THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136200. June 8, 2000.]

CELERINO VALERIANO , petitioner, vs . EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION

COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM ,
respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a retruck driver assigned at the

San Juan Fire Station. In the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was standing along
Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of Alexander Agawin. They
decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their way
home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in gured in a head-on
collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in
Quezon City. Due to the strong impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the
vehicle and was severely injured. He led a claim for income bene ts under PD 626 with
the Government Service Insurance System. His claim was opposed on the ground that the
injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his work. Petitioner
led a motion for reconsideration of the denial, but the same was turned down. Petitioner
then interposed an appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC for short)
which ruled against petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals a rmed the ECC ruling.
Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. The Court ruled that petitioner's
injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable.
Petitioner was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a retruck driver was related
to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely
personal and social function — having dinner with some friends — is clear from the records
of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while
he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of
his superior. The Court also ruled that the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to
petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the
orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important justi cation for
the Court's stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a
firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries.
cSTHaE

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION;

DISABILITY BENEFITS; TO BE COMPENSABLE, THE INJURY AND THE RESULTING
DISABILITY MUST HAVE NECESSARILY RESULTED FROM AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF
OR IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. — Disability bene ts are granted an employee who
sustains an injury or contracts a sickness resulting in temporary total, permanent total, or
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 permanent partial, disability. For the injury and the resulting disability to be compensable,
they must have necessarily resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S INJURIES AND CONSEQUENT DISABILITY WERE
NOT WORK CONNECTED AND THUS NOT COMPENSABLE. — Thus, for injury to be
compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satis ed. The injury
and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable
regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of
the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and
performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto. Petitioner Valeriano was not
able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a retruck driver was related to the injuries he
had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social
function — having dinner with some friends — is clear from the records of the case. His
injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was
performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his
superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his
injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO REASONABLE CONNECTION BETWEEN PETITIONER'S
INJURIES AND HIS WORK AS A FIRETRUCK DRIVER. — We recognize the importance and
laud the efforts of firemen in our society. Indeed, the nature of their job requires them to be
always on alert, like soldiers and police o cers, and to respond to re alarms which may
occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances in the present case do not
call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-
hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither at his
assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident.
But the more important justi cation for the Court's stance is that he was not doing an act
within his duty and authority as a retruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the
time he sustained his injuries. We cannot nd any reasonable connection between his
injuries and his work as a retruck driver. While we sympathize with petitioner's plight, we
cannot grant his Petition. True, the policy is to extend the applicability of Presidential
Decree No. 626 to as many quali ed employees as possible, but this must be balanced by
the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation. Considering the
circumstances in petitioner's case, he cannot be deemed quali ed for disability bene ts
under the law.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN , J : p

To be compensable, an injury must have resulted from an accident arising out of and
in the course of employment. It must be shown that it was sustained within the scope of
employment while the claimant was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental
thereto or while following the orders of a superior. Indeed, the standard of "work
connection" must be satis ed even by one who invokes the 24-hour-duty doctrine;
otherwise, the claim for compensability must be denied.
The Case
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 Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the January 30, 1998 Court
of Appeals 1 (CA) Decision, 2 as well as the September 25, 1998 Resolution 3 in CA-GR SP
No. 31141. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows: 4
"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission
dated April 1, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto."

The September 25, 1998 Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are summarized in the assailed
Decision as follows: 5
"Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a re truck driver assigned at the
San Juan Fire Station. Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was
standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of
Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA,
Quezon City, for dinner. On their way home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type
jeepney they were riding in gured in a head-on collision with another vehicle at
the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the
strong impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was
severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several
hospitals for treatment. prcd

"On September 16, 1985, he led a claim for income bene ts under PD
626, with the Government Security Insurance Service (sic). His claim for bene ts
was opposed on the ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or
result from the nature of his work. Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration of
the denial by the System but the same was turned down on the ground that the
condition for compensability had not been satis ed. Petitioner then interposed an
appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC for short). In a
decision dated April 1, 1993, the ECC ruled against herein appellant, the pertinent
portions of which are stated in the following wise:

