SPECPRO CASE DIGESTS

1. Rules of Special Proceedings (Rule 72, Rules of COurt)

1 Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880 , No. 16680 September 13, 1920
Facts:
This is a case of special proceeding where the judge appointed assessors for the purpose of fixing the
amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management and
settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge is authorized by law in a special proceeding to appoint assessors for
purposes mentioned above?
Ruling:
No. The judge is not authorized to appoint assessors in special proceedings. Supreme Court made a
distinction on what is the difference of action and special proceeding. The former means an ordinary suit in a
court of justice while the latter is every other remedy furnished by law. An action is a formal demand of ones
legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by law. It is a method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules. While a special proceeding may be defined as an application
or proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in
special proceedings is generally granted upon an application or motion.
Being different in nature, the Supreme Court held that the judge is not authorized by law to appoint
assessors because such authority is properly given to the judge in an ordinary action and not in a special
proceeding.

2 Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 , G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001
Facts:
Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife and eleven (11) children. He left several
properties which is the source of controversy because eight out of eleven children filed in the RTC of Manila for
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as
administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order of default. However this order was set aside by the trial court upon
motion of three (3) children of Manalo who did not join in filing a case for judicial settlement made by their other
brothers and sisters. Several pleadings were filed by the three children of Manalo in opposition to the present
petition.
RTC rendered decision in favor of the eight children.
Issue:
Whether or not this case is an ordinary action or special proceeding
Whether or not compromise agreement is applicable in special proceedings
Ruling:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition shall be controlling. In the case at bar, SC
noted the jurisdictional facts of the petition such as the fact of death of their father, enumerations of the name
of legal heirs including tentative properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in a probate
proceedings. Further, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action is determined by the averments of the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer. Thus, considering all of those mentioned the eight heirs of Manalo seek judicial

settlement of the estate of their late father which makes their petition a special proceeding and not just an
ordinary action.
Being a special proceeding, a compromise agreement which is a condition precedent before filing an
action is not applicable to this case because there is no defendant impleaded therein. SC pronounced in
several cases that an action is different from a special proceeding. Thus, the petition for issuance of letters of
administration, settlement and distribution of estate is a special proceeding where the petitioners (eight
children) therein seek to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. The three children who are the
oppositors merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court. Petition DENIED.
3 Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385 , G.R. No. 133000 October 02, 2001
Facts:
Spouses Graciano and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death
of Graciana their six children entered in an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate. Before Graciano
contracted his second marriage to herein petitioner, he first donated his pieces of properties to his children
leaving only enough for himself. That lot which is left for him was subdivided into two where the first lot was
sold to a third person and the second one was still in his ownership. Then when Graciano married Patricia
Natcher, he sold the second lot to her. Graciano died. Here comes the controversy that rooted from the sale of
the second lot by their father to herein petitioner. The six children of Graciano want that the sale be annulled
because it was through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery that the second lot was sold to Natcher. The RTC
issued a decision, among which is the declaration that the deed of sale cannot be regarded as donation it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir. CA
reversed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
Whether or Not RTC acting on its general jurisdiction could render adjudication and resolve the issue of
advancement of real property
Ruling:
No. RTC is devoid of authority to render adjudication and resolved the issue of advancement of real
property. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. SC contended that RTC Manila was not
properly constituted to be a probate court when it decides on these matters.
In a train of decisions, SC has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although
generally a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership yet if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership.

4 Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768 , G.R. No. L-26751, No.L-26085, No. L-26106 January 31,
1969
Facts:
Carlos Matute one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of Matias Matute filed in a special
proceeding for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos) appointment in such capacity. Carlos
alleged that for two years Matias was not able to properly perform his job for being incompetent and negligent
in his management of the estate and that allegations are supported by documents which was not properly
identified by the court. Matias filed oppositions thereto contending that the allegations against him are all
hearsay, self-serving and without a basis. Hence, he filed a motion to dismiss/ or demurrer to evidence which
avers that there is no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support for the removal of the Matias. In the
same motion, said counsel reserved the right to introduce evidence in behalf of his client should the foregoing
motion be denied. Then the probate court issued an order removing Matias as a co-administrator.
Issue:
Whether or Not motion to dismiss/ or demurrer to evidence is applicable in a special proceeding

Ruling:
Yes. This application of the above cited rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized
by section 2 of rule 72 which direct that in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for ordinary
civil actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. According to the SC, what is
patently censurable is the actuation of the probate judge in removing the respondent, not on the strength of the
evidence adduced by the movants but on the basis of his (judge) findings, which he motu propio gleaned from
the records of special proceeding without affording the Matias an opportunity to controvert said findings or in
the very least to explain why he should not be removed on the basis thereof. Evidently, Matias was not
afforded due process of law.

5 Guy vs. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 151 , G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
Facts:
Private respondent-minors, represented by their mother, filed a petition for letters of administration
before the RTC of Makati entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei. Petitioner, as one of the known heirs of the
deceased, opposed the said petition. Moreover, the petitioner stressed that the filiation of the respondents was
not duly established and it cannot be done together with the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The RTC
ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
May the court before which a petition for letters of administration is pending accept evidence on a
persons filiation?
Held:
The SC denied the petition
The jurisdiction of the courts extends to matter incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status
of each heir and two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance,
may be joined in one complaint.

6 Reyes vs. Sotero, 482 SCRA 520 , G.R. No. 167405 February 16, 2006
Facts:
Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late
Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac. She claimed that was the niece and heir of Lising who died
intestate. Reyes file an opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and she
submitted public documents to support her claim. Chichioco seeked the annulment of the adoption decree.
Issue:
May the adoption decree be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents
estate?
Held:
The SC granted the petition
The decree of adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in the petition for letters of administration.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

7 Lasam vs. Umengan, 510 SCRA 496

Facts:
Petitioners file a complaint for unlawful detainer before the before the MTCC, alleging that they are the
owners of the subject lots. They anchored their claim on the purported last will and testament of Isabel
Cuntapay. In her answer, respondent alleged that she acquired said lots through sale and donation inter vivos
from an heir of Isabel Cuntapay. The MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioners by giving credence to the will even
if it was not probated. The CA reversed the ruling of the MTCC.
Issue:
Is the will reliable to establish the petitioners claim even if it was not probated?
Held:
The SC denied the petition
Under RULE 75, Sec. 1: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance shall be conclusive as to
its due execution.

8 Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, 490 SCRA 140 , G.R. No. 139868 June 08, 2006
Facts:
Spouses Audrey ONeill and Richard Guersey were American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter Kyle. In 1979, Audrey died leaving a will. In it, she
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard. The will was admitted to probate before the Court of Baltimore,
Maryland, USA. Such court named petitioner as ancillary administrator. In 1981, Richard married respondent
with whom he had two children. In 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the CFI of Rizal. In
1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., shares, which he left to Kyle. In 1987, petitioner a project of partition
of Audreys estate, with Richard being apportioned the and Kyle the of the Makati property. Meanwhile,
the petitioner also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richards 3/4 share in the Makati property was
allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy. Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, his entire share in the Makati property should be given to respondent. The CFI ruled in favor of
the respondent and such ruling was affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
What law shall govern in the settlement of property located in the Philippines but owned by foreigners?
Did the petitioner committed fraud in ignoring the applicability of the foreign law in the settlement of the
estate of the decedent?
Held:
The SC denied the petition
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are
her heirs, is governed by her national law, that is, the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in
Article 16 of the Civil Code. While laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of
Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Thus, the failure of the petitioner to introduce such law is tantamount to an extrinsic fraud.

9 Domingo vs. Landicho, 531 SCRA 606 G.R. No. 170015 , August 29, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Tagaytay Cuty an application for registration of five parcels of land. He
claimed that he bought the lots from Genoveva and has since been in continuous, open, public, adverse and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner. He further claimed that prior to his purchase of
the lots, Genoveva had been in possession thereof in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. Herein
respondents filed an opposition to the application, claiming that they have been in continuous, open, public,
adverse and actual possession and cultivation of the lots in the concept of an owner and have been paying real
estate taxes thereon. During the pendency of his application, petitioner died. His counsel, did not, however,
inform the RTC of his death. The RTC granted the application. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
Can the court render judgment in an action that survives even if theres no substitution of the deceased
applicant?
Held:
The SC denied the petition
Under the Rules of Court, it is the counsels duty to inform the court promptly of the death of his
client so that the court can make an order substituting a legal representative or heir in place of the
deceased.
When a party dies in an action that survives and no order is issued by the court for the appearance
of the legal representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a
matter of fact no substitution has ever been effected, the proceedings held by the court without such
legal representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because
the court acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or of the heirs upon
whom the trial and judgment would be binding.
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90, Rules of Court)

10 Eusebio vs. Eusebio, et al., 100 Phil. 593 , No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
Facts:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of
the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in
Quezon City. Eugenios siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are
illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenios petition and overruled his siblings objection.
Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr.
Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to
transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his sons residence. It is
well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one owns health even
if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home. Having
resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent
Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr.
Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in
San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house
at 889 A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract

signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical
presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with the first
two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they
introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically made of
record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of
assailing the same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that
the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
venue having been laid improperly.

Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It is not changed by presence in a
place for ones own health.

11 Maloles II vs. Phillips, 324 SCRA 172 , G.R. No. 129505, G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000
Facts:
A, during his lifetime, filed a petition for probate of his will in Branch 61, claiming that hehad no compulsory
heirs and left all his properties to a foundation. He named D as executrix.The will was allowed and A
subsequently died. P filed a motion for intervention claiming to beAs nephew while D filed a motion for
issuance of letters testamentary which D later withdrew.D refiled her motion with Branch 65. Branch 65
appointed D as special administrator but later ordered the transfer of Ds case to Branch 61. However, Branch 61
remanded the second caseback to Branch 65.
Issue:
Whether Branch 65 has jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes.After Branch 61 allowed the will of A, it had nothing else to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of
the will pursuant to Rule 73 12 of the Rules of Court. After As death, insofar asthe venue of the petition for
probate of the will of A is concerned, it does not bar other branchesof the same court from taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of the testator after hisdeath. Thus, Branch 65 has jurisdiction.

12 Malig vs. Bush, 28 SCRA 449 , No. L-22761 May 31, 1969
Facts: the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural children and the only
heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush. They prayed that They prayed that the project of partition
be annulled; that the defendant be ordered to submit a complete inventory and accounting of all the properties
left by the deceased and another project of partition adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the
said estate and/or in the event that the defendant had disposed of all or part of the estate, that she be ordered
to pay them the market value thereof; and that the defendant be ordered to pay for the value of the fruits
received, damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations.
After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date thereof the hearing was postponed
upon the defendant's manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss. The motion, when filed,
challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since the action was one to annul a project of partition duly
approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the defendant but because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs
moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal.

Issue: The procedural question posed by appellants is: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not
alleged in the motion to dismiss?
Held: No. The Court should not dismiss a case based on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss
because it is tantamount to depriving the opposing party of their right to respond or argue the case.

13 Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 , G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001
FACTS:
- Troadio Manalo died intestate survived by wife and 11 children left several properties in Manila and Tarlac.- 8
children (resps) pet for the judicial settlement of the estate in RTC Manila & appointment of bro Romeo as
admin- TC order declaring the whole world in default, except the government.- order of general default set
aside upon motion of pets (wife & remaining 3 children)- TC order admitting the petition for judicial settlement
of estate.- Pets pet for certiorari under Rule 65- absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among
members of the same family; and no certification of nonforum shopping was attached to the petition.- CA
denied the petition & MFR- Pets petition claiming Pet for issuance of letters of admin, settlement &
distribution of estate is an ordinary civil actionthus should be dismissed under
Rule 16, Sec 1(j) of the ROC on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claimhas not been
complied with as there was failure to comply with the requirement in Art 222 CC.
ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate an ordinary civil
action, thusRule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 CC apply as a ground for the dismissal of the
petition
HELD: NO
Rule: In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment and the character of the relief
soughtin the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling. Scrutiny of the Petition for ILASD of Estate belies
herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of anordinary civil action petition contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate:
1
2
3
4

fact of death
residence at the time of his said death
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.

Reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention to seek judicialsettlement
of the estate of their deceased father. Petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary
civil action & so petitioners, as oppositors took advantage of such in anapparent effort to make out a case of an
ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Courtvis--vis,
Article 222 of the Civil Code.
- action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or theprotection
or redress of a wrong. Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions

Use of term suit excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make it applicable only to civil actions
which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.

Special proceedings
remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status, right or particular fact.
Pet for ILASD of Estate = special proc

14 Rodriguez, et al. vs. Borja, et al., 17 SCRA 418, June 21, 1966
FACTS:
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb. 12, 1963. On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida
Jacalan (respondents) delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testatment of Fr.
Rodriguez. On March 9, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriquez (petitioners), through counsel filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. On March 11, 1963, before the Court could
act on the petition, the same was withdrawn. On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the CIF of Rizal a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez. On same day, (March 12), defendants filed a
petition for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4.-petitioners contend that the intestate
proceedings in the CIF of Rizal was filed at 8:00AM on March 12, while the petition for probate in the CIF of
Bulacan at 11AM, so the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.-defendants
contend that CIF of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery of the will, hence the case in this
court has precedence over petitioners.-CIF of Bulacan denied MD of petitioners. MR denied.
ISSUE:

Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD:
The jurisdiction of the CIF of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the will of the Fr. Rodriquez
on March 4 even if no petition for its allowance was filed yet because upon the will being deposited, the court
could, motu proprio have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: When a
will is deliver to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall
fix a time and place for proving the will xxx and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published xxx
where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the
time when the will was delivered. Since the will was delivered to the court of Bulacan on March 4 while
petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in court of Rizal only on March 12, the precedence and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable. As to petitioners objection that the Bulacan court did not have
jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal, court ruled that the power to settle the decedent;s
estates is conferred by law upon all CIFs, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the estate proceedings having been initiated in Bulacan court ahead of
any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case
of wron venue by express provisions of Rule 73. Court also held that petitioners, in commencing intestate
proceedings in Rizal, were in bad faith, patently done to divest the Bulacan court of the precedence awarded it
by the Rules. Lastly, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to testate, since intestacy only takes
place in the absence of a valid and operative will.

15 Eusebio vs. Eusebio supra

FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of
the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in
Quezon City. Eugenios siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are
illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenios petition and overruled his siblings objection.
ISSUE: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
HELD:
No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his
son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was
able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his sons residence.
It is well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one owns health
even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.
Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent
Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr.
Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in
San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house
at 889 A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract
signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical
presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with the first
two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they
introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically made of
record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of
assailing the same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that
the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
venue having been laid improperly.

16 Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360 , No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Cuenco died at Manila and was survived by his widow, petitioner Rosa Cuenco, and 2
minor sons, all residing at QC, and by his children of the 1st marriage, respondents Lourdes et.al. all residing
in Cebu. Respondent Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI of Cebu alleging that
decedent died intestate in Manila, that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left
properties in Cebu and QC. The Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and ordering the
publication at a newspaper of gen. circulation in Cebu. It was modified stating that it will be premature it to act
since the publication and notice requirements have not been completed. In the meantime, Rosa filed a petition
with the CFI of Rizal (QC) for theprobate of the last will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, Rosa filed an Opposition and MTD as well as an
Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator for which an order holding in abeyance its
resolution on the MTD until after the CFI of QC shall have acted on the petition for probate. No MR or appeal
was filed. Instead, respondents filed in the QC court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss opposing probate
and assailing its jurisdiction to entertain petition for probate in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested
by her petition in the Cebu court. The QC court denied the motion, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." It further found that the residence of the
senator at the time of his death was at QC. If a party has two residences, the one which he himself selects or
considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs will be deemed his domicile. The
petitioner, in filing in QC, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once the QC court acquires
jurisdiction, it is to the exclusion of all others. Lourdes' two MRs were denied. Instead of appealing from the
QC court's order admitting the will to probate and naming Rosa as executrix thereof, Lourdes filed an SCA of
certiorari and prohibition with PI with the CA which rendered a decision against Rosa and held that Section 1,
Rule 73, which fixes the venue for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, covers both testate and intestate
proceedings. Cebu case having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which
first attached. MR was denied, thus, Rosa filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the probate proceedings in the QC Court, despite being filed later than the intestate
proceedings in Cebu, should be given preference ?
HELD: YES
RATIO: A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate
jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

17 Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385 , G.R. No. 133000 October 02, 2001
FACTS:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area
of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia,
Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate on 09 February 1954
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889.

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of
Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his
interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under
Gracianos name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meters was registered
under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT
No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot[2] to a third person but retained ownership over the second
lot.[3]
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold
the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059[4] was issued in
the latters name. On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by
his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint, filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, private
respondents alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed
of Sale dated 25 June 1987[6] in favor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and
the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged
in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter.
Petitioner further alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to
his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against
herein petitioners property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:
[8]

1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law
and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

2) The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under
Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower courts decision ratiocinating, inter alia:

It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The
court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it
performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person.
Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance. What the court should
have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved
in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose.Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our
protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate courts
decision for being contrary to law and the facts of the case.

ISSUE:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person particularly in questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

HELD:
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:

a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the
rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

b) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. As
could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term
special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party,
or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute
expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,
inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind,
the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

18 Edgar San Luis vs. Luis, 514 SCRA 294

FACTS:
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis. During his lifetimeFelicisimo contracted three
marriages. From the first marriage contracted in 1942 he had six children, twoof whom are the petitioners in this case. His first wife
died in 1963 and his second marriage to anAmerican citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971. In 1974 Felicismo married
Felicidad, therespondent in this case, in the USA. They had no children but lived together for 18 years until Felicismo died in 1992.
After Felicisimos death, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets andfiled a petition for letters of
administration. The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage opposedthis on the grounds that Felicidad is only a mistress, the
second marriage to the American wife subsisting.The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effectto validate the bigamous marriage because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimatechildren
(Article 256 of the Family Code).
ISSUE: Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad, Felicidad still haslegal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides (in part) that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by
aninterested person. Felicidad qualifies as an interested person with direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of
their 18-year cohabitation. If she proves the validity of the divorce but fails to prove her marriage, she may beconsidered a coowner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. If she fails to prove the validity of both thedivorce and the marriage, Article 148 of the
Family Code would apply.

19 De Borja, etc. vs. Tan, etc. and De Borja, 97 Phil. 872 , No. L-6476 November 18, 1955

FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus to compel respondent Judge Bienvenido A. Tan to approve and
admitthe record on appeal filed before him and to give due course to the appeal.-On October 25, 1940,
petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for the probate ofthe Last Will and Testament of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. It was approved.-One of the heirs who is now one of the respondents herein
Jose de Borja appealed the case to the CAbut later his motion for dismissal of the appeal as granted. All the
records of the case were destroyed orlost during the last Pacific war but were reconstituted later on. On March
26 of that year Francisco deBorja qualified as executor and administrator.

Due to the physical inability of Francisco de Borja to fully administer the estate he being quite weak
andunable to see, on petition of Matilde de Borja, one of the heirs, lower court appointed Crisanto de
Borja,another heir, as co-administrator. Crisanto qualified. The trial court according to petitioner, without
petition of or notice to anyone appointed respondent Josede Borja as co-administrator, this, after holding in
abeyance consideration of Francisco de Borja'samended account dated March 25, 1952. Francisco, Matilde
and Crisanto moved for reconsideration ofthe appointment of Jose de Borja but respondent Judge indirectly
denied the motion for reconsideration-On July 22, 1952, Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of
appeal from the order appointingJose de Borja as co-administrator and the order denying the motion for
reconsideration and later theyfiled the corresponding record on appeal. By order of December 27, 1952,
respondent Judge Tandisapproved the record on appeal and refused to give due course to the appeal on the
ground that theappointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory in nature and so was
notappealable. Hence, this petition formandamus,as already stated, to compel respondent Judge toapprove
the record on appeal and to give due course to the appeal
HELD:
An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable. On the other hand, according to Rule
105,section 1 (e) an order appointing a special administrator is not appealable. Respondents contend that acoadministrator is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partakethose of a

special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not subject to appeal. We cannotshare this view. The
powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. Under Rule 81,section 1, a special
administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letterstestamentary or of administration
occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will orfrom any other cause, and such special
administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of theestate until the questions causing the delay are
decided and an executor or administrator thereonappointed. Under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator is
also appointed when the regularexecutor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents and
said special administratorshall have the same power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or
administrator. Inother words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific
purpose.Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by
thelaw not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. On the other hand, a coadministrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regularadministrator, only
that he is not alone in the administration. Further taking into consideration thecircumstances obtaining in this
case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja though originally designatedadministrator, is and has for several years
been one only in name due to his physical and mentaldisability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja
is now practically the sole administrator thereis no question that for all practical and legal purposes the
appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole regular or
general administrator.

20 Macias vs. Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251 , No. L-31174 May 30, 1972
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale,
reivindicacion and damages against Uy kim, et. Al at Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance asserting
that he is a beneficiary of the estate of Julian Wolfson pending settlement in Special Proceedings No. 57405
before Branch VI of the Manila Court of First Instance and also a beneficiary of the estate of Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson pending settlement in Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First
Instance.
He bases his alleged interest in the estate of Julian who died intestate solely on the latter's memorandum to
his sister Rosina wherein he hoped that his sister Rosina will, after his estate is settled, give at her
convenience to petitioner Manuel Macias the sum of P500.00; to Faustino A. Reis and Severino Baron the
amount of P10 000.00 each; and to Dominador M. Milan and Vicente D. Recto P1,000.00 each. Unfortunately,
Rosina died on without being able to comply with the memorandum of her brother Julian.
ISSUE: Whether or not Branch X could take cognizance of the complaint filed by the appellant pending
settlement in Special Proceedings before Branch VIII.
HELD:
Under the rules and controlling jurisprudence, the Presiding Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of
First Instance cannot legally interfere with, nor pass upon the validity of said orders of the Presiding Judge of
Branch VIII, which court, as the probate court, has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent,
including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of the estate for the payment of its
liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residue thereof.
Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of
the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this provision,
therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson
should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, where Special Proceedings No. 63866
for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still
pending.
This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule 73, thus:
... The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of a deceased
person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administration of that estate it
is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court, which should have
exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to two or more courts, each
independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay.

xxx xxx xxx

The provision of section 602, giving one court exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, was not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant, but
in the public interest for the better administration of justice. For that reason the parties have no
control over it. 1
On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated herein that any
challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand
or claim which any heir, delegate or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may
make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate
action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take
cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to
make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties, ... . 2
It is also a general principle that the branch of the court of first instance that first acquired jurisdiction over the
case retains such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other branches of the same court of first instance or judicial
district and all other coordinate courts

21 Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367 , No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
FACTS:
Eusebio Capili died before his wife Hermogena Reyes. Eusebios will was admitted to probate wherein
he left his properties to his wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then during the pendency of the probate
proceedings died intestate, thus she was substituted by her collateral relatives as petitioned by Bernardo, the
executor of Eusebios estate. Bernardo then filed a project of partition in accordance with the will of Eusebio
which however was opposed by Hermogenas relatives. They submitted their own project of partition claiming
that of the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio should be awarded to them as those properties did not
belong to Eusebio but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This was questioned by Bernardo. He
claimed that the properties belonged exclusively to Eusebio and not to the conjugal partnership because
Hermogena donated to Eusebio her share of
such partnership. The probate court issued an order declaring the donation as void as it is prohibited by law
and disapproved both projects of partition. The court ordered the executor to file another project partition
dividing the property of Eusebio according to his will, however noting that such properties were conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court had jurisdiction to determine that the properties belonged to the
conjugal partnership?
HELD:
YES . The Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title of property cannot be
passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except when one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion
or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon
the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. It has also been held that when
the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a
question as to title to property, and when so submitted said probate court may definitely pass judgment
thereon. Provided that interests of third persons are not prejudiced. The jurisdiction to try controversies
between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has
been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration
proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.
Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him.
The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass
whatever community property he has in his possession.

In this case the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain properties involved
whether they belong to the conjugal partnerships or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within
the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the state of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs including of course the widow
represented by her collateral relatives upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily.
There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. Therefore the claim being asserted is one belonging
to an heir to the testator, and, consequently it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties
interested are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

22 Ermac vs. Medelo, 64 SCRA 358 , No. L-32281 , June 19, 1975( expanded jurisdiction, value of the
estate)
FACTS:
Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a parcel of land as the only property to be inherited by
heirs MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary settlement of the estate.ERMAC: moved for
reconsideration of the order of settlement claiming the land as belonging to him and his wife.
ISSUE: W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid despite the claim of ERMAC in a separate civil
action?
HELD:
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
persons with the least loss of time. Small estates: summary procedure dispensing with appointment of
administrator Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a third
person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate; properly ventilated in an independent action
and probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate (subject to the results of suit). Appropriate
step: proper annotation of lis pendens.

23 PCIB vs. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 (issue of pinpointing the property in re to stranger being apptd as
administration; administer jointly pending issue of property)
FACTS:
CHARLES Hodges and LINNIE Hodges were spouses. Both executed similar wills, whereas the
decedents entire estate shall go to the surviving spouse and that spouse may do whatever s/he pleases, with
the condition that when the surviving spouse likewise passes away, the residual estate shall pass on to the
surviving brothers/sisters of the (first) decedent [and if brother or sister dies, the corresponding heirs shall
represent, etc. LINNIE Hodges died ahead of CHARLES. CHARLES was the named administrator in LINNIEs
will. As administrator, CHARLES was allowed by the probate court to do several acts of administration,
including continuing the business run by CHARLES and LINNIE. CHARLES made annual reports to the
probate court and at some point he allegedly renounced all the inheritance he got from LINNIE *in favor of
LINNIEs siblings. Shortly after this alleged renunciation, on December 25, 1962, CHARLES died. CHARLES
died without having ever liquidated or closed or distributed LINNIEs estate. Upon CHARLES death, AVELINA
Magno was named administratrix of LINNIEs estate and as Special Administratrix of CHARLES estate.
Nothing else happened in LINNIEs estate henceforth. (AVELINA was assigned because she was the one
employee closest to the spouses and she had been with them for more than a decade.) AVELINA carried on
acts of administration in both estates until she was joined by CHARLES brother, JOE Hodgens, as
coadministrator in CHARLES estate. AVELINA and JOE were subsequently replaced by several other
individuals until only PCIB was appointed sole administrator (there were no records of why the changes took
place and why PCIB ended up the sole admin). Both proceedings in LINNIEs and CHARLES estates
proceeded independent of each other AVELINA acting as admin for LINNIEs estate and PCIB for
CHARLES. Both administrators hired lawyers and eventually had to pay substantial amounts out of the estate.
Both proceedings went on independently until such time that conflicts arose between administrators with
respect to safekeeping the properties, liquidating the estate, etc. The instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed by PCIB against the court which handled both estate proceedings. The judge (ESCOLIN)
kept approving motions apparently from both estates, which led to confusing or even conflicting issues.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether there exists, still, LINNIEs estate (on the theory that her estate is practically closed
since she bequeathed everything to her husband)?
(2) If so, how much does she still have that would go to her siblings? Are the siblings entitled to
anything (on the theory that the will contained substitutions)?

