REPUBLIC OF THE PfflLIFPINES

Quezon City

SEVENTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Crim,Case No.SB-17-CRM-0496

Plaintiff,
For. Violation of Sec. 3(e),
R.A. No.3019

Present:
- versus -
GOMEZ-ESTOESTA,J., Chairperson,
TRESPESES,J.,and
HIDALGO,y.

LEONISA JOANA"ONA"BASA Promulgated:

VIRATA,
Accused.
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DECISION

HIDALGO,/.:

The People of the Philippines charged accused Leonisa Joana "Ona"

Basa Virata, Municipal Mayor, General Mariano Alvarez (GMA), Cavite, for
Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in an Information^
quoted below:

That on 14 November 2012, or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused public officer
LEONISA JOANA <'ONA" BASA VIRATA, being then the
Municipal Mayor of General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite, acting in
relation to and taking advantage of her office, through manifest
partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
give unwarranted benefit, advantage and privilege to one Rasul
Ambol, a bazaar operator, by granting him a temporary business
permit and allowing him to use the closed portion of Congressional
Road, General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite to set up stalls for his bazaar
operation, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 05-s-Ol which
prohibits the use of roads for commercial and business purposes and
without an ordinance authorizing the closure of a portion of
Congressional Road, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.

' Record, pp. 1-2.

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CONTRARY TO LAW.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The case was filed with this Court on March 15, 2017. Immediately
thereafter, a Hold Departure Order dated March 21, 2017^ and a Warrant of
Arrest dated April 11, 2017^ were issued against accused Virata. For her
provisional liberty, she posted bail bond on April 24,2017.

Accused Virata was arraigned on May 25,2017, with the assistance of

her counsel and she pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged."^ Pre-trial
Conference took place on June 22, 2017. During the said proceeding, the
parties entered into the following stipulations:
1. That whenever referred to, orally or in writing, by the Court,the
prosecution and the witnesses, accused LEONISA JOANA B.
VIRATA admits that she is the same person being referred to in
this case.

2. That at the time material to the case, accused occupies the

position of Municipal Mayor of General Mariano Alvarez,
Cavite.

3. That accused Virata issued Executive Order No. 23, series of

2012, dated October 29,2012.

4. That the fees collected, if there be any, redounded to the account

ofthe municipality of General Mariano Alvarez.^

Likewise, they marked their respective documentary evidence and

identified the following issues:

Common Issue:

Whether or not accused is guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of

RA3019.

For the Accused:

Whether or not the accused by issuing E.G.No.23 s. 2012 acted

in violation of Section 3(e) Republic Act 3019(Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).®

2 Id. at 55.
Md.at65.
* Id. at 97-98.
Md. at 150-151.
® Id. at 151.

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SB-17-CRM-0496
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EVTOENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

To substantiate the charge filed against accused Virata,the prosecution

presented testimonial and documentary evidence.
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

The following witnesses testified:

Monet Rosaroso Abobon (Abobon). Her testimony was stipulated

consisting of(1)she is the Licensee Inspector I of the Business Permit and
License Office (BFLO) of GMA Cavite; and (2) as such, her duties and
responsibilities include processing ofbusiness permit applications filed before
the BFLO.She identified pictures. Exhibits"J"and series,ofthe tents along
Congressional Avenue where the actual tiangge was supposed to have taken
place. She also testified that the said pictures were taken before the operation
ofthe actual tiangge and that,she has experienced shopping in the said tiangge
when it was already in actual operation. Finally, she testified that she was the
one who computed the payment ofthe entire bazaar.^
Mary Ann E.Clariza(Clariza),who testified that she is the Municipal
Treasurer of GMA, Cavite. She said that, the ''tiangge-an" operated after
payment was made by one Rasul Ambol(Ambol) and admitted that she did
not know when the ^^tiangge-arC* ended.®

Maricel Echevarria Torres (Torres), the Municipal Vice Mayor of

GMA,Cavite. She identified Exhibits "B", «C","D","E","G","H","I"
and"J". She testified that she filed the said case against the accused because
the latter allowed the improper use of Congressional Road despite the
existence of Municipal Ordinance No. 5-2001. She likewise testified that the
accused issued EG No. 23-2012, allowing the use of a portion of the
Congressional Road for ^^tiangge-an^\ which she alleged to have caused traffic
in the area and within the Municipality. She further testified that when she
saw that a tiangge or a tent was erected along a portion of Congressional on
November 12, 2012, she inquired through a letter addressed to the Business
Fermit and License Office(BFLO)if a permit was issued. She came to know
that an Official Receipt was issued by the Municipal Treasurer in the name of
Ambol. The Official Receipt was attached to the reply to her inquiry. Finally,
she testified that along wifti the issuance ofBO 23 is a Sketch Plan, showing
the re-routing scheme along Congressional Road.

