Ramel, Ezra Denise L.

2A
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs.

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUÑGA JR.
G. R. No. L.65935, September 30, 1988

Facts:
Nestor Sunga, businessman and owner of a transit company, purchased a
passenger minibus Mazda from the Motorcenter, Inc. and for which he executed a
promissory note to pay the price in monthly basis. He executed a chattel mortgage
in favor of the Motorcenter, Inc. The Chattel Mortgage and Assignment was
assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation. The minibus was seized by two (2)
employees of the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation, without any receipt who
claimed that he was delinquent in the payments of his vehicle. Florence Onia of the
Filinvest explained that the minibus was confiscated because the balance was
already past due. After verification that his accounts are all in order, Florence Onia
admitted it was their fault. The motor vehicle was returned to Sunga upon proper
receipt.
After trial, the court rendered decisions granting Sunga moral, actual damages,
litigation expenses and Attorney's fees. Filinvest filed motion to review the decision
of the court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but
increased the amount to be paid for the moral damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court erred in increasing the amount of
moral damages

RULING:
Yes. It was held that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages and in granting
litigation expenses.
There is no dispute that the private respondent, is entitled to moral damages
due to the unwarranted seizure of the minibus Mazda. Considering, however, that
respondent Sunga was dispossessed of his motor vehicle for barely three days, the
award of moral damages even in the sum of P30,000.00 is excessive for it must be
emphasized that "damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the
expense of a defendant.” They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
sufferings the injured parties have undergone by reason of defendant's culpable
action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration
within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Moreover, "Moral damages
though not incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose
a penalty on the wrongdoer."
Ramel, Ezra Denise L. 2A
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

231 SCRA 292
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
FACTS
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a complaint with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) seeking to stop the operation of an open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects
on residents and pollution of the water. The LLDA personnel found that that City
Government did not secure a compliance certificate as required by law. They also
found that waters sample indicates the presence of bacteria. As a result, the LLDA
issued an order to the City Government to stop and desist from any dumping of any
kind or form of garbage.
The City Government filed with the RTC contending that the City
Government has the authority to promote the health and safety and enhance the
right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction.
The RTC ruled in favor of City of Government enjoining the LLDA from
enforcing its cease and desist order. CA, on the other hand, held that RTC has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment of LLDA’s
cease and desist order. Also, it was held that LLDA has no authority to issue such
order under PD 813 and EO 927.
ISSUE
Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint against
the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by
the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety,
and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in
the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage
dumpsite
HELD
Yes.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides
for another forum.
It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative
agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting
and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions
for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human
life and ecological systems
Ramel, Ezra Denise L. 2A
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

MAGBANUA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. Nos. L-66870-72; June 29, 1985

FACTS:
Agapito Magbanua, et.al. filed a petition against the respondents all surnamed
Perez alleging that they are shared tenants of the defendants, and that the latter
divert the flow of water from their farm lots which caused the drying up of their
landholdings and asked to vacate their areas for they could not plant palay due to
lack of water.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered the
defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants
appealed to the IAC which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of
moral and exemplary damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the
reinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its
decision because the former believe that as shared tenants, they are entitled to be
maintained as agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective
landholdings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and
exemplary damages.

HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and each
of the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by
the defendants.

Under the law, the landowners have an obligation to keep the tenant in the
peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. In this case, it shows that
the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make
them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff's rights and
caused prejudiced to the latter by the diversion of water. Under Article 2219 (10),
the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21
of the same Code which provides, Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. The defendants acted in an oppressive
manner which is contrary to the morals of the petitioners and therefore, they are
liable for the compensation to the latter.
Ramel, Ezra Denise L. 2A
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

OPOSA VS FACTORAN
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
Minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., who are duly represented and joined by
their parents filed as a taxpayer’s class suit at RTC against Fulgencio Factoran Jr.,
Secretary of DENR. Oposa alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Oposa prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing
Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs and granting the
plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged
that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to
cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of
the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
Factoran filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(1) plaintiffs have no cause of action against him; (2) the issues raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to
“prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Ramel, Ezra Denise L. 2A
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ et.al. v INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT AND DAYTONA

CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (DCDC)
G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