RULING:
(1) Yes, LINNIEs estate still exists and the proceedings
therefor have not closed. While it is true that LINNIE adjudicated her entire estate to CHARLES, she still had
her own estate for which the proceedings in which AVELINA is administratrix could proceed. LINNIEs estate
consists of those properties which are her part in the conjugal partnership. However, given the murky factual
circumstances, the Court cannot make a final determination
which of the properties in the conjugal partnership belong to
LINNIEs estate.

24 Calma vs. Taedo, 66 Phil. 594 , No. 44602 November 28, 1938
FACTS:
The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of a certain property. They were
indebted to Esperanza Taedo, and these debts were chargeable against the conjugal property. Fausta
Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her
properties. In the probate proceedings in the CFI of Tarlac, Maria Calma was appointed judicial administratrix
of the properties of the deceased. While these probate proceedings were pending, Esperanza Tanedo filed a
suit for collection against Eulalio Calma. The CFI of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In
the execution of this judgment, despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the conjugal property
was sold by the sheriff. Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, brought an action
to ask that the sale made by the sheriff of the property be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit
be declared the sole and absolute owner thereof.
HELD:
The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio
Calma for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and said
property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit. The
probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176: SEC. 685. When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall beinventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the administration and liquidation and
partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right
granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.

25 Ocampo vs. Potenciano, 89 Phil. 159 , No. L-2263 May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Edilberto Ocampo, husband of Paz Yatco (plaintiff Ocampo), executed a deed of sale w/ pacto de retro
on a town lot w/ house in favor of Conrado Potenciano (defendant) and his wife. Edilberto also made a
document where vendees where leasing to him house and lot during the redemption period. 2) House and lot
conjugal property in reality, even if reg in husband's name only. One year repurchase period was "extendible to
another year" but extensions were granted.
Period lapsed w/o repurchase so defendant Potenciano consolidated title w/ RD of Laguna.
Potenciano gave plaintiff Paz Ocampo option to repurchase property w/in 5 years + 5 yr lease. Paz sought to
exercise option by tendering payment to Potenciano but tender was rejected. Paz deposited money in court
and brought action as administratrix of husband's estate to have property reinstated to them. 5) Potenciano's
children, Victor and Lourdes, intervened by filing cross-complaint alleging that option to purchase null and void
as to share of their dead mom because they inherited her share and as to their dad, Victor and Lourdes were
exercising right of redemption as co-owners of property. Paz amended complaint: a) pacto de retro sale was
really a mortgage b) option agreement was really extension of the mortgagec) valid tender of payment w/in the
period. CFI gave judgment in favor of Paz and kids (sub after her death). CA found that pacto de retro sale
was really a mortgage so Potencianos had no right to consolidate title over the property. However, CA said that
mortgage novated by option agreement for the repurchase of mortgaged property. Potenciano siblings argue
that this was error because Potenciano dad had no authority to enter into agreement after wife's death. SC
agrees.

ISSUE: W/n CA erred in supposing that surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator of
conjugal estate?
HELD: YES, CA erred, Potenciano dad no authority to enter into option ag'mt.
1) The decisions laying down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the
husband must liquidate the partnership affairs, are now obsolete. PRESENT RULE: when the marriage is
dissolved by death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidate in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse (Rule 75, Sec. 2)
2) Option agreement was nothing more than mere extension of time for payment of mortgage debt since the
real transaction was the equitable mortgage
3) Tender and consignation of Paz must be held to produce their legal effect, to relieve debtor from liability.
4) Thus, Victor and Lourdes (appellant children) Potenciano acquired nothing because ownership of property
never passed to their parents.

26 Reyes and Arcon vs. Ysip, etc., and Crisostomo, 97 Phil. 11 , No. L-7516,May 12, 1955
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus to compel the Judge of RTC Bulacan to permit
and allow Petitioner to submit evidence of her claim that she is a natural daughter of the deceased, Juan
Reyes Panlilio enjoying her status as such continuously up to the time of the latters death.

A petition was presented for probate of the last will and testament of decedent Juan Reyes. Leonar
reyes, petitioner herein, filed an opposition thereto. Special administratrix, who had presented the will for
probate, objected to the personality & right of the Petitioner to contest the will before hearing thereon.
ISSUE: In hearing of a petition for the probate of the will, is the court obliged to accept or receive evidence of
the filiation of opposition to the probate or may the said court postpone reception of such evidence of filiation
later?
HELD:
For a clear understanding, it is necessary to invite attention to the most pertinent rulings and provisions of
the rules:
1
2

In distribution proceedings, at the stage at which the determination of the persons entitled to inherit may
be made after , not before the payment of all debts, funeral charges, etc... is effected.
In distribution proceedings, where a will is sought to be admitted to probate, a person who have no
interest in the succession cannot be allowed to intervene and oppose such probate.

Only evidence as to the execution of the will or in opposition to the probate could be admitted, postponing
reception of the evidence as to the filiation of the Petitioner to another occasion or hearing and perhaps on the
occasion of the hearing for the declaration of heirs.
Reasons:
-if the court permits the submission of evidence as to filiation, the nature of evidence would only be prima facie
and only to justify her intervention in the probate proceedings (not decisive of her right).
-the court has not deprived her of the right or opportunity to contest a will.
-it will tend to confuse or increase the numbers of issue to be determined at the hearing on the will, all these
without any benefit or advantage to the parties.
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90, Rules of Court)

27.CUNANAN vs AMPARO (80 PHIL. 227, G.R. NO. L-1313, February 16, 1948)
Facts:
The petitioner, Rosalina Cunanan, in her capacity as administratix of the Intestate Estate of Isaac Cunanan
and Candida Joaquin (Special Proceeding No. 8355 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija), seeks a
review of two orders of the respondent Judge, Honorable Rafael Amparo, alleging that these orders were made
"without and/or in excess of his
jurisdiction, with grave abuse of discretion."
Bonifacio Soriano, one of the present respondents, under date of September 26, 1940, filed a money claim for
P880 against the decedent's estate. He alleged that on various dates in 1937 and 1938, the deceased
received from him diverse sums of money aggregating P880.
On April 17, 1941, Rosalina Cunanan, the administratix, filed a motion setting out Bonifacio Soriano's claim
and two others totalling P2,054, besides a debt of P1,600 in favor of one Filomeno Santos bearing 12 per cent
interest per year. To pay these obligations, and because funds were needed to defray the expenses on the
farm, she asked the court for authority to negotiate a loan in such amount or to sell so much of the property
described in the inventory as might be sufficient to satisfy the said obligations. The Honorable Sotero Rodas,
Judge, in an order dated April 23, 1941, granted the motion.
On June 1, 1944, Rosalina Cunanan manifested to the court that she had tendered to Bonifacio Soriano in
March of that year P880 but that Soriano refused to accept it on the ground that the money she offered was
Japanese notes and had no value. She prayed that the creditor be ordered to accept the amount tendered, to
execute the necessary deed of cancellation, and to return the possession of two parcels of land which had
been conveyed to him.
On June 15, 1944, the Honorable Quintin Paredes, Jr., Judge, authorized the administratix to deposit with the
clerk of court P880 in full payment of the obligation in favor of Bonifacio Soriano and ordered Soriano to deliver
the property in his possession to the administratix. Rosalina Cunanan filed a complaint against Soriano for
contempt of court, alleging that she had complied with the court's order of June 15, 1944, but that Soriano
disobeyed that part of it which commanded him to return the two parcels of land to the estate of Isaac Cunanan
and Candida Joaquin.
After hearing, Judge Paredes, on August 4, 1944, found Soriano not guilty of contempt. However, Judge
Paredes reiterated his order that Soriano deliver the property in question to the administratix Rosalina
Cunanan for the benefit of the Intestate Estate." He also directed the clerk of court to turn over to Soriano the
P880 which had been deposited with him, "upon proper proof that the possession of the property has been
actually delivered to the Intestate Estate.
Bonifacio Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of August 4, 1944. On August 16, 1946, the
Honorable Rafael Amparo, who now was presiding over the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in a lengthy
order granted Soriano's motion.
Issue:

Whether the court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate.
Held:
Petition denied, with cost against the petitioner. As a general rule, with the consent of the parties matters
affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the
intestate proceeding provided the interests of third persons are not prejudiced. Determination of title to property
is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The respondent Soriano's objection relates exclusively to
the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice which may
be waived. Certainly, there is waiver where, as here, and has been pointed out, the party who raises the
objection was the one who set the court in motion, and who, by failing to disclose
the existence of a sale under pacto de retro, suppressed jurisdictional facts that might be in the way of his
claim's success.

Soriano is bound by his own petition and by the court's adjudication of his claim made in consonance with his
prayer. A party can not trifle with a court's decision or order which he himself sought with full awareness of his
rights under the premises, by taking it or leaving it at pleasure. The allegations, statements, or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusively as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contradictory of, or inconsistent with, his pleadings.

28 CORTES vs CA (340 SCRA 715, G.R. No. 117417 September 21, 2000)
Facts:
Petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent (petitioner in this petition) Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante
Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia
Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and May 13, 1987, respectively. During their lifetime, they
acquired a property particularly a house and lot consisting of 100 square meters, more or less, with address at
173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter
executed a holographic will which was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the
appointed Executrix. After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion before
respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered to
vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession
thereof. This is
the motion which the respondent court granted in the assailed order of October 18, 1993.
In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set aside for having been issued beyond the latter's
limited jurisdiction as a probate court.
Issue:
Whether the property in issue belongs to the partnership or exclusively to the decedent is within the jurisdiction
of the probate court.
Held:
Probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties.
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and
lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an "outside party" for
he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much involved in the settlement of
Teodoro's estate. By way of exception to the rule, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional
upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to property. Here, the probate court is competent
to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society
and a separate action would be most expensive and inexpedient.

In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent since the former's
theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter. In the same way, when the controversy is whether the
property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within
the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs.
More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
"RULE 73"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is dissolved by the death
of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either."

The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33826 is hereby
SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to
costs.

2.1 Summary settlement of estates (Rule 74, Rules of Court)

28.MONSERRAT vs IBAEZ (88 PHIL 785)

Facts:
Vicenta Salamanca died intestate leaving as heirs 1 son and 4 daughters. Ramon (son) filed in CFI Laguna a
petition for his appointment as administrator of the properties of his deceased mother. His sisters
(respondents) opposed saying that they are all of age; the debts and obligations of the estate has already been
paid; that they did not want to be burdened with admin proceedings; and that Ramon's remedy was to sue for
partition under Rule 74 of Revised Rules of Court.
Judge Ibanez issued an order stating that in accordance with Fule v Fule the proper remedy should be an
action for partition because all the heirs were of age and there were no debts of the estate. He required the
sisters to institute partition proceedings and that the litigation begun by Ramon will be held in abeyance.
The sisters filed an action for partition. Ramon filed this special civil action alleging that the respondent judge
had committed grave abuse of discretion. He prayed for the court to proceed with the hearing of his petition for
administration. Petitioner asserts that it is not known whether there are any debts because these may be
shown only in the administration proceedings but he did not assert otherwise when respondents' affidavit says
that there was no debt. He argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of hereditary
estate but only in the manner of partition does Section 1 Rule 74 of ROC apply, and that in this case the parties
are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering
some assets of the intestate.
Issue:
Whether or not the administration proceedings should be held in abeyance.
HELD:
Yes. Fule v Fule applies: where there are no debts, the heirs are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration which is always long and costly or to apply for an appointment of an admin by the court. These
proceedings are superfluous and unnecessary.
The creditors are protected even if, without benefit of the administration, the estate is distributed in an action
for partition.
Questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the
partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.
SC also said that the admin proceedings will be dismissed soon, inasmuch as the partition suit has already
been instituted, because the court has already intimated that the proceedings will be suspended pending the
presentation of the other suit.

29. RODRIGUEZ vs TAN (92 PHIL 273)

Facts:
Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, at Paraaque, Rizal, leaving an estate with a value of P10,000;
that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata Vda. de Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners
and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a verbal
agreement whereby they agreed not to make a liquidation of the estate but to place it under the administration
of the widow with the understanding that each of the six children would be entitled to receive a portion of the
income in equal shares from year to year for the needs of their families provided that they do not exceed the
participation to which they are entitled; that on March 19, 1952, or eight years after the death of Flaviano
Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo Rodriguez filed a petition for administration of their intestate estate of said
deceased in spite of his knowledge that the estate had no debts and all the heirs were of age; that on June 2,
1952, the other heirs, petitioners herein, objected to the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from
obligations and the heirs are all of age, no administration proceedings shall be allowed; that on August 11,
1952, respondent Judge, after overruling the opposition, appointed Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the
estate upon filing the requisite bond.
Respondents herein, in answer to the petition, admitted the existence of a verbal agreement entered into
between the heirs in 1944, wherein they agreed not to liquidate the estate and to place it under the
administration of the widow in view of the unsettled conditions then prevailing at the time, but they contend that
while that was the understanding the same was not carried out because in reality it was Benjamin Rodriguez,

one of the petitioners herein, who took over the administration of the estate and in the discharge of his duties
he failed and refused to give to respondent Abelardo Rodriguez his share in the income which he badly needed
for the support of his family, for which reason he started the intestate proceedings which
gave rise to the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining the administration proceedings and in appointing
Abelardo Rodriguez as administrator of the estate notwithstanding the fact that the estate has no debts and all
the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age.
Held:
Under section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. SC held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long
and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held that in
such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings. section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of
partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made
therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word
shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not only
once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the
heirs. In this particular case, however, The court find that the core of petitioners' objection is not that the heirs
have erroneously instituted these administration proceedings but that the court erred in appointing Abelardo
Rodriguez administrator of the estate. It is claimed that Abelardo Rodriguez was appointed administrator
without the petitioners having been given an opportunity to be heard. But this claim has no basis it appearing
that the parties had been duly heard before the court issued its order now complained of. It appears that both
parties submitted the names of the persons they wanted to be appointed as administrator and the court made
its choice
only after weighing the fitness and qualifications of the persons recommended. Thus, on this point, the court
said:
The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as administrator of the estate of the deceased
Flaviano Rodriguez and does not possess any of the disqualifications. Moreover, he is one of the heirs left by
the deceased. Inasmuch as one of
the oppositors appear to be more qualified to act as administrator of the estate, the court is inclined to grant the
petition
presented by Abelardo Rodriguez.
The petition is dismissed with costs. The preliminary injunction issued is hereby dissolved.

30. FERRERA V. CA
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of CA
Facts:
Andres Pereira passed away and he was survived by his legitimate spouse and sister Rita. Rita filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of Andres. It was alleged in the
petition that she is the only surviving heir of Andres; that Andres left no will; that there are no creditors of the
deceased and Andres left several properties, i.e. death benefits and real properties.
Victoria opposed the same contending that there exists no estate of the deceased for purpose of
administration, but the lower court appointed Rita as administrator of the estate of Andres.
Issue:
Should there be judicial proceedings?

Ruling:
Letters of Administration issued by RTC to sister Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration
proceedings dismissed w/o prejudice to her right to commence an action for partition of the property left by
decedent.
Held:
No. Summary Settlement Only action for partition only is needed. Estate not substantial. No administrator need
be assigned. When a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.
Exception: Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION: If they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition.

31. GUICO, ET AL. vs BAUTISTA, ET. AL.(110 Phil. 584, GR No. L-14921 December 31, 1960)
Nature: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Pangasinan
Facts:
Plaintiffs Dolores Guico, et.al. filed an action for liquidation and partition of the estate left by the spouses
Mariano Bautista and Gertrudes Garcia against defendants Pablo Bautista et.al.
The complaint alleged inter alia that Mariano Bautista died intestate and that his properties had already been
extra judicially partitioned among his heirs. His wife, Gertrudes, made several deeds of donation of some of her
properties in favour of all the defendants but did not donate any of the properties to the plaintiffs except plaintiff
Dolores Guico. The aforesaid deeds of donation did not provide that the properties donated would not be
subject to collation so that the donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of collation
the value of the property received by them in order that the net hereditary estate may be divided equally
among the heirs. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the action was premature because it was
admitted in the complaint that Gertrudes Garcia left outstanding debts to Rehabilitation Finance Corp. and the
G.A Machineries Inc.
Issue:
Is the contention of the plaintiffs correct?
Ruling:
Order appealed from is affirmed with costs against appellants.
Held:
No. There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by the heirs,
extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the
appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if
the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians". The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real
owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.

The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations. In such cases, such
obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among the
heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate
would inevitably be submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary
partition, the regular estate proceedings offer the advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to
disclose themselves and submit their respective claims within a comparatively short period (12 months under
Rule 87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions
the creditors' claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period of extinctive prescription. An heir,
therefore, may have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed from invisible
claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the very estate proceedings sought to be avoided,

and he may properly object to an action for partition on this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are
agreeable to assuming personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as those
undisclosed, regular estate proceedings cannot be avoided.
Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court from directing and ordering that the
pending obligations of the estate be paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the respective shares
to be received by the heirs. In other words, appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the
purpose of paying off its debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court performing the
duties of the administrator, or an administrator appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed for in their
complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action for partition cannot be converted into a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased, without compliance with the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the Rules of
Court, especially the provisions on publication and notice to creditors.

32. HERNANDEZ vs ANDAL(78 Phil. 196, GR No. L-273 March 29, 1947)
Nature: An appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Batangas
Facts:
Plaintiff and the intervenors were siblings. They inherited a parcel of land from their father. The intervenors sold
their share to Andal, allegedly for P150. The plaintiff now sought to repurchase the said parts of the land.
However, Andal refused,
even when she offered a higher price which is P860. Then, Andal allegedly made a simulated sale back to the
intervenors.
Now, plaintiff sought brought the action to repurchase the land from Andal. The intervenors' and Andal's
defense: They said that there was already partition between the siblings. According to the facts there was a
document of partition, however it was not presented in trial.
During trial, when the defendant and intervenors tried to present witnesses to prove such partition, the counsel
of the
plaintiff objected invoking the best evidence rule. The document of partition is the best evidence of the terms of
partition.
Issue:
The defendant and intervenors now assail that the trial court was in error in denying the admissibility of their
evidence proving the existence of the partition due to the fact that the partition should be put into writing. Are
their contentions
correct?
Ruling:
Judgment is reversed. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceeding and a new decision
not incompatible with this decision. Cost against appellee.
Held:
Yes. SECTION 1 OF RULE 74, NOT CONSTITUTIVE BUT MERELY EVIDENTIAL OF PARTITION.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that the public instrument therein required is to
be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And
this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the
parties de-pendent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. The requirement that a partition
be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time
the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of
debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to
others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not
come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors
being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

33. REBONG VS IBAEZ (79 Phil. 324, GR No. L-1578 September 30, 1947)
Nature: Original action in the Supreme Court
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari against the respondent judge of the CFI of laguna about a land he extra judicially
inherited as the only heir of her predecessors in interest to the effect that the property described in the title is
subject to the claims of the creditiors and other heirs of the deceased Jose Rebong and Maria Rebong within 2
years in accordance with sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying
the petition for cancellation of the lien or annotation on the certificate of title issued to the petitioner.
Ruling:
Petiton for certiorari is denied.
Held:
The registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs of the petitioner's predecessors in
interest, established by section 4 Rule 74, has not yet terminated or ceased for the period of 2 years have not
yet elapsed.
Rule 74 section 4 and section 112 of Act No. 496 doesn't authorizes the substitution of a bond for a lien or
registered interest of any description, whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent, which have not yet
terminated or ceased.
34. McMICKING vs. SY CONBIENG (21 Phil. 211 , No. 6871 January 15, 1912)
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
Facts:
In 1902 one Margarita Jose, died and one Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator with the will annexed
of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his
sureties.
After the execution of this bond said Palanca, as such administrator, took possession of all the property of the
said Margarita Jose. In 1904, Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of Manila. CFI made an order
directing the Palanca to furnish a bond to take the place of the undertaking upon which said Mariano Ocampo
and Dy Cuyao. The bond thus required was duly filed and the new surities thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis
Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca.
In the same year 1904, Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and
Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator. Doroteo
Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased,
together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory said administrator
filed an instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing
to the partition of the estate among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the
payment of all obligations against the estate.
In 1908, Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose and Jose
McMicking, was appointed in his stead. Palanca refused to render an account of the property and funds of the
estate of the said Margarita Jose. Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said property and funds,
absconded with the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands.
In 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the court for the appointment of
commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims against the estate. The
commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim was presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the
defalcation of said Engracio Palanca, as administrator, which claim was allowed by said commission and later
approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds
to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due by the commission has been paid to the
representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose.
In 1905, Pio de la Barretto died and letters of administration were issued to Benito Sy Conbieng. In 1909, upon
the application of McMicking, a committee was appointed by CFI Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio
de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims presented against his estate. The claim so presented
against the estate of Pio de la
Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the committee thereof.

Upon these facts the court having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in rendering judgment in favour of the defendants.
Ruling:
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Held:
The judgement must be affirmed base upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la
Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him.
If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.

35. GERONA vs CA (G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964)

Nature: Appeal by Certiorari
Facts:
Legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman (legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman
and Teodora Dela Cruz in the first marriage) filed a complaint against the children of Marcelo on his second
marriage claiming that they are representative of the latter in the partition of the estate. Placida de Guzman
predeceased Marcelo on August 9, 1941, the latter died on September 11, 1945. Respondents executed a
deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although
they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs. This fact has been discovered only by the
petitioners a year before institution of the case. Petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their
(petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon instead of the 1/7th sharing made
by the respondent.

Petitioner's Contention: They are legitimate heir as such is allowed to receive equal amounts. Also, present
action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by
said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the
fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said
period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4, 1958. Respondent's
Contention: Placida de Guzman's heirs are not entitled to the share of Marcelo's estate since she is merely a
spurious child. Either which, the claim made by the petitioners are already barred by statute of limitations which
is only 2 years upon after the settlement and distribution of an estate.
Issue:
Whether or not statute of limitations has been properly raised by the respondents.
Held:
Yes.
Generally, Action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe. This is true ONLY so long as defendants do
not hold property in question under adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the
moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. An action for reconveyance of real
property based upon constructive or implied trust resulting from fraud may be barred by statute of limitations.
With regards to annulment of EJS, plaintiffs learned at least constructively of the alleged fraud committed
against defendants on June 25, 1948 the date of registration of the title with the Register of Deeds as
registration of the deed of extra- judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world, and
complaint was filed until November 4, 1958 or 10 years after, claim for discovery of fraud, which is 4 years had
already prescribed.

36. PEDROSA vs CA
(G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001)
Facts:
Petition assails decision of CA affirming the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement of
herein respondents.
August 1, 1946 - Maria Elena's adoption was granted.
April 29, 1972 - Miguel (Adoptive father) died intestate.
November 21, 1972 - Action to annul adoption (upheld by RTC pending before CA)
March 11, 1983 - Rodriguez' entered into EJP&S with Rosalina (Adoptive mother)
Spouses Miguel and Rosalina de Rodriguez adopted Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. Years later, Miguel died
intestate. Private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of Maria Elena. The RTC upheld the validity
of the adoption. While the case is pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Rodriguezes entered into a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel
and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. New TCTs
under the name of the respondents were subsequently issued. Maria Elena then sent her daughter to claim
their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes.

The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Maria Elena filed a complaint to annul the partition.

Petitioner's Contention: Complaint for annulment of EJP&S did not prescribed yet. Prescriptive period should
be 4 years as Section 4 of Rule 74 cannot be validly raised as the requirements mentioned weren't attained.

Respondent's Contention: Already prescribed. Maria Elena & Rosalina already have their shares in estate of
Miguel reflected in Compromise Agreement. Non-participation in EJP&S was understandable since adoption
was under litigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the action to annul the partition has prescribed.
Held:
No. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or
taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 74 have been strictly complied with. Maria Elena did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently
then, the two-year prescriptive period
is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period is 4 years from discovery since the annulment
is based on
fraud (for the lack of notice and consent of 1 of the heirs, Maria Elena).
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and
new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. Considering that the complaint of
the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial
settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis
of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Also, Section 1 of Rule 74 provides that "The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof."
Lastly, it cannot be argued that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the extrajudicial settlement
because at that time, Maria Elena was no longer a minor. Hence, Rosalina only represented herself during the
settlement.

37. SAMPILO vs CA (G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958)

Nature: Petition for Certiorari
Facts:
Certiorari against decision of the CA affirming with slight modification a judgment of the CFI declaring plaintiffs
owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land described in the complaint.
January 1945 - Teodoro Tolete died intestate. Left as heirs is his widow (Leoncia) and several nephews and
nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters.

Widow executed an affidavit stating that she is the only heir and no other. Executed a deed of sale in favor of
Benny Sampilo and later sold it to Honorato Salacup. Felisa Sinofera instituted proceeding for administration of
said estate in March 1950, having secured her appointment, brought present action on June 20, 1950.

Petitioner's Contention: Leoncia de Leon had no right to execute affidavit of adjudication and Salacup acquired
no rights to the land sold to him same as Sampilo.

Respondent's Contention: No cause of action - thus if such action do exist, it has already barred by statute of
limitations. Also raises the claim for innocent purchasers for value.

CFI Ruling: Rendered judgment against defendant (Sinopera) declaring affidavit and deed of sale are null and
void. Declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of 4 parcels and finally declaring usufructuary rights of
Leoncia de Leon terminated.