On cross-examination, she admitted that the amount paid for the

''tiangge-an'' redounded to the Municipality as evidenced by an Official
Receipt. When asked further,she admitted that in Palawan Avenue,also found

^ TSN dated December 5,2017.

® TSN dated January 15,2018.

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within the municipality, has a tiangge-an for years already. Regarding the
issue of whether a public consultation was made prior to the issuance ofthe
EO in question, she answered in the negative. When asked whether the
accused is her political adversary, she said she does not consider her as one,
but she admitted that her father and the accused were pitted against each other
for Mayor ofGMA in 2013. She also admitted that during the period material
to this case, most ofthe Members of the Sanggunian belong to the opposing
political party.In addition, she said that she did not support the accused in the
passing ofthe said EO.Finally, she admitted that the EO does not in any way
state any "closure" or that"Rasul Ambol" appears in the EO in question.^
Artemio B. Sambrano (Sambrano), an incumbent Sangguniang
Bayan Member of GMA, Cavite. He testified that in Resolution No. 072,
Series of 2012, Rasul U. Ambol was named as the supposed operator of the
''tiangge'\ He said that, he has personal knowledge ofthe actual operation of
the "tiangge'' which lasted for around 30 days. He is not aware, however, if
all ofthe stalls for the ''tiangge" operated.

Lastly, he admitted that the Municipality operates or installs tiangge

during holidays or Christmas season.^®
Helen D. Salvador (Salvador), an incumbent Sangguniang Bayan
Member ofGMA,Cavite. She testified that she has personal knowledge about
the ''tiangge,'' as she has passed by the "tiangge" area several times though
she dropped by the said area only once. She does not know when the tiangge
startpd its operation or when it ended. She likewise testified that the
merchandises sold in the tiangge were toys for kids, RTW's and the like. She
added that it has been a tradition in the Municipality to have a bazaar or
tiangge during Christmas season.

After the testimony ofthe above witnesses,the prosecution offered the

following:

DOCUMENTARY EVTOENCE

Exhibit "A", Complaint-Affidavit of Maricel Echevarria Torres

dated November 20, 2012; Exhibit "B",Executive Order No. 23,
S 2012; Exhibit "C", Sketch Plan; Exhibit "C-1", Bazaar;
Exhibit "D" Resolution No. 401-s-Ol; Exhibit "E", Resolution
No. 072-S-2012; Exhibit "G", Certified True/xerox Copy of
Official Receipt No. 3149956; Exhibit "H", Letter of Mary Aim
E. Clariza dated November 15, 2012; Exhibit "H-l", Certified
Xerox copy of OR No. 3149956 ; Exhibit "I", Letter of Hon.
Maricel E. Torres dated November 14, 2012; Exhibit "J",

'TSN dated December 4,2017.

TSN dated Januaiy 16,2018.
"TSN dated January 16,2018.

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SB-17-CRM-0496
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"J-2'% "J-6", photographs; Exhibit "M",

Certification issued by Helen D. Salvador dated 23 August 2017.

which this Court admitted in a Resolution^^ dated March 20, 2018.

After the Court ruled on the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence,

accused Virata filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to
Evidence, which this Court denied in its Resolution dated April 2,2018.^^

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE

Also, the defense presented both testimonial and documentary

evidence.

