RULE 72

Pilar Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2001

FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, petitioner Pilar Manalo and 11 children. He left
several real properties located in Manila and Tarlac including a business with offices at Quezon City and
Valenzuela. Herein respondents, who are 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with the RTC Manila for the
judicial settlement of the estate of their late father. On the date set for hearing of the petition, the RTC issued an
order declaring the whole world in default, except the government. However, this order of general default was
set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners.

The latter filed an omnibus motion which was later denied by the trial court. On appeal to CA, petitioners argued
that there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family as stated
under Art. 151 of the Family Code, but it was also dismissed. Hence, the present case.

ISSUE:
Is the petition for the judicial settlement of the estate an ordinary civil action requiring Art. 151 of the Family
Code prior the filing of the petition?

HELD:
NO. In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief
sought in the complaint or petition shall be controlling. As a rule, Art. 151 of the Family Code, which requires
members of the same family there must be a verified allegation of earnest efforts at compromise, applies only to
ordinary civil actions, but not to a special proceeding, like a petition for judicial settlement of estate, which is
imply for the establishment of a status, right, or particular fact.

It must be emphasized that the petitioners are not being sued in said petition for any cause of action as no
defendant was impleaded therein. Respondents merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and be
duly recognized as heirs so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate.

Patricia Natcher v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land located in
Manila. Upon Graciana’s death, Graciano, together with his 6 children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana’s estate. Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the 6 children received 1/14 share of the said
property. Graciano then donated to his children a portion of his interest leaving only 447.60 sqm registered
under his name. The remaining land was further subdivided into 2 separate lots. Eventually, Graciano sold the
1st lot to a third person but retained ownership over the 2nd lot. Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher
and during their marriage, he sold the 2nd land to petitioner. Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and
his children by his first marriage, as heirs.

Private respondents filed a civil case against petitioner, alleging that upon Graciano’s death, through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, she acquired the 2nd lot thru a Deed of Sale, and as a
consequence, their legitimes have been impaired. Natcher answered that she was legally married to Graciano
and thus, a compulsory heir, and alleging Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children,
hence, respondents may not anymore claim against petitioner’s property. The RTC ruled for the petitioner, but
was reversed on appeal by the CA, holding that it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a
just and legal distribution of the estate. The RTC, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title,
went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person. Hence, the instant case.

ISSUE:
May the RTC, acting in its general jurisdiction, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person?

HELD:
NO. An ordinary civil action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. The term special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which alongside requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the
estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose.

Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to
validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent to his wife, petitioner Natcher.

Euhilda Tabuada v. Cedrick Ruiz

G.R. No. 168799, June 27, 2008

FACTS:
The case surfaced when the parties in the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Jose and Paciencia
Calaliman manifested to the RTC their desire to amicably settle the case. The RTC, however, invoking Section 3,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on account of the parties failure to submit the
amicable settlement. Parties filed a MR arguing, among others, that the termination of the case was premature,
there being yet no payment of the debts and distribution of the estate, and that they had already prepared all the
necessary papers for the amicable settlement, but was denied. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE:
May the strict rules of compliance on ordinary civil action apply on special proceedings?

HELD:
NO. While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to
consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to
jettison the case.

Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of the mere
failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An
Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings, which do not depend on the will
of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties
interested, its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is
the sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein.

Alfredo Hilado v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009

FACTS:
The decedent, Roberto Benedicto, died intestate, with two pending civil cases against petitioners. Private
respondent Julita Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration and was granted by the trial
court. Among the liabilities listed are the pending actions therein. Petitioners asked the trial court to order Julita
to furnish them with the copies of the orders and processes of the intestate proceedings, but it was denied on the
ground that they are not considered as parties in the proceedings.

On appeal to CA, petitioners argued that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC, but it was
dismissed ruling that the fact that the claims of petitioners were contingent or expectant, as these were still
pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts, making intervention improper. Hence, the instant
case.

ISSUE:
May the petitioners apply the rule on intervention in a special proceeding case?

HELD:
NO. The settlement of estates of deceased persons falls within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules
of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that on the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings.

Notwithstanding said provision, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. Intervention does not accommodate contingent claims.
Assuming arguendo, had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, then they should
have filed their claim, even if contingent, under a notice to creditors to be issued by the court after granting
letters of administration. However, their claims were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection
with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. Merits of their claims against
Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the
event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment
against the estate.
RULE 73
Eugenio Eusebio v. Amanda Eusebio
G.R. No. L-8409, December 28, 1956

FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with CFI Rizal a petition for administrator of the estate of his father, Andres
Eusebio, who died residing in Quezon City. Andres’ illegitimate children, respondents, objected to said petition,
stating that their father was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and the case must be dismissed upon the
ground that venue had been improperly filed. However, the petition was granted.

ISSUE:
Is the venue where the petition was filed improperly laid?

HELD:
NO. Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, refers
mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines. If proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of
venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
decide said issue

Should it be decided in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case
pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may be initiated in the proper court. In
conclusion, the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga and CFI Rizal had
no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid
improperly.

Virginia Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-40502, November 29, 1976

FACTS:
Petitioner Virginia Fule filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging that Amado Garcia,
a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Laguna. The petition was granted. Preciosa Garcia filed an opposition to the letters of
administration, raising the issues improper venue. The trial court ruled in favour of Virginia.

During the hearing of the case, Virginia presented the death certificate of Amado showing that his residence at
the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa presented the residence certificate of the decedent
for 1973 showing that, months before his death, his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia also testified that
Amado was residing in Calamba at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention for Laguna. On appeal to CA, it reversed the orders of the trial court for lack of jurisdiction. Preciosa
immediately filed a petition for letters of administration before CFI Rizal, which was granted. She then informed
the court of the pendency a case in CFI Laguna. CFI Laguna ordered the suspension of the proceedings until she
informs the court of the final outcome of the case pending before CA. Hence, the instant case.
ISSUE:
May the petition of Virginia be dismissed on the ground of improper venue?

HELD:
NO. In Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record,
is in reality a matter of venue. The word "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat, not legal residence or domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

In the case at bar, the last place of residence of the deceased was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A
death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.

Rosa Cuenco v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

FACTS:
Senator Mariano Cuenco died in Manila and was survived by his widow, the petitioner, and their 2 minor sons
and by his children of the first marriage residing in Cebu. Respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration with CFI Cebu, alleging that Cuenco died intestate in Manila, was a resident of Cebu at the time
of his death, and left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. Rosa filed a petition with CFI Rizal
for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor,
as the surviving widow and executrix. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, petitioner filed an
Opposition and Motion to Dismiss. CFI Cebu held in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss
"until after CFI QC shall have acted on the petition for probate. Instead of appealing, respondents filed in CFI QC
a Motion to Dismiss on the probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of CFI QC.

CFI QC denied the Lourdes’ motion to dismiss ruling its precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate
proceeding since the residence of the deceased at the time of his death was in QC. On appeal to CA, it ruled for
the respondents considering that the first proceeding was instituted in CFI Cebu. Hence, the instant case.

ISSUE:
Is CFI Cebu the proper venue for petition for probate of the deceased Cuenco?

HELD:
NO. In Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, it specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The
residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter
but merely of venue. Hence, a court may, upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow, decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold it in abeyance, and defer to the second court
which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

CFI Cebu declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate
proceedings filed with CFI QC to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at
the time of his death was in QC where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu as claimed by
respondents. Since CFI QC took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of CFI Cebu, CFI QC court should be left now to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.

Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis

G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007

FACTS:
Felicisimo San Luis had 3 marriages, 1st was with Virginia Sulit with 6 children. 2nd was with Merry Lee Corwin,
with a son, but was divorced. 3rd was with Felicidad Sagalongos, respondent, up to his death. She filed for the
petition for letters of administration with RTC Makati, alleging that the decedent was residing in Alabang, Metro
Manila. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children in his 1st marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue. Felicidad submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in Alabang.

RTC Makati ruled that respondent possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. It was later on reversed when the case was re-raffled to another branch ruling that the petition should have
been filed in Laguna and not in Makati. On appeal to CA, it was again reversed, reinstating the first decision that
the place of residence of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Was the petition for letters of administration filed by Rosa improperly filed with RTC Makati?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. The term
“resides” should be viewed in the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode, not legal residence or domicile. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Laguna, respondent proved
that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa up to the time of his death, for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the RTC which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. Muntinlupa was still a municipality
and the branches of the RTC of the NCJ which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City.

Carolina Camaya v. Bernardo Patulandong

G.R. No. 144915, February 23, 2004

FACTS:
Rufina Reyes, testatrix, executed a notarized will wherein she devised parcel of land to her grandson Anselmo
Mangulabnan. The testatrix’s son, Bernardo Patulandong, respondent, was in the will appointed as the executor.
During her lifetime, she herself filed a petition for the probate of her will before the CFI Nueva Ecija, which was
admitted to probate. However, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying the land partition given to Anselmo.
Anselmo sought the delivery to him by Patulandong of the whole lot but refused to do so in view of the codicil.

Anselmo filed an action for partition which the court allowed but without prejudice to the probate of the codicil.
Patulandong filed a petition for probate of the codicil of the testatrix, which was admitted. However, before the
codicil was then admitted, Anselmo already sold the lot to the petitioners Camayas, rendering the latter’s TCT
null and void. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Did the probate court exceed its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of the
TCTs of petitioners’ and the deed of sale?

HELD:
YES. As a general rule, a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that it could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is dispute, the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so.

Having been apprised of the fact that the property was in the possession of the Camayas who are third parties,
covered by a TCT issued in their name, RTC Nueva Ecija should have denied the motion of Patulandong and
excluded the property from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property.

Emilio Pacioles v. Miguela Chuatoco-Ching

 G.R. No. 127920, August 9, 2005

FACTS:
Miguelita Ching-Pacioles died intestate and was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor
children, leaving real properties. Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition on the ground that the bulk
of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties because she gave half of her inherited properties to
Miguelita on condition that both of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the
capacity of business partners. The RTC appointed the petitioner and Emmanuel Ching, as nominated by
respondent, to be the special administrator. However, only petitioner submitted an inventory. The petitioner
and their children were declared as compulsory heirs. Petitioner then filed for the partition and distribution of
the estate, but was opposed by the respondent for being premature.

The trial court ruled for the respondent. On appeal to CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC holding that there is
no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in
probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be
passed upon in the course of the proceedings. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May a probate court hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the
decedent’s estate?

HELD:
YES. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings, for having a special and limited jurisdiction. However,
as an exception, the probate court is allowed to do so when its purpose is to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory. In such situations, the adjudication is merely incidental and
provisional.

But such was not the situation in the case. Respondent did not dispute the petitioner’s inventory and Emmanuel
did not submit his own inventory. Respondent’s purpose was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of
what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted to secure from the intestate court
a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The
probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a RTC. Respondent’s claim must be brought in an ordinary proceeding.

Ana Reyes v. Judge Cesar Sotero

G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006

FACTS:
Respondent Corazon Chichioco, niece of the decedent, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before RTC Tarlac. Petitioner Ana Reyes filed an Opposition
claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary,
since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She also submitted
documentary evidence of her adoption by the Delos Santos spouses. The respondents assailed her adoption
claims and filed for a petition for special administrator, which was granted.

On appeal to CA, it ruled that it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was
indeed adopted since imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under
a cloud of doubt. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May a probate court try and determine the validity of the petitioner’s adoption decree?

HELD:
NO. The certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s
adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos
spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a
cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to
the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought
principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate. Therefore, for as long as petitioner’s adoption is considered
valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate.

Filomeno Coca v. Crispin Borromeo

G.R. No. L-27082, January 31, 1978

FACTS:
The spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate and possessed a homestead consisting of two
parcels of land. 1st parcel is in the name of Juan Pangilinan and 2 nd parcel is in the name of the Heirs of Juan
Pangilinan. According to Guadalupe Pizarras, a 3 rd parcel was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pangilinan,
also forms part of the estate. A special proceeding was instituted for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouses. The administrator presented a project of partition of the combined areas, but Guadalupe Pizarras
opposed it, contending that they have a right to a 12-hectare portion.

The RTC deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the 12 hectares is determined in an
ordinary action. After noting that no separate action had been filed, the RTC issued an order approving the
project of partition but excluding the 12-hectares claimed by Pizzaras. That order appears to be incomplete
because the lower court did not decide how the remainder should be partitioned. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May the probate court determine the title of the 12-hectare property in a special proceeding?

HELD:
YES. As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate
proceeding, but in a separate action. As an exception, it may provisionally pass upon the question of inclusion in,
or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired.

In the case, it may be treated as an exception. The probate court had already received evidence on the ownership
of the 12-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only
interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding. As pointed out by the
appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur additional expenses by
bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the 12-hectare portion.

Isabel Portugal v. Leonila Portugal-Beltran

G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005

FACTS:
Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. He then married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. Petitioner gave birth to Jose
Douglas Portugal, her co-petitioner. Paz gave birth to Leonila Portugal, respondent. Portugal and his siblings
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate.
The Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued a TCT covering the Caloocan parcel in the name of Jose Portugal,
married to Paz Lazo. Paz and Portugal died intestate. Respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole
Heir adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. Petitioners opposed the petition alleging that
respondent is not related to Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land.

The RTC, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on
the ground that petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court,
and lack of jurisdiction over the case. On appeal to CA, it was dismissed ruling that the main issue is the
annulment of title to property, not on the questions as to such status or right which must be properly ventilated
in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May the trial court rule on the status of the parties as heirs in an ordinary proceeding?
HELD:
YES. Under the jurisprudence, if a special proceeding is pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but
there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of heirship should be
raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the
special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its reopening, then an ordinary civil action can be
filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication. Petitioners claim, however, to be the
exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of
a deceased. It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is
the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is impractical and burdensome to the estate. In
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. In fine, the trial court
should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

Deogracias Bernardo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963

FACTS:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died and a testate proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was instituted by his wife. Hermogena Reyes herself died. Upon petition of Deogracias
Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives
and intestate heirs. Petitioner filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms
of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives. The latter opposed it and submitted a
counter-project of partition claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili
on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs, it was contended: (1) that the properties in the
will of Eusebio belonged to him exclusively because Hermogena had donated to him her half share of such
partnership and (2) that even assuming that relatives could question the validity of the donation, the same must
be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action. The trial court rejected both project of
partitions. The CA affirmed on appeal. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May the probate court adjudicate in the testate proceedings if the properties belong to the conjugal partnership,
or to the deceased husband exclusively?

HELD:
YES. The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on
testate or intestate proceedings," except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. When the parties interested are all heirs of the
deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property; and that with the
consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by
the probate court, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced.

In the case, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved, whether
they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including the widow, represented by her heirs. Consequently, it complies with the requirement of
the exception that the parties interested are all heirs claiming title under the testator. However, the heirs are
estopped from questioning the ownership of the properties donated since the deceased widow acted as she did
because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal.
 Maria Calma v. Esperanza Tañedo
G.R. No. L-44602, November 28, 1938

FACTS:
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property as their conjugal roperty.
They were also indebted to respondent Esperanza Tañedo. Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will appointing her
daughter, petitioner Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the commencement of the probate
proceedings, Esperanza Tanedo filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of a sum of money
which the CFI ordered payment. In the execution of this judgment, the property was sold by the sheriff.

Calma now brings this action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff be annulled and that the estate of
Macasaquit be declared the sole and absolute owner. However, the court absolved the respondents since the
probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176 authorizing the institution of testate or
intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of an ordinary action for the
liquidation and partition of the property of a conjugal partnership.

ISSUE:
Was the sale of the property for the satisfaction of a debt properly made pending probate proceedings?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 695 of Act No. 3176, when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in
the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code
relative to the administration and liquidation and partition proceeding. When it is necessary to sell any portion
of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be
made in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of deceased
persons. Otherwise, it shall be null and void.

Tañedo brought suit against Eulalio for the payment of debts chargeable against the conjugal property and the
power of Eulalio as legal administrator while Fausta Macasaquit was living, had ceased and passed to Maria
appointed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta. Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176, it should be
filed before the committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings and file by appeal to the CFI or in an
ordinary action against the Maria. He had his property included among the inventoried properties subject to the
testamentary proceedings of Fausta because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it should, under Act
No. 3176, be included among the properties of the testamentary proceedings. Hence, no complaint can be
brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, and that the
action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the Fausta by filing with the committee on claims.

Paz Ocampo v. Conrado Potenciano

G.R. No. L-2263, May 30, 1951

FACTS:
Edilberto Ocampo, married to petitioner Paz Yatco, executed a deed of sale with pacto de retro to his relative,
respondent Conrado Potenciano, H&L registered in the name of Ocampo, while in reality belonged to the
spouses as conjugal property. Ocampo signed another document, making it appear that, for an annual rental of
P300, the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the redemption period. Ocampo
failed to pay the repurchase price but Potenciano offered to repurchase the property for P2,500 and a lease of
P300 annually. Paz tendered P4,000, but upon being rejected, she deposited it with the court and brought an
action as administratrix of the estate of her husband to compel Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the
property reinstated in her name and that of her husband.

Potenciano's children intervened and filed a cross-complaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by
their father to Paz was null and void as to the share of their deceased mother in the property in litigation, which
share passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in the same property, they were
exercising the right of redemption as co-owners for which they had already tendered him P1,250 after they
learned of said option through the complaint. The CFI ruled for the petitioner ruling that respondents were not
entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption of the other half of the property belonging to their father
Conrado.
ISSUE:
Did Potenciano had a right to exercise administration over their conjugal property?

HELD:
NO. Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after the death of his wife. The procedure has
been changed by Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the marriage is dissolved by
the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse.

However, the option agreement was a mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgagee debt, since in
the mind of the parties, the real transaction between them was that of loan with security, or equitable mortgage
and it was given the form of sale with right to repurchase. At the time Paz Yatco made the tender of payment and
consigned the necessary amount in court, the said contract of loan with security was still in effect, and as the
tender was made in legal currency, the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal effect, which
is that of relieving the debtor from liability. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, the
respondents acquired nothing.

RULE 74
Simon Malahacan v. Josefa Ignacio
G.R. No. L-6207, August 4, 1911

FACTS:
The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the
defendants, the only heirs, to recover possession of the real estate of which Guillerma seized, which said real
estate the defendants had been occupying for some years before the commencement of this action. The lower
courts have ruled for the respondents. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May the heirs recover possession of the property after the death of the deceased?

HELD:
YES. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, the ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner
instantly in his death. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the
estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely
to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any
way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the
law offers them a remedy for its division among themselves.

Guillerma Martinez, having died, seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only
heirs, it follows that said heirs became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession. It is not
alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts
outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground upon which an administrator
can demand of the heirs at law possession of the real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land
will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased.

Aurelio Arcillas v. Judge Gregorio Montejo

G.R. No. L-21725, November 29, 1968

FACTS:
Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the late Eustaquio Arcillas, sought the cancellation of title in the name of
the deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate in the names of the heirs. It was claimed after the
death of the deceased, several transactions transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of their
respective shares and participation in the property executed by 4 other children in favor of co-heir Vicente
Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of the Land Registration Act, Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion of each
heir's participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new certificate of title. But before any pleading
could be filed, 5 other children filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of petitioner
Aurelio Arcillas for the final settlement of the deceased's estate.

Petitioner filed his opposition on respondent’s petition on the ground that the subject lotwas included in the
estate of the deceased for which a petition for administration had actually been filed and was awaiting
resolution. Hence, respondent judge issued an order holding in abeyance resolution of Geronimo’s petition until
the termination of the intestate proceedings. Geronimo opposed Aurelio’s petition on the ground that it was the
only property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts. The lower court ruled in favor of Geronimo’s
petition.

ISSUE:
Was it proper to dismiss Aurelio’s petition on the ground of Section 1, Rule 74?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action of partition. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made
therein. If the intention were otherwise, the framers would have employed the word shall that is mandatory in
character. The word may is used not only once, but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the
matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.

Having decided to institute administration proceedings, the heirs may not use the excuse of their discretion
merely on the ground that the expenses in administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the estate. The
resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred are consequences which must be deemed to have been
voluntarily assumed by the heirs so that they may not, in the future, be heard to complain of these matters.

Victoria Pereira v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-81147, June 20, 1989

FACTS:
Andres de Guzman Pereira died intestate and was survived by his wife, petitioner Victoria Pereira, and his sister
Rita Pereira Nagac, private respondent. The latter instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor alleging that she and Victoria are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the
deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased. Petitioner filed her opposition alleging that
there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an
estate does exist, the letters of administration be issued in her favor. The RTC appointed private respondent as
administratrix. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action for partition. It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate
has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where
partition is possible, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.

In the case at bar, parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is apparent is that these
two heirs are not in good terms. However, there is no compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not
appear to be substantial, especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being squandered. Hence, the issuing of the letters of administration were
not justified, there being no good reason for burdening the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding.

Verona Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000

FACTS:
Jacinto Pada died intestate and left his children as heirs. His estate included a residential and coconut land,
where its northern portion is in controversy. His half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission to build a
house on it. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together with his children. The
heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extrajudicial partition, where Ananias and Marciano, represented by his
daughter, Maria, that said lot was allocated to them. They executed a private document which they never
registered in the Registrar of Deeds. Juanita succeeded to Aniana’s right as co-owner and sold the land and right
to Engr. Ernesto Paderes. Maria sold the co-ownership right of his father, Marciano to private respondent,
Silverio Pada. The latter demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the land so his family can utilize the land,
hence a complaint for ejectment was filed.

The subject land was then donated to petitioner and they opposed the complaint alleging that the partition was
null and void for not being registered and no SPA was issued in behalf of the representatives of the heirs. The
MTC ruled for the petitioners. The RTC and CA reversed the MTC ruling on the doctrine of laches since that the
said conveyances executed by Juanita and Maria were never questioned by their co-heirs for more than 40 years.

ISSUE:
Is the extrajudicial partition valid albeit executed in an unregistered private document?

HELD:
YES. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The
requirement in Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and
registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition, not executed with the prescribed formalities, is not undermined when no creditors are involved.

The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is
only for convenience. Non-compliance does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as
among themselves. Neither does Article 1403 apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property, considering that it involves a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance, not a
transfer of property to another. The extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as
among his heirs, Juanita and Maria validly transferred their ownership rights to Engr. Paderes and private
respondent.

Jose McMicking v. Benito Sy Conbieng

G.R. No. L-6871, January 15, 1912

FACTS:
Margarita Jose died in China, leaving an estate in HK and PH. Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator
and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao as sureties. Palanca took possession of all the property.
Mariano died in Manila. One of the legatees of Jose filed an application for an order directing Palanca to furnish a
new bond to take the place of the sureties. A new bond was executed. Doroteo Velasco was appointed
administrator of the testate estate of Ocampo, and Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto as sureties.
Doroteo filed an instrument where all interested persons in the estate of Ocampo agreed to its partition without
proceedings in court. The court then delivered to the devisees and legatees of Ocampo all the properties
pursuant to the partition. From that time forward, Velasco has not had in his possession or control any of the
assets of the estate and has not had any participation in the management.

At the time the agreement for the distribution of the property was made, no committee had been appointed to
hear claims against the estate of Ocampo, and no notice had been published to creditors of Ocampo to present
their claims against the estate. Upon application of all parties interested, Palanca was removed from office as
administrator of the estate of Jose, because he failed to deliver the property and funds to the court, or to
petitioner Jose McMicking, who replaced him as administrator. He made an application to the court for the
appointment of commissioners of the estate of Mariano Ocampo and in such commission, a claim was presented
by McMicking based upon the defalcation of Palanca, which claim was allowed and directed that the claim be
paid by Velasco. However, non was paid from the estate of Jose. Pio de la Guardia Barretto, as surety under
Velasco, died testate, and appointed respondent Benito Sy Conbieng as administrator. In the committee
appointed to hear the claims presented against Barretto’s estate, McMicking presented a claim for P30,000
based upon the estate of Ocampo failed to pay said claim. The committee under Barretos’s estate disallowed the
claim, and on appeal, the trial court dismissed his complaint.

ISSUE:
May McMicking claim from Barretto’s estate?
HELD:
NO. Doroteo Velasco, for whom Barretto was surety, would not have been liable if the action has been
commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be. The basis of the
liability of a surety on an administrators’ bond is the fault or failure of the principal. If Velasco incurred no
liability, then his surety incurred none. When the persons interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreed
voluntarily upon a partition, the matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as administrator. In giving his
consent to the partition and in assisting the parties to obtain the approval of the court, he did no wrong.

An administrator cannot be held to any accountability for property over which he has absolutely no power or
jurisdiction and in which he has not the slightest legal interest. Moreover, the sureties of an administrator
cannot be held liable for property which by force of law has been taken from the principal and its ownership and
control turned over to others. Their obligation is that their principal shall obey the law in the handling and
distribution of the estate. Their obligation is discharged when the estate is legally turned over to those entitled
thereto. Without their consent another obligation could not be imposed upon them in relation to the same
principal, and the same property, or apart thereof, especially after the lapse of two years. It is only debts
discovered within the prescribed period that can be made the reason for an administration of the estate
subsequent to its partition. The necessary result is that a debt not discovered within that period cannot be made
the reason for an administration of the estate. The method of ascertaining claims against the defendant’s estate
not being prescribed, it is apparent that no objection can be urged by a creditor whose claim has not been paid,
due to the faulty method adopted by the partitioning parties to ascertain claims, or even, the absence of any
effort at all to ascertain them.

Donato Lajom v. Jose Viola

G.R. No. L-47475, May 6, 1942

FACTS:
Donato Lajom filed a complaint, praying that he be declared a natural child of the late Dr. Maximo Viola and be a
co-heir of the respondents. CFI Nueva Ecija dismissed the complaint on the ground that it cannot assume
jurisdiction over the case because the will of the deceased had already been probated in CFI Bulacan and has
already taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate. On appeal, Lajom alleged that he did not intervene
during the pendency of the special proceeding in CFI Bulacan, as he expected that his siblings, the respondents,
would disclose to the court that they have a natural brother, the petitioner, whom they knew to be living, and
whose address was well known to them. Further, respondents promised to him that they would give him his
lawful share in the estate of their father, but respondents concealed the truth. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May CFI Nueva Ecija rule over the complaint of petitioner?

