I.

Rules of Special Proceeding

Rule 72: Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

Meaning and Scope of Special Proceedings

Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 12924216 January 2001

Facts:

Troadio Manalo died on February 1992 and was survived by his Pilar and his 11 children. The Troadio left several
real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992, 8 of the surviving children of Troadio filed a
petition with RTC for the judicial settlement of the estate of their father and for appointment of their brother Romeo
Manalo as its administrator. On the date of the hearing, the trial court issued an order declaring the world in default,
except the government and set the reception of evidence of the children. On motion of Pilar vda. de Manalo, et al.,
the order of general default was set aside. However, the trial court only admitted the opposition of Pilar, et al. only
for the purpose of considering its merits and denied most of the relief she sought.

Pilar, et al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, alleging that there was absence of earnest efforts
toward compromise among members of the same family. According to them, the petition is an ordinary civil action
involving members of the same family hence the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition
precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with. The CA, denied the petition.

Issue:

Whether the case is in the nature of an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family.

Whether Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable to special proceeding cases.

Ruling:

No, the case is in the nature of a special proceeding. It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature
of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition shall be
controlling. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate
of a deceased person such as the fact of death of Troadio, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of
his said death. The facts of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundational facts
upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. It also contains an enumeration
of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by Troadio which are sought to be
settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as
regard the intention of the children to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio.
Although, it contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action, Pilar, et al. may not be
allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The
rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is
determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defences contained in the answer.

No, Article 151 of the Family Code which provides that: "No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of
the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed" is applicable only to ordinary civil actions and NOT WITH SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. This is clear from
the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in
which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a
right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

Natcher v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 133000 02 October 2001

Facts:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
estate adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property where Graciano received 8/14 of the property
and his children 1/14 each. In 1980, Graciano married Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold a parcel
of land covered TCT No. 107443 to his wife Natcher. In 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Natcher and his
six children by his first marriage, as heirs. Graciano’s children filed a civil case against Natcher before the RTC alleging
that upon Graciano's death, Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired
TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Natcher resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Natcher. Similarly, Graciano’s
children alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

The RTC ruled that the deed of sale executed by Graciano in favor of Natcher was invalid as it is prohibited by law;
that it cannot constitute a valid donation but that the same may be an extension of advance inheritance. On appeal,
however, the CA ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction to distribute the estate of Graciano

Issue:

Whether an RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions
as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs.

Ruling:

No. An ordinary civil action and a special civil action may be differentiated as follows: 1. An ordinary civil action is a
formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law, whereas a
special civil action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by
the law; and 2. An ordinary civil action is a method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules,
whereas in special proceedings no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides - the
remedy being granted generally upon an application or motion.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is an ordinary civil action, whereas matters relating
to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the Graciano, partake of
the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in
the Rules of Court. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. In the case at hand, RTC is acting in its
general jurisdiction and is devoid of authority to render adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the
real property in favor of Natcher. Moreover, the RTC was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly
pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, Natcher.

Nature of Special Proceedings

Tabuada v. Ruiz
G.R. No. 168799 27 June 2008

Facts:

In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jose and Pacencia Caliman, the trial court issued the
following Order:

In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective counsel that they will be able to
raise an amicable settlement, finally, on or before 25 December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the
pending incidents for hearing as the parties and their counsel have assured this Court that they are going to
submit a “Motion for Judgment Based on an Amicable Settlement” on or before 25 December 2004.

The RTC, invoking Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on account of the parties’
failure to submit the amicable settlement and to comply with its Order.

Issue: Whether the termination of the case premature.

Ruling:

Yes, the termination of the case was premature. While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very
strongly encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide
an authority for the court to jettison the case. The case should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial
court on account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion
for Judgment Based on an Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings, which do
not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of
the parties interested, its dismissal should be ordered only in extreme cases where the termination of the
proceeding is the sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties
therein.

The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to
comply with the rules or any order of the court, cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous,
termination of the proceedings herein. The RTC, in its Order, neither required the submission of the amicable
settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they fail to submit the
compromise within the given period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order
requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. Even if it were
worded in coercive language, the parties cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly
encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable
settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an erroneous interpretation and
application of the law and rules.

Applicability of Rules of Civil Action

Hilado v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 164108 08 May 2009

Facts:

Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the Intestate Estate of Roberto S.
Benedicto before the RTC. The case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition was approved.
Alfred Hilado, et al. on the other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of Roberto. Hilado, et al. then filed with
the RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes
and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. The RTC denied the manifestation/motion, on the ground that
Hilado, et al. are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings. Hilado, et al. then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that
the RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings.