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

The following witnesses testified:

Leonisa Joana "Ona" Basa Virata, the accused in this case. She
testified that the tiyanggian or Christmas bazaars are held annually and are
regular events during the Christmas season in her municipality; and that even
before her term as Mayor, these bazaars were always put up in their
municipality. That she issued Executive Order No. 23, Series of2012 for the
general welfare and guidance of businessmen and her constituents, and to
address the problem oftraffic congestion. She added that she did not order the
closure of any road or street. That before the issuance of the said Executive
Order, bazaar operators went to her three times complaining about the
difficulties they encountered while in their previous locations because the
barangay captain there was asking them fees other than the arkabala. After
hearing their complaints,she called several meetings with the transport group,
the PNP, Municipal Traffic Marshall Office (MTMO), among others,
resulting in a decision to have a rerouting as indicated in the Executive Order.
That she does not know Rasul Ambol personally and has only heard his name
during the hearing ofthe case. She denied having given any exclusive right to
Ambol for him to operate a certain business during her term as Mayor and
further said that, she did not have any financial gain from the issuance ofthe
Executive Order. She added that, in fact, the Executive Order was
implemented by the traffic office and the PNP,among others. That she knows
private complainant Maricel Echevarria Torres because the latter is the
daughter ofthe political opponent ofher father.^"^

On cross examination,she said that the bazaars in issue were previously

Record, pp. 290-291.
'Md. at 306-309.
TSN,July 3,2018.

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SB-17-CRM-0496
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found in Barangay San Gabriel, and that there were other bazaars existing
besides them which were called bazaars even though they do not contain
goods for sale. She confirmed that it was in 2012 when for the first time, a
bazaar was constructed along Congressional Road. She, however, denied that
the bazaars in issue were constructed by virtue ofEO No. 23, series of2012
that she issued. She maintained that the said EO was only for the rerouting.
Nevertheless, the said EO was not implemented. Only a dry run of the
rerouting scheme was made because of the Executive Order issued by the
Governor. She confirmed further that she is aware of Municipal Ordinance
No.5,Series of2001,which states that the LGU ofGMA,Cavite cannot issue
any order which involves the closure ofany main thoroughfares or roads.^^
On re-direct examination, she affirmed that the sketch shown to her
during cross examination was about rerouting, which was proposed by the
transport group and MTMO,but was subject to changes.^^
Mylene Salcedo Sotolombo, an online businesswoman residing in
Brgy. Poblacion, GMA,Cavite, and the then Executive Assistant of accused
Virata. She testified that she is familiar with the political families in GMA,
the two most prominent ofthem are the Virata and Echevarria families who
have been rivals since 1981. That during the 1999-2002 term, when Antonio
"Boying" Virata was the mayor and Walter"Etsi" D.Echevarria was the vice-
mayor, there was tension between them. At that time, any and all acts ofthe
city mayor were opposed by the Sangguniang Bayan members. As part ofthe
staff of the Sangguniang Bayan, she recalled that oppositions were made
relative to the passing and approval ofall resolutions or ordinances. That after
the end ofMayor Boying's term, Vice-Mayor Etsi asked accused Virata to run
under him as a Sangguniang Bayan Member. That subsequently, Etsi won as
Mayor. She also testified that when accused Virata was still the number one
councilor,she was the chairperson ofthe committee on appropriation,finance,
banking, and taxation. And,regarding the issue on the tiangge operatidn, she
said that it was a customary practice in GMA to operate tiangge along
Palawan Avenue located at Brgy. Gavino Maderan where the mayor's brother,
Nestor Echevarria,is the barangay chairman. That because ofthe many issues
and conflicts that arose during Mayor Etsi's term, accused Virata decided to
run as Mayor for the municipality of GMA, Cavite and won. She testified
further that indeed there was difficulty obtaining a favorable vote for
resolutions or ordinances relating to reforms and projects from the
sangguniang bayan, because the mayor, vice-mayor, and sanggunian bayan
members belong to different political parties. More, she said that in 2011,
while she was the executive assistant of accused Virata, monthly meetings
were held with the transport group. One of the matters taken during^ those
meetings was the traffic situation of the municipality during the Christmas

Id.
'«TSN,July4,2018.