HELD:
YES. CFI Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction over the case because the complaint contains allegations which would be
sufficient to support and warrant an accion reivindicatoria of his right as a co-owner of the parcels of land. The
allegations in the complaint as to the promise of the defendants to deliver to Lajom his share in the estate of Dr.
Viola and their subsequent non-observance of such promise clearly denounce a breach of trust. Regardless of
any legal title to the plaintiff’s share, equity demands that the defendants shall not take advantage of such legal
title. As far as plaintiff’s share in the inheritance is concerned, the defendants are trustees for the plaintiff, who
may bring an action in Nueva Ecija for breach of trust. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, it held that a judicial
partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto, and that in such cases,
the heir who has been deprived of his share in the estate may bring an action for reivindication with the
prescriptive period against the persons put in possession by the probate court.

Lucrecia Jerez v. Judge Emigdio Nietes

G.R. No. L-26876, December 27, 1969

FACTS:
Nicolas Jalandoni died intestate. A proabate proceeding of his estate was filed before respondent Judge by
petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, wife and appointed as administratrix. A project of partition and final accounting was
submitted and was approved. Respondent Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child,
and respondent Victoria Jalandoni, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to
intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project of partition which they would have respondent
Judge reject for being contrary to law. Intervention and reopening the proceedings was allowed.

After denial of petitioner’s MR, an appeal to the CA was filed but was again denied, ruling that reopening
proceedings for the settlement is primarily addressed to the sound discretion and judgment of the probate
court. Since the motion to reopen was filed before the order closing the proceedings had achieved finality and
during the reglementary period, the court still had jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to amend
and control its process and orders.

ISSUE:
Was the respondent Judge correct in allowing private respondents to intervene after the intestate proceedings
were closed?

HELD:
YES. The only instance that which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence
not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by
proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if
successful, would be for another court to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle
properties distributed and disposed of.

Rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate or
intestate proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure
the relief that is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been
approved. Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention.

Ignacio Gerona v. Carmen de Guzman

G.R. No. L-19060, May 29, 1964

FACTS:
Marcelo de Guzman and Teodora dela Cruz were married and had a daughter, Placida de Guzman. Petitioners
herein are the legitimate children of Placida de Guzman. After the Teodora’s death, Marcelo married Camila
Ramos, who begot him several children, respondents herein. Marcelo de Guzman died intestate and respondents
executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of his estate fraudulently misrepresenting that they were the only
surviving heirs although they well knew that petitioners were also his forced heirs. Such fraud was discovered
only a year before the institution of the case and petitioner demanded their share in said properties, but
respondents refused. Hence, a complaint to nullify such extrajudicial settlement.

Respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in
the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is
barred by the statute of limitations. The RTC pronounced that Placida wasa legitimate child of Marcelo, however,
the properties decribed were covered under the second marriage, hence, dismissing the complaint. The CA
affirmed.

ISSUE:
Did the action for partition of the latter's estate prescribe within the statute of limitations?

HELD:
YES. As a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs do not prescribe when defendants do not hold the
property in question under an adverse title, otherwise, the statute of limitations operates from the moment such
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.

When respondents executed the deed of settlement stating that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman, and secured new TCTs in their own name, they excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased
and set up a title adverse to them. Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the deed upon the ground of fraud, the
action may be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place
when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new TCTs were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement that constitute constructive
notice to the whole world.
 Maria Elena Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001

FACTS:
Spouses Miguel and Rosalina Rodriguez initiated adoption proceedings of petitioner, Maria Elena Pedrosa where
the CFI granted the petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an
extrajudicial settlement adjudicating between them the estate of Miguel. Private respondents attempted to annul
the adoption but it was denied by the CFI. While pending in the CA, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as
representative of the heirs of Miguel and Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. The Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered parcels of land divided among the heirs of Miguel, represented
solely by Rosalina. Meanwhile, the CA denied the petition annulment of the adoption decree. Some portions were
sold to third parties, included as respondents.

Petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto, to claim their share of the properties from respondents but refused saying
that former were not heirs as they were not blood relatives. Petitioner filed a complaint to annul the partition
with earnest efforts toward a compromise were made but the same failed. The RTC dismissed the case ruling
that participation of Rosalina has already estopped petitioner from questioning the validity of the partition
applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Is the prescriptive period of 2 years under Sections 1 and 4, Rule 74 applicable in the complaint for annulment of
the extrajudicial partition, not 4 years?

HELD:
NO. Section 4, Rule 74 is when a person, who has been deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the
decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within 2 years after the extrajudicial or summary
settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right will
have prescribed. It will not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground
of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge
of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.

Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel and as a consequence, she excludes the collateral relatives. The respondents
cannot claim that they were not aware of her adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of
adoption and was only filed 26 years after its declaration, a much delayed response to prevent her from her
inheritance. With this setting, it is patent that respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent
to defraud Maria Elena. The applicable prescriptive period is 4 years since the action to annul a deed of
extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud may be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud.
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and
new TCTs were issued in the name of respondents.

In Re Summary Settlement Estate of Jose Francisco v. Fausta Carreon

G.R. No. L-5033, June 28, 1954

FACTS:
Rosa Francisco petitioned the CFI to summarily settle the estate of her husband, Jose Francisco, alleging that
they had 3 minor children who were legal heirs, had a parcel of land with house, and no creditors, asking for
declaration that they are entitled to share in his estate, which was granted. Rosa mortgaged and sold her share
to the respondent sisters Fausta and Catalina Carreon. However, Tiburcia Magsalin, mother of the deceased,
allegedly in representation of the minor Jose Francisco, averred that he was a recognized natural son and that
the previous proceedings were void because Rosa had concealed such fact.

Rosa and respondents pointed out that Tiburcia could not be named guardian because she would then be
representing interests in conflict. Hence, the court chose Macaria Palumpon, mother of the minor Jose. However,
when the motion to annul was called for hearing, Macaria requested the dismissal, without prejudice, of Jose
Francisco's demand for recognition. Her request was granted without prejudice to the 3 children's petition for
reopening of the order adjudicating ½ of the estate to Rosa. Tiburcia filed an amended motion for the
guardianship of only the 3 children. The CFI ruled that the whole property were passed to the ownership of the
three legitimate children of the deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of the widow and it annulled the
mortgage and the sale executed in favor of the respondents. Hence, the case.
ISSUE:
Is the reopening of the case valid even if the minor Jose already withdrew his case?

HELD:
YES. There is no reason to prevent the court below from considering such amended motion as an independent
petition filed on behalf of the 3 minors because under Section 5, Rule 74, such motion may be lodged with the
court within 1 year after the minors have reached majority; and they are still minors now. Respondents may not
justly complain that they thought such petition for readjustment or reopening could take place only within two
years because they are conclusively presumed to know the existence and provisions of Section 5, Rule 74.

They accepted the mortgage with the encumbrance annotated referring to Section 4, Rule 74 and did not
specifically mention Section 5. However, the latter being an imposition of the law, and being a mere sequence to
the provisions of Section 4, a third person who accepts it must take notice that he is running the risk of
interferring with the rights of minors as provided under Section 5.

Benny Sampilo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-10474, February 28, 1958

FACTS:
Teodoro Tolete died intestate and left parcels of land and as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several
nephews and nieces. Without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit adjudicating herself as
the sole heir and legitimate wife of the deceased. She then executed a deed of sale of the parcels of land in favor
of petitioner Benny Sampilo, who subsequently sold it to petitioner Honorato Salacup. Respondent Felisa
Sinopera instituted intestate proceedings for the estate of Teodoro Tolete alleging that Leoncia de Leon had no
right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that petitioner did not acquire rights to the lands. The CFI ruled
for Sinopera. On appeal, the CA modified the judgment declaring that the deeds of sale are null and void only
insofar as the properties conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Are the heirs prescribed from filing an action to recover their participation to the lands?

HELD:
YES. Section 4 of Rule 74 bars distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the
expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated
or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, (2) when the provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e. that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both
requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, having found
that the decedent left also left nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.

In addition, the action is one based on fraud, as the widow had declared in her affidavit of partition that the
deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs, except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and
which has a period of four years (Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed when the action was
instituted.

RULE 75
United States v. Chiu Guimco
G.R. No. 12184, September 27, 1917

FACTS:
Testator Joaquin Cruz had lived as a Chinese merchant in Misamis and had a considerable estate. He visited
China and was there married to Uy Cuan. After his return from China, he was married to Maria Villafranca.
Joaquin Cruz again visited China, leaving his brother, Chiu Guimco, the accused, in charge of his property and
business as his agent. Joaquin Cruz died leaving a will, executed before a notary, in which Guimco and Co-Iden
were named as executors. The will itself was not produced before the notary and he was not informed as to who
then had possession of the will. Nothing further was done in the matter of the probate of the will and Co-Iden
subsequently died. Guimco then entered into an arrangement with Maria Villafranca whereby she relinquished
in favor of third parties all her claims in respect to the estate and no further action was taken to distribute the
estate. Uy Cuan filed a petition for the settlement of the estate but Guimco and Uy Cuan entered into a contract
whereby he agreed to pay her by way of rental on their interest in the real estate of the decedent. No payments
have, however, been made.

Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, urged him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution
of proceedings. His attention was called to the penalty for withholding a will. Chiu Guimco called in his friend
Antonio Yacapin, and showed Yacapin the will. Chiu refused to show it in court stating that he would suffer
prejudice as a long time had already elapsed. Guimco asserted that the will had never been in his possession and
that he had never seen it. Hence, a complaint was filed, under Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
charging the defendant with the failure to produce the will within the time required by law. The court found the
accused guilty and imposed the fine under Section 628 and to the effect that the accused should be committed to
the provincial jail under Section 629, until he should produce the will or until further order the court.

ISSUE:
Is the imposition of imprisonment under Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure proper?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise
of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where administration proceedings
are not already pending, the court, before taking action, should require that there be before it some petition,
information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under this section appropriate. The
proceeding in this provision is an ordinary criminal prosecution and is properly prosecuted upon complaint or
information as other criminal offenses created by law. The fact that this penal provision is contained in the Code
of Civil Procedure does not make the proceeding to enforce the penalty a civil proceeding in any sense.

The remedy provided in Section 629 is a totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in
Section 628. It follows that the order of commitment made by the lower court remanding the accused to jail
should be vacated.

Ernesto Guevara v. Rosario Guevara

G.R. No. L-5405, January 31, 1956

FACTS:
The case is an offshoot of a previous SC decision where petitioner Ernesto Guevara was ordered to present the
will of Victorino Guevara and allow its probate. Respondent Rosario Guevara then initiated a settlement
proceeding and probate of the will only 12 years after the decedent’s death, but Ernesto opposed it. The lower
court dismissed the case since Rosario’s right to petition for the probate of the testament of Victorino and action
for judicial declaration of acknowledgment has prescribed. However, the CA reversed it. Hence, the case.

ISSUE;
Is the petition for probate of the alleged will of the deceased Victorino Guevara barred by the statute of
limitations considering that the petition for probate was filed 12 years later after death?

HELD:
NO. The provision of Article 1042 of the Civil Code and of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, point out that the
presentation of a decedent’s will to the competent court has always been deemed as more of a duty than a right,
and the neglect of such obligation carries with it the corresponding penalty, and it is inconsistent with that
policy that the court should refuse to admit wills to probate, without inquiry into their validity. In holding the
statute of limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the court failed to notice that its doctrine was destructive
of the right of testamentary disposition and violative of the owner’s right to control his property within the legal
limits.

While it is true that the rights of parties should not be left hanging in uncertainty for periods of time far in excess
of the maximum period of ten years allowed by law, the petition must not be dismissed for probate, however
belatedly submitted, and thereby refuse sanction to testamentary dispositions executed with all the formalities
prescribed by law, incidentally prejudicing also those testamentary heirs who do not happen to be successors ab
intestato. From whatever angle the case is viewed, a hearing on the allowance of the will is unavoidable.

Juan Palacios v. Maria Catimbang-Palacios

G.R. No. L-12207, December 24, 1959
FACTS:
Juan Palacios executed a will and filed a petition for its approval in the CFI. In said will, he instituted as his sole
heirs his natural children Antonio and Andrea. Respondent Maria Catimbang filed an opposition alleging that she
is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner, but that she was completely ignored in said will. The court
admitted the will for probate, but it set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of
the will. After hearing, the court issued an order declaring respondent as natural child and annulling the will as
it impairs her legitime.

On appeal to the SC, petitioner raised the fact that he instituted the present proceeding in order to secure the
probate of his will availing himself of the provisions of Article 838, paragraph 2, of the new Civil Code, which
permit a testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his will. In other words,
Maria Catimbang does not object to the probate of the will insofar as its due execution is concerned or on the
ground that it has not complied with the formalities prescribed by law, rather she objects to its intrinsic validity
or to the legality of the provisions of the will.

ISSUE:
May respondent Maria Catimbang oppose the petition for probate even if petitioner-testator is still alive?

HELD:
NO. The petition for the allowance of the will for probate decides no other questions aside from the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
a will. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions. The
questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator, it does not mean that he cannot alter or revoke
the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should
die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testator’s
death would be in order. It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the
portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the respondent on the ground that she is an
acknowledged natural daughter of the testator.

Dionisio Fernandez v. Ismaela Dimagiba

G.R. No. L-23638, October 12, 1967

FACTS:
Respondent Ismaela Dimagiba filed with the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes, which instituted her as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. Petitioners filed
oppositions to the probate on the ground of forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the
proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the
testatrix in favor of the proponent, but which conveyances were finally set aside by the SC. The CFI allowed the
will for probate but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation until such time these will
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the
properties is opportunely presented. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Is the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal?

HELD:
YES. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the
proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid
and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable and it is so recognized by
express provisions of Section 1, Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will.”

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir
is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. As to the
issue of estoppel, the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily
designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the
decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
 Spouses Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner Consolacion Sioson and respondent Remedios Eugenio-Gino are the niece and granddaughter of the
late Canuto Sioson. Canuto and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina, and his brother Victoriano,
were co-owners of a parcel of land. The 3 of them each owned an aliquot 10/70 share. Canuto had the lot
subdivided into 8 lots and were placed under her name. Canuto and Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan where Canuto sold his 10/70 share in favor of Consolacion. This agreement was affirmed by
Canuto’s children thru a joint affidavit.

Respondent Remedios filed a complaint against petitioner spouses for Annulment or Cancellation of
TCT claiming that she is the owner of said lots because Catalina devised these lots to her in the latter’s will.
Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of prescription where Remedios should have filed the action within
4 years from the registration of Consolacion’s title, and not some 19 years later. The lower court ruled for the
petitioners. However, it was reversed by the CA ruling that the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is 10
years, not 4 reckoned from the time Remedios filed her complaint when the 10-year prescriptive period had not
yet expired. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Was respondent Remedios barred from filing an action to enforce an implied trust?

HELD:
YES. The prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust
under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Article 1144 and begins to run from the date the
adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the
land. The 4-year prescriptive period applies only if the fraud does not give rise to an implied trust, and the action
is to annul a voidable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code and begins to run from the time of discovery
of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

In the present case, Remedios does not seek to annul the Kasulatan but the removal of the excess area from the
TCT issued to Consolacion prompting her to file an action for Annulment or Cancellation of TCT. This action is
based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the inclusion of the additional area was
without basis, but through mistake or fraud, and thus, Consolacion should be considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years
under Article 1144 and not 4 years under Articles 1389 and 1391.

In re Emil Johnson. Ebba Johnson

G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918

FACTS:
Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of US, died in Manila, leaving a holographic will,
signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three required by Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law. However, a petition
was presented in the CFI for the probate of this will on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death, a US
citizen and his will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State, hence, could properly be
probated pursuant to Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

An opposition was made by petitioner Ebba Johnson on the grounds upon which she seeks to avoid the probate
are: (1) Emil Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila at the time the will in question was executed; (2) The
will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois; (3) The order admitting
the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and (4) The order in question was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE:
May the order of probate be set aside on the other ground that the testator was not a resident of the State of
Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State?

HELD:
NO. In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will of real
or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution." The due execution of a will involves conditions
such as age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his
behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses
who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court
recites that the will was executed in conformity with the law of Illinois and that the testator was a citizen of that
State places the judgment upon an unassailable basis. However, it is probable that even if the judgment had not
contained these recitals, there would have been a presumption, from the admission of the will to probate as the
will of a citizen of Illinois, that the facts were as recited in the order of probate.

The fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of
returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile, in accordance with the 14 th
Amendment to the US Constitution. This situation, however, has no analogy when he comes to reside in the PH
as he cannot acquire a new citizenship by the mere change of domicile. Hence, at the time the will was executed,
the testator was, as stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. Hence, it was entirely
insufficient to warrant the setting aside of probating the will in question.

Tiburcia Manahan v. Engracia Manahan

G.R. No. 38050, September 22, 1933

FACTS:
Petitioner Tiburcia Manahan instituted a petition for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan.
The will was probated and petitioner was named the executrix. More than a year later, respondent Engracia
Manahan filed a MR and MNT praying for said order to declared null and void on the ground that the court did
not really probate the will, but limited itself to decreeing its authentication.

ISSUE:
Did the court limit its order to the authentication of the will, and not to its probate?

HELD:
NO. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in question, which is the only
pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly
executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference
between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are
synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the
will the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will,
is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

Cynthia Alaban v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Soledad Provido
Elevencionado alleging that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. RTC allowed the
probate of the will of the decedent and issued letters testamentary to respondent. Four months later, petitioners
filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings, but it was denied by the RTC for being filed beyond
the reglementary period.

On appeal to CA, petitioners averred that a compromise agreement was made to implement the division of the
estate. Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that
respondent feigned interest in participating in the compromise agreement so that they would not suspect his
intention to secure the probate of the will, but the contrary was expected. They claimed that they learnt of the
probate proceedings only later, as a result of which they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit
their opposition to the probate of the will. They argued that the RTC Decision should be reversed on the ground
of extrinsic fraud. Respondent countered by saying that petitioners were not made parties to the probate
proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs. The CA dismissed the petitioners’ motion.

ISSUE:
Were the petitioners made as parties in the settlement case?
HELD:
NO. Petitioners are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate
proceedings. A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of
the petition the court’s jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate
of the decedent.

Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties as
a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing. On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is
required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Petitioners, as nephews
and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs, who are entitled to be notified of the
probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition
for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to
be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.

RULE 76
Emerita Santos v. Judge Modesta Castillo
G.R. No. 45463, March 18, 1937

FACTS:
Petitioner Emerita Santos filed a petition for the probate of the will claiming to be the last will and testament of
Nicolas Azores. She also moved for the appointment of a special administrator and commissioners on appraisal,
of the properties of the deceased. At the hearing of said motion, respondents who legitimate children of Azores,
opposed it on for lack of jurisdiction because petitioner did not allege that she had the custody of the will and,
therefore, was not entitled to present it for probate; and furthermore because that will that should be probated
is the original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed an amended
petition praying that respondents be required to present the copies of the will and the codicil in their possession

The court issued an order denying the petition for the appointment of a special administrator andd ordered Jose
Azores, who has custody of the will to deliver said papers to the court within 10 days from notice. Consequently,
petitioner moved to admit her amended petition be admitted. However, before the motion was decided,
respondents, 16 days after their father's death, presented the original will and codicil, and petitioned that they
be admitted for probate. The court then dismissed the petition filed by Santos.

ISSUE:
Did the court have jurisdiction over the petition for probate of a will filed a party not in possession of the will?

HELD:
NO. In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and for the
administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege, in addition to the
residence of the ceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the applicant is the executor named
in the will or is the person who had the custody of the will to be probated.

When one of the two copies of the will was turned over to Jose Azores, it must be the original because the
respondents had the original of the will, as well as the codicil. In fact, it may be concluded that it was Jose Azores
who had the custody of the will because the original was turned over to him. If, in addition to fact that the
respondents had the original of the codicil, it necessarily follows that, by provision of the testator, it was said
respondents who had the custody of his will and of his codicil. Therefore, as the legitimate children of the
deceased had custody of the originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could, had the right and were
bound by law to apply for the probate of their father’s last will. Consequently, the respondent judge, in
dismissing the application of petitioner, neither exceeded his jurisdiction.

Bernardino Perez v. Conrada Perez

G.R. No. L-12359, July 15, 1959

FACTS:
The respondents insist the lower court did not "acquire jurisdiction to receive the evidence for the allowance of
the alleged will of the late Carida Perez" because 2 heirs had not been notified in advance of such will. Petitioner
says the persons mentioned were not entitled to notice, since they were not forced heirs as grandnephew and
niece, and had not been mentioned as legatees or devisees in the will of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Did the court lack jurisdiction on the ground that notice was not given to some heirs?

HELD:
NO. The omission of sending of notice, if any, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court, but it only constituted a
mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis of reversal. The Court has ruled that the court acquires
jurisdiction over all persons interested in the estate through the publication of the petition in the newspapers
which took place. Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural
convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. So much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been
omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not adviced — the decree allowing the
will does not ipso facto become void for want of jurisdiction.

Joaquina De Aranz v. Judge Nicolas Galing

G.R. No. 77047, May 28, 1988

FACTS:
Private respondent Joaquin Infante filed a petition for the probate and allowance of the will of the late
Montserrat Infante, with the petitioners and private respondent as legatees and devisees. The court issued an
order setting the petition for hearing and it was published in the "Nueva Era," a newspaper of general
circulation. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. Private respondent was then allowed to present
evidence ex-parte. Petitioners later filed a MR alleging that, as known legatees and devisees, no notices were
sent to them as required by Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, however, it was denied.

ISSUE:
Was the lack of notice to legatees and devisees impaired the jurisdiction of the probate court to probate the will?

HELD:
YES. Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in
the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. In other instances, it is not
necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of the notice in a
newspaper of general circulation.

The residences of petitioners were known to the probate court because the petition for probate indicated the
names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. Despite such knowledge, the court did not
cause copies of the notice to be sent to them. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not
satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for 3 weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.

Joaquina Basa v. Atilano Mercado

G.R. No. L-42226, July 26, 1935

FACTS:
CFI Pampanga allowed and probated the will of Ines Basa and approved the account of Atilano Mercado, the
administrator of the estate and only heir of the deceased, and closed the administration proceedings. Petitioners
then filed a motion that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction because
there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in
Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of the fact that, although the trial judge ordered the
publication of the required notice for "3 weeks successively", there were only 21 days after the date of the first
publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Should the first publication be made 21 days before the date of hearing?

HELD:
NO. The order provided that notice should be given by publication for 3 weeks successively in the Essex County
Herald. In accordance with this order, the notice was published in the issues for December 4, 11 and 18,
respectively. This was "public notice" to all persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing
said account and making decree of distribution, and was sufficient under the provisions of G.L. 3276. "The
proceeding was according to law in all respects, and being in the nature of a proceeding in rem, it binds
everybody by its legal effect." In view of the foregoing, it is held that Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure
express that the 1st publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day of hearing.

Rafael Maninang v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982

FACTS:
Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a petition for probate of the will of Clemencia Aseneta where such
holographic will disinherited the respondent Bernadrdo Aseneta, while the latter, who, as the adopted son,
claims to be the sole heir of Clemencia, instituted intestate proceedings. Respondent Bernardo then filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the
only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. Petitioner opposed it arguing that
in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. The
testate case filed by petitioner was dismissed considering that Bernardo is a forced heir while Soledad is not.

ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of the testate case proper, notwithstanding the existence of an alleged will?

HELD:
NO. The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered
nugatory. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in
probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance
with the requirements of the law.

In the Nuguid v. Nuguid case as invoked by the respondent, the Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid
as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution
is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if
the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts and
must not be interchanged. By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial
issue has not been thoroughly considered.

Constantino Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioner Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and for the issuance of
letters testamentary, on the premise that Nemesio died leaving a will in which petitioner and his siblings were
instituted as heirs. The will was written in Bisaya with a translation in English submitted by petitioner without
objection raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
appointment of Atty. Ignacio Villagonzalo as the executor.

Respondents Virginia Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and Rosa Acain, the widow, filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. However, the
motion was denied. On appeal to CA, the probate proceeding was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Is the authority of the probate courts limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will?

HELD:
NO. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will follows after the Court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. As exceptions, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.

For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress, when on its
face, the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
universal heirs, coupled with the fact that private respondent has been preterited, would have been an exercise
in futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity
of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved.

Fausto Gan v. Ildefonso Yap

G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958

FACTS:
Petitioner Fausto Gan initiated probate proceedings for the alleged holographic will executed by Felicidad Yap.
In said will, the surviving husband, respondent Ildefonso Yap, shall inherit a share in estate upon the condition
of putting up a health center in Bulacan amounting to P60,000. Respondent Ildefonso opposed the petition
asserting that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The lower
court disallowed the alleged will. The will itself was not presented but petitioner tried to establish its contents
and due execution by testimonies, but it was still denied by the court.

ISSUE:
May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare
that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

HELD:
NO. The matter of holographic wills, no guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since they need no
witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself." The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it
could at any time, be demonstrated to be or not to be in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a
holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required.” The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the
only medium of proof.

In the evidence presented by the petitioner, it is hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely
to relatives who had received nothing from it. These could pester her into amending her will to give them a
share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. In fine, even if oral testimony were
admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, the evidence submitted by petitioner is so tainted
with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by
Rule 77, Section 6.

Marcela Rodelas v. Amparo Aranza

G.R. No. L-58509, December 7, 1982

FACTS:
Petitioner Marcela Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of RicardoBonilla and the
issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. It was opposed by the respondents on the ground that the alleged
holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect. Further,
they argue that lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary
wills. However, the court dismissed the respondents’ motion.

ISSUE:
May a holographic will, which was lost or cannot be found, be proved by means of a photostatic copy?

HELD:
YES. Article 811 of the Civil Code provides that probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the
court after its due execution has been proved. If uncontested, at least 1 identifying witness is required and, if no
witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least 3 identifying witnesses are required.
However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that
there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a
photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with
the standard writings of the testator.

In the case of Gan v. Yap, "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,"
Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

RULE 77
Mercedes Leon and Adda Ghezzi v. Manufacturer's Life Insurance
G.R. No. L-3677, November 29, 1951

FACTS:
Basil Butler, a former resident of the Philippines, died testate in NY, USA. In the same year, his will was duly
probated in the Surrogate’s Court of New York County. The will contained a residuary clause by which the
decedent allowed the named executors to purchase an annuity for the benefit of petitioner Mercedes de Leon.
Hence, one of the executors, James Ross bought an annuity from the respondent Manufacturer’s Life Insurance
in Canada, with the contract stipulating a monthly payment of $57.60 to de Leon with the proviso that in the
event of her death, the residue shall be paid to Ross or his successor.