'After a study of the records of the case under consideration, we nd

the decision of the respondent System denying appellant's claim in order.
'Under the present compensation law, injury and the resulting
disability or death is compensable if the injury resulted from an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment. It means that the injury or
death must be sustained while the employee is in the performance of his
o cial duty; that the injury is sustained at the place where his work
requires him to be; and if the injury is sustained elsewhere, that the
employee is executing an order for the employer. The aforementioned
conditions are found wanting in the instant case. The accident that the
appellant met in the instant case occurred outside of his time and place of
work. Neither was appellant performing his o cial duties as a reman at
the time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the Bonanza Restaurant
where he and his friends had dinner. Apparently, the injuries appellant
sustained from the accident did not arise out of [and] in the course of his
employment. Considering therefore the absence of a causal link between
the contingency for which income bene ts [are] being claimed and his
occupation as reman, his claim under PD 626 as amended, cannot be
given due course.
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 The CA Ruling
The Court of Appeals agreed with the nding of the Employees' Compensation
Commission that petitioner's injuries and disability were not compensable, emphasizing
that they were not work-connected.
"Turning to the case before us, the evidence on record shows that herein
petitioner was injured not at the place where his work required him to be. Neither
was he executing an order from his superior, nor performing his o cial functions
at the time of the accident. It must be recalled that at the time of the accident,
petitioner was already dismissed from his regular 8-hour daily work. He was
walking along Santolan Road when he met his friend and they decided to go to
Bonanza Restaurant for dinner. Notwithstanding his claim that he can be called
to report for work anytime in case there is a re, or that his position is akin to that
of a military man, a contention we cannot support, still the circumstances leading
to the accident in which he was injured reveals that there is no causative
connection between the injury he sustained and his work. Petitioner's invocation
of the ruling in Hinoguin vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 is misplaced. In that case,
petitioner Sgt. Hinoguin was a member of the Armed Forces and soldiers are
presumed to be on o cial duty 24 hours a day. In the case at bar, petitioner is a
reman with a speci c tour of duty. To sustain petitioner's contention of
compensability would, in effect, make the employer, in this case the State, the
insurer against all perils. That is not the intendment of our lawmakers in enacting
the Workmen's Compensation Act." 6

Hence, this Petition. 7

The Issues
In his Petition, 8 Petitioner Celerino Valeriano urges the Court to resolve the
following questions:
"I
WHETHER PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED.

"II
WHETHER PETITIONER FIREMAN, LIKE SOLDIERS, CAN BE PRESUMED TO BE ON
24 HOUR DUTY." 9

These questions point to the sole issue of the compensability of Petitioner

Valeriano's injuries and resulting disability. cdtai

The Court's Ruling

We find no merit in the Petition.
Main Issue:
Compensability of Valeriano's Injuries and Resulting Disability
Disability bene ts are granted an employee who sustains an injury or contracts a
sickness resulting in temporary total, permanent total, or permanent partial, disability. 1 0
For the injury and the resulting disability to be compensable, they must have necessarily
resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. 1 1
Were Petitioner's Injuries Work-Connected?
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 Citing Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission , 1 2 the
Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's claim on the ground that he had not been injured
at his work place, executing an order of his superior, or performing o cial functions when
he met the accident.
We agree. In Iloilo the Court explained the phrase "arising out of and in the course of
employment" in this wise:
"The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in
the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be
independently satis ed; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept
of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word,
"work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent
application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude
clearly work-connected injuries. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or
cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the
course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident
takes place.
"As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in
the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the
employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably . . . be, and while he
is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto." 1 3

Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be

substantially satis ed. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of
employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can
be proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his
or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto. 1 4
Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a retruck
driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after
pursuing a purely personal and social function — having dinner with some friends — is clear
from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were
they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in
pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the
appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and
thus not compensable. prLL