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SB-17-CRM-0496
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season, but with the help of the transport and business groups, the traffic
situation became better. These transport and business groups suggested
different kinds oftraffic routes or schemes that would help alleviate the traffic
situation in GMA during the Christmas season and due to such suggestions,
accused Virata issued Executive Order No. 23, which relates to tempor^
rerouting schemes.The EO did not mention anything about closing or opening
ofroads or the tiycmggicin. That while there was a dry run and an actual setting
up ofthe stalls within the Congressional road, no actual operation transpired.
Lastly,she said that, as former executive assistant ofaccused Virata, she does
not know of any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference given to
anyone by her. She believed that this case is politically motivated because the
complaint has no basis.^®
Tomas Lentejas, a jeepney driver and resident of Brgy. Granados,
GMA, Cavite. He claimed that he was the former President of United
Transport Federation ofGMA,Inc. and a Member ofthe Municipal Peace and
Order Council. As one, he had monthly consultations with accused Virata
regarding the daily traffic problems ofthe municipality and abusive conduct
ofthe traffic enforcers. Also, he consulted with accused Virata about how the
heavy traffic condition during the Christmas season be remedied. Hence, in
relation to these,they made several plans and sketches to change the route of
vehicles. Their first"route plan" caused heavy traffic, prompting him to report
the incident to the Mayor's Office, so a new route plan was devised. Accused
Virata immediately instructed her secretary to accompany him to the MTMO.
His suggestion was well-taken by the MTMO and so he went back to the
Mayor's Office to talk with the President ofthe Business Chamber of pMA
regarding the new route. The latter agreed with his suggestion that the
"vehicles coming from Alabang, Binan, Carmona, and Calamba be directed
to go straight to BPI Samangka Site to Gabales area and exit to Congressional
road,while the vehicles coming from GMA will be directed to go out ofGMA
Petron and go straight at the Petron Street which must be one way only." As
per his suggestion also, the Chief of MTMO assigned traffic enforcers. After
his suggestions were implemented,the vehicle flow was good. When the "old
route" was used/implemented again,the traffic problem went back.^^
Reynante Viado, Assistant Chief of MTMO,who testified that he is
the Officer-in-Charge of MTMO, GMA, Cavite. He confirmed that he and
members of United Transport Federation of GMA, Inc. had monthly
consultations with accused Virata. He corroborated the testimony ofLentejas
as to his suggestions regarding the traffic problems especially durmg
Christmas season. He testified further that he saw the sketches and plans for
the rerouting, but when an order from Governor Remulla to implementthe old
route was issued, the traffic problem was there again.^°
"Id.; Judicial Affidavit ofSotolombo,record, pp. 316-322.
Judicial Affidavit ofSotolombo, record, pp. 320-321.
Judicial Affidavit of Lentejas, record, pp. 336-346.
Judicial Affidavit of Viado, record, pp. 363-370.

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SB-17-CRM-0496
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After the above witnesses testified, the defense offered the following:

DOCUMENTARY EVTOENCE

Exhibit "1", Executive Order No. 23, 2012; Exhibit "l-a" - "1-
d", pages 2-5; Exhibit "2", Sinumpaang Salaysay of Tomas
Lentejas; Exhibit "3", Appointment Certificate of Tomas
Lentejas; Exhibit "4" to "4-a", Panunumpa sa Katungkulan of
Tomas Lentejas; Exhibit "5", Sketches; Exhibit "6", Letter of
Complaint of UTRAFEDGMAI-Traffic Enforcer; Exhibit "7",
Letter of Complaint of UTRAFEDGMAI - Iskirol etc.; Exhibit
"8",Letter of Complaint of UTRAFEDGMAI-Jeepney Bankers;
Exhibit "10", Kapasiyahan 2010-04; Exhibit "11", Kapasiyahan
2010-03; and Exhibit"12", Joint Counter Affidavit.

which this Court admitted in a Resolution^^ dated September 21,2018.

No rebuttal evidence was presented thereby terminating trial.

Thereafter, and as prayed, parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.On November 29,2018,the prosecution filed its Memorandum.^^
For its part,the defense filed its Memorandum^^ on November 15,2018.

FINDINGS AND RULING OF THE COURT

The primary theory ofthe prosecution is that accused violated Section

3(e) of R.A. 3019 when she issued Executive Order No. 23, series of 2012
(E.O. No.23 s. of2012)and for subsequently granting a certain Mr. Rasul L.
Ambol(Mr. Ambol)a temporary business permit to operate a bazaar.

The prosecution further avers that accused's issuance ofE.O.No.23 s.

of 2012 on October 29, 2012 for the purpose of putting up a bazaar in the
guise of a re-routing scheme, gave unwarranted benefit, advantage, or
preference to Mr. Ambol. Although said E.O. is temporary in nature, the real
intention ofits issuance is to provide a business opportunity for Mr. Ambol to
operate a bazaar along Congressional Road, one ofthe roads affected by the
re-routing scheme.