With the object of getting hold the entire amount invested in the annuity, de Leon presented Butler’s will for
probate in CFI Manila and secured the appointment of petitioner Ada Ghezzi as administratrix. The latter filed a
motion praying that the Manager of the Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Manila Branch to appear and render a
complete accounting of funds in its possession that purportedly belong to the estate of Butler. The CFI denied
the motion. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Does CFI Manila have jurisdiction over the assets involved?

HELD:
NO. Administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was
granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state
or country.

The entire amount invested in a contract of annuity, by virtue of which the beneficiary receives a periodical sum
during her lifetime, no longer forms part of a decedent’s estate and is beyond the control of the probate court. It
has passed completely into the hands of the company in virtue of a contract validly executed. Whether
considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed obligation, the proceeds of the sale
cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the annuitant, the residuary
legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will,
nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and except upon the
conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.

Silvino Suntay v. Federico Suntay

G.R. Nos. L-3087 & L-3088, July 31, 1954

FACTS:
Jose Suntay, a Filipino resident, died in China. He had 2 marriages and had sons, respondent Federico with the
late Manuela Cruz and petitioner Silvino with Maria Billian. Intestate proceedings were instituted in CFI Bulacan.
Federico was appointed administrator of the estate. Maria Billian, surviving widow, filed a petition for the
probate of the will claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines by the deceased. However, it was
denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing, and of the
insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. Notwithstanding the remand of the case to the
lower court, it denied the motion for continuance of the hearing by the surviving widow and dismissed the
petition.

In the meantime, the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines or of the will executed in China. He claimed
that he had found among the files of his late father a will in Chinese and that the same was probated in China.
However, CFI disallowed the alleged will executed in China.
ISSUE:
May the will, executed in China, be allowed and recorded by the CFI?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 1, Rule 78, wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such
country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper CFI in the Philippines. Section 2 provides that when a
copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a
time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance. Section 3 provides that if it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines,
the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the
courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall
have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of
a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. However, there are no proof on
these points. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the
purpose of taking the testimony of 2 attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district
court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. Even if it were, it does not measure the same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested
parties residing in the Philippines.

Salud Teodoro Vda. de Perez v. Judge Zotico Tolete

G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New
York, each executed a will in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that
it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his
wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael Cunanan, who was named
trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, petitioner Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing
that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. The RTC granted administration to petitioner. As her first
act of administration, petitioner filed a motion that Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the
proceeds of the life insurance policy taken by the spouses. The trial court granted the motion. Hence, Rafael
moved to set aside the appointment of petitioner as administrator arguing that since the wills were executed in
New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and
sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance
with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court
already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE:
Is notice required to a reprobate of a will executed outside the Philippines?

HELD:
YES. Section 2, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court states that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will
shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" which means that
with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 & 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident
in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time
and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also
cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
 Alonzo Ancheta v. Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon
G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006

FACTS:
Spouses Audrey ONeill and Richard Guersey were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30
years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey-Hill. The wife died and left a will where she left her entire
estate to her husband. Years after the Audrey’s death, the husband married respondent Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon. Richard died and left a will where he left his entire estate to respondent, except for some of his shares
in a company which he left to Kyle. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal and inventory was taken
on their conjugal properties. Petitioner Alonzo Ancheta, the administrator, filed for a partition of Audrey's
estate. The will was also admitted in a court in Maryland, USA. Richard’s will was then submitted for probate in
RTC Makati and Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator. Petitioner filed a project of partition of
Audrey’s estate, with Richard and being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property and from the
Citibank current account. The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court.

Meanwhile, Atty. Quasha also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the
Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was
opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, a legacy passes to the legatee
the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy. Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the Makati property, then his entire undivided interest in the
Makati property should be given to respondent. The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition and
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. Respondent then filed another
motion contending that petitioner breached his fiduciary duty since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard,
then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent. The CA ruled for the latter.

ISSUE:
Was there a breach of duty on the part of the petitioner on the probate of Audrey’s will?

HELD:
YES. Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court state that “such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses
of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it.” While
foreign laws do not prove themselves in this jurisdiction and courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland.

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of
Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a
judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

RULE 78
Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua
G.R. No. L-17091, September 30, 1963

FACTS:
Petitioner Ngo The Hua, claiming to be surviving spouse of the deceased Chung Liu, filed a petition to be
appointed administratrix of the latter’s estate Her petition was opposed by respondents claiming to be children
of the deceased by his 1st wife since petitioner is unfit to execute the duties as administratrix, and that she and
the deceased have secured an absolute divorce in Taiwan, both being Chinese, confirmed a legalized by the
Taipei District Court. The lower court appointed respondent Chung Kiat Hua as administrator, finding petitioner
as validly divorced with the deceased and the respondents are indeed children of the deceased. Respondent now
argues that the declaration of heirs shall only take place after all debts, expenses and taxes have been paid" in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Was the declaration of the heirs premature?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court discloses that what the court is enjoined from doing is the
assignment or distribution of the residue of the deceased's estate before the obligations chargeable to the estate
are first paid. Nowhere from said section may it be inferred that the court cannot make a declaration of heirs
prior to the satisfaction of these obligations. It is to be noted, however, that the court in making the appointment
of the administrator did not purport to make a declaration of heirs.

On the other hand, it was deemed necessary by the lower court to determine the relationship of the parties to be
able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the order preference established in Section 5, Rule 79 of the
Rules of Court. It provides that letters of administration shall be granted to the surviving spouse the next of kin,
or to any principal creditor, in this order. Since these applicants were asking for the letter of administration on
the theory that they are preferred according to Section 5, Rule 79 because of their relationship to the deceased
Chu Liu, the lower court necessarily had to pass first on the truth of their respective claims of relationship to be
able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the aforementioned order of preference.

Serafin Medina v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-34760, September 28, 1973

FACTS:
Private respondent Beda Gonzales was appointed as special administrator of the estate of Agustin Medina, but
excludes him from interfering in the possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as
"Bitukang Manok" by petitioner Rosalia del Carmen, to whom the said property had been sold by the estate,
through Gonzales' predecessor with the approval of the lower court, by ruling that a person with an adverse
conflicting interest is unsuitable for the trust reposed in an administrator of an estate.

ISSUE:
Was there a conflict of interest on the part of Gonzales when he opposed the sale made to petitioner?

HELD:
YES. An administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed where his personal interests conflict with
his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi-trustee,
disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and
claimants of the property except to preserve it for due administration, and who should be removed when his
interest conflicts with such right and duty.

Gonzales has been placed in a position where he may use his position as special administrator to favor his
personal interests as one interested in the purchase of the property for himself, although he denies such
personal interest with the statement that having acquired the rights and interests of the majority of the heirs, he
had stepped into the shoes of such heirs, hence, his concern and interest to protect the estate, as special
administrator, is to protect his claimed majority interest in the estate, hence his insistence on opposing the sale.
Grave prejudice is inflicted on petitioner as an heir because of the further delay (13 years now) in their receiving
their distributive shares of their father's estate, as well as to Rosalia as buyer, because of Gonzales' interference
with her enjoyment of the property paid for in full by her since 1970.

Octavio Maloles v. Pacita delos Reyes-Phillips

G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000

FACTS:
Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will alleging that he had no compulsory heirs and named in
his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation. Copies of said will were in the custody of
the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes-Phillips. Petitioner Octavio Maloles filed a motion
for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio Maloles, Sr., he
was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Arturo. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the
testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters
of administration in his name. However, the court appointed respondent as special administrator and denied his
motion to intervene.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner’s argument as nearest kin to the deceased tenable for him to be appointed as administrator?

HELD:
NO. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties, the
private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is not direct
or immediate as he is not a compulsory heir.

On petitioner’s argument that since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon
the Court to respect the desires of the testator. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust,
or fails to give bond that the court appoints other persons to administer the estate. However, none of these
circumstances is present in this case.

Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand Marcos II and Imelda Marcos

G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855, August 4, 2009

FACTS:
RTC Pasig City, acting as probate court, granted letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand
Marcos II and Imelda Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand Marcos. However,
petitioner Republic filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration for issuance of Letters of Administration to BIR
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as Special Administratrix of the Marcos Estate. It was granted by the
court. Respondent filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration to Commissioner Chato, but it was
denied. Meanwhile, the RTC, acting on the pending unresolved motions, appointed as joint special
administrators the DOJ Undersecretary and the respondents, which the petitioner opposed on the grounds of (1)
want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE:
Are the respondents incompetent to serve as executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos?

HELD:
NO. Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as executors, stating that
“no person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to
execute the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by
reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

Petitioner omits to state that the 2 cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have already been reversed by the
SC, hence, it cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor. As for Bongbong, the
failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude, as the mere omission is already a
violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual. This conclusion is supported by the
provisions of the NIRC as well as jurisprudence which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax
return, the NIRC considers three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2) a fraudulent return with intent to
evade tax, and (3) failure to file a return. The filing of a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax is a crime
involving moral turpitude, as it entails willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same,
however, cannot be said for failure to file a return where the mere omission already constitutes a violation.
Thus, this Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Bongbong is affirmed, the same not being a
crime involving moral turpitude, cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.

Marta Torres v. Juan Javier

G.R. No. L-10560, March 24, 1916

FACTS:
Petitioner Marta Torres, claiming as lawful wife, filed for the settlement of estate of the late Tan Po Pic and
prayed for appointment as administrator. However, the trial court refused to appoint Marta Torres and, instead,
appointed respondent Juan Javier as administrator. It appears that 2 women are claiming to be the legal wife,
Marta Torres and Yu Teng New. Marta Torres objected to the appointment of anyone except herself, while Juan
Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of Yu Teng New, opposed the appointment of Marta Torres. The probate court, being
unable to determine who the lawful wife of the deceased was, appointed a disinterested third person to act as
administrator.

ISSUE:
May the court appoint a disinterested person as administrator of an estate?

HELD:
YES. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of administration should be granted, first, to
the surviving husband or wife; second, to other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or
next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the administration may be granted to some other person,
such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, the
administration may go to such person as the court may appoint. The court had a right in view of the controversy
between the women to name a disinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between
them to be settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time.

Nicolasa de Guzman v. Angela Limcolioc

G.R. No. L-46134, April 18, 1939

FACTS:
Proceso de Guzman had two marriages, first was with to Agatona Santos, whom he had 4 children, including the
petitioner Nicolasa. After Agatona's death, the deceased had a second marriage with respondent Angela
Limcolioc, with no child. Proceso died intestate. CFI Rizal appointed petitioner as administratrix of the
properties of the deceased. Respondent asked that such appointment be set aside and that she be named
administratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as the widow. The court denied the respondent’s
petition.

ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to be appointed as administratix on the ground that she is the widow of Proceso?

HELD:
NO. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is not absolute if there are other reasons
justifying the appointment of an administrator other than surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what
principally determines the preference in the appointment of an administrator, and if, under the circumstances of
each case, it develops that there is another who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the
preference established in the latter's favor becomes untenable.

The application filed by petitioner Nicolasa de Guzman for her appointment alleges that during the marital life of
the deceased with Agatona, both acquired all the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any
property during his second marriage with Angela Limcolioc. If the properties left by the deceased were acquired
during his marriage with Agatona Santos, petitioner has more interest than his now widow, Angela Limcolioc,
who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the children
who has received no betterment.

Pedro de Jesus v. Hermenegilda Sicat

G.R. No. L-5236, May 25, 1953

FACTS:
Luis Morales died intestate. Petitioner Jose Torres, alleging to be a creditor of the conjugal partnership,
commenced a petition for the issuance of letter of administration in favor of Atty. Pedro de Jesus, for the purpose
of settling the estate of the deceased. Days after, respondent Hermenegilda Sicat, the widow of Luis Morales,
voiced her opposition, and claimed preference to be appointed as administratrix as the only close relatives and
forced heirs were her legitimate minor children, besides herself. The trial court disregarded the preference
established by law and appointed Atty. Pedro De Jesus as administrator.

ISSUE:
Is the appointment of petitioner proper, notwithstanding the widow’s preferential right?

HELD:
NO. The order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is founded on the assumption
that the persons preferred are suitable. If they are not, the court may entirely disregard the preference. This is
the reason for the rule that in the selection of an administrator, courts may exercise discretion, and, as stated
elsewhere, the person appearing in the order of preference may not be appointed where he appears to be
unsuitable for the trust, he having an adverse interest, or is hostile to the interested parties to such an extent as
to make his selection inadvisable.

The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference but on expressing his reason for disregarding it, saying
that the widow has shown hostility to the creditors by openly disputing their credits for having adverse
interests, is not sufficient. The administration of the intestate is undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and
the creditors. For creditors, before their credits are fully established, they are not "creditors" within the purview
of the law. It is proper for the administrator to oppose, or to require competent proof of, claims advanced
against the estate.

Emilio Suntay III v. Isabela Cojuangco-Suntay

G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010

FACTS:
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay, married to Federico Suntay, died intestate. Their only son, Emilio Suntay I,
predeceased both of them. Cristina was survived by her husband and several grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio Suntay III, a child out of wedlock, and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, wife of Emilio I, which
however, was annulled. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I and brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina. After Emilio I’s death, Federico filed a petition for
visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. It was granted but
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents. Federico, after the death of Cristina, adopted their illegitimate
grandchildren.

Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favour for the estate of Cristina,
but it was opposed by Federico on the ground that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than 30 years. Federico nominated his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator. The
court appointed petitioner. On appeal to CA, the appointment of Emilio III was revoked and appointment was
given to the respondent.

ISSUE:
Was the appointment of Emilio III proper?

HELD:
YES. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
of an estate, but is not absolute. Jurisprudence has held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court.

As Federicos adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent as the interest of
respondent, considering that the CA even declared that under the law, Federico, being the surviving spouse,
would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share
in the conjugal partnership. However, the attendant facts and circumstances of the case necessitate, at the least,
a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of the Cristina’s estate. The estate calls to the
succession the other putative heirs, the illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico but who was likewise
adopted, and the 2 siblings of respondent Isabel. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs,
and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico, which forms part of their respective estates,
a joint administration of the estate is proper.

RULE 79
Adela Gutierrez v. Jose Villegas
G.R. No. L-11848, May 31, 1962

FACTS:
Irene Santos died intestate, leaving her surviving spouse Jose Villegas and nieces, Rizalina Rivera and Adela
Gutierrez. Jose filed with CFI a petition for Letters of Administration and was appointed administrator of the
estate. An unverified manifestation with a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan" was filed to the probate court by
Adela stating that all of her rights, interests and participation in the estate now belong to Rizalina and that she
will not take part in the proceedings. Adela later opposed the manifestation arguing that it was obtained thru
fraud by the administrator when she was made to sign a document she could not read for securing a loan from
Jose. It was only then that Adela came to know that said document was a deed of sale wherein she was not
informed of the true value of the estate. Jose and Rizalina filed objections, denying the allegations against them.
Adela also filed a motion to furnish her with copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings,
which was granted. This was opposed by the respondents, which is now questioned in this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is Adela entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator and orders issued by the court?

HELD:
YES. Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings since her interest in the estate is not
inchoate as it was established at the time of death of Irene Santos. The motion in question is not one of
intervention, but solely a plea to enforce a right and that is to receive pleadings and orders related to the case. In
effect, all she wanted to convey was that she should participate or continue taking part in the case for being an
original party. Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an
original party to pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of
some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. Hence, there is no prejudice to be
suffered by Jose and Rizalina, if they are required to furnish copies of the pleadings to Adela.

Cipriano and Miguel Duran v. Josefina Duran

G.R. No. L-23372, June 14, 1967

FACTS:
Pio Duran died intestateand left Josefina Duran, surviving spouse, and several collateral relatives. Before his
death, Cipriano Duran, a brother, executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to
the decedent's estate in favor of Josefina Duran, for P2,500. A year later, he filed a petition for intestate
proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. Josefina opposed it
on the ground that Cirpriano is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and
renunciation the estate. Anent the deed of assignment, he contended that it was procured thru fraud. Josefina
moved to strike out said petition as an improper attempt to intervene in the case. The CFI dismissed Cipriano’s
petition for lack of interest in the estate, hence, the present case.

ISSUE:
Are petitioners considered as “interested parties” to the estate?

HELD:
NO. The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an estate must be filed by an
"interested person" as explained in the case of Gutierrez v. Villegas case. In the present case, however, the
assignment took place when no settlement proceeding was pending. The properties were not under the
jurisdiction of a settlement court. An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the
requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of
binding creditors and non-participating heirs only. Should it be contended that said partition was attended with
fraud, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same. Until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, the
assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceeding and it is deemed valid and effective against him leaving
him without that "interest" in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.

Victoria Tayag v. Felicidad Tayag-Gallor

G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008

FACTS:
Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving 2 real properties in the possession of petitioner wife, Victoria Tayag. A
motor vehicle was sold and allegedly promised to give respondent Felcidad Gallor and her brothers, as
illegitimate children of Ismael, their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of
them half the amount she promised. Respondent Felicidad then filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag further averring that petitioner has caused the annotation of
declaring the properties of Ismael to be the paraphernal properties of petitioner.

Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties using her own money and she was
not planning to sell them. She moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that respondent must allege that she
was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. The motion was denied ruling that
the allegation of illegitimacy suffices for a cause of action, without need to state that she had been recognized
and acknowledged as such. However, respondent still has to prove her allegation and petitioner has the right to
refute the allegation in the course of the settlement proceedings.

ISSUE:
Is the allegation of illegitimacy sufficient for a cause of action to file a petition for letters of administration?
HELD:
YES. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag, an interested party is one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore,
must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. Hence, where the right of the person filing a
petition for letters of administration is dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can no
longer be established, such contingent interest does not make her an interested party. However, applying the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, persons claiming illegitimate filiation, with open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action for proving legitimacy is barred by the
death of the alleged father.

Since respondent had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been
voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of petitioner’s opposition, there is yet
no way to determine if Victoria’s petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been
foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the
suit by reason of the decedents voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.

RULE 80
Virginia Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-40502, November 29, 1976

FACTS:
Petitioner Virginia Fule filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration on the estate of Amado
Garcia with a prayer that she be appointed as special administrator. The petition was granted. Preciosa Garcia
filed an opposition to the letters of administration, raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no
delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving
spouse of Amado, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia Fule is a
debtor of the estate. Preciosa, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate and as
regular administratrix.

ISSUE:
Is Preciosa more suitable to be appointed as special administrator?

HELD:
YES. As a rule, the discretion to appoint a special administrator lies in the probate court. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. Under the law, the widow would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin.

Preciosa Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix which is but temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed. The preference of Preciosa is with sufficient reason by
reasons of: (a) a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased in favor of Agustina Garcia, where he indicated
that he is married to Preciosa Garcia; and (b) In his certificate of candidacy where he wrote the name of Preciosa
as his spouse. Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa Garcia can be reasonably believed
to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado Garcia.

Feliciano de Guzman v. Judge Teofilo Guadiz

G.R. No. L-48585, March 3, 1980

FACTS:
Petitioner Feliciano de Guzman filed a petition for the probate of a will of Catalina Bajacan instituting the
petitioner as sole heir and as executor. However, private respondents moved to dismiss contending that all the
real properties of Catalina are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Intervivos. The respondent
judge dismissed the motion until the parties have presented their evidence. A motion for the appointment of a
special administrator was filed by the petitioner alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss would delay the
probate of the will and the appointment of an executor. However, it was denied.
ISSUE:
May a special administrator be appointed?

HELD:
YES. Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court states that the probate court may appoint a special administrator
should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. It may include any cause general administration that cannot be
immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased.

The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are: (1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for
the probate of the will; and (2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina Bajacan and
opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation. There is an immediate need to file an action for the
annulment of such deed of donation in behalf of the estate but it was dismissed. In the meantime, there is
nobody to sue in order to protect the interest of the estate considering that the probate of the will and the
appointment of an executor will take time. It also appears that the properties consisting of 80 hectares of first
class agricultural land produce P50,000 worth of palay each harvest twice a year. Hence, there is an immediate
need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the estate as regards the products.

Julito Relucio v. Judge Ramon San Jose

G.R. No. L-4783, May 26, 1952

FACTS:
Petitioner Julita Relucio was appointed administratrix of the estate of Felipe Relucio. However, upon petitioner,
the court appointed Rolando Relucio as administrator in substitution of the petitioner. Rolando filed a motion
declaring petitioner in contempt of court for failing to deliver to him, after demand, all papers, documents, titles
and properties of the estate under her administration. However, it was denied and appointed Equitable Banking
Corp. as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner. The court ruled that the appeal suspended
the appointment of Rolando Relucio as administrator but it justified the appointment of the special
administrator by arguing that, if the petitioner has to remain as administratrix during the pendency of her
appeal, "a removed administrator may easily nullify such removal by interposing an appeal." Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Was the appointment of the special administrator proper?

HELD:
NO. Cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are specified in Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court "when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator
to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased and executors or administrators thereupon appointed." A
special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered by Section 8, Rule 87 "if the executor or
administrator has a claim against the estate he represents. The court may order the executor or administrator to
pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim."

Since the case does not fall under Section 1, Rule 81 or Section 8, Rule 87, there is no need for a special
administrator. Pending petitioner’s appeal, she had the right to act as administratrix. If the respondent Judge had
decreed the immediate execution of the order, Rolando Relucio would then be the administrator pending
petitioner's appeal. Consequently, the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in appointing the respondent
Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator.

Pedro de Guzman v. Judge Zosimo Angeles

G.R. No. 78590, June 20, 1988

FACTS:
Manolito de Guzman died intestate and left properties as part of his estate which were conjugal properties with
private respondent Elaine de Guzman and the compulsory heirs of the decedent is petitioner as surviving spouse
and 2 children. She filed a petition for the settlement of estate of Manolito and a motion for writ of possession
over 5 vehicles registered under Manolito, but which are in the possession of the petitioner Pedro de Guzman. As
co-owner and heir, Elaine must have the possession of said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late
husband. She also filed an ex parte motion to be appointed as special administrator, but no notice was sent to
petitioner. The motion was granted.

Trouble erupted when petitioner resisted when the sheriffs tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that
they were his personal properties. He then filed a petition to annul the said orders alleging that the immediate
grant of the motion praying for the court's assistance in the preservation of the estate of the deceased, "without
notice and its immediate implementation are proof that all the antecedent events were intended solely to
deprive him of his property without due process of law."

ISSUE:
May a special administrator be appointed absent a mandatory notice sent to all interested parties?

HELD:
NO. In Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court, the probate court must cause notice through publication of the
petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the
court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on the whole world. Notice through
publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of
which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment.

A special administrator has been defined as the "representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to
care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed." The petitioner, as
creditor of the estate, has a similar interest in the preservation of the estate as the private respondent. However,
it is not clear from the records what emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was
deferred at least until the most interested parties were given notice of the proposed action. If emergency
situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate justify a court's immediately taking some kind of
temporary action even without the required notice, no such emergency is shown in this case.

Heirs of Belinda Castillo v. Dolores Lacuata-Gabriel

G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005

FACTS:
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo Almoradie, died instestate. Crisanta Yanga, the deceased’s mother, filed
an intestate proceeding alleging that the estate was being managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law,
Lorenzo. She prayed that letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, brother of the deceased.
However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator. Later, the marriage between Crisanta and Lorenzo was
declared void for being bigamous and removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano. Belinda
Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention. Roberto
Gabriel, a legally adopted son of Crisanta, filed a petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary in his favour as he was instituted as the sole heir and designated as alternate executor.
Belinda died.

The RTC dismissed the mother’s petition and appointed Roberto as administrator. Roberto died and Dolores, his
wife, substituted him. The petitioners opposed it arguing that Dolores was not next of kin of Crisanta. The court
then appointed Dolores as special administrator.

ISSUE:
Is the appointment of respondent as special administrator proper?

HELD:
YES. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and
preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded in charge of the estate, and as an officer of the court subject to the supervision and
control of the probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate. The occasion for
such an appointment also arises where a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is delayed.

The deceased left a document purporting to be her will where Roberto was named as the sole heir of all her
properties. However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving the respondent as his sole heir. Thus, the
respondent has much stake in Crisanta’s estate in case the latter’s will is allowed probate. It needs to be
emphasized that in the appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the shares in the decedent’s estate,
but merely appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the
decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to
be the basis of distribution.

Rowena Corona v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-59821, August 30, 1982

FACTS:
Dolores Vitug died in USA, leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will which excluded her husband, respondent
Romarico Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will which expressly disinherited her husband "for
reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage", and bequeathed her properties to her
sisters and nieces petitioner Rowena Corona and Jennifer Way. Rowena was then appointed as executrix.
Petitioner filed a petition for probate of the wills and for the appointment of Nenita Alonte as Administrator
because petitioner is presently employed in the US.

Romarico opposed the petition and moved for his appointment as Special Administrator because the Alonte is
not related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to
administer. The court then appointed Romarico as special administrator. Petitioner appealed this present case
arguing that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should not be followed where the surviving spouse is
expressly disinherited, opposes probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate which would
disqualify him from the trust.

ISSUE:
Is the appointment of Romarico as special administrator proper?

HELD:
NO. While special administrators may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject
to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire
estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement. Nenita Alonte, petitioner’s nominee, should be
appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own
inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to the
highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are
overshadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the
surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate.

Natividad Vda. de Roxas v. Potenciano Pecson

G.R. No. L-2211, December 20, 1948

FACTS:
Pablo Roxas died testate leaving petitioner Natividad Roxas, surviving spouse, and respondents Maria and Pedro
Roxas, siblings. The latter filed a petition for the administration of Pablo's estate and Maria was appointed
special administratrix. Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and
for her appointment as executrix of his estate designated is said will. In view of the opposition to the probate of
the will by the respondents, the petitioner was appointed special administratrix. The lower court then denied
the probate of the will on the ground that the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names in the
presence of the testator, from which the petitioner has appealed, and the appeal is now pending.

Respondents renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria as special administratrix or special co-
administratrix. The lower court appointed the petitioner as special administratrix only of all the conjugal
properties of the deceased and respondent Maria as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging
exclusively to the deceased. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Was the appointment of 2 separate special administrators under a single estate proper?

HELD:
NO. Provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under
Section 1, Rule 81, as well as those as to causes for removal of a executor or administrator under Section 2, Rule
83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. As the law does not say who shall be
appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical
or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

However, as under the law, only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. Although his powers and duties are
limited to "collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve
the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold.
Hence, the court has no power to appoint two special administrators of the estate of a deceased husband.