CA Ruling: Annulment of Affidavit was correct. Annulment of deeds in so far as one half of the properties and in
adjudicating of the same to the heirs of deceased is premature. It is void only insofar as properties in excess
of the portion that is allotted to Leoncia is concerned.
Issue:
Whether CA's decision is correct and right of action has prescribed.
Held:
CA's decision is correct. No mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons
who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. If they claim to have been in any manner
deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights
or interest within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such
rights or interest.
Those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the
settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within the period of two years.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in
the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow,
nephews and nieces living at the time of his death. The bar of statute of limitation only applies when parties
who had taken part in EJP&S but not against third persons not parties thereto. The action is one based on
fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of
the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs
except herself.

38. CUA vs VARGAS (G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006)

Nature: Petition for Review
Facts:
Paulina Vargas left behind a parcel of residential land. Extrajudicial Settlement among heirs was executed (9
heirs) but only 6 heirs signed on the said partition. EJS was published for 3 consecutive weeks. EJS with sale
was again executed, same heirs, same property and also same shares, only the same person signed thereof
and was sold to Joseph Cua (55m) on November 15, 1994.

EJS was only known by one of the heirs (who did not sign) when the house built in their property on May 1995
was demolished. After knowledge, Gloria Vargas (widow of Santiago an heir who did not sign said EJS) tried to
redeem the property. Offer to redeem was refused and failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, filed a
case for annulment of EJS and Legal redemption.

Respondent's Contention: As co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated to the rights of purchaser by
reimbursing him the price of the sale. Likewise alleged that 30-day period following a notice by the vendors to
co-owners for them to exercise the right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice
was sent to them.

MTC denied petition. Deed of EJS among heirs with sale is valid and binding. RTC affirmed. CA reversed the
ruling of both lower courts and declared said deed and sale to be void.
Issue:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound regardless of failure to participate therein by an
extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly
published.
Held:
No. Persons who did not participate therein nor had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound
thereby. Publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The records of the
present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered
their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned.

39. CRUZ vs CRISTOBAL (G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006)

Facts:
Petition assails the decision of CA affirming in toto the decision of RTC. Petitioner (Cristobal) claim that they
are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal, deceased, resulting during first marriage, respondents
on the other hand are children of the said deceased on his second marriage. More than 6 decades later,
petitioners learned that private respondents had executed and EJP of the subject property and transferred its
titles to their names. No settlement was reached before the barangay thus a complaint for annulment of Title
and damages were filed before RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged proindiviso shares. To prove filiation, baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo and the late Socorro (petitioner) were
presented. Mercedes who was born on January 31, 1909 produced a certification issued by the office of Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, attesting that records of birth for years 1901, 1909, 1932- 1939, 1940, 1943, and
1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. Eufrosina upon execution of EJP declared that her
father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes and Anselmo (child of first marriage) never asserted their alleged right
over the property subject to present litigation and that they have been paying all the taxes due on the parcel of
land.
RTC Ruling: Dismissed the case as petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Bueneventura
Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners'
inaction for a long period of
time amounts to laches

CA Ruling: Able to prove their filiation with the decease thru other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. However, affirmed the ruling of RTC barring their right to recover their share of the subject
property because of laches.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by private
respondents. Whether right to challenge has already prescribed.
Held:
No. As to As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private respondents
among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial
settlement is not binding on said persons. The partition of the subject property by the private respondents shall
not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded therefrom. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the
transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of private respondents only in 1994 when she
was offered by private respondent Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the subject property or money, as
one of the children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject property.
Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective
shares in the subject property.
No. It was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold that petitioners' right to challenge the said
settlement had prescribed. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership. Such co- owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned." Action for partition is imprescriptible; it cannot be barred by prescription.

Probate of Wills (Rules 75-77, Rules of Court)

40. In re Estate of Johnson., 39 Phil., 156 , No. 12767 November 16, 1918
Facts:
- The deceased is a native of Sweden, a naturalized citizen of the US but died in the Philippines. He was
married in the US and had one daughter. When he resided in the Philippines he married again and had three
more children.
- He left a will naming all his childrens as heirs. It appears that the will was in holographic form, in his own
handwriting and attested by only two witnesses. The said will was proved and allowed in a foreign country. It
was alleged that the said will is not in conformity with the laws of the said country
Issue:
- Whether the courts had authority to inquire upon the validity of the judgment of foreign courts?
Ruling:
- No, wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country may be allowed, filed
and recorded by the proper court in the Philippines
- Courts has no authority to inquire into the validity of the judgment of the foreign country
41 Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448 , No. 38050 September 22, 1933
Facts:
- Deceased left a will and instituted her niece as executor. The court set the date for hearing and sent the
necessary notice required by law, it was then published and no opposition was filed. The court after evidences
were presented decreed the will to probate.
- One year and seven months after, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, praying that
the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will be declared null and void.
- The contention of the appellant is based on the premised that she was not been notified of the probate of the

will, and the court did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication
Issue:
1) Whether there is a difference between authentication of a will and probate?
2) Whether she was entitled to personal notice?
Ruling:
1) There is no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words
authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the competent court
declare that the execution of the will, the essential and external formalities have been complied with and that in
view thereof, the document as a will is valid and binding
2) She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither she had the right to expect it, in as
much as she was not an interested party not having filed a petition thereof, and neither a forced heir that
acquired a successional rights. Moreover, the present action and the testamentary proceedings followed in a
testemantary case are in rem, the trial court decision in admitting the will to probate was effective and
conclusive against her.

42 Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez, 64 SCRA 452 , No.L-39247 June 27, 1975
Facts:
- To annul the will of his late mother, which states that her properties should not be divided among her heirs
during her husbands lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties.
- The opposition was based on the ground of lack of capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and
alleged improper partition of conjugal estate
- They pray that the will be declared void and the testate proceedings be declared as intestate proceedings.
The will was declared void
Issue:
- Whether the court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity and declaring it void
Ruling:
- Yes, the probate of the will might become an idle ceremony on its face if it appears to be intrinsically void.
- Where practical considerations demand the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon before its probated,
the court should meet the issue.

43 Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428 , No. L-23638, No. L-236 32 October 12, 1967
Facts:
- The will instituted Fernandez as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. Several persons all claiming to
be the heirs of the deceased filed oppositions to the probate court on the ground of forgery, vice of consent of
the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the
major portion of the estate.
- After trial the CFI found that the will was genuine and properly executed but deferred resolutions on the
question of estoppels and revocation until such time when the court shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of its
provision or when the question adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented.
- Appellant did not appeal because according to them it is interlocutory.
Issue:
- Whether a probate decree is interlocutory?
Ruling:
- It is an elementary that probate decree finally and definitely settles all questions concerning the capacity of
the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the last will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provision are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
- As such, the probate order is final and appealable. It being not appealed on time, it became final and
conclusion

44 Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360 , No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
Facts:
- Testator died.
- Testator was survived by heirs belonging to his first and second marriage (including petitioner and
respondent)
- Lourdes Cuenco (respondent) filed a petition for letters of administration w/ the CFI of Cebu.
- A few weeks later, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (petitioner) filed a petition w/ the CFI of Rizal and for the
issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
testament.
- Respondent successfully enjoined the probate of the will.
Issue:
- Which court has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling:
- Writ of prohibition not proper.
- The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter
of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court
lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among
the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts."
- A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate
jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
- Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that
the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the
petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate
of the decedent's alleged last will.
- Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
- Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the
Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the
Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
- Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction
over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now,
by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
- The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor
with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to
the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the
decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the
falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that
respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the
Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
- For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73,
section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
- Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964
admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has
jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final and cannot be overturned
in a special civic action of prohibition.

45 Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez, 64 SCRA 452 , No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
(see CASE 42)

46 Heirs of Rosendo Lasam vs. Umengan, 510 SCRA 496 , G.R. No. 168156 December 06, 2006
Facts:
- Heirs of Lasam filed an ejectment case against Umengan.
- The heirs hinges their claim of right to possession on the theory that their father was the sole owner of the
subject lot by virtue of the newly discovered last will and testament of Isabel Catupay bequeathing the same to
him.
- On the other hand, respondent hinges her claim of possession on the legal conveyances made to her by the
children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband, namely, Maria, Rufo, Sado and Abdon.
- These conveyances were made through the sale and donation by the said siblings of their respective
portions in the subject lot to respondent as evidenced by the pertinent deeds.
Issue:
- Whether a will can properly be relied upon to establish a right to possess?
Ruling:
- The purported last will and testament of testator could not properly be relied upon to establish petitioners
right to possess the subject lot because, without having been probated, the said last will and testament could
not be the source of any right. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. Art 838 is explicit
when it says no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
47 Guevara vs. Guevara, and Quinto, 98 Phil. 249 , No. L-5405 January 31, 1956
Facts:
- Testator made a will.
- Testator then conveyed a portion of his estate to one of his heirs (Ernesto, his son).
- Ernesto caused the said portion of the registered in his name.
- Testator died.
- Rosario, claiming to be a recognized natural child of the testator, initiated a special proceeding for the
probate of the will of the latter.
- Ernesto opposed the probate of the contending that such action is barred by the statute of limitations,
considering that the testator died on September 27, 1933, and that the petition for probate of said will was filed
twelve (12) years later, or, to be exact, on October 5, 1945.
Issue:
- Whether the action for the probate of the will of the testator is barred by the statute of limitations?
Ruling:
- NO.
- We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and
the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to
the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of
the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will
to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law
enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice
thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as
may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs
who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.
- It is not without purpose that Rule of Court 77 prescribes that any person interested in the estate may, at
any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Taken
from the Code of Procedure of California, this provision has been interpreted as meaning that the statute of
limitations has no application to probate of wills.
- The chapter of the Code relating to the probate of wills does not provide for opposition to such probate on
the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations, but, in effect, excludes it from the category of grounds
allowed as a basis for such opposition. Section 1299 declares that any person interested in the estate may at
any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will proved. This
implies that there is no arbitrary time limit.
48 Duran vs. Duran, 20 SCRA 379 , No. L-23372 June 14, 1967
FACTS:
Pio Duran died in 1961 without a testament, leaving as his heirs his wife, Josefina, and several brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces. In 1962, Cipriano, one of Pio's brothers, executed a public
instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights in favor of Josefa for a consideration of

P2,500.00. A year later, Cipriano filed in the CFI of Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settles
Pio's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. Josefa opposed and prayed for its
dismissal on the ground that the Cipriano is not an interested person in the estate, in view of the deed
of transfer and renunciation. In the alternative, she asked to be appointed administratrix. The CFI
dismissed Cipriano's petition for lack of interest in the estate on the premise of the deed of transfer
executed by the latter. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N Cipriano is an interested person in the estate of Pio considering the deed of transfer he
executed in favor of Josefina.
HELD: Appeal denied.
A legal heir, who in a public instrument assigned and renounced his hereditary rights in favor of the
decedent's widow, is not an interested party who can institute intestate proceedings and petition for
issuance of letters of administration. He has no more interest in the decedent's estate. His petition
should be dismissed.

49 Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna and Rivera, 64 Phil. 785 No. 45642 September 25, 1937
Facts:
- The petitioner instituted special proceeding no. 3109 in the CFI of Laguna, praying for the probate of the will
allegedly made on May 13, 1924 by his deceased mother Damiana Capistrano.
- The petition was opposed by the respondent Sabina Rivera, who filed a pleading entitled Opposition and
Counter-Petition.
- In her pleading, respondent prayed for the probate of the will, setting of its hearing and its publication and
ordered respondent to institute another proceeding and apply separately the probate of the alleged will.
- Respondent made a motion for reconsideration and the court granted it. It also ordered that expenses for the
publication be defrayed by her.
- The petitioner filed two motion for reconsideration, which were denied and finally instituted certiorari.
Issue:
- Whether the court acquired no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter-petition for the probate of the
second will, or to set for hearing the said will, jointly with the first one on the ground that respondent had not
previously filed her pleading and paid the fees.
Ruling:
- Petition is denied.
- A CFI acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown by evidence
1.) A person has died leaving a will
2.) In case of resident of the Philippines, he died in the province where the court exercises jurisdiction
3.) In case non-resident, he has left an estate in the province and admitted by the parties, it is evident that the
court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the 2nd will, in view of all the jurisdictional facts.

50 In re Estate of Johnson., 39 Phil., 156 , No. 12767 November 16, 1918

IN THE MATTERS OF THE ESTATE OF EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON
Facts:
- On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of Chicago, Illinois, died
in Manila leaving a will which he disposed of an estate the value of which was P231,800.
- The will is a holographic instrument being written though his handwriting and signed by him and 2 witnesses
in which it did not conform to the required number of witnesses provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
- A petition was presented in the Court of First Instance in Manila for the probate of the will on the ground that
Emil Johnson was, at the time of his death, a resident of Chicago, Illinois, and that the will was duly executed
in accordance with the laws of the State; Hence, could properly be probated.
- After due publication, the witnesses were examined. Upon March 16th thereafter, the will was declared valid
and legal and was admitted for probate.
- On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg
Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate.
- On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various
other orders in the case.
- On February 20, 1917, this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present appeal has
been perfected.
- As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to annul the decree of
probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of the

claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.

Issue:
- Whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the case
Ruling:
- The order appealed from his hereby affirmed with cost.
- Upon the question, then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an inspection of the record of the
proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate of a will were
complied with in every respect and that the probate was effected in external conformity with all legal
requirements. This much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the argument submitted in behalf of the
petitioner, that, at the time the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner
lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probate of the
will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently
far in the future to permit the petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it is said that
the failure of the court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of
the Philippine Bill which declared that property shall not be taken without due process of law. As what was
stated in the case of In re Davis, "the proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the
very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice
to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional
case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of
law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive
notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."

51 In re Estate of Deceased Jose B. Suntay 95 Phil 500

Facts:
- Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen died in Amoy, Fokien, China on May 14, 1934, leaving properties in the
Philippines and China.
- The intestate Proceeding was instituted and a letter of administration issued to a Apolonio Suntay, and when
the latter died, Federico Suntay was appointed administrator.
- The surviving spouse of the 2nd marriage filed a petition for probate of a last will claimed to have been
executed and signed in the Philippines in November 1929by the late Jose Suntay.
- The petition was denied because of the loss of the said will. Appeal was taken to the SC and it held that
there was sufficient evidence to prove the loss of the will and the case was remanded to the court.
- It was later on dismissed because attesting witness could not come to the Philippines because he is in
China.
- Silvino Suntay filed an alternative petition praying for the probate of the will which was allegedly executed by
Jose Suntay on Amoy, China. Federico filed a motion for the dismissal of the petition.
- He also filed his alternative petition. Judge Pecson issued an order granting the petition of Silvino.
- Federico filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial. It was granted.
- Silvino then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
- Whether petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother were stopped for asking for the probate of the lost will or
foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of right, title and interest to the estate of the late Jose B.
Suntay
Ruling:
- Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
- There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria Natividad Lim
Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or
assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez
and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goo and the subsequent assignment thereof by the
assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such
assignments cannot be threshed out in this proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will
and testament executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy
on 4 January 1931 and claimed to have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien
province, Republic of China.
- As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
- No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be
established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown
to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor
unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When a lost will is
proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under the seal of the court,
and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.

52 Abut vs. Abut, 45 SCRA 326 , No. L-26743 May 31, 1972
Facts:
- Generoso Abut, one of the children of the deceased Cipriano Abut by his 2nd marriage and the person
named as executor in a will allegedly executed by the deceased, filed a petition before the court a quo praying
that after due notice and hearing, the same will be approved and allowed and that the letters testamentary
issue in his favor. The court a quo motu proprio set the petition for hearing and further directed compliance with
section 3 and 4 of Rule 76. An opposition was filed by the children of the deceased namely Felipe
Presentacion and Absoluto Abut. During the pendency of the case but before the court a quo can start the
formal hearing of the petition, Generoso Abut died. This eventually prompted Gavina Abut, sister, to substitute
her in lieu of Generoso. The court dismissed the petition originally filed by Generoso without prejudice.
Issue:
- Whether the court correctly dismissed the petition simply because the original petitioner died before it can be
heard or terminated.
Ruling:
- Case is remanded to the lower court.
- A proceeding for the probate of a will is one of in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the
petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in the said will or in the settlement of the estate
of the deceased. The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in the original petition
did not require the notice of the amended petition be published anew. All that section 4, Rule 76 provides is
that those heirs be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will either by mail or personally.

53. Basa vs. Mercado, 61 Phil., 632 , No. 42226 July 26, 1935
Facts:
The judge of the CFI of Pampanga,Hermogenes Reyes, allowed and probated the last will and
testament of Ines Basa. He also approved the account of the administrator of the estate and declared the latter
as the only heir of the deceased and closed the administration proceedings. The herein petitioners-appellants
filed a motion to reopen the administration proceedings and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in
the matter because there was a failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of
hearing prescribed in the rules of Civil Procedure.
SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. When a will is delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the
same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the
will, and shall cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as the
court directs of general circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to the time appointed,
and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under
oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses.
In this motion the appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not
been complied with in view of the fact that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of
the required notice for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the
first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place on the 27th of that
month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set
for the hearing.
Section 630 of our Code of Civil Procedure is taken from the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Vermont.
The Supreme Court of that State, commenting on the phrase "three weeks successively", held:
The date of examining and allowing P.A. Barlett's final account of administration, and for decreeing the residue
of the estate to the lawful claimants of the same, was set by the probate court for December 19, 1919, at the
probate office in Brighton, and an order was made to this effect on November 28, 1919. The order provided
also that notice should be given by publication for three weeks successively in the Essex County Herald. In
accordance with this order, the notice was published in the issues for December 4, 11 and 18, respectively.
This was "public notice" to all persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing said account
and making decree of distribution, and was sufficient under the provisions of G.L. 3276. (Lenehen vs.
Spaulding, 57 Vt., 115.) "The proceeding was according to law in all respects, and being in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, it binds everybody by its legal effect." (Burbeck vs. Little, 50 Vt., 713.) At the time and place
set for the hearing none of the petitioners or other legatees under the will of Nickerson Warner appeared.

Thereupon the judge of probate then and there continued the hearing until April 6, 1920, at which time the final
account of P.A .Barlett as administrator de bonis non with will annexed was filed and, no one appearing to
object, the same was allowed, and the decree of distribution was entered. (In re Warner's Estate [Supreme
Court of Vermont] 1925; 127 Atl. Rep., 362, 364; 98 Vt., 254, 261.)
It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three publications was on December 18, 1919, and
the hearing on the administrators's final account was set for December 19 of that year, only fifteen days after
the date of the first publication.
The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in
which the notice of hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga.
Issue: Whether or not the publication requires three full weeks.
Brilliance of the Supreme Court:
Wills; Publication of Notice for the hearing of a will. - it is held that the language used in section 630 of the
Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full
weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not
be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing.
Id.; ID; NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION - The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of
general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general
information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals
and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a
"newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." No attempt has been made to prove that it
was a newspaper devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession,
trade, calling, race or religious denomination.
Id.;Id.;Id.; The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure,
should be made in the newspaper with the largest number subscribers. No fixed number of subscribers is
necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.

54. Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380 , No. 25489 September 08, 1926
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan, denying probate to an
instrument propounded as the will of Basilia Tantoco, deceased.
Facts:
Basilia Tantoco died, leaving a purported will. An application for probate was made by her father
Vicente Hernandez, a parish priest of Malolos. Opposition to the probate was made by three brothers and a
nephew of the deceased. At the time set for the submission of proof with respect to the execution of the will,
the proponent introduced three attesting witnesses to the instrument, namely, Vicente Plation, Fidel
Macapugay, and Placido Suarez, as well as Aurea Gaspar, sister-in-law of the deceased who had been in
attendance upon her at the hospital. However, the trial court denied the probate for the reason that the three
attesting witnesses are not in harmony upon the point whether all three of said witnesses were present
together at the time and place when the testatrix and the witnesses affixed their signatures to the document.
One of the principal testamentary dispositions in a will provided that the a building with its accessories and the
lot should be delivered to the parish priest for certain religious uses and for the assistance of a catholic school.
For many years Vicente Platon, an attorney of Malolos, has from to time done legal services for the testatrix;
and about the year 1910 he wrote a will for her containing the same substantial disposition with respect to the
property above-mentioned as is found in the contested instrument. A codicil to the same will was on a later
occasion executed by the testratix with the assistance and on the advice of Sr. Platon.
When her final illness came upon her, testatrix expressed a desire to make some further changes in her will,
and Sr. Platon therefore redrafted the entire document and carried it to the hospital for execution by her on
September 9, 1925. Sr. Platon, as of the officiating attorney, was naturally charged with the duties incident to
procuring the execution of the will, and he at first invited the Attending physician, Dr. Nicanor Jacinto to act as
one of the subscribing witnesses, but doctor Jacinto excused himself on the ground that he feared that, if he

acted as subscribing witness to the will, he might become complicated in a family quarrel which would be
prejudicial to him as a physician. He undertook, however, to procure someone to act in his place and he
accordingly brought in Doctor Fidel Macapugay, a resident physician in the hospital, who took his place. The
other intending witness was one Placido Suarez.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the testimony of a lawyer is given more weight than the testimonies of the attesting
witnesses.
(2) In case of opposition to the probate of the will, how many witnesses must be presented?
Ruling: The testimony of the attorney, Sr. Platon, is in our opinion in every effect respect worthy of credit, and
he gives a detailed account of the incidents connected with the execution. He shows that the testatrix
understood the contents of the instrument and that its provisions were found to be in conformity with her
wishes. At the time of the execution of the instrument she was sitting up in her bed and was able to affix her
signature in a clear and legible hand at the close of the will and upon each of its pages, as the law requires.
The recitals of the closing paragraph in the will and of the attesting clause are full and complete in every
respect and they show that the mind of the attorney was advertent to the requisites of proper formal execution.
According to Sr. Platon, after the testatrix had signed all of the sheets, Doctor Macapugay followed, signing at
the end of the attesting clause and upon the margin of each sheet. Then came Placido Suarez who likewise
signed at the end of the attesting clause and upon each sheet. Finally, Sr. Platon himself affixed his signature
at the bottom of the attesting clause at the bottom of the space used for signatures in the margin.
Macapugay testified somewhat vaguely and evasively; and although he admitted having been the testatrix sign
and the fact that all the signatures of himself are genuine, he exhibited a weak memory with respect to other
things that occurred. In particular he suggests that he left the room before Sr. Platon had finished signing all of
the sheets.
The other subscribing witness, Placido Suarez, pretended that Macapugay was not present when Suarez
signed; and, while admitting his own signature, he claims not to be able to recognize the other signatures
appearing on the sheets.
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who has
been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater
weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course that no
motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney,
being conversant with the requisites of the proper execution of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed
on details; and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.
It is admitted by all of the witnesses that Aurea Gaspar was present in the room at the time the will was
executed, and she corroborates Sr. Platon upon the point that all of the witnesses were present throughout the
ceremonies attending the execution of the will. This witness speaks with apparent frankness, and we believe
her testimony to be true, notwithstanding the fact that she possibly has a minor interest in the establishment of
the will.
In case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound to introduce all of the subscribing
witnesses, if available. They are therefore forced witnesses so far as the proponent is concerned, and he is not
bound by their testimony to the same extent that a litigant is bound by the testimony of witnesses introduced in
ordinary course. It follows that the proponent of a will may avail himself of other proof to establish the
instrument, even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or all of them.
With respect to the will now in question a prima facie case for the establishment of the document was made
out when it appeared that the instrument itself was properly drawn and attested and that all of the signatures
thereto are authentic. These facts raise a presumption of regularity; and upon those facts alone the will should,
be admitted to probate in the absence of proof showing that some fatal irregularity occurred. And such
irregularity must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before probate can be denied.
The order appealed from is therefore reversed and the instrument Exhibit C is declared to be the last will and
testament of Basilia Tantoco. So ordered, without express pronouncement as to costs.

55. Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102 , No. L-14003 August 05, 1960
This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January 1958 by the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City in its Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the determination of the quantity of evidence
required for the probate of a holographic will.
Facts:
On September 9, 1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City. Francisco Azoala
petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will submitted the said holographic will whereby Maria Milagros
Azoala was made the sole heir as against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson. Witness Francisco
Azoala testified that he saw the holographic will before the death of the testratix as the same was handed to
him and his wife. Francisco also testified that he recognized all the signatures in the holographic will as the
handwriting of the testratix. The opposition to the probated was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2)
that the testratrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her las will, and that the same was actually
written on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present at least three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent did not
prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testratrix. The proponent
appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the wills authenticity
was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be
denied by the adverse party.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is required to produce more than one witness considering that the
authenticity of the will was not contested.
Ruling: The Court rules in the negative. The court agreed with the appellant that since the authenticity of the
will was not contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of
the holographic will were contested, the Court is of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot
be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution
of a holographic will, none being required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses
possessing the requisite qualification is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses who know the handwriting and
signature of the testator and who can declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. There may be no available witnesses acquainted with the testators hand; or even if so familiarized,
the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 Article 811
may be impossible. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that in
the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it
necessary, expert testimony may be referred to.

56. 1 Gan vs. Yap 104 Phil 509

Facts:
After the death of Felicidad Yap, herein petitioner filed a petition for probate of a holographic will
allegedly executed by the deceased. The petition was opposed by Felicidads surviving spouse who stated that
the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not
presented and petitioner tried to establish its contents and due execution through the testimonies of 4
witnesses, who testified that they saw Felicidad make the holographic will and/or that they were allowed by
Felicidad to read the same on different occasions. The presiding judge disregarded the testimonies of
petitioners witnesses and sustained the opposition of Felicidads husband to the probate of the alleged
holographic will which was never presented in court.
Issue: May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who
declared that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

Ruling: NO. At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic
wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the
nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the
testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available
to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie.
And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the
likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were
intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to
distort his wishes. Last but not least, they cannot receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible9 only one man could engineer the
fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he
may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no
interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity.
The will having been lost the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" the oppositors have
no way to expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the
holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of
the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature feasibility of forgery
would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and
Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law.
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying
to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost
holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an
opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting
itself is not at hand.