In order that a charge for violation under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 to
prosper, the following elements must concur:

Section 3.Corrupt practices ofpublic officers.In addition to acts

or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the follovsdng shall constitute corrupt practices ofany public officer

Record, pp.450-452.
22 Id. at 556-584.
22 Id. at 478-515.

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SB-17-CRM-0496
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and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to aiiy party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

The essential elements ofthe said crime are as.follows:

(1)The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,

judicial or official functions;

(2)He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence; and
\

(3)That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in ihe discharge ofhis functions.^'^

Moreover, the Court has consistently held that there are two ways by
which a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the
performance of his functions, namely:(1) by causing undue injury to any
party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged
under either mode or both. The disjunctive term "or" connotes tiiat either act
qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.^^ It is not enough
Aat undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits were given as these acts
must be performed through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the
prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to
convict.^^

We now test whether the aforementioned elements are present, taking

into consideration the above ruling.

^ Consignavs. People,G.R.Nos. 175750-51,April 2,2014;Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan,G.R.Nos.162314-

17, October 25,2004, citing Jacm/o vs. Sandiganbcyan,G.R. No.84571, October 2,1989.
^ Giangan vs. People, G.R. No. 169385, August 26,2015.
Braza vs. Sandiganbqyan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 471, citing Velasco vs,
Sandiganbayan,492 Phil. 669,677(2005): Constantino vs. Sandiganbc^an,559 Phil. 622,638(2007).
"Sison vs. People, G.R. Nos. 170339,170398-403, March 9,2010,614 SCRA 670,679.

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SB-17-CRM-0496
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First element'. Accused is a public officer

discharging official functions.

There is no dispute that the first element ofthe offense is present.

During the preliminary conference, the parties submitted a "Joint

Stipulation of Facts and Issue" dated October 17, 2017^^ and ^ong the
admitted facts is, accused Virata is a public officer being the Municipal Mayor
of General Mariano Alvarez(GMA),Cavite.

The second and third elements, however,are absent in the present case.

Second element: Accused did not act with

manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence in the
discharge of her function.

Citing manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable

negligence,the prosecution faults the accused for indirectly allowing a certain
Mr. Ambol to put up a bazaar by causing the temporary re-routing of traffic
through the issuance of E.G. No. 23 s. of 2012, thereby giving him
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference. The evidence adduced,
however,leads to the conclusion that the issuance ofthe executive order was
clearly made in the regular performance ofthe accused's duties.
Let us discuss.

As borne by the evidence, what can be deduced is, when the accused
issued Executive Order No.23 s. of2012,traffic congestion was a recognized
problem in the affected roads indicated in the executive order, those roads
being located in the business and economic zone ofthe Mumcipality.^^ In fact,
the roads plotted in the sketch plan of the executive order have previously
been the subject of traffic control efforts owing to their nature as primary
roads of the Municipality.^^ They are also the very same roads that were
subjected to re-routing proposals given by the transport and business sectors^^
as a result of the consultations that the Municipality, through the Mayor and
the Municipal Traffic Management Office(MTMO),had with them.
\

Given the nature of the location of these affected roads and the
perennial problem oftraffic congestion,the traffic control measure—^initiated
^ Record, pp. 143-149.
Id. at 270,501,507. Exhibit B ofthe Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence,third whereas clause^ E.(J.
No.23 s. of2012; Judicial Affidavit of Myiene Salcedo Sotolombo dated July 4,2018; Judicial Affidavit of
Reynante R. Vidao, p. 2.
^®Id. at 426, Exhibit 11 of the Defense's Formal Offer of Evidence, Kapasiyahan Bilang 2010-03 of the
United Transport Federation ofGMA Inc.
Memorandum for the Accused received on November 23,2018. Judicial Affidavit ofTomas Lentejas dated
August 15,2018, p. 6.
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by the accused in the form of the temporary re-routing scheme under the
assailed executive order as preparation for the coming Christmas season—is
undoubtedly a valid exercise ofher local chiefexecutive powers under Section
444(2)(iii) of the Local Government Code. It is consistent with her duty to
ease the transport difficulties normally associated with the holiday season
experienced by the riding public as well as the transport and business sectors
ofthe Municipality.

Moreover, the prosecution insists that the subject executive order,

which directs a temporary re-routing scheme for the increased business
activity during the holiday season, violates Section 21 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 requiring an ordinance for the closure and
opening oflocal government roads. It provides:
Section 21. Closure and Opening ofRoads. -

(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,

permanently or temporarily close or open any local road,alley, park,
or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however. That in
case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at
least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and
when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure is provided.