Aurea Matias v. Judge Primitivo Gonzales

G.R. No. L-10907, June 29, 1957

FACTS:
Aurea Matias filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, leaving Aurea Matias
as heir and appointed therein as executrix without bond. Basilia Salud opposed the probate and was sustained
by the respondent judge to be dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the SC. Meanwhile, Basilia Salud moved for the
dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez and the appointment of Ramon Plata. The court appointed Basilia Salud as
special administratrix to "be assisted and advised by her niece, Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide,
interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud" and provided that "Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata as
appointed as co-administrator." Aurea opposed the appointment. Later, Basilia resigned as special administrator
by reason of disability, due to old age, and recommended the appointment, in her place, of Victorina. This was
again opposed by Aurea and moved to appoint any bank as special administrator, but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Is the appointment of two special administrators proper?

HELD:
YES. The record shows that there are, at least 2 factions among the heirs of the deceased, namely, one
represented by the petitioner, and another to which Basilia and Victorina Salud belong. Inasmuch as the lower
court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.

The rule, laid down in Roxas v. Pecson, to the effect that "only one special administrator may be appointed to
administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered wherein one special administrator
for some properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties were
appointed. Thus, there were 2 separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar there is only 1
special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators.
Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several special co-administrators.

Serapia de Gala v. Apolinario Gonzales

G.R. No. L-30289, March 26, 1929

FACTS:
Severina Gonzales died testate, leaving no heirs and in which Serapia de Gala, a niece, was designated executrix.
She presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew, opposed on the probate on the ground that it
had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Serapia
de Gala was appointed special administratrix and returned an inventory of the estate and made several demands
upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery of the property inventoried and of
which he was in possession.

The CFI ordered Sinforoso to deliver to Serapia all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the
property, Sinforoso filed a motion cancelling the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix and
that he be appointed instead. The motion was granted on the ground that he had possession of the property. The
court admitted the will for probate. Serapia appealed the order of her removal.

ISSUE:
Was Serapia validly removed as a special administrator?

HELD:
YES. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court; the function of
such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased and to return an inventory
thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be
taken from the appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal are
purely discretionary. In removing Serapia and appointing the present possessor of the property, Sinforoso,
pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.

Gliceria Liwanag v. Judge Luis Reyes

G.R. No. L-19159, September 29, 1964

FACTS:
Pio Liwanag executed in favor of the Rotegaan Financing, a REM on a parcel of land to secure the payment of a
loan, with a stipulation that the amount be fully paid a year thereafter. Before the period expired, Pio died
intestate. As the obligation was not fully paid within the stipulated period, Rotegaan Financing filed a complaint
for foreclosure against the Estate of Pio Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the estate. Petitioner
Gliceria Liwanag moved to dismiss the complaint on the theory that she may not be sued as special
administratrix. The action on the motion to dismiss was deferred because there is a possibility that the estate
may be in a position to pay the amounts claimed by Rotegaan Financing, in which case the latter may choose to
file its claim against the decedent, and waive the mortgage. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May the special administrator be sued?

HELD:
YES. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against
the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them
in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So to deny the present action on this
technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for
which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated. It was therefore, the will of the deceased himself that, in
case of foreclosure, the property be put into the hands of a receiver, and this provision should be respected by
the administratrix of the estate.

Dora Anderson v. Idonah Perkins

G.R. No. L-15388, January 31, 1961

FACTS:
A petition was filed by Dora Anderson for the probate of the will of Eugene Perkins, who died leaving properties
in Manila. She also filed an urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Enrile as special administrator of the
estate, which was granted. Idonah Perkins, surviving spouse, opposed the probate of the will. Enrile then
submitted an inventory of all the assets belonging to the deceased.

He submitted a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or
institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, which were deteriorating, in order to avoid their
further deterioration and to save whatever value might be obtained. Idonah Perkins filed an opposition to the
proposed sale by reason that most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and
her deceased husband and that said order which authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal
estate of the deceased, was contrary to Section 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. However, the sale was approved.
Idonah appealed to SC arguing that the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, Enrile has no
legal authority to sell them

ISSUE:
May a special administrator sell the property of the deceased, despite not being perishable?

HELD:
YES. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the property of the
estate but also its value, that Section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the
court ordered sold.
However, records show that, up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially approved, no
proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of Idonah from the
estate or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property. Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of the
properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated, or at least, an
agreement be reached with Idonah as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being
sold to preserve their value, the proposed sale is clearly premature. Idonah must have a reasonable opportunity
to point out which items in the inventory she did not want sold.

Luis Co v. Judge Ricardo Rosario

G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008

FACTS:
The RTC Makati City appointed petitioner Luis Co and Vicente Yu as special administrators of the estate of the
petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun. However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioner’s
appointment. Co nominated his son, Alvin Co, for appointment as co-administrator of the estate, which was
granted. Years later, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs, revoked the appointment of Alvin by
reason that Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator since he
had several criminal cases against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample
reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.

ISSUE:
Was the removal of Alvin Co as special administrator proper?

HELD:
YES. The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. Thus, even if a special administrator had already
been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.

In ruling to revoke the appointment of Alvin Co, the lower courts observed that, burdened with the criminal
charges of falsification of commercial documents, and the corresponding duty to defend himself in these
proceedings, his ability and qualification to act as special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are
beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is only proper under the attendant circumstances. The court merely
declared that it is more consistent with the demands of justice and orderly processes that Alvin Co be relieved of
his duties and functions as special administrator, to avoid conflicts and possible abuse.

Judge Mateo Alcasid v. Amado Samson

G.R. No. L-11435, December 27, 1957

FACTS:
Respondents filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in favor in one of them, Jesus Samson,
for the estate of the late Jose Samson. Jesus Samson was appointed special administrator of the estate. This was
opposed by petitioners Josefina Samson, surviving spouse and her 3 children, and asked for the granting of
letters of administration in favor of Josefina. Petitioner Judge Alcasid, however, appointed Antonio Conda,
Municipal Treasurer of Libon, Albay, as regular administrator. The parties appealed the order arguing that the
appointment of Antonio Conda as regular administrator was stayed by the appeal taken against it, and
thereafter, Conda should not have been allowed to qualify in the meantime; and that "should the special
administrator be found, after due process of law, unfit to continue", he "could be dismissed and another
appointed to look after the interests of the estate until the appeal filed against Conda's appointment is finally
disposed of". The CA revoked Conda’s appointment.

ISSUE:
Was the removal of the special administrator poper?

HELD:
YES. Provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under
Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. As the law does not say who
shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court
has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed.

However, in the present case, the special administrator was not actually removed by the court, but that he was
superseded by the regular administrator by operation of law. The removal of the special administrator is at the
court's sound discretion, and it shows that the special proceeding was commenced more than one and one-half
years ago, and that the notice of the creditors cannot be even issued until after letters of administration have
been granted by the court to the regular administrator. This being so, the heirs cannot seek to prolong the
tenure of the removed special administrator by appealing Conda's appointment as regular administrator.

Jose Junquera v. Crispin Borromeo

G.R. No. L-9314, May 28, 1956

FACTS:
Vito Borromeo died testate wherein the will named petitioner Jose Junquera as executor. The latter filed a
petition for the probate of said will praying that, during the pendency of its probate, he be appointed a special
administrator of the estate. The court granted his prayer.
Crispin and Teofilo Borromeo filed their opposition to the petition and a motion for the removal of Junquera as
special administrator on the ground that he failed to submit an inventory of the estate as required by law as well
as to deposit either in the bank or with the clerk of court all the income of the estate and by his conduct he may
be considered as having neglected his duties as such administrator.

Junquera explained that the reason why he failed to file the inventory and report is that all the documents are in
the possession of Tomas Borromeo who owns ½ of the conjugal properties of the deceased by virtue of a deed of
donation. And if he was not able to submit a report of the income of the estate, it was because he failed to collect
its rentals due to the opposition of the heirs in the will. He subsequently filed an inventory and report. However,
the court removed him as special administrator.

ISSUE:
Is the removal of Junquera as special administrator proper?

HELD:
YES. The rule is that "The appointment and removal of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound
discretion of the court. Section 4, Rule 82, of the Rules of Court, a special administrator before entering upon his
duties shall give a bond conditioned "that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for
such as are received by him when required by the court.

It appears that from the time that he was appointed as special administrator until the time a motion to remove
him was filed, he has not taken any step to determine the property, real or personal, belonging to the estate and
much less has filed an inventory thereof with the court as required by law. While the provision does not fix any
period, it must be noted that such duty has to be performed within a reasonable period, if not as soon as
practicable, in order to preserve the estate and protect the heirs of the deceased. Junquera "have not even
attempted, much less done any substantial performance of any of (his) commitments", it is evident that he has
proved to be unworthy of his trust.

RULE 81
Rosario Cosme de Mendoza v. Januario Pacheco
G.R. No. 43351, February 26, 1937

FACTS:
Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme. To assure faithful performance of
his duties, he filed a bond for P5,000 with the reposndent Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero, as sureties.
Soriano's account showed him indebted to the estate in the sum of P23,603.21. Unable to turn this amount over
to the estate upon demand of petitioner Rosario Cosme, the new administratrix, the lower court ordered the
execution of his bond, after notice duly served upon the sureties.

Later, a settlement was made between the Rosario and Soriano, whereby the latter ceded certain real properties
to the estate reducing on that account his indebtedness to P5,000. Rosario had a public sale to collect this
amount of P5,000. Separate motions to be discharged from the bond were filed by sureties Pacheco and Cordero
but both motions were denied.

ISSUE:
Does a court have the power to order the execution of an administrator's bond?

HELD:
YES. Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or
of administration are issued, the person to whom they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable
sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his
trust. The administrator is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for the performance of certain legal
obligations.

The lower court, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond,
to fix the amount, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty. Despite absence of any
provision that a court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, by necessary and logical implication,
the power exists as if it were phrased in unequivocal term. In this connection, Section 683 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, trustee, or
guardians, a person liable as surety in respect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to
such accounting, and may have the right to appeal as hereinafter provided." Since a person who may be held
liable as surety in respect to an administrator's account the right to be admitted as a party to their accounting,
then he may be charged with liability upon the bond during the process of accounting, that is, within the
recognized confines of probate proceedings.

Warner, Barnes and Co. v. Luzon Surety Co.

G.R. No. L-6637 September 30, 1954

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against the defendant Luzon Surety for the recovery of the sum of P6,000 for a bond
filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the estate of Agueda Gonzaga, for failure to comply with the
conditions being that said bond would be void if the administratrix "faithfully prepare and present a correct
inventory of all the property of the deceased; faithfully pay all debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber
said estate, and renders a just and true account of his administrations.

The defendant filed an answer on the lack of jurisdiction of the court stating that its maximum liability under the
surety bond is P6,000 and if it were not for the untimely death of the judicial administratrix, she would have
been able to fully comply with her duties and obligations.

ISSUE:
May another court, aside from the probate court, pass upon the surety’s liability under the bond?

HELD:
YES. Even citing the case of Mendoza v. Pacheco, it is noteworthy that while the citation is to the effect that the
probate court has jurisdiction over the forefeiture or enforcement of an administrator's bond, it was not held
therein that the same matter may not be litigated in an ordinary civil action brought before the court of first
instance. Hence, another lower court may hear and determine the liability of the sureties on the bond.

Luzon Surety Co. v. Pastor Quebrar

G.R. No. L-40517, January 31, 1984

FACTS:
Petitioner Luzon Surety issued 2 administrator's bond in behalf of respondent Pastor Quebrar, as administrator
for the estate of A. B. Chinsuy and Cresenciana Lipa. In consideration of the suretyship, respondents executed 2
indemnity agreements where they agreed to pay petitioner P300 in advance as premium. The respondents were
able to submit a project of partition, and were subsequently approved by the court. Later, respondents were not
able to comply with the agreement and moved for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the
ground that "the heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares". The bonds were
cancelled by the court.
The petitioner appealed arguing whether or not the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and
after the year that they were filed and approved by the court up to the time they were cancelled. The lower court
ruled in favor of petitioner stating that when the bonds were filed, the same were in force and effect from and
after filling when the same were cancelled. It follows that the defendants are liable under the terms of the
Indemnity Agreements, notwithstanding that they have not expressly sought the renewal of these bonds.

ISSUE:
Are respondents liable for the indemnity agreements against petitioner?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the
purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. Having in mind the purpose and intent of
the law, the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do
as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator
and embraces the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of administration, it
follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in
consideration of the suretyship.

Respondent Pastor Quebrar still had something to do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of
the amended project of partition. Administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution
of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the
estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid.
An estate may be partitioned even before the termination of the administration proceedings. Hence, the
approval of the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the administration proceedings.
Notwithstanding the approval of the partition, the lower court still had jurisdiction over the administration
proceedings of the estate of A.B. Chinsuy and Cresenciana Lipa.

RULE 82
Johanna Borromeo v. Canuto Borromeo
G.R. No. L-6363, September 15, 1955

FACTS:
Maximo Borromeo died testate leaving his widow petitioner Johanna Borromeo, and a will wherein he
designated the Borromeo Bros. Estate as his sole heir and named his brother respondent Canuto Borromeo as
executor. Later, petitioner prayed for the removal of the executor on the grounds of negligence in the
performance of his duties and unfitness to continue discharging the powers of the office. The motion was
postponed and taking advantage of the postponement Canuto, as executor withdrew, without any authority from
the court, the total amount of P23,930.39 and then deposited in the joint account of Canuto and his brother,
Exequiel. Canuto was then removed. On appeal, there being no practical difference between removal and
resignation, Canuto was "relieved of (instead of removed from) his commitments as such executor.

ISSUE:
Was Canuto removed as an executor?

HELD:
YES. Upon Canuto’s act of withdrawing all the money from the bank account of Maximo and depositing in the
joint account of Exequiel and his, is contrary to the agreement where it was stated that “upon the condition that
said money deposited, x x x shall be the property of all of us, during our lifetimes and after the death of any one
of us shall be the sole property of and payable to the survivors, or survivor, provided that this last deposition is
not contrary to provisions of laws now in force or may hereafter be in force in the Philippines.

This is also a stipulation that could deprive the wife of her share in the conjugal assets. The validity of the
agreement could properly be the subject of debate in court; yet this executor bypassed judicial adjudication by
getting the money, especially at a time when his actuations were already being questioned, and his appointment
as executor in danger of revocation. And his conduct is aggravated by taking advantage of a postponement in
order to vest in himself money on which the corporate heir and the widow might have a claim. Also, conflict
between the interest of the executor and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal or resignation of the
former, who was thereby become unsuitable to discharge the trust.

Dalisay Ocampo v. Renato Ocampo

 G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners Dalisay Ocampo, et al, are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo, who died.
Leonardo and his siblings, respondents, are the legitimate children of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo,
who died intestate. Petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings alleging that, upon the death of
Vicente and Maxima, respondents and Leonardo jointly managed the estate of their parents. When Leonardo
died, respondents took possession, to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the
estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. Respondents opposed the petition contending that it
was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. Respondents also prayed
for appointment as special joint administrators of the estate. The RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special
joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses,

Respondent filed a MR for said order insisting that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed,
considering that she even failed to take care of Leonardo when he was paralyzed. In addition, respondents
asserted their priority in right to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima,
whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a legal heir by right of
representation from Leonardo. The RTC then revoked Dalisay’s appointment as co-administrator on the fact that
respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest the order and even
manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate. Months after, Dalisay moved for
revocation of special administration on the ground that respondents had been resorting to the mode of special
administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due them. The RTC revoked the
special administration of respondents for failure to comply with the posting of the required bond, and to submit
an inventory and income statement of the estate.

ISSUE:
Was the revocation of respondents’ special administration valid?

HELD:
YES. When a special administrator is appointed, the objective is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the
hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs. It is settled that the
selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds
other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the
issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 as would
be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain.

The RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special administrators for failing to post their administrators
bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply with its
lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of respondents’ plea to assume their office sans a bond,
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81. The administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it
compels the administrator to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon him.
Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be
considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts
constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the
nature of a qualification for the office of administration.

RULE 83
Benjamina Sebial v. Roberta Sebial
G.R. No. L-23419, June 27, 1975

FACTS:
Gelacio Sebial died intestate leaving 3 children, herein respondents, in his first marriage and 6 children which
includes the petitioner Benjamina. The latter filed a petition for the settlement of Gelacio's estate and prayed
that she be appointed administratrix. Respondent Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the
estate of Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his children and that, if an administration
proceeding was necessary, Roberta Sebial should be the one appointed as he resides near the properties of the
estate. The court appointed Benjamina and found the alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. For the
possibility of an amicable settlement, the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of the properties of the
decedent with segregation for each marriage. The court approved the administrator's inventory six months from
her appointment. Roberta then moved for reconsideration alleging lack of jurisdiction by the court to approve
the inventory as it was filed beyond the 3-month period.

ISSUE:
Did the court lose jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months after the appointment?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court states that the prescribed 3-month period is not mandatory. Once a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper court and the publication of the
notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and retains such until the
probate proceedings is closed.

Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after 3 months, this delay will not deprive the probate court of its
jurisdiction to approve it. However, under Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, such unexplained delay can
be a ground for an administrator's removal.

Teresa Garcia v. Luisa Garcia

G.R. No. L-45430, April 15, 1939

FACTS:
After respondent Luisa Garcia was appointed special administrator of the properties of Paulina Garcia’s estate,
she filed an inventory with the court which was opposed by petitioner Teresa Garcia to include in the inventory
certain properties of the estate. However, it was denied. Teresa filed a motion asking that she be appointed
special administrator for the sole purpose of bringing any action which she may believe necessary to recover for
the benefit of the estate, the properties and credits set out in her motion, as well as other properties which might
be discovered from time to time belonging to the estate. It was also denied.

ISSUE:
Does a court have jurisdiction ruling upon on an heir’s inclusion or exclusion of certain properties and credits in
the inventory of an estate?

HELD:
YES. It is the duty of every administrator to return to the court within three months after his appointment a true
inventory of the real estate and all the goods, chattels, right, and credits of the deceased which come into his
possession or knowledge, unless he is residuary legatee and has given the prescribed bond. The court acquires
jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings and
has supervision and control over the said properties. It is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted
by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to set out in his inventory.

The court, therefore, has jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Teresa to the inventory filed by Luisa Garcia, as
well as the observations made by the former as to certain properties and credits, and to determine for purposes
of the inventory alone if they should be included therein or excluded therefrom.

Francisco Cuizon v. Judge Jose Ramolete

G.R. No. L-51291, May 29, 1984

FACTS:
Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land. He distributed his property between his
two children, Rufina and Irene. Part of the property given to Irene consisted largely of salt beds which eventually
became the subject of the case. Irene executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the petitioners who were the children of
Rufina. However, the sale was not registered because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime
usufructuary rights of Irene. An OCT was issued in the name of Marciano Cuizon and was later transferred to
Irene. The latter died. In the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, her alleged half-sister Rufina adjudicated to
herself all the property of the decedent including the property in question. The deed of sale was duly registered
and a TCT was issued in favor of the petitioners.

Respondent Domingo Antigua filed for the administration for the estate of Irene and was granted. He filed an
inventory of the estate of Irene and included in the inventory the property in question which was being
administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. Antigua filed a motion asking the court for authority to sell
the salt from the property and praying that petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator.
The motion was granted. Hence, petitioners were disturbed in their peaceful possession and cultivation of the
property.

ISSUE:
Does a probate court have jurisdiction over owners of parcels of land who are not parties to the intestate
proceedings?

HELD:
NO. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All it could do is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there a dispute, the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.

In the case, the fact that the property was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the
property. Even assuming that the sale was tainted with fraud, these issues may only be threshed out in a
separate civil action filed by the respondent administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate
proceedings.

Teodora Guinguing v. Agapito Abuton

G.R. No. L-23035, October 13, 1925

FACTS:
Ignacio Abuton died testate, 12 children with the 1st marriage and the second wife, petitioner Teodora Guinguing
with 4 children. Gabriel Binaoro was appointed administrator who then submitted an inventory of the
properties. He included only the lands which the testator had devised to the children of the second marriage,
omitting other lands possessed by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the children of the
first marriage as having been derived from their mother. Petitioner Teodora asked the court to order the
administrator to amend his inventory and to include all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
Ignacio Abuton and Dionisia Olarte, including property actually in the hands of his children by her which had
been delivered to said children as an advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force the first set of
children to bring into collation the properties that had been received by them. The court found that no property
had been acquired by the testator during his 2 nd marriage and that the administration was concerned only with
property that had been acquired before the death of the first wife. The court granted the motion.

ISSUE:
Is the inclusion of a property in the inventory deprives the occupant of possession?

HELD:
NO. It should be pointed out, the inclusion of a property in the inventory does not deprive the occupant of
possession; and if it is finally determined that the property has been properly included in the estate, the
occupant heir is liable for the fruits and interest only from the date when the succession was opened as Art.
1049 of the Civil Code provides. The provisions of the Civil Code with reference to collation clearly contemplate
that disputes between heirs with respect to the obligation to collate may be determined in the course of the
administration proceedings.

RULE 84
J.J. Wilson v. M.T. Rear
G.R. No. L-31860, October 16, 1930

FACTS:
J.J. Wilson was qualified as special administrator of the estate of Charles Rear, who was murdered by some
Moros on his plantation at an isolated place in the province of Cotabato. It appears that at the timeof his death,
the only debts against the deceased were one in favor of Sewal Flemming which then amounted to P800, and the
one in favor of JS Alano, and the estate with an appraised value of P20,000 (P15,000 for the plantation and
P5,800 for the personal properties including livestock).
Without any order, process or authority of the court, the administrator continued the operation of the
plantation. Wilson filed a final account, which waslater on amended. It appears from the amended final report
that the administrator received the total amount of P9,519.25 in cash including the sale to Mannion of the real
property (P7,600), and the total amount of cash disbursed by the administrator was P11,328.94, leaving a deficit
or balance due and owing from the estate of P1,809.69. To this amended final account, the heirs made numerous
and specific objections, and after a hearing, the court approved the account as filed. Thus, the heirs of the
deceased appealed

ISSUE:
Was Wilson, as special administrator and administrator neglectful and imprudent and committed waste, thus,
liable?

HELD:
YES. The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in the administration of an estate, but
it does not impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. In the instant
case, there were no complications of any kind and in the usual and ordinary course of business, the
administrator should have wound up and settled the estate within eight months from the date of his
appointment. It is the duty of the administrator of an estate to represent and protect in interests of all interested
persons, including the heirs of the deceased. To entitle the administrator to credit for money paid out in the
course of administration, he should submit and file with the court a corresponding receipt or voucher. Thus, the
administrator is liable for the amount of P3,839.22.

Moises San Diego v. Adelo Nombre

G.R. No. L-19265, May 29, 1964

FACTS:
In a special proceeding, respondent Adelo Nombre was the appointed administrator, and in his capacity as such,
he leased one of fishpond properties of the estate to Pedro Escanlar, respondent. Without previous authority or
approval of the probate court, Nombre was removed as administrator and Sofronio Campillanos substituted
him. Respondent Escanlar was cited for contempt for his refusal to surrender the fishpond. Campillanos filed a
motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond in favor of petitioner Moises San
Diego. Escanlar was not notified of such motion. Nombre opposed to the motion pointing out that the fishpond
had been leased by him to Escanlar and argued that the validity of the lease contract must be recognized unless
so declared void in a separate action.

The lower court nullified the lease contract with Escanlar. However, on appeal to the CA, the contract of lease
between the respondents was declared valid ruling that no such limitation on the power of a judicial
administrator to grant a lease of property placed under his custody is provided for in the present law. Under
Article 1647 of the Civil Code, it is only when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot
be instituted without special authority.

ISSUE:
May a judicial administrator validly lease property of the estate without prior judicial authority and approval?

HELD:
YES. The Rules of Court provides that an executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the
expenses of administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by his will.

A judicial administrator is appointed by the court and a representative of the heirs and creditors of the estate. A
judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true
in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives the principal,
in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru
agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of
the appointing court. Hence, in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease in favor of Escanlar,
notwithstanding the lack of prior authority and approval, the act of Nombre was valid.

Natividad Jaroda v. Judge Vicente Cusi

G.R. No. L-28214, July 30, 1969
FACTS:
Carlos Abrille died intestate, leaving as heirs are his surviving spouse, 9 children including petitioner Natividad
Jaroda, and 4 grandsons including respondent Antonio Tan. The latter filed a petition for the settlement of estate
of Abrille, and hence, he was appointed as special administrator. He filed a petition for the withdrawal of money
from PNB which were not listed in his petition for administration as among the properties left by the deceased,
alleging that these sums actually belong to the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, and alleging that it would be
advantageous to the estate of the deceased. It was granted. Tan was promoted then as regular administrator and
petitioned to the court a SPA for authority to sell the lots as the deceased had been engaged in the business of
selling lots. The court granted the petition. Petitioner Natividad Jaroda moved to nullify the order that allowed
the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the approval of authority to sell lots, but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Was the approval of the SPA proper?

HELD:
NO. The CFI order is void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction. An
administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust
property. This is because of the fiduciary relationship that they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased
and their responsibilities toward the probate court.

By the court’s order, Tan came to be the agent of 2 different principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased
on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the Juna Subdivision on the other, in managing and disposing of
the lots of the subdivision. This dual agency of Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense of the
estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly undesirable and improper that a court
officer and administrator, in dealing with property under his administration, should have to look to the wishes
of strangers, as well as to those of the court, that appointed him. A judicial administrator should be at all times
subject to the orders of the appointing court and of no one else.

Mauro Mananquil v. Atty. Crisostomo Villegas

A.M. No. 2430, August 30, 1990

FACTS:
Respondent Crisostomo Villegas was retained as counsel for Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the late Felomina
Zerna, who was appointed as administrator of the Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna. A lease contract was
executed between Felix Leong and the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" involving sugar lands of the estate. Another lease
contract was executed between Felix Leong and the partnership Hijos de Jose Villegas with Marcelo Pastrano
signing as representative of the lessee. When Pastrano died, respondent was appointed manager of Hijos de Jose
Villegas. Respondent was then replaced by Geronimo Villegas as manager of the family partnership.