Issue:

Whether Hilado, et al. have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Benedicto.

Ruling:

No, Hilado, et al. does not have a right to intervene. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court…” While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude Hilado, et al. from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor “must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.”

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes
into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons falls within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that “in
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable
to special proceedings.” It can readily be concluded that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set
forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

II. Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons

Rule 73: Venue and Process

Venue and Meaning of Residence

Eusebio vs. Eusebio

December 28, 1956

FACTS: Andres Eusebio, the decedent, resided in San Fernando, Pampanga for 70 years. In 1952, he bought a house
in Quezon City where his belongings were transferred, while he is supposed to be treated for a heart ailment. Soon
thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke and was brought to the UST Hospital. He died later.

His son, Eugenio, filed with the CFI of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father.
According to his petition, Andres died on November 28, 1952, residing in the City of Quezon.

Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they
are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying
therefore, that the case be dismissed for improper venue.

LAW
Rule 75, Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.- ...in the CFI in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death...

ISSUE
Where is the residence of Andres?

HELD
Andres was residing in San Fernando, Pampanga, hence the venue was improperly laid.
The domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, where he resided for over 70 years. The presumption is
that he retained such domicile, and hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is
well-settled that “a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained”.

If Andres established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are
essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3)
intention to stay therein permanently. There is no direct evidence of Andres’s intention to stay, neither does he
appear to have manifested his wish to indefinitely in QC. Besides, it is well settled that “domicile is not commonly
changed by presence in a place merely for one’s own health, even if coupled with knowledge that one will never
again be able, on account of illness, to return home.

Garcia vs. Fule

November 29, 1976

FACTS
Virginia Fule, filed with the CFI of Laguna at Calamba, a petition for letters of administration, alleging, inter alia, that
Amado (the decedent) is a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, and that Amado was elected as Constitutional
Delegate for the First District of Laguna and that his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna. This was
opposed by Preciosa Garcia, the spouse of the decedent, questioning, among others authority of CFI Calamba.
Preciosa alleges that Amado was residing at Quezon City at the time he died, hence the venue was improperly laid.

LAW
Section 1, Rule 73...in the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his death...

ISSUE
Where is the proper venue of the petition?

HELD
The proper venue is in Quezon City.

The term “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73, refers to actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile.
“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person.
Cuenco vs. CA
October 26, 1973

FACTS
The decedent is Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco. He was survived by his widow and their two minor children, residing
in Quezon City, and his children by the first marriage including Lourdes Cuenco, residing in Cebu.

Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI of Cebu, alleging, inter alia, that the Senator died
intestate and that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death. His widow (petitioner) also filed a Petition with
the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased’s last will and testament and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, Lourdes filed an Opposition thereto. The Cebu Court issued an
order holding in abeyance its resolution until after the CFI of QC shall have acted on the petition for probate.

ISSUE
Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD
Either court has jurisdiction since the decedent manifested in his will that he has two residences. But since the QC
court was already given deference and consent of the Cebu court, then the QC court should assume jurisdiction.
The residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter
but merely of venue.

The court with whom the petition is first filed, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent’s last
will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with
his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition may actually be false,
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition in abeyance, and instead defer to the second
court.

San Luis vs. San Luis

February 6, 2007

FACTS
The decedent is Felicisimo San Luis. He was a governor of the Province of Laguna. He was survived by his third wife
(Felicidad), a son in his second marriage, and six children by his first marriage. His wife filed a petition for letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati City. She alleges, among others, that Felicisimo was residing at Alabang,
Metro Manila. One of the children of Felicisimo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, among
others. He claims that Laguna was his father’s place of residence prior to death.

ISSUE
Where is the proper venue?

HELD
RTC Makati is the proper venue.

There is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue,
the residence of person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which
may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Hence it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

Limited Jurisdiction of Probate Court

GR 144915 (February 23, 2004)

Camaya v Patulandon

FACTS: Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised, among others, a lot to her grandson
Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, she filed a petition for the probate of her will which was admitted to probate.
Later on, the she executed a codicil modifying the part pertaining to the subject lot by giving said lot to her 4 children
and to Mangulabnan (1/5 each). Mangulabnan sought the delivery of the lot but Patulandong (the executor) refused
on account of the codicil.

Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong (partition case). The court ordered partition
without prejudice to the probate of the codicil. On the other hand, Patulandong filed a petition for the probate of
the codicil. Mangulabnan later on sold the subject lot to the herein petitioners Camayas.

