G.R. No.

114337 September 29, 1995

NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision1 rendered by public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili
sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship
agreement2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75
which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.

At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on,
accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.

Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was
not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process
injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.

The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter3 which reads:

August 2, 1990

Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin
and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya
at nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.

Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa
shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at
nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling kamay.

Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:

Emergency and doctor fee P715.00

Medecines (sic) and others 317.04

Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng
kanyang kamay.

Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.

Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay,
pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.

Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng

kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.
 Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi
pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.

(Sgd.) Roberto Capili

Roberto Capili

On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in
consideration of the sum of P1,912.79.4

Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch,
National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.

On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid
and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims
dismissed for lack of merit.

The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial
assistance.

SO ORDERED.5

Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was valid. First,
private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross
negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had
shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without
authority and proper training.6

On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to
reinstate complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his wages
were withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to
further hear complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and evidence
obtaining.

SO ORDERED.7

The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus:

As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship

agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the
Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain
"apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular
employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the
security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.

The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent,
pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5,
1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent
such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed.8

On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's
representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you are
hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster
located at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where
their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work
last performed or at the option of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.

You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the
dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Hence, the instant petition — for certiorari.

The issues raised before us are the following:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE
EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

We find no merit in the petition.

Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an
apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was
executed.

Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employer-
apprentice relationship.

Petitioner's argument is erroneous.

The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:

Contents of apprenticeship agreement. — Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of

apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period
of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates
below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable
minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved
by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of
apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on
May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same
date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and
Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence
of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it
was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with
the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.

Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a
condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.

The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a
preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice
relationship.

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through
the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish
apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior
approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any
such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and
agreements cannot be debased.

Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the
absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was
hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be
considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment
has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:

Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service
is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which
he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)

and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."9

Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.

There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive and
procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means
that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of
his representative, if he so desires.

Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11

As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12

The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2)
written notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13,
BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as
 amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure
is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached by management is void and in existent
(Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122;
Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).

The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after he was
made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.

Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or
"pahinante").

He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter and
quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have
a choice. 13

Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's alleged
resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies
any spontaneity on private respondent's part.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 12-15.

2 Records, p 12.

3 Id., at 13.

4 Id., at 14.

5 Id., at .47-48.

6 Id., p. 47.

7 Rollo, pp. 14-15.

8 Ibid.

9 Sec. 18, Art. II, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

10 Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 528 (1988); Gold City-Integrated Port
Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 189 SCRA 811 (1990); Kwikway Engineering Works v. NLRC, 195
SCRA 526 (1991).

11 Abiera v. National Labor Relations Commission, 215 SCRA 476 (1992).

12 210 SCRA 277 (1992).

13 Original Record, p. 39.

NITO ENTERPRISES VS. NLRC G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995 Apprenticeship
NOVEMBER 2, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Nito Enterprises hired Capili as an apprentice machinist under an apprenticeship agreement for six
months for a daily wage, which was 75% of applicable minimum wage. However, shortly 2 months after he
started work, Capili was asked to resign for the reason that he had been causing accidents, that he has been
doing certain things beyond the scope of his duty, and that he had even injured himself in handling one of the
machines, to the financial prejudice of the company as his medication would be shouldered by Nito Enterprises.

Capili later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which the Labor Arbiter dismissed. This decision was
reversed by the NLRC, holding that Capili was a regular employee. With this, Nito came to the Supreme Court.
Nito Enterprises assails the NLRC decision on the ground that no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and
approved at the time the agreement was executed.

ISSUE:

Is Capili a regular employee or an apprentice?

RULING:

Capili is a regular employee. Apprenticeship needs DOLE’s prior approval, or apprentice becomes regular
employee.

Petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements
entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship
program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.

Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is,
therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.

The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a
preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice
relationship.

Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in
the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent’s assertion that
he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy (“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves credence. He
should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
 [G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999]

MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL,

RAQUEL ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON
GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN,
ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O.
LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA
CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL
MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V. GRUELA, BERNADETH D.
AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO
VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA
SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY
BALOLOA, ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, Petitioners v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and
conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the status of regular
workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to
the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice for all.
The Case

Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari1 before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision2 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC),3 which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L.
Linsangan. The labor arbiters Decision disposed as follows:4 cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit.

Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution5 of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts

The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:6

Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to
1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said
agreement is quoted below:

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS

This Contract, entered into by and between:

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla,
Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN,
(hereinafter referred to as the BANK);

- and -

________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing at

__________________ (hereinafter referred to as the (EMPLOYEE).

WITNESSETH: That

WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide disabled
and handicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift their socio-
economic well being and welfare and make them productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to
fully integrate in the mainstream of society;

WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped
persons, particularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens and
authorized government agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these positions;

WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible
employment with the BANK;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article 80 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into this
Employment Contract as follows:

1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and
faithfully work with the BANK, as Money Sorter and Counter.

2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:

i Sort out bills according to color;

ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;

iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;

iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and

v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.

3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall determine
whether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.

4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in the
sole judgment of the BANK, payable every 15 and end of the month.
th

5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru Fridays,
at eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as circumstance may
warrant, for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if
performed during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest day.
6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:

i. Proportionate 13 month pay based on his basic daily wage.

th

ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.

iii. SSS premium payment.

7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations
and Policies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK.

8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment program
of the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied in his/her case.
Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the
employment generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANKs regular employee are not applicable
to the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEEs employment with the
BANK shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the applicable rules and regulations
that the Department of Labor and Employment may issue in connection with the employment of disabled and
handicapped workers. More specifically, the EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six
of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay
are not applicable to him/her.

9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier
terminated by the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract shall
be in writing and therefore this Contract will automatically expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in
writing by the BANK.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of
_________________, ____________ at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.

In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19);
in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six
months such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by
respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in
1992 and whose contract expired on July 1993.

xxx

Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company
maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were hired
temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and
political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to pakiusap which must be
considered in the light of the context of the respondent Banks corporate philosophy as well as its career and
working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officers
and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending
policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee
grows in the corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a
special arrangement basis; that it adopted the special program to help tide over a group of handicapped workers
such as deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of
counting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that the
counting and sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of
the tellers normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank
plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a
regular feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the
tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new
positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with
purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.

Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz:7 cräläwvirtualibräry

NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed

1. MARITES BERNARDO Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE Intramuros 24 JAN 90 11 JAN 94

3. REBECCA E. DAVID Intramuros 16 APR 90 23 OCT 93

4. DAVID P. PASCUAL Bel-Air15 OCT 88 21 NOV 94

5. RAQUEL ESTILLER Intramuros 2 JUL 92 4 JAN 94

6. ALBERT HALLARE West 4 JAN 91 9 JAN 94

7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 JAN 91 3 DEC 93

8. JOSELITO O. AGDON Intramuros 5 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN, JR. Intramuros 6 SEPT 89 19 JAN 94

10. CELSO M. YAZAR Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93

11. ALEX G. CORPUZ Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

12. RONALD M. DELFIN Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93

15. ROBERT G. NOORA Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN Intramuros 1 FEB 93 1 AUG 93

17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI Intramuros 22 JAN 93 22 JUL 93

18. IKE CABANDUCOS Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93

19. COCOY NOBELLO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93

20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93

21. ROBERT MARCELO West 31 JUL 938 1 AUG 93

22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO West 15 JUN 90 21 NOV 93

23. JOSE E. SALES West 6 AUG 92 12 OCT 93

24. ISABEL MAMAUAG West 8 MAY 92 10 NOV 93

25. VIOLETA G. MONTES Intramuros 2 FEB 90 15 JAN 94

26. ALBINO TECSON Intramuros 7 NOV 91 10 NOV 93

27. MELODY V. GRUELA West 28 OCT 91 3 NOV 93

28. BERNADETH D. AGERO West 19 DEC 90 27 DEC 93

29. CYNTHIA DE VERA Bel-Air26 JUN 90 3 DEC 93

30. LANI R. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 10 DEC 93

31. MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION West 6 SEPT 90 6 FEB 94

32. DINDO VALERIO Intramuros 30 MAY 93 30 NOV 93

33. ZENAIDA MATA Intramuros 10 FEB 93 10 AUG 93

34. ARIEL DEL PILAR Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93

35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA Intramuros 27 JUL 90 4 FEB 94