57. Nittscher vs. Nittscher, 537 SCRA 681 , G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007
Facts: On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for
the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales.
-On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued
an order allowing the said holographic will.
- On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for
the administration of the estate of the deceased. A probate court denied the motion to dismiss, the petition for
the issuance of Letters Testamentary, being in order, is GRANTED. based Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
- Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit.
- Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondents petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and
that she was denied due process.

- The appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
- Petitioner contends that respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification
against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case
because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines; neither did he leave real properties in the
country. Petitioner claims that the properties listed for disposition in her husbands will actually belong to her.
She insists she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal service the notices of
the proceedings.

Issue: Whether petitioners was denied due process in the probate proceedings?
Held: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Petitioners allegation that she was denied due process in the
probate proceedings is without basis.
Petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husbands will is conclusive only as to its due execution. The
authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Thus, petitioners claim of title to the
properties forming part of her husbands estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular
courts.

58. Azuela vs. Court of Appeals, 487 SCRA 119 , G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally
defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And
perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally
defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just
aching for judicial rejection.
Facts: Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly executed by
Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and
was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the
attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of
both pages of the will though.
Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedents signature did not appear
on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged.

The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in accordance with law and, thus,
admitted it to probate, calling to fore the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a
willwith the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes. According to the
trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub-title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi, comprised the
attestation clause and the acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the
law. It also held that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will
containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied
the purpose of
identification and attestation of the will.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for
probate. It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering
the will void and undeserving of
probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the number of pages used in a
notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather thanmandatory, and thus susceptible
to what he termed as the substantial compliance rule.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject will complied with the requirements of the law and, hence,
should be admitted to probate?
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally
defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And

perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally
defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just
aching for judicial rejection.

59. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, supra ,490 SCRA 140, June 8, 2006
Facts: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died
in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal
share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in
A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter,
Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in
A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate. The motion and
project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richards will also filed
a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to
respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the
ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.
Issue: Whether the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect
is like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will
and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

2.3 Letters Testamentary and of Administration (Rules 78-79, Rules of Court)

60. Lim vs, Diaz-Millarez, 18 SCRA 371 , No. L-17633 October 19, 1966
FACTS:
Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died intestate filed a petition forhis
appointment as judicial administrator of theestate of the deceased.- The petition alleged that the deceased left
norelatives such as descendants, ascendants orsurviving spouse, except collaterals.- Basilisa Diaz-Millarez,
claiming to be a widow of the deceased filed an opposition on two grounds:1. That the petitioner has an
adverse interest inthe estate; and 2. That the properties of the estate are the subject matter of a litigation
between her asplaintiff and Cirilo Lim as defendant- When the case was called for hearing, bothparties
manifested the existence of a litigation between them over the properties of the estate.
TC dismissed petition.- Failing in his motion for the reconsideration, petitioner Lim, brought the case to the CA
which certified the appeal to SC.- In the Civil Case: Diaz-Millarez sought to recover from Lim 1/2 of the total
amount of P22,000 allegedly delivered to him by her and the deceased Millarez on various occasions and to
declare her as the owner of 1/2 of the profits and gains derived therefrom, on the ground that Jose Millarez and
she used to live as husband and wife for about 23 years and as such she is entitled to1/2 of the property held
in common by them. She asserted further that since she contributed capital and labor to the tobacco business
in which she and the deceased were engaged and from which they gave P22, 000 in cash to Lim, she would
be entitled to 1/2 of the capital and 1/2 of the proceeds and profits derived from such capital.
ISSUE

WON Lim may be appointed as administrator of the estate of the deceased.

HELD
- NO. The claim which Basilisa has against Ciriloin the civil case is based on her declared the right to of the
estate of the deceased.
It cannot therefore, be denied that Cirilo Lim, asa relative of the deceased has some interest adverse to that of
Basilisa. Shown to have some liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole, Cirilo cannot compatibly
perform the duties of an administrator.- In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment
as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the
estate.- The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent,
in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be
interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Disposition Order appealed from affirmed.

61. Medina vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 206 , No. L-34760 September 28, 1973
This is a review by certiorari of the appellate court's resolution dismissing the petition filed by petitioners
challenging the lower court's orders appointing private respondent Beda Gonzales as special administrator of
the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina.
Facts: The Court's action is based on the established doctrine that a person with an adverse conflicting interest
is unsuitable for the trust reposed in an administrator of an estate.
- the estate proceedings have been pending for over 13 years now without the lower court once having
appointed a regular administrator, said court is directed to name a suitable person as regular administrator
charged with the task of accomplishing the administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch.
- respondent court of first instance of Zambales approved and confirmed the deed of sale executed on May 8,
1969 by then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin
Medina covering the sale of its property known as "Bitukang Manok" for P24,000.00 to petitioner Rosalia M. del
Carmen, a daughter-heir of the decedent.
- Respondent lower court, through its said order, overruled the opposition of therein oppositor-heir Uldarico S.
Medina and of assignee Beda J. Gonzales, private respondent herein, who claimed therein "to have an interest
over the estate on the ground that certain heirs have already sold their shares and/or interest over the same in
his favor" as being "without merit."
- respondent Beda J. Gonzales "could not ... claim a better right over that of the herein vendee Rosalia Medina
del Carmen in the deed of sale because the said Beda J. Gonzales is merely subrogated, if at all, to the
interests of the heirs concerned who according to the records, have received more benefits from the estate
even before its distribution as against that of the vendee, who according to the records has never received
anything yet from the estate.
-Respondent Gonzales appealed respondent court's order of approval and confirmation of the sale of the
"Bitukang Manok" property as an interested party-assignee opposed to the sale executed by the estate of the
deceased Agustin Medina through its then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion, later replaced by the
clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr., as above stated, on his assertion that he had bought the rights of the
other heirs of the estate those of a majority of the heirs, according to his answer at bar. The appeal is now
pending in the Court of Appeals.
-A year after, respondent lower court appointed him "not as a regular administrator but only as special
administrator for the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina" and he qualified as such upon posting of
the bond fixed in the amount of P5,000.00 and replaced "judicial administrator Pastor de Castro, Jr.
- the Court finds said petition of Serafin Medina to be without merit and the same is hereby denied and the
appointment of said J. Gonzales as special administrator is hereby retained.
- petitioners instituted in the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction under date of
September 20, 1971, citing respondent Gonzales' conflicting interests as special administrator and as
"interested buyer ... persisting in objecting to the sale, in his desire to be the buyer (of the Bitukang Manok
property).

- court of appeals modified first court decision.

Issue: Whether Beda J Gonzales has the right over the property of the decedent?
Held: ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified and in lieu thereof,
judgment is entered allowing the appointment of respondent Gonzales special administrator to stand, insofar
as taking care temporarily of the other properties of the estate are concerned, but to the exclusion of the
Bitukang Manok property previously sold by the estate to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, who is entitled to
the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof.
the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed where his personal
interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a
quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the
estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due administration, and who should be removed
when his interest conflicts with such right and duly.

62. Maloles II vs. Phillips, 324 SCRA 172 , G.R. No. 129505, G.R. No. 133359 January 31, 2000
Facts:
A, during his lifetime, filed a petition for probate of his will in Branch 61, claiming that he had no compulsory
heirs and left all his properties to a foundation. He named D as executrix. The will was allowed and A
subsequently died. P filed a motion for intervention claiming to be As nephew while D filed a motion for
issuance of letters testamentary which D later withdrew. D refiled her motion with Branch 65. Branch 65
appointed D as special administrator but later ordered the transfer of Ds case to Branch 61. However, Branch 61
remanded the second case back to Branch 65.
Issue:
Whether Branch 65 has jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes. Branch 61 allowed the will of A, it had nothing else to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the
will pursuant to Rule 73 & 12 of the Rules of Court. After As death, insofar as the venue of the petition for
probate of the will of A is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. Thus, Branch 65 has jurisdiction.

62. Sison, et al. vs. Teodoro, 98 Phil. 680, No. L-6704 March 26, 1956
In the matter of the testate estate of Margarita David. CARLOS MORAN SISON, Judicial Administrator,
Petitioner-Appellee. NATIVIDAD SIDECO, ET AL., Claimants-Appellees, vs. NARCISA F. DE TEODORO,
heiress, Oppositor-Appellant.
Facts:
On December 21, 1951, this Court rendered a decision in G. R. No. L-3846 ordering the Testate Estate of
Margarita David to pay the claim of the Testate Estate of Crispulo Sideco in the sum of P17,010.43, with legal
interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from March 11, 1945, until the same is fully paid. To falicitate the
payment of this claim, Priscilla F. Sison, an heiress of the estate, delivered to its administrator the amount of
P12,128.44 to cover the payment of her one half share in the Sideco claim. The other heiress, herein Appellant
Narcisa F. Teodoro, was unwilling to do the same, contending that the Estate has real properties which could
be sold and with its proceeds pay the Sideco claim; hence, on January 23, 1952, the administrator filed a
petition with the lower court to compel Narcisa F. Teodoro to deliver to him her share in the payment of the
aforementioned Sideco claim. While this motion was pending hearing because of the opposition thereto filed by
Appellant, on March 5, 1952, the co-administratrix of the Estate of Crispulo Sideco filed a petition in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to secure an order directing the Administrator of the Testate Estate of Margarita
David to pay the aforementioned claim of P17.010.43 plus the legal interest accrued thereon. Both the petition
of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of Margarita David and that of the administratrix of the Sideco Testate
Estate were heard and, on April 5, 1952, the lower court entered an order, the pertinent portion of which reads
as follows:
With respect to the petition of the Administrator filed on January 23, 1952, it appears that in the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 3921-R, promulgated on June 30, 1950, the amount of P272,000 was held to
be residuary cash within this testate proceeding and that the same was equally divided between the two
heiresses herein, Narcisa de la Fuente and Priscilla de la Fuente.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether that said decision was final and executory and, therefore, cannot be amended by the lower court as it
was being done in the disputed order.
Ruling:
We agree with the view of the lower court that the residuary funds in the hands of the heiresses of this estate
should be applied to the payment of the Sideco claim, for it is more advantageous to use that fund to pay the
claim in question than selling the real properties of the estate for that purpose. Besides, section 3 of Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court provides:
The personal estate of the deceased shall be first chargeable with the payment of debts and expenses; and if
the personal estate is not sufficient for that purpose, or its sale would redound to the detriment of the
participants in the estate, the whole of the real estate, or so much thereof as is necessary, may be sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered for that purpose by the executor or administrator, after obtaining the
authority of the court therefore.
And according to section 6 of Rule 89, the Court has authority to fix the contributive shares of the devisees,
legatees or heirs for the payment of a claim if they have entered into possession of portions of the estate
before the debts and expenses thereof have been settled and paid. Appellant argues, however, that section 3
of Rule 89, Rules of Court, is not applicable to the instant case on the ground that it refers to the personal and
real properties of the deceased which are in the hands of the administrator, and not to the properties of the
estate which are already in the hands of the heiresses. This contention is likewise untenable. The residuary
funds in the hands of the Appellant are funds of the estate and the Court has jurisdiction over them and,
therefore, it could compel the Appellant to deliver to the administrator of this estate the necessary portion of
such fund for the payment of the Sideco claim.

63. Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768 , G.R. No. L-26751, No. L-26085, No. L-26106 January 31,
1969
Facts:
Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both the petitioner and the herein
respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in special proceeding 25876 (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition
praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos') appointment in such capacity. Carlos
alleged that "for a period of more than two years from the date of his appointment (on May 29, 1963), said
Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his administration," and that he
"is not only incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting of five
haciendas on account of a criminal charge for murder filed against him which is occupying most of his time."
The respondent Matias claims that he forthwith interposed an opposition to the aforesaid petition, and the
record discloses that he later filed an amended opposition dated August 25, 1965.
On September 21, 1965 the heirs of Agustina Matute Candelario, Elena MatuteCandelario and Amadeo Matute
Candelario and their mother and legatee Anunciacion Candelario, moved for the immediate appointment of
Agustina Matute Candelario,Carlos S. Matute and Jose S. Matute, herein petitioner, as joint co-administrators
or anyone of them in place of Matias S. Matute, whose removal they also sought together with the ouster of the
general administrator Carlos V. Matute.
On January 31, 1966 the probate court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby removes co-administrator, Matias S.Matute, as
such co-administrator of the estate and orders him to submit a final accounting of his administration
together with his past administration accounts which have not been approved, and, in his stead
appoints Jose S. Matute, a brother by the same mother of Matias S. Matute, as co-administrator, who is
hereby required to put up a bond of P15,000.00, and thereafter immediately qualify in his commission
and assume the responsibility of co-administrator....
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner has the right to co-administer the entire estate.
Ruling:
In this regard, the ruling inFernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla 1 is determinative of the jurisdictional issue posed
here. In said case, this Court ruled that in a contest for the administration of an estate, the amount in
controversy is deemed to be the value of the whole estate, which total value should be the proper basis of the
jurisdictional amount. Consequently the Court proceeded to conclude that the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and preliminary injunction prayed for in a petition concerning a conflict
over administration arising as an incident in the main probate or settlement proceeding if in the first place the

principal case or proceeding falls outside its appellate jurisdiction considering the total value of the subject
estate.
ACCORDINGLY, (1) in L-26751 the petition for certiorari is hereby granted; the respondent Court of Appeals is
adjudged as without jurisdiction over CA-G.R. 37039-R; the probate court's controverted order of January 31,
1966 is hereby set aside in its entirety, thereby maintaining the respondent Matias S. Matute in his trust as coadministrator of the Amadeo Matute Olave estate; (2) in L-26085 the petition for certiorari is hereby granted;
the order of default dated April 16, 1966, the judgment by default dated April 23, 1966, and the order of
execution dated May 3, 1966, all issued in excess of jurisdiction by the respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, are set aside; and (3) in L-26106 the petition for certiorari is hereby denied in so far as it
seeks to nullify the final order of dismissal dated February 15, 1966; the order of default and judgment by
default dated March 29, 1966 and the order of execution dated April 12, 1966, all similarly issued in excess of
jurisdiction by the same respondent Judge are set aside.

64. Baluyut vs. Pao, 71 SCRA 86 , No. L-42088 May 07, 1976

Facts:
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six, leaving an estate allegedly valued at
not less than two million pesos.
A few weeks later, or on February 20, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his
widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate.
Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed that he be appointed regular administrator
and in the meantime as special administrator.
The lower court in its order of February 24, 1975 appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator with a
bond of P100,000.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition of March 8, 1975 alleged that she was unaware that her deceased
husband executed a will. She characterized as libelous the allegation as to her mental incapacity. She prayed
that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set
aside.
The lower court in its order of March 24, 1975 cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special administrator. In that
same order the lower court noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while on the witness
stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally qualified".
Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order. Acting on that motion, the lower court in its
order of March 31, 1975 appointed Baluyut and Jose Espino as special administrators.
On December 13, 1975 Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent Judge, Mrs. Baluyut and the Espino
spouses this special civil action of certiorari in order to set aside the order of November 27 appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix.
Issue:
Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
Ruling:
We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys
preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that
she should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge
that trust.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed
administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to
contest the petition.
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for the issuance
of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be conducted
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut as
administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That irregularity became
more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He anticipated
that development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed wills which should
be delivered to the court for probate.

Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed by the lower court or if the petitioner's
contention is clearly tenable or when the broader interests of justice or public policy justify the nullification of
the questioned order
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is set
aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is directed to conduct
further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in this decision. Costs against respondent
Mrs. Baluyut.

65. Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 46 Phil. 726 , No. 18754 September 26, 1922
Facts:
The lower court had appointed Justo Buera special administrator; and after a hearing, it decided the
controversy, declaring Leon Nadurata not to be the surviving spouse of Petra de los Santos and that the latter's
nearest relatives are not the opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos who allege themselves to
be, but are not, brothers of the deceased, but the applicants Capistrano, who are her true brothers by the same
mother. Upon these findings, the lower court confirmed the appointment of Justo Buera as administrator of the
estate. From this judgment Leon Nadurata, Pedro de los Santos, and Juan de los Santos appealed, assigning
as errors: (a) The overruling of their opposition to the confirmation of the appointment of Justo Buera as
administrator; (b) the declaration that the applicants are the sole heirs of the deceased to the exclusion of said
opponents; and (c) the ordering of the prosecution of certain persons enumerated and referred to in said
decision for the crime of falsification of public document and for perjury.
Issue:
whether or not Leon Nadurata is the husband of the said deceased, and whether the applicants, or the
opponents Santos, are her nearest relatives.
Ruling:
The first error was not committed. The selection of an administrator of the estate of a deceased lies within the
discretion of the court (sec. 642, subsec. 1, Code of Civil Procedure). And the record does not contain anything
tending to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court. On the contrary, the act of the lower court
in overruling the objection of the opponents and confirming the appointment as administrator of the person
proposed by the applicants is not only indicative of sound discretion, but is right and just; for the evidence
shows that Leon Nadurata is not surviving spouse of Petra de los Santos, who died widow and not twice
widow, and that the opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos are not, as they pretend to be,
brother of the aforesaid deceased.
However, the declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently
shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the
proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance
is liquidated (sec. 753, Code of Civil Procedure).
The order contained in the judgment, directing the prosecuting officer to prosecute the persons therein
mentioned, finds sufficient support in the evidence. Although we are convinced by the evidence that Exhibits 1
and 2 are not authentic by any means, yet we prefer to leave it, with the court to take cognizance of the
criminal action, to declare whether they were criminally falsified or not. But, as stated, we are persuaded by the
evidence of record that the trial court committed no error in directing the prosecuting officer to take such action
as may be deemed proper for the punishment of those criminally responsible, as revealed by the evidence and
found in the course of this proceeding.
Except as regards the declaration of heirs, which, while it is supported by the evidence, is premature, the ruling
appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

2.3 LETTERS TESTAMENTARY & OF ADMINISTRATION

66) Arevalo vs. Bustamante et al., 69 Phil. 656 , No. 47098 April 02, 1940
FACTS:
Two years after Bernabe Bustamante died, his widow Rufina Arevalo brought to CFI Manila the
settlement of the formers estate and she was appointed by the court as its administrator. An inventory
and appraisals were made on the properties. Meanwhile, Jose Bustamante and others, who claimed to
be heirs of Bernabe, filed objections against Rufina. Before the court could act on the obections,
Rufina died. Her son, Ariston Bustamante, was appointed by the court as the receiver of the intestate
of Bernabe Bustamante. When this became known to Jose, et al., they opposed to Aristons

appointment on the grounds that Ariston, not being the heir of Bernabe or having interest in the estate,
should not have been appointed as administrator, that there was preterition of several heirs in the
project of participation, that the expenses are excessive and unjustified, among others.
The trial court resolved the incident and repealed the appointment of Ariston as receiver, holding that he
failed to act on the project participation. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of Ariston as administrator is proper.
HELD:
-----67. Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 413 , G.R. No. 101512 August 07, 1992
FACTS:
Nine months after the death of Domingo Gabriel on Aug. 6, 1987, Roberto Dindo Gabriel, an illegitimate
son, filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for letters of administration over Domingos estate. A
hearing has been set for opposition and publication of the order in a newspaper of general circulation.
However, no opposition has been filed. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order appointing
Roberto as administrator of the intestate estate of Domingo. Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the
filing of claims against the estate of the decedent was published. Aida Valencia, mother of Roberto,
filed a motion to file a claim against Domingos estate alleging that the decision in a civil case between
her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate. Later,
Roberto filed for the approval by the probate court an inventory and appraisal of the estate. Nilda
Gabriel and others, the legitimate children of the decedent, filed an opposition praying for the recall of
the letters of administration issued to Rodrigo. They alleged that they were not duly informed by
personal notice of the petition, that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, as the legitimate spouse-widow, should be
preferred over Roberto as administrator, and that Roberto has a conflicting and/or adverse interest
against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother. The probate court denied the
opposition on the ground that they had not shown any circumstances sufficient to overturn the order.
On appeal, the CA ruled in favour of Roberto on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is
left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration must be followed; W/N
the appointment of Roberto as administrator be nullified.
HELD: CA decision affirmed w/ modification. The appointment of Roberto as administrator is valid;
Felicitas Jose-Gabriel be appointed as co-administratrix.
Under the Sec.6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the order of preference in the issuance of letters of
administration categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and
requires that the sequence be observed in appointing an administrator. In the appointment thereof, the
principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator.
The widow has the preference to administer the estate of her husband upon the latters death, because
she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. On this ground
alone, Felicitas, the widow of the deceased, has every right and is very much entitled to the
administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred
to another who has less.
On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of Roberto as administrator. The
determination of a persons suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in
the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be
interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. In the instant case, a mere importunity
by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not
adequate ratiocination for the removal of Rodrigo.
Under the circumstances obtaining therein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a coadministration of the estate of the deceased by Felicitas and Roberto. The purpose of having coadministrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times have different interests
represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the
legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all
interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and
supervision of the probate court.

68) PCIB vs. Escolin supra

FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines
at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had
made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the
laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the
Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her
death (and not said law at any other time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.
69. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373 , G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Rommel Silverio filed a petition to change his first name (to Mely) and sex (to
female) in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He alleges to be a male transsexual
and that he has always identified more with girls since childhood. After
undergoing breast augmentation, hormone treatment and psychological examination, on January 27,
2001, he finally underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok.
The petition was granted by the trial court, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, and Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court allow
petitioner to change his name and sex in his birth certificate. NO.
RATIO: A persons first name cannot be changed because of sex reassignment. The State has an
interest in the names carried by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification. Change
of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are thus controlled by statute. Art. 376
of the Civil Code was amended by R.A. 9048. Section 1 of the said law provides:
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
Thus, the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar, assuming it could be legally done,
instead of the trial court.
Moreover, the petition has no merit as the use of his true and official name worked no prejudice
towards him.
R.A. 9048 provides for the following grounds for which a change of first name may be allowed:
1. First name or nickname ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
2. First name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by petitioner and has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
3. Change will avoid confusion.
Here, Silverio failed to even allege any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true name.
His basis in praying for the change of his first name was the sex reassignment to make his name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into. A change of name does not alter ones
legal capacity or civil status. The law does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, granting the petition may only create complications in
the civil registry and the public interest.
Under R.A. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries correctable under Rule 108 and Art. 412 of the Civil Code are found in
Articles 407 and 408 of the same Code. No reasonable interpretation of the provisions can justify a
conclusion that they cover correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error. To change means to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. The
birth certificate of Silverio contained no error. No correction is necessary.
70. Edgar San Luis vs. San Luis, 514 SCRA 294 , G.R. No. 133743, G.R. No. 134029 February 06, 2007

FACTS:
This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna.
During his lifetime, he contracted three marriages. First, he married Virginia Sulit in 1942 and had six
children with her. Second, five years later after Virginias death in 1963, he married Merry Lee Corwin,
an American citizen and had one son with her. However, in 1971, Merry Lee filed a divorce against
Felicisimo in Hawaii and was granted a decree thereof in 1973. Third, Felicisimo married herein
respondent Felicidad Sagalongos San Luis in the US in 1974. They had no children but they lived
together for 18 years from the time of their marriage until the death of Felicisimo in 1992.
Felicidad filed with the RTC Makati City a petition for letters of administration, praying that their conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. Rodolfo San Luis,
herein petitioner and one of Felicisimos children in his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. He claimed that the petition should
be filed in Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death, being a public
official (governor) thereof. He further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee and the decree of divorce issued in Hawaii was not valid in the Philippines.
The RTC ruled in favour of Rodolfo. But in the CA, the RTC decision was reversed and ruled in favour
of Felicidad. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N venue was properly laid; W/N Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
RULING: Petition denied. CA affirmed.
Under Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of a decedents
estate should be filed in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of his death.
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. From the
foregoing, We find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the RTC Makati City which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Re: Legal Personality
The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. It was cited in Van Dorn case that if the foreigner obtains
a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
The Court held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
However, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo
by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him

was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven.
71. Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710 , No. L-3378 August 22, 1951
FACTS:
This case involves the testate estate of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo. The facts of the case show
that the testatrix executed two wills during her lifetime, one dated Aug. 16, 1948 and the second dated
Oct. 19, 1948. It was the second will that was probated by the CFI of Bulacan. The appellants,
Crisostomo and others, filed a petition for relief from the judgment of the said court, alleging that they
are the nephews and nieces and therefore the legal heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo; that
the court erred in admitting to probate the (second) Oct. 19, 1948 will when there existed the (first) Aug.
16, 1948 will; that the two wills should be probated jointly or together and the latter be allowed instead
of the former; and that if the second will be disallowed, they would inherit the estate left by the testatrix.
The lower court denied their petition for relief. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the two wills be probated together; W/N the appellants are interested parties to the
case?
HELD: Appeal denied.
The lower court was right in not setting a date for proving the will of Aug. 16, 1948, because this will
was expressly and absolutely revoked by the subsequent will of Oct. 19, 1948. It stands to reason that
if two wills are presented for allowance but one of them revokes expressly and absolutely the other, the
revoked will cannot be included in the probate of the latter subsequent will, because it would be a waste
of time to allow the revoked will. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent
revoking will is disallowed.
The appellants, who alleged that they were the nephews and nieces of the deceased but without
specifying the degree of relationship they had with the latter, have no interest in the probate of said
wills, and they cannot appeal from the judgment which allowed one of the them instead of the other.
Appellants argue that they are in interested parties and therefore may appeal in the present case,
because in the event the will of October 19 is disallowed and in its that of August 16 is allowed, and the
legacies in the latter are declared invalid or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to
appellants. This argument has no merit. In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise
provided by law, the interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and
direct, so that he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or
judgment: and not indirect or contingent (Espinosa vs. Barrios, 40 Off. Gaz., [8 Supp. No. 12]. p. 145).
The interest claimed by the appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and
future events to (1) The disallowance of the will of October 19, 1948 (2)The allowance of the will of
August 16, 1948, and (3) invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948.
72. Duran vs. Duran, 20 SCRA 379 , No. L-23372 June 14, 1967
FACTS:
Pio Duran died in 1961 without a testament, leaving as his heirs his wife, Josefina, and several brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces. In 1962, Cipriano, one of Pio's brothers, executed a public
instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights in favor of Josefa for a consideration of
P2,500.00. A year later, Cipriano filed in the CFI of Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settles
Pio's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. Josefa opposed and prayed for its
dismissal on the ground that the Cipriano is not an interested person in the estate, in view of the deed
of transfer and renunciation. In the alternative, she asked to be appointed administratrix. The CFI
dismissed Cipriano's petition for lack of interest in the estate on the premise of the deed of transfer
executed by the latter. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N Cipriano is an interested person in the estate of Pio considering the deed of transfer he
executed in favor of Josefina.
HELD: Appeal denied.
A legal heir, who in a public instrument assigned and renounced his hereditary rights in favor of the
decedent's widow, is not an interested party who can institute intestate proceedings and petition for

issuance of letters of administration. He has no more interest in the decedent's estate. His petition
should be dismissed.
73. Gutierrez vs. Villegas
FACTS:
Irene Santos died intestate in 1954, leaving her legal heirs, her husband Jose Villegas, and her nieces
Adela Gutierrez and Rizalina Rivera. A petition for administration was granted by CFI Rizal in favor of
Jose in 1955. In the same year, Adela signed a document entitled Kasulatan Ng Bilihan At Salinan,
purporting to be a sale of share and participation in the estate in favor of Rizalina for a consideration of
P50,000 payable in instalments. She also signed a Manifestation purporting to inform the probate
court that she had sold all her rights, interest, and participation in the estate to Rizalina, among others.
Adela filed the present case to annul the aforesaid deed of sale on grounds of fraud and mistake. She
alleged that she was forced to sign the abovementioned documents without knowing their purpose, and
that she was not able to read them on account of her poor eyesight and her failure to bring her
eyeglasses with her. She claimed, furthermore, that in signing the deed of sale, her consent was
vitiated by gross mistake because the defendants (Jose & Rizalina) misled and deceived her as to the
actual and real value of the estate of Irene Santos because the inventory failed to include certain
properties, or which, if at all listed, were either undervalued or stated to be conjugal when, in fact, they
are paraphernal properties of the deceased.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N there was fraud in the execution of the deed; W/N there was a gross undervaluation of the
estate properties.
HELD: Trial courts decision affirmed.
The facts, as shown by the records, do not support Adelas conclusions. The alleged indicia of fraud
upon which she rests her case are backed only by her own uncorroborated testimony, which is
contradicted by that of defendants and their witnesses.
The claim of grossly inadequate consideration for the sale is predicated by Adela upon a double theme:
(a) that the inventory of the estate of Irene Santos did not include certain properties, and (b) an alleged
gross undervaluation of the estate properties. We note that the trial court preferred to adopt the
appraisal of the examiner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue made in assessing the inheritance taxes
due on the estate of Irene Santos, and approved by the superior officers of the Bureau. These real
properties were appraised by the BIR for purposes of fixing the amount of estate and inheritance taxes
to be paid, and their fair market value was determined by the examiner after an ocular inspection of the
properties and investigation of the deeds of title and tax declarations covering the same. This Court
sees no ground for disturbing the finding of these public officials in the absence of proof of any
irregularity in their actuations. Hence, the claim of gross inadequacy of the price must be rejected as
unproved.
74. Avelino vs. Court of Appeals, 329 SCRA 369 , G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Socorro Avellino, the compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino Sr. Petitioner filed
before the RTC for a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Avelino Sr.
The respondent Sharon Avelino the second wife of the children and Angelina Avelino filed a motion to
convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
ISSUE: WON converting petitioners petition for issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition is valid.
HELD: Petition is denied.
SC ruled that if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatee are all of age, section 1 rule 74 of
the rules of court should apply.
Extra judicial settlement by agreement between heirs if the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age or the minors represented by their judicial or legal representative duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.