FACTS:
Ernesto filed an action for abatement of public nuisance with damages
against defendant. The continued operation of the cement batching plant of the
DCDC poses a great menace to the neighborhood, both in point of health and
property. Rodriguez Ill testified that he has three parcels of residential lots adjacent
to the Daytona compound. He informed the Court that his property, with an area
of 8,892 square meters has been over-run by effluence from the cement batching
plant of the defendant. The sediment settled on the lots and all forms of vegetation
have died as a result, and the land tremendously diminished in value. Rosario
testified that she experienced dust pollution and destruction of her plants by the
cement powder. Cruz, a chemical engineer, said that the effluence deposited on
the properties of Rodriguez has a very high PH11.8, and the soil is highly alkaline
and cannot support plant life; that pollution coming from the batching plant can
cause stomach disorder and skin problems; In an order dated July 9, 1982, the trial
court upon motion of plaintiffs granted execution pending appeal it indeed
appearing as alleged in the motion that he continued operation of the cement
batching plant of the defendant poses a "great menace to the neighborhood, both
in point of health and property. DCDC filed for a petition for relief but was denied
by lower court. They also filed defendant filed a petition for injunction with the IAC
which found the petition unmeritorious. Its motion for reconsideration, having
been denied by the Appellate Court, defendant went on appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have cause of action to file the case.

HELD:
Yes, the trial court’s order denying defendant's motion to set aside the order
of default was appealable but was not appealed by defendant, the necessary
conclusion is that the default order became final. There is no question that there
were good reasons for the trial court to issue the order of execution pending
appeal. The order categorically stated that there was a need for the closure and
stoppage of the operation of DCDC’s cement batching plant because it posed "a
great menace to the neighborhood both in point of health and property." The trial
court thus stated: From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs,
there is hardly any question that the cement dust coming from the batching plant
of the defendant corporation is injurious to the health of the plaintiffs and other
residents in the area. The noise, the vibration, the smoke and the odor generated
by the day and night operation of the plant must indeed be causing them serious
discomfort and untold miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain rights of
the plaintiffs and causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance and its abatement
justified.
Ramel, Ezra Denise L. 2A
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC VS CA

G.R. 94759

FACTS:
Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting
charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent
Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the
petitioner’s plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to
show to the office of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit,
mayor’s permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural Resources
Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required
documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of
company’s plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation.
Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition,
mandamus with preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the
closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled against
the company. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

ISSUE:
1. Whether of not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant.
2. Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:
1. Yes. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter
of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires
control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to
the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a
town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by
virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a
business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to
control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from
the emissions in the operation of the business.
2. No. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to
the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only
pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area,"
so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders were given.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in
this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with
the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is
the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the
people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
Ramel, Ezra Denise L. 2A
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

HERNANDEZ v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

G.R. 145328

FACTS:
NAPOCOR began constructing poles and towers with a height of 53.4 to
support overhead high tension cables where it passes the South Superhighway to
Tamarind Road, where petioners Hernandez et. al. homes are. Alarmed by the sight
of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the internet on the possible
adverse effects that such a structure could cause to their health and well-being and
which could lead to fatal illnesses. They aired this growing concern to the
NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings with them.
The Trial Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing NPC
from energizing and transmitting high voltage current through the lines. NPC
challenged this order on the basis that the Presidential Decree No. 1818 prevented
courts from issuing temporary restraining orders or injunctions. In the interim, the
Trial Court issued a writ of a preliminary injunction against NPC, saying it was
necessary because the power lines posed possible health risks to the Petitioners. It
also ruled that Presidential Decree No. 1818 did not apply to the case because of
these health risks.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s order, finding that
Presidential Decree No. 1818 did apply to the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the TRO and Preliminary Injunctions were purposely designed to
address matters of extreme urgency where there is probability of grave injustice
and irreparable injury.

HELD:
Yes. What Presidential Decree No. 1818 aims to avert is the untimely
frustration of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional
remedies, to the detriment of the greater good by disrupting the pursuit of
essential government projects or frustrate the economic development effort of the
nation. Presidential Decree No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket
prohibition so as to disregard the fundamental right to health, safety and well-
being of a community guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land.
Ramel, Ezra Denise L. 2A
Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 72119

FACTS:
Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspi’s (petitioner) request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians,
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu.
Petitioner claims that his right to information is guaranteed by the Constitution
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Commission to disclose said information. The Solicitor General
challenges the petitioner’s standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not
possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the
government employees concerned. SolGen further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the
information he seeks.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate
the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees.

HELD:
Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu
City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.