The probate court ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Mangulabnan and the Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the Camayas. The court also ordered the Register of Deeds to issue TCTs to the 4 children and to
Mangulabnan.

ISSUE: W/N the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and ordered the cancellation
of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale

HELD: YES, probate court exceeded its jurisdiction.

It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

In this case, having been apprised of the fact that the lot in question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a TCT issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of
the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. The
probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and
void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.

Moreover, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree provides:

SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law,

GR 127920 (August 9, 2005)

Pacioles v Chuatoco-Ching

FACTS: Both Pacioles (husband) and Emmanuel Ching (brother, nominated by the mother-respondent Ching) were
appointed as joint regular administrator of the estate. Pacioles filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion
praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and
distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees. Ching opposed Pacioles’
motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering
that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or
owned in a joint venture." Ching claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." The
intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." Pacioles filed a petition for certiorari.
The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing to
inquire into the propriety of Ching’s claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate.
This act is not tainted with of grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: W/N a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate

HELD: GR: NO, the probate court has no jurisdiction.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend
to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle
that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is
merely incidental and provisional.

The CA relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing
on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose
of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the
purpose of the intestate court.

First, the inventory was not disputed. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the
exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she
expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.

And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita’s estate,
did not submit his own inventory. He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one
shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.

Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should
or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final
determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. Clearly, the RTC,
acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that when a question
arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some
other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to
that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Respondent’s recourse is to
file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction.

GR 167405 (February 16, 2006)

Reyes v Sotero

FACTS: Chichioco, claiming to be the niece and heir of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising. According to her, the deceased left real properties
and assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes
(petitioner), a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate.
Reyes filed an Opposition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband. She asserted
that the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since she was
the only heir of Lising. She submitted a certification from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was
registered therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the
decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Chichioco filed a criminal complaint against Reyes for
falsification of the adoption decree which was ultimately dismissed by the DOJ.

The RTC appointed its branch clerk of court as the special administrator and enjoined Reyes from conducting
business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent. In a special civil action for certiorari, the CA reversed
the appointment of the special administrator but held that it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the
trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court,
"imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."

ISSUE: W/N the validity of an adoption decree can be assailed in a proceeding for the settlement of estate

HELD: NO, it cannot be assailed in a proceeding for the settlement of estate.

The certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption
which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption until contradicted or overcome by
sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since
the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought
principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding
for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso. Accordingly, respondents
cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is
the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of
adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed
legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no
serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioner’s adoption is
considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate.

Exceptions to Limited Jurisdiction

GR L-27082 (January 31, 1978)

Coca v Borromeo

FACTS: A special proceeding was instituted for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses. There are 3 sets
of heirs: Heirs or Francisco, Prima and Concepcion. The administrator (Coca) presented a project of partition for with
a combined area of 22 hectares (Atty-3, Francisco-5.3, Prima-6.3, Concepcion-7.3). The Heirs of Francisco opposed
the project partition claiming 12.6 ha, that Prima shall be excluded because she sold her share to Francisco and
Concepcion shall have 6.3 ha. The lower court, after noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the
ownership of the twelve hectares, issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve
hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan. After excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did not
bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that
remainder.

ISSUE: W/N the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should
be decided in the intestate proceeding

HELD: YES, it shall be decided in the intestate proceeding.

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In
essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are
all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide
the question of ownership.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the
hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs who have all
appeared in the intestate proceeding. As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society.
They should not be forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to
determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.

PORTUGAL vs. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN

Facts:
 Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta and she gave birth to
Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli
Portugal.Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of
their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a parcel of land in his favor. Lazo died.

Portugal also died intestate. Portugal-Beltran executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person” adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then issued the title in her name.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the (RTC) of Caloocan City a complaint against Portugal-Beltran for annulment of
the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled
to inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta
and Portugal Jr.‘s status amd right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court, and lack of
jurisdiction over the case.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC‘s dismissal of the case.

Issue: Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as
heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title
issued in her name

Held: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are
pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file
one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the parcel of
land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that
the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal‘s
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Eusebio Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his wife, cousins all surnamed
Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes (wife) died the
following year. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of Capili, she was substituted by her
collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro. The executor filed a project of partition in the estate
proceedings in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs
with the exception of Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives.

These relatives filed an opposition to the executor’s project of partition and submitted a counter-projection of their
own claiming ½ of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Capili on the  theory that they belong not to
the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. The probate court issued an order declaring the
donation void for the reason that it falls under Article133 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between
spouses during the marriage. In the same order, the court disapproved both project of  partitions and directed the
executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of Capili and the properties
mentioned in the deed of donation, between the instituted heirs of Capili and Reyes, upon the basis that the said
properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.

