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People vs. Rodriguez

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THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.

, Defendants-
Appellants.

[G.R. No. 6344. March 21, 1911. ]

FACTS:

- It appears that the appellants, with nine others, being members of the second company of the
Constabulary stationed at Davao, mutinied on the 6th day of June, 1909, attempting, during the
course of such mutiny, to kill one of their superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria; that immediately
after such revolt the mutineers, having taken arms and ammunition from the depositary, left the
vicinity of Davao and marched toward the mountains of Lipada;
- that on the 8th day of June, 1909, said mutineers returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking
the town; that the inhabitants thereof, having received previous notice of the proposed attack,
prepared themselves to meet it; that J. L. Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M. Templeton, and Roy Libby,
armed with rifles, having been detailed by those commanding the defense of the town, on the
afternoon of the day referred to, advanced to the cemetery within the limits of the town, forming
an outpost for the purpose of awaiting the coming of the mutineers;
- that about 4.15 o’clock they sighted the mutineers; that immediately thereafter they heard a shot,
followed by others, which came from near the cemetery, where the mutineers had halted and
dismounted;
- that after a few shots had been exchanged Roy Libby was struck with a ball and killed; that the
outpost retreated to the convent and took refuge therein; that the mutineers advanced against
the town, attacking it at various points and especially the convent, where a portion of the
residents of the town had gathered, including the women and children, for the purpose of
defending themselves; that no other person except Roy Libby was killed, although several others
were more or less severely wounded.

ISSUES: WON the crime charged was committed with the following aggravating circumstances:

8. When craft, fraud or disguise is employed.

9. When advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense.

10. When the act is committed with abuse of confidence.

11. When advantage is taken by the culprit of his public position.

13. When the crime is committed on the occasion of a fire, shipwreck, or other calamity or misfortune.

15. When it is committed at night, or in an uninhabited place, or by a gang.

16. When the crime is committed in contempt with insult to the public authorities.

RULING:

As to number 8:
We do not believe that this circumstance was present. This circumstance is characterized by the
intellectual or mental rather than the physical means to which the criminal resorts to carry out his design.
This paragraph was intended to cover, for example, the case where a thief falsely represents that he is
the lover of the servant of a house in order to gain entrance and rob the owner (astucia); or where (fraude)
A simulates the handwriting of B, who is a friend of C, inviting the latter, without the knowledge of B, by
means of a note written in such simulated hand, to meet B at a designated place, in order to give A, who
lies in wait at the place appointed, an opportunity to kill C; or where (disfraz) one uses a disguise to prevent
being recognized; and cases of that class and nature.

We are unable to find from the facts proved any element which warrants the conclusions of the learned
trial court as to the presence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime of which the appellants
were found guilty. They boldly marched from the mountains of Lipada to Davao, partly, at least, in the
daytime, with the purpose of attacking the town, which purpose they communicated to at least three
persons, one of whom was permitted to precede them to the town. They advanced against the town at
about 4.15 in the afternoon without any effort at concealment. They were in no way disguised, but on the
contrary. Each wore the greater portion of the Constabulary uniform in which he was clad at the time of
the mutiny. While it appears that some of them had cloths wrapped about their heads, it does not appear
that this was done as a disguise, but was following rather the custom of the country in which they had
been reared. We find in all the case nothing of craft, fraud or disguise.

As to number 9:

This circumstance depends upon the relative strength of the one attacking and the one attacked. It can
hardly be said that advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense
when twenty-three men, in the daytime, openly and without stratagem of any kind, attack a town of the
size of Davao. The results of the attack clearly show that the strength of the attacking party was not
sufficient to accomplish the purpose in view. They demonstrate, under the circumstances, that no means
were employed to weaken the defense, outside of such as are inherent in the situation when one body of
men attacks another with deadly weapons.

As to number 10:

For the existence of this circumstance it is necessary that there exist a relation of trust or confidence
between the person committing the crime and the one against whom it is committed and that the former
make use of such relation to commit the crime. For example, where one commits a robbery in a house in
which, as a friend of the owner, he is at the time a guest. No relation of this nature existed between the
appellants and the citizens of Davao or the deceased. The evidence fails to disclose a single fact upon
which the existence of this relation can be based.

As to number 11:
In order that this aggravating circumstance exist it is necessary that the person committing the crime be
a public official and that he use the influence, prestige or ascendency which such office gives him as the
means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry, Did the
accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime? We do not believe that the facts of this case
warrant the finding of the trial court in this particular. (Supreme court of Spain, decisions of 4th March,
1872; 18th December, 1871.)

As to number 13:

The reason for the existence of this circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality met in one
who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by
taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them. As is readily seen from the facts, no such condition
as is described in this paragraph existed in Davao on the occasion of the attack.

As to number 15:

The second paragraph of this subdivision reads:

"The courts shall take this circumstance into consideration according to the nature and characteristics of
the crime."cralaw virtua1aw library

In this case, under all the circumstances, including those presented in the discussion relating to paragraph
9, the fact that there were more than three armed persons in the attacking party is not sufficient to call
for the application of the provisions of this paragraph.

As to number 16:

The supreme court of Spain has held that the circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority,
provided for in paragraph 16 of the Penal Code, can exist only when such authority is engaged in the
exercise of its functions and he who is thus engaged in the exercise of said functions is not the person
against whom the crime is committed in which that circumstance appears; the court further saying that
such aggravating circumstance was not present in the case before it because D. Jose Torres, although he
was municipal judge, was the object of the murder involved in that case.

In the case at bar, if the crime was committed with contempt of and insult to the public authorities have
been the public authorities of Davao. But the persons exercising that authority were the very persons
against whom, among others, the crime charged in this action was being committed.

After diligent investigation and extended consideration, we have been unable to find that any
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of this crime.

There being present no aggravating circumstance and there existing no extenuating circumstances, the
penalty imposed must be in its medium degree.

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