It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extra judicial
action for partition is possible, the ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case.

2.4 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

75. Roxas vs. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407 , No. L-2211 December 20, 1948 Roxas vs. Pecson
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria and Pedro Roxas sister and brother of the deceased Pablo M. Roxas filed a petition for
the administration proceeding.
The widow Natividad Roxas filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband
and for her appointment as executive administratrix of his estate designated in the said will.
Respondent filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of the court appointing the petitioner as
special administratrix with an alternative prayer that Maria Roxas be appointed as special coadministrator. Respondent judged render a decision denying the probate of the will, from which the
petitioner has appealed. Respondent rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner Natividad Roxas
as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased and Maria Roxas as special
administratrix of the capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo Roxas.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON, respondent acted in excess of the court jurisdiction appointing two separate special
administratrix.
HELD: SC held that the lower court has no power to appoint two special administratrix of the
deceased husband, one of the community property and another of the exclusive property of the
decedent.
The order is set aside.
Under the law, only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute
the estate of the deceased.

76. Matias vs. Gonzales, etc., et al., 101 Phil. 852 , No. L-10907 June 29, 1957
FACTS:
Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a document purporting
to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single, at the age of 92 yrs old.
Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will, and, after
appropriate proceedings, respondent Judge issued an order, sustaining said opposition and denying
the petition for probate.
Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriquez, as special administrator of the estate of
the deceased and the appointment in his instead of Ramon Plata.
Respondent Judge by an order found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and relieved him as special
administrator and appointed Basilia Salud as special administratrix thereof.
Aurea Matias, asked the said order to set aside and that she be appointed special co-administratrix on
the ground that Basilia is over 80 yrs of age
ISSUE: WON, to appoint more than two special administrators is valid.
HELD: Set Aside.
In Roxas vs Pecson, the Supreme Court ruled that only one special administrator may be appointed
administrator temporarily the estate of the deceased must be considered in the light of the facts
obtaining in said case.
In the case at bar, there is only one special administrator, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly
by two special co administrators.
2.5 Executors and Administrators (Rules 81-85, Rules of Court)

77. De Gala, vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil. 104 , No. 30289 March 26, 1929
FACTS:
Severina Gonzalez executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of Severina was designated
executrix.
Testatrix died, leaving no heirs by force of law, through her counsel presented the will for probate.
Apolinario Gonzalez, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had
not been executed in conformity with the provision of sec 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of the deceased. She made several
demands upon Sinpfoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery of the property
inventoried and which he was in possession.
Sinforoso filed a motion acting the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be
cancelled and that he, Sinforoso be appointed in her instead.
Serapia was removed and Sinfroso was appointed special administratrix in her place.
The court order the will and admitted it to probate.
ISSUE: WON, a special administrator can be removed on the ground for causes under section 653 on
the code of civil procedure.
HELD: AFFIRMED
Section 653 of the civil procedure only applies to executors and regular administrators, and the office of
a special administrator is quite different from the regular administrator.
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court. The function
of such and administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased and to return and
inventory thereof. He cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased.

78. Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals, 14 SCRA 922 , No. L-20735 August 14, 1965
FACTS:
Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag.
Respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special administratrix for the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime.
Petitioner move to dismiss Agregados Complaint, upon the ground that as special administratrix cannot
be sued by a creditor. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: WON, a special administrator shall be liable to pay any debts of the deceased?
WON, Agregado has no cause of action against her as a special administratrix?
HELD: Affirmed.
The rules of court do not expressly prohibit making special administratrix a defendant in a suit against
the estate. Otherwise creditors would find the adverse effects of statute limitations running against them
where the appointment of regular administrator is delayed.
Sec. 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides a creditor holding a claim against the deceased,
secured by a mortgage or other collateral security my pursue of any of this remedies:
1

Abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of the
assets of the estate.
2. Foreclose his mortgage realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged
property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings and
3. Rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of
limitations and of the he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not share in the
distribution of the assets.
79. Anderson vs. Perkins, 1 SCRA 387 , No. L-15388 January 31, 1961

FACTS
Dora Perkin Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene
Arthur Perkins. On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also
filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on
the same day, the court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon
his posting of a bond. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the
probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. The special administrator submitted an
inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur
Perkins at the time of his death.
About two years later, special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give
away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased,
such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically
and in value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value migh be obtained in their
disposition. When the motion was heard, court required the administrator to submit a specification of the
properties sought to be sold, and in compliance therewith, the special administrator submitted to the court, in
place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate with the
items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too
voluminous to enumerate.
Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale reasoning that (1) most of the properties sought
to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of
fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made.
Lower court approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Idonah Slade
Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the special
administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2 of Rules of
Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were
perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty sought to be sold
represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing
unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent
identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's
separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.
Lower court denied the MR. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES/HELD
1

WON the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the special administrator has no
legal authority to sell them / NO

WON the opposition of the surviving spouse of the deceased that she is entitled to a large portion of the
personal properties in question should be entertained / YES

WON the oppositor-appellant should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want
sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim / NO

RATIO1.Section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special administrator's
power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only.
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased
until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be
preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of
perishable property. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the
property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell
"other proerty as the court ordered sold" .
2.Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially approved, no
proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the
oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal
partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of
the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an
agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind
being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought to
be sold pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books can
easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two residential

houses (in Manila and in Baguio City) left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the
proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be
adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.
3.It does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory
she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to
the order approving the same were overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds
for her opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to the
validity of the grounds of her opposition.
DISPOSITIVE
The lower court's order authorizing the special administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is
set aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petition-appellee Dora Perkins
Anderson.

80. Silverio, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 541 , G.R. No. 109979 March 11, 1999
FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After
her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her
estate.
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an
Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing
Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the
property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said Order
on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12,
2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private
respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected
within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order
dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises. Consequently, private respondent filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated May 2, 2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the
assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
ISSUE: W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are
Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.
RULING: The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed.
The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was
against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to
file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12,
2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of
an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the
wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court instead.

A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court,
while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be
decided upon.
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the
interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally
cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be
resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it
ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On
that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the
heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly
secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any
real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May
31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus,
private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for
employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the
filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private
respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

81. Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo vs. Lacuata-Gabriel, 474 SCRA 747 , G.R. No. 162934 November
11, 2005
FACTS: On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died in Malabon City,
Metro Manila, leaving behind a sizable inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock.
On October 16, 1989, Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo
and Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention.
On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC
of Malabon City a petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor.
He alleged that he discovered his mothers will on October 25, 1989 in which he was instituted as the sole heir
of the testatrix, and designated as alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a
brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter sometime in 1985 or 1986.
On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died. She was substituted by her heirs, Bena Jean, Daniel,
Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo.
The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. On May 15, 1991, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the
intestate proceedings
On July 8, 1991, the probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of his mothers estate.
On April 16, 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a Manifestation and Motion
where she informed the probate court of her husbands death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute in
place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.
On August 24, 2001, Bena Jean filed a Motion for Appointment as Administrator of the Estate of Crisanta Y.
Gabriel praying that she be appointed administratrix of the estate of her grandmother Crisanta.
On October 11, 2001, Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean, claiming that the latter has neither proven
her kinship with Crisanta Gabriel nor shown any particular qualification to act as administratrix of the estate.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari of Mariano Yanga, Jr.
In a Resolution dated December 5, 2001, the lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix upon a
bond of P200,000.00. The probate court merely noted the motion for substitution filed by the heirs of Belinda,

stating that they were mere strangers to the case and that their cause could better be ventilated in a separate
proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper that Dolores should be the administrarix
Whether or not a proceeding for special administratrix be made separately
RULING: The petition is without merit. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the
discretion of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator under
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. In
the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator
is appointed, the court determines who is entitled to the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On this point, We hold that the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient
reason.
While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir of
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and is considered a third person to the estate of Crisanta, nonetheless, private
respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration of the said estate because she is an heir of her
husband Roberto, whose estate is the former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta.
The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
probate court. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care
for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as
the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is subject to
the supervision and control of the probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire
estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement. The principal object of appointment of
temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to
administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.
82. Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero, 64 Phil. 134 , No. 43351 February 26, 1937
FACTS: Former administrator Soriano filed a P5K bond, with respondent-appellants as sureties. Upon
accounting, Soriano was indebted to the estate for P23K and was unable to return it to the estate. New
administrator Cosme demanded the execution of Sorianos bond. CFI Laguna ordered such, after notice to
the sureties. CFI approved a settlement between former and current administrators, whereby the former ceded
some real properties, reducing the debt from P23K to P5K. A year after, new administrator requested the sheriff
to levy the properties of the sureties and advertise public sale thereof to collect the remaining unpaid debt of
P5K. Sureties filed moved to be discharged from the bond but CFI denied. They filed Motion for
Reconsideration (MfR) to CFI and appeal to SC, but were all denied. SC ruled that since they did not file MfR
and appeal on the execution order, their MfR for the levy was too late. Case was remanded to CFI. They
challenged, for the first time, that CFI had no jurisdiction to issue execution of bond.
ISSUE: Whether or not probate court can order execution of bond.
HELD: YES. Probate court has the power to require the filing of the bond, fix the amount thereof, and hold it
accountable for any breach of administrators duty. Surety is liable within the bond during accounting in the
probate proceedings, not in another separate proceedings.

83. G.R. No. L-23419

Intestate Estate of the Deceased Gelacio Sebial.
Benjamin Sebial, petitioner-appelle
vs.
Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial and Heirs of Balbina Sebial, oppositors-appelants
Action: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Cebu
Facts:

Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and 6
other children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother).

In 1960, Benjamina filed for the settlement of her father's estate and her appointment as administrator.

This petition was opposed by Roberta on the ground that said estate had already been apportioned and
that she should be the one appointed as administrator and not Benjamina.

The Court appointed Benjamina and found that alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. So the
letters of administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issued on the same date.

The oppositors motion for reconsideration was denied. For the possibility of an amicable settlement,
the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of the properties of the decedent with segregation
for each marriage.

On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or six months from
the appointment. Roberta then moved for the motion reconsideration alleging as ground that the court
has no jurisdiction to approve the inventory as it was filed beyond the 3-month period. The Court of
Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Did the court lose jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months after the appointment?
Held:

NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-month period is not
mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper court and
the publication of the notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate
and retains such until the probate proceedings is closed.

Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after the three-month period, this delay will not deprive the
probate court of its jurisdiction to approve it.

However, under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, such unexplained delay can be a ground for
an administrator's removal.

84. Vda. De Paz, et al. vs. Vda. De Madrigal, et al., 100 Phil. 1085, No. L-8981 October 23, 1956
Appeal from an order of the CFI of Manila, dismissing plaintiffs action to recover the possession
and ownership of seven parcels of land situated in the province of Camarines Sur, on parcel of land
situated in the province of Marinduque, and one lot and a house situated in the City of Manila.
Order appealed from is set aside with costs against the appellees. Appellants are directed to
amend the complaint so as to include the executrix of the estate of the party defendant.

85. G.R. No. L-46249 October 18, 1939

Intestate Estate of Rafael Jocson deceased.
CONCEPTION JOCSON DE HILADO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESUS R. NAVA, defendant-appellant.
Action: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Occidental Negros
Facts:

On February 8, 1935, the administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the deceased Rafael Jocson,
executed in favor of appellant Jesus R. Nava a contract of lease period of five crop years, over certain
properties of the estate, at a stipulated rental of P1,000 a year.

The contract was entered into without the intervention of the court acting in the intestate proceedings.

On July 23, 1936, appellee herein, Conception Jocson de Hillado, filed a motion in said proceedings,
praying that the administratix be required to explain certain details in the matter of said lease; and in
reply to the answer filed by said administratrix, she prayed that the contract be declared null and void.

The court in its order of December 6, 1936, declared the contract null and void and ordered the
administratix to lease the lands compromised in the contract to the highest bidder at public auction.

Jesus R. Nava, the lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set aside, it having been issued
without jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and he appealed.

Issue: Can the lower court annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by the
administratrix without its intervention.
Held:

The contract here in question being a mere act of administration, could validy be entered into by the
administratrix within her powers of administration, even without the court's previous authority.

And the court had no power to annul or invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had
no jurisdiction over the person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary to that effect.

Order is accordingly reversed, with costs againts appellee.

86. No. L-6704 March 26, 1956

In the matter of the testate estate of Margarita David.
Carlos Moran Sison, Judicial Administrator, petitioner and appelle. Natividad Sideco, et al., claimants
and appellees
Vs.
Narcisa F. de Teodoro, heiress, oppositor and appellant
Action: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Manila
Facts:

On Dec. 21, 1951, this Court rendered a decision in GR No. L-3846 ordering the Testate Estate of
Margarita David to pay the claim of the Testate Estate of Crispulo Sideco in the sum of P17,010.43,
with legal interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from March 11, 1945, until the same is fully paid.
Complying with the said order, the heiress Priscilla de la Fuente deposited with the Philippined National
Bank on May 8, 1952, the amount of P12,128.44 as her share in the payment of the Sideco claim in
accordance with the said order of the court.
However, the heiress Narcisa de la Fuente filed a motion seeking the reconsideration of the said order
on the ground that the estate has sufficient real properties which he could be sold to pay the Sideco
claim, invoking the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Who should be ordered to pay the claim of Sideco, the executor of the testate estate or the heiresses?
Held:

The residuary funds within the estate, although already in the possession of the universal heirs, are
funds of the estate. The Court has jurisdiction over them and it could compel the heirs to deliver to the
administrator of the estate the necessary portion of such funds for the payment of any claim against the
estate.
The court agrees with the lower court that the residuary funds in the hands of the heiresses of this
estate should be applied to the payment of the Sideco claim, for it is more advantageous to use that
fund to pay the claim in question than selling the real properties of the estate for that purpose.
Sec. 1 Rule 89 If, after hearing all the money claims against the estate, and after ascertaining the
amount of such claims, it appears that there are sufficient assets to pay the debts, the executor or
administrator shall pay the same within the time limited for the purpose.

87. De Borja, etc. vs. Tan, etc. and De Borja, 97 Phil. 872 , No. L-6476

November 18, 1955

FACTS
--->this is a petition for mandamus to compel respondent judge Tan to approve and admit the record on appeal
filed before him and to give due course to the appeal.
--->on October 25, 1940, petitioner De Borja filed a petition in the lower court for probate of the Last Will and
Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tongco.
--->the will was probated on April 2, 1941 and named the petitioner the executor thereof.
--->one of the respondent appealed the the case to the CA but later his motion of dismissal of the appeal was
granted.
--->unfortunately all the record of the case were lost and destroyed during the Pacific war but were later on

reconstituted.
--->on that same year, Petitioner was qualified as an executor and administrator.
--->on August 29, 1951, Crisanto De Borja was appointed as petitioners co-administrator due to a motion filed
by Matilde alleging that Francisco was physically incapalbe to administer the estate because he is blind and
weak.
--->that according to petitioner, the trial court without a petition or notice to anyone appointed Crisanto as his
co-administrator.
--->Francisco, Matilde, and Crisanto moved for a motion for reconsideration regarding the appointment of Jose
De Borja as the co-administrator of the estate but respondent Judge indirectly denied their motion, and
revoked the appointment of Crisanto and directed administrator Jose De Borja to comment on the amendment.
--->so on July 22, 1952 Francisco, Matilde, Crisanto filed a notice of appeal on the appointment of Jose and
the order denying the MR and later they filed the corresponding record of appeal.
--->respondent Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal and refused to give due course to the appeal on
the ground that the appointment of Jose was interlocutory in character, therefore not appealable.
--->HENCE THIS PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
ISSUE
--->WON co-adminsitrator Jode De borja's, being just a special administrator, position is revocable?
--->WON respondent Judge Tan may be compelled to appoint Crisant instead of Jose?
HELD
--->petition is GRANTED.
RATIO
--->respondent contends that, Jose is a co-administrator, and it being such, it is a special appointment, hence it
is not appealable, BUT we find that in this case, Francisco was only an administrator by name due to his
physical incapacities, so for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of Jose is like a general
administrator therefore, we hold that his appointment is appealable.

88. Uy Tioco vs. Imperial, and Panis, 53 Phil. 802, No. 29414 July 17, 1928
FACTS
--->This is a petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent judge from compelling the petitioner to
pay the sum of P11,250 or three-fourth of 15,000 to the other respondent, Alejandro Panis, out of the funds of
the estate of the deceased Basilisa Yangco, of which estate said petitioner is the administrator.
--->respondent Panis was a counsel for the administrator of the estate and that he presented a motion in the
probate proceedings for the allowance and attorneys fees, which was granted by the judge.
--->the petitioner did not appeal but, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors
presented an MR on the ground that he was not notified and had no konwledge thereof and also that it is
excessive and prejudicial to the estate, but the same was denied, because although he was not notified, the
administrator was properly served.
--->minor Pedro Tionco appealed the order of the respondent Judge, but Wijanco said that, Pedro's share is
only one-fourth ofnthe property,nhence Respondent demanded from the administrator three-fourth of the
15,000 that was granted by the court to be given by administrator.
--->the guardian ad litem objected, but the same was denied by the Judge, hence this petition.
ISSUE
--->WON the granting of the payment should be defferred due to the fact thatbit was awarded after the appeal
was taken into consideration?
HELD
--->petition is GRANTED. Hereby prohibiting the respondent judge from allowing Panis to collect three-fourth of
the 15,000 until the disposition ofthe appeal bynthe minor Pedro.
RATIO
--->it appears that, the intention to appeal by the guardian ad litem of Perdro was already given due course
before the respondent judge has ordered the payment of three-fourthsnofnthe attorneys fees to Panis by the
administrator.
--->it was opinned that, the appeal should be disposed first before the award for damages should be given.
--->also, there was an allegations regarding "the attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his
fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the
payment rests on the executor or administrator but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable,
he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate."

89. Rodgriguez vs. Ynza, 97 Phil. 1003 , Nos. L-8290-8291 November 18, 1955
FACTS
--->this is an appeal from the order of the CFI of Iloilo authorizing payment to Atty. Tirol for professional service.
--->alleging that Atty. Tirol was not acting for the service of the estate of Julia Ynza but on his capacity as a
counsel of the counsel of the said estate of Julia Ynza
ISSUE
--->WON the the payment can be defferred?
HELD
--->petition is GRANTED.
RATIO
--->it was held that, it was apparent that Atty. Tirol as a counsel for Rodriguez in this case, had rendered
services for the benefit of Julia Ynza. also that, Rodriguez was appointed as trustee not by his occupation as a
lawyer but by his qualifications.

2.6 Claims Against the Estate (Rule 86, Rules of Court)

90. Tumang vs. Laguio, 96 SCRA 124 , No. 50277 February 14, 1980
FACTS
--->this case arose when in a special proceeding case involving the estate of late Dominador Tumang and
pending before the CFI of Pampanga, the widow of the deceased and two of her children filed a petition
terminating the special proceeding case
--->the petition was opposed by the appellees daughter Guia Laguio and her children on the ground that the
appellee, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them, hence Magdalena withdrew the petition.
--->an order (questioned) was issued by the court: saying that the opposition is untenable because the final
accounting has already been approved, filed an MR but again denied. Also, that by the receipts of the cash
dividends, the alleged accounting requirements has already been waived.
ISSUE
--->WON the court should have required the administrato to render an accountinnon the cash and stock
dividends received after the approval of her final accounts?
---> WON the said rightsmor accounting requisites has already been waived by the respondent due to their act
of receiving without objecting?
HELD
--->petition is DENIED.
RATIO
--->under Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that, executor should render an account ofmhis administration after
one year of its receipt.
--->we hold that, executor should have made full accounting for all the receipts and reinbursements since his
last accounting.
--->also, the question regarding the waiver of the same rights due to the act of receiving the cash and stock
dividends by the person askinfg such accounting.
91. Santos vs. Manarang., 27 Phil. 209 , No. 8235 March 19, 1914
FACTS
--->Don Lucas de Ocampo died testate and left certain real and personal properties to his 3 children and
included in his last will the obligation to pay his previous obligations which will become due in some future time
by his executor.
--->when the will was duly probated, a committee was created and regularly appointed to hear and determine
such claims against the estate as might be presented.
--->after the committee has submitted its report, Isidro Santos filed a petition that the committee be reconvened
again and pass upon his cliams against the estate of Ocampo, but it was denied, hence the appeal.
--->the denial was due to the failure of Isidro to claim, and such failure was due to the belief that, due to the
fact thatbhis name was expressly recognized in the will, itnis therefore unnecessary for him to make such

claims.
ISSUE
--->WON the court erred in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's
claim?
HELD
--->petiton is DENIED.
RATIO
--->the statute of limitations is apparent in this case. the required time to file claimsnis only 6 months, which in
this case, Isidro failed to file. save in the case if there was a failure on the part of the committee to give notices
to the creditors, wchich is in fact, as the case provides, was complied with the said committee.
--->hence, by law and in fact, the court did not erred in denying to reconvene thecommittee, because of the
negligence of the petitioner to assert his rights.
92. TAN SEN GUAN vs. GO SIU SAN (47 phil 89)
Action: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila.
Ponente : Villamor, J.:
FACTS:
Tan Sen Guan is the special administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng Sue.
Go Siu San is the administrator in the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Antonio Tampoco.
Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue the sum of P30,272.89 including interest at 9 6/10 percent per
year, to end in the year 1922. Upon the death of Tampoco, proceedings was instituted for the settlement of his
estate. Hence, commissioners were appointed to hear and decide whatever claim might be presented against
the estate.
Tan Sen Guan, filed a motion to the Court that the committee on claims be again authorized, or a new
committee be appointed, to hear and decide a claim against the estate of Tampoco, alleging that the
administrator Go Siu San had been assuring the heirs of Tan Peng Sue that they would not lose their credit, in
no need of presenting their claim, they would be paid by the heirs of Antonio Tampoco as soon as they should
ask for it, and that in the meantime the credit might continue in the business of the deceased Antonio Tampoco
and thus earn interest.
The lower Court presided by Judge Anacleto Diaz rendered decision that the commissioners appointed
on September 21, 1922 had no authority under the law to hear and decide said claim, that more than 14
months have elapsed since their final report was submitted by the former committee on claims.
Upon motion for new trial, the Lower Court rendered a new decision ordering Go Siu San to pay Tan
Sen Guan the sum of P28,802.60 with interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff-apellee lost his right to enforce his claim against the estate of Antonio
Tampoco.
RULING: Judgment appealed from is reversed. plaintiff-apellee has lost his right to enforce his claim in this
proceeding.
RATIONALE:
Under the law, a creditor who has failed to present his claim within the period fixed by the committee on
claims may apply to the Court within 6 months after the period previously fixed, for the renewal of the
commission for the purpose of examining his claim. Also, a creditor may make such application even after 6
months from the expiration of the period formerly fixed and before the final settlement of the estate, if the
committee shall have failed to give notice required under the law.
The record shows that the application of the plaintiff was presented 14 months after the expiration of
the period fixed for the filing of claims. The commissioners have complied with the statute, requiring the
publication of the notice to the creditor.
Therefore, before a credit may be held barred by our procedural statutes relative to the liquidation of
inheritance, it must appear among other things, that the committee have designated convenient hours and
places for the holding of their meetings for the examination and admission of claims, and that they have
published this fact in the manner provided by law. Unless this is done, the right of a creditor cannot prescribed
and he who claims the benefit of prescription has the burden of proof.