36. THELMA SEBASTIAN Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93

37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES West 6 JUN 92 7 DEC 93

38. JEANNIE RAMIL Intramuros 23 APR 90 12 OCT 93

39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL Bel-Air20 APR 89 29 OCT 93

40. PINKY BALOLOA West 3 JUN 91 2 DEC 93

41. ELIZABETH VENTURA West 12 MAR 90 FEB 94 [SIC]

42. GRACE S. PARDO West 4 APR 90 13 MAR 94

43. RICO TIMOSA Intramuros 28 APR 93 28 OCT 93

As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this
recourse to this Court.9
The Ruling of the NLRC

In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows:
We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants were
hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were
covered by xxx Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art.
80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the
parties.10

The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, considering the
prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.
Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:

I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners - money
sorters and counters working in a bank - were not regular employees.

II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment contracts
signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of six (6) months - were valid.

III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the
Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled
persons.11

In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.
This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose
contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.
Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari

Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is not
allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of
public respondents that petitioners were not regular employees.

True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in a certiorari proceeding.
In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by the
public respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.
Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and
counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts
served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and should
not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.12 Rather, they were special
workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of
petitioners, whose employment was merely an accommodation in response to the requests of government
officials and civic-minded citizens. They were told from the start, with the assistance of government
representatives, that they could not become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for
money sorters, whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not
because of need but merely for humanitarian reasons. Respondent submits that as of the present, the special
position that was created for the petitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had
decided not to renew anymore their special employment contracts.

At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondents effort to provide
employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society.
However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their
employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,
indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such,
they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of
compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one
month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month
term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable
cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.

According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the
Labor Code, which provides:

ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an
employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:

(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;

(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the
applicable legal minimum wage;

(c) The duration of employment period; and

(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.

The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives.

The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding
events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons),13 however, justify the
application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the
contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of
the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities
of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned
to them.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given
the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta
provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for
suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of
employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a
qualified able bodied person.

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts
from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons,
they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That,
any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such activity exists.

The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,14 in which this Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test
is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of
the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one
year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing
need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such
activity exists.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus,
the following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go
Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O.
Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes,
Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B.
Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida
Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo.

As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making
permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary
appointments, ad infinitum.15 The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during
which the bank determined the employees fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the
lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees.16 No employer is
allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.

As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may
be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause,17 these twenty-
seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges.18 Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money
sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged,19
petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.20 cräläwvirtualibräry

Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not
entitled to the same benefits.
Applicability of the Brent Ruling

Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora21 in which the Court upheld the validity of an employment
contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It adds that the
petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera
and Representative Arturo Borjal.

We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled,
and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the
Labor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by qualified
able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners are qualified for their positions.
The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring
instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law.

Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest.22 Provisions
of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate
themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with
each other.23 Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the
provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified
able-bodied employees.

Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task could
not be done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night.24
We find no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied persons
alike. This excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent

Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not change the nature
of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of
service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.

Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, and
that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC,25 the Court held that the determination of
whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the
procedure of hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the
length of performance and its continued existence.

Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become regular
employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we
are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in
the contract, but by the nature of the work performed.26 Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the
simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.

In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC:27 cräläwvirtualibräry

Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employees right to be secure
in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the
concept of regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a
regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of
employment.

xxx

At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in
subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive
determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the
day certain agreed upon the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship.
But this Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been
imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded
as contrary to public policy and morals.

In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class,
but also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of
qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a
hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment
contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court
believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the
same rights like any other regular employees.

In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners cause.28 cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995 Decision and the
August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSEDand SETASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company is hereby ORDEREDto pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-seven
(27) petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel
Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo,
Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero,
Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma.
Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The
NLRC is hereby directed to compute the exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws
and regulations, within fifteen days from the finality of this Decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 3-39.

2 Rollo, pp. 46-65.

3Penned by Presiding Comm. Lourdes C. Javier and concurred in by Comm. Joaquin A. Tanodra. The other member, Comm. Ireneo B.
Bernardo, dissented.

4
Rollo, p. 113.

5 Rollo, pp. 73-74.

6
NLRC Decision, pp. 2-10; rollo, pp. 47-55.

7 Petition, p. 12; rollo, p. 14.

8This is a typographical error on the part of the petitioner, for it is unlikely that the Contract of Employment was terminated the day after it
was executed. In fact, Annex C of petitioners Position Paper, which was submitted before the labor arbiter, shows that Petitioner Robert
Marcelo was hired on July 31, 1992, not 1993 (Rollo, p. 100.).

9The case was deemed submitted for resolution on December 1, 1998, when the Memorandum of the private respondent was received by the
Court. The case was given due course on December 8, 1997.

10
NLRC Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 63.

11 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 474.

12
Respondents Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 523.

13 Approved on March 24, 1992.

14
176 SCRA 615, 621, August 21, 1989, per Fernan, CJ.

15
CENECO v. NLRC, 236 SCRA 108, September 1, 1994, per Puno, J.

16 Ibid.; Article 281, Labor Code.

17 Articles 282 to 284 of the Code.

18 Article 279 of the Labor Code as amended.

19 Respondents Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 529.

20 Zarate v. Olegario, 263 SCRA 1, October 7, 1996.

21 181 SCRA 802, February 6, 1990.

22 Article 1700 of the Civil Code provides: The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must
yield to the common good. x x x.

23Pakistan Airlines Corporation v. Ople, 190 SCRA 90, September 28, 1990, per Feliciano, J. See also Servidad v. NLRC, GR No. 128682, March 18, 1999; Villa v. NLRC, 284
SCRA 105, January 14, 1998.

24 Respondents Memorandum, p. 15; rollo, p. 528.

25
253 SCRA 440, 450, February 9, 1996, per Kapunan, J.

26 A.M. Oreta& Co. v. NLRC, 176 SCRA 208, August 10, 1989.

27 GR No. 122327, August 19, 1998, per Martinez, J.

28
Manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General; rollo, pp. 354-375.
Bernardo vs NLRC

GR 122917 07/03/99

Facts:

Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and

Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped

Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and counters was necessary

and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of

Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special workers and should not in any way be

considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor

Code.

Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.

Held:

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which the

employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the

employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the

contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of

them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring

of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they

were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or

unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and

conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:

“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable

employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same

compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article

80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor

Code, which provides:

“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless

of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform

activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”

“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity

performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually

necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of

the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been

performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and

continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the

business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of

them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring

of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they

were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or

unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. With the

exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.

Petition granted
BERNARDO vs. NLRC and FAR EAST BANK

GR No. 122917; July 12, 1999

FACTS:

Far East Bank (Respondent) entered into employment contracts with deaf-mutes, who were hired as
money sorters under uniform “Employment Contracts for Handicapped Workers.” Every 6 months, these
workers renewed their employment contracts. The complainants here complain that they were regular
employees and that they have been illegally dismissed.

Respondent argued that complainants were not regular employees, but a special class of workers who
were hired because of political and civic accommodation. And that the Bank’s corporate philosophy does
not allow the hiring and regularizing handicapped workers unless it was on a special arrangement basis.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent bank workers. NLRC affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner workers are regular employees.

HELD:

YES, petitioners are regular employees. The fact that after the expiry of their 6 month contract,
respondent bank renewed their contracts shows that these workers were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions.

The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the
same terms of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. This being so, petitioners are thus covered
by Art. 286 of the Labor Code which defines regular employment to be that the employee has been
engaged to perform activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. The task of counting and sorting bills is necessary to the business of respondent bank. Except
for sixteen of them, the petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Therefore, the 27
petitioners should be deemed regular employees entitled to security of tenure. Their services may only be
terminated for a just and authorized cause. Because respondents failed to show such cause, these 27
petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and hence entitled to backwages and separation pay.