Issue:
Whether or not a probate court in a special proceeding had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed
of donation in question and pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned in the will.

Held:
Yes. The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed
upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However, the court has also held that when the
parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to
title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (and that with
the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by
the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced. The Court
held that the determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The probate
court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including the
widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the
executor himself and who appeared voluntarily. The petitioners, by presenting their project  of partition including
therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband) put in question the
issue of ownership of the properties is within the competence of the probate court.

Claims for or Against Conjugal Partnership

Calma vs. Tanedo

Facts:
Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit own a conjugal property. They were also indebted to
Esperanza Tanedo which debt was chargeable to the conjugal property. Fausta died leaving a will wherein she
appointed her daughter, Maria Calma as administratrix of her properties. While the
probate proceedings of Fausta were pending, Tanedo filed a complaint against Eulalio for the recovery of the sums
of money, and the CFI rendered judgment for the payment of the debt. In the execution of the judgment, despite the
third party claim filed by Fausta, the property was sold by the sheriff.

Issue:

Whether Esperanza Tanedo can charge the debt against Eulalio?

Ruling:

 No.The amendment introduced by Act No. 3176 consists in authorizing the institution of testate or intestate

proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of an ordinary action for the liquidation and
partition of the property of a conjugal partnership. It should be understood that these remedies are alternative, and
not cumulative, in the sense that they cannot be availed of at
thesame time. Consequently, the testamentary proceedings of Fausta having beeninstituted, the liquidation and
partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to Eulalio should be made in these proceedings, to the
exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose. The SC also decided in another case that when the marriage
is dissolved by death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband ceases, passing to
theadministrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedingsinstituted to that end if there be
any debts to be paid. From the foregoing, it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio for the
payment of the debt, which were debts chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio as legal
administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta was living, had ceased and passed tot eh administratrix Maria.
Hence, this being indebtedness chargeable against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought
against Eulalio, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property. The claim for this amount had to
be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta.

Ocampo vs. Potenciano

Facts:

Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed to his relative, Conrado Potenciano and his wife
Rufina Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro, a town lot with a house. On the same day Ocampo signed another
document, making it to appear that the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the
redemption period. Though registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as
conjugal property. Several extensions were given for repurchase but no repurchase was made. Potenciano filed with
the Register of Deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title, and the RD issued a TCT in the name of
Potenciano and his wife. Subsequently, with Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz
Yatco an option to repurchase the property. Paz sought to exercise the option but Potenciano rejected it so Paz
tendered the payment to the court. Intervening in the case, Potenciano’s children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a cross-
complaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by their father to plaintiff was null and void as to the share of
Rufina, which share passed to them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father’s share in the property they
were exercising the right of redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common, for which
purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1250.

Issue: Whether Potenciano had the authority to enter into the agreement for the repurchase of the conjugal

property after the death of his wife?

Ruling:

  The CA erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator of the
conjugal estate. The decisions relied on by the CA in support of its view are now obsolete in view of the enactment
of Act No. 3176,which provides that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either
husbandor wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestateproceedings of the deceased
spouse. Furthermore, there is ground to believe that the option agreement in question was nothing more than a
mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgage debt, since in the mind of the parties the  real transaction
between them was that of loan with security, or equitable mortgage. It follows that at the time Paz Yatco made the
tender of payment and consigned the necessary amount in court, the said
contractof loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal currency, the tender and
consignation must be held to produce their legal effect,which is that of relieving the debtor from liability. Under this
view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of Victor and Lourdes and that the CA erred in not declaring
them owners of the property in question, they having inherited ½ of it from their mother and acquired the other half
from their father in the exercise of their right of legal redemption as co-owners. As ownership in the property never
passed to their parents, they acquired nothing.

Rule 74: Summary Settlement of Estates

Extrajudicial Settlement by Agreement and Two-Year Lien

MALAHACAN vs. IGNACIO, et al.

G.R. No. L-6207, August 4, 1911
Facts:
Malahacan, as administrator of the estate of the late Guillerma Martinez (Guillerma), sued the Ignacios (Defendants)
to recover possession of the real estate owned by Guillerma. The defendants are the only heirs of Guillerma. It is not
alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts
outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death.

Issue:

May an administrator demand the possession of a deceased’s real estate from the legal heirs if there are no claims
against the estate?