(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently

closed without making provisions for the maintenance of public
safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public
use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be
lav^ly used or conveyed: Provided, however. That no freedom
park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer
or relocation to a new site.

(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be

temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta
celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an
undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications,
and waterworks projects,the duration ofwhich shall be specified by
the local chief executive concerned in a written order: Provided,
however. That no national or local road, alley, park, or square shall
be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not
officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local
government unit concerned.

(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted

ordinance,temporarily close and regulate the use ofany local street,
road,thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls,
Sunday,flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be established
and where goods, merchandise,foodstuffs, commodities, or articles
ofcommerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.

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However,it failed to demonstrate, either in the text or during the brief

implem'^ntatirm, that any ofthe affected roads covered by the executive order
was to be closed or that the accused,in fact,ordered the closure ofany affected
road. Consequently,the accused could not haye violated the following:
(1)Section 444(bX2)(iii)ofthe Local Government Code,which states:
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and /

Compensation.-

xxxx

(b)For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose

of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 ofthis Code,the mumcipal mayor
shall:

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of

the municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers provided
for under Section 22 ofthis Code implement all approved policies,
programs, projects, services and activities of the mumcipality and,
in addition to the foregoing, shall:

xxxx

(iii) Issue such executive orders as are necessary for the proper
enforcement and execution oflaws and ordinances.

or her power to issue only lawful executive orders for the proper enforcement
ofthe law; and

(2)M.O. No.5 series of 2001 strictly prohibiting the use of municipal

primary roads for commercial or business purposes.

In addition, the prosecution failed to prove that the accused acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in
issuing the assailed executive order. "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias"
which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for
rather than as they are.""Bad faith does not simply connote bad jud^ent qr
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliqui^ ffid
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach ofsworn duty,through some mdive qr
intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligenee has
been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even sli^i baQie,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duly to aqt;,
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indiffel^Citq
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the onusslia
that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take qpfhefr
own property."^^
Ambil vs. Office ofthe Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 192685, July 31,2013.

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Decision
People vs. Virata
SB-17-CRM-0496
Page 13 of 17
x- X

As discussed above,there was enough evidence and reasonable basis to

conclude that the accused issued the executive order in good faith, devoid of
any alleged partiality or bad faith. By all means, the evidence revealed that
the executive order is not a road closure intended to accommodate a bazaar
but a re-routing scheme formulated to address the traffic challenges of the
Municipality after several consultative meetings with the stakeholders or in
particular with the transport group.United Transport Federation ofGMA,Inc.
The prosecution's claim that the accused used the subject executive
order to disguise the intent to put up a bazaar based on its fanciful reading of
its text and the sketch plan fails in light ofthe fact that it was not the accused
but the MTMO which drafted the sketch plan and that the same was based on
the re-routing proposals suggested by the stakeholders and considered by the
MTMO.

Without a doubt, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that there was

bias,fraud, or neglect on the part ofthe accused when she issued the assailed
executive order. Nonetheless, even assuming that there was partiality, bad
faith, or negligence attending the acts ofthe accused,the prosecution failed to
establish that the same was manifest, evident, or grossly inexcusable;"Mere
bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held
liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first
place be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should
both be gross and inexcusable."^^

Third element: Accused did not give any

private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge
of his functions.

There is likewise insufficient evidence to prove that the accused gave

unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to Mr. Ambol's business
endeavor. "Unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support;
imjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason.
"Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition;
benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit fi'om some course of action.
"Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another. To be found guilty ofgiving unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference, "it suffices that the accused has given unjustified
favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or
judicial functions."^^

Sistoza vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 144784, September 3,2002.

Rivera vs. People ofthe Philippines, G.R. No. 156577, December 3,2014.
Ambil vs. Office ofthe Ombudsman, et al, G.R. No. 192685, July 31,2013.

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Decision
People vs. Virata
SB-17-CRM-0496
Page 14 of 17
X- X

Here,there is no direct evidence connecting the accused to Mr. Ambol.