93. Barredo vs. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 620, No. 17863 November 28, 1962

Facts:
-The present appeal by the heirs of the late Fausto Barredo involves a tardy claim to collect the face value of a
promissory note for P20,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from 21 December 1949, the date of its maturity,
plus attorney's fees and costs in the sum of P2,000.00, from the intestate estate of the late Charles A.
McDonough, represented herein by the administrator, W. I. Douglas.
- The promissory note was secured by a mortgage executed on 31 December 1940 in favor of Fausto Barredo
over the leasehold rights of McDonough.
-Fausto barredo died, his heirs, in a deed of extrajudicial partition, adjudicated unto themselves the secured
credit of the deceased.
-This annotation was, however, cancelled when one day in August 1944 Manuel H. Barredo was ordered to
appeal before an officer of the Japanese Imperial Army at the Army and Navy Club.
-McDonough died, thereupon, intestate proceddings were instituted and pursue a court order of 17 August
1945, the administrator caused to be published in the "Philippine Progress" for three consecutive weeks, on 23
and 30 August 1945 and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them to their claims with the clerk of
court within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first publication and expiring 23 February 1946.
- On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim against the estate of McDonough.
This claim was opposed by the administrator. After hearing the lower court allowed the claim, but the Court of
Appeals reversed the order of allowance;
Hence, Barredo appealed.
Issue: That the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the "one month" period referred to in Section 2 of Rule
87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the six-month period fixed in the
published notice to claims,

Held: The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin
from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from
the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims
The appealed decision is affirmed.

94. De Villanueva vs. Philippine National Bank, 9 SCRA 145 , No. L-18403 September 30, 1963
Facts:
For the administration of the estate of the deceased Pascual Villanueva, the heirs agreed that Atty.
Teodulo R. Ricaforte would serve as the administrator and later on entered upon the performance of his duties.
The Clerk of the Agusan CFI issued a Notice to Creditors, requiring them to file their claims with the
clerk of court within six months but not beyond twelve months after the date of the first publication of the said
notice. The publication was effected thru the Morning Times of City, a newspaper of general circulation, on
Nov. 16, 23 and 30, 1950, which expired on November 30, 1951.
Defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank, Creditor of Pascual Villanueva, filed in the administration
proceeding, Creditors Claim in the amount of P1,347.45 and a Motion for Admission of Claim. The CFI issued
an order declaring that the claim of the PNB is already barred by the statute of limitations because the claim
was due and demandable since December 20, 1940, but filed on July 20, 1953, after the expiration ten years.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim in question is already barred.
Held:
Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court, within
which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November 16, 1951 and
the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late. Thus notwithstanding, appellant
contends that it did not know of such administration proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office
in Butuan City. It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were

duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full compliance
with the requirements of the Rules.
Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of the appellant and its
employees had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of
money by the administrator of the estate in said bank. The deposit was made on December 1, 1951, inspite of
which the appellant Bank only filed its claim on July 20, 1953. It is quite true that the courts can extend the
period within which to present claims against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such
extension should be granted under special circumstances. The lower court did not find any justifiable reason to
give the extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same has elapsed.
Motion for reconsideration denied for lack of merits.

95. PNB vs. Vda. De Villarin

Action: Appeal from an order of the CFI of Misamis Occidental (Ozamis City)
PONENTE: MARTIN, J.:
FACTS:
On july 7, 1955, petitioner obtained a judgment in its favor and against Porfirio Villarin. That the latter
sentenced to pay PNB the sum of 1) P13,669.60, plus a daily interest of P2.84 on P13,000.00- from June 24,
1953 until fully paid, plus Attorneys fees; 2.) P31,625.74, plus a daily interest of P6.57 on P30,000.00- from
June 24,1953 until fully paid, plus Attorneys fees.
On Jan. 18, 1961 Porfirio Villarin died in Mis.Occ. without leaving any will. On sept. 24, 1965 , PNB filed
a petition in the CFI of Mis.Occ for the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Porfirio
Villarin. But Vda. De Villarin alleged in her answer that the claim of PNB has prescribed under Article 1144 of
the Civil Code which limit only to ten (10) years the prescriptive period within which an action to revive a
judgment may be filed.
The CFI of Mis.Occ rendered decision that the claim of PNB already prescribed and therefore denied.
ISSUE: W/N the claim of PNB consisting a money judgment on July 7, 1955 has become final and executor.
RULING: Decision reversed and set aside and another order entered directing the clerk of court to remand the
records of special proceedings to the lower court.
RATIONALE:
Once the creditor (PNB) has filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, the Court shall
issue letters of administration to a qualified person. The action filed by PNB to revive the money judgment was
still subsisting and after the death of Porfirio Villarin it converted into a claim enforceable only in the settlement
of the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased.
Therefore, the applicable period of prescription is not the 10-year period for filing an action to revive a
judgment but the period of prescription for the filing of creditors (PNB) claim against the judgment debtors
(Porfirio Villarin) estate under Rule 86, sec.2 of the Rules of Court.

96. Aguas vs. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 , No. L-18107 August 30, 1962
FACTS
-March 14, 1960: Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an actioni n t h e
C F I o f C a t b a l o g a n , S a m a r t o r e c o v e r damages from Llemos, averring that the latter had
served them by registered mail with a copyof a petition for a writ of possession, with noticethat the
same would be submitted to the said c o u r t o f S a m a r o n F e b 2 3 , 1 9 6 0 , 8 a m ; t h a t
i n administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgmentby
him so recovered for the costs incurred and s u c h o t h e r e x p e n s e s a s t h e c o u r t
d e e m s equitable.view of the copy and notice served, plainti ffsproceeded to the court from their
residence inManila accompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed;
andthat Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court,so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turnedout to be
in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment.-Before answering the complaint,
defendant died.Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include heirs of deceased. The heirs filed
MTD, and byorder of Aug 12, 1960, the court below dismissedit, on the ground that the legal
representative,and not the heirs, should have been made party-defendant; and that the action being for
recoveryof money, testate/intestate proceedings shouldb e i n i t i a t e d a n d t h e c l a i m f i l e d
t h e r e i n . M F R denied

ISSUE
WON the action survives
HELD
YES.
Ratio
Rule 88.1 enumerates actions that surviveagainst a decedent's executors or administrators,a n d t h e y a r e :
1 ) a c t i o n s t o r e c o v e r r e a l a n d personal property from the estate; 2) actions to enforce a lien
thereon; and 3) actions to recoverdamages for an injury to person or property. Thepresent suit is one for
damages under the lastclass, it having been held that "injury to property"is not limited to injuries to specific
property, butextends to other wrongs by which personal estateis injured or diminished. To maliciously
cause aparty to incur unnecessary expenses, as chargedin this case, is certainly injurious to that
party'sproperty.B e t h a t a s i t m a y , i t n o w a p p e a r s f r o m a communication from CFI
Samar that the partiesa r r i v e d a t a n a m i c a b l e s e t t l e m e n t a n d h a v e agreed to dismiss this
appeal.
Disposition

The case having thus become moot,it becomes unnecessary to resolve the questionsraised therein. This
appeal is, therefore, ordereddismissed, without special pronouncement as tocosts.
97. Vera vs. Fernandez, 89 SCRA 199 , No. L-31364 March 30, 1979
Facts:
Appeal from the two orders of the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissing the Motion for Allowance of
Claim and for an Order of Payment of Taxes by the Government against the estate of the late Luis D. Tongoy,
for the total amount of P3, 254.80.
The administrator opposed the motion solely on the ground that the claim was barred under Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Finding the opposition well-founded, the respondent judge, dismissed the
allowance of claim.
Issue:
Whether or not the statute of non-claims Section 5, Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court, bars claim of
the government for unpaid taxes.
Held:
A perusal of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court shows that it makes no
mention of claims for monetary obligation of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of
different character from the claims expressly enumerated therein, such as all claims for money against the
decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent, all claim
for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for money against the
decedent. Under the familiar rule of statutory construction of expressio unios est exclusion alterius, the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the
things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily, and by implication be excluded from its
operation and effect.
Judgment reversed.

98. GOTAMCO vs. Chan Seng and Razon

Action: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila.
FACTS:
Antonio Tampoco died in 1920 and left a will dividing his estate of over P300,000.00 among his four
sons Tan Kim Hong, bequeathed one half of the estate and described in his will as his legitimate son. The
other half of the estate were divided in equal shares to his three adopted sons- Tan Kimco, Tan Kimbio and Tan
Kim Choo. At that time, all of the heirs were minors and had lived in China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco.
Go Siu San was appointed as the executor of his will.

Tan Kim Lay and Te Sue were appointed and qualified as commissioners and they published the usual
notice to creditors to present their claims within six months.
Sometime in 1922, the heirs of Antonio Tanpoco arrived in Manila and it was then that Chan Seng
learned of the allowance of the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, Judge Harvey ordered an
investigation of the administration of Go Siu San and it appears in the salary ledger of 1920 to have been
credited in favor of Tan Kim Hong the total amount of P40,000.00, however, reduced to P38,766.69 which is
exactly the amount claim to have been presented and admitted against the estate. Knowing that Tan Kim Hong
was a minor, the lower Court discarded the claim by reason of its illegality and nullity and the administrator
required to explain its presentation and admission. Hence, the report concluded with a recommendation for the
removal of the executor for gross misconduct and fraud, and the annulment of the claim of Tan Kim Hong.
Thereafter, present administrator-Vicente Gotamco applied to the Court for authority to pay the claim in
question, to which the appellee appeared and objected.
The Court denied the application of the present Guardian administrator (Vicente Gotamco) to pay the
claim in question on the ground that it was void and fictitious. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the administrator-Vicente Gotamco had the legal authority to appear for and present his claim or
to represent Tan Kim Hong.
RULING: Judgment of the Lower Court Affirmed.
RATIONALE:
All of the parties in interest were minors. There is no claim or pretense that Tan Kim Hong had a
guardian or that anyone had the legal authority to appear for and present his claim or to represent Tan Kim
Hong, or that his claim was ever presented. There is no claim or pretense that any of the parties in interest had
any knowledge of the fact that the claim was presented and allowed before they came to Manila from China
sometime in September 1922.
It is very significant that the will of the deceased was made sometime after the entries were made, and
that no reference whatever is made in the will to the claim in question.
The allowance of the claim would be like rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even
the making or presentment of a claim. Hence, a judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the matters
contained in the record, or the application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts, as found by the Court or
admitted by the parties, or deemed to exists upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings.

99. Paredes vs. Moya, 61 SCRA 526 , No. L-38051 December 26, 1974
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari impugning the legality of the order of the respondent court, nullifying its order of
execution pursuant to the judgment that has become final and executory , and the corresponding levy on
execution and the public auction sale.
Petitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit on January 4, 1964 in CFI-Manila, as Civil Case No. 55880, 1
for the collection of separation and overtime pays against his employer, August Kuntze. On March 5, 1971, a
decision was rendered against the defendant August Kuntze, from which judgment, he appealed to the Court of
Appeals. While the case was pending appeal in the said Court, August Kuntze died on June 19, 1972.
Accordingly, plaintiff Parades (now petitioner) was duly notified. 2 Thereafter, Carmencita D. Navarro Kuntze, 3
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, was substituted in his place as party in the appealed case. On
June 5, 1973 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in said Civil Case No. 55880 for appellant's failure to
file the printed record on appeal, and so the record of the case was ordered remanded respondent court. 4
A motion for execution was filed by plaintiff-appellee (petitioner Parades). On August 22, 1973 the provincial
Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of defendant-appellant (now substituted by the Administratrix of the
estate of the Deceased, consisting of two (2) lots covered by TCT No. 45089 issued by the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Rizal. 5 In the auction sale conducted by the Sheriff of Rizal on October 2, 1973, plaintiffappellee (petitioner Paredes) being the highest bidder, acquired said lot for the total sum of P17,296.16, as per
certificate of sale which was duly annotated in the back of TCT No. 45089. 6
However, in spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by respondent-appellant and still pending
resolution, Parades sold the property he acquired in execution sale in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio Ignacio
on October 10, 1973. 7
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition to the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, respondent Court, on
November 2, 1973, issued an order setting aside the Writ of Execution of August 22, 1973, and the Sheriff's

Sale and Public Auction of the property covered by TCT No. 45089, without prejudice to the filing of the
judgment as a claim in the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased. 8
Issue: the court erred in nullifying its order of execution pursuant to the judgment that has become final and
executory in the lower court , and the corresponding levy on execution and the public auction sale.
Held:
The SC hold that in the case of a money claim, where the defendant dies during the pendency of his appeal
from the judgment rendered against him, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue, but the
deceased defendant should be substituted by his legal representative, namely, the executor or administrator of
the estate. If the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must afterwards go to the probate court for
an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The Court of First Instance that
originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and a levy on the properties of the
deceased because the same are already in custodia legis in the probate court where administration
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant are already pending.
N VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the Lower Court nullifying its Order of Execution of August 18,
1973, the levy on execution dated August 22, 1973, and the auction sale of October 2, 1973, is hereby affirmed
and the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, "without prejudice to the filing of the judgment (in favor of
Paredes) as a claim in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Kuntze)." Without
costs.
SO ORDERED.

100. Ignacio vs. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 126 , No. L-18936 May 23, 1967
Facts:
Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., lodged its complaint in the CFI of Manila against defendants Valentine
Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico Vda. Fernando to collect P105,000.00 upon a contractual obligation. Later,
Encarnacion died but the Pambusco in the foregoing civil case had already presented its evidence and
submitted its case. Intestate proceedings were filed. Notice to estates creditors was given for them to file their
claims within six months from the first publication of the notice.
The CFI of Manila rendered judgment ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P93,000.00. Defendants appealed but the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the judgment in
the civil case reached finality, Pambusco moved in the intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the present
joint administratrices, be ordered to pay 46,500, the share of the deceased in the judgment debt. The
administratrices opposed on the ground that the claim is time barred.
Issue:
Was the Pambuscos claim properly admitted by the probate court?
Held:
At the time of the death of the defendant Encarnacion Elchico Vda. De Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco
had already closed its evidence and submitted its case. Her administrator substituted. By this substitution, the
estate had notice of the claim. The estate was thus represented. The administrator did not complain of the
substitution. At no time did the estate of the deceased impugn the authority of the regular courts to determine
the civil case. Much less did it seek abatement of the civil suit. On the contrary, its administrator took active
steps to protect the interest of the estate. He joined issue with plaintiff. He filed an amended answer. He
counterclaim. He went to trial. Defeated in the CFI, he appealed to the CA. He even elevated that civil case to
this Court. Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said judgment
reached after a full dress trial on the merits will now go for naught. The estate has thus waived its right to have
Pambuscos claim re-litigated in the estate proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is
imperative, it is generally understood that it may be waived by the estates representative. And, waiver is to be
determined from the administrators acts and conduct. Certainly, the administrators failure to plead the
statute of nonclaims, his active participation, and resistance to plaintiffs claim, in the civil suit, amount to such
waiver.
Decision affirmed.

101. BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. vs. ESTEBAN ICARAGAL AND ORIENTAL COMMERCIALCO., INC.

Action: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Laguna

PONENTE: MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
On june 11, 1930, Esteban Icarangal with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received, executed a
promissory note for P1,614.00 in favor to Bachrach motor co. and in security for its payment, Esteban
Icarangal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Laguna. Therafter, promissors defaulted the
monthly installment payments. Hence, Bachrach motor instituted before the CFI of Manila for the collection of
payment due on the note. Judgment was in favor of BAchrach motor, and a writ of execution was issued.
ISSUE: W/N The position of the parties plaintiff and defendant is the same in special or insolvency proceedings
as in ordinary actions.
RULING: A mortgagor creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either personal action for debt or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage.

RATIONALE:
There is indeed no valid reason for not following the same principle of procedure in ordinary civil
actions. With the substitution of the administrator or executor in place of the deceased, or of the assignee or
receiver in place of the insolvent debtor, the position of the parties plaintiff and defendant in the litigation is
exactly the same in special and insolvency proceedings as in ordinary civil actions.
102. Soriano vs. Parsons Hardware Co., Inc., 34 SCRA 519 , No. L-24008 August 31, 1970 *not digested
103. De los Reyes vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, 55 Phil. 408 , No. 34450 December 13, 1930
Facts:
Petitioner and his wife filed a petition for certiorari quashing an order of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas granting an attachment of property belonging to them in favour of the respondent Chua Pua
Hermanos.
Issue:
Whether in a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage upon land, the court can issue an attachment against
other property of the defendants than such as is included in the mortgage.
Held:
We are of the opinion that the court has such authority. The affidavit accompanying the application for
attachment shows, in conformity with requirement of section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the value
of the mortgage property is not sufficient to satisfy the debt. In addition to this, it is alleged in the affidavit that
defendants are attempting to dispose of their other property, meaning property not mortgage to the plaintiff,
with intent to defraud the plaintiff. This is in conformity with the requirement of subsection 5 of section 412 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Under section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an attachment may be obtained at or after the
commencement of the plaintiffs action. The word action, as used in this provision, includes in our opinion a
proceeding for the foreclosure of a mortgage. This is of course directed primarily to the property covered by the
mortgage, but under section 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the mortgage creditor is entitled to judgment
for any excess remaining due upon the mortgage debt after the mortgaged property shall have been sold; and
this judgment for the balance due is entered upon motion in the foreclosure proceeding itself. This fact, taken
in connection with the statement of the affidavit to the effect that the mortgaged property was insufficient in
value to cover the indebtedness due to the plaintiff, made a case where it was proper to grant an attachment
upon the facts stated.
Petition dimissed.

104. Republic vs. Cojuanco, 487 SCRA 609

REPUBLIC represented by the Administrator of the POEA
vs.
PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, INC.

Action: Petition for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the CA.

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
This case stemmed from two separate complaints filed before the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) against Principalia for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and regulations.
In the first complaint. Ruth Yasmin Concha applied with Principalia for placement and employment as
caregiver or physical therapist in the USA or Canada, and paid Principalia the amount of P20,000.00 without
proper receipt, and Principalia failed to deploy Concha for employment abroad. The office of the POEA found
Principalia liable particularly for collecting a fee from applicant before employment was obtained; for non
issuance of official receipt; and for misrepresenting that it was able to secure employment for Concha. Hence,
Principalias licensed was ordered suspended and to pay a fine of P120,000.00 and to refund Conchas
placement fee P20,000.00.
In the second complaint. Principalia assured Baldoza of employment in Doha, Qatar as a machine
operator. After paying the P20,000.00 placement fee, he departed for Doha, Qatar, however, upon his arrival at
the jobsite, he was made to work as a welder and not a machine operator. Thus, he was repatriated on July 5,
2003.
On November 12, 2003, Baldoza and Principalia entered into a compromise agreement with quitclaim
and release whereby the latter agreed to redeploy Baldoza for employment abroad, however, Principalia failed
to deploy Baldoza. The office of POEA suspended Principalias documentary processing.
Principalia moved for reconsideration which was granted by the POEA. Meanwhile, before the lifting the
suspension, Principalia filed a complaint against Rosalinda D. Baldoz in her capacity as Administrator of POEA
and Atty. Jovencio R. Abara in his capacity as POEA Conciliator before the RTC of Mandaluyong City for
Annulment of Order for suspension of documentation processing with damages and application for issuance
of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Principalia claimed that the suspension of its documentary
processing would ruin its reputation and goodwill and would cause the loss of its applicants, employers and
principals.
On june 14, 2004, the RTC granted a 72hour restraining order enjoining Administrator Baldoz and Atty.
Abara to refrain from imposing the suspension orders before the matter can be heard in full. After the hearing
on the preliminary injunction, Administrator BAldoz and Atty. Abara submitted their memorandum, however, the
trial Court held that the issue on preliminary injunction has become moot because POEA had already released
the renewal of Principalias licensed. On appeal, the CA dismissed outright for failure of POEA to attach
copies of its memorandum. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N a writ of Preliminary prohibitory injunction will lie against the immediate implementation of the
order of suspension of license of Principalia.
RULING: Petition denied.
RATIONALE:
The allowance of the petition on the ground of substantial compliance with the Rules is not a novel
occurrence in our jurisdiction. Indeed, if we apply the Rules strictly, we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for
dismissing the petition because the POEA did not demonstrate willingness to comply with the requirements set
by the rules and to submit the necessary documents which the Court of Appeals need to have a proper
perspective of the case.

NB: CASES 105-130 were not digested.

GUARDIANSHIP
GUARDIANSHIP
Case No. 131
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45623
June 30, 1938
JESUS CRISOSTOMO vs.
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, and RAMON CRISOSTOMO
FACTS: On April 21, 1933, petitioner filed a verified petition in the same court that appointed him guardian over
incompetent Petrona Crisistomo, to terminate such guardianship after the latter was already cured and
discharged from the National Psychopathic Hospital. The petition was supported and accompanied by a
verified statement of the incompetent dated Feb. 15, 1936, who stated under oath that she was well already
and capable of taking care of herself her property, plus, two medical certificates dated Feb. 15, 1936 of the
doctors who supervised her medical treatment, saying she had recovered her mental faculties. After approving

the accounts submitted by the said guardian including his administration until Feb. 14, 1936, the court
approved the petition on Feb. 29, 1936.
On Nov. 9, 1936, respondent Ramon Crisostomo, brother of the incompetent, filed a motion in the guardianship
proceedings and in the same court which had taken cognizance of said special proceedings, asking that the
restoration order of February 29, 1936 be set aside, that the case be reopened, and that a new guardian of the
person and property of Petrona Crisostomo be appointed, alleging as grounds that the aforesaid order is null
and void because entered without notice to the nearest relatives of the incompetent and without hearing and
that the latter had not yet recovered her mentality. The petitioner objected to this petition on the ground that the
order sought to be annulled had already become final and that the court had already lost jurisdiction to reverse
or annul the same. But on December 15, 1936, the respondent judge issued the annulment order. After the
said judge denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, the latter went to the Court of Appeals which denied
his petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Is the Feb. 29, 1936 order of restoration to capacity of Petrona Crisistomo valid?
HELD: Yes. The appealed judgment is reversed and the order of December 15, 1936 entered by the respondent
judge is set aside, with costs of this instance to the other respondent Ramon Crisostomo.
(1) In order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship of an incompetent may issue a valid order
restoring him to capacity it is necessary, under Sec. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (1) that a verified
petition be presented by the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree,
or any friend of his; (2) that said petition should allege that the incompetent has recovered his mental faculties
or his legal capacity, as the case may be; and (3) that upon receiving the petition the court should set the same
for hearing and notify the guardian and the incompetent thereof. At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives of
the incompetent, and, in the discretion of the court, any other person may oppose the remedy sought.
The section does not require notice of the hearing to any other person except the guardian and the
incompetent. In the case under study, it happened that the verified petition was signed by the guardian himself
and was supported and accompanied by the sworn statement of the incompetent. In the petition it was stated
that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties and this allegation was corroborated by her in her
sworn statement when she stated that she had already recovered her mental faculties. In these circumstances
the only logical conclusion is that the requisites of section 562 have at least been substantially complied with
and that the notice and the hearing were unnecessary and superfluous.
It is true that under the section the respondent Ramon Crisostomo could have appeared at the hearing and
opposed the petition, but he is not entitled to a personal notice.
If, as it seems, the intention of the respondent Ramon Crisostomo is to annul the donation of property made by
the incompetent to the petitioner, he could go to court to bring an action for that purpose.
(2) The order issued by the respondent judge on December 15, 1936, annulling the restoration-to-capacity
order is null and void. The court was without jurisdiction to enter the same after the accounts of the guardian
had been approved, his bond cancelled and the record of the guardianship proceedings deemed closed and
filed away definitely. The restoration order had already become final and binding upon the parties when
respondent filed his motion.
(3) Another of the reasons taken into account by the CA in denying the writ of certiorari filed by the herein
petitioner is that the order of December 15, 1936, was appealable and the petitioner could have perfected an
appeal within the prescribed period but did not.
But, the remedy by certiorari may be successfully invoked both in cases wherein an appeal does not lie and in
those wherein the right to appeal having been lost with or without the appellant's negligence, where the court
has no jurisdiction to issue the order or decision which is the subject matter of the remedy.
CASE No. 132: IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON
VS. PNB (GR No. L-17066)
FACTS: As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson became
entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits which amounted to P10,738 as of July 1, 1957, and to a monthly
death compensation for the rest of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. Upon
inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans Administration filed Special
Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, where in due course, an order was entered on
August 8, 1957, adjudging Carmen Vda. de Bengzon to be an incompetent and appointing the Philippine

National Bank (PNB) as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the said Veterans
Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued in favor of the Philippine National Bank.
On March 5, 1960, alleging that she had regained her competence, her ward, by counsel, filed a petition asking
for an order terminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of the residuary estate. Attached to this
petition was a medical certificate attesting that she was mentally competent and possessed full knowledge of
her environmental surroundings. This was opposed by the Veterans Administration on the ground that by
reason of her advanced age (78), physical and mental debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning
of Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. On March 30, 1960, the son of the ward, Francisco Bengson, filed
a "Manifestation" to the effect that he was the personal guardian of the incompetent; that if appointed guardian
of her estate as well, he will comply with all the provisions of the Rules of Court, will not ask any remuneration
for his services, and will file a nominal bond. He prayed to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate in place
of the Philippine National Bank, and for the balance of her estate to be withdrawn or transferred from the
Philippine National Bank's main office to its branch at San Fernando, La Union, in his account as guardian. On
the same date, the lower court ordered Francisco Bengson to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate to
substitute the Philippine National Bank, upon filing a P1,000 bond with proper sureties;
ISSUE: WON legal grounds exist for the termination of PNBs guardianship over the estate of Vda. De
Bengzon
RULING: We find this appeal meritorious. The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in
Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules.
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable
therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to
render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian,
remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be
lawfully entitled thereto.... (emphasis supplied).
Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian, a guardian cannot be legally removed from
office except for the causes therein mentioned (Alemany vs. Moreno, 5 Phil. 172; Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed. p. 515). This is also the American law (39 C.J.S., p. 657). Accordingly, conflict
of interest (Ribaya vs. Ribaya, 74 Phil. 254; Gabriel vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25) has been held sufficient ground for
removal, premised on the logic that antagonistic interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust. To
the extent that a court uses its discretion in appraising whether a person is insuitable or incapable of
discharging his trust, that much it can be said that removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be
exercised within the law, and when the latter has laid down the grounds for removal of a guardian,
discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of those grounds.lawphil.net
No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that there was any legal ground
upon which the removal of the Philippine National Bank as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco
Bengzon's manifestation nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear that the Philippine National
Bank had become incapable of discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed
anything which the Rules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all
throughout, the Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. A guardian should not be
removed except for the most cogent reasons (39 C.J.S. 65); otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and
illegal.