Ruling:

No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in
his death. Guillerma, having seized of the lands involved in this suit after her death, leaving the defendants as her
only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate
possession thereof. The only ground upon which an administrator can demand the possession of the real estate from
the heirs at law is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. The Supreme Court, in
citing the case of Calzado vs. Alaras Frondoza, stated that when there are no debts existing against the estate, there
is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among
the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be
burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator.

ARCILLAS vs. MONTEJO,

G.R. No. L-21725, November 29, 1968
Facts:

Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased Eustaquio Arcillas, sought the cancellation of the TCT of Lot No.
276 and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs in the enumerated proportions
alleged in the petition. But before any other material pleading could be filed with respect to this petition, five (5)
other children of the deceased filed a petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, praying for the issuance of
letters of administration in favor of Aurelio Arcillas preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate.

In his answer, Geronimo Arcillas opposed the issuance of letters of administration to herein petitioner, arguing that
inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition for
administration was improper. However, Aurelio Arcillas, in his reply, insisted that there were still other properties of
the estate of the deceased besides Lot No. 276, that there was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial
partition, and that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of their participation in the estate.

In the trial court’s ruling, Respondent Judge Montejo denied the later petition and gave due course to Geronimo’s
petition "... to obviate the necessity of spending uselessly which would only deplete the funds of the estate; to avoid
unnecessary delay in the partition of the property involved herein, and following the doctrines established by the
Honorable Supreme Court in several cases of the same nature, which is in consonance with the provisions of Section
1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court…”

Issue:

Did the respondent Judge act properly in dismissing the administration proceedings under the authority of section 1,
rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in
its distribution are all of age?

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court, citing Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273, ruled that section I does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire
to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate
among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do
so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may
be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would
have employed the word shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word
may its used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the
discretion of the heirs.

Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of
settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then be
rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the
ground that the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the estate. The
resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have been
voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not in the future be heard to complain of these
matters. Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to the alleged existence of other properties of the
deceased aside from the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in administration proceedings rather
than in any other action.

PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. L-81147, June 20, 1989
Facts:

Rita Pereira Nagac (Rita), sister of the deceased Andres Pereira, instituted an action for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner Victoria Pereira, spouse of the
deceased, for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased.

Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favour of Rita and appointed her as the administratrix of the intestate estate
of Andres Pereira.

Issue:

Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the court before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified
in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres
Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. The parties in this case admit that there are no
debts of the deceased to be paid. The only conceivable reason why Rita seeks appointment as administratrix is for
her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are
presently in the hands of Victoria who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is
not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the
estate of Andres Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has
been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose
it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, the claims of both parties as to the
properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors,
should there be any, are protected in any event.

PADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000
Facts:

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house
on the northern portion of a lot owned by Jacinto. When Feliciano died, his children continued living in the house.
Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario (Verona), one of Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.

Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this
purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Deeds. At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias, one of Jacinto’s six (6) children, was himself present
while his other brothers were represented by their children.

After some of the heirs of Jacinto have sold their respective co-ownership right in the lot, Silverio Pada, one of the
grandchildren of Jacinto, demanded that Verona and her husband vacate the northern portion of the lot and filed a
complaint for ejectment against them on June 26, 1995.

On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, another son of Jacinto, executed a Deed of Donation transferring to
petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of the subject lot. On February 12, 1996, Verona
and her husband filed their Answer to the ejectment complaint averring that the northern portion of the subject lot
had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of
the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney was
executed by the children of Jacinto in favor of their respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial
partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in the office of
the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

The MTC ruled in favor of Verona. However, the RTC reversed the MTC’s ruling and the CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.

Issue: Is the extrajudicial partition in 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto valid?

Ruling:

Yes. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid,
albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be
registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be
put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from
which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be
valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards
the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their
object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property, must
appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or
enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property,
considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification
of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance.
The belated act of the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44)
years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to
other heirs, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject
property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of
coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta.
Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were
not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal
effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.

Remedies against Extrajudicial Settlement

(Contribution from Distribution, Execution against Bond or Sale of Realty of Decedent)

G.R. No. L-6871, January 15, 1912

JOSE McMICKING (McMicking), administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose (Margarita) vs. BENITO SY CONBIENG
(Conbieng), administrator of the estate of Pio de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco (Barretto)

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca (Palanca) was the administrator of the estate of Margarita and took possession of all her
properties. Mariano Ocampo was Palanca’s surety. However, Ocampo died.

Ocampo’s appointed administrator was Doreteo Velasco, while Pio Barretto (Baretto) became a surety of said
Doroteo.