Applicability of Hinoguin and Nitura

Petitioner debunks the importance given by the appellate court to the fact that he
was not at his work place and had in fact been dismissed for the day when he met the
accident. He argues that his claim for disability bene ts is anchored on the proposition
that the exigency of his job as a reman requires a constant observance of his duties as
such; thus, he should be considered to have been "on call" when he met the accident. He
underscores the applicability of Hinoguin v. ECC 1 5 and Nitura v. ECC 1 6 to his case.
In Hinoguin and Nitura, the Court granted death compensation bene ts to the heirs
of Sgt. Limec Hinoguin and Pfc. Regino Nitura, both members of the Philippine Army. After
having gone elsewhere on an overnight pass, Sgt. Hinoguin was accidentally shot by a
fellow soldier during the former's return trip to their headquarters. Pfc. Nitura, on the other
hand, died after falling from a bridge during his trip back to his camp. At the time of his
death, he had just accomplished his commander's instruction to check on several
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 personnel of his command post who were then at a dance party.
Both cases espoused the position that the concept of "work place" cannot always
be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status who, to all intents and purposes, is on
a 24-hour o cial duty status, subject to military discipline and law and at the beck and call
of his superior officers at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status. 1 7
This ratiocination, later applied to police o cers in Employees' Compensation
Commission v. Court of Appeals , 1 8 was dissected in the more recent GSIS v. Court of
Appeals. 1 9 In the latter case, the deceased police o cer, SPO2 Florencio Alegre, was
moonlighting as a tricycle driver at the time of his death. The Court reviewed Hinoguin,
Nitura and ECC and noted that in each case death bene ts were granted, not just because
of the principle that soldiers or policemen were virtually working round the clock. More
important, there was a nding of a reasonable nexus between the absence of the
deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident causing his death. The Court
explained:
"In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he
was assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission
duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on
overnight pass. According to the Court, "a place [where] soldiers have secured
lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where
they are required to go by their commanding o cer" and hence, the deceased is
to be considered as still in the performance of his official functions.
"The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go
outside of his station on permission and directive by his superior o cer to check
on several personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party.
"As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees' Compensation Commission case,
although he was not given any directive or permission by a superior o cer to be
at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justi ed
by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time . . . he
was attacked and shot to death, that is, [while] bringing his son to the police
station to answer for a crime [—] a basic duty which any policeman is expected
and ought to perform." 2 0

Ruling that the death of SPO2 Alegre was not compensable, the Court pointed out
that the 24-hour-duty doctrine should not embrace all acts and circumstances causing the
death of a police o cer, but only those that can be categorized as police service in
character. It further held:
"Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with
respect to claims for death bene ts, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the
place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been
performing his o cial functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere,
the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not
di cult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the
claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at
the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically
private and uno cial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or
permission of his superior o cer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the
cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peace-keeping nature of the act attended to by
the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive
of a superior o cer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justi cation for
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 holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That
he may be called upon at anytime to render police work as he is considered to be
on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not
change the conclusion arrived at[,] considering that he was not placed in a
situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as policeman.
In fact, he was refusing to render one[,] pointing out that he already complied with
the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and
soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them
within the scope of the guidelines rather than [as] a blanket license to bene t
them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-
hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and
circumstances causing the death of a police o cer but only to those which,
although not on o cial line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in
character." 2 1

We recognize the importance and laud the efforts of remen in our society. Indeed,
the nature of their job requires them to be always on alert, like soldiers and police o cers,
and to respond to re alarms which may occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the
circumstances in the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura.
Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to
petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the
orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important justi cation for
the Court's stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a
retruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We
cannot nd any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a retruck
driver. cdll

While we sympathize with petitioner's plight, we cannot grant his Petition. True, the
policy is to extend the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 626 to as many quali ed
employees as possible, 2 2 but this must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying
undeserving claims for compensation. 2 3 Considering the circumstances in petitioner's
case, he cannot be deemed qualified for disability benefits under the law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., is abroad, on official business.

Footnotes
1. Eleventh Division composed of J. Fermin A. Martin, Jr., ponente; and JJ. Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr., and Artemio G. Tuquero, both of whom concurred.
2. Rollo, pp. 80-87.
3. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
4. Rollo, p. 86.

5. CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 81-83.

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 6. CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 85.
7. The case was deemed submitted for decision on December 20, 1999, upon receipt by the
Court of the Memoranda of petitioner and Respondent GSIS. Respondent ECC's
Memorandum was filed on December 16, 1999.
8. Signed by Attys. Arceli A. Rubin and Teresita S. de Guzman of the Public Attorney's O ce;
rollo, pp. 12-31.
9. Rollo, p. 26.
10. See Articles 191-193, The Labor Code, as amended.
11. Section 1(a), Rule III, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. Note that the present
law in Employees Compensation, although part of the Labor Code, is also known as
Presidential Decree No. 626.
In Article 167(k) of the Labor Code, as amended, injury is de ned as "any harmful change in
the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment."
12. 26 SCRA 102, November 27, 1968.
13. Ibid., pp. 105-106, per Castro, J.
14. Lopez vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 228 SCRA 657, December 21, 1993.
15. 172 SCRA 350, April 17, 1989.

16. 201 SCRA 278, September 4, 1991.

17. See Hinoguin, pp. 356-357; and Nitura, pp. 283-284.
18. 257 SCRA 717, June 28, 1996.
19. 306 SCRA 41, April 20, 1999.
20. Ibid., p. 48, per Romero, J.

21. Ibid., p. 49.

22. Lazo v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 186 SCRA 569, June 18, 1990.
23. Beberisa Riño v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 132558, May 9, 2000.

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