The present petition filed by complainant Mauro Mananquil alleges that for a period of 20 years, respondent
allowed lease contracts to be executed between his client Felix Leong and Hijos de Jose Villegas, of which
respondent is one of the partners, without the approval of the probate court and in violation of Articles 1491
and 1646 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Did respondent act in good faith when he renewed the lease contracts as a counsel of Leong and as a partner of
Hijos de Jose Villegas?

HELD:
NO. The prohibition referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the Civil Code, as far as lawyers are concerned, is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary and confidential
association. The rule that the claim of good faith is no defense to a lawyer who has failed to adhere faithfully to
the legal disqualifications imposed upon him, designed to protect the interests of his client.

There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although Villegas should be suspended from practice of law
because he participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involving the properties of Zerna's estate in favor
of Hijos de Villegas. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code, "lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which
may be the object of litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession" are prohibited from
leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned. Such act
constituted gross misconduct, hence, suspension for 4 months.

RULE 85
Felicisimo Joson v. Eduardo Joson
G.R. No. L-9686, May 30, 1961

FACTS:
Tomas Joson died testate leaving behind heirs and properties. His will was presented by his son Felicisimo
Joson, petitioner, for probate and was later appointed administrator. He then filed an inventory of the properties
left by the deceased for 3 years but without approval of the court. In the 3 rd year, he was ordered to file an
accounting under his administration. Respondent Eduardo Joson filed an opposition to all the accounts filed
alleging that the administrator diminished the shares of the heirs in the yearly produce of the properties and
had padded his expenses of administration. Petitioner submitted an amended statement of accounts which were
objected by the heirs on the ground that the he had an inaccurate income of what was actually received and
expenses were much higher than those actually incurred by him.

In the meantime, the heirs were able to compromise and entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition
of the entire estate. But as the court was never informed either by petitioner or heirs, it issued an order
requiring the administrator to file an accounting of his administration which administrator complied with by
submitting an amended statement of his accounts as already mentioned. However, without said accounts having
been heard or approved, petitioner filed a motion to declare the proceedings closed and terminated and to
relieve him of his duties. The motion was granted, as well as his accounts, holding that if the parties have already
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the same should put an end to this proceeding. Once this
proceeding is terminated, the incidents such as the accounting of the administrator must also yield, since the
only purpose of submitting a report of the accounts is to facilitate the liquidation. The administration of an
estate cannot be an end but only a means of settlement of the estate

ISSUES:
a. Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his administration a mere incident which can
be avoided once the estate has been settled?
b. Is the administrator relieved of his duty of proving his account from the moment said partition has
been executed?

HELD:
a. NO. Under Section 8-10, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, it charges an administrator "with the whole of
the estate of the deceased which has come into his possession at the value of appraisement contained
in the inventory; it imposes upon him the duty to render an account of his administration within one
year from his appointment, unless the court otherwise directs, as well as to render such further
accounts as the court may require until the estate is fully settled. Also, before an account of the
administrator is allowed, notice shall be given to all persons interested of the time and place of
examining and allowing the same. Finally, it directs that the court shall examine the administrator
upon oath with respect to every matter relating to his account except when no objection is made to the
allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily established by competent testimony.

Hence, the duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration
proceeding which can be waived or disregarded when the same is terminated, but that it is a duty that
has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered
closed and terminated.

b. NO. Petitioner has submitted his accounts for several years upon requirement of the court, to which
accounts the heirs have seasonably submitted their opposition. And when the administrator moved the
court to close the proceedings and relieve him of his administration and of his accounts, the heirs again
objected invoking their right to be heard but the court ignored their opposition and granted the motion
which was contrary to the Rules.

The fact that the heirs have entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition cannot be
interpreted as a waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the administrator
because there is nothing provided in said partition that the accounts shall be deemed waived or
condoned. While the attitude of the heirs in concluding said extrajudicial settlement is plausible and
 has contributed to the early settlement of the estate, the same cannot however be considered as
release of the obligation of the administrator to prove his accounts. This is more so when the
administrator has committed in his accounts a shortage in the amount of income which cannot just be
brushed aside by a mere technicality.

Magdalena Tumang v. Guia Laguio

G.R. No. L-50277, February 14, 1980

FACTS:
In the special proceeding for the settlement of estate of Dominador Tumang, the petitioner-widow Magdalena
Tumang, as administratrix filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings terminated and closed with respect
to herself and her children premised on the fact that they had already acknowledged receipt of the properties
adjudicated to them, and in order for such properties to be transferred in their names, there was need for an
order of the court declaring the proceedings closed. The petition was opposed by respondent Guia Laguio on the
ground that Tumang had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them. Thereafter, Tumang withdrew the
petition. During the hearing of the motion to withdraw, Tumang, as required by the court, filed a pleading
captioned "Compliance", alleging that the estate and inheritance taxes had been fully paid and no claim has been
presented that there was no delivery of the properties and dividends of the shares of stock adjudicated to
respondent since the approval of the original and amendatory projects of partition, hence, the court no longer
has jurisdiction to entertain the motion under consideration.

The court, on denying the opposition of the respondents, held that the receipt of the cash dividends without first
requiring petitioner’s accounting for purposes of determining the correctness of the cash dividends, constituted
a waiver to question its correctness.

ISSUE:
Is it required for the executrix to render an accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the
approval of her final accounts?

HELD:
YES. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an account of his
administration within 1 year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration x x x and he
shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled. The duty of an
executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which
can be waived or disregarded. It is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the
administration is finally ordered closed and terminated, to the end that no part of the decedent's estate be left
unaccounted for.

In the case, further accounts in view of the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final
accounts rendered by the executrix. It has been held that an executor or administrator who receives assets of the
estate after he has filed an account, should file a supplementary account, and may be compelled to do so, but
only with matters occurring after the settlement of final account that representatives will be compelled to file
supplementary account." It is only in a case where the petition to compel an executor to account after he has
accounted and has been discharged fails to allege that any further sums came into the hands of the executor, and
the executor specifically denies the receipt of any further sums that the accounting should be denied.

Petitioner received funds of the estate after the approval of her final accounts and before the issuance of an
order finally closing the proceedings. She must, therefore, account for the same, in consonance with her duty to
account for all the assets of the decedent's estate which have come into her possession by virtue of her office.

Victorio Rodriguez v. Pablo Silva

G.R. No. L-4090, January 31, 1952

FACTS:
The cancellation of the bond of Pablo Silva who had resigned as joint administrator of the intestate estate of
Honofre Leyson and P600 as compensation for his services was granted by the court. The petitioners, as
remaining administrator and an heir, opposed to the order for being contrary to Section 7, Rule 86. Also,
granting respondent’s resignation, he secured the cancellation of the TCTs issued in the name of Honofre
Leyson, and transferred it in his name.
ISSUE:
May the court fix an administrator's or executor's fee, in excess of the fees prescribed by Section 7 of Rule 86?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, a greater sum may be allowed "in any special case, where the
estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of
capacity on the part of the executor or administrator." And so it has been held that "the amount of an executor's
fee allowed by the lower court in any special case under the provisions of Section 680 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, is a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on appeal,
except for an abuse of discretion."

Although being a lawyer is by itself not a factor in the assessment of an administrator's fee, it should be
otherwise as in this case, the administrator was able to stop what appeared to be an improvident disbursement
of a substantial amount without having to employ outside legal help at an additional expense to estate. The
respondent having announced that no questions of fact would be discussed is estopped from contesting the
allegations. On the basis of the services specified, coupled with the fact that the Silva worked as co-
administrator, the probate court committed an abuse of discretion in granting him P600.00 or P700.00, as fee
independent of the fee that might be allowed the other administrator.

The Philippine Trust v. Luzon Surety

G.R. No. L-13031, May 30, 1961

FACTS:
CFI Manila appointed Francis Picard as administrator of the intestate estate of James Burt upon a bond of P1,000
which he submitted and the Court approved, with respondent Luzon Surety as his surety. However, the Court
dismissed Picard as administrator and appointed petitioner Phil. Trust. The latter submitted an inventory that
the only asset of the estate was P57.75 representing the balance of the checking account with PNB. A review of
the case reveals that Picard found the amount of P8,873.73 and was reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting his
expenses in the amount of P887.22 and P865.20, thereby leaving P7,121.33. The Court then ordered Picard to
pay the difference of P7,063.58 to the petitioner.

Picard submitted an itemized statement of disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate, showing
that he reported to the Court additional expenses of the estate to defray the burial expenses and delivery of
allowances to Feliciano Burt, adoptive son of the deceased. However, the Court still found Picard guilty of having
disbursed funds of the estate without authority, hence a charge for estafa. He was then convicted and held civilly
liable. The Court then issued a show cause order upon respondent Luzon Surety why the administrator's bond of
Picard would not be confiscated. It moved to set aside the order on the ground that the Court cannot order the
confiscation of the administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate and
that "a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the probate bond.

ISSUE:
May a court confiscate and prosecute a bond motu proprio?

HELD:
YES. Jurisprudence provides that probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring
but also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of
an administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings as much
as its filing and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have said bond
executed in the same probate proceeding.

Moreover, the condition of the administrator's bond is that Picard shall faithfully execute the orders and decrees
of the court; that if he did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect.
In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the estate without authority, the conclusion follows
that he had and his surety became bound upon the terms of their bond. Also, In De Mendoza v. Pacheco, the
sureties on the administrator's bond were held liable although they were not parties to the proceeding against
the administrator, nor were they notified prior to the issuance of the confiscation of the bond since Section 11,
Rule 86 imports that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of
the accounts of the executor or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time.

Quasha, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco Law Office v. LCN Construction

 G.R. No. 174873, August 26, 2008

FACTS:
A settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere was instituted by his widow, Amy Triviere. Atty. Enrique Syquia
and Atty. William Quasha, representing the widow and children were appointed administrators. They incurred
expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the
estate, as well as litigation expenses. They then filed a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing
their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC
denied their motion. They again filed another motion for payment on the ground that Syquia, who is a lawyer, is
entitled to additional Administrator's fees under Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court. LCN opposed the
motion stating the failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate
and an agreement of only 5% of the gross estate shall be the compensation of the administrators. Also, Section 7,
Rule 85 of the Rules of Court was inapplicable, since the administrators failed to establish that the estate was
large, or that its settlement was attended with great difficulty, or required a high degree of capacity on the part
of the administrators. The second motion of petitioners was granted.

On appeal to CA, they favoured the respondent holding that, while petitioner was entitled to administrator's fees
and litigation expenses, they could not claim the same from the funds of the estate on a qualification that where
the executor or administrator is a lawyer, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal
services rendered by him. Instead, the attorney's fees should be borne by their clients, the widow and children of
the Raymond Triviere.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner law firm entitled to attorney's fees and that of the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 85?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 7, Rule 85, compensation provided by will controls unless renounced x x x When the executor
or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services
rendered by him. In attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents
conflicting arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one point, it alleges that the
award of attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the estate; yet, it would later renounce that it was
an administrator.

Petitioner Quasha Law Office asserts that it is not within the purview of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court
since it is not an appointed administrator of the estate. When Atty. Quasha passed away, Atty. Syquia was left as
the sole administrator of the estate. The person of Atty. Quasha was distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law
Office; and the appointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of the estate did not extend to his law office.
Neither could petitioner Quasha Law Office be deemed to have substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator for the
same would be in violation of the rules on the appointment and substitution of estate administrators under
Section 2, Rule 82. Hence, when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office merely helped in the settlement
of the estate as counsel. The records of the case are also wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its
lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate.

Carlos Sison v. Narcisa Teodoro

G.R. No. L-9271, March 29, 1957

FACTS:
Petitioner Carlos Sison was appointed by the court as administrator over the estate of the late Margarita David.
Upon taking oath and putting up the bond, letters of administration were issued to him. He then filed an
accounting of his administration which included renewal premiums on the Administrator's bond. Respondent
Narcisa Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected to the approval of the said premiums on grounds that they are not
necessary expenses of administration and should not be charged against the estate. However, the court
approved the report of the administrator but disallowed said premiums on the ground that they cannot be
considered as expenses of administration.

ISSUE:
Is an administrator, without any compensation, entitled to charge as an expense of administration the premiums
paid on his bond?

HELD:
NO. Section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure, similar to Section 7, Rule 86, does not authorize the executor or
administrator to charge against the estate the money spent for the presentation, filing, and substitution of a
bond." There is nothing in the decision that may justify the conclusion that the allowance or disallowance of
premiums paid on the bond of the administrator is made dependent on the receipt of compensation.

“If an individual does not desire to assume the position of executor or administrator, he may refuse to do so,"
and it is far-fetched to conclude that the giving of a bond by an administrator is an necessary expense in the care,
management and settlement of the estate within the meaning of the law, because these expenses are incurred
"after the executor or administrator has met the requirement of the law and has entered upon the performance
of his duties." Of course, a person may accept the position of executor or administrator with the entire incident
appertaining thereto, having in mind the compensation which the law allows for the purpose, but he may waive
this compensation in the same manner as he may refuse to serve without it. Appellant having waived
compensation, he cannot now be heard to complain of the expenses incident to his qualification.

Teoderico Tioco v. Judge Carlos Imperial

G.R. No. L-29414, July 17, 1928

FACTS:
Respondent Alejandro Panis was counsel for the administration of estate of the deceased Basilisa Yangco. Before
the final settlement of accounts, he presented a motion for the allowance of attorney's fees which the
respondent judge granted. The administrator, petitioner Teoderico Tioco did not appeal from the order of the
court, but Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem of the minor sons and the only heirs of the deceased, filed a MR
on the ground that the fees allowed to Panis were excessive and prejudicial to the interest of the estate; and that
considering the nature of the work performed, the services rendered with him did not warrant the payment of
the sum claimed. This motion was denied.

The guardian ad litem excepted from the order, gave notice of his intention to appeal to the SC to restrain the
respondent judge from compelling the petitioner to pay Alejandro Panis out of the funds of the estate.

ISSUE:
May attorney’s fees be paid out of the funds of the estate?

HELD:
NO. There is a misconception of the character of the liability for the attorney's fees which have been rendered to
the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney cannot hold the estate
directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The
liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate
and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his
accounts and the reimbursement settled upon the notice prescribed in Section 682 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

For the reasons stated, the respondent judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing the payment of the attorney's
fees until the appeal taken by Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has been
passed upon by this court or dismissed.

RULE 86
Marian Afan v. Apolinario de Guzman
G.R. No. L-14713, April 28, 1960

FACTS:
Respondent Apolinario de Guzman filed a claim against the intestate estate of Arsenio Afan as set forth in a
promissory note then issued by Afan. Petitioner Marian Afan, administratrix, objected to the consideration of the
claim upon the ground, among others, that it had been filed long after the expiration of the period for the
presentation of claims against said estate. Hence, the court denied his claim. On appeal, respondent invoked
Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court stating that at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for
cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claims to be filed within a time not exceeding 1
month. Relying upon this provision, De Guzman maintains that the lower court should have entertained his
claim, the same having been filed prior to the distribution of the estate of the deceased.
ISSUE:
May the creditor file his claim before an order of distribution?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 2, Rule 86, the 2nd sentence gives the court with authority to permit the filing of a claim after
the lapse of the period stated in the 1st sentence, but prior to and distribution, subject to the following
conditions, namely: (1) there must be tin application therefor; (2) a cause must be shown why the permission
should be granted; and (3) the extension of time granted for the filing of the claim shall not exceed 1 month.

De Guzman has not sought permission to file the claim and does not allege any reason why he should be excused
for his failure to file the claim in this proceeding within the period stated. Whether or not the reasons given —
and none were set forth in De Guzman's claim — are sufficient, rests upon the discretion of the court, and the
record does not show that the lower court has abused its discretion.

Heirs of Ramon Pizarro v. Judge Francisco Consolacion

G.R. No. L-51278, May 9, 1988

FACTS:
Private respondent Luis Tan filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Alfonso
Atilano. He alleged that he is the only surviving son of the deceased Dominga Garcia who died intestate where
she left a parcel of land which is in the possession of the petitioner Heirs of Ramon Pizarro. Petitioners opposed
said petition claiming that the deceased was the vendee of ½ of the lot. The parties then came into a compromise
where petitioners agreed to withdraw their opposition to the appointment of Tan’s nominee and for the
intestate proceedings to proceed in due course. The court then issued an order requiring the filing of creditors'
claim against the said estate within the period of 6 months from the date of the first publication and a copy was
received by petitioners through counsel.

Meanwhile, Tan and the City of Davao filed a joint motion asking the court to take notice of their agreement and
to proceed with the determination of the heirs of Garcia which shall be determinative of their respective claims
against the estate. Petitioners filed their opposition. The court issued an order taking note of the agreement
between Tan and the City of Davao. Tan moved to drop and exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do
not even claim to be the heirs of the deceased. Petitioner opposed it and likewise filed a claim against the estate
of Garcia. Tan moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that it is barred for having been filed beyond the 6-
month period for the filing of creditors' claim. The lower court dismissed the claims of the petitioners on the
ground that they are barred for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners barred from filing their claims?

HELD:
NO. Section 2, Rule 86 provides that the probate court is permitted to set the period, provided it is not less than
6 months or more than 12 months from the date of the 1st publication of the notice. Such period, once fixed by
the court, is mandatory. The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be
presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the
property to the person entitled to the same.

In the present case, the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within 6 months from the date of the
1st publication of the notice. It was obviously short of the minimum limit of 6 months provided for by the law.
The 1st publication of the notice was on March 30, 1978. Thus, the claims of petitioners against the estate which
were filed both on March 1979 and were filed on time.

Ricardo Gutierrez v. Lucia Barretto-Datu

G.R. No. L-17175, July 31, 1962

FACTS:
Maria Gerardo, owner of fishpond lands, leased the same to petitioner Ricardo Gutierrez. Pursuant to a decision
of DPWH, the dikes of the fishponds were opened at several points, resulting in their destruction and in the loss
great quantities of fish inside, to the damage and prejudice of the lessee. Lessor died and testate proceedings
were initiated. Gutierrez filed his claims, (1) for a sum representing advance rentals he had to the decedent since
the possession pf the fishponds have been returned to her after the open of the dikes ordered by the
government; and (2) damages for the profits which the claimant failed to realize because of the breach of the
lease contract. Petitioner commenced the civil action against the respondent executrix of the estate for the
recovery of the amounts. However, the court dismissed the action for abandonment. The MR was also denied on
the ground that the claim should have been prosecuted in the testate proceeding and not by ordinary civil
action.

ISSUE:
May the claim for damages a money claim against the estate within the purview of Section 5, Rule 86?

HELD:
NO. The word "claims" is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have
been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and
among these are those founded upon contract. The claim in this case is based on contract — specifically, on a
breach. It falls squarely under Section 5 of Rule 87 where "upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his
lifetime, even though they were personal to the decedent in liability, the personal representative is answerable
for the breach out of the assets."

The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or administrator are those to recover real or
personal property from the estate, or to enforce a lien, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal. While the contract was with the decedent, its violation was by the executrix and
hence, personal to her. Besides, the claim was for indemnity in the form of a certain quantity of palay every year
for the unexpired portion of the term of the contract. The denial of the claim was affirmed by this Court on the
grounds that it was not a money claim and that it arose after the decedent's demise, placing it outside the scope
of Rule 86, Section 5.

Maria Aguas v. Hermogenes Llemos

G.R. No. L-18107, August 30, 1962

FACTS:
Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action to recover damages
from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition
for a writ of possession; that in view of the copy and notice served, they discovered that no such petition had
been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and
trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment. Before respondent
could answer the complaint, the defendant died and plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs of
the deceased. The respondent heirs moved to dismiss and was granted on the ground that the action, being for
recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein.

ISSUE:
May the petitioners file their claim as money claims under Section 5, Rule 86?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 5, Rule 86, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those
for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract express or implied".

None of these includes that of the petitioner’s for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for
money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied", and these words were construed to include all
purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. However, in Section 1,
Rule 87, it enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1)
actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3)
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the
last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends
to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur
unnecessary expenses is certainly injurious to that party's property.

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Concepcion E Hijos

G.R. No. L-27701, July 21, 1928

FACTS:
Respondent Concepcion executed a PN in favor of petitioner BPI, payable on demand and as security for
payment, deposited 700 shares of PNB as collateral with the plaintiff and gave it a mortgage on a parcel land,
with improvements. Respondent defaulted in payment so foreclosure proceedings were instituted. Elser entered
into negotiations with the Concepcions and offered to take over the mortgaged property and assume the
mortgage debt. To this, the Concepcions agreed on the condition that they be relieved of all liability for the debt.
Elser wrote the bank informing it of the agreement with the Concepcions but the bank did not reply. It appeared
that it was unwilling to release the Concepcions from their liability for the mortgage debt and insisted on their
confessing a judgment in the foreclosure proceedings. Concepcions refused to do, unless the bank would agree
to bid in the mortgage property for the full amount of the judgment.

Elser wrote to the bank again with the understanding that the bank would bid in the land at the foreclosure sale
for the full amount of the judgment and sell it to him for the same price. No direct reply was given and Elser
invited BPI to a conference with Nolting, the president of the bank, in regard to the matter. The negotiations did
not lead to any action on the part of the bank, but, Elser entered into an agreement in the form of bilateral deed
of sale, with V. Concepcion & Hijos, Inc., and Venancio Concepcion. The bank never gave notice of its conformity
with the agreement. It petitioned the court to include Henry Elseras, defendant in the complaint, on the strength
of the obligations assumed by him in said agreement. Elser died and BPI asked that the administrator of the
estate, C. W. Rosenstock, be substituted in his place as defendants, and that the action be continued against
Rosenstock in the capacity on the ground that this action is for the foreclosure of a mortgage.

ISSUE:
May BPI, having failed to present its claim, be regarded as having elected to rely on its mortgage alone?

HELD:
YES. According to Section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the mortgagee has the election of one out of three
courses: (1) He may abandon his security and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) He
may foreclose, secure a deficiency judgment and prove his deficiency judgment before the committee; or (3) He
may rely upon his security alone, in which case he can receive no share in the distribution of the assets of the
estate.

In this case, BPI did not abandon the security and took no steps of any sort before the committee within the time
limit provided by the sections 689 and 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The committee ceased to function
long ago, and the bank has now nothing to rely on except the mortgage. Internationally or not, it has bought
itself within the third course provided for in section 708; it has no alternative.

The Imperial Insurance v. Emilia David

G.R. No. L-32425, November 21, 1984

FACTS:
Petitioner Imperial Insurance filed the first 2 causes of action involving indemnity agreements which
respondent Emilia David and Felicisimo Reyes, jointly and severally, executed for and in consideration of 2
surety bonds underwritten by it to lift the lift the writs of attachment in 2 civil cases. The 3rd cause of action
involves accrued premiums and documentary stamps for 4 years also underwritten by respondent. Felicisimo
died and a special proceeding for settlement of estate was commenced. Emilia became administratrix of said
estate and notices to creditors were issued and published.

Meanwhile, judgment was rendered in the 2 civil cases which has become final and executory. As a consequence,
judgment was rendered against the surety bonds. Petitioner made demands on Emilia to pay the amounts under
the surety bonds and arrears in premiums. When she failed to make payments, petitioner then filed a civil case
for collection of sums of money under 3 causes of action. Emilia moved to dismiss on the ground that the
petitioner's causes of action have been barred for its failure to file its claims against the estate in due time.

ISSUE:
Was the petitioner barred from filing its claims against the estate?

HELD:
NO. Jurisprudence provides that when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action against
any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in
case of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her husband’s; she may be sued for the whole
debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be
made in the decedent's estate.

In the case, appellant signed a joint and several obligation with her husband. As a consequence, the latter may
demand from either of them the whole obligation. As distinguished from a joint obligation where each of the
debtor is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt and the creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part
of the credit, in a solidary obligation the creditor may enforce the entire obligation against one of the debtors.

Stronghold Insurance Co. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corp.

G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006

FACTS:
Respondent Republic-Asahi Glass Corp. entered into a contract with Jose Santos, the proprietor of JDS
Construction, for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in Asahi’s compound. Asahi was to pay
P5.3M for the construction, which was supposed to be completed by JDS within 240 days. To guarantee the
faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings, JDS shall post a performance bond executed solidarily
with petitioner Stronghold Insurance the performance bond.

During the construction, Asahi called JDS’ attention for the slow pace of construction, which feared that the
construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240 days. Reminders from Asahi went unheeded.
Dissatisfied, Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract and hired another contractor to finish the project. Asahi
sent a letter to petitioner filing its claim under the performance bond, but it went unheeded. Asahi eventually
filed a complaint against JDS and petitioner for damages. However, Jose Santos had already died and JDS was no
longer at its registered address. Petitioner opposed the action on the ground that Asahi’s money claims against it
and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal. Even if this were not the case, petitioner
had been released from its liability under the performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the
active participation and involvement of petitioner and Jose Santos.

ISSUE:
May the claims filed by respondent be filed against JDS and petitioner?

HELD:
YES. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a
contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is
extinguished is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent
were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in
the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a
defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently,
petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Absolute Management Corp.

G.R. No. 170498, January 9, 2013

FACTS:
Sherwood Holdings Corp filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent Absolute Management Corp.,
alleging that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of plywood and plyboards covered by
Metrobank checks made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General Manager, but Chua died and a
special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced. SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s
death, for allegedly undelivered items. AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chua’s transactions with SHCI
and it did not receive any money from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the
subject checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.

Metrobank moved to dismiss the case against AMC on the ground that the latter engaged in prohibited forum
shopping since AMC’s claim against it is the same claim that it raised against Chua’s estate proceedings.
Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate alleging
that Chua’s estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed
against it by AMC.

ISSUES:
 a. Are quasi-contracts included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court?
b. May Metrobank file its claim against Chua’s estate thru a fourth-party complaint?

HELD:
a. YES. Jurisprudence provides that the term "implied contracts" originated from the common law where
obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus,
the term quasi-contract is included in the concept "implied contracts" as used in the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the
settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Both lower court described Metrobank’s claim against Chua’s estate as one based on quasi-contract.
Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls under the quasi-contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of the
Civil Code which embodies the concept "solutio indebiti" which arises when something is delivered
through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has
been received through mistake. In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chua’s estate
should reimburse it if it becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and
Hardware’s account upon Chua’s instructions. However, the appropriate trial court should still
determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim against Chua’s estate based on quasi-contract.

b. NO. A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or
may not happen. Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions
while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against the estate. The specific provisions
of Section 5, Rule 86 must therefore prevail.

Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is
also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims against a
deceased person that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 and, as such, should have been so filed in
the estate proceedings.

Isidro Santos v. Leandra Manarang

G.R. No. L-8235, March 19, 1914

FACTS:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died who possessed real and personal property which, by his will, he left to his three
children. The 4th clause of the will reads: “I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is
my desire that they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon
with my creditors.” Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are in favor of petitioner Isidro Santos.
The will was duly probated and a committee was appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate
as might be presented. The committee submitted its report to the court.

Petitioner then presented a petition to pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will
of testator and he states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it
was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and
directed that they should be paid. However, the petition was denied by the court.

ISSUE:
May the claim of petitioner against the estate be entertained by the committee?

HELD:
NO. Section 686 empowers the committee to try and decide claims which survive against the executors and
administrators, even though they be demandable at a future day "except claims for the possession of or title to
real estate." Section 700 provides that all actions commenced against the deceased person for the recovery of
money, debt, or damages, pending at the time the committee is appointed, shall be discontinued, and the claims
embraced within such actions presented to the committee. In Section 690, on application of a creditor who has
failed to present his claim, if made within 6 months after the time previously limited, or, if a committee fails to
give the notice required by this chapter, and such application is made before the final settlement of the estate,
the court may, for cause shown, renew the commission and allow further time, not exceeding 1 month, for the
committee to examine such claim.

If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for further
consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was submitted to the court.
But this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did give the notice required by law. Where the
proper notice has been given, the right to have the committee recalled for the consideration of a belated claim
appears to rest first upon the condition that it is presented within 6 months after the time previously limited for
the presentation of claims. In the present case, the time previously limited was 6 months from July 23, 1907.
This allowed the plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of this
time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the court. When petitioner discovered his mistake and now
seeks to assert his right, they have been lost through his own negligence.

Estate of Amadeo Olave v. Judge Manases Reyes

G.R. No. L-29407, July 29, 1983

FACTS:
The estate of Amadeo Olave is the owner of a parcel of land. Private respondent Southwest Agricultural
Marketing Corp. filed a civil case against respondents Carlos Matute and Matias Matute, in their capacities as co-
administrators of said estate, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness and attorney's fees. CFI Manila issued
an order directing the administrators to secure the probate court's approval before entering into any
transaction involving the 17 titles of the estate. The parties the submitted to the respondent court an Amicable
Settlement whereby the property of the estate was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim; that
the said Amicable Settlement signed by the respondents was not submitted to and approved by the CFI Manila.
Respondent SAMCO contend that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court, "the same
having been entered into in another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank. In the alternative,
lack of approval of the probate court of the Amicable Settlement does not render it null and void, but at most
voidable, which must be the subject matter of a direct proceeding in the proper court.

ISSUE:
Is the amicable settlement valid despite absence of CFI Manila’s approval as probate court?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or
debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;" The claim of private
respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the
administration proceedings in CFI Manila for the settlement of the estate of the deceased; and the claim must be
filed within the period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever" under Section 5, Rule
86, Rules of Court. The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is
to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the EXECAD will be able to examine each claim and
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions
requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that
a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of
the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all
of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased.

It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent in filing the civil case in CFI Davao was to secure a money
judgment against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than 29 hectares of
land belonging to the estate of Olave in payment of its claim, without prior authority of CFI Manila which has the
exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Olave. It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due
course to the civil case, much less in approving the Amicable Settlement.

Salonga, Hernandez, & Allado Law Firm v. Olivia Pascual

G.R. No. 127165, May 2, 2006

FACTS:
Doña Adela died leaving behind a will designating Olivia Pascual as the executrix, as well as principal beneficiary
of her estate. The will also bequeathed several legacies and devises to several individuals and institutions. Olivia
Pascual then engaged the services of petitioner law firm in connection with the settlement of the estate of Doña
Adela. Their agreement as to the professional fees due to petitioner is contained in a letter signed by Atty.
Esteban Salonga stipulating that the final professional fee "shall be 3% of the total gross estate as well as the
fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of the estate. The 3% final fee shall be payable upon
approval by the court of the agreement for the distribution of the properties to the court designated heirs of the
estate."

Private respondent commenced a petition for the probate of the will. The court allowed probate of the will and
etters testamentary were issued to Olivia Pascual. Petitioner moved to annotate Attorney's Lien on properties of
the Estate of Doña Adela and a Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of petitioner's attorney's
lie, which was denied. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May the petitioner hold the attorney’s fees as claims against the estate?

HELD:
YES. As a general rule, it is the EXECAD who is primarily liable for attorney’s fees due to the lawyer who
rendered legal services for the EXECAD in relation to the settlement of the estate. However, if EXECAD refuses to
pay, the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against EXECAD, but in his/her
personal capacity and not as EXECAD. Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate
proceedings, asking the court to direct the payment of attorney’s fees as an expense of administration. If the
second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and interested parties be made so as to
enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his
employment.

The fact that the prayer for attorney’s fees was cast in a motion and not a petition should not impede such claim,
considering that the motion was nonetheless filed with the Probate Court. However, the record bears that the
requisite notice to all heirs and interested parties has not been satisfied. Such notice is material to the other
heirs to Doña Adela’s estate. The payment of attorney’s fees, especially in the amount of 3% of the total gross
estate as sought for by petitioner, substantially diminishes the estate of Doña Adela and may consequently cause
the diminution of their devises and legacies. Since these persons were so named in the very will itself and the
action for probate which was filed by petitioner itself, there is no reason why petitioner could not have given
due notice to these persons on its claim for attorney’s fees.

The second or alternative recourse is the direct claim for attorney’s fees against the estate, as authorized under
Escueta. The character of this claim is not contractual in nature, but rather, as a reimbursement for a necessary
expense of administration, and it will be allowed if it satisfies the criteria for necessary expenses of
administration. Its entitlement can be established by the actual services rendered by the lawyer necessary to the
accomplishment of the purposes of administration, and not necessarily by the contract of engagement of the
attorneys services.

RULE 87
Heirs of Rafael Gregoire v. Albert Baker
G.R. No. L-27486, November 18, 1927

FACTS:
J. H. Ankrom died and respondent A. L. Baker was qualified as his administrator. He filed his inventory of the
assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent which included a tract of land with improvements thereon.
Petitioner Heirs of Rafael Gregoire filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom based upon a judgment rendered in
SC of the Republic of Panama. This claim was allowed by the commissioners and no appeal was taken. As the
affairs of the estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be sufficient assets to pay all claimants.

However, Baker made a discovery that before Ankrom’s death, he had executed a mortgage on said property in
favor of the Philippine Trust Company to secure that company from liability upon which it had made itself
contigently liable. Two days after the mortgage had been executed Ankrom made an assignment of all his
interest in the mortgaged property to J.G. Jung. In view of these conveyances, Baker presented an amended
inventory, omitting the land. The court, however, having its attention called to the fact that the omission of this
property from the inventory would leave the estate insolvent, made an order directing Baker to restore said
item to his inventory. Nevertheless, the removal was later approved and such approval is now being questioned.
ISSUE:
May the creditors claim the deficiency despite the approval of the omission of the property in the inventory?

HELD:
YES. In Section 713 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an
executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person made in his lifetime such
fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, any creditor of the estate
may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced such action, commence and
prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same
and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed.
But such action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be
approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against the costs of such action.
Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such other
expenses as the court deems equitable.

The remedy of the petitioners is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to
institute an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to
have been made in fraud of creditors. Orders made by a court with reference to the inclusion of items of
property in the inventory or the exclusion of items are purely discretionary, provisional, and interlocutory
nature and are subject to modification or change at any time during the course of the administration
proceedings. Such order in question not final in the sense necessary to make it appealable.

Sinforoso Pascual v. Ponciano Pascual

G.R. No. L-48140, May 4, 1942

FACTS:
While the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda de los Santos were pending in CFI
Rizal, petitioner Sinforoso Pascual instituted in CFI Pampanga an action for the annulment of a contract of sale of
a fishpond in Pampanga, supposedly executed without consideration by said deceased in favor of respondents
Ponciano Pascual. The latter moved to dismiss which the trial court granted on the ground that the action should
have been brought by the EXECAD. Petitioner filed an amended complaint stating that Miguel Pascual has been
appointed by CFI Rizal as executor of the estate of the deceased, but the lower court declared that such
amendment did not cure the insufficiency of the complaint and dismissed the action.

ISSUE:
May the heirs file an action o recover the estate property?

HELD:
YES. Under the Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased for
causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his EXECAD. Upon the commencement of proceedings,
the heirs have no standing in court except when the EXECAD is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event
to heirs may act in his place.

In the case, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to the respondents, Miguel Pascual, being the
executor appointed by the probate court. Such executor naturally would not bring an action against himself for
recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case under the
exception. It should be noted that in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond be delivered not to the plaintiff
but to the executor, thus indicating that the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased. Since the
sale is alleged to be fictitious, with absolutely no consideration, it should be regarded as non-existent and there
being no contract, there is nothing to annul by action. The action brought cannot thus be for annulment of
contract, but is one for recovery of a fishpond, a real action that should be brought in Pampanga, where the
property is located.

Maria Velasquez v. William George

G.R. No. L-62376, October 27, 1983

FACTS:
The petitioners are the widow and legitimate children of the late Benjamin George. In their complaint, they
alleged that the respondents-mortgagors are officers of the Island Associates and was also appointed as
administrator of the estate. Without the approval of the probate court and without notice to the heirs,
respondents executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of respondent Erlinda Villanueva. Subsequently, a
SPA was executed by respondents in favor of Villanueva, whereby the latter was given the full power and
authority to cede, transfer, and convey the parcels of land within the reglementary period provided by law for
redemption. This led to the execution of a Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership where 3
parcels of land, were cancelled and new TCTs were issued in favor of Villanueva.

The petitioners therefore, filed the complaint for the annulment of the REM and the TCTs. Respondents moved
to dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case as the subject matter of the
complaint referred to the corporate acts of the Board of Directors of Island Associates, and, therefore, falls
within the jurisdiction of SEC. Villanueva further contends that petitioners have no capacity to file the complaint
as Section 3, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court states that only the EXECAD may bring actions of such nature as the
one in the case at bar. The only exception is when EXECAD is unwilling or fails or refuses to act.

ISSUE:
May the heirs file a complaint for the recovery of the estate property?

HELD:
YES. The administrator, Andres Muñoz, is the same person charged by petitioners to have voted in the board of
directors without securing the proper authority from the probate court to which he is accountable as
administrator. In Ramirez v. Baltazar, since the ground for the present action to annul the foreclosure
proceedings is the fraud resulting from insidious machinations and collusion in which the administrator has
allegedly participated, it would be far-fetched to expect the administrator to file the action in behalf of the estate.
Inevitably, the case should fall under the exception since the heirs are the ones left to have an interest in
protecting the estate.

Teodora Rioferio v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004

FACTS:
Alfonso Orfinada died intestate leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent
Esperanza Orfinada and 7 children, and the petitioners who are his paramour and their children, Teodora
Riofero. Respondents discovered that petitioners executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent and accordingly, the Registry of
Deeds in Dagupan issued TCTs in favor of petitioners. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to
obtain a loan from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan by executing a REM over the properties subject of the
extrajudicial settlement. Respondents filed a Petition for Letters of Administration praying it be issued to them.
They also filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, REM, and
Cancellation of TCTs against petitioners. The latter answered interposing the defense that the property subject
of the settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero. Petitioners
also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of
Alfonso Orfinada. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. They filed a Motion to Set
Affirmative Defenses for Hearing bu was denied on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-
in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed.

ISSUE:
May the heirs bring suit to recover estate property pending the appointment of an administrator?

HELD:
YES. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations
to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by
his will or by operation of law. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may
still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total
lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court. Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions:
(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is
alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party defendant.

The necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is
no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either
disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself. Therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal
standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has
three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.

Cirilo Modesta v. Jesus Modesto

G.R. No. L-11801, June 30, 1959

FACTS:
Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs including parties herein. During the intestate proceedings, Jesus
Modesto, acting as administrator moved to cite and examine under oath several persons, especially petitioner
Cirilo Modesto, regarding properties concealed, embezzled or fraudulently conveyed. Joint commissioners were
appointed to verify and ascertain persons who were holding, claiming or possessing properties belonging to the
estate of the deceased Bruno Modesto. They submitted their report where respondent moved to require Cirilo to
turn over to him the personal properties belonging to the intestate supposed to be in Cirilo's possession.
Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued and a Notice of Attachment against the real property in the name of
Cirilo Modesto was made. Cirilo filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Writ of Execution but was denied. The
trial court required Cirilo to deliver the properties listed therein to Jesus as administrator,

ISSUE:
Was the order of the court to require Cirilo to deliver the property to the administrator proper?

HELD:
NO. Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court is merely to elicit information or to secure evidence from those
persons suspected of having possessed or having knowledge of the properties left by a deceased person, or of
having concealed, embezzled or conveyed any of the said properties of the deceased. In such proceedings, the
trial court has no authority to decide whether or not said properties belong to the estate or to the persons
examined. If after such examination, there is good reason to believe that said person/s are keeping properties,
then the administrator should file an ordinary action to recover the same.

The order requiring Cirilo to deliver the properties, as belonging to the estate, said that Cirilo was supposed to
have admitted having received or taken possession of said properties after the death of Bruno. This findings of
the lower court is not supported by the evidence on record. As a matter of fact, Cirilo claimed that although he
held the aparador in the list properties, nevertheless, said furniture belonged to their parents and so Bruno
Modesto had only 1/6 share; that he did not have the mirror because the same had been taken by Jesus himself,
neither did he have the desk in question; that though he held a trunk, it was empty and only contained clothes
which were torn; that the bicycle in question was in the possession of Mauricio Modesto. But, even if Cirilo had
admitted possession of the properties, still it was necessary for the ordinary courts to determine the title and
ownership of said properties.

Pompillo Valera v. Judge Sancho Inserto

G.R. No. L-56504, May 7, 1987

FACTS:
In the proceedings for the settlement of estate of Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa where Eumelia Cabado
and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators, the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa
Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix be declared in contempt for her failure to render an
accounting of her administration. Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin,
Teresa's husband, delivered to the administrator the fishpond belonging to the estate, so that it might be
partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate,
asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included in any
inventory of the estate. The motion was granted as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the
estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

Fabiana then instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a preliminary
injunction which was granted enjoining the administrators from disturbing Fabiana in the possession of the
fishpond, as lessee. The administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint averring that the action was
barred by the Probate Court's prior judgment and that the act sought to be restrained had already been
accomplished, but it was not acted upon by the trial court.

ISSUE:
May the probate court act upon the determination of the title of the property?

HELD:
NO. The RTC, acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a 3rd person adversely to the decedent,
unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly,
to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not
thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter
should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, or of its limited jurisdiction as a special
court.

In this case, it does not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It was clear that if cognizance was
being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely
and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary
civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory. This function
of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within
the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. The
Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint-in-intervention after obtaining
the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or
ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint-in-intervention instead.

ABS-CBN Brodcasting Corp. v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 133347, April 23, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners, in their capacity as officers and on behalf of petitioner ABS-CBN filed a MR for dismissing their
petition for certiorari because of the absence of grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman Resolution where
there were no probable cause to indict respondents for the following violations of the RPC: (1) Article 298
Execution of Deeds by Means of Violence or Intimidation; (2) Article 315, paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], and 3[a] Estafa;
(3) Article 308 Theft; (4) Article 302 Robbery; (5) Article 312 Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real
Rights in Property; and (6) Article 318 Other Deceits. They raised the argument on the irrelevance of the civil
law concept of ratification in determining whether a crime was committed.

ISSUE:
Does ratification extinguish criminal liability?

HELD:
NO. The Court applied ratification in determining the conflicting claims of petitioners regarding the execution of
the letter-agreement. Petitioners, desperate to attach criminal liability to respondents’ acts, specifically to
respondent Benedicto, alleged in their complaint-affidavits that Benedicto forced, coerced, and intimidated
petitioners into signing the letter-agreement. In other words, petitioners disown this letter-agreement that they
were supposedly forced into signing, such that this resulted in a violation of Article 298 of the RPC

However, the elements of the crime are lacking. True, ratification is primarily a principle in our civil law on
contracts. Yet, their subsequent acts in negotiating for the rentals of the facilities cannot be disregarded simply
because ratification is a civil law concept. The claims of petitioners must be consistent and must, singularly,
demonstrate respondents’ culpability for the crimes they are charged with. Sadly, petitioners failed in this
regard because, to reiterate, they effectively ratified and advanced the validity of this letter-agreement in their
claim against the estate of Benedicto. It should also be noted that the conflicting claim of petitioners, by filing a
separate civil action to enforce a claim against the estate of respondent Benedicto, petitioners do not even
specifically deny this fact. The Rules of Court has separate provisions for different claims against the estate of a
decedent under Section 5 of Rule 86 and Section 1 of Rule 87.

If, as insisted by petitioners, respondents committed felonies in forcing them to sign the letter-agreement,
petitioners should have filed an action against the EXECAD of Benedicto’s estate based on Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court. But they did not. Instead, they filed a claim against the estate based on contract, the
unambiguous letter-agreement, under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The existence of this claim against
the estate of Benedicto, as opposed to the filing of an action against the EXECAD of Benedicto’s estate forecloses
the issues of the letter. In the milieu prevailing during the Marcos years, incidences involving intimidation of
businessmen were not uncommon. However, given the foregoing options open to them under the Rules of Court,
petitioners choice of remedies by filing their claim under Section 5, Rule 86 ― after Marcos had already been
ousted and full democratic space restored ― works against their contention, challenging the validity of the
letter-agreement. Now, petitioners must live with the consequences of their choice.

RULE 88
Gavino Aldamiz v. CFI Mindoro
G.R. No. L-2360, December 29, 1949

FACTS:
Santiago Rementeria, the decedent, was a Spaniard and member of the partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria." The
other members were the brothers, Gavino and Jose Aldamiz. Rementeria died and a probate proceeding was
instituted in CFI Mindoro by petitioner, represented by respondent Atty. Juan Luna. Petitioner was appointed
administrator and as such was represented by respondent up to when the order complained for was issued.
When the court approved the accounts, it refused to approve the project of partition unless all debts, including
attorney's fees, first be paid. It is for this reason that respondent, to comply with the order, without filing a
petition to have his professional fees fixed and without notice to all the parties, submitted evidence of his
services so that the court might fix the amount of his compensation and the administrator may make payment

When the amount of his fees was fixed by the court and Gavino asked him for a substantial reduction, he
answered that it was not he who had fixed the amount but the court, and advised his client to file a motion for
reconsideration, with the assurance that he would offer no objection to any reduction in amount and to any
extension of the time for paying what might be granted by the court. The Court, after considering the whole
evidence presented, issued its order awarding respondent in payment of his professional services,

ISSUE:
Was the fixing of the amount of attorney’s fees by the lower court valid?

HELD:
NO. The correct procedure for the collection of attorney's fees, is for the counsel to request the administrator to
make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity, not as an administrator, should he fail to
pay. If the judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his
account to the court. The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an action, file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceeding "asking that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the
administrator to pay it as an expense of administration."

In the instance case, no written petition for the payment of attorney's fees has ever been filed by respondent
attorney and the interested parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by the court.
Consequently, the order issued by the respondent court and all subsequent orders implementing it, are null and
void, as having been issued an excess of jurisdiction.

Bienvenido Buan and Natividad Paras v. Sylvina Laya

G.R. No. L-7593, December 24, 1957

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a contingent claim against the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio and Rizalina Buan based
on the fact that a bus collided with a car in which Juan Laya, Rodolfo Escosa, Jose Palma, and Juan de Leon, were
riding. The collision was caused by the fact that the bus driver drove the vehicle in a negligent manner and as a
consequence, Juan Laya was killed and his companions suffered physical injuries. The heirs of Juan Laya filed an
independent civil action against the administrator of the deceased spouses. When the administrators learned of
the filing of the contingent claim, they opposed thereto on the ground that the same was not filed within the
period prescribed by Rule 89, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. However, CFI Tarlac admitted the claim but denied
the prayer that a portion of the estate be set aside to respond for the amount of the contingent. Petitioners
moved to set aside the order which was granted since the reason to admit had ceased to exist. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Was the admission of the contingent claim valid?

HELD:
YES. A contingent claim is one which is necessarily dependent upon an uncertain event for its existence or
validity. It may or may not develop into a valid and enforceable claim, and its validity and enforceability
depending upon an uncertain event. It does not follow the temporary orders of dismissal of an action upon
which it is based; it awaits the final outcome thereof and only said final result can cause its termination. The
rules provide that a contingent claim is to be presented in the administration proceedings in the same manner as
any ordinary claim, and that when the contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid claim,
the court should then be informed that the claim had already matured.

Whether or not the heirs of Juan Laya would succeed in the action brought in Manila against the administrators
of the estate, is the uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the claim presented in the
administration proceedings depends. While the said action has not yet been finally decided or determined, to the
effect that the heirs of Laya, have no right of action against the estate of the deceased spouses, the contingent
claim that petitioners have filed in the proceedings, may not be dismissed. The order of the court subject of the
appeal should, therefore, be set aside.

Rafael Dinglasan v. Ang Chia

G.R. No. L-3342, April 18, 1951

FACTS:
Petitioner Rafael Dinglasan filed a case against Ang Chia to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of
land. In order to protect their interests, petitioners also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim and a
motion praying that a co-administrator be appointed and the bond of the administratrix be increased. By their
claim-in-intervention, petitioners made of record the pendency of a civil case and prayed that the intestate
proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated, but respondent moved to dismiss. The
court denied the petition for a co-administrator but increased the bond. As regards the petition not to close the
intestate proceedings, it was denied. The administratrix did not appeal on the ground that the heirs had already
entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. To this motion, the petitioners objected, whereupon the
court held in abeyance the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the decision in
said civil case has been rendered Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Was the holding in abeyance of the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the
decision in said civil case has been rendered proper?

HELD:
YES. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property
from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator". This rule is corollary to the ruling
which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by
another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction. Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to
be substituted for the deceased, within a period of 30 days, or within such time as may be granted.

If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.)
This rule also implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case
wherein an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule nugatory.

RULE 89
Eusebio Godoy v. Guillermo Orellano
G.R. No. L-16584, November 17, 1921

FACTS:
Respondent Felisa Pañgilinan executed a document giving petitioner Eusebio Godoy an option to buy a dredge
for the sum of P10,000, which is the common property of the vendor and of the other respondents. The option
was granted in accordance a SPA executed by her co-owners who reserved the right to ratify whatever sale
might be made, or option granted by Pañgilinan. The latter's co-owners did not ratify the option contract. Before
the expiration of the period to pay, petitioner was ready to make complete payment of the price, but the
respondent failed to deliver the dredge. Hence, petitioner filed a case against respondents.

Respondent Orellano gave a special defense holding that the dredge was the property of the estate of Julio
Orellano and under the administration of Felisa Pangilinan. Pangllinan knows that said dredge is under judicial
control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority and the court has never authorized the sale.
Pañgilinan filed a separate answer that, believing herself to be under obligation to comply with the option deed,
she applied to the court for permission to sell the dredge and her respondents authorized her by means of a SPA.
The court ordered the respondents to pay petitioner.

ISSUE:
Was the sale of the dredge without proper court order valid?

HELD:
NO. In the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, it is necessary to comply with the
provisions of Sections 717, 718, and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said sections prescribed the
proceedings to be had before an administrator may sell personal or real property. Unless compliance is had, the
sale by the administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and void.

A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under a will devising property to
them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise than by a direction to pay the debts of the
testator, is void, and passes no title to the purchase. A sale by an administrator of the personal property of the
estate, without the authority of an order of court, or of a will, or under an order of court which is void for want of
jurisdiction, does not confer on the purchaser a title which is available against a succeeding administrator.
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under
consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without
authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs

CFI Rizal v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-51785, July 25, 1981

FACTS:
Elena Escutin, executrix of the Testate Estate of Ponciano Lacson, asked the probate court for authority to sell
property of the estate in order to pay the taxes and other claims against the estate, which was granted, but shall
not be less than P360,000. Petitioner sold the property to respondent Gan Heng for P400,000, and from this
amount she paid the taxes. She submitted the Deed of Sale to the probate court for approval. However, Felix Ong
filed an opposition to the approval of the sale, alleging that he had offered to buy the property at a higher price.
The probate court found that Felix had not made an offer to buy the property prior to its sale to Gan Heng, and
approved the sale to Gan Heng. However, it was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Should the executor accept the offer of Felix for a higher price for the purchase of the property?

HELD:
NO. In a special proceeding for administration of an estate, the probate court enjoys ample discretion in
determining under what conditions a particular sale would be most beneficial to all persons interested, and
appellate courts are should not to interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by it unless it be shown
that there has been positive abuse of discretion.

The offer of Felix to buy the property at a higher price would not make the approval of the sale a grave abuse of
discretion, because the difference in the prices was not the only factor taken into consideration by the probate
court in approving the sale. Moreover, Felix did not comply with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court by submitting a bond in order to prevent the sale of the property. It results that the Court of Appeals
erred in setting aside the order of the probate court approving the sale of the property to Gan Heng and in
ordering the executrix to accept the bid of Felix to buy the property.

Josephine Pahamotang v. Philippine National Bank

G.R. No. 156403, March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their children, including
herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor. Agustin filed a petition for issuance of letters administration over the
estate of his wife. The late Agustin then executed several mortgages, and later sale of the properties with the
respondent PNB and Arturo Arguna. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions as prejudicial to
them arguing that the mortgage contracts with respondent PNB, as well as his subsequent sale of estate
properties to PLEI and Arguna, are void because petitioners never consented to it. They assert that as heirs, they
are entitled to notice of Agustin's several petitions in the intestate court seeking authority to mortgage and sell
estate properties. Without such notice, court orders that allowed Agustin to mortgage and sell estate properties
are void on account of Agustin’s non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court. The trial court declared the REM and the sale void, but both were valid with respect to the other parties.
However, it was reversed by the CA since petitioners committed an error amounting to a collateral attack on the
foregoing orders, instead of initiating a direct action to annul them.

ISSUE:
Is the notice mandatory under Sections 2, 4, and 7, Rule 89?

HELD:
YES. Settled is the rule that when an order authorizing the sale or encumbrance of real property was issued by
the testate or intestate court without previous notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees as required by the Rules,
it is not only the contract itself which is null and void but also the order of the court authorizing the same.