Doroteo, as the administrator filed a complete report and inventory of the property, together with an agreement of
partition. CFI approved the agreement. Thus, Doroteo delivered all the properties to the devisees and legatees of the
said Ocampo, leaving no property or thing of value whatever belonging to said estate.

Meanwhile, Palanca was removed as administrator due to his refusal to render an account and failure to return the
properties. McMicking was appointed in his stead and filed a claim against Palanca.

However due to Palanca’s default, McMicking filed a claim against to the estate of Barretto, as the surety of
Doroteo. Doroteo as the administrator of the estate of Ocampo, who in turn, is the surety of said Palanca.

CFI: ruled in favor of Barretto, through Conbieng

ISSUE: WON McMicking may claim against the Barretto as the surety of Doroteo Velasco.

HELD: NO, Barretto is not liable.

The Court based their decision upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Barretto was surety,
would not have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon
the obligation, the surety cannot be.

A partition of the property of a deceased person may be made, notwithstanding that an administrator with the will
annexed has been appointed and the administration of the estate under said appointment is in progress. Such
provisions are applicable no matter what stage the administration has reached

SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. — Whatever all the
heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the intestate
estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as shown under
 Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate
among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.

SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it shall appear, at any time within two years after
such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which
have not been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the
court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying
the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors
for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have
been made.

These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent without proceedings in
court. These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal construction so that the intent of the framers
may be fully carried out.

In the case at bar, under the broad and liberal policy which the court adopted, the division of the property of
Mariano Ocampo, deceased falls within the provisions of said sections and may be termed, a partition of the
property of a decedent without legal proceedings within the meaning of those sections. The fact of the prior
appointment of an administrator and the filing of an inventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as
the right of the owners to partition is concerned. The only requisite for such petition prescribed by the law is that
"there are no debts or all the debts have been paid by the heirs." When this condition is fulfilled the partition can
take place, no matter what stage the administration may have reached.

The basis of the liability of a surety on an administrator's bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of
the principal precedes that of the surety. Thus, If Velasco incurred no liability, and then his surety incurred none.

Reopening by Intervention within Reglementary Period

G.R. No. 47475. May 6, 1942.

DONATO LAJOM (Lajom) vs. JOSE P. VIOLA, RAFAEL VIOLA, and SILVIO VIOLA (Violas)

FACTS: Lajom filed a complaint in CFI Nueva Ecija, praying, that he be declared a natural child of the late Dr. Maximo
Viola and therefore a co-heir of the Violas, legitimate children. A demurrer was also filed by Violas on the ground
that the will was already probated.

CFI of Nueva Ecija ruled in favor to the Violas and dismissed the case

ISSUE: WON the aggrieved co-heir, Lojam, may bring an action for reivindication within the prescriptive period

HELD: YES, Lojam may bring an action. In any event this matter of prescription of the action has not been set up as a
defense.

Under the law the aggrieved coheir may bring an action for reivindication within the prescriptive period, properly
applied section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding acquisitive prescription after ten years of adverse
possession by "occupancy, grant, descent or otherwise." In order words, that even after a decree of distribution, an
action for recovery may be brought by the excluded heir within ten years.

Also, Sec. 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure safeguard the protection of property rights. The lawmaker must have
contemplated, would seem to reveal the wisdom of allowing a coheir the benefits of the law of prescription even
after a partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been had. Since, frequently the heirs are living in different provinces, far
from one another and far from the residence of the decedent.

Section 196. Paramount rights and amicable partition not affected. — Nothing herein contained shall be
construed so as to injure, prejudice, defeat, or destroy the estate, right or title of any person claiming a tract
of land, or any part thereof, by title under any other person, or by title paramount to the title of the joint
tenants, tenants in common, or co-parceners by whom partition may have been made.

In the case at bar, Lojam has a paramount title to his share in the estate. Applying the law, Lojam as the aggrieved
coheir may bring an action within ten years even after a decree of distribution of the estate of Dr. Maximo.

G.R. No. L-26876, December 27, 1969

LUCRECIA JEREZ (Lucrecia) vs. HON. EMIGDIO v. NIETES (Judge Nietes)

FACTS: Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed before the sala of Judge
Nietes, where Lucrecia, his widow, was appointed as administratrix. A project of partition and final accounting was
submitted. Judge Nietes gave an order approving the partition. Lucilo Jalandoni alleged that he is an acknowledged
natural child of the late Nicolas, and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that he is an illegitimate son, sought to
be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project of partition.

Judge Nietes allowed the intervention and reopened the proceedings to permit Lucilo, to present whatever evidence
they may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased.

