud Dajo. Hurley reported: “Of the 1,000 Moros who opened the battle two days previously,
only six men escaped the carnage.” [Vic Hurley, Swish of the Kris, Chapter 19]. Panglima Gumbahali mentions
some 700 Moro dead, and five survivors. General Wood reported more than 600 dead. [Telegram from Wood to
Andrews, Adjutant General, Manila, March 9, 1906, in Wood’s papers as quoted in Gowing, 161.]

16 Hagedorn, 70.

17Vic Hurley, Swish of the Kris, E.F. Dutton, (New York, NY, 1936) in Chapter 19,
ww.bakbakan.com/swishk/swkr-18.html.
18 Hurley, Chapter 19.
 White is badly wounded in an attempt to scale the cotta wall and Captains Schindel
and Koehler of the 6th Infantry take charge just as the Tausug defenders,
led by Adam, pour over the top of the cotta in a fierce counterattack.

So Hadji Butu al-Baqui, prime minister or wazir to the sultan, proposed a strategy
that was accepted by the American leaders. The Hadji said: “Let us stop the fight, our way
of fighting is wrong. Let us do it in a better way. Adam is the one guarding the road or the
path and the ropes made out of rattan. We will give him forty laksa (a laksa is ten thousand
implying so much money) as long as he lowers down the rope. And so they did offered 40
laksa to Adam to lower the rope, and Adam accepted the offer. Hence, the Americans were
able to climb the mountain.”19 According to Panglima Gumbahali, had it not been for
Adam, the Americans would have stalled in their advance and slowed their climb to the top
of Bud Dajo, which was heavily forested.

With support from a gunboat anchored offshore and an artillery battery that they
hauled close to the crater’s edge, the Americans executed a prolonged bombardment of the
Moros’ kuta.

When the Americans were assured that they had flattened the camp, the assault of
their troops followed. As they climbed, they were met with a shower of javelins, knives,
bullets, and boulders. The Moros, armed mainly with kris and barongs, were no match for the
American’s modern warfare. Their only defense was their bodies, and victory for a Moro was
to die with even just one American body beside him/her. Some feigned death and attacked
the Americans as they came within striking distance. Among the sabils were women dressed
as men, who fought just as bravely. “Moro women, dressed in men’s clothes, fought side by
side with their husbands.”20 The official report states that "[T]he Moro women fought
alongside the men and held their children before them, having sworn to die rather than yield.
In this way, a number of woman and children were among the killed--an unfortunate but
necessary evil.”21 By the end of the battle, more than 600 Moro men, women, and children
had been killed. On the American side, there were 21 killed and 75 wounded.22 Vic Hurley
reported that after the carnage, many of the Moros who died had as many as fifty wounds.
Of the 1,000 Moros who opened the battle two days previously, only six men escaped.

Reactions to the Massacre

When the details of the aftermath reached the United States, the reactions from were
both critical and unfavorable. The Republicans conferred their congratulations to General

19 Silsilah sin Lupah Sug (History of Sulu), Appendix D.

20 Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 161.

21 Hurley, Chapter 19.

22 General Wood’s Diary, the Wood Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
Wood and the American Army for their gallantry, basically affirming the position of
Rowland Thomas, a veteran of Bud Dajo, who commented “[I]t was merely a piece of public
work such as the army has had to do many times in our own West.”23 “The West” here refers
to American encounters with the Indians (Native Americans). Gowing argued that U.S.
policy regarding the Moros had a similar purpose and commonality with its policy toward
America’s native people. The “Moro policy and administrative methods of the White
Americans were influenced as well by their experience in governing the Indian peoples of
North America. Many of the military and civil officials who were placed in authority over
the Moros were veterans of the ‘Indian Wars’ in the American West.”24 Many in the U.S.
Congress were outraged and called the Bud Dajo engagement as a massacre and a slaughter,
particularly of women and children. The most critical reaction came from the “Anti-
Imperialist League (who) had been opposed to U.S. involvement in the Philippines. After
the Moro slaughter at Mount Dajo, Mark Twain, who was involved in the Anti-Imperialist
League, considered the Army as ‘Christian butchers.’ The Anti-Imperialist League used this
opportunity to further their cause. They published two pamphlets about the massacre and
distributed 3,000 copies of a photograph of the carnage to the press in January 1907.”25 The
critical reaction to the Bud Dajo massacre eventually prevailed.

General Leonard Wood was forced to vacate his post, a little more than a month after
the massacre, as a consequence of political pressure from the U.S. Congress and mounting
criticism of his actions at Bud Dajo.

Governor General Leonard Wood [1921-27]

He left disgraced but returned 13-years later as the Moros’ champion.

Before his return to the Philippines, Wood had declined President Warren Harding’s
offer to make him the next Governor General, but when he saw the disadvantaged position
the rapid Filipinization had put the Moros, he reconsidered and accepted the post. After
becoming Governor General on 15 October 1921, Wood offered the Moros a special
relationship by presenting himself as their protector from Filipino26 domination. He knew
he had contributed to their disarmament, and now that he saw they were vulnerable to
exploitation by enterprising Filipino politicians, he was there to defend them. Wood decried
absolute control of national and local government by the caciques (large landowners). In as
much as he hoped to free the common Moro from the heavy hand of the datu class, he

23 Boston Transcript in Manila Times, 5 May 1906, as quoted in Samuel Tan, 73.

Gowing, “Moros and Indians: Commonalities of Purpose, Policy and Practice in American
24

Government of Two Hostile Subject Peoples,” an essay, Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, 1980, 1.

25 Hurley, Chapter 19.

26 Filipino refers to those from Luzon and Visayas.

wanted to lessen the domination of the caciques.27

As Governor General, Leonard Wood wanted to reduce Filipino control of government

in Moroland. “During his six years in that position, Wood focused on any maladministration
or insensitivity by Christian Filipinos in Mindanao and Sulu. He accurately described such
acts as being dysfunctional to the goal of advancing and integrating Muslim Filipinos. He
used instances of Christian Filipino misgovernment to justify reversing the trend toward
Christian authority over Muslim areas and as one argument against Philippine independence
in the near future.”28 In fact, it was not only Wood who saw mismanagement by
opportunistic Filipinos. Senator Juan Sumulong, who in January 1927, called for a separate
government for the Moro regions of Mindanao and Sulu on the basis that “…Mindanao has
fast become the ‘dumping ground’ for all undesirables in the local government service. Very
often, men of doubtful ability and character are sent as government officials or employees to
the Moro regions, and they commit indiscretions which provoke the ire of the Moros against
Christians in general…”29

He sought to slow down this process of Filipinization of Mindanao by hands-on

management of Mindanao as Governor General. This attempt to slow down the
Filipinization of Mindanao and Sulu was based on a combination of his sympathy for the
Moros, and his response to Moro complaints of discriminatory Filipino administration.
However, rather than recognizing his genuine concern for the disadvantaged Moros, his
direct involvement in the local government of Mindanao and Sulu was misconstrued his
involvement in the as American self-interest.

27Ralph Thomas, Muslim But Filipinos: The Integration of Philippine Muslims, 1917-1946
(Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1971), p. 330.

28 Thomas, pp. 97-98.

29 Philippines Herald, 8 January 1927, quoted in Thomas, 126.