It appears that petitioners were never notified of the several petitions filed by Agustin with the intestate court to
mortgage and sell the estate properties of his wife. According to the trial court, the petition for Authority to
Increase Mortgage and petition for Declaration of Heirs and for Authority to Increase Indebtedness, filed by
Agustin do not contain information that petitioners were furnished with copies of said petitions. Also, notices of
hearings of those petitions were not sent to the petitioners. The trial court also found in Civil Case No. 16,802
that Agustin did not notify petitioners of the filing of his petitions for judicial authority to sell estate properties
to Arturo Arguna and PLEI.

Natividad Jaroda v. Judge Vicente Cusi

G.R. No. L-28214, July 30, 1969

FACTS:
Carlos Abrille died intestate, leaving as heirs are his surviving spouse, 9 children including petitioner Natividad
Jaroda, and 4 grandsons including respondent Antonio Tan. The latter filed a petition for the settlement of estate
of Abrille, and hence, he was appointed as special administrator. He filed a petition for the withdrawal of money
from PNB which were not listed in his petition for administration as among the properties left by the deceased,
alleging that these sums actually belong to the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, and alleging that it would be
advantageous to the estate of the deceased. It was granted. Tan was promoted then as regular administrator and
petitioned to the court a SPA for authority to sell the lots as the deceased had been engaged in the business of
selling lots. The court granted the petition. Petitioner Natividad Jaroda moved to nullify the order that allowed
the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the approval of authority to sell lots, but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Is the court order to authorize withdrawal of the bank deposits valid?

HELD:
NO. If even to sell for valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior written notice of the
application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, such notice is equally, if not
more, indispensable for disposing gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers.

Admittedly, no such notice was given, and without it, the court's authority is invalid and improper. The order
approving the power of attorney executed by administrator Tan and appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to
sell the subdivision lots for a price at his discretion is, likewise, void for want of notice and for approving an
improper contract or transaction. Section 4 of Rule 89 that was relied on by respondent Tan to sustain the
power of attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the estate in the subdivision requires "written notice
to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator
Tan did not furnish such notice. Without such notice, the order of the court authorizing the sale is void.

RULE 90
 Felicisimo Gatmaitan v. Gorgonio Medina
G.R. No. L-14400, August 5, 1960

FACTS:
Petitioner Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition for his appointment as administrator for the estate of his wife,
Veronica Medina. Respondent Gorgonio Medina opposed praying that he be jointly appointed as administrators
of the estate. The court appointed petitioner and respondent as co-administrator without compensation and
bond. Gatmaitan filed an amended inventory consisting of an undivided half of the conjugal partnership
properties which was opposed on the ground that the same did not include a parcel of land. The heirs filed a
"Motion for Partial Partition and Distribution," stating that the estate had no debts and the heirs were all of legal
age. The court, without receiving any evidence, granted the heirs’ motion.

ISSUE:
Was the partial partition valid?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that no distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations has been made or provided for, unless the distributees or any of them, give a bond, in
the sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the courts
directs.

While the wordings of the appealed order seem to indicate that it was rendered with the conformity of the heirs,
there is reason to believe that the administrator never agreed to the partial distribution of the estate. It should
be noted that the bond required by the Rules is not solely for the protection of the heirs then appearing, but also
for the benefit of creditors and subsequent claimants who have not agreed to the advances.

Quasha, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco Law Office v. LCN Construction

G.R. No. 174873, August 26, 2008

FACTS:
A settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere was instituted by his widow, Amy Triviere. Atty. Enrique Syquia
and Atty. William Quasha, representing the widow and children were appointed administrators. They incurred
expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the
estate, as well as litigation expenses. They then filed a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. Citing
their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC
denied their motion. LCN opposed the motion. The CA adopted the position of LCN that the claim of LCN was an
obligation of the estate which was yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, barred the
distribution of the residue of the estate. Petitioners, though, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner
children and widow is not a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court inapplicable.

ISSUE:
Was the distribution of the estate barred by a pending payment obligation to LCN?

HELD:
YES. Although it is within the discretion of the RTC to permit the advance distribution, its exercise should be
qualified by the following: (1) only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal
may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed
by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 90).

While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order was not yet a distribution of
the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute a
partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being
awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for. There is no
showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the
settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into
consideration. Taking into account that the claim of LCN, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving
the advance distribution of the same.
 Marcela de Borja Vda. de Torres v. Judge Demetrio Encarnacion
G.R. No. L-4681, July 31, 1951

FACTS:
In the settlement proceeding of the estate of Marcelo de Borja, the commissioners submitted a project of
partition in which a parcel of land, which was then in the possession of the petitioners, was included as property
of the estate. Over the objection of the petitioners, the proposed partition was approved. The petitioners now
questions the approval of said partition invoking Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. They also contend that
the administrator's remedy to recover that property is an action at law and not by motion in the intestate
proceeding.

ISSUE:
Was the approval of the partition proper?

HELD:
YES. The question of the petitioners' title and possession has been concluded by the partition and become a
closed matter. All they could prove would be that the property belonged to them or to their father's estate and
that they are in possession of it, to the exclusion of Marcelo de Borja's personal representative. Granting all such
proofs to be true, yet they would not detract from the authority of the court to make the order under
consideration.

The court had only the partition to examine, to see if the questioned land was included therein. The inclusion
being shown, and there being no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without
the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the
property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the
partition. What the petitioners could have done was to ask for a reconsideration of the partition on the grounds
of fraud, excusable mistake, inadvertence, etc. if they could substantiate such allegations. They cannot attack the
partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case.

Purificacion Imperial v. Judge Emmanuel Muñoz

G.R. No. L-30787 August 29, 1974

FACTS:
Luis Santos, surviving spouse of the deceased Fermina Santos, filed and instituted a special proceeding on the
estate of the latter. Luis was appointed regular Administrator. Petitioner Purificacion Imperial entered her
opposition moving to require Luis asa administrator to render an accounting, which resulted in the approval of
the project of partition. The court then approved a Compromise Agreement wherein Purificacion shall have the
amount of P53,072.81 in full settlement of her 3/8 share in the income of the estate. It also approved the final
partial project of partition filed by Luis. However, the latter moved for Correction of the Project of Partition as
Luis should be entitled to ¾ of the properties partitioned while Purificacion should get only the remaining ¼ of
the estate, pursuant to Article 996 of the Civil Code. The motion was approved.

ISSUE:
Was the correction of the order of partition valid?

HELD:
NO. In Chereau v. Fuentebella, it was held that an erroneous decree or judgment, although granted without legal
authority and contrary to the express provision of the statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal was taken, the
decree must be conceded to have full force and effect. An erroneous decree is not a void decree.

An order of the lower court which determines the distributive shares of the heirs of a deceased is appealable.
The Court in deciding the issue as to whether the order of the lower court is final and appealable, being final in
character, should have been appealed by the party adversely affected within the 30-day reglementary period
provided for appeal. This was not done. Hence, Luis has to suffer the misfortune brought about by his own
negligence and fatal inadvertence.

Concepcion Lopex v. Adela Lopez

G.R. No. 45736, May 26, 1939

FACTS:
Concepcion Lopez filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of the deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be
an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased and praying that she be declared his universal heiress
entitled to a summary award of his estate. Respondents opposed by denying petitioner’s claim and praying that,
as nephews and nieces, they be adjudged entitled to the property let by him. Concepcion Lopez filed later an
amended petition, alleging that the estate was worth P9,000 and its distribution could not be made summarily,
but thru regular administration proceedings. After hearing, the court issued an order declaring the petitioner as
acknowledged natural daughter entitled to the rights accorded her by law. The oppositors appealed.

ISSUE;
Is there a need to file a separate action for recognition as heir?

HELD:
NO. It is a well-settled that a person claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a deceased need not
maintain a separate action for recognition, but may simply intervene in the intestate proceedings, by alleging
and proving therein his or her status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the inheritance.

The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate proceedings is alleged to be insufficient since no prayer
was stated that she be declared an acknowledged natural child, but only that she be adjudged universal heiress,
of the deceased. In the body of the petition, there is an allegation that she is a natural child of the based and has
been in an uninterrupted possession of such status. Inasmuch as the recognition of her status is a prerequisite to
her right to heirship, her prayer implies a like prayer that she be recognized as an acknowledged natural child.

Michael Guy v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006

FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for letters of administration for the Estate of Sima Wei, alleging that they are
the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei. They likewise prayed that petitioner Michael Guy, son
of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Petitioner opposed that private
respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. In addition, petitioner alleged that private respondents’ claim had
been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim
stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, The RTC, however,
ruled in favour of the private respondents.

ISSUE;
Should respondents establish their status as illegitimate heirs in accordance with the Family Code?

HELD:
NO. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was
Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit: The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases, (1) If the father or mother died during
the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority. In Bernabe v. Alejo, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family
Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for
a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code.

It is clear them that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by
private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same as there
has been no reception of evidence yet. Such matters may be resolved only by the RTC. While the original action
filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded from
receiving evidence on private respondents’ filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of
the status of each heir.

RULE 91
In re Estate of Bernardo Lao Sayco
G.R. No. L-4824, February 13, 1912
FACTS:
Counsel for the municipal president of the pueblo of Mambajao, complying with a resolution of the council of the
said pueblo, set forth in a petition praying that, since Bernardo Rafanan died in that pueblo without leaving any
known legitimate successor, the real and personal property left by the said decedent be awarded to the pueblo,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 571 of Act No. 190. Lao Chiaman, administrator, filed a written petition
alleging that there were no longer any debts to pay any debts to pay and therefore requested that the property
be delivered to Chiaman Lay Chuyting, son and sole heir of Rafanan.

The court rendered judgment ordering that the property be assigned to the municipality of Mambajao to be
administered by its municipal council and placed at the disposal of the school in the same manner as other
property intended for the same use. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Was the reversion to the State of a certain property left a deceased valid?

HELD:
NO. Section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a person dies intestate, seized of real or
personal property in the Philippine Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the president
and municipal council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, may, on behalf of the municipality,
file a petition with the CFI for an inquisition in the premises.

In the case, it does not appear that there was made the inquisition provided by law as it was not accompanied by
any certified copy of the investigatory of the real and personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with
a statement of the places where the realty is located. Neither is it shown to have ascertained whether the
deceased executed any will during his lifetime, or whether he left in Mambajao or in any other place in these
Islands any relative entitled to inherit from him, information in regard to which points might be furnished by
those who were his friends or with whom he had friendly dealings during his lifetime. Moreover, the notice
summoning the persons who believed they were entitled to his property should have been published for at least
six consecutive weeks, and not for three as was directed.

In order that the property which belonged to the decedent Bernardo Rafanan may be decreed to have reverted
to the State, it is indispensable that the requirements contained in the above-quoted section of the said code
should have been complied with by making the inquisition with regard to the matters specified, at the instance
of the interested municipality. Furthermore, the person who lays claim to the property left by the decedent at
death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his identity and rights. Counsel for the municipality of
Mambajao merely prayed for an order of reversion and for the adjudication in behalf of the municipality of the
property aforementioned; he did not comply with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required proofs in
regard to the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be the subject of an investigation.

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 14348. January 31, 2002

FACTS:
In recognition of private respondent Amada Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Elizabeth Hankins executed
in her favour 2 deeds of donation involving 2 parcels of land. Solano alleged that she misplaced the deeds of
donation and were nowhere to be found. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition
for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the RTC and during the proceedings, a motion for
intervention was filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent but was denied as "they failed to show
valid claim or right to the properties in question. Since it was established that there were no known heirs and
persons entitled to the properties of decedent, RTC escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.

By virtue of the said decision, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled the TCTs and issued new ones in the
name of Pasay City. In the meantime, Amada claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had
been looking for. In view of this development, she filed a petition for the annulment of the decision.

ISSUE:
May the properties be escheated in favour of the petitioner Republic?

HELD:
YES. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In
the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by
the first comers." The state may prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such
property may be made and in this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within 5
years from the date of such judgment. The 5-year period is to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment.

In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 1989, but it was
only on 1997, more or less 7 years after, when Solano decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a
petition for annulment of judgment. Obviously, her belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties
militates against recovery. A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not
parties or privies thereto. With the lapse of the 5-year period, she has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the
supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which
has long attained finality.

RULE 109
Testate Estate of Maria Biascan v. Rosalina Biascan
G.R. No. 138731, December 11, 2000

FACTS:
Respondent Rosalina Biascan filed a petition for settlement of estate of Florencio Biascan and Timotea Zulueta
and for her appointment as administrator, which was granted. Maria Biascan, wife of Florencio Biascan opposed
such orders and moved for her appointment as administrator of Florencio Biascan, which was granted. 58 days
after the receipt of the order, Maria filed her MR which private respondent opposed. In 1981, the 4th floor of the
Manila City Hall was completely gutted by fire and the records were among those lost in the fire. Thus, Rosalina
filed a Petition for Reconstitution. Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it
was only on April 1985 that the RTC denied Maria’s MR.

Petitioner was made aware of and given notice of the denial when its associate visited the RTC to inquire about
the status of the case. There was also no record if there was proof of service of the order. A Notice of Appeal was
filed by petitioner. However, the trial court denied petitioner’s appeal on the ground that the appeal was filed
out of time. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Is the appeal filed beyond the reglementary period?

HELD:
YES. An appeal is allowed in Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, as these orders, decrees or judgments
issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so appealing.
In contrast, interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are merely incidental to judicial proceedings. In
these cases, the court issuing such orders retains control over the same and may thus modify, rescind, or revoke
the same on sufficient grounds at any time before the final judgment.

In the instant case, the Order of the RTC decreed, among others, that Maria Biascan, the lawful wife of the
deceased Florencio Biascan, private respondent Rosalina Biascan are entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court as a proper subject of
appeal. By so ruling, the trial court has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of the
deceased. As such, the same may be the proper subject of an appeal. In special proceedings, the period of appeal
is 30 days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. The appeal period may only be interrupted
by the filing of a MNT/MR. Once the appeal period expires, the decision becomes final. With respect to the
assailed Order, petitioner admits that Maria received a copy of the same. Applying these rules, Maria had 30 days
to file a notice of appeal with record on appeal. She may also file a MR. But it was all filed out of time.

Republic of the Philippines v. Nisaida Nishini

G.R. No. 186053, November 15, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Nisaida Nishina filed a petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil
registry of Malolos. Her father died and her mother remarried. As they could not find any record of her birth at
the Malolos civil registry, her mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her
mother’s second husband, Hakamada. Her mother and Hakamada eventually divorced. She then remarried with
Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted her by a decree issued by the Tokyo Family Court of Japan. The adoption
decree was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila. Years after, it surfaced that her birth was in fact
originally registered at the Malolos under the name Nisaida Nishina, hence, her filing before the RTC of her
petition praying that her 2nd birth certificate bearing the surname Hakamada be cancelled; and that her surname
be changed to Watanabe. The court granted the petition.

A copy was received by the OSG which filed a notice of appeal. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as stated under Rule 41.
Opposing the motion, petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings where
multiple appeals may arise. The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal holding that, since respondent’s petition with
the RTC is classified as a special proceeding, petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within 30 days from receipt of the Order granting respondent’s petition, and by not filing a record on
appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the requirement of a record of appeal proper?

HELD:
NO. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may
be the subject of an appeal and it contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A
record on appeal, in addition to the notice of appeal, is thus required to be filed as the original records of the
case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.

In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary, since no other matter remained to be
heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent’s petition for
cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

RULE 103
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992

FACTS:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Alcala. When he was
a child and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., by court order, he was adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong. They decided to adopt him as they remained childless. Upon reaching 22 years old, Wong
filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. since his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and
isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry, when in truth and in fact, he
is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community and he wants to erase any implication of alien nationality;
that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that
his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname. The RTC and CA granted his
petition.

ISSUE:
Are there valid grounds to grant Wong’s petition for change of (sur)name?

HELD:
YES. A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his relation with
others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem and
strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the
court with jurisdiction. For this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register. For clarification, the change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and Rule
103 of the Rules of Court must not be confused with and cannot be effected through the summary proceeding
proposed in Article 412 of the Civil Code, as procedurally regulated by Rule 108 of the Rules, which refers only
to correction of clerical errors, such as those which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, or an
error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing, or some harmless or innocuous change,
and not those which will involve substantial changes.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason, but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonourable, or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will
avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of
her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. Also, a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family
relations or in the rights and duties. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is
altered is only the name.

Rommel Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in RTC
Manila alleging that his name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth,
his sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the US and underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged
to be married. He then sought to have his name changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."

During the hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established and no opposition to the petition was made.
The RTC granted his petition. However, the CA reversed the RTC holding that there is no law allowing the change
of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.

ISSUE:
May the petitioner be allowed to change his name and gender by reason of surgery?

HELD:
NO. Under RA 9048, it vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. In Section 4, it lays down the grounds for change of first
name: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used
by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The
change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. However, RA 9048 does
not sanction such ground. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. In sum, the petition in the RTC was not within
that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative,
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.

Republic of the Philippines v. Jennifer Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before RTC Laguna
alleging that she was born and registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth, but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
which is a condition where persons afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged
that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she
has small ovaries and has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged
that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first
name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon who issued a
medical certificate stating that respondent is female, but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs. He further testified that respondent’s condition is
permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her. The RTC granted the petition.

ISSUE:
Was it proper to change his name and gender on the ground of her medical condition?

HELD:
YES. For respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial
court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, there is merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of
the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. Medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” to
apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. Philippine statutes compel that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but it cannot be controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. In the instant case, if respondent is determined to
be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. Otherwise, based on
medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in
the birth certificate entry is in order.

Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Florendo Aquino

G.R. No. L-32779, May 25, 1979

FACTS:
Private respondent John Li Kan Wa filed a petition for change of his name to John Sotto, alleging (a) change of his
status from Chinese to Filipino as a result of his election of Filipino Citizenship; and (b) the previous confusion
resulting from being registered as John Li Kan Wa and using a different name since childhood which is John
Sotto. Finding the petition sufficient in substance, the court issued an order giving notice to all interested parties
to appear before the court and state their objections, and directed that the order be published in the Monday
Post, a newspaper of general circulation in Nueva Ecija. After due hearing, the court granted the petition for
change of name.

ISSUE:
Did respondent judge acquire jurisdiction to hear the petition?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the petition for change shall set forth the name asked for.
The requirement is mandatory and compliance is essential, for it is by such means that the court acquires
jurisdiction. In Republic v. Reyes, failure to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the petition and
consequently in the notices published in newspapers, is a substantial jurisdictional infirmity. As enunciated in
Go Chill Beng v. Republic, for publication to be effective, it must give correct information. To inform, the
publication should recite, among others, the following facts: (a) the name or names of applicant; (b) the cause
for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the new name asked for.

Respondent's exhibits 3-A and 3-B show that only the name Li Kan Wa was given in the title, and the name John
Sotto was not mentioned. Omission in the title of the petition of the name asked for is fatal, and the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case. Non-compliance with the rules did not vest the court with authority to act on
the petition and therefore, the questioned decision is null and void.

Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Pio Marcos

G.R. No. L-31065, February 15, 1990

FACTS:
A petition was filed by private respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist China,
married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen and had resided in Baguio since her birth, By a previous
marriage to Sia Bian, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia/Manman Huang. She
caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang. When petitioner Pang Cha Quen
married Alfredo De la Cruz, her daughter has grown to love and recognize her stepfather. She desires to adopt
and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her name. Alfredo gave his conformity to the petition by signing
at the bottom of the pleading.

Respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition and inviting all interested persons to file
their opposition. The order also directed that it be published at the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and
Midland Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio. During the hearing, nobody opposed it, hence,
respondent Judge authorized the name of May Sia/Manman Huang to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz.

ISSUES:
a. Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the petition?
b. Was there a proper and reasonable cause for changing the name?

HELD:
a. NO. In Republic v. Zosa, the reason for the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted in the title of the
petition or in the caption of the published order is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at
the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding for a change of
name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar
to him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The probability is great that he will not
notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if they are mentioned only in the body of the order or
petition.

The omission of her other alias "Mary Pang", in the captions of the court's order and of the petition
defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the petitioner which she
wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."

b. NO. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) having
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage;
or (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and
not to prejudice anybody.

The reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up
with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father; (2) to afford her daughter
a feeling of security; and (3) that Alfredo agrees to this petition. Clearly, these are not valid reasons for
a change of name. In Padilla v. Republic, laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname
of a person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is
not their father, can result in confusion of their paternity.

Also, only May Sia herself, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to
change her name. It must be her personal decision on the reason that when she grows up, she may not
want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother.

Republic Act No. 9255: Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use Father’s Surname
In Re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005
FACTS:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anna Wang and Sing Foe Wang. When his parents subsequently
got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The parents plan to stay in Singapore because they will let him
study there together with his sister. Since in Singapore middle names are not carried in a person’s name, they
anticipate that Julian will be discriminated because of his current registered name. Hence, petitioner Julian,
represented by his mother, filed a petition for change of name to drop his middle name. The RTC denied it.

The reason given for the change of name did not fall within the grounds recognized by law since the change
sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names
cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right
should be taken from Julian. It added that when he reaches adulthood, he can decide whether he will change it.

ISSUE:
Is the dropping the middle name of a minor contrary to Article 174 of the Family Code?

HELD:
NO. The grounds for change of name are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change
will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him
from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. The use of surnames state that
legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives
legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall
use the surname of their mother. Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by
the father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name.

In the case, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However,
how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
clearly established. The continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. In addition, petitioner is
only a minor and it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority.

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astroga Garcia

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia, alleging that Stephanie was born to her mother, Gemma Astorga Garcia. Stephanie has been using her
mother’s middle name and surname. Petitioner, now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent, he
prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname
Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. The RTC granted the petition and changed her name to Stephanie
Nathy Catindig.

Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to
use the surname of her natural mother, Garcia, as her middle name. However, the trial court denied the motion
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.

ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name?
HELD:
YES. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name.
The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an individual.

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of
the Family Code is silent as to what middle name a child may use. The middle name is only considered in Article
375(1) in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
middle name shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter. Hence,
since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mother’s surname, there is no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Republic of the Philippines v. Trinidad Capote

G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent Trinidad Capote was appointed guardian of minor Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso by virtue of a court
order authorizing her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of
his mother, who is residing and working abroad. Minor Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso is the illegitimate natural
child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. The father failed to take up his responsibilities on matters of
financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his
father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname. Giovanni’s mother might
eventually petition him to join her in the US and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso may complicate his
status as natural child. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N.
Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.

ISSUE:
May the minor Giovanni use his mother’s surname?

HELD:
YES. When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code), Art. 366 of the
Civil Code, as regards his use of a surname, states that a natural child acknowledged by both parents shall
principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ
the surname of the recognizing parent. Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother’s
surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni’s father to actually
recognize him. Meanwhile, according to Art. 176 of the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of
the Civil Code, illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother.

Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found that the evidence presented
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father, while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase
the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his
mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the US. It is noteworthy that cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry, a proceeding separate and distinct from change of name. The nature of adversarial
proceeding was made by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The
lower court also furnished the OSG a copy. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition
including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear
the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.

Republic Act No. 9048 & 10172: Clerical Error Law

Jorge Batbatan and Delia Batbatan v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Zamboanga
G.R. No. L-33724, November 29, 1982
FACTS:
Petitioner Eligia Batbatan, mother of Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia Batbatan Luy whose surnames were taken
from the name and the alias of their father Ang Kiu Chuy, alias Sioma Luy., filed a petition for the correction of
entries as regards the names of the children, Eligia and Ang were never married at least up to the time the
former testified in court. According to the petitioner, Ang was married to another woman at the times their
children were born. An elder daughter carried the name Jane Batbatan without the father's surname.

Eligia wanted the "Ang" and the "Luy" surnames dropped from her children's names such that their corrected
names would be Jorge Batbatan and Delia Batbatan. The trial court denied the petition since the Office of the
local civil registrar are allowed only to correct clerical errors. Corrections are not allowed when the effect is to
change status, citizenship, or any substantial alterations, which should be decided in an appropriate proceeding.

ISSUE:
May such petition be granted for correction of their names in the birth certificate?

HELD:
YES. In Lim v. Republic, a clerical error implies mistakes by the clerk in copying or 'writing, the making of wrong
entries in the public records contrary to existing facts. In De Castro v. Republic, an error is not clerical and does
not fall under the summary procedure contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code if it affects substantial
matters, if its correction will bring about a substantial change. However, where justice and equity dictate it and
where no such change is contemplated, its use must be sustained.

The corrections in this petition do not go so far as to affect citizenship or status. The errors committed by the
clerk have resulted in entries contrary to law. The changes sought, if granted, would bring about a compliance
with Article 363 of the Civil Code which provides: "Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the
surnames of the mother." Since the petitioner children were born of a married man with a woman not his
legitimate spouse and are thus "spurious or adulterous", they should bear the petitioner’s surname. The
petitioner prayer to strike out the surnames not sanctions by the Civil Code should have been granted by the
lower court.

Marcelo Lee v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001

FACTS:
Two sets of children are sired by one and the same man but begotten of 2 different mothers. One set, the private
respondents who are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the
petitioners who are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. Private respondents filed
2 petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners for the false and
erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name
of Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is allegedly the
petitioners’ true birth mother. Every time Tiu Chuan gave birth, Lee Tek Sheng falsified the entries in the records
of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate
objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners. However, the motion was denied. Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
May Rule 108 be used to corrections which are summary in nature?

HELD:
NO. Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings. Changes affecting
civil status or citizenship are substantial and should be made in a proper action. The basis for the
pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is unconstitutional. Hence, under
RA 9048, clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed
without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The effect is to
remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. What
is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register.
RA 9048 embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as
it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of RA 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the
necessity for the preceding treatise.

Republic of the Philippines v. Carlito Kho

G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007

FACTS:
Carlito and his siblings filed a petition for correction of entries in the civil registry to effect changes in their
respective birth certificates. He requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother
to Filipino instead of Chinese, as well as the deletion of the word married opposite the phrase Date of marriage
of parents because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco, were allegedly not legally married. Carlito filed
an Amended Petition praying that Carlito’s second name of John be deleted from his record of birth; and that the
name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his marriage certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and
Filipino to Chinese. The RTC granted the petition.

ISSUE:
Was there a need for an adversarial proceeding since the nature of the petition is substantial?

HELD:
NO. In Republic v. Valencia, even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108. It is true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as
well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also
true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is
used. The Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.

The enactment of RA 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors
or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings. When all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect
substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. Publication of the order of hearing under
Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party required under RA 9048.