CA: Affirmed the order of Judge Nietes

ISSUE: WON the decision of Judge of Nietes was proper.

HELD: No, Lucilo must present evidence to justify their right to intervene in special proceeding.

The Court held that as a rule preterited heirs must file an intervention with proper motion within the reglementary
period to secure relief by reopening the proceedings. The only exception for a probate proceeding that has a final
liquidation be set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

In the case at bar, Judge Nietes acted too soon, that the motion of Lucilo did not suffice to call for an intervention.
There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In the absence
thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be considered premature. Thus, the court required Lucilo to file
a proper motion to justify its intervention.

New Action to Annul Settlement within the Reglementary Period

G.R. No. L-19060. May 20, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA (Gerona) vs. CARMEN DE GUZMAN (de Guzman)

FACTS: Placida was the legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora.

After the death of his first wife, Marcelo married Camila, who begot him several children, all surnamed De Guzman;
Placida has 3 children, all surnamed Gerona.

Marcelo died and subsequently the De Guzman fraudulently executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement of the
estate, with the misrepresentation that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased, despite of the knowledge
of the Gerona, as Mareclo’s forced heirs.
De Guzman thereby secured new TCTs in their own name; such fraud was discovered by the Gerona only the year
before the institution of the case.

Gerona demanded share in said properties; but the De Guzman refused to heed said demand, contending that
Gerona’s Mother, Placida, was a spurious child and their action is barred by statute of limitations. Thus, Gerona filed
a complaint for reconveyance.

RTC: ruled in favor with the De Guzman, that the action has already been prescribed

ISSUE: WON the action for partition has been prescribed

HELD: Yes, Gerona’s action is barred by statute of Frauds.

It is already settled that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust,
resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition
among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the De Guzman do not hold the property in question
under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases; from the moment such adverse title is
asserted by the possessor of the property.

Hence, the action for reconveyance should have been filed within four (4) years from the discovery of fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, in 1948, when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of De Guzman exclusively, for the registration
of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.

GR 118680, March 5, 2001

Pedrosa v CA

Facts: Maria Elena Rodriquez-Pedrosa (herein petitioner) was legally adopted by spouses Miguel and Rosalina
Rodriguez in 1946. In April 1972, Miguel died intestate. Pedrosa and Rosalina thereafter entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate, adjudicating the estate equally between themselves.

In November 1972, Miguel’s brothers and sisters (Rodriguezes and herein private respondents) filed an action to
annul the adoption of Pedrosa. On March 11, 1983, while said action is pending, Rosalina entered into an
extrajudicial settlement with the Rodriguezes for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar,
who died after Miguel. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel.

In June 1986, the Rodriguezes filed a joint motion to dismiss the action to annul the adoption of Pedrosa. This, the
court granted. Therefter, Pedrosa sent her daughter to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The
latter refused.

On January 28, 1987, Pedrosa filed a complaint to annul the 1983 extrajudicial settlement and partition. Both RTC
and CA dismissed the complaint, holding that the complaint was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period as
provided in Section 4 of Rule 74.

Issue: Whether or not the right of action to annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition has already
prescribed

Held: No. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two-year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition and in addition (2) when the provision of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly
complied with, i.e., that all persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians. Pedrosa, as records confirm, did not participate in the partition.
Hence, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in this case.
The applicable period is four years when the action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement is on the ground of
fraud. It may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Since it was filed on January 28, 1987 or
three years and ten months after the March 1983 partition was executed, the action has not yet prescribed.

Note that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. It is also not correct to say that Rosalina represented Pedrosa in
the partition, since Pedrosa at that time was no longer a minor. Note also that as adopted child, Pedrosa excludes
the collateral relatives of his father. The Rodriguezes, therefore, had no interest in the estate of Miguel.

Summary Settlement of Estates of Small Value

GR L-5033, June 28, 1954
Estate of Franscisco v Carreon

Facts: Rosa Francisco, wife of deceased Jose Francisco petitioned the court for summary settlement of the estate of
her husband. After the requisite publication and there being no creditors, the court issued an order adjudicating
one-half undivided share to the widow Rosa, and the other half in equal parts to their three children.

Thereafter, Rosa mortgaged her share of the real property to the Carreon sisters. Later, she conveyed by absolute
deed of sale her interest in the land to the Carreons.

Tiburcia Francisco, mother of deceased Jose, filed a motion in representation of a certain Jose Palumpon, a
recognized natural son of the deceased, who was not able to participate in the settlement of the estate of Jose. She
further alleged that the property in question was private property of Jose, of which the wife could not have been
awarded a portion. Because Rosa’s interest in the property conflicted with that of her own children, Tiburcia sought
to represent the three legitimate children as well.