While the prosecution took great pains in order to make the connection
between the subject executive order and the permit issued to him by
emphasizing that Mr. Ambol alone was issued a business permit to operate
the entire bazaar and that the bazaar could not have been put up in a primary
road without the consent and approval of the accused, the prosecution failed
to establish how the accused knew Mr. Ambol or if she previously dealt or
transacted with him, or what she would gain or why she would give him a
favor or benefit at the risk ofjeopardizing her position. It is significant to note
that the fees collected firom Mr. Ambol went to the account of the
Municipality, as admitted by both parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Issue.

Without any evidence connecting the accused to Mr. Ambol, the

prosecution's argument that the subject executive order was issued by the
accused-to provide a business opportunity to him, especially because stalls
were put up two(2)days before his permit was issued on November 14,2012,
is at best,specious. This reasoning is made even more obvious by the fact that
the official receipt cited by the prosecution as proof that the accused unduly
favored him, was issued by the Business Permit and Licensing Office and not
by the Office ofthe Municipal Mayor itself.

Accused is entitled to acquittal for failure

of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the

requisite quantum ofevidence in criminal cases:
Section 2.Proofbeyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond re^onable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree ofproof,excluding possibility oferror,produces
absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required,or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt
ofan accused,relying on the strength ofits own evidence,and not banking on
the weakness ofthe defense ofan accused. Requiring proofbeyond reasoirtfe
doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause^^ ofthe Constitufiojns fedt
similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent ^

CONST,(1987),art. Ill, sec. 1. No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty, or property without due pfdC0iss. ,
oflaw, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection ofthe laws.

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Decision
People vs. Virata
SB-17-CRM-0496
Page 15 of 17
X

contrary is proved."^^ Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of

innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution.^^

No less than the High Court ruled in People vs. Ganguso:.39

An accused has in his favor the presumption ofinnocence which

the Bill of Rights guarantees, x x x This reasonable doubt standard
is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt ofevery fact necessary to constitute die crime with
which he is charged, x x x Proofbeyond reasonable doubt does not,
ofcourse, mean such degree ofproofas,excluding the possibility of
error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required,
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the
accused is responsible for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction ofthe

accused must rest, not on the weakness ofthe defense, but on the strength of
the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence."^®

Couched differently, it is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that

the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumhit
probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove, and as a means of respecting the presumption of
innocence in favor ofthe man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly,
the State has the burden of proofto show:(1)the correct identification ofthe
author of a crime, and(2)the actuality ofthe commission ofthe offense with
the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace
from the weakness ofthe defense.'^^

Verily, based on our foregoing disquisitions, the prosecution in this

case failed to meet the required quantum of evidence to ascribe criminal
liability on the part of accused Virata.

CONST,(1987), art. Ill, sec. 14(2): In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed inhpi^ht
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be in^nheidf
the nature and cause ofthe accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,td^meetithf
witnesses face to fece, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesse^s^:lhd th^^
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwiffisjagdMgclhb
absence ofthe accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is imjustifiiSijBi
Peop/e vj, S'o/qyao, 330 Phil. 811,819(1996).
G.R. No. 115430, November 23,1995,250 SCRA 268,274-275.
^People vs. Velarde, G.R. No. 139333, July 18, 2002, 384 SCRA 646, 663; cited in Bode vs. Peoj>/e,f9l
Phil. 508,521-522(2008)and Macayan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 175842, March 18,2015.
Peop/evj. G.R. No. 157943, September 4,2013.
Decision
People vs. Virata
SB-17-CRM-0496
Page 16 of 17

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused LEONISA JOANA

"ONA"BASA VHIATA is hereby ACQUITTED ofthe crime of Violation
ofSec. 3(e), Republic Act No.3019.

Consequently,the Hold Departure Order dated March 21,2017 issued

against her is LIFTED and the cash bond in the amount of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) she posted for her provisional liberty is RELEASED in
her favor.

so ORDERED.

GEORGINA .HIDALGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Sch
MA.THERESA DOlraiRES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA
Associate Justice, Chairperson

Z/M^^JffesPESES
r ^Associate Justice
Decision
People vs. Virata
SB-17-CRM-0496
Page 17 of 17

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation with the Justices ofthe Court's Division.

MA.THERESA DOLC|J^S C.GOMEZ-ESTOESTA

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Seventh Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,Article VIII ofthe Constitution and the Division

Chairperson's Attestation,I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion ofthe Court's Division.

PAROM.
Presiding Justice

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