Case Digest
Case Digest
Case Digest
Facts:
At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6.
The case was pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344)
was enacted amending among others the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised
from 9 to 15 years old. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already
reached the age of majority.
Issue:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be
applied, in the resolution of the case.
Held:
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue
of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years
old, this law is evidently favorable to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at
the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate
of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his
mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the
crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal
liability.
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Facts:
Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of the
then 5-year-old victim. The crime was committed when appellant was only 17;
Judgment was rendered when appellant was already 25.
Issue:
Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344 regarding criminal
liability of an accused who was a minor during the commission of the crime and the
suspension of sentence of one who is no longer a minor during the pronouncement of
verdict.
Held:
The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the straightforward
testimony of the victim and the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the defense
witnesses.
The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was only 17
during the commission of the crime since, in view of the circumstances to which
accused committed the felony, it was proved that he acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA
9344). There was showing that the accused understood the consequences of his action.
Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with reclusion perpetua
instead of the death penalty.
As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to the decision of the
Court, ordering accused to pay the victim for damages.
However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension of his sentence
provided in Section38 of RA 9344, which made no distinction to an accused found guilty
of a capital offense. The Court stated that what was important was the intent of the Act
to uphold the welfare of a child in conflict with the law. What was to be considered was
the fact that accused committed the crime at a tender age.
The Court held that accused may be confined in an agricultural camp or any training
facility in accordance with Sec 51 of RA 9344. The case was remanded to the court of
origin to take appropriate action in accordance to the said provision.
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Facts: On November 25, 1995, brothers Jerry Velez and Jelord Velez were on their way home on board a
motorcycle. A motorcycle was speeding behind them and as they were about to cross the bridge, they
heard gun shots firing behind them. As they turned around, Jerry identified PO3 Renato Villamor and
Jessie Maghilom riding the motorcycle behind them. Shots were fired at them and Jerry sustained
wounds on the abdomen and elbow while Jelord died on the spot. The trial proceeded against PO3
Villamor while Maghilom was still at large. During trial, the Trial Court found the PO3 Renato Villamor
guilty of having commited Murder aggravated by the circumstance of taking advantage of his public
position.
Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court properly applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage
of public position?
Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the aggravating circumstance of “taking advantage of public
position” under paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was improperly applied. A public
officer must use the influence that is vested in his office as a means to realize the purpose of the crime
to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. The question “Did the accused abuse his office to
commit the crime” must be asked in order to appreciate this circumstance as an aggravating
circumstance. No proof was shown that Villamor took advantage of his position of being a policeman
when he shot Jelord Velez. Neither was his influence, prestige or ascendancy used in killing Velez. Even
without occupying a public position, the accused could have committed the crime.