Subsequently, the demand for recognition of Jose Palumpon was withdrawn. However, the court decided to
proceed in taking up the matter concerning the adjudication of one-half of the estate to Rosa. It eventually found
that the land was indeed private property of Jose Francisco, acquired four years before marriage. As such, the whole
estate passed to the ownership of the three legitimate children. The court, therefore, annulled the mortgage and
sale of the land in favor of the Carreons, to which the latter appealed.

Issue: Can the probate court validly take cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and sale?

Held: Yes. If during the summary proceeding, some of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the decedent, some
parcels of land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which must be decided in a separate
suit. But in this case, there is no question that the realty belonged to the decedent and a separate suit was
unnecessary, especially considering the nature of summary settlements.

Furthermore, Section 4, Rule 74 expressly authorizes the court to give every heir his lawful participation in the real
estate “notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate” and to “issue execution” thereon. All this implies that
when within the amendatory period, the realty was alienated, the court, in re-dividing it among the heirs, has
authority to direct cancellation of such alienation in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to
do so. To require the institution of a separate action for such annulment would run counter to the letter and spirit of
summary settlements.

GR L-10474, February 28, 1958

Sampilo v CA

Facts: Teodoro Tolete died intestate, leaving as heirs his widow Leoncia and several nephews and nieces, children of
deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, Leoncia executed an affidavit stating that her husband left no heir
other than his legitimate wife to inherit his properties consisting of four parcels of land. She registered said affidavit
in the Register of Deeds. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the land in favor of Sampilo for the sum
of P10,000. Sampilo later sold the realty to Salacup.
In March 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Tolete. She alleged that
the widow had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication, there being other heirs. As such, Sampilo and
Salacup acquired no rights to the land sold to them.

The CFI declared the affidavit and the deeds of sale all null and void. CA modified the judgment, declaring that the
deeds of sale are void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that corresponds to
Leoncia.

Issue: Whether Sinopera and her co-heirs’ right of action to recover the lands had already prescribed, not having
been filed within two years

Held: No. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement or by affidavit, is an ex parte
proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third
persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit,
especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.

Hence, the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition
after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken
part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.

Neither is Section 4, Rule 74 a statute of limitations or a bar of actions against third persons. It is only a bar against
the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings, but not against third persons not parties thereto.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is
still unavailing to Sampilo. The action of Sinopera is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the
lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or nieces, nor other heirs except
herself. Plaintiff's right of action, which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years, does not appear to
have lapsed when the action was instituted.

(Guys, walang mention ng summary settlement sa case.)

Rule 75: Production of Will, Allowance of Will Necessary

Probate Mandatory

GR 12184, Sept. 27, 1917

US v Chiu Guimco

Facts: Joaquin Cruz died in China during one of his visits there, leaving an estate worth P40,000-P50,000. He also left
a wife (Uy Cuan) and a child in China, and another wife (Maria Villafranca) in the Philippines.

Before his departure to China, he was able to execute a will before a notary public, in which he named his brother
Chiu Guimco and a certain Co-Iden as executors. Co-Iden eventually died with nothing done to institute probate of
the will. Meanwhile, Chiu Guimco managed Joaquin’s business and properties.

In exchange for certain properties, Maria agreed to relinquish any interest in the estate of Joaquin. Later, however,
Uy Cuan arrived in the Philippines to effect the settlement of her husband’s estate. Through a friend (Ramon
Contreras) who inquired about the affairs of the estate, Uy Cuan sent Chiu Guimco a letter urging him to produce the
will of the decedent for the institution of lawful proceedings in accord therewith. He replied through a letter
denying having seen or taken possession of the will.

A complaint was filed in court charging Chiu Guimco, under Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure with failure to
produce the will within the time required by law. The CFI found him guilty. Because he failed to produce the will
even after the court’s order, he was fined and committed to prison until he produces the will.
Issue: Whether it was right to commit Chiu to jail until he produces the will

Held: No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that if a person having custody of a will after the death
of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by
the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court and there
kept in close confinement until he delivers the will. This provision can only be applied when a court is acting in the
exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and where administration
proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require that there be
before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under this section
appropriate.

Further, Section 628 is an ordinary criminal prosecution. To enforce the production of the will by the accused, as
provided in Section 629, would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the will by him
would be conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint; and it seems probable that
this would constitute an infringement of that provision of law which says that in a criminal action the defendant shall
be exempt from testifying against himself.