TRUSTEES
Case No. 133
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17809
December 29, 1962
RESURRECCION DE LEON, ET AL.vs.
EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON, ET AL
FACTS: On January 24, 1941, Mariano Molo y Legaspi died leaving a will (probated by The CFI of Pasay City,
Rizal, and affirmed by the Supreme Court on November 26, 1956 ,G.R. No. L-8774) wherein he bequeathed
his entire estate to his wife, Juana Juan. On May 11, 1948, Juana Juan in turn executed a will. On June 7,
1948, however, Juana Juan executed a donation inter vivos in favor of Emiliana Molo-Peckson and Pilar Perez
Nable of almost all of her entire property including the ten parcels of land subject of the present action. Juana
Juan died on May 28, 1950.
On December 5, 1950, Emiliana Molo-Peckson and Pilar Perez Nable executed a document which they called
"MUTUAL AGREEMENT" which partly reads this way:

That the above named parties hereby mutually agree by these presents . . . that the following lots
should be sold at ONE (1) PESO each to the following persons and organization:

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28157 and allocated as follows:

(a) To JUSTA DE LEON Five (5) Lots.
(b) To RESURRECCION DE LEON, the remaining Five (5) Lots.
That this agreement is made in conformity with the verbal wish of the late Don Mariano Molo y Legaspi
and the late Dona Juana Francisco Juan y Molo. These obligations were repeatedly told to Emiliana
Molo Peckson, before their death and that same should be fulfilled after their death.
On August 9, 1956, however, the same defendants executed another document in which they revoked the socalled mutual agreement. On August 11, 1956, the beneficiary Resurreccion de Leon and Justa de Leon, thru
their counsel demanded the conveyance to them of the ten parcels of land. When the defendants refused to do
so, said beneficiaries consigned on July 8, 1957 the amount of P10.00 as the consideration of the ten parcels
of land.
Resurreccion De Leon, et al. filed on November 13, 1958 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
complaint seeking to compel Emiliana Molo-Peckson, et al. to convey to the former the said ten parcels of
land. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered on September 21, 1960 a decision wherein it held that,
under the facts established by the evidence, trust has been constituted by the late spouses Mariano Molo and
Juana Juan over the ten parcels of land in question in favor plaintiffs as beneficiaries. It ordered, among
others:
1. The defendants, jointly and severally to free the said ten (10) parcels of land from the mortgage lien
in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now Development Bank of the Philippines) and Claro
Cortez, and thereafter to sign and execute in favor of the plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale of the said
properties for and in consideration of TEN (P10.00) PESOS already deposited in Court after all
conditions imposed in Exhibit A have been complied with;
2. That in the event the defendants shall refuse to execute and perform the above, they are ordered,
jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the value of said ten (10) parcels of land in question, the
amount to be assessed by the City of Pasay City as the fair market value of the same, upon orders of
the Court to assess said value;
The respondents then took this appeal.
ISSUE: Did Spouses Mariano Molo and Juana Juan constitute a trust over the properties in question in favor of
plaintiff-appelless as beneficiaries?
HELD: Yes. The decision appealed from is affirmed. The document executed on December 5, 1950 creates an
express trust in favor of appellees; (2) The appellants had no right to revoke it without the consent of the cestui
que trust; (3) The appellants must render an accounting of the fruits of the lands from the date the judgment
rendered in G.R. No. L-8774 became final and executory; and (4) The appellants should free said lands from
all liens and encumbrances.
1. The Mutual Agreement was executed by appellants on December 5, 1950, or about two years and six
months from the time they acquired title to the lands by virtue of the donation inter vivos executed in their favor
by their foster mother Juana Juan and six months after the death of the donor. There is nobody who could
cajole them to execute it, nor is there any force that could coerce them to make the declaration therein
expressed, except the constraining mandate of their conscience to comply with "the obligations repeatedly told
to Emiliana Molo Peckson," one of appellants, before their death, epitomized in the "verbal wish of the late Don
Mariano Molo y Legaspi and the late Doa Juana Francisco Juan y Molo" to convey after their death said ten
parcels of land at P1.00 a parcel to appellees. In fact, the acknowledgement appended to the document they
subscribed states that it was "their own free act and voluntary deed.
That the document represents a recognition of a pre-existing trust or a declaration of an express trust
impressed on the ten parcels of land in question is evident. A declaration of trust has been defined as an act by
which a person acknowledges that the property, title to which he holds, is held by him for the use of another.
Here the document in question clearly and unequivocally declares the existence of the trust even if the same
was executed subsequent to the death of the trustor, Juana Juan, for it has been held that the right creating or
declaring a trust need not be contemporaneous or inter-parties (Stephenson v. Stephenson, 171 S.W. 2d 265,
351 Mo. 8; In re Corbin's Trust Orhp., 57 York Leg. Rec. 201). It was even held that an express trust maybe
declared by a writing made after the legal estate has been vested in the trustee (Kurtz v. Robinson, Tex. Civ.

App. 256 S.W. 2d 1003). The contention, therefore, of appellants that the will and the donation executed by
their predecessors-in-interest were absolute for it did not contain a hint that the lots in question will be held in
trust by them does not merit weight because the fact that an express trust was created by a deed which was
absolute on its face may be shown by a writing separate from the deed itself (Mugan v. Wheeler, 145 S.W. 462,
241 Mo. 376).\
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in applying the provisions of the new Civil Code on trust. This is
correct. The express trust was constituted during the lifetime of the predecessor-in-interest of appellants, that
is, before the effectivity of the new Civil Code, although the instrument recognizing and declaring such trust
was executed on December 5, 1950, after the effectivity of said Code. But the Civil Code of 1889 contains no
specific provisions on trust as does the new Civil Code. Neither does the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901 for
the same merely provides for the proceeding to be followed relative to trusts and trustees (Chapter XVIII). This
silence, however, does not mean that the juridical institution of trust was then unknown in this jurisdiction, for
the principles relied upon by the Supreme Court before the effectivity of the new Civil Code were those
embodied in Anglo-American jurisprudence as derived from the Roman and Civil Law principles (Government
v. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 42).And these are the same principles on which we predicate our ruling heretoforestated
and on which we now rely for the validity of trust in question.

(2) It is true, as appellants contend, that the alleged declaration of trust was revoked, and having been revoked
it cannot be accepted, but the attempted revocation did not have any legal effect. The rule is that in the
absence of any reservation of the power to revoke a voluntary trust is irrevocable without the consent of the
beneficiary (Allen v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.of Baltimore, 7 A. 2d 180, 177 Md. 26). It cannot be revoked by
the creator alone, nor by the trustee (Fricke v. Weber, C.C.A. Ohio, 145 F. 2d 737;Hughes v. C.I.R., C.C.A. 9,
104 F. 2d 144; Ewing v. Shannahan, 20 S.W. 1065,113 Mo. 188). Here, there is no such reservation.
(3) The trial court ordered appellants to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties in question even if
appellees did not expressly ask for it in their prayer for relief. We, however, believe that this is covered by the
general prayer "for such other relief just and equitable under the premises."What is important is to know from
what date the accounting should be made. The trial court ordered that the accounting be made from the time
appellees demanded the conveyance of the ten parcels of land on August 11, 1956, in accordance with Article
1164 of the new Civil Code which provides that the creditor has a right to the fruit of the thing from the time the
obligation to deliver it arises. But this cannot be done without first submitting proof that the conditions stated in
the mutual agreement had been complied with. And this only happened when the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-8774 became final and executory. The ruling of the trial court in this respect should
therefore be modified in the sense that the accounting should be made from the date of the finality of the said
decision.
(4) We find no error in the directive of the trial court that appellants should free the lands in question from the
encumbrance that was created thereon by them in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines and one
Claro cortez, for as trustees it is their duty to deliver the properties to the cestui que trust free from all liens and
encumbrances.

RULE 98: TRUSTEES

CASE No. 134: SALTIGA DE ROMERO VS. CA (GR No. 109307 11/25/99)
FACTS: The spouses Eugenio Romero and Teodora Saltiga had nine (9) children. On December 12, 1939
Eugenio Romero bought from spouses Celedonio Jaug and Sofia Macan the latter's "rights, interest,
participation, ownership and possession" of 12 hectares of land. The land in question was then public land.
When Eugenio Romero applied for a homestead patent for said land, the same was disapproved by the
Bureau of Lands because said Romero already had applied for a homestead patent for 24 hectares and was
disqualified from owning the additional 12 hectares.
Eugenio Romero placed the application in the name of his eldest son, Eutiquio Romero, allegedly in trust for all
the children of Eugenio. When Eutiquio got married and had children, his brothers and sisters got worried that
his heirs may claim the land so the application was transferred in the name of Lutero Romero, the second son
of Eugenio who was then still single. When Lutero in turn got married, he relinquished the application in favor
of his younger brother Ricardo through an instrument dated July 5, 1952.
Eugenio Romero died sometime in 1948. In 1961 his widow Teodora caused the land in question to be
subdivided among six (6) of her children, the other three (3) having already been given their shares in the other

properties of the Romero spouses. The twelve (12) hectares were supposedly divided equally among Lutero,
Ricardo, Mindalina, Lucita, Presentacion, and Gloriosa who all got about two (2) hectares each.
The appellants further claimed that after the partition, they had been in occupancy of their respective shares
through their tenants.
However, appellee Lutero Romero presented evidence to the effect that sometime in 1969 a policeman picked
him up and brought him to the office of Mayor Pablito Abragan of Kapatagan where he found his mother
Teodora and his three (3) sisters Gloriosa, Presentacion and Lucita and the respective husbands of the latter
two. He testified that when he arrived at the office, he was presented three (3) affidavits for his signature. Said
affidavits were to the effect that he sold three (3) hectares each out of the 12 hectares of land to his sister
Gloriosa, his brother-in-law Sabdullah Mama married to Presentacion Romero, and to Meliton Pacas married
to Lucita Romero for a consideration of P3,000.00 each.
ISSUE: Whether LUTERO acquired Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust for the benefit of the heirs of his late father Eugenio
RULING: "A trust is the legal relationship between a person having an equitable ownership in property and
another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to
performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter." Trust relations between
parties may be express or implied. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both
coming into by operation of law.
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines
the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise
from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby
becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the
other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of
justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or
abuse of confidence, obtains or hold the legal right to property, which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold.
However, it has been held that a trust will not be created when, for the purpose of evading the law
prohibiting one from taking or holding real property, he takes a conveyance thereof in the name of a
third person.
In the present case, the petitioners did not present any evidence to prove the existence of the trust. Petitioners
merely alleged that LUTERO, through fraudulent means, had the title of Lot 23 Pls-35 issued in his name
contrary to the alleged agreement between the family that LUTERO would merely hold the lot in trust for the
benefit of EUGENIO's heirs. The alleged agreement was not proven and even assuming that the petitioners
duly proved the existence of the trust, said trust would be of doubtful validity considering that it would promote
a direct violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act as regards the acquisition of a homestead patent. A
homestead applicant is required by law to occupy and cultivate the land for his own benefit, and not for the
benefit of someone else. 15 Furthermore, under Section 12 of The Public Land Act (CA 141), a person is
allowed to enter a homestead not exceeding twenty-four (24) hectares. In the present case, it is not disputed
that EUGENIO already applied for a homestead patent for twenty-four (24) hectares of land and was
disqualified from applying for an additional twelve (12) hectares. If we uphold the theory of the petitioners and
rule that a trust in fact existed, we would be abetting a circumvention of the statutory prohibitions stated under
the Public Land Act. We therefore find no legal or factual basis to sustain the contention of the
petitioners that LUTERO merely held Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust for the benefit of the heirs of EUGENIO.

TRUSTEES
Case No. 135
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133047
August 17, 1999
HEIRS OF LORENZO YAP, namely SALLY SUN YAP, MARGARET YAP-UY and MANUEL YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON YAP and BENJAMIN YAP, respondents.
Petitioners seek the enforcement of an alleged trust agreement between Lorenzo Yap, now deceased, and his
brothers Ramon and Benjamin, herein co-respondents, covering a piece of land and its improvement.

FACTS: Sometime in February 1966, Ramon Yap purchased a parcel of land situated at 123 (formerly 75)
Batanes Street, Galas, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82001/T-414, from the
spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery. The lot was thereupon registered in the name of Ramon Yap under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 102132; forthwith, he also declared the property in his name for tax purposes
and paid the real estate taxes due thereon from 1966 to 1992. In 1967, Ramon Yap constructed a two-storey
3-door apartment building for the use of the Yap family. One-fifth (1/5) of the cost of the construction was
defrayed by Ramon Yap while the rest was shouldered by Chua Mia, the mother of Lorenzo, Benjamin and
Ramon. Upon its completion, the improvement was declared for real estate tax purposes in the name of
Lorenzo Yap in deference to the wishes of the old woman.
Lorenzo Yap died on 11 July 1970. A few months later, his heirs (herein petitioners) left their family dwelling in
Lucena City to reside permanently in Manila. Ramon Yap allowed petitioners to use one unit of the apartment
building.
On 18 March 1992, Ramon Yap sold the land and his share of the 3-door apartment to his brother, his herein
co-respondent Benjamin Yap, for the sum of P337,500.00 pursuant to a Deed of Sale, recorded on even date
in the Memorandum of Encumbrances of the title to said property. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73002 was in
due time issued in the name of Benjamin Yap.
The controversy started when herein petitioners, by a letter of 08 June 1992, advised respondents of the
former's claim of ownership over the property and demanded that respondents execute the proper deed
necessary to transfer the title to them.
On 29 July 1992, respondents filed an action with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, docketed
Civil Case No. Q-92-12899, for quieting of title against petitioners. In their answer, petitioners averred that
sometime in 1966 the spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery offered to sell the disputed parcel of land to their
predecessor-in-interest, Lorenzo Yap, for the sum of P15,000.00. Since Lorenzo and his wife Sally Yap were at
that time Chinese citizens, Lorenzo requested his brother Ramon to allow the use of the latter's name in the
purchase, registration, and declaration for tax purposes of the subject lot to which Ramon Yap consented. It
was agreed that the property would remain registered in the name of Ramon Yap until such time as Lorenzo
would have acquired Philippine citizenship but that, should Lorenzo predecease, the lot would then be
transferred to Lorenzo's heirs upon the latter's naturalization. Petitioners contended that it was Lorenzo who
had caused the construction of the 3-door apartment on the property, merely entrusting the money therefor to
Ramon Yap. The death of Lorenzo in 1970 prompted petitioners to move in and occupy the apartment and the
lot, without any objection from Ramon and Benjamin, although the latter were allowed to stay in the premises
since they had no other place to live in. In 1991, petitioners acquired Philippine citizenship and, forthwith, they
requested Ramon Yap to have the title to the lot transferred to their names but to their chagrin they discovered
that Ramon had sold the lot to his co-respondent Benjamin.
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for the respondents and adjudged Benjamin Yap to be
the true and lawful owner of the disputed property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and debunked the claim of petitioners
that Ramon Yap was merely so used as a dummy by Lorenzo Yap. Giving full weight and credit to the Deed of
Sale executed by the Nery spouses in favor of Ramon Yap, the appellate court stressed that to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the execution of a public document, the evidence to the contrary should be clear
and convincing even as it was equally incumbent upon petitioners to show that the subsequent sale of the
property to Benjamin had only been simulated and fictitious. The appellate court, however, deleted the award
of attorney's fees in favor of respondents for, in its view, it was not adequately shown that petitioners had acted
in bad faith in pursuing their case.
ISSUE: Did a trust agreement exist between Lorenzo Yap and his brothers covering a piece of land and its
improvement?
HELD: No. The instant petition is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of 08 January
1998 is AFFIRMED
One basic distinction between an implied trust and an express trust is that while the former may be established
by parol evidence, the latter cannot. Even then, in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol
evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by
an authentic document.10 An implied trust, in fine, cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.11
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they submit in the case at bar boil down to the appreciation of the
evidence presented. The Court of Appeals, sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by
petitioners to be utterly wanting, 12 consisting mainly of the self-serving testimony of Sally Yap. She herself
admitted that the business establishment of her husband Lorenzo was razed by fire in 1964 that would
somehow place to doubt the claim that he indeed had the means to purchase the subject land about two years

later from the Nery spouses. Upon the other hand, Ramon Yap was by then an accountant with apparent
means to buy the property himself. At all events, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, particularly when
consistent with those made by the trial court, should deserve utmost regard when not devoid of evidentiary
support. No cogent reason had been shown by petitioners for the Court to now hold otherwise.
Not to be dismissed, furthermore, is the long standing and broad doctrine of clean hands that will not allow the
creation or the use of a juridical relation, a trust whether express or implied included, to perpetrate fraud or
tolerate bad faith nor to subvert, directly or indirectly, the law. The trust agreement between Ramon and
Lorenzo, if indeed extant, would have been in contravention of, in fact the fundamental law. Then Section 5,
Article XIII, of the 1935 Constitution has provided that
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations, qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.
The mandate has also been adopted in Section 14, Article XIV, of the 1973 Constitution and now reiterated
under Section 7, Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution. A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust would be
invalid if the enforcement of the trust or provision is against the law even though its performance does not
involve the commission of a criminal or tortuous act. It likewise must follow that what the parties are not
allowed to do expressly is one that they also may not do impliedly as, for instance, in the guise of a resulting
trust.13
CASE No. 136: SOLEDAD CAEZO, substituted by WILLIAM CAEZO and VICTORIANO CAEZO VS.
CONCEPCION ROJAS
( GR No. 148788 11/23/07)
FACTS: On January 29, 1997, petitioner Soledad Caezo filed a Complaint for the recovery of real property
plus damages with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naval, Biliran, against her fathers second wife,
respondent Concepcion Rojas. The subject property is an unregistered land with an area of 4,169 square
meters, situated at Higatangan, Naval, Biliran. Caezo attached to the complaint a Joint Affidavit executed on
May 10, 1979 by Isidro Catandijan and Maximina Caezo attesting to her acquisition of the property.
In her complaint, the petitioner alleged that she bought the parcel of land in 1939 from Crisogono Limpiado,
although the transaction was not reduced into writing. Thereafter, she immediately took possession of the
property. When she and her husband left for Mindanao in 1948, she entrusted the said land to her father,
Crispulo Rojas, who took possession of, and cultivated, the property. In 1980, she found out that the
respondent, her stepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating the same. She also
discovered that the tax declaration over the property was already in the name of Crispulo Rojas.
In her Answer, the respondent asserted that, contrary to the petitioners claim, it was her husband, Crispulo
Rojas, who bought the property from Crisogono Limpiado in 1948, which accounts for the tax declaration being
in Crispulos name. From then on, until his death in 1978, Crispulo possessed and cultivated the property.
Upon his death, the property was included in his estate, which was administered by a special administrator,
Bienvenido Ricafort. The petitioner, as heir, even received her share in the produce of the estate. The
respondent further contended that the petitioner ought to have impleaded all of the heirs as defendants. She
also argued that the fact that petitioner filed the complaint only in 1997 means that she had already abandoned
her right over the property.
On July 3, 1998, after hearing, the MTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner. RTC reversed the MTC
decision on the ground that the action had already prescribed and acquisitive prescription had set in. However,
acting on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the RTC amended its original decision on December 14,
1998. This time, it held that the action had not yet prescribed considering that the petitioner merely entrusted
the property to her father. The ten-year prescriptive period for the recovery of a property held in trust would
commence to run only from the time the trustee repudiates the trust. The RTC found no evidence on record
showing that Crispulo Rojas ever ousted the petitioner from the property.
The CA held that the petitioners inaction for several years casts a serious doubt on her claim of ownership
over the parcel of land. It noted that 17 years lapsed since she discovered that respondent was in adverse
possession of the property before she instituted an action to recover the same. And during the probate
proceedings, the petitioner did not even contest the inclusion of the property in the estate of Crispulo Rojas. 13
The CA was convinced that Crispulo Rojas owned the property, having bought the same from Crisogono
Limpiado in 1948. The CA further held that, assuming that there was an implied trust between the petitioner
and her father over the property, her right of action to recover the same would still be barred by prescription

since 49 years had already lapsed since Crispulo adversely possessed the contested property in 1948. CA
denied petitioners MR for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON 1) an express trust was constituted by canezo in favor of her father Crispulo Rojas over the land
in question
2) Rojas effectively repudiated the trust, therefore allowing him to acquire the property through
acquisitive prescription
3) petitioner is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel from recovering the property
RULING: A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership of
property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the
former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the
latter. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust.
Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent or, independently, of the particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity. An implied trust may either be a resulting trust or
a constructive trust.
It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a property
entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust. The following discussion is instructive:
There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of property entrusted to him, or that
an action to compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui que
trust does not prescribe, or that the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to recover property
held by a person in trust for the benefit of another, or that property held in trust can be recovered by the
beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time.
That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a trustee is not
adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus, Section 38 of
Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust."
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may possibly apply to resulting
trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
As a rule, however, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its
existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its
elements. The presence of the following elements must be proved: (1) a trustor or settlor who executes
the instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee, who is the person expressly designated to carry out the trust; (3)
the trust res, consisting of duly identified and definite real properties; and (4) the cestui que trust, or
beneficiaries whose identity must be clear. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove the existence
of the trust relationship. And petitioner sadly failed to discharge that burden.
The existence of express trusts concerning real property may not be established by parol evidence. It
must be proven by some writing or deed. In this case, the only evidence to support the claim that an express
trust existed between the petitioner and her father was the self-serving testimony of the petitioner. Bare
allegations do not constitute evidence adequate to support a conclusion. They are not equivalent to proof
under the Rules of Court.
Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for
the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.
In one case, the Court allowed oral testimony to prove the existence of a trust, which had been partially
performed. It was stressed therein that what is important is that there should be an intention to create a trust,
thus:
What is crucial is the intention to create a trust. While oftentimes the intention is manifested by the trustor
in express or explicit language, such intention may be manifested by inference from what the trustor has said
or done, from the nature of the transaction, or from the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
purported trust. In the case at bench, an intention to create a trust cannot be inferred from the petitioners
testimony and the attendant facts and circumstances. Neither can it be deduced from the circumstances of the
case that a resulting trust was created.

In light of the disquisitions, we hold that there was no express trust or resulting trust established
between the petitioner and her father. Thus, in the absence of a trust relation, we can only conclude
that Crispulos uninterrupted possession of the subject property for 49 years, coupled with the
performance of acts of ownership, such as payment of real estate taxes, ripened into ownership. The
statutory period of prescription commences when a person who has neither title nor good faith, secures a tax
declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. While tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the
basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. Moreover, Section 41 of Act No. 190 allows adverse
possession in any character to ripen into ownership after the lapse of ten years. There could be
prescription under the said section even in the absence of good faith and just title.
In addition, a number of other factors militate against the petitioners case. First, the petitioner is estopped
from asserting ownership over the subject property by her failure to protest its inclusion in the estate
of Crispulo. The principle of estoppel in pais applies when -- by ones acts, representations, admissions, or
silence when there is a need to speak out -- one, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another
to believe certain facts to exist; and the latter rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so as to be prejudiced if
the former is permitted to deny the existence of those facts. Such a situation obtains in the instant case.
Second, the action is barred by laches. The petitioner allegedly discovered that the property was being
possessed by the respondent in 1980. However, it was only in 1997 that she filed the action to recover the
property. Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS
Case 137
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167405

February 16, 2006

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO
SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special
Administrator, CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and
ERNESTO LISING,
.FACTS: On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir
of Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos,
Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents
Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition 2 to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted
child of Lising and the latters husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted
that the petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since she
was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition3 attaching thereto the Certification4
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register
of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant to a decision
rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch
3, promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29,
1969.
Petitioner also submitted a Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a
judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioners adoption by
Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 indicating that the
adoption decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City.
Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a Comment/Reply to Oppositors Opposition, 10 after which the
RTC ordered the parties to submit memoranda thereon. 11 On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed submitted
for resolution.12

On June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the adoption decree. Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed 15 SP No. 53457 for
failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 16 The said dismissal
became final and executory on March 8, 2000.17
On November 16, 2000, respondents informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the adoption
decree and Judicial Form No. 43, which found probable cause. On January 14, 2002, the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal
complaint against petitioner. On November 12, 2002, the DOJ also issued a resolution dismissing respondent
Chichiocos petition for review in the criminal case.
Pending resolution of the issues raised by Chichioco in the CA and the justice department, the RTC deferred
acting on the petitioners opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents motion for the appointment of a special administrator and
appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod. 24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that
the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of special administrator, and that Atty.
Saguyod was appointed without being required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should
be dismissed because she is the sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration on November 5, 2001.26
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion, which the RTC granted, to enjoin
petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that
petitioner converted the basement of Lisings residence into a billiard hall without authority of the special
administrator.28
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was denied by the RTC on
November 12, 2002. Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047, 31 assailing the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002
resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the
decedents property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon the latters death. Moreover, the
special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and submit an inventory of the decedents estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal by the Court
of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid challenge to
her adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there
was no need for the appointment of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial court. It held that
the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of
court as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez,33 the appellate court reasoned that such act could
engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedents estate.
Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and could not
therefore take control and possession of any of the decedents properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204. It was incumbent upon petitioner to prove
before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the
appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a
cloud of doubt."
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005, she went to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Can the validity of an heirs adoption be challenged in a petition for settlement of estate?
HELD: No. The instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.
The petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already
presented before the trial court. These are presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties
that said public officers perform.37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document 38 required by law to be entered into
the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the
status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of
doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the
contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action
brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in
a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate.
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from inheriting
from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to
continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant case. After all, the dismissal
of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of
petitioners adoption.

ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS

CASE No. 138: LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC (GR No. 164948 6/27/06)
RA 8552 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998
FACTS: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos
who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left
to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married
there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by
Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are
being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on
November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her
own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own
home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the
Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors.
Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment
to support the minors while in petitioners custody.
ISSUES: WON (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the
petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially
capable of supporting the adoptees.
RULING: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava, 28 that
adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
(a)Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her
right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is
hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said
adopter and the latters souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner
failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary
because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then
left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who
provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the
children.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No.
8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and refusal to perform the
filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to
display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed
at the time of adoption.
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia
Ramos had abandoned her children.
(b) Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove.
The joint written consent of petitioners children was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for
it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs
to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be
considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the following
requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation,
charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within
the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of
the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument
or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that
the same is his free act and deed. XXXXX
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited
law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be

proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of
her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
(c ) Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial
capacity
of
prospective
parents
should
also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the
would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social Services
of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the
latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was
57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a
month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house
at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the
limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial
aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct
in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioners
allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors
herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew,
there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not
prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS
Case 139
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 125932 April 21, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners
vs.
CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents.
FACTS: On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.
The trial court scheduled the petition for hearing on September 9, 1988, at 9:00 in the morning. At the hearing,
with the attendance of an assistant city fiscal of Angeles City, in representation of the Solicitor General,
respondents adduced evidence showing that:
They are husband and wife;
They US citizens;
They were childless on account of a medical problem of the wife;
Claude A. Miller was a member of the United States Air Force, as airman first class, assigned at Clark Air
Base since January 26, 1985.
The family maintains their residence at Don Bonifacio Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, since 1985.
The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno.
Born on July 14, 1987, at San Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the custody of respondents since
the first week of August 1987.
Poverty and deep concern for the future of their son prompted the natural parents who have no visible
means of livelihood to have their child adopted by respondents. They executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development, through its Regional office at San Fernando,
Pampanga, recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents were
morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to the minor's
best interest and welfare.

On May 12, 1989, the trial court granted the rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that petitioners possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
adoption, the instant petition is hereby Granted, and this Court decrees the minor MICHAEL MAGNO
MADAYAG freed from all obligation of obedience and support with respect to natural parents and is hereby
declared the child of the herein petitioners by adoption. The minor's surname shall be changed from
"MADAYAG"
to
"MILLER",
which
is
the
surname
of
the
herein
petitioners.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which certified
the case to this Court because it involved purely questions of law.
ISSUE: May the alien respondents adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code,
effective on August 3, 1988?

HELD: Yes. The appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court is affirmed.
When the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, it was made under the provisions of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt.
This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in
force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of
the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.
CASE No. 140: NERISSA Z. PEREZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ
(G.R. No. 118870 March 29, 1996)
FACTS: Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife who
is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York
on July 20, 1992.
Petitioner who began working in the United States in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a modest
house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York.
She became a resident alien in February 1992.
Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike
his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to
the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets.
However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby.
According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York,
she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up
her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days, before Ray II's first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms.
Despite mediation by the priest who solemnized their marriage, the couple failed to reconcile.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray C. Perez to
surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her.
Before us is the unedifying situation of a husband and wife in marital discord, struggling for custody of their
only child. It is sad that petitioner and private respondent have not found it in their hearts to understand each
other and live together once again as a family. Separated in fact, they now seek the Court's assistance in the
matter of custody or parental authority over the child.

ISSUE: In case of marital discord, who between the mother and father is best entitled to custody over their one
year old child?
RULING: When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of wthe Family Code is the applicable law. It
provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the Code does not qualify the word "separation" to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples
who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms.
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, section 6 (Adoption and Custody of
Minors) provides:
Sec. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. When husband and wife
are divorced or living separately, and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care,
custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First
Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as
will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason
of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty. . . . No child under seven years
of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be
separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word
"shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a
mandatory character.
The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old should not
be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of
the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) which reduced the child's age to five years.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison
d'tre in the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify
the court's awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to
exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to
deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable
disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and
best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child provides: "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be
a primary consideration."
Courts invariably look into all relevant factors presented by the contending parents, such as their material
resources, social and moralsituations.
In the case at bench, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means.
Respondent court stated that petitioner has no permanent place of work in the U.S.A. and has taken this point
against her. The records, however, show that she is employed in a New York hospital and was, at the time the
petition was filed, still abroad. She testified that she intends to apply for a job elsewhere, presumably to
improve her work environment and augment her income, as well as for convenience. The Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that a registered nurse, such as petitioner, is still very much in demand in the United States.
Unlike private respondent, a doctor who by his own admission could not find employment there, petitioner

immediately got a job in New York. Considering her skill and experience petitioner should find no difficulty in
obtaining work elsewhere, should she desire to do so.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose attempts at having a baby were
frustrated several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from her
before he has even reached his first year. The mother's role in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh
irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a mother's love has been immortalized times without number,
finding as it does, its justification, not in fantasy but in reality.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his
mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately executory.
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS
Case 141
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23828
February 28, 1966
PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, respondents.
FACTS: A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana
Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4, 1949.1 Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and
Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, which was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the
minors' nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors
have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy, said children have
continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter
appointed for the minors. Said guardian ad litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina
Santos, being over fourteen years of age, likewise gave her written consent thereto. The office of the Solicitor
General was duly notified of the petition and at the hearing did not offer any objection.
After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) granted on August 25, 1949 the adoption petition.

On Oct. 21, 1957 (8 years later), Juliana Reyes died in Manila intestate. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio
Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Juliana Reyes.3 In said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he,
as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In the same
petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed on January 2, 1958 an opposition to
the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos" marriage to
the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora
Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had
not abandoned them.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the deceased Juliana Reyes and adding that
she is the mother of the child Paulina Santos, filed on March 19, 1959 an opposition to the petition of Simplicio
Santos to be named administrator, and, moreover, thereunder adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by
Gregoria Aranzanso.
By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that the validity of the
adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). From
the order Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding
instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural
parents of the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack.
After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos
appealed to this Court by way of petition for review, filed on November 18, 1964, to which due course was
given.

ISSUE: May Respondents attack in the settlement proceedings the validity of the adoption of petitioners as
decedents children?
HELD: No. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the order of the probate court a quo
sustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed. Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria
Ventura as well as Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to intervene as heirs in the
settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes
In sustaining respondents right to make such a collateral attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested as
abovementioned on the premise that failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional
defect rendering the adoption void ab initio. In its view, said consent was not properly dispensed with, not only
because the evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings was insufficient to support a finding that the
parents had abandoned the children, but also since the adoption court fatally omitted to expressly and
specifically find that such abandonment in fact occurred.
The point to remember, however, is that under our law on the matter, consent by the parents to the adoption is
not an absolute requisite:
SEC. 3. Consent to aAdoption.There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption
signed by the child if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by each of its known living
parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no
such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of
an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of
such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been
recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required. (Rule 100, Old Rules of
Court.)4
Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the adoption by the guardian
ad litem suffices.
It can thus readily be seen that although the CFI judgment approving the adoption does not use the word
"abandoned", its findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes a finding
of abandonment.
Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the finding of abandonment made by
the adoption court, we find that even under American jurisprudence relied upon, as stated, by said Court
the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence
of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a
collateral attack upon its order (In re McKaeg's Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In re Camp's Estate,
131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736).
It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack, the determination of
the adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them.
For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in fact concealed the adoption
proceedings from the natural parents, thereby rendering the judgment obtained therein null and void or being
secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well recognized that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of
extrinsic fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez vs.
Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos vs. Maalac, 89 Phil. 270).
Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural parents, suffice it to mark that
adoption is a proceeding in rem5 and that constructive notice, such as the publication duly made as aforesaid,
is enough where the residence of the parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Notice,
moreover, is not required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons vs. Parsons, supra).
Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will not make any difference as far
as the right of respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings is concerned. Juliana Reyes should then
be deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is single, not married. The defect
would then lie only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person (a point that we do not
decide in this case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the petition.6 It being the estate of Juliana Reyes
that is the subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not affect the consideration of
the right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of
respondents.

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura and those who, like them
(Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as
such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted
children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the
adoption must be as in the instant case considered valid.
CASE No. 142 REPUBLIC VS. HERNANDEZ ( GR No. 117209 2/09/96)
FACTS: The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y
Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly
alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their
qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which
the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for
the change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he
was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family,
relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents' residence.
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder
of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued
that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as
two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of
causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in view of the natural
interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of
justice. Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and application of the Rules, the
welfare and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant
proceeding.
ISSUES: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper
or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was
lawful ground for the change of name.
RULING: Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in
the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow
that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not
confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic
change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor
furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order
to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, 17 and shall continue to be so used until the
court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a
substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The
purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a
record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made
should normally make its decree recording such change. 18
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a
change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where
the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide
resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for
which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall
be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the
Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition
and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be
changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the
municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements
therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. 19 It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it
cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of
another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available
under our remedial law system.
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our
present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following
requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of
action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money
or are of the same nature and character.
The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial
unity between them. 29 While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there
should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved,
subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is
not authorized. 30
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties 31 and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented,
effectively disallows unlimited joinder. 32
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder
of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between
these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any
common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions
do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under
our Rules.
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination
of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one
petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to
the prayer for change of name of the adoptee.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than
promotes substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In such situations,
the courts are empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules. 41

We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following the
reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We
are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and
benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the
Rules. It is the State that stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering
its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of
identification of its citizens.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a
person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a
person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise
mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is
premised on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name
under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be
changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for
change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure
therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences
of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be
authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or
is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may
justify such change.
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of
name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under
which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is
not sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the
fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and
reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church records or
elsewhere or by which be is known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long accepted wisdom and
applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had
been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it was the
name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from, the time he came to
live with private respondents. Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for
compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or established by private
respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as unavailing
for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name
registered in the civil register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon.
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSONS
Case 143
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33281
March 31, 1930
CHIN AH FOO (alias CHAN FOO WOO) and YEE SHEE (alias YEE SUI YENG), widow of Chin Ah Kim,
petitioners,

vs.
PEDRO CONCEPCION, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LEE VOO, respondents.
FACTS: On November 15, 1927, one Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo), was charged in the Court of First Instance
of Manila with the murder of Chin Ah Kim. Thereafter, the trial judge rendered judgment declaring the accused
not responsible for the crime due to insanity. Pursuant to Art. 8 of the Revised Penal Code, he required the
admission of the accused for treatment in San Lazaro Hospital, and barred his without first obtaining the
permission of the court. During his 2-year confinement, efforts to obtain his release were made. These were
opposed by the wife and children of the murdered man. They contended that Chan Sam was still insane, and
threatened to kill them if ever he obtained his liberty. Finally, based on report of the 2 doctors tasked to
examine and certify the mental condition of Chan Sam, the respondent judge allowed Chan Sam to leave the
San Lazaro Hospital to be turned over to the attorney-in-fact of his wife so that he might be taken to Hongkong
to join his wife in that city. Thus, the petitioners, questioning the courts jurisdiction to release the accused,
went to the SC on certiorari.
ISSUE: Did the release of the accused from hospital depend on the trial courts decision alone?
HELD: No. The writ prayed for will issue and the temporary restraining order will be made permanent, without
costs.
Article 8 of the Penal Code, pursuant to which the trial judge purported to act in issuing his order of release,
provides that among those exempt from criminal liability are:
1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval.
When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court
shall order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall
not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has superseded or supplemented article 8 of the
Penal Code, provides as to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for the insane the following:
When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other place for
the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger, he may discharge
such patient, and shall notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in
case the patient is confined by order of the court.
Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative Code. Article
8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both can stand
together. In other words, the powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary each with the
other. As a practical observation, it may further be said that it is well to adopt all reasonable precautions to
ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can
best be accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in proper cases.
After thorough discussion, our view is that while the respondent Judge acted patiently and cautiously in the
matters which came before him, yet he exceeded his authority when he issued his orders of December 26,
1929, and March 17, 1930, without first having before him the opinion of the Director of Health.
CASE NO. 144
Madrian vs. Madrian
527 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 159374 July 12, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R. Madrian were married on July 7, 1993 in
Paraaque City.
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on
November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000.

After a bitter quarrel petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao
City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-inlaw to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of
Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna
disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner
be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned
to her custody.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling
that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo
who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect
to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper
family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that
jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving child custody.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction.

In Thornton v. Thornton, this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where
the custody of minors is at issue.

The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers
intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial

jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here,
the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have
been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369]

CASE NO.145
G.R. No. 167211

March 14, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. FERNANDO ARGUELLES,
JR., ATTY. REYNALDO GERONIMO, PAUL SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN,
SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR,
CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and
FERNAND
TANSINGCO,Petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., In his capacity as Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, Respondent.

Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus because they were detained in a room at the Senate pursuant to
an order issued to respondent by the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies
(Senate Committee).

The Senate Committee scheduled a hearing to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, regarding the
alleged illegal sale of unregistered and high risk securities by the Standard Chartered Bank. Standard
Chartered Bank filed a petition for prohibition against the Senate Committee.

The officers of Standard Chartered Bank were subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Committee hearing.
During the hearing, Senator Enrile declared that "there is one portion of this petition that casts a slur on this
Committee and the proceedings of the Committee." He asked Paul Simon Morris, Chief Executive Officer of
the Standard Chartered Bank, who verified the petition for prohibition, whether he endorsed this allegation,
thus:
THE COMMITTEE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
BY CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, BUT IN REALITY IN
AID OF COLLECTION OF A HANDFUL OF CLIENTS OF THE STANDARD CHARTERED BANK FOR
LOSSES WHICH WERE FOR THEIR ACCOUNT AND RISK WHICH COLLECTION IS WITHIN THE
PROVINCE OF THE COURT RATHER THAN OF THE LEGISLATURE. 1
Morris admitted that he endorsed the allegation that the investigation was "in aid of collection" upon the advice
of their lawyers. He stated that he acted in good faith, and apologized for his error of judgment.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile moved to cite the officers of Standard Chartered Bank and their counsel, Atty.
Fernando Arguelles, Jr. and Atty. Reynaldo Geronimo, for contempt for making the allegation.
The persons who were detained in a room at the Senate then filed this petition for habeas corpus, alleging that
the Committee acted in violation of the Constitution and without jurisdiction.
Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that they were released from the custody of
the Senate by the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms.

Issue: WON a case for habeas corpus be granted even if the party involved is already release?
Ruling:
No.

The petition has become moot.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to
it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person
from it if such restraint is illegal.
The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical
liberty. Petitioners have been released. While the issues raised by petitioners are important, it is not
appropriate to resolve them now in these proceedings.

CASE NO. 146

Camara vs. Pagayatan,
520 SCRA 182 , G.R. No. 176563 April 02, 2007

Facts:
This resolves the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus filed by Mark Darwin Camara
(petitioner) for the release from detention of Leticia Lourdes A. Camara (Camara), Assistant Vice-President and
Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

Respondent judge issued an Order ordering LBP to deposit the preliminary compensation as determined by
the PARAD, in cash and bonds, in the total amount Php 71,634,027.30 with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
LBP questioned the order in a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which the appellate court dismissed.
LBP sought reconsideration. Pending LBPs motion, respondent in Josefina Lubrica filed a petition in the trial
court to hold liable for indirect contempt Camara and one Teresita V. Tengco, head of LBPs Bonds Servicing
Department, for LBPs non-compliance with the courts Order. Overruling LBPs objection that a contempt
citation is premature since the Court of Appeals had yet to act on its motion for reconsideration in the CA. The
trial court, in its Order of 9 February 2007, found Camara and Tengco guilty of indirect contempt and ordered
their arrest until they comply with the order to deposit. The authorities arrested Camara and detained her at
the Provincial Jail, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Tengco eluded arrest.

LBP filed with the trial court a Compliance, indicating that as of that date, it had deposited in its head office in
Manila the amount of P71,634,027.30 in cash under the account of Land Bank in trust for, and in bond
payable to, The Clerk of Court, RTC Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. LBP submitted to the trial
court a copy of a managers check for the cash deposit payable to The Clerk of Court, RTC Branch 46, San
Jose Occidental Mindoro, in the Matter of Agrarian Case No. 1390. Hence, LBP moved for the release of
Camara from detention and for the quashal of the arrest warrant.

However, respondent judge found LBPs Compliance insufficient because the deposit was not made in such
form that the Respondent Josefina S. Lubrica may immediately withdraw the same without any difficulty.
Accordingly, respondent judge ordered LBP that cash and bond payments be placed in the name of Josefina
S. Lubrica as payee, in a form that is readily withdrawable. Meanwhile, respondent judge let the warrant of
arrest stand.

Issue: WON the Judge erred in allowing the warrant of arrest stand and will a writ of habeas corpus be
available as relief.

Ruling:

Yes. If an order for detention is in grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction the writ of habeas
corpus can be availed.
Camara was detained under a warrant of arrest respondent judge issued arising from a contempt citation
against Camara (and Tengco) for LBPs failure to deposit the preliminary compensation. Under Section 4, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus does not lie[i]f it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge x x x, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process x x x. Petitioner does not question the trial courts
jurisdiction to issue the Order of 9 February 2007 citing Camara and Tengco in contempt of court. What
petitioner assails is respondent judges refusal to release Camara from detention despite LBPs deposit with its
head office on 14 February 2007 of the full amount of the preliminary compensation provided in respondent
judges 4 March 2005 Order. Thus, the issue is whether, by doing so, respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction.

The office of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of deprivation of liberty. It is on this narrow
ground that we resolve this petition.

CASE NO. 147

Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
332 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 137560. January 19, 2000

Facts:
This is a consolidated petition for certiorari and habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari was filed by David
Cruz y Gonzaga questioning the Resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed his appeal from the
judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig, Metro Manila for failure to file appellant's
brief. The petition for habeas corpus was filed by David Cruz's mother, Maria Cruz y Gonzaga, against
respondents Superintendent of the National Penitentiary and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.

Petitioner David Cruz y Gonzaga was charged before the Regional Trial Court, with a violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He allegedly sold to another person dried marijuana fruiting
tops weighing 2.70 grams. the trial court found David Cruz guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to
suffer life imprisonment with all the accessory penalties of the law

David Cruz seasonably appealed to this Court. His counsel of record, Atty. Carmelo L. Arcilla, was notified and
required to file the appellant's brief within thirty (30) days from notice. The notice was, however, returned
unserved twice, before being served in the third time but was not acted upon by said counsel.

On 1994 the Supreme Court issued a Resolution referring the appeal to the Court of Appeals in view of the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 and the promulgation of the case of People v. Martin Simon y Sunga. The
SC noted that as the quantity of the marijuana involved in the case was less than 750 grams, the imposable
penalty on the appellant was not life imprisonment but one within the range of prision correccional to reclusion
temporal, in accordance with the People v. Simon y Sunga ruling.

Due to the failure to file a brief by Cruz, the Court of Appeals declared the appeal as abandoned and dismissed
the same on 1996, and which became final and executor of that same year.

In 1998, the mother of Cruz, herein petitioner Maria Cruz sought the assistance of the Office of Legal Aid of the
University of the Philippines College of Law. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the petition for the writ of habeas corpus be granted in view of the fact that there is an apparent
full service of sentence.

Ruling:
The petition for habeas corpus must be granted.

Maria Cruz's petition for habeas corpus, on the other hand, must be granted. Her son, David, was tried and
convicted by the trial court for violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He was
convicted on September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment and its accessory penalties. He was
committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
769 took effect. This law amended provisions of several penal laws, including the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was "life imprisonment to death." Under R.A.
7659, the penalty depended on the quantity of the drug. The sale of "750 grams or more of Indian hemp or
marijuana" became punishable by reclusion perpetua, to death. The penalty for the sale of less than 750
grams of marijuana was reduced to a range "from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua, depending upon
the quantity" of the drug.
In the instant case, the amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams. The imposable
penalty for this amount under the Simon ruling is prision correctional which has a duration of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently, David Cruz has already served six (6) years and three (3) months
of his sentence which is way beyond the last day of prision correccional. The continued detention of Cruz at,
the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the Solicitor General as already illegal. David Cruz should
therefore be released from prison without further delay.
An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified petition setting forth: (1) that the person in
whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the officer or name of the
person by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person.[14] The writ of habeas corpus
extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.

CASE NO. 148

Feria vs. Court of Appeals
325 SCRA 525 , G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000

Facts:
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision of the Eighth Division of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace
Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.

Some twelve (12) years later petitioner sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the
RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements,
namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. It was then discovered that the entire
records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. The entire records appear to have been
lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3,
1986.

In view of this petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court
against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued
detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

The SC remanded the case for hearing to the RTC which dismissed the case for lack of merit, the decision of
which was upheld by the CA.a

Issue: WON under the peculiar circumstances of the case where the records of conviction were lost, the
petitioners continued incarceration is justified under the law.

Ruling:
The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the accused will not
render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas
corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution
as of the defense.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined
and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful
authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as
to such excess. Petitioner's claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued
detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional
right to due process.

Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to
establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made
judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".

CASE NO. 149

Moncupa vs. Enrile
141 SCRA 233, No. L-63345 January 30, 1986

Facts:
Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of a subversive organization.
Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on the
ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and
no longer under the respondents custody.

Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic because of
the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view of the detained
persons release with restrictions.
Ruling:
No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the Supreme Courts inquiry into
the nature of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.

Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainees temporary release constitutes
restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of
habeas corpus.

Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are necessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.

CASE NO. 150

Harden vs. Director of Prisons
81 Phil. 741 , No. L-2349 October 22, 1948

Facts:
Fred Harden is being confined in prison for contempt of court. This arose when the plaintiff was restrained from
transferring moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets involving the administration of conjugal
partnership that he had with Mrs. Harden. Mr. Harden, however, transferred cash to various banks
inHongkong and California, as well as to an unknown person. He was ordered by the court to redeposit the
money and the Balatoc Mining Co. shares belonging to the conjugal partnership, which he had inHongkong to
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (Manila Branch). He was not able to fulfill these orders, and
so was put to jail.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, Fred Harden, can warrant a writ of habeas corpus

Ruling:
No. The petition is denied with costs.

The grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1) deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights (2)
lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence or (3) excessive penalty. It was held that the court has
jurisdiction to impose the sentence simply because the person charged is in the state and he is still within the
jurisdiction of its courts. Moreover, the penalty imposed on the petitioner is not excessive because under
Section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet
in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.
This justifies the penalty imposed on Fred Harden, thereby not making it excessive. Moreover, the courts
findings are supported by sufficient evidence and it is a matter of fact which cannot be reviewed by habeas
corpus. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.

CASE NO. 151

Olaguer vs. Military Commission
150 SCRA 144, G.R. No. L-54558 May 22, 1987

Facts:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong
Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives
and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to
assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to
assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted
murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7)
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went
to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

Ruling:
The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC
Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the
persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the
issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released
from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the militarycourt created to try the
case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

CASE NO. 152

People vs. Simon
234 SCRA 555, G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
Facts:
Martin Simon y Sunga was charged for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that he sold four

tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of
P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant NARCOM operative, informed the police unit of the
illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa". They then formed a buy-bust team in preparation for an
operation against the said person. When they reached the place where the illegal activity was said to be
happening, the confidential informer pointed out appellant the police who consequently approached appellant
and conducted the buy bust operation successfully.
Simon was subsequently tried and convicted but appealed the said conviction, alleging among others that the
said buy bust operation was a frame up.
Issue: WON a petition for the writ of habeas corpus be availed as a relief.
Ruling:
Yes.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No.
7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence there under, then practice,
procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial
authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.

CASE NO. 153

Ilusorio vs. Bildner
332 SCRA 169, G.R. No. 139789, G.R. No.139808 May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband
in consortium.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention
of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.

Thus Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have
custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano
Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights
to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and granted the petition to nullify the Court of Appeals'
ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.8

Issue: WON habeas corpus can be availed to have custody of estranged husband.

Ruling:
No.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from
bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a
two-way process.

CASE NO. 154

Villavicencio vs. Lukban
39 Phil., 778 , No. 14639 March 25,1919

Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of
about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were
shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of
the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those
women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or
(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to
be present.

Issue: WON the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

Ruling:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for
nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in
the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that
the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in
his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be
compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief
of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the
same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to
change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

CASE NO. 155

In Re Azucena L. Garcia
399 SCRA 292, GR 141443, August 30, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner is convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document. In the case at bar,
petitioner is out on bail and is seeking for a relief via a petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of the
judgment rendered. Petitioner contends that were proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional
rights of the accused; the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal
remedy of habeas corpus.
The OSG, on the other hand states that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a person who is
illegally imprisoned or restrained by his liberty. Consequently, a person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner,
is not entitled to the writ.

Issue: WON a person convicted by final judgment and/or out on bail is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.

Ruling:
No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found
illegal, to order release of the detainee.

It is a well-settled rule that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on
bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or
make the order.

CASE NO. 156

Tijing vs. Court of Appeals
354 SCRA 17, G.R. No. 125901 March 08, 2001

Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from respondent and presented
witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on the other hand that she is the natural mother of
the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal, the CA
reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the
propriety of the habeas corpus.
Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor.
Ruling:
Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.

CASE NO. 157

Andal vs. People
307 SCRA 650, G.R. Nos.138268-69 May 26, 1999

Facts:
Petitioners convicted of rape with homicide seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim of mistrial
and/or that the decision if the RTC was void. The petitioners argue that the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction
to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistance of counsel
and without a valid waiver from the accused.
Issue: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
Ruling:
No. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violation of
the petitioners constitutional rights and that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. The jurisdiction of
this court has been expanded to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
In this case findings show that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and a resultant
deprivation of liberty or due process of law. The accused were sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a
result of a valid jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.

NB:

1. Cases under Change of name (Rule 103 RC, RA 9048 and RA 9255) were not digested.
2. Cases under constitution of Family Home (Rule 106 RC) were not digested.
3. Cases under Absentees (Rule 107 RC) were not digested

4. Cases under Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Civil registry (Rule 108 RC) were not
digested.