Kilosbayan Foundation v. Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita

G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent Executive Secretary announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory Ong as Associate
Justice of SC to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of AJ Callejo. The appointment was reported by the
major daily publications. However, it was later reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in
abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory Ong. But
there is no indication that the appointment has been cancelled. Petitioners now claim that respondent Ong is a
Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese
citizenship. The birth certificate reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth, his father was Chinese and
his mother was also Chinese, which is contrary to Section 7(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?

HELD:
YES. Under Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be
made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. RA 9048
provides in Section 2(3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in
a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship
of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by
various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have
to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in
the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as
his citizenship under the timeline of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution.

RULE 108
Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Feliciano Belmonte
G.R. No. L-32600, February 26, 1988

FACTS:
Private respondent Anita Po @ Veronica Pao filed a Petition for the change of name from Anita Po to Veronica
Pao. For this purpose, she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's
name appearing as Po Yu be corrected to Pao Yu and her mother's name recorded as Pakiat Chan be changed to
Helen Chan. The petitioner alleged that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan and that the given name
“Pakiat” written on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. The petitioner
also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as erroneously written in her birth certificate
and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns these alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of
Chinese names. The petitioner also averred that she had been baptized by a Catholic priest and that she was
christened as Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian given name and the latter being the correct spelling of
her surname; that since her childhood up to the present, she had always been known and referred to as Veronica
Pao and not Anita Po.

Respondent Judge Feliciano Belmonte ruled in favor of the petitioner and was allowed to change her name from
Anita Po to Veronica Pao. The court also allowed the correction of the names of her parents as prayed for in the
Petition in the registry of birth.

ISSUE:
May the names Po Yu and Pakiat Chan appearing in the birth certificate of Anita Po can be changed in the same
proceeding for the change of name of Anita Po?

HELD:
NO. Under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made
parties to the proceeding.

An inspection of all the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar
concerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final
determination of the case cannot be made. The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in
Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is separate and distinct. They
may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would render
nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction of entries in
the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with.

Hubert Tan Co v. The Civil Registrar of Manila

G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004

FACTS:
Hubert Tan Co and sister Arlene Tan Co were born to their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan
who are Chinese citizens. Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines
and was granted. In the meantime, Hubert and Arlene finished college and earned their respective degrees. They
filed with the RTC a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of entries in their certificates of
birth as to the citizenship of their father Co Boon Peng, from Chinese to Filipino. The RTC dismissed the petition
on the ground that their father applied for naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine
citizenship by naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under CA No. 473.
The petitioners sought reconsideration arguing that LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 were designed to grant
citizenship to deserving aliens; hence, should be construed together. They averred that the benefit of Section 15
of CA No. 473 should also be granted to the petitioners whose father was granted naturalization under LOI No.
270.

ISSUE:
May the petition under Rule 108 for correction of entries in their certificates of birth as to the citizenship of their
father be entertained?

HELD:
YES. LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the
Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree
while LOI No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential decree. Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of CA
No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as an integral part thereof, not being
inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship
to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of those
naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.

However, it is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father
and of his oath of allegiance to the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise
mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition: (a) that they are the legitimate children of
Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were born in the Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng
was naturalized as a Filipino citizen. The petitioners’ recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is appropriate.
Under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order. The Court approved Rule 108 to provide for a procedure to implement the law.

Ma. Cristina Torres-Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occ.
G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009

FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:

Gerbert Corpuz v. Daisylyn Tirol-Sto.Tomas

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:

RULE 102 HABEAS CORPUS

Felipe Gonzales v. Florentino Viola
G.R. No. L-43195, August 23, 1935

FACTS:
Petitioner Felipe Gonzales was placed under arrest by order of the respondent Florentino Viola and Valentin
Maniquis and detained in the municipal jail. Hours later, a criminal complaint was filed by Maniquis against the
petitioner. But on the same day, he was released on bail. When the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was had in the court, Gonzales was already out on bail. In passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, a court of judge must first inquire whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ
will be refused. Only where such restraint obtains is the court required to inquire into the cause of the detention,
and if the alleged cause is found to be unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.

ISSUE:
May a petition for WHC be entertained if the detainee was released under bail?

HELD:
NO. It is well settled that a person out on bail is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus. The restraint of liberty which would justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a mere moral
restraint; it must be actual or physical. There must be actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it. In
the present case, the court would have been justified in refusing the writ solely on the ground that the petitioner
was not deprived or restrained of his liberty.

In Re: Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa

G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004

FACTS:
In People v. De Villa, petitioner Reynaldo de Villa was found guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by
affinity. In addition to the sentence of reclusion perpetua and payment of damages, support for Leahlyn Corales
Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape was also ordered. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the
New Bilibid Prison. Years after said promulgation, petitioner-relator June de Villa, son of Reynaldo, alleged that
during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a DNA testing and he was only informed during the
pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity.
Relator conducted another DNA testing. The results showed that Reynaldo could not have sired any of the
children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in
petitioner’s sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn’s.

In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to relitigate the
factual issue of the paternity of the child. Since paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the
conviction must be overturned. In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to
collaterally attack the Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the
presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered evidence.

ISSUE:
May the writ of habeas corpus be issued to an individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a
final and executory judgment?

HELD:
NO. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a
competent court which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction
through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings. In Feria v. Court of Appeals, a review of a judgment of
conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in the following,, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has
been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

However, petitioner invokes WHC to assail a final judgment of conviction, without providing a legal ground. He
also invokes such remedy to seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far
outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In Abriol v. Homeres, WHC, in permitting a collateral challenge
of the jurisdiction of the court issuing the judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be
distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction. Mere
errors of fact or law are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of WHC; if at all, these errors must be
corrected on certiorari or on appeal. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.

Rolando Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison

G.R. No. 117568, January 4, 1995

FACTS:
In People v. Angeles, petitioner Rolando Angeles was convicted of violating the 2nd paragraph of Section 20 of RA
6425. He has now lodged this petition for habeas corpus, invoking (a) RA 7659 which has reduced the penalties
prescribed under the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, and (b) the recent ruling in People v. Simon,
which has confirmed the retroactive application of RA 7659 wherein the newly prescribed penalty for his
offense would now only be prison correccional. Applying ISLaw, the range of indeterminate penalty on
petitioner should be from 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 6 years of prision correccional as
maximum.

ISSUE:
May a WHC be issued in case of an amendatory law passed reducing the sentence?

HELD:
NO. The WHC is still premature. However, all courts of competent jurisdiction may entertain petitions for habeas
corpus to consider the release of prisoners convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act who have served
the maximum of the applicable penalties newly prescribed by RA 7659. In this regard, the formalities required
for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such petitions, although deficient in form, may
be entertained so long as they are sufficient in substance. In the negative, the courts to which the petitions are
filed may refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights or to the Public Attorney's Office for possible
assistance to the prisoners concerned.

Edgardo Tijing v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children and the youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. Petitioner
Bienvenida Tijing served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante. According to
Bienvenida, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way
to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her son under the care of
Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry. When Bienvenida
returned, Angelita and her son were gone. Angelita’s maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a
stroll. She returned to Angelita’s house after 3 days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida then complained to the barangay chairman and police. Although estranged from her husband,
Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this
made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and
together to look for their son. But he is nowhere to be found.

Years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of
Angelita. She went to the wake where she allegedly saw her son for the first time. She claims that the boy was
already named John Thomas Lopez and Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Petitioners filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court to recover their son. The petition was
granted. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision expressing its doubts on the evidence adduced by Bienvenida
since it was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor.

ISSUE:
Is WHC a proper remedy to recover the custody of a child?

HELD:
YES. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the
latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving
minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the
availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody
over a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and
material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.

A close scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to
establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr. First, there is evidence that
Angelita could no longer bear children. Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez
is no longer capable of siring a son. Third, it is unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed
by Tomas Lopez, instead of the midwife four months after the alleged birth. Under the law, the attending
physician or midwife should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can
the parent register the birth of his child. Fourth, the child and Bienvenida have strong similarities in their faces
and resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
parentage. Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida’s giving birth to Edgardo Jr. All these
considered, the minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of
said child.

In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus for Ashraf Kunting

G.R. No. 167193, April 19, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Ashraf Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. He was
turned over to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by RTC Isabela
City, Basilan for 4 counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention. Atty. Guillermo Danipog of the
PNP-IG informed the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. He requested for Kunting’s
temporary detention at Camp Crame due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a
commitment order. The RTC issued an Order directing PNP-IG to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial
court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. PNP-IG Director Arturo Lomibao wrote a letter to
DOJ requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial to Pasig City,
for the reasons that there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in
Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the
ASG. Tthe RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused, hence, denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case
for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order
to turn over Kunting to the court. Police Inspector Amado Barbasa filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer
Implementation of the Order until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.

Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus stating that he has been
restrained of his liberty by the PNP-IG. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him
until his family discovered that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the
kidnapping incident in Basilan. Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he
promptly filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. He was aware that the motion for the transfer of venue of
his case. Having no further information, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation, but since no
action was taken by the trial court or DOJ, he filed a WHC to put an end to his illegal detention.

ISSUE:
Is a WHC proper for his illegal detention?

HELD:
NO. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed if it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order.

In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the
PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by RTC Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at Camp
Crame was thus authorized by the trial court for 4 counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention in several criminal cases. In Bernarte v. Court of Appeals, once the person detained is duly charged in
court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

NBI Director Epimaco Velasco v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118644, July 7, 1995

FACTS:
A warrant of arrest was issued by RTC Pasig against accused Lawrence Larkins for violations of BP 22. Then a
certain Desiree Alinea filed with the NBI a complaint accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed
against her. Acting on said complaint, petitioners proceeded to the office of Larkins and arrested the latter. He
was detained in NBI. Larkins posted his bail on the BP 22 case where RTC Pasig eventually issued an order
directing NBI to release Larkins from confinement "unless otherwise detained for some other cause." NBI
refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for
which he would be held for inquest. Larkins, through his new counsel, moved for the dismissal of the complaint
and for immediate release based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. But it was denied.

Unable to accept the ruling, his wife filed before the CA a petition for WHC. After hearing the arguments, it ruled
in favour of Larkins. On the ground that Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape, which did not
meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Further, on the day the detention of
Larkins commenced, no other criminal complaint had been filed or pending in any court.

ISSUE:
Is WHC unavailable in case of issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment only?
HELD:
NO. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of the filing of the application for WHC, for even if
the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such
supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Another
is the filing of a complaint for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the
restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus
is no longer available.

While it may be true that 4 days after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release based on the alleged illegality of his
warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial
court had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person. Moreover, the trial court's order denying the urgent
motion for bail was an unequivocal assertion of its authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. This order
comes under the purview of the word order under the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . . by virtue of [an]
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to . . . make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed. . . ." Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
will not prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the
complaint against him and by the issuance of the denial order.

Glenn Caballes v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 163108, February 23, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Glenn Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in RTC Malabon. Because the petitioner was charged
with a non-bailable offense, he was detained. The petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. The prosecution presented 2 witnesses, Venice Pio, the private complainant, and her mother. The
petitioner’s counsel commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to complete the same for almost 3
months. The prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer who
had conducted a medico-legal examination of Pio, but stated that he had not been subpoenaed. The prosecution
prayed for the cancellation of the trial to give the prosecution time to secure and cause the service of a subpoena
on him. The petitioner filed a petition for bail. The trial was postponed many times. Petitioner filed a motion
seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy trial and for the urgent resolution of his petition for
bail. Both motions were denied. Upon filing of a motion to dismiss, the trial court issued an order denying the
petitioner’s motion since there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial, considering that the
delays could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. Anent the MR of the denial the petition for
bail, the same was abandoned by the petitioner upon the filing of his motion to dismiss without waiting for the
resolution of his MR on his petition for bail.

The petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for WHC averring that the trial court committed grave abuse of
its discretion in denying his petition for bail. The CA dismissed the petition since a writ of habeas corpus is not a
writ of error; that it could not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent
judge as a concomitant remedy; and that the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature,
scope and purpose.

ISSUE:
May a petition of WHC be used as a remedy to review a denial of bail of a trial court?

HELD:
NO. WHC is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot
be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the
writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. It also does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before
the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to
be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be
denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
In the case, it was a "petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari" where
petitioner assailed the orders of the trial court denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the
ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. A petition for a writ of
habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are
governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes
of action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a
special proceeding with a special civil action. Also, a petition for WHC is a remedy different from the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since WHC is a collateral attack on the processes, orders,
or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of
certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, WHC
reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record.
However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a WHC, to bring the body of the person whose liberty
is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may be
accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding.

Even then, the petition for WHC must be dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish his right to the writ.
The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained
based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution. There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense
charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to
detain the petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted
after trial.

Erlinda Ilusorio v. Erlinda Bildner

G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:
Erlinda Ilusorio is the wife of Potenciano Ilusorio who is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
They contracted marriage and lived together for 30 years. They separated from bed and board for undisclosed
reasons. Upon Potenciano’s arrival from the US, he stayed with Erlinda for 5 months. Their children alleged that
during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of an antidepressant drug and as a consequence,
Potenciano’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

After attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City, and instead lived
in Makati. Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. She alleged
that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City. The CA denied the petition.

ISSUE:
May a wife secure a WHC to compel her husband to live with her?

HELD:
NO. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extraordinary
WHC. It extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that he is about 86 years old or under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Also, Potenciano did not request the administrator of
the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it
clear that he did not object to seeing them. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the
people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these
are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. No court is empowered, as a judicial authority, to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a WHC. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left
to the man and woman’s free choice.

Norberto Feria v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto Feria has been under detention by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide for the jeepney hold-up and killing of US Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Carmona. Petitioner sought
to be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed
the RTC Manila that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the Commitment Order or
Mittimus, Decision, and Information. It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the
copy of the judgment, were missing as they were lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the 2nd and 3rd
floor of the Manila City Hall.

Petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a WHC for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his
continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
RTC Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the
judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be
reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision. The
CA affirmed the decision and with the modification that petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau of
Corrections without submission of the requirements but without prejudice to the reconstitution of the original
records.

ISSUE:
May the mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case render the judgment of conviction void or
warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a WHC?

HELD:
NO. The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will
not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a WHC. The
proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the
defense. As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who
attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth
process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the
prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of
the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal under Section 13,
Rule 102.

Public respondents, having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention, petitioner’s release from
confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102. The proper remedy in this case is for either
petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No.
3110, the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under the inherent power of courts to
reconstitute at any time the records of their finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court. Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception, whether they refer to pending
cases or finished cases. There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just
as important as pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.

A.M. No. 7-9-12-SC: WRIT OF AMPARO

Secretary of National Defense v. Raymond Manalo
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

FACTS:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat
their existing petition as amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all
official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official
assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo
brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP
appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.

ISSUE:
Was the issuance of the Writ of Amparo proper?

HELD:
YES. There is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities.
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably
yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative
roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the
threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and
escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.

Armando Canlas v. NAPICO Homeowners Association

G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Pasig City and their dwellings/houses have either
been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court
judgment. While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed as fraudulent and spurious land titles,
petitioners, desirous to help the government unearth syndicates clothed with governmental functions, in
cahoots with the squatting syndicates, filed for issuance of the Writ of Amparo for Land Officials to answer their
participation in the issuances of fraudulent and spurious titles in the hands of the private respondents.

ISSUE:
Do petitioners have standing to file a writ of amparo in court?

HELD:
NO. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 provides that the petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Under Section 6, the court shall issue the writ
upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the
enumeration of rights as stated for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their
dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not
constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of
amparo. Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in question is not alleged in the
petition at all. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and
legal basis of the right sought to be protected.

Gen. Avelino Razon v. Mary Jean Tagitis

 G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009

FACTS:
Respondent Mary Tagitis was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by
boat from a seminar. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a
boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis
was no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food and even left his room key with
the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did
not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait. Kunnong and
Muhammad Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported
Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, respondent filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo directed against petitioners. Mary stated that she approached her co-employees to help her find her
husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information
from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that the husband is in the hands of the uniformed
men as he was being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect him with the
different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and since the intelligence operatives
are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, she filed a petition for writ of amparo.
Petitioners denied any involvement or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. In addition, they all claimed that
they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to
apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance. The CA confirmed that the disappearance of Tagitis
was an "enforced disappearance". Also, the CA ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the
ARMM since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’
abduction or demand for payment of ransom. Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege
of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to
protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis.

ISSUE:
May the privilege of the Writ of Amparo be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis?

HELD:
YES. The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full
and exhaustive proceedings.

Based on these considerations, Col. Kasim’s disclosure unequivocally point to some government complicity in
the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to
this conclusion. From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already
establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN
Declaration, evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance
and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and
haphazard handling. There is the evidence of ineffective investigation in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while
in all three was the recognition that the burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use of
circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement for direct evidence to
establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would render it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear.

In Re: Petition for Writ of Amparo in Favor of Melissa Roxas v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010

FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the US, enrolled in an exposure program to the
Philippines with the group BAYAN- USA of which she is a member. After doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and
her companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions
were resting, heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van.
When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of NPA. She
was then separated from her companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of
gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle. She was interrogated and tortured
for 5 days to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that
those who tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her name
is included in the “Order of Battle.”

Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report
the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release,
Roxas continued to receive calls from RC. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card. Hence,
Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data impleading the high-ranking officials
of military and PNP, on the belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
The SC issued the writs and referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate
action. The CA granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, it absolved the respondents
because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas.
Hence, the case.

ISSUE:
Was absolving the respondents proper?

HELD:
YES. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or
threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. However, the writ does not fix liability
for such disappearance, killing or threats. But that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility
in an amparo proceeding does not preclude impleading military or police on the ground that the acts were
committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded not actually
on the basis of command responsibility but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.

However, the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her
abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. In amparo
proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement
depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of
directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity must be preferred
over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers
greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave
to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated
with the military or the police. Neither does the evidence prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military
camp Fort Magsaysay. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the
abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents.
On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public
respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac v. Erlinda Cadapan

G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011

FACTS:
At 2 AM of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino from a
house in Bulacan and were herded onto a jeep that sped towards an undisclosed location. Having heard nothing
from them, their respective families scoured nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding
them but the same yielded nothing. Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition
for habeas corpus impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan. By Return of the Writ, the
respondents denied that the 3 are in the custody of the military and they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino. During trial, witnesses testified that they saw the three being taken by armed men wearing bonnets.
Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names of Ka Lisa and Ka
Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to conduct an
investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. He also stated that he a got the report that it
was Ka Tanya and Ka Lisa that were the ones abducted.
The CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. The respondents appealed. While it was pending, they filed a
petition for writ of amparo. The habeas corpus case was granted and the court ordered the immediate release of
Cadapan under the amparo case, by virtue of Raymond Manalo’s testimony. Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion
Empeo filed before the CA a Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents to
comply with the directive to immediately release the three missing persons.

ISSUE:
Did petitioners have command responsibility over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino?

HELD:
YES. An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or
entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure
designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life,
liberty and security of aggrieved individuals. It determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies
this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court
would issue. The CA then erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found to be responsible
for the abduction and continued detention of three persons. For it appears that the responsible and accountable
individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas.
They should thus be made to comply with the CA decision to immediately release them.

In Re: Petition for Writ of Amparo in Favor of Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as
an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle when 4 men
forcibly took him and forced him into a car. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a
member of the NPA, but he remained silent. The car then entered a military camp. During the interrogation, the
soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head. The soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location
of the NPA camp. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where a doctor examined him. When the
doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained them when he
slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him.

The soldiers instructed petitioner not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that
he had surrendered to the military. Rodriguez was accompanied by soldiers to the CHR office, where Rodriguez
was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to return
home, he was forced to sign the document. He was able to go back home. Rodriguez then filed a Petition for the
Writ of Amparo. The CA granted the petition.

ISSUE:
Was the grant of the writ of amparo proper?

HELD:
YES. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President
Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. Although originally
used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in
civil cases for human rights abuses. However, this development in the use of command responsibility in civil
proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended if it should be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may
be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.

In the case, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise
remedial measures to protect his rights. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility,
the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the superior knew or had reason to
know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (c) the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. After a careful
examination of the records, there is sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17 th Infantry Battalion,
5th Infantry Division of the military abducted Rodriguez.

Sec. Leila de Lima v. Magtanggol Gatdula

G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013

FACTS:
Respondent Magtanggol Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo against petitioners Justice
Secretary Leila De Lima, Director Nonnatus Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo Esmeralda of the NBI for the
fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula. Instead of deciding on
whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.
During that hearing, De Lima manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases. The RTC
judge Pampilo insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer.

The RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and interim reliefs prayed for,
namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in
relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of
Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the
alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula.

ISSUE:
Was the grant of the writ of amparo proper?

HELD:
NO. A petition for a writ of amparo is initiated through a petition to be filed in the RTC, Sandiganbayan, the CA,
or the SC. The judge/justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation of the facts. After evaluation, the judge has
the option to issue the Writ or immediately dismiss the case. The issuance of the writ sets in motion
presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner and the court compels the respondents to appear before a
court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary. The
respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ. The Return serves as the responsive
pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in
the case. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition
and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the
hearing, the court will render the judgment within 10 days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If
the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs.

However, the "Decision" could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo. This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested
by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision.
The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court
upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.

Also, there irregularities made by the RTC, as to application of summary proceeding, when it only applies to
MTCs; holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a
Return, the issues could not have been properly joined; Worse, it required a memorandum in lieu of a
responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al. The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the
issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. More importantly, a
memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo.
The privilege includes availment of the entire Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its
attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail
the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to
the petitioner's life, liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be
executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC: WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Daniel Tapuz v. Judge Elmo del Rosario
G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008

FACTS:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio and Ma. Lourdes Sanson filed with the MCTC a complaint for forcible
entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
petitioners Daniel Tapuz and other John Does numbering about 120, alleging that they are the registered owners
of the land located in Boracay and petitioners, armed with bolos and suspected firearms and together with 120
unidentified persons, entered the land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents permission
and against the objections of the private respondents’ security men. The MCTC ruled in the private respondents’
favor.

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR. Hence, petitioners filed a
petition, among others, the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. The
petition was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Are petitioners entitled to a writ of habeas data?

HELD:
NO. Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts
in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, among others, (a) the personal circumstances of the
petitioner and the respondent; (b) the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) the actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
secure the data or information; and (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office,
and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known.

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that: (1) the PNP may release the report
on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private
respondents; and (2) to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in
the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP. These
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security are insufficient. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is
nothing more than the fishing expedition that this Court had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of
habeas data is not.

MERALCO v. Rosario Lim

G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Rosario Lim is an administrative clerk in MERALCO. An anonymous letter was posted at the door of
the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Bulacan at which denounced respondent as
corrupt and doing favors for the government. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO
linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter to the PNP. By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander
Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s HR, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in light of the
receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against her from unknown individuals and
which could possibly compromise her safety and security. Respondent appealed her transfer and requested for a
dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the
transfer amounted to a denial of due process.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against petitioners alleging petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and
refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty
and security, correctible by habeas data. The RTC granted the petition and directed petitioners to file their
verified written return. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that resort to a petition
for writ of habeas data was not in order and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to
the NLRC. The trial court issued the writ of habeas data ruling that recourse to said writ should extend not only
to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights
to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or data on the
reported threats to her person.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction to issue a writ of hbeas data?

HELD:
NO. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides that the writ of habeas data is a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.

According to jurisprudence, the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns, nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that
respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing that petitioner’s committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation
of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to
disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative.

Marynette Gamboa v. P/SSupt. Marlou Chan

G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Former PGMA issued A.O. 275 "Creating
an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country" to investigate
the existence of private army groups in the country with a view to eliminating them before the May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Gamboa alleged that the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted
a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.
Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on
her to the commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining
PAGs.

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-
Ilocos Norte. Respondents contended that the Petition, being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of
Gamboa. The RTC dismissed the Petition ruling that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining
PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, but failed to prove through
substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this
database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.

ISSUE:
May the Writ of Habeas Data be issued to petitioner?

HELD:
NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy.

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized
by the duly constituted authority. It is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 aim to investigate the existence of PAGs
with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its
goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an investigative body. Likewise, it authorized the Commission to
deputize the AFP, NBI, DOJ, PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the
performance of its functions. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, the PNP collected information
on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those
individuals is petitioner Gamboa.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the Zeñarosa
Commission. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs
the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data
must be denied.

Rhonda Vivares v. St. Theresa's College

G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

FACTS:
Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College, uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her
classmates wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their
teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero viewed and downloaded said pictures and showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action. STC found Tan, et al. to have violated the student’s handbook and
banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012. The issue went to court
but despite a TRO enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred
said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of one of the students, filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that: (1) the privacy setting of their children’s
Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must
be respected; (2) the photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently
showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon; and (3) the
intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STC’s Computer Laboratory. They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft
and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the
children’s right to privacy. The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the petition for writ of habeas data proper?

HELD:
YES. But in this case, it will not prosper. The Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Also, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. The SC ruled that if an online networking site like Facebook has privacy tools, and
the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, such
privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence
would show that that their post on Facebook was published as “Public” where every Facebook user can view the
photo. If a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that
the students concerned did set the posts that only five people can see them, then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who
informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan, et al. never
used the privacy settings of Facebook, hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of
them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be
considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher
and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it
was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school.

Dr. Joy Lee v. P/Supt. Neri Ilagan

G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014

FACTS:
Respondent Neri Ilagan and petitioner Joy Lee are common-law partners. When Ilagan visited Lee at her
condominium unit, he accidentally left his digital camera. As Lee found the said camera, she discovered that a
sex video of Ilagan with another woman was recorded therein, hence, she confronted Ilagan about it, which the
latter denied. Lee further alleged that during the confrontation, Ilagan slammed her head against a wall inside
his office and walked away. Thereafter, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing criminal and
administrative complaints against Ilagan.

Thereafter, Ilagan filed a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data on the ground that Lee’s acts of
reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM
and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the
other woman. The RTC issued the writ of habeas data.

ISSUE:
Is the issuance of the writ of habeas data proper?

HELD:
NO. In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the petition must adequately show that there
exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears
pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.

In this case, Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or
would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video.
While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find
its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection
between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. In fact, even discounting the
insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence
presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving
testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule.