When Colombia Bled

WHEN
COLOMBIA
BLED
A History of the
Violencia in Tolima
James D. Henderson

The University of Alabama Press

 Copyright © 1985
The University ofAlabama Press
Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487-0380
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States ofAmerica

00

The paper on which this book is printed meets the mini-

mum requirements ofAmerican National Standard for
Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed
Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

ISBN 978-0-8173-5619-4 (pbk : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-8173-8395-4 (electronic)

A previous edition of this book has been catalogued by

the Library of Congress.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Henderson, James D., 1942-

When Columbia bled.

Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Columbia-Politics and govemment-1946-1974.
2. Violence-Colombia-History-20th century.
I. Title.
F2278.H39 1985 986.1 '0632 83-18027
ISBN 0-8173-0212-3
 For
Alberto G6mez Botero} a confirmed Liberal}
and
Carlotica Gonzalez de G6mez} a convinced ConseIVative}
who for many years have lived together in harmony.
 Contents

Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1. Gran Tolima 27
2. At the Threshold of a New Age 49
3. The Invisible State 73
4. Preface to the Violencia 96

5. The Violencia 127

6. Libano 153
7. Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 181
8. More Than a Political Solution 203

9. Aftermath 230

10. The Violencia and Tolima: An Assessment 242

Appendixes 253
Notes 283
Glossary 324
Bibliography 327
Index 341
 Maps
Colombia: Rivers) Mountains) Plains 12
Colombia: Political Divisions) Cities) Selected Towns 13
Political Divisions of Tolima) Mid-Twentieth Century 16
Physical Tolima 17
The Municipio of Libano 154

Tables
Table 1. Coffee Production in the Municipio of Libano) 1926 156
Table 2. Violentos in Colombia) ca. 1960 207
Table 3. Homicides per 100)000 Population 228

Photographs
Calle de las Trampas) Colonial Honda 31
General Domingo Caicedo 35
Manuel Murillo Toro 43
Liberal veterans of the War of the Thousand Days 58
Fabio Lozano Tonijos 60
Munitions of the Bolsheviks) Libano) Tolima) 1929 70
Quintin Lame 76
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan campaigning for the presidency 100
Gaitan speaking in the Municipal Theater 112
Laureano G6mez and Mariano Ospina Perez shortly
before the bogotazo 134
G6mez delivering his presidential address 148
Uladislao Botero and daughter Genoveva 158
Isidro PaITa 162
Surveying the Liliano Highway 164
Hector Echeveni Cardenas and editorial staff of Tribuna 183
IIChispas" and members of his cuadrilla 213
Graves of IIDesquite" and his followers 218
Jesus Marla Oviedo (IIMarlachi") and friends 220
Aerial view of HMarquetalia" 220
The people of Gaitania) Tolima) talk of Violencia with a reporter 221
Jose del Carmen PaITa and Luis Eduardo G6mez 225
 Acknowledgments

I \\!ish to thank the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation,

the Grambling State University Foundation, and the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities for their support during the preparation of
this study. Personnel of the National Library of Colombia and the
Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango were ever helpful in making available to
me materials from their unique collections during my several research
trips to Bogota. Special thanks are owed Eduardo Santa for his counsel
over the years; and to tolimenses Rafael Parga Cortes, Luis Eduardo
G6mez, and Jose del Carmen Parra for the hours they spent recount-
ing to me their experiences, which span half a century of Colombian
history. Finally, I thank my wife Linda for her editorial and other
assistance.
J!Vhen Colombia Bled
 Introduction

The Violencia and Its Literature

On the fourth of June 1949} the registrar of voters of Santa Isabel}
Tolima} picked up a pistol and fired a bullet through his brain. The
news caused a ripple of interest in the village} and for several days
people mused on his untimely passing. A newspaper in the nearby
town of Libano carried two articles on his death explaining that the
pressures of his job drove him to pull the trigger.1 Then} after a week}
interest waned and the registrar was forgotten. He was not a very
important person after all} and indeed would never have been resur-
rected here were he not part of a larger story whose telling sheds new
light on the Colombian Violencia.
Next to the Mexican Revolution of 1910} it was the longest} most
destructive civil war to befall any nation in the western hemisphere
during the twentieth century. As many as 200}000 persons died before
it ran its course} a majority of them simple country folk unlucky
enough to live in one of the many regions where the conflict raged.2
One such place was the municipio of Santa Isabel in the central
Colombian department (state) of Tolima. Violencia came to that mu-
nicipality in the mid-1940s and hung on stubbornly there until the
1960s. Thousands of citizens were driven from their homes and
hundreds murdered} many of them hacked to death with machetes.
They were the anonymous victims of a perverse bloodletting they
could neither halt nor} initially} understand.
The registrar of Santa Isabel was not one of the hundreds counted

1
2 Introduction

as victims of the Violencia, for he died by his OMl hand. Still, as holder
of a politically sensitive bureaucratic post, he was plunged into the
center of a maelstrom that was political in nature.3 And Colombia's
Violencia was eminently political, the frUit of a hundred-year struggle
that pitted the nation's Conservative and Liberal parties in unending
contention for dominance in national affairs. Through a process
whose dynamics are still not completely understood, these two par-
ties came to enlist all Colombians, prominent and humble alike, in
their ranks.4 So thoroughly were citizens polarized and set against one
another that some people have refeITed to the monolithic political
corporations as systems of uhereditary hatreds." These hatreds,
fanned to white heat by events of the 1940s, touched off Violencia and
drove the registrar of Santa Isabel to seek the ultimate relief from the
intolerable pressure to which he was subjected.
Colombians were shocked and disheartened over the bloodshed
that broke out in their backcountry at mid-century, though few of
them appreciated the full dimensions of Violencia until it had almost
run its course. This was true in part because so much of the killing
took place in remote rural areas that it was impossible to gain a clear
picture of what was going on there. Thus, the breakdoMl of the
democratic political system tended to dominate printed comment on
the situation in the country through the 1950s. Earlier in the century,
Colombians had found immense satisfaction in hearing their nation
described as an uemphatically democratic" country where con-
gressmen "read their poems aloud to one another, and talked about
quantum theory, the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, the influence of
Rimbaud on Gide and the works of Waldo Frank."5
That the nation could slip into chaos and dictatorship with ap-
parent ease set scholars searching for some key to explain the sad
state of affairs. Writing in the mid-1950s, Luis L6pez de Mesa diag-
nosed Colombia as having suffered a "heart attack" in 1949 that sent
national history "veering off course by ninety degrees."e The feeling
that the course of national history had been subverted was wide-
spread. It engendered a frantic search for a scapegoat, and the
polemical literature spaMled by that search further obscured the real
extent of Violencia. Liberals accused Conservative Presidents Mariano
Ospina Perez and Laureano G6mez of sectarian use of the police
forcesj and Conservatives branded Liberals as subversives intent on
Introduction 3

overthrowing constitutional government through encouraging revolu-

tion in rural areas.
Typical of Liberal writing on Violencia was the essay by Gennan
Arciniegas titled ((Colombia, or How to Destroy a Democracy/' con-
tained in his volume The State of Latin America (New York, 1952).
Influential in shaping foreign opinion on the situation in Colombia, it
vigorously advanced the view that a reactionary ((neo-Fascist group"
headed by Laureano G6mez used both anny and police to commit the
((crime of genocide" in the countryside.7 The essay was quoted exten-
sively and uncritically in subsequent works published in the United
States and elsewhere.8 Other popular expositions of the anti-Conserva-
tive position were Antonio Garcia's Gaitan y el problema de la revolu-
ci6n colombiana and Carlos Lleras Restrepo's De la republica a la
dictadura, both issued in 1955.9
Conservatives circulated their own version of events in official
government documents and in independently published mono-
graphic studies. A particularly influential work was Rafael Azula
Barrera's De la revoluci6n al orden nuevo, which chronicled twentieth-
century Colombian political history through the bogotazo, the bloody
riot that rocked Bogota following the assassination of Liberal leader
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan.10 Like most other Conservatives, Azula saw the
tumult as a frustrated social revolution that climaxed half a century of
leftward drift by the Liberal party. Jose Marla Nieto Rojas in his La
batalla contra el comunismo en Colombia and Roberto Urdaneta
Arbelaez in El materialismo contra la dignidad del hombre, taking up
where Azula left off, argued that the Violencia was part of a plot
hatched by the communists to destroy Colombian civilization and that
the Liberals were their accomplices, or at best dupes in the scheme.ll
The Conservative etiology of the Violencia did not achieve wide cur-
rency outside of the country. It smacked of cold war paranoia and ran
counter to evidence showing little communist influence in national
life.
Novels written early in the Violencia, though blatantly polemical and
tending to present the Liberal position, possessed the virtue of por-
traying the tragedy in concrete human tenns. Many of them were
based on the experiences of their authors and therefore possessed a
quality of eyewitness veracity. Some mingled fact and fiction and
heightened dramatic effect by including photographs of violent inci-
4 Introduction

dents described in the text. Notable in this respect were Fidel Blan-
d6n's Lo que el cielo no perdona and Augusto Angel's La sombra del
say6n. In the former} a violento, or perpetrator of Violencia} in Antio-
quia is shown displaying the heads of two freshly decapitated teen-
aged boys} and in the latter three sequential photographs show the
beheading of a young campesino in the department of Huila.12 Among
the more important works of this genre are Daniel Caicedo's Viento
seeD, Eduardo Santa's Sin tierra para morir, Alvaro Valencia Tovar's
Uisheda, and Eduardo Caballero Calderon's El cristo de espaldas.
Their respective settings are Valle} Tolima} the Eastern Llanos} and
Boyaca.13
The landmark in thinking and writing about the Violencia came in
1962} when La violencia en Colombia, the first of a two-volume compre-
hensive analysis of the subject} was published. Chief author of the
430-page tome was German Guzman Campos} a Catholic priest who
had done extensive work in strife-tom Tolima during the 1950s.
Because of his labors on behalf of the victims and his experience in
trying to rehabilitate notorious violentos, he was named in 1958 to the
seven-man National Commission to Investigate the Causes of Violen-
cia} a body formed in the first year of the bipartisan Frente Nacional
government that ultimately ended the Violencia.
Employing an aITay of primary and secondary sources gathered in
the course of work with the commission} Guzman and two collabora-
tors} sociologist Orlando Fals Borda and lawyer Eduardo Umana Luna}
effectively set parameters for subsequent study of the Violencia. In that
sense} the Guzman study was a scholarly watershed. All that went
before was either of a tentative nature or was so narrowly parochial
that it limited rather than broadened the average reader's perception
of the Violencia. Here at last was factual material embracing the
warlare geographically as well as chronologically; using primary} em-
pirical evidence; professing a degree of objectivity; and demonstrating
that the strife was a major incident in hemispheric history deseIVing of
serious consideration.
The Violencia depicted by Guzman and his colleagues was a gener-
alized phenomenon that ravaged a major part of the nation from the
year 1948 and left in its wake 200}000 dead as well as untold physical
destruction. It was defined as an occurrence unique to Colombia
whose ramifications were political} economic} and cultural and whose
Introduction 5

nature changed over time and in accord with varying local conditions.
It was also characterized by the extreme degree of cruelty with which
violentos dispatched their victims) most of whom were simple) un-
learned campesinos like themselves. In the opinion of Guzman) all
Colombians bore responsibility for this flaw in ((the soul of the nation/'
and were morally obligated to assist in bringing about ((national
recuperation."14
La. violencia en Colombia created a sensation when it was published
in July 1962. Those lucky enough to receive copies of the first) limited)
edition guarded them so jealously that it was thought the book had
been suppressed by the government. A second edition) issued two
months later) sold out immediately. Bookstores able to acquire sec-
ondhand copies sold them readily at four times the publication price.15
Liberals seized on the volume as proof that their interpretation of the
Violencia had been correct all along and cited scores of references to
the harassment of their compatriots by members of the national police
during years of Conservative rule. Conservatives responded byattack-
ing the study as sectarian and calling it ((just one more lie written
about the Conservative party."18 Writers in some Conservative newspa-
pers started refening to the chief author as ((Monster Guzman" and
the ((renegade priest/' while one prominent Conservative stated pub-
licly that the book's authors ((earn their living in a way less worthy
than prostitutes."17
The debate even reached into the halls of Congress. On September 6)
1962) Minister of War and General Alberto Ruiz Novoa rose to defend
the army against charges leveled by several Conservative representa-
tives: ((We all know that it wasn't the AImed Forces who told campe-
sinos to go out and kill one another in order to win elections/' he
fumed. ((We surely know that it wasn't the AImed Forces who told
campesinos to murder men) women and children in order to wipe out
the very seed of their political adversaries) but rather it was the
representatives and senators) the Colombian politicians."18 Later that
same year) Minister Ruiz again debated the Violencia with a Conserva-
tive) Senator Daria Marin Vanegas. That exchange on the Senate floor
ended with the two men challenging each other to a duel. Fortunately
for all concerned) friends interceded and the duel) illegal under
Colombian law) was never fought. 19 As the year 1962 ended) so too did
the furor sparked by Guzman's book.
6 Introduction

Father Guzman never offered his work as a definitive study of the

Violencia} and indeed it was far from that. As a collaborative venture
written by men of varied background and training} it exhibited an
unevenness that was but one of several of its flaws. The chief author
quoted extensively from secondary sources as well as testimony taken
during interviews and sUITOunded these materials with his own
fragmented} impassioned prose. His 117-page UHistory and Geography
of the Violencia/' the first of the book's three sections} was a summary
of the conflict presented in a regional/chronological format. This
allowed him only a handful of pages for treating his subject in each of
its major theaters and phases} an approach that rendered the discus-
sion at best superficial. Guzman also was author of the study's second
section} an inquiry titled UStructural Elements of the Conflict." It
included a miscellany that embraced songs of the violentos, a descrip-
tion of machete Ucuts" used on victims} examples of guerrilla argot}
and biographical sketches of famous violentos. Much of the source
material in both sections was quoted from czyptically enumerated
documents contained in Father Guzman's own personal archives. The
third and concluding section of La. violencia en Colombia combined
sociological and juridic interpretations of the Violencia by Fals Borda
and Umana Luna.
One of the most cogent criticisms of the book appeared soon after
its publication. In a pamphlet titled ((La. violencia en Colombia)):
Analisis de un libro, Jesuit scholar Miguel Angel Gonzalez took Guz-
man} Fals} and Umana to task for their lack of objectivity. He ques-
tioned their portrayal of Conservative authorities as criminally
inclined perpetrators of Violencia and the violentos as good men
driven into the hills by an evil sociopolitical system. This bias} Gonza-
lez argued} the reliance upon much privately held source material}
and the tendency to draw unwalTanted conclusions from fragmentary
quantitative data} invited a far more rigorous and impartial treatment
of the Violencia than Guzman and his colleagues had given it.20
The appearance in 1964 of the second volume of La. violencia en
Colombia disappointed all who had hoped it would improve upon its
predecessor. In fact much inferior} it consisted of legalistic documents
generated by the gueITilla movement in the Eastern Llanos and in
Tolima} a chapter on children orphaned by the Violencia} and a third
Introduction 7

section containing a list of more than a hundred ticauses of the

Violencia."21 The list was so prolix and full of sociological terms that it
tended to obscure rather than enlighten. In the final analysis) the
two-volume study by Father Guzman) Orlando Fals) and Eduardo
Umafia was a laudable) though flawed) effort that raised more ques-
tions than it answered and pointed to the need for continued study of
the subject.
Following publication of Guzman's study) an explosion of Violencia
scholarship occurred) which was encouraged in part by speculation
that the rural fighting in Colombia might herald a Cuban-style revolu-
tion in the Andean nation. Among the more influential pieces of this
tinew generation" writing on the subject was an essay by Camilo
Torres Restrepo) the Colombian priest who later became a revolu-
tionwy gueITilla. His tiThe Violencia and Socio-Cultural Change in
Rural Colombia" presented the warfare as an outgrowth of the parti-
san sectarianism traditionally employed by ruling elites to keep the
lower classes divided and powerless. In the sense that Violencia was
fed by social aggressiveness that sprang from the frustrations of
exploited popular classes) Torres contended) it was an implicit kind of
revolutionmy movement. Because it broke down the old clientelist)
paternalistic structures of social control in the campo, or countryside)
the Violencia was a major force for social change in rural Colombia.22
\Vh.en peasants formed guenilla groups for their self-defense they
began acquiring a sense oftigroup solidarity" leading to true class-con-
sciousness. The sectarianism used so successfully by the dominant
class backfired by helping tum the peasants into a pressure group (lof
definitive importance in the change of Colombian society."23 Camilo
Torres called his work a tipositive analysis of Violencia."
Torres's Marxist analysis was echoed in the works of numerous
succeeding scholars. Brazilian sociologist L. A. Costa Pinto elaborated
on the idea that ConselVative and Liberal elites were in fact a ti super
party" that throughout history had coalesced to defend its interests
when threatened by some outside force. He pointed out that leaders of
the two parties quickly forgot their differences when ousted from
power by General Rojas Pinilla. They easily ended the Violencia after
1957) the year Rojas fell and the coalition government was formed)
because by that time it was manifestly in their interest to do so. uTo
8 Introduction

deny the Violencia its character as a class struggle/' he wrote in Voto y

cambio social, "is to accept a false and simplistic concept of class
struggle in history."24
Historian E. J. Hobsbawm} a leading student of rural rebellion} found
particular significance in the "long-suppressed frustrations and ten-
sions" of Colombian peasants. He explained that "the Violencia of 1948
and later is best regarded as a mass social revolution which} for want
of effective leadership and organization} aborted into a disoriented
civil war and anarchy. "25 French rural sociologist Pierre Gilhodes
endorsed the '''frustrated revolution" theory of Torres and Hobsbawm
and cited comments of the infamous violentos "Chispas/' "Sangrene-
gra/' and "Desquite" to demonstrate that they hoped to bring about
social revolution.28
Marxist interpretations of the Violencia grew less frequent during
the mid- and late-1960s as researchers discovered that they could not
prove the assumptions upon which they rested. Scholars tried in vain
to find positive correlations between Violencia and economic depriva-
tion. They were unsuccessful in establishing that levels of frustration
and anomie were significantly higher in Violencia areas.27 In fact}
events seemed to contradict the main thrust ofCamilo Torres's theory:
that Violencia disrupted patterns of traditional social control in rural
areas} which allowed campesinos to develop a sense of class solidarity
and mechanisms for advancing their interests. On the contrary} evi-
dence showed that old social structures rapidly reemerged} even in
areas of greatest upset. Communities organized on a socialist or
communal basis in times of Violencia gradually reverted to the general
system of private ownership/8 traditional voting patterns remained
little changed}28 and clientelist linkages retained much of their pre-Vio-
lencia vigor. A symbolic counterpoint to these revelations was the
death ofCamilo Torres in 1967. The priest-turned-revolutionary guer-
rillero died in an army ambush while trying to speed the process of
social change that he had previously described in academic terms.SO
Once it was established that the Violencia was something other than
the bizarre opening act in a revolutionary drama} the search for causal
explanation moved in new directions. A notable attempt to relate the
Violencia and social modernization was that of Richard Weinert. In his
widely read American Political Science Review article of 1966} he
explained that Liberal party successes in turning the forces of mod-
Introduction 9

ernization to its advantage caused a weakened Conservative party to

lash out both at the Liberals and at the idea of change itself. Conserva-
tives, lead by Laureano G6mez, answered appeals to "populist legiti-
mism" that in turn stimulated traditional identifications and
U

intensified resentments toward the modem sector. 1131 The resulting

Violencia was thus based in a "pre-modem" Conservative party re-
sponse to modernization and not in social frustration and anomie.32
Others offered varied explanations for Violencia. Psychiatrist Jose
Socarras suggested that ferocious, cannibalistic Indians, such as the
Pijaos of Gran Tolima, left a strain of innate aggressiveness in their
descendants that "naturallyl1 caused them to tend toward violence.33
Sociologist Everett Hagen, in his short essay "The Necessity of Aggres-
sion in Colombia,l1 explored the same tendency, but called it a re-
sponse learned over centuries of domestic violence.34 Historian Jaime
Jaramillo Uribe found significance in the fact that the areas of strong-
est violence were those where Spanish colonial government had
rested most lightly.35 The same argument was made in a slightly
different way by Luis Duque G6mez, who found that theaters of
Violencia coincided with areas of modem colonization.36 Demographic
pressure was offered as a causal factor by both Bernardo Gaitan
Mahecha and Gennan Guzman, and Luis L6pez de Mesa wondered if
the lack of protein in the diet of mountain dwellers was not an
important component.37
Over the years, some scholars had maintained that politics was the
root cause of Violencia and that it sprang from a deadly combination
of intense partisan loyalties and a flawed mechanism of national
governance. This was the theory of institutional "heart attack l1 and
"death l1 offered by L6pez de Mesa in 1955, and by another generation
of scholars more than two decades later. At the end of his doctoral
thesis "Violence, Conflict and Politics in Colombia," Paul Oquist con-
cluded that "the Colombian State had lost its efficacy during the
Violencia to the point that one could speak of a partial collapse of the
State . . . caused by intense sectarian rivalries between the Liberal and
Conservative parties."38 Writing two years later, in 1978, Alexander W.
Wilde observed that escalating violence became an "unsolvable prob-
lem l1 for Colombia's Uoligarchical democracy" and caused all institu-
tional nonns to be lost.39 The nation's political elites simply did not
possess sufficient skill to keep their system from breakdown.
10 Introduction

Two other political scientists singled out irresponsible political

elites as those chiefly to blame for the Violencia. ((Political elites could
have condemned rural violence when it began)" wrote John Pollock in
an essay on the subject of elite accountability. ((They could have voted
funds for the army and they could have united the power of their
presses to condemn all violence wreaked by members of either party
had they wished. They chose more partisanship) however} which
transfonned social mobilization and party rivalry into violent mass
partisanship} mass conflict."40 James Payne hypothesized that in their
venal struggle for status and spoils of office} ((the chief incentives of
Colombian politics/' elites touched off a ((defensive feud" that their
system of governance could not contain.41
Others turned from the examination of political elites and focused
instead on the countryside) the true sphere of the Violencia. Steffen
Schmidt} a proponent of the structural school of the strife's etiology}
looked to the patron-client network omnipresent over rural Colombia
as a key to understanding the conflict. According to him} the weakness
of the nation's centralized government during the early national
period drove rural elites to construct networks of loyal ((subjects" to
defend their interests when the need arose. When the Conservative
and Liberal parties were fonned in the mid-nineteenth century) the
myriad of patron-client networks coalesced into two groups repre-
senting} and represented by} the two parties. Because control of the
national government} its patronage and its protection} amply benefited
members of the party in power} the oveniding interest of patrons and
their clients was to see their party triumph} whether in elections or
civil war. And civil war raked the nation constantly in the later
nineteenth century. By the twentieth century} Colombians were in-
tensely politicized within their clientelist networks. When the au-
thority of the central government crumbled in late 1949} Conservatives
and Liberals were not only predisposed to spring at each other's
throats} but also found it easy to do so thanks to the clientelist
groupings that made it a simple matter to identify friend and foe. In
Schmidt's words} ((Local notables and peasant village leaders contin-
ued to mobilize themselves either on the offensive or the defensive.
Guenilla leaders were patrons (often literally speaking in the sense
that they were local landlords or their sons). They offered leadership}
protection} arms and food in exchange for the loyalty of peasant
Introduction 11

followers."42 The author coined the phrase ((defensive patronalism to

Jl

describe the mobilization of patrons and clients for purposes of

mutual defense.
By the late 1970s, members of every humanistic discipline, ideology,
and methodology had bent to the task of exploring the Violencia, and
in the process they created a respectable body of scholarship on the
subject. Yet the overall result was mildly disappointing. A nagging
feeling prevailed among those who had mastered this corpus of
infonnation that something was missing, that somehow ((La Violencia"
had not been contained within any single paradigm or captured
between the covers of a single volume. Three characteristics of the
phenomenon help explain its intractability to scholarly analysis. First,
it dragged on for nearly two decades, during which the pressures of
modernization were metamorphosing national life. Rapid population
increase, urbanization, advances in communication, and many related
factors made Colombia of the bogotazo a quite different place from
that of the Frente Nacional. Second, just as the country changed over
two decades, so too did the Violencia. In fact, it passed through four
distinct phases that were marked, and in considerable part deter-
mined, by pivotal events in the political life of the nation.
The first phase, 1946--49, was one of progressive political breakdown
at the national level and spreading sectarian violence in many parts of
provincial Colombia. These were years of incipient Violencia. Gaitan's
assassination on April 9,1948, was the single most important event of
the period that ended in November 1949, when two-party government
failed. 43 During the second phase, November 1949-June 1953, the
Violencia was in its most generalized fonn, usually exhibiting its
((traditional" sectarian face. That is, most acts of Violencia could be
traced to exchanges between representatives of the hegemonic Con-
servative regime holding power in Bogota and members of the Liberal
party, whether civilians or guerrillas.
Phase three was ushered in by the military coup led by General
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla on June 13, 1953. The Violencia declined dramati-
cally during the first year of his rule, but soon returned and persisted
through his overthrow on May 10, 1957. Although not as widespread
during the third phase as during the second, it reached its most
complex point under Rojas. In addition to traditional sectarian fight-
ing, there were military operations launched against Liberal guerrillas
 12

COLOMBIA: RIVERS, MOUNTAINS, PLAINS

CARIBBEAN SEA

VENEZUELA

PACIFIC
OCEAN

ECUADOR

BRAZIL

PERU
 13

COLOMBIA: POLITICAL DIVISIONS,

CITIES, SELECTED TOWNS

CARIBBEAN SEA

VENEZUELA

PACIFIC
OCEAN

BRAZIL

ECUADOR

PERU
14 Introduction

who were labeled as communists by the government} diffuse violence

that was economic in nature} numerous assassinations carned out
under contract} horrible genocides perpetrated by gangs of psycho-
paths} and genuine revolutionary fighting in some areas. The fourth
and final phase of the Violencia began with the fall of Rojas Pinilla and
the rapprochement of the ConseIVative and Liberal parties that led to
establishment of the Frente Nacional government. Most of the purely
sectarian Violencia ended then} which allowed the forces of order
systematically to attack and destroy the criminal} psychopathic} and
nontraditional (communist) components over an e.ight-year period. By
1965 Violencia had virtually ended.44
The third and most vexing characteristic of the Violencia was its
regional nature. Just as Colombians developed distinctive accents}
colloquial expressions} folk dress} and even personality traits in accord
with their province of origin} so too did the Violencia exhibit many
regional variations.4! This was the chief impediment to achieving a
smooth} integrated treatment of it. Because of these regional differ-
ences} the fighting in a given place did not necessarily conform with
the four-part periodization given above. For example} the Violencia
was generalized in Norte de Santander as early as 1947} fully three
years before it began its sweep across Tolima. Likewise} in the Eastern
Llanos} it ended in 1953} but spiraled out of control in Tolima between
that year and 1958.46 Although in broadest outline it was a unified and
coherent phenomenon} in its regional aspect it showed faces as
variegated as the Colombian countryside itself.
Following Gennan Guzman's notable attempt to tell the story of the
Violencia in a single volume} as he did in the first part of his two-vol-
ume collaborative work} other writers undertook the same quijotesque
task} in the process reaching similar conclusions: before the Violencia
could be adequately understood} it must be examined in its regional}
and even its local} contexts. The regional study must in tum be
sensitive to events transpiring at the national level and should illumi-
nate the national-regional-Iocal linkages along which Violencia was
transmitted.41 Russell Ramsey succinctly stated the argument for re-
gional analysis: ((Regional and topical studies appear to offer the best
promise for building a solid history of the Violencia. The scholar who
will walk the teITain of Tolima) or Santander} or Boyaca} interview eye
witnesses} and exhaust local collections of letters and newspapers will
Introduction 15

have the basis for a new level of sophistication in Violencia scholar-

ship. A dozen such studies} drawing also on documents and memoirs
at a national level} could furnish the basis for a solidly rooted his-
tory."48
The present study is an attempt to place Colombia's Violencia in a
regional setting. It is a history of the beautiful department called
Tolima and of the long conflict that settled over it in the mid-twentieth
century. As such} this work represents the first sustained effort to
((walk the terrain" of a place darkened by the shadow of Violencia.

Tolima and the Regional Study of Violencia

Tolima is an appropriate setting for the first regional history of the
Violencia for several reasons. Of all Colombian departments) it suffered
most intensely and it experienced every variety of the complex war-
fare. Although predominantly rural} it was quite near the nation's
political center. This meant that it was well positioned to allow the
exploration of that nexus between center and periphery so important
to creation and sustenance of the Violencia. Tolima was small in both
area and human population} but possessed a diversity of terrain and
population that made it representative of afflicted parts of the nation.
In short} the exploration of Tolima's history affords a sharply delin-
eated view of both the Violencia and Colombia's sociopolitical system.
This approach brings an intimacy and immediacy to the study of both
subjects that were beyond the reach of previous scholarly inquiry.
The department of Tolima fOnTIS a rough oval that is tilted slightly
northeastward. It seems to lean against adjoining Cundinamarca} an
observation not so fanciful as it seems because little Tolima was
traditionally something of a cockboat bobbing in the wake of her
larger} more politically significant sister department. Running the
length of Tolima from south to north is Colombia's most important
river} the Magdalena. That fact} plus Tolima's central location} served
to make the department a crossroads from earliest times. Before the
advent of air transportation} virtually every visitor to Bogota} the
national capital} passed through Tolima by one of two routes. The first
led up the Magdalena to Honda} Tolima's northernmost city. Honda
lay at the head of navigation for the Magdalena and was the gateway to
the tortuous trail up the Eastern Cordillera to Bogota. Travelers to the
16

POLITICAL DIVISIONS
OF TOLIMA,
MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

CUNDINAMARCA

Cabrera ,
~ ."
.'
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; META
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Conventions

Departmental Capital
, m
City <:>
""
Cabecera •
~.

;'
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I'
 17

PHYSICAL TOLIMA

,.....
Salamina

,\

...

CUNDINAMARCA

VALLE

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, META

'lit.
-. Conventions

Paved Highway
Unpaved Road
T r a i l · · · · · · · ••
Departmental Capital KiD
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, Cabecera
Vereda
18 Introduction

capital from the Pacific coast crossed into Tolima by the Quindio Pass
over the Central Cordillera. They descended the mountains to Ibague}
the capital of Tolima} and thence proceeded toward the Magdalena
River town of Girardot along a highway bisecting the department at its
midsection.49 Geographically} then} modem Tolima is a long valley
circumscribed by two towering ranges of mountains} the Central and
Eastern cordilleras of the Andes. The mountains and their foothills
occupy some 60 percent of the department's area} and more than half
of its people live among them.50
Most of Tolima's populace are mestizo} of mixed European-Indian
ancestry} and are differentiated chiefly by their place of residence.
Those living in the hot Magdalena River Valley} or llano as it is called}
are descended from the Spanish who settled there in the sixteenth
century. Tolimenses, as people of Tolima are called} who live in
temperate highland areas are more recent anivals. Their ancestors
were part of a major migratory movement that spilled southward out
of Antioquia in the nineteenth century and filled the upland valleys of
the Central Cordillera. Fifteen percent of tolimenses are Indians} most
of whom live in the south-central part of the department. A majority of
Tolima's people are farmers} and the crops they cultivate are deter-
mined by the llano-upland dichotomy. In the llano} rice} sugarcane}
cotton} sorghum} sesame} and tobacco are the principal money crops}
and highland farming is dominated by coffee. Cattle are raised
throughout the department} though commercial cattle ranching is
most common on the llano and in the Andean foothills. Tolima's
predominantly rural population was estimated at approximately nine
hundred thousand in 1973} an increase of more than 25 percent since
the year 1951.51 This yields a population density of thirty-nine persons
per square kilometer} distributed fairly equally over the department's
23}325 square kilometers. Tolima and New Hampshire} in the United
States} are similar in population density and size as well as in shape.
The foregoing brief description of Tolima and tolimenses is decep-
tive in that it fails to convey a sense of the physical isolation that the
land imposes upon its human inhabitants. Even today} each mountain
valley and dusty comer of the llano is something of a little world unto
itself because it has its own unique history and personality. This is in
large part explained by the fact that only in recent times has it been
possible to move from place to place in the department without large
Introduction 19

expenditures of time and energy. As late as the 1970s) no paved roads

seIVed the principal towns of the cordillera except for Cajamarca)
which is on the major east-west route linking Bogota and the Pacific
coast) and Fresno) which is on the highway between Honda and the
city of Manizales) Caldas. The rest of the department relied on dirt
roads that were frequently closed by landslides during rainy season
and were jolting and dusty under optimum conditions. Tw'enty years
earlier) these mountain roads were primitive indeed) and six munici-
pal seats) or cabeceras, could not be reached at all except by mule
trails.52 Virtually all other upland villages and the fanns dotting their
hinterlands were a long and arduous ride away from their cabeceras.
This isolation of one region within Tolima from another easily
escapes summary consideration of the department and its people.
Unless Tolima is perceived as a place of many unique regions) an
essential dynamic of the Violencia is missed. This point becomes clear
in the case of Santa Isabel) the troubled municipio whose registrar of
voters introduces this study. Out-of-the-way) perched high in the
Central Cordillera) it was one of the first places in Tolima where blood
started flowing. It preceded most of the department's other thirty-nine
municipios into Violencia by some two years) a fact best explained
through inquiry that reaches back to the founding of the municipal-
ity.53
Santa Isabel was never a tranquil place at any time in its history. In
early days) it was a mere stopping point on a mule trail over the
Central Cordillera) a bleak place of flea-infested hovels) where mule
drivers spent the night before continuing on their way. The discovery
of small gold and silver mines brought in a turbulent new group of
settlers who helped spread the word that the region was full of vacant
land ideal for the cultivation of coffee and other crops. In 1895 the first
group of settlers arrived from the town of Salamina) in Caldas) and
fonnally christened the miserable village Tolda de Marla) a whimsical
name later changed to Santa Isabel after the snowcapped mountain
and paramo high above to the west.54 The town and its surrounding
countryside became a municipio in 1907) and five years later was
granted ten thousand hectares of unsettled) nationally owned land for
allotment to new settlers.55 By that time) a number of large coffee
estates had been established) one of which would boast several
hundred thousand coffee trees within just a decade.56
20 Introduction

One factor lent a notable continuity to the municipal life of Santa

Isabel: politics. The caldenses, or residents of the department of
Caldas} who founded the town in 1895 were members of the ConseIVa-
tive party} an already historic institution in Colombia that was eter-
nally locked in battle with its antagonist} the Liberal party.51 Other
like-minded settlers followed} and} by the second decade of the
twentieth century} Santa Isabel enjoyed the reputation as a place
where ConseIVatives could prosper. In 1916 Bishop Ismael Perdomo}
of Ibague} engineered the settlement of hundreds more ConseIVative
families in Santa Isabel through the formation of a corporation called
the Sociedad Fomentadora de la Acci6n Social. He sold shares in the
corporation and used the capital to buy hacienda uLa Yuca" from the
heirs of General Manuel Casabianca} ConseIVative caudillo and six-
time governor of Tolima. The estate} located in Santa Isabel along its
northern boundary with the municipio of Libano} was divided into 360
farms of twenty-five hectares each and sold to staunch ConseIVative
families. 58 In part because of Bishop Perdomo's colonizing efforts}
people of the little municipality enjoyed their greatest period of
happiness and prosperity during that decade. In 1928 they numbered
6}682 souls} nearly double the population of ten years before.59
After more than three decades of peace and prosperity under
partisan nurturing} disaster struck} at least as the ConseIVatives of
Santa Isabel explained it} laying full blame upon the Liberals. Electoral
miscalculations at the national level caused political power to slip
from the grasp of the ConseIVatives in the year 1930} which con-
demned them to nearly two decades of rule by the Liberals} a group
never more than a tiny minority among them.80 Especially from the
vantage point of mid-1949} it seemed clear to the ConseIVatives of
Santa Isabel that the Liberals} and they alone} had led Santa Isabel
down the road to perdition after 1930. The umiserable" Liberals} who
purged ConseIVatives from municipal office and loaded the depart-
mental police with sectarian incompetents} were solely to blame for
the troubled times. During some terrible days in the late 1930s}
drunken police shot into the air every night and beat or killed
ConseIVative campesinos and sometimes citizens of the {(better sort"
as well) actions that rankled every good ConseIVative. Fortunately} all
that started changing in 1946} when the Liberals fell from power. Not
that things improved overnight. The new ConseIVative president in-
Introduction 21

sisted on a mad policy of cooperation" with the opposition, which

II

meant that Santa Isabel was left with Liberals for mayor, city treasurer,
collector of the liquor tax, police chief-in short the whole panoply of
municipal govemment.
President Ospina Perez soon saw the eITOr of his ways, according to
Conservative logic, for on April 9, 1948, the Liberals showed their true
colors by rising up against legitimate govemment in Bogota, Tolima,
and the nation.81 \'Vhat other proof was needed after the disgraceful
events of the nueve de abril, when saintly Father Ramirez was lynched
by Liberal rabble in Armero, the center of Ibague destroyed, and the
penitentiary opened to unleash a murderous mob on the department?
\!Vh.y, even in Santa Isabel the rectory was blown up by the revolution-
aries!82 And then, once order was restored, the government had the gall
to send an aImy detachment and a military mayor to rule Santa
Isabel-as if loyal Santa Isabelanos did not know how to handle Red
subversion in their midst! At least the nueve de abril forced President
Ospina to face reality. He stopped the insane collaboration and al-
lowed tolimense patriots to apply the antidote to long years of vene-
mous Liberalism.
In his heart of hearts, every Conservative of Santa Isabel believed the
devil theory of Liberal responsibility for the political violence and
harbored no doubt about what should be done. It just required the
girding of loins and completing the purge of Liberal influence. That
process had actually been undeIWay since 1946, when Conservative
police had been assigned to Santa Isabel. But, because all other
governmental posts were still in Liberal hands, the help they could
offer was minimal. After the nueve de abril, events moved more rapidly.
No more Liberal mayors were sent to Santa Isabel, and, indeed, no
more members of this party were sent to serve in any official capacity.
The police force was made unifoImly Conservative through recruit-
ment of ideologically pure people, many of whom came from heavily
partisan villages such as Chulavita, in the department of Boyaca. The
only institution of municipal government in which Liberals enjoyed
any voice after April 1948 was the popularly elected city council, or
concejo. Years of electoral fraud under them, coupled with nearly a
decade of Conservative electoral abstention, had resulted in Liberal
control of the city council after 1941.83 The resurgence of Conservative
voting in the municipio since 1946 made it clear that the Liberal
22 Introduction

council was on its last legs. Conservatives came within a scant forty-
five votes of winning the June 5) 1949) election) and the suicide of the
registrar of voters bore mute witness to the passion of that contest.
All these events spelled potential disaster for the Liberal minority of
Santa Isabel. They were being harassed by their old antagonists and
driven from their farms fully a year before the nueve de abril. After the
uprising of April) chulavita police were more than happy to deal with
Liberal ttsubversives" pointed out to them by ttpatriotic" Conservatives.
Increasing numbers of Liberals from Santa Isabel fled the municipio,
but they escaped with little more than tales of outrage committed by
the police and armed Conservatives.54 A Liberal from the nearby mu-
nicipality of Anzoategui described his flight from one group of police-
men: ttThey spent the whole night shooting into the air) shouting
threats at the houses and committing every sort of outrage. During
those moments there were murders) fires and injuries throughout the
region . . . I was obligated to flee through the mountains with all my
family) filled with anguish until we reached Ibague where I took refuge
without work and lacking even the bare essentials."85 Others did not
escape without being physically brutalized. ttl remember the arrival of
uniformed men and some civilians as if it were yesterday/' recounted
a young Liberal campesino from a municipio farther down the cordil-
lera. ttThey treated those of us who had the bad luck to run into them
very badly . . . calling us collarejo sons of bitches and other offensive
things) when they weren't beating and threatening us.... I especially
recall everything that happened with a cousin of mine named J oba
Rojas) who they grabbed in the presence of her parents ... and they
did things to her that I don't even want to remember) in spite of the
pleas of her parents."88
Not all Liberals were forced to leave Santa Isabel in the late 1940s.
The luckier ones could bribe the police) or better yet purchase a
good-conduct pass similar to one used in Anzoategui:

The ConseIVative Directorate of the Municipio of Anzoategui Certifies

that--, bearer of identification number-, is an honorable
citizen, hard working, friend of the Government, defender of the Conser-
vative party and a financial contributor to the Party. We ask that party
members and employees of the Government support and protect this
friend and his family. . . .87
Introduction 23

The farther one moved into the countryside around Santa Isabel the
more frightening events of those years became. La Yuca} the planned
Conservative farming neighborhood} provides a good example. After its
creation by Bishop Perdomo in the 1920s} it was looked on by Liberals
during their tum in power as a nest of Conservative fanatics who bore
close watching. To make vigilance easier} they arranged for the neigh-
borhood to be removed from Santa Isabel and administratively at-
tached to the large Liberal municipio of Libano. 68 That political change
was in the nature of an ukase that placed Conservatives of La Yuca at
the mercy of their political enemies. In the thirties} a police post was
established there so local officials might keep closer watch on them}
and on election day it became common for sectarian Liberals to
ambush Conservatives from La Yuca as they made their way down to
vote in the corregimiento of Murillo. One such incident took place in
1933. Police later retrieved the bodies} took them into the town of
Libano} and dumped them in the plaza as a crowd gathered to joke
about Hthree fat yucas brought down from the high country. The
lJ

incident caused outrage among Conservatives of Tolima and all Co-

lombia.69 After the Conservative takeover of the national government in
1946} the people of La Yuca began their revenge} first murdering the
Liberal leader there} Rafael Amador} and conscientiously harassing his
lesser copartisans .70
Violence in Santa Isabel manifested itself in many ways: the suicide
of an emotional functionary} the extortion and outright theft of per-
sonal property} the harassment and murder of political opponents}
and even drunken brawls in smoky cantinas. Many of these activities
were colored by the same traditional politics that had given perverse
coherence to municipal life from earliest days. Santa Isabel was a
unique place} yet one that was bound to Colombia and the world by
invisible strands} along which ran impulses for good and evil. The
people living there responded to those impulses in the context of their
day-to-day experience} some impassively} some with passion} others
with desperation. The registrar of voters was in the latter category.
Incapable of dealing with the chaos settling over his windswept comer
of Colombia} he lodged the ultimate kind of existential protest.
The dramatic events described above were but a tiny part of what
would in time be known as the Violencia of Colombia. Although
24 Introduction

possessing their own logic and dynamic, they must be fixed in the
broader matrix of the Violencia if they, in tum, are to be understood.
Thus} we come full circle. The part and the whole, the violence in
Santa Isabel and in Colombia, must be brought together in such way
that the workings of both as well as the relationship of one to the other
are clearly illuminated. Regional history, in this case the political
history of Tolima, offers the best approach to gain a coherent and
concise vision of the Violencia.

Preview and Suppositions

This introduction was written to convey some sense of what the
Colombian Violencia was, how a generation of scholars has inter-
preted it, and why the regional study is a valuable tool for furthering
understanding of it. The history of Tolima that follows is the first such
study. Because Colombia's Violencia grew out of a long sociopolitical
process} it must be approached with sensitivity to the historical factors
underlying it. Accordingly, the three initial chapters deal with the
evolution of tolimense society prior to the Violencia. Chapter 1 touches
on Tolima during its colonial and independence periods and dwells at
length on the process by which tolimenses were politicized during the
nineteenth century. The chapter also describes the department's
economic development and changes in the pattern of human settle-
ment prior to the twentieth century. Chapter 2 treats formation of the
modem state of Tolima, as well as political events taking place there in
the early twentieth century, and considers at length the subject of
modemization and its impact. The effects of sixteen years of Liberal
party hegemony in Tolima and Colombia, 193Q-46, are examined in
chapter 3.
Chapter 4 is the first of six dealing with the Violencia itself. It
analyzes the process through which events occurring elsewhere in
Colombia conditioned the department of Tolima for the strife. The
most significant of those precipitant factors, Gaitan's assassination on
April 9, 1948} and its repercussions in Tolima, make up the latter
portion of the chapter. Chapter 5 focuses upon phase two of the
Violencia} 1949-53} and is complemented and amplified by chapter 6} a
history of the municipality of Libano and of the process through
which it fell to the Violencia. Progress of the fighting during the regime
Introduction 25

of Rojas Pinilla is the subject of chapter 7. The denouement of the

Violencia following Rojas's fall in 1957 is the focus of chapter 8.
Chapter 9 provides a look at Tolima since that time.
The author has tried to avoid the methodological and emotional
pitfalls into which others have stumbled, by treating the Violencia as
an integral part of Colombian history best approached through the
technique of forthright naITative history. The diffuseness of the phe-
nomenon is dealt with here by limiting the study to the history of a
single Colombian region, and a degree of objectivity is attained
through a naITative technique that pennits the facts to emerge with
minimal distortion. The author hastens to admit that unbiased history
is impossible to write and believes that, prior to embarking on a
lengthy exposition of what he believes to be true, it is well to first make
clear the assumptions guiding his work.
The first broad assumption coloring this history is that the people of
Tolima were individuals acting in their own self-interest. Their percep-
tion in this regard was of course filtered through the lens of Hispanic
culture and the values implicit in it, but within that context they
enjoyed freedom of mobility so long as cultural nonns were honored.
Buying land to expand one's fann, manying one's children well, or
obtaining a bureaucratic post are all examples of the way tolimenses
commonly used this freedom to advance personal ends. Their other
actions were also consistent with their perception of self-interest,
though less obviously so. Joining a revolution to defend liberty or
religion, doggedly supporting a discredited and powerless political
party, or defending one's honor with machete and fireann were all
consistent with values suffused in them by the Catholic church,
Colombia's traditional political parties, and a broader culture that
encouraged extreme individualism within a context of hierarchy.
This culture-laden perception of self-interest among tolimenses
fonns the basis of the second major assumption of this study: ideas
have been important moving forces in the history of the department.
The average tolimense may not have known it, but Marx and Hegel
were constantly at war in his soul; they drove him sometimes toward
material goals and at other times led him to pursue the sublime Idea,
occasionally at the cost of his own life.
Another belief of the author is that cultures change very slowly.
What at first seems to be revolutionary change in the economic}
26 Introduction

political} or other dimension will} upon closer scrutiny} be revealed to

conform with patterns already well defined in the culture. Likewise}
the people of a culture are very selective in the way they react to
change. Some groups will reject it out of hand} or at best will accept it
very cautiously. During the early years of the Violencia in Tolima}
many individuals believed that in time campesinos fighting against the
government would learn the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism and
consequently would become enemies of Colombian capitalism. Only
the first part of that assumption was true. Tolimense gueITillas learned
the politically sophisticated theories} but rejected them} thereby fatally
weakening the communist movement in Tolima.71
An important final assumption is that the subject of this study is too
important to waste the reader's time with anything but the author's
best effort at injecting life and spirit into it. The history of Tolima is full
of drama-perhaps too full-and it should be written within the
framework of Theodor Mommsen's dictum Uhistory is neither written
nor made without love or hate."
 1

Gran Tolima

Late in the pre-Columbian era, Carib Indians fought their way up the
Magdalena River Valley pushing aside lesser indigenous peoples and
claiming the land for themselves.1 Accustomed to the steamy Carib-
bean and Atlantic lowlands, the ferocious Caribs looked with satisfac-
tion, and perhaps even wonder, upon their new territories. All along
the upper part of the river, from the rapids of Honda at its midpoint to
its headwaters flowing out of hills some three hundred kilometers
farther south, was a grassy valley that reached westward to a misty line
of snowcapped mountains. This was the Upper Magdalena, the geo-
graphic region framed by the Central and Eastern cordilleras and
defined by the river and its broad llano. The Caribs called it Tolima,
ULand of the Snows."z
The first Spaniards to travel the long valley saw it merely as a
highway connecting places of more importance-and a dangerous
one at that. Carib-related peoples, such as the Coyaimas, Natagaimas,
and Pijaos, discouraged foreigners from tarrying long by killing them
whenever possible. Sebastian de BelalcAzar entered the valley in 1538,
crossing into it from the Cauca River Valley on the other side of the
Central Cordillera. It was his good fortune to find the Indians there
prostrate in the wake of warlare that had partially depopulated the
llano. This allowed him free access to the lower reaches of the river.
Leaving part of his small army at the Indian village of Neiva near the
southern extremity of the valley, he traveled northward to a point just
upstream from the rapids of Honda, and then moved up into the

27
28 Chapter 1

Eastern Cordillera for a historic meeting with conquistador Gonzalo

Jimenez de Quesada on the Sabana of Bogota.
Several months later} Belalcazar} Jimenez} and another explorer
named Nikolaus Fedennann descended to Honda and} hotly pursued
by Indians} paddled down the river en route to Spain.s Some years
later} Jimenez de Quesada himself led an expedition into Tolima} the
results of which did little to change the Spaniards' early bad impres-
sion of it. Upon emerging near Neiva after hellish weeks lost in the
mountains to the east} Jimenez} his soldiers} and even their horses
were struck by a mysterious fever that weakened and almost killed
them. Tottering northward to the nearest trail back up to salubrious
Bogota} the Spaniards cursed Tolima for their troubles and left it with
the somber new name El Valle de la Tristeza (The Valley of Sadness).4
For Jimenez de Quesada) that was not his last experience in the valley.
In 1579} at the age of seventy} the famed conqueror of New Granada
and seeker after El Dorado died of leprosy there.
A royal cedula of 1550 instructed that a pennanent settlement be
established in Tolima at a point from which the important Quindio
Pass} through the Central Cordillera} could be improved and main-
tained. It was an unenviable task because the new town would be in
territory controlled by the fearsome Pijaos} a warrior people skilled in
use of the same weapon prefeITed by the Spanish} the lance. Andres
L6pez de Galarza founded the town at a village ruled by the cacique} or
chieftain} Ibague} and he appropriately named it San Bonifacio de
Ibague del Valle de las Lanzas.5 Ibague was soon moved to a more
secure location} but its existence was precarious for many years. Pijao
uprisings throughout the latter half of the sixteenth century repeat-
edly reduced it and other towns of southern Tolima to rubble} and in
1606 Ibague was again destroyed and all its population killed or put to
flight. That led to the major Spanish counterattack of 1606 headed by
Captain General Juan de Borja} an able soldier who vowed to stay in
the field until the Pijaos were crushed.8 A war of no quarter} it
culminated in a battle on the plains of Chaparral in 1612} during which
the renowned Pijao chieftain Calarca was killed with a lance wielded
by Don Baltazar} a Coyaima chieftain who was fighting with the
Spanish.7
Destruction of the Pijaos and other obstreperous native peoples
freed all of Gran Tolima} as the Spanish now called the entire valley} for
Gran Tolima 29

settlement during the seventeenth century. Haciendas began to ap-

pear in the more fertile parts of the llanoj and the cattle, mules, and
horses raised there were sent up to Santa Fe de Bogota, by that time
the capital and principal to\\lI1 of the captaincy-general of New Gra-
nada. Honda was the key port on the upper reaches of the Magdalena,
and nearly everyone traveling to or ~m Bogota paused there for rest
and recuperation before continuing their grueling journey. Ibague, in
the foothills, and Neiva, on the upper reaches of the river, were other
important to\\lI1S of colonial Tolima, standing on two routes that
linked the provinces of Tolima and Cundinamarca with the province
of Cauca and the Pacific Ocean port of Buenaventura.
By far the most important tolimense settlement in the seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries was Mariquita, a center of gold and
silver mining on the llano some twenty kilometers west of Honda.
During its century of glory, the to\\lI1 was reno\\lI1ed for the prodigious
wealth of those lucky enough to control the production of one of its
mines.8 Don Gaspar de Mena Loyola, governor of Mariquita, was one
such person, though his luck was both good and bad. In order to
marry his eldest daughter well, he paid the governor of Santa Marta a
doWIj' totaling 1,380 kilos of assayed silver and was said to have a
similar fortune set aside for some other governor who might be
interested in manying his second daughter. After terms of the doWIj'
were set, Mena Loyola paid an additional princely sum of 6,000 pesos
for the groom to travel from Santa Marta to fetch herf 9
Production at the fabulous mines of Mariquita began declining in
the eighteenth century, and in 1795 they closed despite efforts by the
viceroy to keep them in operation.10 The loss of the mines would have
reduced Tolima to the status of just another supplier of animals and
foodstuffs to the highlands had certain events not roiled provincial
waters and involved Tolima in a series of far-reaching political events.
First came banishment of the Jesuit fathers by royal decree in July and
August of 1767. Most tolimenses were shocked by the king's order of
expulsion, for at the least it meant the loss of their excellent secondary
school at Honda, which the fathers had operated. For the province
and the nation, banishment of the Jesuits by an Itenlightened despot"
who feared their influence over the people of his far-flung empire
meant the striking away of a significant underpinning of his 0\\lI1
monarchical regime. The cerebral black-robed priests who gathered
30 Chapter 1

sadly but docilely at Honda to begin their long journey took with them
the considerable power they had long wielded in support of the
monarchy.ll
Fourteen years later, in 1781, royal government suffered a second
and even more serious blow. Spain's foreign involvements had forced
the imposition of new taxes that touched off a popular rebellion. The
URevolt of the Comuneros," as it was called, began in towns north of
Bogota and soon spread over the central part of the viceroyalty.12 Jose
Antonio Galan became the acknowledged leader of the revolt, which at
times seemed to involve something more than a simple uprising of
unhappy but other\Vise loyal subjects of the king. In Mariquita, for
example, Galan freed slaves working in the mines, and in Neiva
imprudent Crown officials were murdered when they called the rebels
Udogs" and tried to disann them.13 On the whole, however, the revolt in
Tolima and elsewhere represented more an objection to royal monop-
olies and taxes than an act of disloyalty to the king. UDown with bad
government! Long live the king!" was a time-honored refrain in His-
panic political parlance, and it was the cry heard often in Tolima
during the Revolt of the Comuneros.14
As major landmarks in the political life of late-eighteenth-century
Tolima, the Jesuit expulsion and the Comunero revolt were most
significant for the reaction they failed to evoke. Those events did not
trigger any popular outcry against the king, though he was manifestly
to blame for them. In fact, tolimenses displayed an aversion to lese
majesty in both 1767 and 1781. Such was even the case when national
independence was declared two decades later. \;\/hat seemed on the
surlace to be an angry reaction against monarchical rule was actually a
protest against Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest of Spain. The French
dictator enraged Spanish subjects when he seized the royal family in
1808 and conquered most of mainland Spain a year later. It was the fall
of the mother country to foreigners that caused the colonies to break
with Spain. In every case, the revolutionaries declared their loyalty to
Ferdinand VII, or tlFerdinand the Beloved" as they preferred to call
him.
Their attachment to the monarchy was soon to lessen, but in 1814,
when Ferdinand returned to Spain following Napoleon's defeat, most
of his subjects in New Granada rejoined the absolutist fold. This left
revolutionaries like Sim6n Bolivar in an untenable position. During the
Gran Tolima 31

Calle de las Trampas, Colonial Honda. (Courtesy El Tiempo)

months that followed, his independence movement collapsed, and

many of his followers were executed by vengeful Spanish authorities.
Among their more notable victims were Dr. Le6n Armero and his
cousin Carlota Armero, both of northern Tolima. The Spanish reprisals
were not to end until the year 1819, when Bolivar's victory in the Battle
of Boyaca definitively freed New Granada from Spanish domination.
Political events in early-nineteenth-century Spanish America take
on sharp focus when viewed in the regional context. New Granada,
32 Chapter 1

like all other former viceroyalties} experienced a flowering of republi-

canism as Spain's grip slackened in 1810 and was shaken off entirely in
1819. However} the tree of republicanism had shallow roots in New
Granada. \tVhere it did not wither outright} it was metamorphosed by
the Hispanic culture that tried to nurture it. The stol)' of Tolima in the
years following 1810 is one of experiments with republican govern-
ment and a simultaneous movement toward an extreme form of
federalism. The later vitiated the former and turned Tolima into one of
several nearly autonomous regions that were weakly controlled by the
central state and powerfully influenced by local leaders} who were
known variously as gamonales or caudillos. 15
Tolimense leaders reacted to the news that Spain and the monarchy
had fallen by announcing a plan to form two independent "nations" in
the northern and southern portions of the Magdalena Valley. To many
people} the plan was impractical} and} when the new states seemed to
be in danger of fragmenting} pressure was brought to bear and Neiva
and Mariquita joined the United Provinces of New Granada} a federa-
tion whose capital was Santa Fe de Bogota. The union lasted until
1815} when extreme federalism triumphed and Neiva and Mariquita
withdrew to become self-governing states. In the face of imminent
invasion by Spanish armies} the leaders of northern Tolima called a
constituent assembly and sat down to form their new government.
The result of their handiwork was the Constitution of the State of
Mariquita} an ostensibly democratic document that was} in fact} more
authoritarian than popular in spirit. The many restrictions on individ-
ual freedoms it contained and its elitist tenor clearly indicate that its
authors' perception of society was rooted in Roman law} the teachings
of the Roman Catholic church} and a thousand years of Hispanic
traditionalism.
The tolimense constitution-makers viewed society as an organic
whole rather than as a collection of unique individuals. The smooth
functioning of this "collective body of people/' as they referred to the
state} could be assured by defining proper behavior for citizens and
prescribing for them an acceptable morality. The Golden Rule was
their fundamental statement of rights} and the Church was the ac-
knowledged arbiter of moral matters.18 Throughout the document ran
the assumption that its makers} as the privileged and enlightened
cream of "republican" society} knew what was best for all the people.
Gran Tolima 33

That implicit attitude, plus a tendency to mandate the use of terms

such as "Excellency" and "Your Grace" for elected officials and an-
tique mechanisms such as the residencia for outgoing bureaucrats, are
all evidence that the tolimenses had recreated something akin to the
authoritarian, seignorial state fonnerly presided over by the Spanish
Crown.11
Although the Spanish reconquest of New Granada kept the constitu-
tion of Mariquita from ever being put into force, the document
provides valuable insights into political and social processes at work
in early-nineteenth-century Tolima. As an unrepresentative charter
drawn up by an educated and monied elite, it naturally reflected their
interests. This was not so much a calculated, selfish scheme on their
part as it was a reflection of their tacit conviction that organic,
hierarchical society was the divinely ordained way of things. Justice
and wealth were distributive in nature, but the "better classes" natu-
rally enjoyed both in larger measure than persons farther down the
social scale. In such a society, the interests of nonelite groups were
destined to suffer.
One of the first concerns of the constitution-makers was that Indi-
ans on resguardos} or communally held Indian lands, be made aware
of their new status as men, "equal to all others of their species." Their
"intimate union with all the rest of the citizenry" would be recognized
by distributing their resguardo lands to them on an individual basis.18
This provision was merely one of the early attacks on communal
Indian landholdings that would in time open them to purchase or
seizure by non-Indians. The gradual alienation of Indian lands
heralded in the 1815 constitution was just one part of a nineteenth-
century process that was to lead to the concentration of large land-
holdings in the hands of a privileged minority.19
Tolima's experiment with self-rule during and after the struggle
against Spain was in large part a function of the breakdown at the
national level of government. \Vhen regional rule proved to be insuffi-
cient, the people of Gran Tolima turned to the most elemental force for
order available to them, the gamonal or caudillo. These leaders, whose
power was based on landownership, military experience, or charis-
matic personality, singly and in combination, emerged all over Span-
ish America in the uncertain early days of national independence.
Caudillos were weighty forces in national politics throughout the
34 Chapter 1

nineteenth century} so much so they often used their immense

regional prestige as a springboard straight into the national presi-
dency. Sometimes they did so at the head of a campesino army} and at
others buoyed by a prestige that transcended their region} as was the
case with Tolima's eminent caudillo of the early nineteenth century}
General Domingo Caicedo.
Caicedo was one of a prominent clan whose haciendas checkered
the llano of north-central Tolima. Born in Bogota in 1783} he lived
there until concluding his fonnal education in 1809. He then traveled
to Spain} where he fought against the Napoleonic armies and partici-
pated in the Cortes of Cadiz as an alternate representative from New
Granada. Following the outbreak of revolution in Bogota} he returned
with Vicente Bolivar} a brother of Sim6n} to join the revolt against
Spain. Aiding the anny of Antonio Narifio when it marched through
Tolima on its way south in 1813} Caicedo supplied it with food from
his hacienda and filled its ranks with his slaves. Following Narino's
crushing defeat at Cuchillo del Tambo and the subsequent reconquest
of New Granada by the Spanish} Caicedo turned to supplying horses to
republican guerrillas} for which he was imprisoned and sentenced to
death. His Spanish wife interceded on his behalf} and} after she
liberally plied his jailers with money} he was allowed to escape.
The beleaguered Caicedo fled Bogota down through the cool moun-
tain valleys back to the llanos of Tolima and his estate ttSaldafia. For
JJ

the next few years} he remained in seclusion on the trackless haci-

enda} sUITOunded by his family and unmolested save for an occasional
Spanish agent sent to spy on him.zo Following the Battle of Boyaca}
Caicedo again returned to public life} becoming vice-president of the
republic on two occasions and even selVing as president for a short
time. He died in 1843 while on his way back to ttSaldafia/' and was
universally mourned in New Granada.
Urbane} widely traveled} and more a civilian than a military leader}
Caicedo was hardly the prototypical caudillo. His career is outlined
here principally because it provides insight into the workings of
tolimense society before either the national government or the politi-
cal parties gained control over it to a significant degree. During his
years of seclusion at ttSaldafia/' Caicedo benefited from one of the
chief elements of political clientelism} that of the reciprocal allegiance
Gran Tolima 35

General Domingo Caicedo. (Courtesy El Tiempo)

uniting patron and client. He, the Spanish, and everyone else in Gran
Tolima knew that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of ordinary folk who
considered themselves his followers would rush to his defense if
36 Chapter 1

enemies tried to apprehend him. The patr6n was their leader} protec-
tor} court of last resort} and in time of exceptional need their insurance
policy.
Domingo Caicedo came by his reputation} as he did his wealth and
status} by inheritance. His father} Luis} was revered by his peons as a
generous and magnanimous patron. Seeing the need for formal gov-
ernmental structure in the territory encompassed by his hacienda
tlContreras/' he founded the municipio of San Luis within its boun-
daries in 1780 and endowed the cabecera with its church and other
public buildings.21 He instilled a sense of noblesse oblige in his son at
an early age. lilt is necessary that you get used to the inconveniences of
these charitable works/' he wrote to Domingo in 1804} ((but through
such acts) pursued with love and good will} one is able to carry out
great works of piety and charity."22
Later in the nineteenth century} no other members of the family
achieved the stature of Luis and Domingo Caicedo. They tended to
remain at home} venturing forth only when some outside danger
threatened. Then they gallantly took to the field at the head of hastily
mobilized armies. They lived in rough splendor on their estates} where
nature's bounty was laid at their feet by hundreds of vaqueros and
peons who lived on their land. Their life-style was a classic statement
of clientelist social organization} which was characterized by reciproc-
ity} proximity} and unequal status.23 The popular saying that the
Caicedos ((fathered more natural children than a-Ieap year has days"
strongly hinted that the relationship between patron and client on
hacienda ttSaldafia" was close and reciprocal indeed.
\Nhile they fought and loved hard) the Caicedos also played hard.
They enjoyed nothing more than elaborate practical jokes which they
called pegaduras (((hard licks"). One of their favorites involved a mag-
nificent mule they had trained to gallop home upon reaching a certain
point in the trail. After tormenting some passing stranger with their
pranks} they would ttrelease" him by lending him the mule. \Vhen the
terrified victim returned clinging to its back} the animal bore him into
the estate house to confront the entire Caicedo family} convulsed with
laughter at their banquet table and prepared to celebrate their wit far
into the night.Z4 Critics of their dissolute life-style were fond of compar-
ing the Caicedos with medieval barons} who lived from the sweat of
their sens' brows. But the analogy is not particularly apt. The gover-
Gran Tolima 37

nance of IISaldafia" was more casually arbitrcuy than that of the

baronies of feudal Europe.
As a nation of semiautonomous regions ruled by men like the
Caicedos and only weakly controlled by the central government,
Colombia, or New Granada as it was called at the time,25 might have
remained a caudillo-ridden place for the duration of the nineteenth
century. For a time, it seemed to be moving in that direction. A
caudillesque civil war that swept the country between 1840 and 1842
reduced tens of thousands to misery. An accompanying smallpox
epidemic carried away an estimated one-twelfth of the population.z8 At
one point during the teITible Guerra de los Supremos (War of the
Chieftains), President Jose Ignacio de Marquez fled the capital in
search of aid and left Vice-President Domingo Caicedo to issue a
circular advising all provincial governors that lithe executive power
presently lacks the necessary resources to successfully reduce the
dissidents to obedience."z7 The essence of his note was II save yourself
if you can." But Colombia escaped permanent rule by caudillos in the
nineteenth century thanks to the formation of the Conservative and
Liberal parties, which divided the nation into two political parts and
was to have significant and enduring consequences.
Enmity between Sim6n Bolivar and Francisco Paula de Santander
set into motion the earliest clear political differentiation in New
Granada. Both men directed the country during the early years of its
independence, and they quickly revealed their profound differences in
governmental philosophy. Santander, who was in tune with avant-
garde political and economic ideas of the day, favored laissez-faire
economics, moderate decentralization of political power, and the
extension of democracy to the maximum possible degree.Z8 Bolivar,
basically a traditionalist in economic matters, espoused state monop-
olies, the sales tax, and other regressive revenue measures of the
colonial period. Furthermore, he favored the wealthy by striking down
direct taxes on wealth.z9 He was so enamored of strongly centralized
government that critics accused him of wanting to reestablish the
monarchy with himself as king. The two men clearly had little in
common save the desire for supreme leadership of their people.
However, the issues separating them were so broad and their fame
and influence in New Granada so far-reaching that few men of means
anywhere in the republic could help being touched by them.
38 Chapter 1

A thoroughgoing sociopolitical reform effected in Colombia between

1849 and 1864 permanently shaped the nation's traditional parties.
That program} rooted in indigenous Santanderist liberalism} man-
dated the following: freedom of speech} religion} and trade (including
arms and munitions); universal and direct suffrage; abolition of clerical
privilege} slavery} the death penalty} debtors' prisons} monopolies as
well as compulsory tithes} and the national army; trial by jury; weaken-
ing of the chief executive; strengthening of provincial government; the
single tax; and expulsion of the Jesuits.30 Many of these measures were
incorporated in the new national constitution of 1853 and restated
more forcefully in the Rio Negro constitution of 1863.
In spite of its outward appearance} the Rio Negro constitution did
not make Colombia a radically libertarian republic. From the begin-
ning} the progressive measures were imposed in a far from liberal
spirit. The constitution-makers acted in the tradition of Hispanic
absolutism that set the shadow of Torquemada} or at least that of
authoritarian Bolivar} hovering over the liberal reforms. Other factors
weakened the reform program. Opposition leaders quickly perceived
that the extreme federalism that was an article of faith among doctri-
naire Liberals made it possible for them to banish the hated ideology
from areas where they predominated. \\!hen a ConseIVative revolt
triumphed in Antioquia just a year after promulgation of the constitu-
tion} national President Manuel Murillo Toro rejected demands that
he send federal soldiers to crush it: "\\!hen I became President of the
Republic I swore faithfully to uphold the National Constitution ...
had I declared war on the new government of Antioquia I would have
violated both my presidential oath and my party principles. JJ31 The
Liberal program was thus undermined by presidents such as Murillo
who upheld each article of the platform even at the expense of the
whole.
If from a functional perspective the Liberal reform was less than the
sum of its parts} weakened as it was by integral flaws} to ConseIVatives
it loomed as something much greater and more insidious than a
collection of hated edicts to be circumvented if possible. To them} the
Liberal utopia was a nightmare vision which} if put into effect} would
destroy Christian society.32 They could only respond to it through the
creation of a counterprogram every bit as doctrinaire and exclusive.
Their antidote to godless Liberalism was a fiery statement of partisan
Gran Tolima 39

ideology that was articulated in 1849 by Jose Eusebio Caro and

Mariano Ospina Rodriguez} two of the party's chief architects:

The ConseIVative party is that which recognizes and defends the follow-
ing program: Constitutional order against dictatorship; legality versus
capriciousness; Christian morality and its civilizing doctrines versus
immorality and COITllpting materialistic and atheistic doctrines; rational
liberty in all its different applications over against oppression and
despotism in monarchical, military, demagogic, literary or any other
variation; legal equality against aristocratic, demagogic, academic or any
other kind of special privilege; true and effective [religious] tolerance
versus exclusivism and persecution} whether it be that of Catholic
against Protestant or deist; or that of atheist against Jesuit and monk, or
any other sort of persecution; the right to private property versus the
theft and usurpation of property exercised by communists, socialists,
supremos or anyone else; security against illegality in any form; in short,
civilization versus barbarism. He who rejects any of these articles is not a
ConseIVative. 33

Like his Liberal antagonists} Caro saw the issues confronting Colombia
in blacks and whites. "The French liberals and their creole imitators
wanted to destroy everything accumulated by old Christian civiliza-
tion ... sundering the good in order to create chaos and anarchy/' he
wrote in 1849. Only through vigorous opposition to pernicious} god-
less liberalism might ConseIVatives "conseIVe good and destroy bad}
admit that which perfects} reject that which degrades/' in the process
saving the nation and her people from perdition.34
Formation of the ConseIVative and Liberal parties raised national
politics to a new level of intensity. Elections became all important}
particularly after universal manhood suffrage was instituted in 1853.
Once voted into power} the victorious party could impose its program
upon the entire nation and dispense state revenues and patronage as
it saw fit. No wonder that battles were frequently fought around ballot
boxes} as attested to by this comment on a contest held in 1856:
"Elections were held [and] ... a large portion of the population went
fleeing into the countryside because two days earlier there were
rumblings that election day would see revolution} deaths} hellfire and I
don't know what else."35 Failing at the polls} the defeated party fre-
quently took up the sword. Between 1851 and 1895} seven civil wars
and many localized revolts} all fought by armies marching under
ConseIVative and Liberal banners} lashed Colombia. Bloodshed thus
40 Chapter 1

became an important by-product of national politics that seIVed to

intensify partisan identification at every level of society. Rare was the
citizen who harbored doubts about where his political loyalty lay once
he was touched by the recuning struggle.
For the purposes of analysis} the establishment of partisan loyalties
should be considered on two distinct levels: the individual and the
regional. Each individual chose his party affiliation through a complex
process in which events} relationships} and ideas combined to deter-
mine political allegiance. An accurate statement of why a given person
cast his fortunes with the ConseIVatives or Liberals requires nothing
less than his life story in full detail. Patterns of regional allegiance are}
in tum} easier to describe than to explain. Antioquia} for example} was
historically ConseIVative in voting} and Cundinamarca tended to vote
Liberal.38 Gran Tolima was split along partisan lines. ConseIVatives
predominated in the south} and Liberals formed a majority in the
north.
Tolima's ConseIVative heartland lay along the llano south from the
huge estates of the Caicedos to Neiva and beyond. This was an old
area of settlement that was characterized by large landholdings.
Scions of the more well-to-do families were influential figures in
political life even during colonial times. Luis Caicedo was such an
individual. The immensely wealthy owner ofUContreras and benefac-
Jl

tor of San Luis had held the office of Alguacil Real of Bogota} an honor
not usually awarded to creoles. Following independence} Caicedo's
son Domingo sided with the Bolivarian conseIVatives} for he enjoyed
the kind of vested wealth that Sim6n Bolivar protected while head of
state. It is not surprising that others like the Caicedos became Conser-
vatives} taking their extended families and numerous retainers into the
party with them.
Another factor probably contributing to ConseIVative preponder-
ance on the southern llano was the lack of a vigorous economy there.
The entire region lay along the upper Magdalena} beyond the head of
navigation and well removed from the zone of export-oriented cash
cropping. The Liberal reform program that did so much to stimulate
this export agriculture did little for hacienda owners of the south} and
in fact reduced their dominance in regional affairs by creating a
nouveau riche class of merchants and exporters who challenged their
leadership.
Gran Tolima 41

The other region where Conservatives predominated was the north-

western cordillera of Tolima. The antioquefto colonizers who settled
those mountains after 1850 brought their regional customs and politi-
cal predilections with them. \\!hen that migration ended early in the
twentieth century, all but one of the six ItAntioquian municipios of the
Jl

northern cordillera were heavily, indeed resolutely, Conservative.

Liberal Tolima ran from Honda, hub of trade and transportation,
south to the highway connecting with BogotA. Ibague was traditionally
Liberal, as was the municipio of Chaparral to the south and Libano to
the north. The llano of northern Tolima became Liberal principally for
economic reasons. The party's policy of free commerce worked a
miraculous change all along the river north and south of the port city
of Ambalema, as indicated in this report of Miguel Samper, minister of
finance under President Francisco Zaldua:

Extinction of the tobacco monopoly developed the productive vitality of

old croplands, especially those of Ambalema and vicinity. So vigorous
and rapid was this action, that in six years a gigantic labor was
peIfonned, equivalent in itself to that carried out over the preceding
three centuries. . . . The work force that had been employed by the
tobacco monopoly was insufficient under free trade, and a great CUITent
of day laborers and workers left the hills and valleys of the cordillera,
headed for the plains of the Upper Magdalena and its tributaries.
Sounds of ax and hoe echoed in the wilderness; swamps were drained;
huts and houses were built, tobacco and all varieties of fruit sprouted at
every season; factories sprang up and filled with workers of both sexes;
stores and shops multiplied; all was movement, action} progress and
work. 31

It seems unnecessary to add that Samper was a Liberal and a busi-

nessman who had extensive interests in northern Tolima.
Although broad causal theories are necessary to explain the parti-
san coloration of regional Colombia, specific factors determined party
affiliation on the part of individuals. Personal friendship, economic
interest, the patron-client relationship, idealism and accident-singly
or in combination-determined their party choice. It is suggested
above, for example, that Domingo Caicedo sided with Bolivarian
conservatives because their political program addressed his needs.
But his longtime friendship with Bolivar must also be considered in
determining why he joined this faction. If, on the other hand, Caicedo
42 Chapter 1

had been an intimate of Santander and an enemy of Bolivar} his

political loyalties and career would probably have been quite different.
A clear example of family ties} personal loyalty} and chance operat-
ing in the politicization of tolimense elites is that of Tadeo Galindo} a
native of Ibague who fought in the wars of independence under the
command of Marshal Antonio Jose de Sucre and Bolivar and ulti-
mately achieved the rank of colonel. Galindo was wounded several
times and once seIVed as an aide in Bolivar's camp during the
Peruvian campaign. After nearly ten years in the field} Galindo retired
to his small hacienda uSalamina/' near Coello. He lived there with his
family for ten years} until the War of the Chieftains exploded against
the conseIVative government of President Jose Ignacio Marquez. In
1840 Galindo} along with his first cousin from Ibague} Jose Marla
Vezga} joined the forces of rebel General Jose Marla Obando. Galindo
made it clear that he joined the revolt as much to support his cousin}
at the time governor of Mariquita province} as ufor the honor of the
spirit of party." Less than a year later} Galindo} Vezga} and Vezga's
secretaI)'} Manual Murillo Toro} Were driven from Honda by govern-
ment troops who pursued and captured them in the progovernment
caldense town of Salamina. Sent to the city of Medellin} the three men
were sentenced to death for treason. Vezga and Galindo were exe-
cuted in August of 1841j Murillo Toro was set free and fled to Panama.
Shortly before his death} Tadeo Galindo penned a letter to his
seven-year-old son Anibal in which he defended his actions: uYou
must not grieve} for it was a political crime which sends us to our
deaths} and not crimes of a heinous nature: such evil has never lurked
in the heart of this lover of liberty} one who has made constant effort to
fight for the emancipation of his country and the upholding of its
laws."38 The younger Galindo went on to become a convinced Liberal
and implacable enemy of those who executed his father. He could no
more have become a ConseIVative than he could have viewed his
father as other than a martyred ulover of liberty" and patriot shot for
the upolitical crime" of upholding the laws of his country.
The origins of Murillo Toro's Liberal affiliation were distinct from
those of Vezga and the two Galindos. Able to attend high school only
through the charity of his godmother} Ana Toro} whose name he
added to his own in grateful acknowledgment of the fact} the native of
Chaparral went on to earn a degree from the School of Law in BogotA.39
Gran Tolima 43

Manuel Murillo Toro, 1869. (Courtesy EI Tiempol

44 Chapter 1

During his study in the capital, he caught the eye of President

Santander, who rewarded him with his first political job.40 Fortunately
for the Santanderists, Murillo Toro did not die with Galindo and Vezga
in 1841, and he later became the great Liberal caudillo from Tolima
and twice president of the republic.
One of the most illuminating and significant cases of political
nonconfonnity in Tolima is provided by Isidro Parra, the Antioquian
colonizer who made the municipio of Liliano a bastion of Liberalism in
the northern cordillera. As a young man of twenty-one, he had
distinguished himself while fighting with General Tomas Cipriano de
Mosquera in the civil war oflS60. When the Conservatives took over in
Antioquia four years later, he gathered a group of liberal-minded
companions and struck out over the cordillera. He did not stop until
he came to a picturesque, wooded valley he later named Libano for its
tall evergreens, which called to mind the famed cedars of Lebanon.
Parra resolved to build a town there that would rival any in Tolima,
and throughout his life he pursued his plan with a tenacity that made
him the spiritual as well as physical patron of Libano. Under his
leadership, the first methodical cultivation of coffee began in the early
1870s, and he inspired those around him to make the town something
more than a mountainous backwater.
Among his many admirable traits, PaITa had a deep, if unorthodox,
intellectual streak. He sent for books from all over the world, read
them, and discussed them with his friends. In 1877 he even translated
from the original Gennan a work on natural religion, and in the
preface offered the following observations: tiThe old dogmas and
traditions no longer serve modem societyj not even true evangelistic
Christianity can satisfy the demands of the new age because in a sense
it fiustrates the true destiny of mankind. Man needs a doctrine more
in accord with human reason and more in touch with scientific
progress. In short, modem man needs a religion that is more realis-
tic. JJ41 Parra could never have comfortably expressed such heretical
thoughts in Antioquia, and perhaps that is the real reason he was
detennined to create a town in his own image. He did not live to see
his municipio enter the new century. Joining the Liberal revolution of
1895, he was assassinated in March of that year, not far from the town
he had founded four decades earlier.42
The foregoing sketches of noted tolimenses demonstrate that a
Gran Tolima 45

variety of factors must be integrated with deterministic formulae to

resolve the problem of partisan alignment in Tolima. Individual
uniqueness} friendship with noted figures} the mechanism of patron-
age} accident of birth} and trauma induced by Colombia's bloody
political warfare-all played their role in helping form the region's
political character.
During the 1850s and 1860s} the people of northern Tolima} sup-
ported by their fields of tobacco and bustling port cities} basked in
unprecedented economic well-being. But} in the final analysis} the
river} more than their own efforts} caused them to become the chief
beneficiaries of the export boom. The Magdalena was a broad highway
uniting Colombia's heartland with the major markets of the world. In a
country where the near-absence of roads made internal commerce
impossible} an economy based on river-borne exports to world mar-
kets was the logical} indeed the only} alternative.43 The Liberals of New
Granada took full tlresponsibility" for the export boom. They coined
the phrase tiThe colony lasted until 1850" and otheIWise lauded their
own economic and political acumen.44 European and North American
consumers kept up a steady demand for tolimense tobacco until the
economic downturn of 1876 caused a sharp drop in prices. Even then}
booms in the export of quinine and indigo helped offset the slump
and made it appear that good times would continue into the 1880s
and beyond.45
As principal producers} processors} and shippers of their natural
bounty} tolimenses saw old fortunes increased and new ones formed
during those halcyon years. Fertile haciendas along the river that had
lain fallow since colonial days were put into tobacco production} and
newcomers poured into Ambalema to set up factories} export houses}
and even banks. Tolima's population reflected these activities. It stood
at 220}645 in 1866} an increase of nearly 20 percent in a generation.46
Many of the newcomers acquired exceptional wealth. Miguel Samper}
Enrique Cortes} and Pedro A. L6pez were members of this nouveau
riche export aristocracy} which by the 1870s and 1880s had formed a
new and influential stratum within the national and departmental
elite. Children of the Liberal reforms} they were as dedicated to the
party as they were to its laissez-faire doctrines.
Tolimense Conservatives enjoyed the financial rewards brought by
economic liberalism} but wasted no opportunity to attack the Liberal
46 Chapter 1

party regime and its supporters. They were particularly concerned

about the growing outspokenness of the lower castes} which had
become part of the largely urban work force employed by the tobacco
industry. As early as 1851} the slave-owning classes in several towns of
northern Tolima rose up against the Liberal government when it
announced the freeing of all slaves in New Granada.47 That was only
the beginning of what seemed to ConselVatives to be a growing
tendency to tum the people against them. Strife of a class nature
exploded from time to time in towns where factory workers} long-
shoremen} or boatmen were concentrated. Terrorist organizations
even operated in some places. In Ambalema} a lower-caste secret
society called "The Serpent" was formed that took special joy in
assaulting and robbing well-to-do ConselVatives of the town during
the mid-1860s.48 Movements like that seemed to provide clear evidence
that Liberal regimes were unleashing new social forces that might
destroy the nation.
By the mid-1880s tolimense tobacco} quinine} and indigo exports
were in full decline} and so too was the nation. Thirty-five years of
Liberal rule had brought beneficial change} but that period of innova-
tion also subjected the country to incessant civil war} which more
than offset the gains.49 Therefore} only the most doctrinaire of Liberals
grieved when one of their own fonner party members} Rafael Nunez}
struck down the Rio Negro constitution in 1885} after his election by a
coalition of ConselVatives and moderate Liberals. He announced a
program of national "regeneration" that returned the country to
centralized} strong presidential rule. The new constitution of 1886 was
the chief juridic expression of the Regeneration. By its provisions}
Tolima lost its sovereign status and became one of nine departments}
or states} administered by a presidentially appointed governor.
ConselVative General Manuel Casabianca selVed as Nunez's first
governor of Tolima. "The winner of a hundred decisive battles for his
party/' Casabianca had experienced his first military seIVice at the age
of nineteen during the ConselVative revolt of 1859 in Santander prov-
ince. The revolt turned into a two-year national civil war} during which
he was captured and imprisoned for a time in Bogota} finally escaping
to win fame as a guerrilla leader in northern Cundinamarca.5o After the
war} he settled in Tolima and headed his party until the Nunez
Gran Tolima 47

({regeneration." Casabianca ultimately held the post of governor six

times during the century.
At the time of the Conservative accession to power) two important
developments were taking place in Tolima. The first was the beginning
of widespread coffee cultivation in the cool uplands of the western
and eastern mountains. This commodity was coming into strong
demand worldwide) and it more than replaced tobacco and quinine as
an income producer for the department. The second) related) develop-
ment was the quickening pace of antioqueflo settlement in northwest-
ern Tolima. Since the 1860s) Antioquian pioneers had been crossing
over the Central Cordillera from the Cauca River Valley to found
settlements in highland valleys of the northern cordillera. Called
Herveo) Fresno) Casabianca) Villahermosa) Libano) Santa Isabel) and
Anzoategui) the villages eventually became cabeceras of a tier of
municipios that stretched from paramo country down almost as far as
the llano.51 Several factors set the Antioquian municipalities apart from
the rest of the department. They were boom towns whose income
depended on the export of coffee. Landholdings throughout the
region tended to be of moderate sizej latifundia were the exception.
This striking fact was attributable to the unique way in which the
antioqueflos founded their towns. Before setting out from Manizales)
Salamina) or some town in Antioquia province) the settlers formed an
agrarian corporation that they called a ({company." According to terms
of the agreement) each of its members would contribute all he could to
the venture) later receiving a proportionate amount of land when the
settlement was made. Further contributing to widespread ownership
of property were grants of baldio lands made by the national govern-
ment when each municipio was officially incorporated. Ranging in size
from 28)000 hectares in Liban 0 to 8)000 in Anzoategui) the baldios were
sold as new settlers arrived in the municipio. 52 Except for Libano)
whose uniqueness is explained above) the Antioquian municipios were
Conservative-a fact of no small importance in the later political
history of Tolima.
The nineteenth century was eventful for Gran Tolima and its people.
In less than a hundred years) they helped win national independence
and then saw strong regional leaders apply an anarchic yet traditional
kind of leadership to the llano. Tolimenses witnessed the formation of
48 Chapter 1

two political parties representing conflicting world views} and joined

the internecine struggle for the right to clamp one or the other
philosophy upon the nation. All this occurred in the midst of sweep-
ing economic changes that transformed national life. Trade restric-
tions lingering from colonial times were destroyed and an age of
exports resulted} in which Tolima and its river port towns} its fields of
tobacco} and its quinine and indigo forests played an integral role. The
age of exports passed} and with it the Liberal regime. It was the
Conservatives who finally rode the troubled waters into the new
century.
 2

At the Threshold
of a New Age

Two men sat together in the chill of a cloudy Bogota afternoon

chatting of Colombia and the world. One of them was Anibal Galindo,
now in his sixties, urbane and widely traveled, translator of Milton's
Paradise Lost, wise in the ways of his country after a lifetime of seIVice
lito party and nation," as he liked to put it.1 The other was Monsieur
Daloz, French ambassador to Colombia. As they talked, sitting stiff-
necked in high starched collars, silk cravats, and other appurtenances
of late-nineteenth-century gentlemanly attire, the Colombian tried to
rationalize his country's history since the winning of independence.
He spoke of Narifio, Bolivar, Santander, and other benemeritos of the
fatherland. The Frenchman listened attentively and, when the other
paused, framed an answer far from diplomatic in tone but devastating
in its logic: "But what defense do you allow, Senor Galindo, for the fact
that in your eighty years of national independence you have not been
able to build a highway-not even a cart road~ighteenleagues long
connecting the highlands and your river port of Honda on the Magda-
lena, and to the fact that you still make use of the same mule trail,
though much deteriorated . . .which the Spanish left you upon fleeing
the country in 1819, in spite of the fact that even the least of your
revolutions consumed a hundred times what construction of the
highway would have cost?"2
Anfbal Galindo had no answer, for indeed there was none. Further-
more, both men knew that, in an age of growing industrialization in
Europe and North America, the issues igniting Colombia's incessant
civil wars were becoming ever more anachronistic. Sister republics like
49
50 Chapter 2

Mexico and Argentina had resolved the federalist-centralist dilemma

by creating strong centralized governments. They were moving confi-
dently into the twentieth century} while Colombia} though theoreti-
cally centralized under the constitution of 188B} still wallowed in the
slough of caudillismo as well as destructive regionalism and no end of
its trials seemed to be in sight. Even as the men talked} Colombians
were arming themselves for a civil war that would dwarf all others of
the past century and leave the nation so exhausted it could not even
protect itself against dismemberment by foreign predators.
Liberals had never resigned themselves to the defeat imposed by
Rafael Nunez and the Conservatives} and on three occasions between
1885 and 1899 tried to regain power through the use of force. The wars
of 1885 and 1895 were fiascoes easily put down by government troops}
but the one in 1899 dragged on for three dreadful years} during which
the government once again triumphed over the Liberal rebels. Several
factors contributed to the Guerra de los Mil Dias (War of the Thousand
Days). First} certain factions in the Liberal party willed it to start. They
worked assiduously after the short-lived 1895 revolt to gather arms
and recruit men. Dashing leaders like thirty-nine-year-old Rafael Uribe
Uribe} already a veteran of three civil wars} traveled abroad raising
money and buying arms} and neighboring Venezuela encouraged the
Liberal cause by permitting arms shipments across its border. Second}
both Colombian parties were fragmented} a fact exacerbated by the
mistaken belief of some Liberals that disaffected Conservatives would
support their cause once war was declared.3 A final and significant
cause of the conflict was a depression in coffee prices that hurt elite
interests in both parties and pushed dissidence to levels unseen in the
prosperous eighties and nineties.4
\JVhen the War of the Thousand Days began in July 1899} it quickly
spread to all parts of the country. The Liberals of Tolima were among
the most enthusiastic supporters of the rebellion} and accordingly
were severely penalized by the Conservative government. A decree of
December 1899 assessed each department a fixed sum of money for
support of the war effort} and Tolima's was set at $BOO}OOO pesos} a
staggering sum second only to the $1}500}000 pesos demanded of
large} wealthy Antioquia.5 Under the decree} the governor of each
department could distribute the assessment among citizens on the
basis of whether or not they were thought to be ((sympathizers/'
At the Threshold of aNew Age 51

Uauxiliaries/' or Uactive participants" in the revolution. Tolima's Con-

servative governor used his discretionaIy powers effectively) and Liber-
als felt the lash of the discriminatory law.6
The War of the Thousand Days wreaked incalculable human and
material damage on Colombia. Some 100)000 citizens were killed;
commerce) industry) and agriculture ruined; and national develop-
ment paralyzed. Centrally located Tolima offered easy access to parti-
sans of both sides) whose annies marched and countermarched its
length and breadth. Tales of heroism and barbarism on the llano of the
upper Magdalena form their own chapter in the thousand-day blood-
letting. Conservatives told of a place called Montefrio) in the uplands
of Doima) where the men of Liberal guerrilla Tulio Varon suspended
prisoners on meat hooks inserted under their lower jaws before
hacking them to death with machetes.1 uHe went by way of Montefrio"
became a popular euphemism to describe comrades who had fallen in
the war. Prisoners were rarely spared during the war's later phase)
after years of killing and privation had thoroughly dehumanized
combatants on both sides. \Vhen ammunition was plentiful) captives
would sometimes be shot for sport; when it was scarce) they were told
to umake a neck" or ulook at your feet/' and then beheaded.8
Neither were civilians spared the war's horrors. There was the
deranged soldier who) on marching by the spot where his house had
once stood on the banks of the Rio Alvarado) paused just long enough
to decapitate his only living child with a mighty machete stroke.9
Another civilian drawn unwillingly into the war was Cantalicio Reyes)
a humble farmer who lived with his family on the llano bet\veen
Alvarado and the sluggish stream called Quebrada de Calma. One day
when he was away in the fields) passing Conservative troops looted his
farm) locked his wife and children in their thatched-roof hut) and then
burned it to the ground. \Vhen he learned what had happened) Reyes
joined the guerrilla force of uEI Negro Marin" and said simply uI've
come to kill godos." And that is what he did) earning fame throughout
Tolima for the maniacal way he wielded the machete during combat.10
For thousands of individuals like Reyes) the War of the Thousand
Days was an obscenity of the first magnitude. It consumed everything
they valued and left nothing but the bleakest kind of despair. But)
despite all the damage done by Colombia's worst civil war) it was a
turning point in national development that portrayed in chilling relief
52 Chapter 2

the bankruptcy of old paths to power. Revolution against the central

government was no longer the way to wrest control of the nation; and
caudillo-led armies gathering for a march on the national capital were
at last relegated to the shadows of another age. Colombians sensitive
to world opinion were saddened that} along with national roin} the
war irreparably damaged their nation's Uprestige before the world/' an
emotion tempered with anger and chagrin when the department of
Panama was lost scarcely a year after the war ended.ll All these painful
lessons in nationhood pointed to the need for continuing the central-
ization of national power that had begun in 1886. President Rafael
Reyes took the first steps to shore up the central state after the war.
Reyes was to fill the 1904-08 term in a hotly contested election} in
which splintered ConseIVative and Liberal parties backed two Conser-
vative candidates. He won on a platform promising a bipartisan
government of Concordia Nacional and featuring strong centralization
of authority in Bogota. The strategy of centralization came easily to
Reyes} a soldier and man of action who was accustomed to having his
orders obeyed. \Vhen his heavy-handedness turned important fac-
tions within his own party against him} he retaliated by throwing
prominent ConseIVatives into prison and establishing a dictatorship.
Because Congress was suspended and his enemies were temporarily
confounded} he was able to role by decree through a puppet national
assembly.12
One of Reyes's first concerns was to strike at entrenched regional
interests through a series of reforms that were intended to change
Colombia's internal organization. Most troublesome to the dictator
were the powerful gamonales, who controlled political life in their
domains by deciding who would hold political office} what municipios
and individuals would receive public monies} and even the extent to
which national laws would be obeyed. General Francisco Manjarres} of
Magdalena} and Dr. Hector Charry} of southern Tolima} were the most
notorious regional strongmen. Reyes's chiefweapon against them was
the reduction of their power through subdivision of the departments.
He knew that} in addition to reducing the area over which the caciques
could distribute patronage} the new divisions would awaken local
loyalites and generate a new bureaucracy to compete with the old one.
One writer has penned an imaginative account of the language
Reyes might have used in explaining his actions:
At the Threshold of aNew Age 53

Compadre, such are the things of life. Some make you smile, some make
you angIy, most make you sad and a very few bring happiness. You will
remember that when I went to congress for the first time I supported a
project attacking the division of the country into departments.... And
one of the first acts of my own government was to divide the nation into
Departments, because if I don't do it they slip through my hands.
Administrative chaos returns and finds refuge on the immense latifun-
dia, among hacienda owners and their princely consorts, or among the
aged widows who want to prolong their husband's power, or pass it on
to their sons. 13

Among the new departments resulting from Reyes's strategy of

dividing to conquer were Narifio} Atlantico} and Valle.14 However} it was
the Antioquia-Gran Tolima axis upon which he lavished his reforming
attention. First} he lopped off the coffee-rich southern end of Antio-
quia to form the department of Caldas and further divided what was
left of Antioquia into subdistricts in a crode attempt at playing off local
loyalties against regional ones.15 Gran Tolima was halved. The south-
ern part took Huila as its departmental name; Neiva was transformed
into the capital city. The northern portion retained its original name
and capital.
The implications for the political life of a much-reduced Tolima
were staggering. There had always been profound differences between
its northern and southern parts. The southern portion was Conserva-
tive} and Liberals abounded in towns along the northern reaches of
the river} in Ibague} in ChapaITal and its hinterland and} of course} in
the big municipio of Ubano. Only in the northern cordillera} between
HeIVeo and Anzoategui} and around Guamo in the center of the new
department} were the numbers of ConselVatives appreciable. In strik-
ing against the Neiva-based caudillo Dr. Charry} President Reyes had
severely diluted ConseIVativism in the portion that remained of To-
lima.
Like every strongman who tried to dominate Colombia} Reyes ulti-
mately failed. In a real sense} it was the nation's intractable regional-
ism that finally drove him from power. His easy victories in the
electoral and departmental reforms of 1904-06 led him to push his
program of national centralization even further. In 1907 he established
a National Military Academy. The following year} he nationalized
departmental match} tobacco} and liquor monopolies and also im-
54 Chapter 2

posed a number of direct taxes. Through these measures, he hoped to

set Colombia on the same path Mexico was following under the
leadership of Porfirio Diaz, a man like Reyes in many ways and much
admired by him.16 The new decrees were his downfall. All the depart-
ments, led by Antioquia, which had consistently earned half its tax
monies from the duty on aguardiente, vigorously opposed the new
revenue measures. Coalescing around banker Carlos E. Restrepo's
((Republican Union" movement, they forced Reyes from power in
1909.17 The following year, Restrepo was elected as president for a
four-year term.
Restrepo's government, which stressed national conciliation, fea-
tured bipartisan cooperation and power-sharing in the political arena
as well as a reduction of state inteIVention in economic matters. Rising
coffee prices during his regime heralded a return to moderate eco-
nomic prosperity for the country and provided him with ample
opportunity to work at binding up the wounds inflicted by a half-cen-
tury of internecine strife. Believing that a country inhabited by upright
Christians and governed in an evenhanded way could be made
strife-free, the president judged anything less than perfect harmony in
the body politic as abnormal and contended that the nation's notori-
ous political corruption offered ((proof that we are still an inferior and
unworthy nation."18
Still, Restrepo entered office with a positivistic faith that the right
reforms could make bipartisan cooperation and power-sharing possi-
ble at every level of government and remove the principal bone of
contention between parties. His faith was based on the belief that a
deep-seated urepublican orientation" existed at the heart of both
traditional parties.19 This simplistic view of national reality even led
him to the unfounded opinion that they would soon split into interest
groups of a corporate nature.20 This concept had much in common
with the corporativist philosophy that would come into vogue
throughout the Latin west some two decades later, but one hardly
relevant to Colombian political realities in 1910.
The reforms Restrepo hoped would transform the country into a
virtuous republic were the work of a national constituent assembly
that met early in 1910, before he took office. Among other things, it
changed national law to permit the direct popular election of the
president, departmental assemblies, and municipal concejos. Signifi-
At the Threshold of a New Age 55

cantly) Hwinner-take-all" elections) which for a quarter of a century

had been won by Conservatives through manipulation of electoral
machinery) were banned and replaced by a system of proportionate
voting that would allow minority parties (Le.) the Liberal party) to gain
representation in political corporations.z1 The constituent assembly
named Restrepo as president. On assuming office) he initiated his
HRepublican Union" program by appointing prominent Liberals to
national and departmental government and speaking out in favor of
standardized voting procedures as well as stiff penalties for electoral
fraud.
Restrepo's political program was an unmitigated disaster. The good-
will he hoped would prevail at the upper levels of government melted
because of suspicions that one side would take advantage of the other;
and Liberals such as Benjamin Herrera) Rafael Uribe Uribe) and Enri-
que Olaya Herrera soon withdrew their cooperation.zz But it was at the
departmental and local levels where the president's misty-eyed ideal-
ism took its severest drubbing. The burden of recent history lay too
heavily upon regional Colombia for his benign program to succeed.
The thoroughgoing change in political ethics he sought required far
more authority than he could muster) a fact demonstrated in Tolima)
where his reforms nearly touched off another civil war.Z3
The Liberals of Tolima were political ciphers following the war. They
were regarded as pariahs by the Conservatives) who indignantly in-
sisted they had brought the country to ruin by their treasonous
actions of the 1890s. Liberals were silent when Reyes split Gran Tolima
into a Liberal north and Conservative south in 1905) and they could
only muse on the implications of events taking place before 1910.
Although they might have suspected that they constituted a majority
in the new department) it seemed unlikely that Conservative election
officials would ever allow them to find out. But) spurred by Restrepo's
electoral reforms) tolimense Liberals suddenly became more vocal.
HSince 1885 we have not been accorded the full rights of citizen-
ship.... None of the governors named for Tolima have shown real
interest in the department" became their refrain. Z4 Even Conservative
Governor Francisco Tafur raised his voice to point out that Tolima)
once one of the country's richest regions) was now reduced to ((a truly
critical state of poverty/' which led to reduced police protection and a
concomitant rise in crimes like cattle-rustling.Z.5
56 Chapter 2

ConselVatives viewed the stirrings of their old adversaries with a

jaundiced eye, particularly when it became known that the Liberals
intended to vote heavily in the election for departmental deputies set
for FebIUcuy 2, 1913. In October 1912 the ConselVatives tried to stop
publication of the influential Liberal newspaper EI Cronista, of Ibague,
by bringing libel charges against its editor, Anibal Quijano; and, the
following month, hecklers and police broke up political meetings in
the Liberal strongholds of Ambalema and AImero.Z8 Then, with breath-
taking suddenness, President Restrepo appointed a Liberal named
Leonidas Cllrdenas as governor of Tolima. ConselVatives were aghast.
liThe choice could not have been a worse one," fumed General
Eutimio Sandoval from the editorial page of his newspaper, La Cordil-
lera, and he added that Cardenas was known to be Hcorrupt, sectarian
and an enemy of the antioqueflo colonists in Tolima."21
The new govemor was not slow to exercise the prerogatives of his
office, for before the month was out he had appointed Antonio
Ferreira, a Liberal, as alcalde of Libano. He was a logical choice for the
post because he had moved into the municipio in 1907 to continue the
good works that had ground to a halt after Isidro PaITa's death twelve
years earlier.23 Ferreira and other admirers of the renowned General
Parra, like Uladislao Botero, searched out Libano because of its reputa-
tion as a haven of Liberalism. They opened the rich southeastern
portion to coffee cultivation by founding the caserto of Santa Teresa.29
Ferreira, Botero, and the Thousand Day War veteran General Antonio
Maria Echeverri all became substantial coffee growers and part of
Liliano's de facto power structure.
\tVhen on Janucuy 21 the telegram arrived informing libanenses that
a Liberal would selVe in the alcaldfa. for the first time since the
Regeneraci6n, the astonishment and rejoicing that prevailed among
Liberals was rivaled in intensity only by the anger and consternation of
ConselVatives, who were sure that some mistake had been made. After
all, did it not defy all common sense that Hthose who won the War of
the Thousand Days with their heroism in the defense of national
institutions should now be made to feel that their sacrifices were
sterile ones, and that they were now to be dominated by those beaten
in the war?"30 Following that logic, the Conservatives did not allow
Ferreira to claim his post later in the day.
The Liberal euphoria turned to fury, and a large contingent
At the Threshold of aNew Age 57

mounted horses and thundered out of town along the dusty road
leading eastward to the caserto of Convenio and thence to tiEl Tesoro/'
the hacienda of General Echeverri. The caudillesque nineteenth cen-
tury was reappearing in microcosm! Upon hearing the news, the
general called together the workers from his hacienda as well as other
campesinos from Convenio and the neighboring region of Tierraden-
tro. The motley anny, brandishing machetes, shotguns, and a few
pistols, arrived in the cabecera at 9:00 P.M., placed all prominent
ConseIVatives under atTest, and installed its alcalde. General Echeverri
and his followers kept their vigil over Libano until three o'clock the
following afternoon, when they disbanded and went home.31
The tlEcheverri Raid," as the uprising became known, was the talkof
Tolima for several weeks. Characteristically, both sides viewed it from
entirely different perspectives. Echeverri defended the action as that of
an Ithonorable people jealous of its rights," tired of the ignominy
inflicted upon them by followers of ConseIVative chief Eutimio Sando-
val, a tlgang of bandits" who fed at the public trough but were soon to
be vanquished. ConseIVatives replied that Echeverri and his men were
rebels and lawbreakers who were dangerous to the peace of Libano
and to that of General Sandoval in particular.32
Just a week after the minirevolution in Libano, all Tolima voted in an
election that Liberals hoped would win them a majority in the depart-
mental Assembly. Voting was heavy and fraud widespread, though it
did not appear to be a decisive factor in the contest. \\!hen the votes
were counted, results indicated that, for the first time since 1886, the
Liberals would control the Assembly. The loss led to several resigna-
tions from the departmental Conservative directorate and to much
soul-searching by party members, one of whom lamented that tlforthe
first time in twenty-five years, the ConseIVatives have lost an election
for departmental representatives. We can't blame our leaders for all
our problems, but it is true that there has been an excess of authority
in the party, and not enough effort to attract the masses."33
But all was not lost. If a few electoral commissions around the
department were to overturn the elections in their jurisdictions-and
all these commissions were controlled by ConseIVatives-then the
election could be salvaged. By the end of February, the commission of
Honda district had announced that it was considering nullification of
the election there. Tension rose in the department. tlFor twenty-seven
Liberal veterans of the War of the Thousand Days: General Antonio Maria
Echeverri (second from right), General Ram6n ("El Negro") Marin (third from
right), sons of Isidro Parra, Joaquin and Alfredo (extreme left and right), 1900.
(Courtesy Horacio Echeverri Parra and Alberto G6mez)
At the Threshold of a New Age 59

years the Liberals of Tolima peacefully participated in elections} and

we Liberals always lost peacefully/' complained one tolimense who
went on to protest the transparent ConseIVative attempt to steal the
election.34 Other people were more outspoken and claimed that most
ConseIVatives in the Assembly were there only because some ((lying
judge or electoral junta" had named them to the post over the legally
elected Liberal.s5
The atmosphere was electric when the Assembly convened for its
first session on March 1. All eight ConseIVatives had been certified) but
only six of nine elected Liberals were allowed to take their seats. As
business got underway} ConseIVatives denied the pro forma salutation
to President Restrepo} whose ((Republican Union" government they
saw as the source of their predicament. Confronting them across the
narrow chamber were their antagonists) led by the most influential
Liberal in the department} Dr. Fabio Lozano Torrijos} a striking person-
ality. Over a lifetime of political activity} he had earned the respect of
Liberals throughout Tolima.
Son of the famous ConseIVative General Juan de Dios Lozano} Fabio
had seen little of his father while growing up. The general was forever
leading aImies in the field or planning the ConseIVative return to
power with General Casabianca and other friends. As a result} his son
grew up in the home of his maternal grandfather} an irascible old
Liberal named Manuel Torres Galindo} of Chaparral} who tutored him
and later expired in the youth's aIms. During his high school years}
Fabio was taught by the novelist Jorge Isaacs and upon graduation
was named as director of the national high school in Neiva} where he
in tum taught several future national leaders} most notably Bishop
Ismael Perdomo. After fighting for the Liberal cause in the short-lived
civil war of 1885} during which he narrowly missed being taken
prisoner by his father} Lozano went into business and earned a
fortune in commerce and agriculture that was subsequently wiped
out in the War of the Thousand Days. At the time of the memorable
meeting of the Tolima Assembly in 1913} the noted orator} soldier} and
statesman was fifty-eight years old and at the height of his career.S8 The
ConseIVatives who glared across the chamber at him that first day of
March could well curse the chain of events that had brought them
face-to-face with so formidable an antagonist.
Angry citizens gathered in front of the big frame building housing
60 Chapter .2

Fabio Lozano Tonijos, ca. 1915. (Courtesy El TiempoJ

Tolima's departmental Assembly, and spectators jostled for room in

the gallery. Even though it seemed clear that the smallest incident
could provoke bloodshed on that first day of the session} except for a
fiery speech by Fabio Lozano that was wildly applauded by the
liberals present the session ended peacefully. For the next two days,
rumors were rampant that Governor Cardenas intended to suspend
the Assembly for the purpose of maintaining public order. On the
evening of March 3, word finally arrived concerning the unseated
delegate from Honda: the election of liberal Luis V. GonzaIez--whose
opponent had already conceded-had been nullified and a Conserva-
tive named to his place. Howls of protest erupted from the liberals,
who flatly stated that they would not allow the deputy from Honda to
At the Threshold of aNew Age 61

be seated. Both sides agreed to suspend sessions while Lozano and

others went to discuss the matter with President Restrepo.37
The latter listened sympathetically to the tolimense Liberals) but
could do little to help. Since taking office he had bombarded fellow
ConseIVatives with telegrams begging them not to indulge in fraud)
but to no avail. Most of them despised his power-sharing government)
and} besides} the very concept of honest elections was an alien one to
most Colombians. As a result} the president was reduced to fuming
impotently about the sins of his copartisans. In a letter on March 10}
he wrote} (lIn Tolima) where the number of [Liberal votes] was truly
astonishing} the circuit judges saw to it that what in the beginning was
a majority got changed to an apparent minority} and they did this by
nullifying the elections in an overt manner."38
Lozano and the other Liberals made it clear that they had not
received satisfaction from President Restrepo and that the question of
vote fraud would be resolved in the Assembly itself. \Vhen the deputies
reconvened on April4} everyone anticipated violence. A mob of Liber-
als} many of whom had arrived from neighboring towns the night
before} gathered in the plaza outside the Assembly building. A hun-
dred soldiers under command of an anny colonel named Uribe
neIVously stood guard at every entrance to the building} at the door of
the Chamber of Deputies} and in the spectators' gallery. The morning
session was predictably stonny: ConseIVatives heaped abuse on Liber-
alism} upon President Restrepo} and upon his coalition government.
At noon} gunfire could be heard in the street outside} where crowds of
ConseIVatives and Liberals stood separated by a handful of troops.
After one person was killed and several wounded} the soldiers fixed
bayonets and cleared the spectators' gallery. Shortly after noon} the
deputies took a break} and the ConseIVatives were escorted to their
homes by soldiers) who stood guard until they were ready to return.
The session resumed late in the afternoon to the accompaniment of
more gunfire and shouts from outside.
Up in Bogota} the scene in President Restrepo's Cabinet room was
nearly as tense. Colonel Uribe kept sending a steady stream of tele-
grams over the course of the day} and} as each was read} the president
and his advisers debated what should be done. But} each time Uribe
begged that martial law be imposed) Restrepo answered that civil
62 Chapter 2

government must be maintained. The scene reached its climax mid-

way through the evening session. All during the day, Conservatives
had refused to permit debate on the recent vote fraud. Finally, Fabio
Lozano tried to push Deputy Gallego away from the podium, where-
upon the Conservative drew a pistol and aimed it at Lozano. The
legislators were instantly on their feet, Liberals vowing to die with their
leader and Conservatives also pledging death before seeing their party
dishonored. \\!hen Restrepo and his harried Cabinet read Uribe's
report of the near-shooting, the president suspended the Assembly
and declared Ibague to be under a state of siege.3s
Were it not for the deadly earnestness of all involved, the events in
Tolima might be dismissed as stupid exercises in demagoguery and
senseless partisanship. After all, the departmental Assembly of Tolima
possessed little power; its deputies usually rubber-stamped legislation
that was passed on to them from Bogota by way of an appointed
governor. Municipal officers exercised even less influence. Alcaldes)
mere local extensions of the weak national state, were charged with
watching over an impoverished municipal bureaucracy and given
virtually no power to raise monies locally. How, then, is the high
incidence of partisan strife to be explained? If political power was not
at stake, what led a respected leader like Fabio Lozano into an
unseemly shoving match that might have led to his death at the hands
of another prominent tolimense? The best and, indeed, only answer is
that Lozano and the others were popular leaders who were involved in
a confrontation transcending the petty spoils of a petty office. They
stood at the top of a hierarchical political structure that embraced all
the people of Tolima. Their two parties may have been democratic
entities in a general sense, but undergirding them was the clientelist
network that had given cohesion to Colombian society long before
their advent.
The structure of clientelism, based on unequal status, proximity,
and reciprocity, is implicit in the episodes of tolimense politics de-
scribed above.4(J Lozano, Echeverri, and Sandoval were all men of
means, educated, and respected for the roles they had played in the
recently concluded civil wars. They were destined to be followed,
obeyed, and respected; and the ordinary campesino would not have
understood if told he was their equal, for in his estimation, and in
theirs, he was not. Proximity between patron and client was close in
At the Threshold of a New Age 63

the rural setting of early-twentieth-century Tolima. General Echeverri

drew his strength from the people of eastern Libano} where he could
be seen any day riding his horse along the trails that crisscrossed his
hacienda or traveling the road into town on public or private business.
Echeverri and the others were also members of countless campesino
families} for they were godfathers to many of the children who were
produced so frequently by antioqueflo settlers of the northern cordil-
lera.
The requirement of reciprocal benefit was fulfilled on many levels.
The patron could always tum to his followers in time of stress} as the
three leaders described here did throughout their careers} and in
highly politicized Colombia the vote of even the most lowly peon was
cherished. On the other hand} the campesino could find relief from
any of a myriad of personal problems simply by laying his case before
the patr6n. But Colombian clientelism embraced many other aspects.
As the Echeverri raid revealed} the first people to join him in his march
on Libano were workers on his own hacienda. As his employees} they
were expected to help him fight his battles} but other factors entered
the equation as well. Echeverri was the general} the patr6n, the
compadre, the friend-any and all reason enough to follow him. His
defeat was theirs as well. In the isolated worlds of regional Colombia}
the patr6n was omnipresent} a sort of demigod whose influence
touched every part of life.
So the fateful} near-fatal debate in Tolima's Assembly involved far
more than departmental politics. It grew out of a bifurcated clientelis-
tic social system. Every blow exchanged and every wound inflicted
during the stormy days of 1913 was an injury felt by all members of the
aggrieved party. Fabio Lozano and Deputy Gallego were not just
hot-blooded politicians fighting for power in a provincial representa-
tive assembly. They were twentieth-century caudillos leading their
polarized clientele in an eternal quest for honor and power.
The national elections} which offered proof of Colombia's strong
civil tradition} were also a whip falling across the body politic. With
numbing regularity} those elections-sometimes as many as three in a
year} as was the case in 1913-kept fresh the wounds inflicted by
random political violence. The vigorous coffee-growing municipality of
Libano again provides an example. October4} 1915} was the date set for
the first election of concejales in Colombia under the electoral reforms
64 Chapter 2

of 1910. The Liberals of Libano, proud of their municipio and its

reputation as the most prosperous of the northern cordillera, were
eager to demonstrate that theirs was also a bastion of Liberalism by
winning a majority on the concejo.
Before dawn on election morning, the first campesinos began drift-
ing into town, and, as the sun rose, streams of people made their way
on foot and by mule into town from all the caserlos and veredas of the
municipality. They came from the cold uplands around Murillo, from
San Fernando and Santa Teresa in the southwest, and from the
scatteredfincas on mountainsides around the cabecera. Tables, a blue
one for Conservatives and a red one for Liberals, had been set up
under the big mango tree that grew on one side of the plaza. At
mid-morning, a cry went up among Conservatives: General Sandoval
was coming with hundreds of his followers, some bearing blue ban-
ners that danced in the breeze of that clear mountain morning. A little
later, General Echeveni anived with hundreds of Liberals from their
heartland between Convenio and San Fernando. Many of them wore
red cockades and displayed scarlet standards. Queues formed at the
tables, and each man who was eligible, and some who were not, voted.
They then went into the cantina to drink sweet coffee or aguardiente,
or moved into one of two crowds on either side of the plaza. Voting
ended at three o'clock and the ballots were taken away to be counted.
Little by little, the anxiety of waiting, the aguardiente, and the
proximity of the two groups changed the atmosphere from one of
gaiety to one of foreboding. Suddenly a door opened and the result
was announced: for the first time in three decades, the concejo
belonged to the Liberals! Taunts and jeers from the apparent victors
were answered by a hail of gunfire that ended the lives of two young
Liberals, Secundino Chani and Jesus Santa. By that violent outburst,
Conservatives won the skinnish and the election, for martial law was
imposed and the election nullified.41 All the Liberals had gained by
day's end were two new martyrs to their cause and the livid memory
of a wrong that must someday be avenged.42
The political events described above-Liberal Tolima's failure to win
control of the Assembly, the inability of the party to take the concejo of
Liliano through democratic means, and the violence and bloodshed
that attended both contests-serve to illustrate five important facts of
political life in the department as well as in the nation during the early
At the Threshold of a New Age 65

decades of the new centwy. First, rank-and-file ConseIVatives did not

intend to let the Liberals, so recently defeated in the nation's longest
and worst civil war, win political power by democratic means. Second,
the Liberals would probably never regain their political voice until a
change in power at the national level broke the ConseIVative strangle-
hold on all branches of government. HRe who counts votes wins the
elections" was a dictum possessing real and enduring meaning.
Third, by the twentieth century, the national government had so
consolidated its power that civil war was no longer a viable way to
redress wrongs that were committed in regional Colombia. Fourth}
because the government in Bogota was so highly partisan} it was
illegitimate in the eyes of political HoutS." President Carlos E. Restrepo
learned this to his chagrin when he attempted to preside over honest
elections. Ris copartisans in Tolima viewed that gesture of republican
idealism as a betrayal of the party-a sellout to the enemy. In a curious
variation on the illegitimacy theme, it was the ConseIVatives who
disavowed their national government, which forced it to impose
martial law on the department.
Finally, the events described above illustrate the explosive nature of
political issues in early-twentieth-century Tolima. Ghosts of the old
caudillos walked the land, and the mere invoking of their names in
moments of stress was all that was required to send tolimenses to
arms. Combatants were, in most cases, the sons and grandsons of men
whose heroics in times past were cherished parts of family lore. It was
a historic enmity that polarized Tolima. Only the Bogota government
kept the uneasy, oft-broken trnce between ConseIVatives and Liberals.
And it would remain that way for another seventeen years. ConseIVa-
tives kept the whip hand in departmental politics until miscalcula-
tions at the national level allowed power to slip from their grasp in the
fateful year 1930.

Tolima's politics may have been dominated by tradition} but, in

other areas of life, social modernization was the keynote. The social
forces brought to bear by modernization would, in time, complicate
departmental politics. But, for the time being, Tolima was very much a
place where old habits of mind embraced and subsumed changes
brought by the modem age.
66 Chapter 2

Nothing better catches the essense of old and new Tolima-the

fonner cherishing its antique vision of caudillo-led armies battling for
party as well as fatherland and the latter attempting to comprehend
rapid technological change} economic fluctuation} and new social
doctrines-than the story of transportation and its development there.
Before 1920} all private and commercial travel was by horse and mule}
riverboat} or foot. Travelers between Honda and Neiva had the un-
pleasant option of spending more than a week braving llano heat
along a desolate and dangerous thoroughfare euphemistically called a
((road" or crowding into one of the round-bottomed champanes that
ferried passengers and freight up and down the Magdalena. The latter
mode of travel was an exquisite fonn of torture that combined tedium)
pain} and degradation. \\!hile passengers spent days reclining in
hammocks strung under the low deck} engulfed in the stench of bilge
waters and sweltering in the heat} boatmen walked just above them
and talked in their argot.43 But the ((delights" of champan travel were
not destined to last forever. One day in 1920) in an incredible contrast
between the old and the new} boatmen passing the town of Girardot
watched an amphibious airplane touch down on the river and inaugu-
rate airmail seIVice between the Caribbean coast and the interior.
Air travel evolved rapidly in Colombia during the 1920s. It was part
of a modem transportation network that included railway lines and
roads passable for automobiles.44 During that decade} in Tolima} rail
lines were built linking Ibague and Bogota} as well as Honda and Neiva.
Plans were made to open the principal towns} especially the coffee-
producing municipios of the cordillera} to trucks and autos. Transpor-
tation by muleback might have seIVed once} but} because nearly four
thousand farms were exporting the beans of more than twenty-six
million coffee bushes as of 1927} poor roads were a vestige of the past
that the department could ill afford.45
Quickened economic growth during the 1920s was encouraged by
an influx of money from abroad. The United States} anxious to ease the
prickings of a guilty conscience over the Panama affair and titillated by
rumors of oil deposits in Colombia} paid the national government a
total of twenty-five million dollars. This sum and other monies bor-
rowed abroad encouraged the nation to draw up lavish plans for rapid
modemization.46 During that ((dance of the millions/' people poured
At the Threshold of a New Age 67

into the cities to take advantage of the comparatively high wages

offered by various public works projects.
In rural departments) some parts of the campo were so depopulated
that coffee crops could not be haIVested. This led to the passage of
"vagrancy laws/' which required the unemployed to assist with agri-
cultural work or face jail terms. Tolima Governor Abel Casabianca
reported in his message to the Assembly of 1923 that Tolima's law was
an excellent defense against the "pernicious influence of those who
don't work for their bread."41 The law provided that campesinos who
did not aid with the harvest could be sentenced to an eighteen-month
term at hard labor on the departmental penal farm at Sur de Ata.
Increased social differentiation was another consequence of the
"dancing millions." The lure of jobs in the city enticed many people
into the money economy for the first time. A new class of workers
sprang up among those who could now satisfy their own immediate
needs and who entertained the prospect of constantly increasing
salaries. Soon the new urban proletariat began to explore ways of
increasing its leverage within society. Jose Maria Samper's observation
that the Colombian "masses" were essentially passive no longer ap-
plied.48 Men and women of vision now understood that power was at
last within reach of the common man.
One tolimense who possessed the wisdom to concern himself with
problems of the workingman was Ibague's bishop) Ismael Perdomo.
Pursuing religious training in Rome when Pope Leo XIII promulgated
his encyclical Rerum NovarumJ Perdomo learned well the new Church
teaching that class interests must be harmonized with prevailing value
systems. Upon his return to Colombia in 1903) he vigorously preached
that workingmen must not yield their souls to the god of materialism.
"Laboring men must not think in terms of quick change because it is
not possible to better the working class all at once/' he counseled in
the pages of his weekly newspaper) El Carmen. "It is enough to push
for change with what now exists) because experience confirms that
good results are possible without radical change . . . and if some
working-class families better themselves on their own) then they will
become a nucleus transmitting morality and social activism through-
out the working class."49 Bishop Perdomo was not merely a propagan-
dist; he also taught by example) using his energies to found trade
68 Chapter 2

schools, cooperative banks, agrarian reform programs, social clubs,

and discussion groups. Colombia's first labor union was a Church-
sponsored one founded across the Magdalena from Tolima in 1909, at
the river-port town of Girardot.5O Through all these organs, the Church
spread its doctrine of docility during the early years of the century.
Most tolimenses first heard of class stmggle from priests who were
involved with the bishop's social work programs or from the pulpit.51
Around 1920 more strident voices were raised on behalf of tolimense
workers. The First World War had caused a IIdisastrous decline" in
departmental tax receipts, principally because of the interruption of
exports to the United States.52 Transportation workers in Honda, Amba-
lema, and other river-port towns suffered accordingly. \'Vhen neither
the departmental nor national government could reverse their declin-
ing wages, they formed local unions like the one that struck the La
Dorada Railroad in 1920. This strike was led by Eran Diaz, a former
priest from Honda who could no longer support the Church position
on labor organization.53 Tolima's first strike was called by longshore-
men in Honda and Ambalema in 1924, and tolimense workers active in
the labor movement participated in the First Workers Congress, held
in Bogota that same year.54
The downtrodden were also becoming more vocal in rural parts of
Tolima. Indians in the south-central part found a fearless and astute
leader in Quintin Lame, an activist who had recently been driven from
his home in Cauca for his activities there; and non-Indian campesino
renters in central and eastern Tolima were beginning to make de-
mands on those whose lands they worked.55 Events took a new tum in
1926, when members of the Colombian socialist movement began
holding rallies throughout the department and urging workers to
fight, if necessary, for thoroughgoing reform of the social system. In
late 1926, following a strike of boatmen on the upper Magdalena,
several leading socialists spoke in Tolima. Marla Cano, liThe Red
Flower of Labor," visited and addressed large and enthusiastic audi-
ences at Honda, Mariquita, Ibague, Venadillo, Doima, Piedras, and
Coello.58
The government of Tolima looked on such unrest with misgivings,
though it was at the same time sympathetic to labor's impotence
before employers, who in many cases were foreign corporations not
noted for dealing understandingly with workers. lilt is well-known that
At the Threshold of aNew Age 69

recourse to strikes grows in centers where there exists a tremendous

struggle between the proletariat and the TRUST that absorbs everything
making progress almost impossible/' the governor wrote in his annual
message of 1927.57 Yet} the following year} Tolima's secretaI)' of govern-
ment asked for absolute prohibition of ((subversive" newspapers and
handbills and quoted a presidential censorship decree of 1927 that
labeled ((Bolshevism) communism) anarchism} social revolution} what-
ever it calls itself . . . a cancer whose excision is called for at any
cost."58 Near the end of the decade} supporters of the status quo openly
worried that ((Bolshevist" subversion was eating away at the underpin-
nings of their Christian republic. Since 1925 they had watched the
socialists spread their message and win converts all along the river
and llano) up into the coffee latifundia of eastern Tolima} through the
Indian lands of Ortega and Coyaima} and even into the antioquefio
settlements of the northern cordillera. Informants warned that the
most dangerous Bolsheviks of all were those led by a shoemaker
named Narvaez} who lived in the mountain town of Libano.
Organizers of the socialists in Libano were artisans who felt that
neither of the traditional political parties was sensitive to the plight of
the small businessman.59 Pedro NaIVaez} principal leader of the Libano
movement} was himself successful in a modest way} employing
twenty-five workers in his shop as of 1929. But business was not good}
as he explained in a letter to the national Congress: ItThe enormous
quantity of foreign-made shoes is presently drowning our own domes-
tic production} with disastrous results which visibly prejudice the
already precarious position of the Colombian worker."80 Narvaez and
others like him around the municipality had already spent several
years working to change the national political system. In November
1927 they began requesting fliers from the Socialist RevolutionaI)'
party} headquartered in Bogota} and at about the same time aITanged
for party leader Maria Canol whom they affectionately called the tiRed
Virgin/' to speak in Libano.81
As time went on and as a small circle of libanese socialists explored
Marxist-Leninist thought} the vision of a society run by the workers
became a beautiful and consuming one. They began closing corre-
spondence with slogans such as Yours in Lenin and Oppressed
It

Humanity/' itA Cordial Communist Greeting/' and ItBrothers in Father

Lenin." Roman Catholic ritual was supplanted in their homes by the
70 Chapter 2

Munitions of the Bolsheviks, Libano, Tolima, 1929. (Courtesy Municipio of

Libanol

new religion. On February 14, 1929, Rosalba Uribe Giraldo, the infant
daughter of two artisans, was baptized "in the Holy Name of Op-
pressed Humanity/' at the "Altar of the Universal Fraternity of United
Workers." Among other things, she was charged with "opening the
At the Threshold of aNew Age 71

path to a new social order} and marching toward a future in which life
will rest upon Justice emanating from the Socialist Spirit."82
Antigovernment feelings rose to new heights all across Colombia
when} late in 1928} government soldiers attacked and massacred
striking banana haIVesters on the Atlantic coast. Socialists labeled it as
a blatant example of the national government working in league with
foreign exploiters of the people} in this case the United Fruit Company}
and they called for open revolt against the system.83 Planning was
initiated for the overthrow of the government} and a coalition of
radical groups known as the Central Conspiratorial Committee picked
July 29 as the date for the revolt.54 Meanwhile} the government had
been aware that something was afoot} for it had already detained for
questioning a number of prominent socialists} such as Tomas Uribe
Marquez} Ignacio Torres Giraldo} and Maria Cano. Discovery of a
stockpile of bombs in Libano had also led to the brief arrest of Pedro
NaIVaez.85
Over the months between his release from jail and the proletarian
revolt} NaIVaez traveled the municipio recruiting artisans and campe-
sinos for his force and arming them with weapons supplied by the
Colombian Communist party. Leaders of the insurgents were shoe-
makers} carpenters} tailors} butchers} small merchants} and a woman
who ran a boardinghouse in the cabecera. An eleven-year-old boy was
given the important task of canying explosives from one place to
another.58 To aid in recruitment} NaIVaez drew up a plan showing how
all private property in the municipio would be distributed to the poor.
The uprising began as planned} before dawn on the morning of July
29} 1929. AImed with Mauser and Gras rifles87 and canying lanterns
shielded with red paper for the purpose of mutual identification} the
socialists began their attack. They exploded bombs in the cabecera
and in the corregimiento of Dos Quebradas} killed six persons} seized
Murillo} and forced officials there to salute their red banner. Citizens
of the cabecera had been forewarned that an attack by {(Bolsheviks"
might take place} and they were ready to fight when awakened by the
bombs. For more than an hour} they battled the insurgents and finally
drove them back to a point west of town. Later in the day} a strong
citizens' militia} led by Captain Marco Saenz} a ConseIVative} and Juan
B. EcheverIi} a Liberal} fell upon and dispersed them. NaIVaez and
many of his force retreated westward over the cordillera into Caldas
72 Chapter 2

and Valle} but were arrested later. One hundred and sixty prisoners
were taken by the militia.
Citizens of Libano called events of July 1929 the HRevolt of the
Bolsheviks/' and most of them rejoiced that the dissidents had not
been able to overthrow the system and give their property to the poor.
Their reaction duplicated that of most other Colombians and explains
the revolutioncuy leadership's decision to call off the revolt a day
before it was to have taken place. Only remote Libano and a village in
Santander failed to receive the news in time. The most significant
feature of the -whole affair was the disinclination of the majority of
citizens to give up their traditional support of Colombia's bipartisan
status quo. When Liberals} who at first supported NaIVaez} leamed he
was not planning the typical kind of revolt against the government}
they withdrew their support} explaining that Hthe thing had changed
its nature." ConseIVatives cooperated only to the extent that they did
not openly oppose the plotters.53
By 1930 Tolima had taken a giant step in the direction of social and
economic modernization. Its citizens were in touch with all the
advanced political philosophies of the day; airplanes} trains} and autos
crisscrossed the department; and its economy had become thor-
oughly integrated into those of the industrialized nations of the
West-perhaps too thoroughly integrated. Yet the burden of its stOrnly
political past was still the major fact of life. Politics-not the socialism
of Libano's "Bolsheviks/' but rather traditional ConseIVative-Liberal
partisanship--was the predominant force. That fact was clear in 1930}
the year a split in the ConseIVative party returned power to the
Liberals. Under their leader} President Enrique Olaya Herrera} toli-
mense Liberals knew they would at last be vindicated. Wherever they
sat together around a bottle of warm aguardiente, they talked of their
victoI)' with relish and anticipation} chuckling as they repeated a verse
making the rounds of bars and roadside tiendas:
Si no alcanzo a disfrutar
el triunfo de los Liberales
10 disfrutarfm mis hijos
que ahorita estfm en pafiales. 89
If I don't live to enjoy
The triumph of the Liberals
It will be enjoyed by my children
\Vho right now are wearing diapers.
 3

The Invisible State

The years of Liberal rule in Colombia were critical ones for the people
of Tolima. During those sixteen years} they lived a dual existence}
caught up in their own local affairs yet swept along by national and
international processes over which they could exercise little or no
control. Local problems whose resolution had once been within the
puIView of the municipality or department became the concern of a
national government whose power had expanded immensely. Interna-
tional economic depression and world war dictated the creation of an
interventionist state that formulated programs of national scope.
Issues addressed by Colombia's government during the 1930s and
early 1940s may have been global ones} but the regime that addressed
them was Liberal and hence its programs were combated by Conser-
vatives} who viewed them as insidious and dangerous. Citizens thus
found themselves in the position of trying to cope with the exigencies
of a new} complex} and turbulent age while saddled with the incubus
of divisive partisanships. By the 1940s it was a melancholy fact that
Conservative-Liberal feuding had rendered the government incapable
of dealing effectively with critical national problems. The ship of state
began to drift at a time when society was politicized as it had not been
since the War of the Thousand Days. This allowed Tolirna and the
nation to be caught up in currents that swirled down into a mael-
strom.
Tolima experienced its usual measure of political strife in 1930 and
afterward} but now it was Conservatives who complained of persecu-
tion by sectarian Liberals who were supported by a venal bureaucracy.
73
74 Chapter 3

The first election of local importance took place in February 1931.

Opposition newspapers} loudly announcing that Conservative blood
was washing over the department} cited scores of injuries to party
members in support of the claim. Commenting on the same election}
the secretary of government in Tolima made a histrionic speech before
the departmental assembly: uThe political moment could not have
been more delicate. A single glance could scorch; there were hidden
conspiracies; blood boiled inside chests with impetuous fury; party
directorates sent confidential orders to the rank-and-file; people
talked heatedly in small groups; telegraph lines hummed; the press
trumpeted; brave words were spoken in the popular idiom; gossip
circulated like small change . . . everyone was ready because in both
town and country there were plenty of dead and wounded."l
Other grave problems were not specifically related to elections.
Conservatives of the northern cordillera reacted furiously when Gover-
nor Antonio Rocha appointed a Liberal alcalde to the recently incor-
porated municipality of Anzoategui and reenacted the uEcheverri
Raid" of some seventeen years earlier. A small aITI1Y of Conservatives
from Santa Isabel and La Yuca attempted to march on Anzoategui and
bar the new alcalde from taking office. Turning to Libano for support}
Rocha dispatched a strong police detachment from the village of
Murillo to confront the rebels. A gun battle followed} in which four
campesinos from La Yuca were killed.z Conservatives took small com-
fort from Rocha's statement that his government was not responsible
for the strife nor in his complaint that Uit has fallen my lot to be
governor in an agitated and turbulent epoch of strong passions which
are motivated by the ferocious nature of politics in Tolima."3
The eight men who governed Tolima during the thirties would have
breathed a bit easier had only Conservative-Liberal feuding broken
departmental calm. Unfortunately for them} two other conflicts trou-
bled their tenure. The more complicated and far-reaching was strife
between renters and the owners of large commercial coffee faITI1s in
eastern parts of the department; the other involved Indians of south-
central Tolima and their struggle to maintain the integrity of their
resguardo lands.
The latter problem had the longer history. Throughout the colonial
period} much of the land on either side of the Rio Saldana as well as
considerable tracts in northern Tolima were owned by native peoples.
The Invisible State 75

Independence brought an attack on everything that had set the

Indians apart from their fellow citizens} most importantly the res-
guardos. Not only were the protected lands places where the natives
could escape assimilation with the rest of society} but} as one non-
Indian complained in 1889} they Uare completely unproductive and
don't do any good for the people of the municipios where they exist."4
To strike at Indian ethnicity and to open ((unproductive" lands to
non-Indians) the resguardos came under attack in a series of laws and
decrees formulated in Tolima between 1877 and 1924.5 By the 1920s} it
seemed that nothing could save the lands from dispersal and probable
absorption by surrounding haciendas.
But in April 1922 a remarkable man appeared in southern Tolima
who led the Indians in a long campaign against white encroachment.
Manuel Quintin Lame} an Indian militant from Valle del Cauca} was
already well known in Colombia. After more than a decade of activity}
he was driven from his home and ultimately settled in Tolima.6 Called
uJefe Suprenlo" by his followers and uIndio hijo de puta" by whites} he
used every legal means at his disposal to protect the resguardos.
Authorities who jailed him many times on charges of subversion and
uperpetuating hatred of whites" saw his astuteness as proof that the
resguardos uhave no reason to exist} given the fact that their inhabi-
tants ... are all civilized."1 In 1924 Quintin Lame} acting in concert
with two tolimense Indians named Jose Gonzalo Sanchez and Euti-
quio Timonte} formed the Supreme Indian Council. Through it} they
founded a town named San Jose de Indias and set about reconstitut-
ing the resguardos of Natagaima} Velu} Yaguara} and Coyaima.
Over the remainder of the decade} the three were successful in
holding the whites at bay until political discord broke out among them
and ended their collaboration. Quintin Lame remained a ConseIVative}
but Sanchez and Timonte became active in the communist move-
ment.8 Because few Indians were willing to become communists}
Sanchez and Timonte found themselves leaders without followers. 9
The Liberal victory in 1930 dealt a final blow to Quintin Lame's
movement. The Indians were deprived of the scant protection their
partisan identification once offered} and within the year white land-
owners began attacking them. Quintin Lame was blamed for the
violence} and} Utied up like a bull/' he was finally dragged away to seIVe
a two-year sentence in the Ortega jail. In 1933 he returned to find that
76 Chapter 3

Quintin Lame, 1958. (Courtesy El Tiempo)

The Invisible State 77

vigilante violence had reduced San Jose de Indias to ruins and

destroyed a decade of patient organizational work.10
Land conflict in eastern Tolima was a more recent phenomenon)
but one whose outbreak had been augured by early patterns of
settlement in the region. Almost two centuries earlier) the prominent
naturalist Jose Celestino Mutis had discovered that forests covering
the rugged mountains south of Bogota contained valuable red) white)
and yellow quinine. He licensed one Pedro de Vargas to exploit them
as a royal monopoly. By 1788 Vargas had processed and shipped more
than 220)000 arrobas of powdered quinine to Spain.l l Three of his sons)
continuing their father's work) founded the town of Cunday in the
highlands above Melgar between 1794 and 1796. Retaining its land-
holdings in the area) the Vargas family profited handsomely from the
quinine boom of the 1870s. A number of wealthy capitalists from
Colombia and abroad bought land in the region during the 1880s and
1890s) notably Alberto) Luis and Ricardo Williamson) and Vicente
Reyes Daza.12 Although the quinine market never recovered after its
precipitous decline in 1881) deciding what to do with the immense
holdings presented no problem.
Coffee flourished on the cool mountain slopes) and a pool of
campesino labor was available to do the back-breaking work of clear-
ing) planting) and cultivating. By the early twentieth century) millions
of coffee bushes covered the mountains of eastern Tolima and south-
western Cundinamarca) virtually all of them growing on the huge
commercial haciendas. The Vargas family had 145)000 bushes in
production and the Williamsons 200)000 on their hacienda uCanada."
tlEscocia/' founded by Vicente Reyes Daza) cared for 230)000 bushes)
and it was not the biggest. Coffee haciendas were springing up so fast
that only a few years after tlVillarrica" was founded by Francisco
Pineda L6pez) it boasted 85)000 bushes in production.13 All this activity
led to the creation of a unique new municipio in the east. Called
Icononzo) it became at once the department's smallest municipality
and the one where the landholdings were the largest. Because eight
estates each grew in excess of a hundred thousand coffee bushes)
more than any other municipality in Tolima) little Icononzo might
better have been named ULatifundia."
In June 1928 a juridic storm cloud appeared over the verdant
haciendas. The Colombian Supreme Court ruled that a large amount
78 Chapter 3

of land in the Sumapaz region of Cundinamarca and Tolima was open

to colonization} and the specific areas of settlement were spelled out
in Presidential Decree #1}110 of that year. At about the same time}
President Miguel Abadia Mendez decreed that every citizen pos-
sessing more than five hundred hectares of land had to register the
title with the minister of industries to aid in the search for petroleum
within national territory. Neither law was in itself particularly danger-
ous to the interests of latifundistas. Decree #1}110 clearly delimited the
area of colonization to baldio lands except for four unexploited haci-
endas in the municipio of Cunday. The verification of land title was a
confidential act involving only the hacendado and the minister of
industries. But the implications of both laws in combination sent a
collective shudder through communities of large landowners. Most of
them knew that they could not produce title to all of the land they
claimed because they had illegally taken over chunks of the national
domain and added them to what may have originally been rather
modest holdings.14 It was common knowledge} for example} that the
Pab6n brothers' hacienda ((Guatimbol/' Maximiliano Aya's ((San Fran-
cisco/' and many others contained illegal holdings.
Now that the government was encouraging new colonization in the
region) campesinos logically expected that unused portions of the
haciendas were open to them also. Many proceeded to establish
homesteads there} and} if they had previously lived on the property as
renters} stopped paying. \JVhen the hacendados tried to expel them} the
colonos just smiled and asked to see their title to the land. Allover
eastern Tolima} land invasions took place in increasing numbers
during the late 1920s and early 1930s} while local bureaucracies tried
frenetically to stop them. In some cases} detachments of the national
army were used to expel invaders.15
The onset of economic depression early in the 1930s further compli-
cated the land problem in eastern Tolima. Owners of the big estates
had worried about an insufficient number of workers during the
((dance of the millions/' but they now realized that economic hardship
was driving too many of their fonner employees back to the land.
Furthennore) the returning campesinos were ((suffused with a new
fonn of discontent."16 Gone was the humble one of old) respectful of
his ((betters/' ready to work out his life on another's land) and
philosophically accepting Church teachings that God would reward
The Invisible State 79

his patience in the next life. Life in the city had radicalized him. He
had earned good money for the first time) had heard of labor unions
and proletarian revolt) and was determined to be his own patr6n.
Midway through 1931) the secretary of government of Tolima paid a
personal visit to the turbulent east) later compiling an extensive report
on his obseIVations. It is a valuable document not just for the infonna-
tion it contains but also for the perspective it offers on official Tolima
and its perception of agrarian revolt. Turning first to the relationship
of the invasions and the colonization decree of 1928) the secretary
wrote:

Based upon this decree, and their opportunistic interpretation of it, the
colonizers [eolonos], or individuals who adopt this name, have not only
risen against their patrones ceasing to pay the rent that they owe, as has
j

happened with those of hacienda I/San Francisco" ... but they have
presumed to imply that other private property is baldio land available
for colonization. Thus have the so-called colonizers moved close to the
to\VIl of Icononzo, sowing intranquility and anguish among property
O\VIlers.
Today the so-called colonists cite the Decree #1,110 at every tum}
predicating all dealings between lando\VIlers and themselves on the
lando\VIlers authenticating their land titles before the Minister of Indus-
tries, without doubt taking advantage of Decree #150 of 1928....
Hence, Decree #1,110 of 1928 ... is the source of all de jure and de
facto evils which the property O\VIlers of Icononzo and Cunday regions
are witnessing. Not convinced that the true zone of colonization is
limited to the actual colony of Sumapaz [the eolonos] base their inva-
sions on it. They also allege that the property O\VIlers have failed to
present their land titles at the Ministry of Industry, and no doubt notice
that there are great mountains on the haciendas which are not culti-
vated and not even cleared, giving it the aspect of unowned land.

Once he had determined that serious trouble existed in the east, the
secretary of government formulated a complicated legal argument that
culminated in the ringing assertion that all landowners in the dis-
puted region had sole jurisdiction over all lands claimed by them)
((without the necessity of improving them in any manner whatsoever. 1J

Striking that reassuring note, he turned to a more somber topic: the

gro\tVing political militance among the campesinos. He explained that
the radicals were intimidating those who refused to join them) inter-
fering with police) destroying property) and traveling through the
80 Chapter 3

cordillera in armed bands. Most disturbing of all, the campesinos were

listening to the counsel of prominent communist organizers, such as
Erasmo Valencia, and subscribing to the radical newspaper Claridad.
Thus, in the words of the secretary, "our campesinos are infecting
themselves, perhaps without suspecting it, with communistic ideas
which are subverting the social order and threatening to destroy the
very foundations upon which rests the edifice of the Republic." Calling
communism "that cancer which dissolves modem society," he con-
cluded his report with a short, general discourse on international and
local communism. Singled out as centers of communism in Tolima
were Icononzo, Cunday and the west bank of the Magdalena, and the
Indian sections of Natagaima, Coyaima, and Ortega. Also included
were the llano municipalities of Coello, Armero, Mariquita, and Honda,
as well as Libano in the cordillera.17
In 1933 violence escalated sharply in the east when eighty campe-
sinos battled the Civil Guard at a hacienda called "Tronco Quemado";
four colonos died and several more were wounded. In other clashes,
members of the police were killed.18 During the previous year, workers
had been unionized on the haciendas "Guatimbol," "La Laja," "Gua-
mitos," and "Santa Ines," all in Icononzo. \\!hen renters on haciendas
"Canada" and "Escocia" began talking of unionization, they were
attacked by bands of hacienda wage laborers who had been promised
the dissidents' land if they could drive them away.19 Meanwhile, in
Cunday agents of the powerful Cunday Coffee Company had burned
the homes of colonos and chopped down coffee trees planted in
violation of the draconian renters' contract required by the company.20
Something needed to be done before landlords and colonos slipped
into civil war.
Late in 1933 a series of meetings took place that cooled passions and
made it possible for a truce to be reached. Prodded by officials in both
departmental and national government, hacendados took the unprec-
edented step of sitting down and negotiating with the dissidents. In
many cases, it was the first time that some landowners had ever seen
their renters, and that fact in itself may have predisposed the colonos
to sign the accords that were hammered out during the talks. Collec-
tively called "The Pacts of Icononzo," the agreement between land-
lords and colonos was essentially a pledge to preseIVe the status quo.
The Invisible State 81

Owners would stop their harassment of employees, and the colonos

would halt further union organization as well as land invasions.21
Now that the land invasions were in suspension, tolimenses turned
their attention to Bogota and national politics. Alfonso L6pez Pu-
marejo had just won the presidency in an uncontested election early
in 1934. He promised the nation a program of thoroughgoing reform.
Shortly before his inauguration, several hacendados from one of the
regions affected by land invasions wrote him for reassurance that his
reforms would not threaten their interests and that he would continue
the government policy of protecting their property from colonos. The
day before being sworn in, he answered them in a much-publicized
letter that gave every landowner in the nation cause for worry. tiThe
law shall not place itself at the unconditional seIVice of injustice," he
began, striking a forceful and slightly self-righteous note. He went on
to state that, though the country's law was written to defend property,
his government was not disposed to Uthe bloody application of juridic
concepts which permit unlimited abuse of the right to possess land
without exploiting it" and that he fully intended Uto raise the standard
of living of the campesinos, and bring about efficient land exploitation
by owners."2.2 This, Colombians reflected, did not sound like the sort of
presidential rhetoric they were used to hearing.
L6pez's hot words to exploiters of the campesinos contained a
decided note of irony, for his own family had long owned a coffee
estate in the same part of Tolima that had been tom by violence the
previous year.23 Alfonso L6pez, a tolimense, was born in Honda in 1896
to Pedro A. L6pez and Rosario Pumarejo. His father earned much of
his money in Tolima by establishing a commercial firm in Honda late
in the nineteenth century, investing in land throughout the depart-
ment, and constructing a variety of public utilities in towns such as
Honda, Libano, and Ibague. But his business interests reached far
beyond the boundaries of Tolima. He was involved in coffee pro-
cessing, banking, and the import-export trade in Colombia, even
maintaining branch offices in London and New York. He sent his son
Alfonso to London for schooling at age fifteen, and, when the youth
was just eighteen, appointed him as manager of the New York office.
Before he was thirty, the younger L6pez became active in Liberal party
politics. He first served as a deputy in the Assembly of Tolima and later
82 Chapter 3

held a variety of appointive and elective offices. By 1934 no Liberal

seemed to be better qualified than the urbane and successful Alfonso
L6pez to lead the nation out of its economic and social turmoil.24
During his first term as president L6pez articulated an unprece-
dented program of sweeping governmental intervention in national
affairs. He encouraged the nascent labor movement through fostering
passage of a constitutional amendment which stated that ulabor is a
social obligation and it shall enjoy the special protection of the state. JJ
Then he broadened the electorate by pushing through universal
manhood sufIrage.Z5 Next, he introduced fiscal reforms, including the
first national tax on income, and struck at the close Church-state
connection that had prevailed since the days of Nunez and Carol
Liberty of conscience was declared to be guaranteed by the state
rather then merely permitted, a provision giving encouragement to
non-Catholic religious sects. Church control over public education
was weakened in the 1936 constitutional revision.
But L6pez struck hardest at the status quo in the area of land
reform. In 1936 the Liberal-dominated Congress passed Law 200, a
package of provisions aimed at providing more security to the thou-
sands of people who occupied lands that were tied up in litigation
over ownership. In the first article, priority ownership of land was
granted to those who actually lived on it, and claimants needed to
show proof that their title had been granted before the year 1821 in
order to retain possession. Eviction of squatters dropped sharply as a
result of this provision. The second article was founded on a revolu-
tional)' phrase from the constitutional revision of 1936: uproperty is a
social function which implies obligations. JJz6 Hence, landownership
carried with it the obligation to exploit it productively, and any
privately owned land lying fallow for ten years was liable to expropria-
tion by the state. The effect of Law 200 was the defusing of tension
throughout the rural parts of the nation.
L6pez's land law of 1936 exerted a significant impact on Tolima.
Even if it was not as sweeping as many campesinos wanted, it was at
least proof that the government was sensitive to their plight and was
not wholly committed to defending the interests of the mighty.
Pockets of radical colonos continued to exist after passage of Law
200-in eastern Tolima, to the north in the Viota region of Cundina-
marca, and in the EI Lim6n-Rioblanco region of Chaparral-but their
The Invisible State 83

numbers did not increase significantly in ensuing years.27 Other re-

forms of the first L6pez administration were less important to toli-
menses because they tended to address urban rather than rural
problems. A few new labor unions were formed in towns along the
Magdalena) in Libano) Ibague) and) curiously) among the Yaguara
Indians of eastern Chaparral) but no unusual growth occurred in the
formation of workers' corporations.28
Sadly for Tolima) and ultimately for L6pez himself) it was the old
political infighting that broadly affected most people in the depart-
ment. As soon as President Olaya Herrera assumed power in 1930, a
process of bureaucratic housecleaning began that gradually extended
from the governor down to the lowest appointed officials. Every
alcalde and corregidor named by the new administration was a
Liberal) as were tax collectors) postmasters, wardens of jails) and other
appointees. Colombia's was a spoils system par excellence, and every
citizen accepted that fact without question. Even the police forces
were manned by Liberals, though that transfonnation took place at a
necessarily slower rate than for purely appointive positions. The
changeover occurred in piecemeal fashion. High officials let it be
known that preference in hiring would be given to recruits who
possessed the proper political credentials. The whole process was
made easier by the fact that within each department were half a dozen
police corps, each of which maintained its own command structure.29
To Alfonso L6pez's discredit) he further encouraged the politicization
of the country's police forces) particularly during his second tenn
(1942-45), because he believed they would become a counterweight to
the Conservative-dominated national army.so
Olaya Herrera) L6pez) and the rest did not set out to establish a
one-party dictatorship when they won the presidency in 1930. They
were convinced democrats who believed in abiding by the verdict of
the ballot box, but they also believed the nation needed leadership
that only the Liberal party could give) and they were willing to use
every perquisite of national political office to keep power once it was
theirs. Nor were they reticent in announcing their intentions. Brash
young Liberals like Carlos Ueras Restrepo crowed that the government
was "liquidating the last vestiges of the Conservative administrations/'
and semiofficial Liberal newspapers announced that triumphant Lib-
eralism intended to occupy power under the theory of homogeneous
tt
84 Chapter 3

government."3l The term uLiberal Republic" was heard with increasing

frequency during 1933, and it came to define the regime after the
Conservative party announced a policy of electoral abstention in 1935.
The political abstention sprang from ConselVative anger over wide-
spread harassment of party members by Liberals, particularly at
election time, and from their belief that the Liberals were making
elections so dishonest they could never regain power. A new system of
voter registration was the chief bone of partisan contention. Designed
as a reform of the existing system and put into effect in 1933, it
required that each bona fide voter request a tarjeta, or card, to present
on election day as proof of registration. Because the cards were
distributed by local registrars, all of whom were Liberals, the Conser-
vatives assumed that the refoIm was just a ploy to emasculate their
party. Simply by denying them to ConselVatives and distributing them
lavishly to Liberals, the registrars could steal every election. These
fears were well founded. Highly placed Liberals admitted publicly that
fraud and violence were rampant in the countryside and that they
were powerless to stop them-the same bitter complaint of Carlos E.
Restrepo and all other Colombians not blinded by partisanship.
National leaders could formulate humane, insightful programs at
the national level, and, as in the case of L6pez's land law of 1936,
exercise a certain gross control over the system. But in the fine control
of political behavior the national government failed, and in the villages
and veredas national party directorates lost control over their faithful
after whipping up emotions with grandiloquent rhetoric. The words of
the nation's leaders might ring loudly in the heat of political debate,
but they wore poorly over time and echoed only faintly in the offices of
venal bureaucrats--eorbatas and manzanillos, as they were called by
the common man-that were tucked away in remote comers of the
republic. Colombia's was a predictable, yet strangely unmanageable,
political system.
After just a few years under the new regime, the country was
spinning helplessly in the familiar circle of political cOITUption and
one-party rule: first came the Liberal takeover; then political abuses;
then ConselVative abstention, which invited further abuses. It was a
road leading nowhere. Meanwhile, Conservative criticism of every-
thing Liberal helped undermine the uLiberal Republic" and give it a
patina of illegality. Colombia's leaders seemingly worked hard to
The Invisible State 85

sabotage their own political system. Examples of the self-destructive

bent in national politics abounded in the years of Liberal rule. Particu-
larly flagrant cases originated in the municipal bureaucracies of To-
lima.
A chief duty of every tolimense governor was finding suitable candi-
dates to fill the myriad of appointive positions at the local level. Even
though it was one of the smallest Colombian departments) Tolima
consisted of forty municipios} which meant that number of alcaldlas
needed to be staffed at every change of administration. A new governor
usually named his friends to important posts) and to lesser ones as
well. Finding qualified} or at least willing} candidates to serve in the
larger and more prosperous municipalities was not so difficult. Al-
caldes in places like Ibague and Honda received decent salaries and
had patronage of their own to dispense.
But the situation was not so rosy in the smaller} more remote towns)
where salary and fringe benefits were so poor as to be insulting and
local de facto power structures were often dominated by members of
the opposition party. In such cases) highly qualified administrators
could rarely be procured} and the governor was reduced to digging
deep into his supply of candidates for someone willing to accept the
posts. Governor Juan E. Largacha found himself in such a position
early in 1937} as he desperately plumbed his pool of available talent for
a Liberal who would accept the thankless task of administering Santa
Isabel. He finally plucked a political hack named Marco Tulio Gutier-
rez from the deepest dregs of the patronage barrel. The latter's
acceptance of the nomination marked him as an insensitive man)
perhaps a bit unbalanced) for what Liberal in his right mind would
voluntarily make the endless journey up to the somber mountaintop
that was peopled with hostile and violent Conservatives?
As it turned out} Alcalde Gutierrez was amply qualified to withstand
the stresses of seIVing as Liberal administrator of Santa Isabel. As a
matter of fact) in this man the Conservatives of Santa Isabel had met
their match. Upon anival) he sUITOunded himself with a group of
trigger-happy municipal police who took delight in making the citi-
zenry "pay" for real or imagined crimes. Even before he completed his
first month in office) local leaders were begging Conservatives in
Ibague to lay their case before Governor Largacha. To gather the most
damning evidence possible) Conservatives from the capital sent Dr.
86 Chapter 3

Nicanor Velasquez to make an investigation. Within a week} he was

back with an account of mayoral malevolence that stood ConselVative
hair on end.
According to Velasquez} Gutierrez had been alcalde of HeIVeo and
Villahermosa before coming to Santa Isabel} and his implication in
cattle-rustling operations had led to his removal from office. In Santa
Isabel} he was accused of allowing the police to shoot at ConselVatives
without provocation} and on one occasion was fired on by his own
men when they mistook him for tithe godo Humberto Zambrano. JJ
Local ConselVatives who complained of these acts were required to fill
out depositions at the municipal police station while surrounded by
officers brandishing clubs and pistols. He not only refused to obey
orders of the municipal judge} who was a ConselVative} but also
tllaughed at his decisions/' and levied fines against merchants and
other businessmen at his whim. In the area of voter registration} his
record was no better. \Vhen ConselVatives came in to register and pick
up their voting cards} the mayor informed them that the election
commissioner was out of town} and} if they insisted on being regis-
tered} legal obstacles would be placed in their path. If all else failed}
Gutierrez would threaten to see that the ConselVatives were drafted
into the annyl
The investigative report subsequently printed in Ibague's ConselVa-
tive newspaper El Derecho, ended by quoting a municipal policeman
who was overheard to say} we will win the concejo elections though
U

we may have to kill many godos,JJ a taunt the writer answered by

declaring that ConselVatives of Santa Isabel would vote with or with-
out police protection tlbecause 300 leftists will never run over 2}500
ConseIVatives ... who enjoy the pulchritude of youth and an extraor-
dinary faith in their principles ... God} order} home} state and all
things clean and good. JJ32
Nicanor Velasquez's newspaper article was \NIitten in the heat of the
moment} but the accuracy of many parts of it was borne out over time.
In spite of the alcaldeJs efforts} ConselVatives decisively won the next
election for concejales and kept on winning until 1941} when the
Liberals gained their first victory in Santa Isabe1.33 And someone really
was after Humberto Zambrano} for tithe godo JJ was killed by a Liberal
just a week after Velasquez filed his report. Perhaps piqued at not
The Invisible State 87

having murdered Zambrano themselves} the municipal police at-

tacked his funeral party as it returned from the cemetezy.34
North of Santa Isabel} beyond the coffee-covered mountains of
Libano} was Villahennosa} another small municipio peopled by indus-
trious famlers of Antioquian descent} most of whom were Conserva-
tives. Nevertheless} after 1930 the Liberals there fully expected to take
power locally} for the presidency was theirs} and history showed that
not even the most stubborn local majority could weather the loss of
the bureaucracy. Were they not destined to win out in the long run?
Villahennosa's leading Liberal} Antonio Jose Restrepo} explained the
logic of power and spoils. In September 1936 he sent a letter to
Ibague's leading Liberal newspaper explaining why the party had not
been able to break the Conservative hold on municipal corporations
even after controlling government at the national and departmental
levels for six years:

Liberalism is vel)' much resented in this community. Without exaggera-

tion I can state that we would have won out over the ConseIVatives in
the recent elections for concejo ifwe had been given more support from
the departmental government. We needed such help from the govern-
ment in order to preseIVe the strength we had built with the help of
alcalde Juan B. Yepes, a man whom we trust implicitly.... Nevertheless
we did poll 841 votes, which in comparison with the 90 that we polled in
1931} shows that had we only been given the support of Governor Parga
[Rafael Parga Cortes] we would have won the elections.

Turning to the important nexus between votes and police} Restrepo

continued:

But this isn't the only way we have been let down. According to Article
3 of Ordinance #72 of 1931} a Departmental Police Post was authorized
for the vereda of Primavera; had the post been established we would
have had a school where a large number of the inhabitants of this region
would have been made Liberals.

Finally} touching on the politicization of local magistrates} he con-

cluded:

We are angered beyond words that our judgeship has been done away
with. Many have been the efforts of Liberalism here to realize the
Liberalization of Villahermosa} and our most important aid was the
88 Chapter 3

judgeship that has been abolished. We must confess that we have lost
our best political arm} and therefore we will have to expect this town
soon to become a formidable ConselVative stronghold} where our com-
patriots can be counted on the fingers of your hand.
Let us add . . . from this time we are ceasing to work for Liberal victory
here because we are so certain of defeat without departmental sup-
port. 35

Liberals of Villahennosa did not cease working for the party} for far
too much depended on their continuing the fight. They labored
diligently through the alcalde and other appointed officials to com-
plete their domination of local government. Finally} in 1943} they
succeeded in winning control of the municipal concejo.38 According to
complaints of the defeated ConseIVatives} several subterfuges made
the victory possible. They accused the Liberal alcalde of denying
voting cards to the ConseIVatives and of using police agents in the
veredas of Primavera (the post was established after Antonio Jose
Restrepo}s letter of 1936)} Quebradanegra} and Pavas to organize Lib-
eral rallies.31 During the election} Liberals from Murillo} in the munici-
pio of Libano} went to Quebradanegra to vote and frightened away
Conservatives with machetes. As a result} 288 Liberal votes were polled
there and only 10 ConseIVative ones. In the vereda of Primavera} more
than eighty children voted because the poll watcher was somewhere
else drinking aguardiente with other Liberals. In the strongly Conser-
vative area of Pavas} the Liberals polled nearly twice the number of
Conservative votes.38
\Nhen the new Liberal concejo met in November 1943} it refused to
allow the Conservative members access to an important committee}
voted pay raises for themselves} reduced the salary of the ConseIVative
town treasurer} proposed to close the local parochial high school}
fired the treasurer}s assistant because he was a ConseIVative} and
named in his place the brother of one of the new concejales. 39 The long
arm of the concejo even reached into the municipal electric plant.
According to EI Derecho, of Ibague} the Liberal concejales fired all the
skilled operators} replaced them with unskilled Liberal ones} and
squandered the fund set aside for upkeep. The correspondent added
laconically that the plant had not been running well since.1tO
The tonnenting of their partisans in Villahermosa} Santa Isabel} and
other Colombian municipalities did not go unnoticed by leaders of the
The Invisible State 89

ConselVative party. During their self-imposed political exile, they

constantly probed for weak spots in the Liberal regime and exploited
them to the fullest advantage whenever the opposition stumbled.
Stentorian speeches in representative assemblies, radio broadcasts,
books, newspapers, magazine articles-all were tools through which
the political "outs" could blast their opposition and whip up the
emotions of rank-and-file party members. "Two Hundred Thousand
Dead" screamed a typical headline in Floro Saavedra}s sectarian
weekly El Derecho} in Ibague, that introduced an editorial which read
in part: "'When the street, the plaza, the vereda} the temple, the home
are replete with dead ConselVatives; when two hundred thousand of
our men have fallen-the pure, the good-hearted; those who know
how to love the republic-when in two hundred thousand homes
prayers are offered up for the well-being of those souls, then ... the
ConselVative Party will be the best sentinel of the nation."41
From the floor of Colombia}s Congress, Representative Augusto
Ramirez Moreno delivered a series of speeches in which he deplored
Liberal crimes against his constituents. They were printed and widely
read by ConselVatives under the titles "Three Years of Fraud and
Violence/} "The Crimes of Santa Isabel/} and "Goings on in Tolima."
Four years later, Ramirez dedicated his book La. crisis del partido
conservador en Colombia to his constituents in Tolima.42 One of the
best-known works of ConselVative criticism was party leader Laureano
G6mez}s Comentarios a un regimen} published in 1934. Lashing Presi-
dent Olaya Herrera for permitting atrocities during his term in office,
he angrily charged that ConselVatives could never hope to recapture
the presidency until "the systematic and bloody coercion ... and
abuses of the authorities" in Boyaca, the Santanderes, Bolivar, Cundin-
amarca, and Valle del Cauca were ended. The book was G6mez}s
explanation of the logic underlying his abstention policy.
The ConselVative counterattack gained a potent new arm in 1936,
when Laureano G6mez and Jose de la Vega founded the Bogota daily
newspaper El Siglo. That important event followed a stroke that had
felled G6mez as he spoke on the floor of the Senate a year earlier.
During months in seclusion while overcoming temporary paralysis, he
had time to study the course his personal friend Alfonso L6pez was
charting for the country, a course he believed would plunge it into "a
whirlpool at whose center is homicidal anger, the incendiary}s torch,
90 Chapter 3

abject iITeligious passion) the rancorous en\)' of all who have failed at
life) civil war) the breakdown of our nationality and the end of
Colombia."43 The growing militance of G6mez's public utterances
moved President L6pez to send an emissary to his home in barrio
Fontib6n to mollify the ConseIVative chief. The president's messenger)
Alberto Ueras) found G6mez so stricken he could barely speak) though
he did manage to tell the young Liberal of his feelings. uAlfonso didn't
want to trick me/' he told Ueras) Ubut there is something behind him
that won't let him do what he wants-perhaps the Masons."44
G6mez identified L6pez and the Liberals as the source of all con-
temporary social ills) and he would later make El Sigl0 his tool for
spreading his message of salvation for the nation. As G6mez put it:

El Sigl0 was founded because the country was passing through a time of
violence, and therefore it was indispensable to create a newspaper to
defend the lives and property of fellow party members. It is a short,
simple story: The division between Valencia and Vasquez Cobo [Guil-
lermo Valencia and Alfredo Vasquez Cobol 1930] determined the fall of
the Conservative party. The Presidency, therefore, passed into Liberal
hands. In the elections that followed the Conservatives obtained a
majority in the House as well as in the Senate. Out of the Conservative
triumph sprang two phenomena up to that time unknown in the nation:
fraud and violence. Violence didn't exist in my youth. Perfect peace
reigned after the War of the Thousand Days. You could travel an)'\'Vhere
in the country after dark. 45

Factors in addition to the fear of change and anger over fraud and
violence drove G6mez and other party leaders to take a more militant
stand in the late 1930s. The ConseIVatives suffered a tremendous drop
in their share of the national electorate over the decade) part of which
was caused by on again-off again abstention. Between 1930 and 1933
alone) a period predating their policy of abstention) ConseIVative
voting shrank from 55 to 37 percent.46 This decline coincided with a
challenge to the G6mez leadership from within his own ranks. A group
of young militant Rightists headed by Silvio Villegas called upon
ConseIVatives to abandon G6mez) whose leadership was character-
ized as directionless and impotent) and to join them in a counterrevo-
lution that would lead to the establishment of a new order." To vitiate
U

growing Liberal strength in the cities) Villegas suggested a policy of

agrarian terrorism:
The Invisible State 91

There exists in Colombia a campesino majority that has been oppressed

by urban demagogy. Because of this it is not possible to use the power of
the vote effectively. Therefore it is necessary to use a new tactic
It • only
••

through the use of counterterror," as Hitler has so magistrally ex-

pounded and demonstrated, //can the eternal menace of violence by the
urban proletariat be muted. The Red dictatorship can be smashed only
through employment of its own tactics."47

All these pressures drove the Conservative chief to announce a new

policy early in 1939. A massacre of Conservatives by Liberal police in
the town of Gacheta, Cundinamarca, moved a furious G6mez to
confront Eduardo Santos in the presidential palace: IIUnderstand that
if the government does not fulfill its principal duty of guaranteeing
human life, all of us will take to the streets in self-defense to see that
we are not murdered with impunity."48 The following week, G6mez
announced publicly that all Conservatives were to prepare themselves
to meet violence with violence. IIIntrepid Action" was what he chris-
tened the new official party strategy. No longer would campesinos be
expected merely to register their complaints with party leaders when
insulted or abused by the opposition. The supreme leader in Bogota
had given the order to resist violently, and party members throughout
Colombia scrambled to arm themselves.
Alfonso L6pez was elected to his second term in 1942, after a bitter
and fraud-ridden campaign during which Conservatives supported a
dissident Liberal candidate. The Second World War was wreaking
much hardship on Colombia at the time, strikes were occurring in the
public sector, and rumors of conspiracy and revolt were rampant in
the army.49 On the left, socialists like Antonio Garcia attacked L6pez
and Liberals in general for their IIbetrayal of the revolution"; and, from
the right, came Conservative warnings that lithe return of Senor L6pez
to the presidency will bring great disturbances of public tranquillity."50
Unlike the situation eight years earlier, Conservatives were unified in
opposition to L6pez and immediately launched a vigorous campaign
against what they labeled as the government's majoritarianism, con-
spiracy against the Church, and moral decadence. During 1942 Con-
servative leaders fashioned these themes into an instrument with
which they bludgeoned the Liberals.
Because modernization was steadily turning his party into a na-
tional minority, Laureano G6mez adopted the tactic of denying the
92 Chapter 3

validity of majority rule. The tlone-halfplus one/' as he phrased it} was

a revolutionary concept by which fraudulently elected democratic
governments imposed their will upon the entire country. tlDnder the
present regime/' he said in a 1942 Senate inteIVention} tithe majori-
tarian criteria of the French Revolution are regarded as the supreme
norm of truth and justice."51 That same year} during Senate debate on
L6pez's proposed alteration of the 1887 concordat with the Pope}
G6mez blasted away with the following indictment: tlA country is
always in a situation of grave corruption and moral decadence when it
is moved by the fatal action of the Masonic lodges.... History is
plagued with happenings such as those when the community is
presented with a social situation or a grave moral problem. Instantly
some are called {liberators of souls}' or {defenders of freedom of
thought/ and they drag up the religious (or iITeligious) problem to
excite sectarianism."52
During the second year of L6pez's term} the ConseIVatives stepped
up their barrage of criticism and concentrated on the issue of moral
corruption in government. Everything from unsavory business deal-
ings by the president's sons to accusations that Liberal police in
Bogota had executed a petty political enemy were aired daily in the
pages of EI Sig/o and other antigovernment newspapers. The scuITi-
lous attacks reached such intensity in early 1944 that police aITested
Laureano G6mez on a charge of libeling Minister of Government
Alberto Ueras. L6pez later explained the action by telling Colombians
that the leaders of tlIntrepid Action" were involved in open subversion}
notably in their attempts to undermine the loyalty of army officers.53
The president's assessment of the situation was accurate} for} just
four months after the G6mez jailing} right-wing officers kidnapped
him while he was attending army maneuvers in the department of
Narifio. L6pez was taken to a hacienda called tlConsaca/' from which
he obseIVed the speedy failure of the revolt.54 He could find little
comfort in recognizing that only one anny brigade} headquartered in
Ibague} was disloyal to him and that a majority of people seemed to
support his government over the proposed military one. In the wake of
his personal humiliation} he felt powerless to cope with the country's
continuing turmoil. After struggling through another year} he resigned
and passed the presidency to his designadoJ Alberto Ueras Camargo.
The Invisible State 93

During his last year} L6pez made many speeches} perhaps the most
important of which he delivered before the Senate on May 15} 1944.
That speech} portions of which were repeated in his final presidential
address} offered a view of national politics which left no doubt that the
unending attacks on the central government had seriously impaired
its functioning at a time when the steady expansion of its programs
had} in the words of a noted Colombian economist} given it a truly
It

impressive panoply of action."ss Such programs were desperately

needed by the nation} but they were stillborn. The corrosive acid of
partisanship attacked them at conception} ensuring that they would
never become forces for national unification.
In his speech} the president painted a grim picture of increasing
political fragmentation} even as state centralization moved apace. He
described the process whereby departmental political leaders were
increasingly concentrated in the capital of the republic} where they
gradually lost touch with the electorate. This tendency to Itmain-
tain ... electoral domain through remote control/' as well as It new
factors of disorder" created by urbanization and the gro\tVth of the
industrial sector} convinced him that strong presidential leadership
was vital.s8-Sadly} such leadership on his part was impossible. In what
stands out as the most damning admission of all} L6pez claimed that
"the authority of the chief executive is broken and diminished"-this
coming even before his humiliating kidnapping. He did not mince
words in telling the senators what he saw in the future. Unless all
these defects were remedied by constitutional revision} the republic
would become ttinvisible."
The teIm "invisible republic" was not simply a dramatic metaphor
employed by L6pez to rationalize his o\'Vl1 failings. Others sensed a
new element of disorder in national life as well. One Liberal journalist
labeled Colombia as La. Republica Invivible (The Unlivable Republic)
and bewailed the need for Bogota to be put under military rule in 1944
as a result of disturbances provoked by ConseIVative university stu-
dents.57 Because the civil government was unable to police even the
national capital} it is small wonder that the "panoply" of new pro-
grams formulated to address pressing national needs remained
stunted and ineffective. But that was hardly the worst aspect of the
breakdo\'Vl1 in Bogota. After all} regional Colombia had always limped
94 Chapter 3

along with little attention from the capital, and it could continue to do
so in the future. By far the worst feature of governmental collapse was
the fact that there seemed to be no acceptable alternative for the
citizens but to follow the leadership offered by their party chiefs.
Hence, irresponsible partisanship was substituted for the positive
leadership of a modem bureaucratic state. The effect of this situation
upon the provinces was stated by one of the few moderates in national
politics at that time. Speaking to campesino leaders during his year as
president, Alberto Ueras indicted the whole political leadership of the
nation. ((The barbarians aren't the campesinos)" he told them; ((rather,
they are the ones who from above move the abominable machinery
which produces the [partisan] effect. \\!hen you read in newspapers of
the capital phrases such as shed even the last drop of blood/ you
t

know what it means. \\!hen hatred is sovvn in the cities, you of the
villages sow dead in the humble earth. JJ58
Lleras lived in the city, but he was sensitive to the failure of the
state-the polarized and ((invisible" Colombian state-in meeting the
needs of the "lethargic and desolate" provincial backcountry. After its
brave attempt to revolutionize the nation through peaceful means in
the 1930s, the ((Liberal Republic" had defrauded the people, and none
more thoroughly than the campesinos. President Ueras spoke to this
point in his address to the Society of Agriculturists on March 5) 1946:

When we speak, for example of the majorities who make up the

democratic system} or of mass opinion, what are we talking about? Are
we talking about the will of all Colombians, or of just small} ardent urban
groups that hear and speak the political language of more homogene-
ous} compact civilizations? And when we refer to campaigns of rural
health, credit or education that are going to save the campesino, don't
we know that at the most those programs reach [only] the villages
[ald.eas]} and the upper echelon of Colombian society? And when we
speak of increases in salaries, or better commodity prices, do we speak
for higher wages for agricultural laborers or higher prices for his product
in the marketplace? No. Among the seventy-one percent of our [rural-
dwelling] fellow citizens and the rest of society, there is no direct
communication, there is no contact, there are no roads} there are no
channels of direct interchange. Fifteen minutes from Bogota there are
campesinos who belong to another age} to another social class and
culture, separated from us by centuries. 59
The Invisible State 95

The nation described by President Ueras in 1946 was a grotesque

distortion of the humane) progressive one that Liberal leaders had set
out to create sixteen years earlier. And nothing better illustrates the
contradictions inherent in a modernizing society where most citizens
lived at primitive levels than the agricultural department of Tolima.
 4

Preface to the Violencia

A HalVest of Spoils

The population of Tolima in 1946 was young} vigorous} and largely

rural. Fifty-five percent of the department's 656}000 people were less
than fifteen years of age} and 70 to 80 percent of them lived in rural
areas. Yet} the population density was an uncrowded twenty-eight
persons per square kilometer.1 Frontier expansion continued in the
south and southeast} while the more centrally located towns and
cities burgeoned. Anzoategui and Santa Isabel} at the southern edge of
antioqueiio settlement} grew 149 and 158 percent} respectively} in the
1918-38 period; and Ataco} the southernmost municipality in Tolima}
190 percent. Another rural area experiencing high growth was the east}
where an influx of population occurred during the depression-ridden
1920s and 1930s. The to\VIlS of AImero and Ibague led all others with
growth rates of 144 and 103 percent} respectively. Their 3.4 per 100
population annual rate of reproduction made tolimenses one of the
world's most fertile peoples.
A persistent problem throughout the department was the grave
disparity between income and standard of living. In 1948 the five most
prosperous municipios-Ibague} AImero} Libano} Honda} and Chapar-
ral-produced as much revenue as the remaining thirty-four. This
meant that most municipalities were forced to exist on budgets often
insufficient to provide their people with even the most rudimentary
public seIVices. The lot of the average citizen was analogous to that of
the smaller} more impoverished municipio. He was a poor campesino
96
Preface to the Violencia 97

who in all probability worked another's land at the prevailing wage of

two pesos per day. Although this amount was sufficient to fill a market
basket in 1946-milk was selling for eleven cents a bottle} beans
twenty-two cents a pound} potatoes fourteen cents} rice twenty
cents-commodity prices were escalating 10 percent annually and
meat had increased in cost 400 percent over the previous decade. Add
to this the fact that nearly three-quarters of all tolimenses owned no
real property} and a picture of widespread poverty emerges.2
Sixty percent of the people were illiterate in the 1940s} a statistic in
part explained by the physical isolation of a dispersed population.3
Only 25 percent of tolimense children attended school} and in the
campo the figure was much lower. Campesino families usually lived
close to the land they worked} in small thatched-roof houses whose
walls were constructed of mud and wattle. In many places} corrugated
tin roofs were starting to replace those made of natural materials} and
the more affluent farmers enjoyed concrete floors. Campo cooking was
done over wood fires} and light was usually supplied by candles or
kerosene lanterns. Electric lighting was a luxury known only to the
cabeceras, and as late as 1946 most of the smaller towns still did not
have their own power plants.
Poor transportation continued to plague the department in the
1940s. The thousand or so kilometers of highways were adequate for
vehicular traffic} but not many of them penetrated the cordillera. A
majority of the coffee-growing municipios, where the larger portion of
departmental income was earned} were not even linked to their
municipal seats by roads. Wealthy Lfbano completed its highway only
in 1935} but it was unpaved} constantly blocked by landslides} and
impassable during much of the rainy season. Mules} horses} and
burros were the prefeITed and} in most cases} the only means of
transportation available. Every municipality possessed a network of
trails over which pack and saddle animals picked their way} though
sometimes they were so crude that a trip of more than a few kilome-
ters exhausted both beast and rider. Indeed} some of these thorough-
fares were passable only by foot.
Thousands of tolimense families were a day's travel from the nearest
aldea-which may have been nothing more than a tiny tienda at the
crossing of two trails. Its walls were invariably decorated with faded
signs urging the passing campesino to uDIink Colombiana [soda]!" or
98 Chapter 4

reminding him that ItCorona [beer] tastes better}); amidst these adver-
tisements were peeling signs and scrawled slogans from the most
recent political campaign. Travel directly between mountain munici-
pios required the crossing of countless steep ridges} which radiated
out from the massif of the cordillera} over thread-like trails that
stretched through coffee-covered hillsides} up and down precipitous}
densely forested} and frequently unpopulated slopes. This painstaking
process of intradepartmental upland travel was the rule from Alpu-
jarra} in the extreme southeast} northward to Icononzo; and from
HeIVeo} in the northwest} down to Ataco. No north-south highway
linked any two upland municipios in 1946.
Travel on the llano was not much easier and was usually a good deal
more uncomfortable. Only a few hundred feet above sea level and
between three and six degrees north of the equator} it was a place of
oppressive heat where a variety of stinging and biting insects like the
garrapata tormented humans and animals alike. There} as in the
mountains} most travel was by horse or muleback} though cars and
trucks could laboriously make their way along the rocky} unpaved
road paralleling the Magdalena from Honda south all the way into
Huila. Because few bridges crossed the many streams flowing into the
Magdalena} the traveler was forced to descend naITOW washes and
ford streams; when cloudbursts made them impassable} hours of
waiting were necessary. Two roads crossed Tolima from east to west.
The better was the paved Bogota highway. The other} less-traveled}
one} was the Honda-Manizales route to the north.
In addition to being one of the nation's leading coffee-growing
departments} Tolima contributed other foods and fibers that were
consumed in Bogota and the rest of Colombia. The llano had tradition-
ally produced cattle and sugarcane} but by the 1940s new crops such
as rice} cotton} and sesame were becoming important wherever irriga-
tion was available. Along the Saldana and Magdalena rivers in the
municipios of Guamo} Espinal} and Flandes} irrigated fields were seen
with increasing frequency during the decade. Such lands produced
many times what they had when supporting cattle and} because of the
changeover to nontraditional agricultural products} boosted the llano
economy.
A majority of landowning tolimenses were relatively recent arrivals
who had moved into the uplands during various waves of colonization
Preface to the Violencia 99

since 1840. They were proud and independent farmers who were
dedicated to cultivation of the lucrative coffee bean. As such} they
formed a relatively affluent middle class that was distributed evenly
across the department wherever coffee flourished. Although physical
isolation forced coffee growers to accept a primitive standard of living}
their economic future was bright} for they produced a valuable cash
crop. And they only needed to plant bushes to increase their wealth.
Were it not for the nagging} divisive problems of a political nature}
tolimenses might have built on their strengths and eventually raised
the standard of living throughout the agriculturally rich department.
Evenhanded government at the national} state} and local levels might
have allowed them to continue their progress into the second half of
the twentieth century} and moderate action in the area of social
reform could have lifted the marginal population out of its unhappy
straits. However} the government of Tolima was anything but moder-
ate} and the direction it gave during the 1940s was destructive rather
than creative. In 1946 the department and its people were moving
toward economic prosperity} but along a path that traversed an abyss.
Presently} they would stumble into it and would not drag themselves
out} maimed and mutilated} for twenty long years.
On April20} 1946} Liberal Governor Ricardo Bonilla inaugurated the
Assembly of Tolima on a grim note. He began by telling the deputies
that the horizon was clouded by labor unrest and growing political
tension. The thrust of his message was that everyone must work to see
that violence did not mar the upcoming presidential election} a
difficult undertaking inasmuch as passions had continued to run high
following the two uvehement and agitated" elections of the previous
year.4 The governor's address implicitly recognized that Colombians
enjoyed no respite from a civil tradition that demanded frequent and
divisive elections. In 1945 separate contests had occurred for renewal
of the national Chamber of Representatives and departmental assem-
blies; in 1946 the presidential election was slated; and} the following
year} two more electoral bouts were to take place. The cycle went on
with fateful and usually fatal regularity.
Governor Bonilla and the Assembly's Liberal majority were con-
cerned with more than peacekeeping. They were in imminent danger
of losing the approaching election} and with it their jobs. Earlier in the
year} it had appeared that the Liberals would not need to wony about
100 Chapter 4

Jorge Eliecer Gaitlm campaigning for the presidency, standing with Colonel
Jose Ram6n Rodriguez, veteran of the War of the Thousand Days, 1946.
(Courtesy Lunga)

facing a Conservative challenge in the presidential race, a "normal"

condition that dated back to the h0aIY abstention policy of 1935. Then,
with breathtaking suddenness, Laureano G6mez abandoned this ap-
proach. In March 1946 he engineered the nomination of moderate
Conservative Mariano Ospina Perez and set to work mobilizing his
Preface to the Violencia 101

party. Not much political acumen was required to see that the Liber-
als, saddled with two candidates and facing a thoroughly divided
electorate, were in trouble. Just sixteen years earlier, the Conservative
party had lost a presidential election under similar circumstances,
and now it seemed to be the Liberals' tum. They were hopelessly at
odds over the candidacies of populist Jorge Eliecer Gaitan and estab-
lishment politician Gabriel Turbay. The former was an avowed Leftist
whose impassioned attacks on Colombian elites, the tloligarchy" as he
called them, appealed to blue-collar workers and the nation's lower
castes. The latter was a party regular who was best known for his skill
in manipulating complex party mechanisms.
As the May 5 election drew near, desperate last-minute efforts of the
Liberal establishment failed to win Gaitan's withdrawal, and Ospina
Perez won a plurality. Jubilation in the Conservative camp was
matched by gloom and frustration among the Liberals. To Ospina's
566,000 votes, they polled 800,000, some 359,000 of which were gaitan-
ista votes.5 As Ospina made preparations for a triumphal march to the
presidential palace, Gaitan resigned himself to waiting four more years
for the presidency, and a bitter Turbay burned his personal archives
and left the country for Europe, never to return.6
Liberal tolimenses first reacted to Ospina's victory with shock and
vowed never to give up their hard-won political power. After all, was
not Tolima a proven Liberal department where the faithful had cast
61,000 votes to a paltry 34,000 for the Conservatives?7 As Ospina's
inauguration drew near, they parroted the veiled threats that ap-
peared in mass-circulation Liberal newspapers such as El Tiempo and
El Espectador to the effect that, if the new chief executive insisted on
firing Liberal officeholders, trouble would ensue. But at least one
Liberal chided his fellows for demanding of Conservatives a magna-
nimity they were in no way bound to demonstrate: tiThe newspaper
writers who bend the knee and go around believing that the Conserva-
tive Party won the battle of May just so they could leave all Liberal
employees in their posts, and thus continue Liberal government,
could not be more mistaken. Conservatives will take control and will
exercise the rights that are due the victor, and Liberals must prepare
for adversity with manly energy and faith in the future."8
Those strong words of Leonidas Escobar, editor of the Libano
weekly La. Voz del Libano, followed an emotional statement issued by
102 Chapter 4

Liberal leaders in Ibague. At the last regular meeting of the departmen-

tal Assembly, the Liberal majority announced opposition to any col-
laboration with the government of Mariano Ospina Perez and declared
that (ltraitors" who dealt with him would be read out of the party: ttWe
consider it indispensable that the party establish drastic and definitive
sanctions against those who betray the high ideals of the cause. In the
present emergency we invite the Liberal population of Colombia to
form a united front of resistance before the political violence un-
leashed by groups of ConseIVatives after May 5th."g
In spite of these dire pronouncements, Tolima remained tranquil
during and after the election. The only trouble took place in Villaher-
mosa, where exuberant ConseIVatives celebrated their victory by firing
pistols into the air. The town lost its civilian mayor as a result, and a
military officer replaced him as alcalde. A few individual acts of
violence occurred, such as the machete attack on a campesino named
Miguel Rico. According to one newspaper report on the incident, a
ConseIVative named Arturo Bustamante shouted ttvulgar and offensive
insults about the Liberal party," drew his peinilla, and wounded Rico,
no doubt after the latter had said equally offensive things about the
ConseIVatives.10
Ironically, the most serious threat to departmental stability came
from the Liberals themselves. As soon as Ospina was sworn in, scores
of Liberal officeholders tendered their resignations, which caused a
brief but severe dislocation of public services. The national police
suffered the most from these resignations; Major Gordillo, commander
of the corps, departed, as well as many lower-ranking officers.ll Presi-
dent Ospina, on the other hand, did what he could to assure toli-
menses and other Colombians of his intention to govern the country
through a ttNational Union" coalition of ConseIVatives and Liberals.
The first governor he named was a Liberal, and Liberal alcaldes were
sent to strongly Liberal municipalities. Nevertheless, the process of
naming ConseIVatives to posts within the departmental bureaucracy
moved along at a perceptible pace.
After the shock of loss passed, Liberals realized that their power
base was more secure than they had first thought. They controlled an
overwhelming majority of municipal concejos, dominated the Assem-
bly, and filled most departmental police forces. Had Tolima continued
to enjoy the same degree of insulation from greater Colombia that it
Preface to the Violencia 103

had a century-or even half a century-earlier) when communications

were in a more rudimentcuy stage) its people could perhaps have
maintained their equanimity in the face of grave events taking place
beyond departmental borders. But that was not the case in an age
when radios and mass-circulation newspapers sped word of faraway
events to remote hamlets.
The news that reached Tolima in 1946 was grave indeed. In that
year) serious political violence began breaking out in the Eastern
Cordillera departments of Boyaca) Santander) and Santander del
Norte. Those three provinces occupied 20 percent of the land covered
by Colombia's departments and contained about a fifth of the nation's
population) dispersed over extremely broken teITain.12 The three de-
partments fonned the most politically polarized part of the country
and had been the scene of much political violence during and after the
change of government in 1930.13 Places like Saboya) in Boyaca) and
Guaca) Piedecuesta) and Capitanejo) in Santander) became so famous
for their political violence in the early thirties that one Liberal was
moved to suggest that the only way definitively to end the problem in
U

the Santanderes would be to line all ConseIVatives up facing a wall and

shoot them in the back."14 ConseIVatives in those towns of the Eastern
Cordillera remembered bitterly the Liberal persecution of the 1930s
and intended to avenge it.
The bloodshed in Boyaca received impetus from a common belief
that boyacenses were by nature "'gobernista,J1 or inclined to vote for
whichever party held office in Bogota.1! Recent history bore out the
accusation. \tVhere boyacenses gave the ConseIVatives 60 percent of
their vote in 1930} by 1942 only 25 percent were voting ConseIVative.18
One writer marveled at the phenomenal change} attributing to virtue
and dynamic political leadership what ConseIVatives saw as the
machinations of a liberal cacique: uPlinio Mendoza Neira ... was one
of the most dynamic of the Boyaca political chiefs. Under his impetu-
ous action during the first years of the government of Olaya} Liberalism
grew in that department with unexpected fertility."17
As reports of political violence filtered into Bogota from Boyaca and
the Santanderes in mid-1946) they were retransmitted to the rest of the
country by commentators who magnified and embellished them with
doomsday rhetoric. Polemical organs of the mass media amplified the
bad news) boomed it across the width and breadth of the land} and
104 Chapter 4

strock fear into some hearts and anger in others. By this insidious
process, Colombians far removed from the actual events were made
acutely aware of what was going on. Liberals in relatively peaceful,
out-of-the-way places such as the corregimiento of Convenio, in
Tolima, were thus moved to telegraph their congressional representa-
tives protesting the tloutrages" being committed against compatriots
in Boyaca and demanding that the tlConselVative barbarism" in that
department be halted.18
Party spokesmen in Bogota and other urban areas used every
incident as another weapon in the mounting attack on Ospina's
national leadership. Liberal leaders pounded away at his inability to
stop the violence in much the same way Laureano G6mez had buried
Alfonso L6pez under a mountain of invective a few years before.
Although other issues were available in the Liberal arsenal of criti-
cism-rampant inflation and labor unrest troubled the country during
the years immediately following World War II-nothing could arouse
public opinion the way tales of political violence could. Every time
party chiefs blasted Ospina as an incompetent, Liberals in Tolima and
other parts of Colombia grew more scomful of the central government.
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was the heir apparent to Liberal party leader-
ship following Ospina's assumption of power, and as such his role was
a crocial one. Unfortunately for the Liberals, Gaitan had little of the
flinty single-mindedness of Laureano G6mez. Gaitan was torn between
showing no quarter in attacking the government and seeking ways of
cooperating with ConselVatives to reduce tension in the nation. He
alternately lifted his followers to a frenzy with harangues against the
president and then used his prestige to calm passions, as in a
short-lived accord with Laureano G6mez in September 1947. Gaitan's
waffling confused his followers and weakened the Liberal party. \tVhen
Ospina was elected, Gaitan outspokenly opposed any cooperation
with the president-elect's proposed bipartisan National Union govern-
mentj he loftily explained that Liberals who selVed in Ospina's govern-
ment would become tlconselVatized" in short order.19
In Gaitan's defense it must be said that the wealthy and aristocratic
Ospina refused to offer him a Cabinet post, undoubtedly because of
Gaitan's seeming radicalism as well as his unwashed and raucous
urban followers. The president-elect thus brought only moderate
Liberals into his government. Ospina's slighting of Gaitan was criti-
Preface to the Violencia 105

cized even by staunch Conservatives.. who understood that) without

his participation) true bipartisan rule was impossible.20 This intransi-
gence on both sides gave Gaitan free rein to bait and attack Ospina
from the latter's first moments in office. Typical of Gaitan's oratory was
the address he gave during simultaneous House-Senate debates in
September 1946:

Study the spiritual stance of the President before the tragic events which
are being registered throughout the country and one is surprised by the
smiling optimism of his messages, as if he were undecided as to whether
he should try to staunch a hemolThage. Contrast this attitude with the
one he adopted during a recent crisis in the stock market which
touched off panic among speculators and the privileged classes. \Vhen
that happened the president mobilized the whole official community
and struggled day and night to work out the problem to the benefit of
the stockbrokers. But when he tries to do something about the fratricidal
drama of Liberals and ConseIVatives there isn't time) there's no huny,
there is no staying up all night-only, shades of Hamlet, words, words,
wordS. 21

During the latter months of 1946) national attention focused on the

Valle del Cauca and Cali) its capital city) where organized labor called a
series of crippling strikes that resulted in the suspension of civil
liberties there on November 8. A militmy governor was sent to Valle)
and he used the army to break the strike. Liberals in Congress reacted
angrily) ordering moderate colleagues serving in Ospina's Cabinet to
resign. They also sent telegrams to every department ordering the
resignation of all Liberals who owed their jobs to the bipartisan
government. Ospina's Cabinet crisis blew over when he refused to
accept the resignations) but national political stability had suffered
another blow. In Tolima) some Liberal officeholders resigned their
positions) which allowed a few more bureaucratic posts to pass into
Conservative hands.
During and after the Cabinet crisis of 1946.. Tolima remained quiet.
Liberals were certain of continuing their domination of local politics)
though they were still unable to unite left-leaning gaitanistas and
moderate Liberals. It was thus a dominant) though divided) Liberal
majority that prepared for important congressional elections early in
1947. In January of that year) party members listened to a radio
address in which Jorge Eliecer Gaitan presented an ambitious refonn
106 Chapter 4

program aimed at modernizing the nation. The Liberal party was

declared to be the tlparty of the People," pledged to tlfight against the
forces of reaction which try to impose a fascist or falangist policy" on
the country, a charge aimed at the ConseIVatives and particularly at
the traditionalist Laureano G6mez.zz
The party plank most heartily approved by tolimenses promised the
refonn of tax laws in order to decrease departmental dependence on
liquor taxes. More than half of department-level revenues commonly
came from these levies, a fact that had caused more than one governor
to complain that he was little more than a glorified tavemkeeper.
Popular literature echoed the plaint: tiThe department is an entity as
poor as a Franciscan, and its most ample revenue is the one from
liquors, which I think is better called the alcoholic windfall. Without
this tax the departmental entity couldn't exist. And in order for it to
exist it is necessary to cultivate the vice of drunkenness. . . . [If]
alcoholic consumption increases, the department breathes; if the
people drink less there is a crisis."Z!
The congressional elections of March 1947 came and went, affinning
predictions that Tolima would stay overwhelmingly Liberal. The party
piled up a 150,000-vote majority nationwide in a clear demonstration
of its numerical superiority. A particularly ominous feature of the
contest was the high number of fallen left in its wake: twenty dead and
more than two hundred wounded, many of them in Cundinamarca.
The area of violence seemed to be spreading southward, driven by the
windy rhetoric of Bogota politicians, given continuity by all too regular
elections, and fed by an abundant supply of campesinos anned with
machetes and courage drawn from the ever-present bottle of aguar-
diente. 24 The violence had not yet reached Tolima, where a new Liberal
governor was sent to Ibague in June. Gonzalo Paris Lozano was known
as a judicious and scholarly Liberal who, it was thought, would be
acceptable to ConseIVatives and Liberals alike. After his first month in
office, he seemed to be living up to expectations that he would
administer departmental affairs tlcorrectly, efficiently," and to the
satisfaction of both parties.~ At that instant, Tolima was an island of
tranquillity sUITOunded by a sea of troubles.
Despite his outward appearance of benign calm, President Mariano
Ospina Perez was deeply disturbed by his tenuous hold on the
governmental apparatus, particularly the national police. It was com-
Preface to the Violencia 107

mon knowledge that the Liberals had filled its ranks with their own
partisans during sixteen years of rule and that most of the agents
disliked the country's new leadership. That disaffection explains the
riot of October 31} 1946} in Bogota and the heated exchange that took
place late that evening in President Ospina's outer office. Early in the
day} transportation workers associated with the leftist} Liberal-sup-
ported Confederaci6n de Trabajadores Colombianos (Colombian
Workers Confederation) or CTC) had blocked several downtown
streets} tied up traffic} and caused some damage to public and private
property. They were protesting the rationing of gasoline caused by a
strike of petroleum workers at the refinery center of Barrancabenneja}
Santander. When it became clear that the police on duty in the area
were not going to disperse the irate bus} trolley} and taxi drivers} and
that the disturbance might escalate into a full-scale riot} national
police commander Carlos Vanegas was called in to confer with Presi-
dent Ospina and his Cabinet.
General Vanegas could only offer vague explanations as to why his
police had not halted the demonstration. Even after the meeting} he
failed to take action and contented himself with the dispatching of
mild and ambiguous directives to his men. Rather than proceeding to
the site of the trouble some ten blocks distant} or even to his own
headquarters} he planted himself in a comfortable chair outside Presi-
dent Ospina's office and proceeded to send and receive dispatches
from there. Ospina's private secretary} Dr. Rafael Azula} observed the
maneuverings of police and politicians throughout the day and} like
his superiors} was thoroughly outraged over Vanegas's lack of action.
Finally} Azula walked over to him and hissed: ItThey aren't going to
calm down unless there is fast and energetic action by the authorities
before it's too late." As Azula later described the exchange} General
Vanegas looked up at him and explained that he had a good deal of
affection for Itthose boys" (the rioters) and that it was best to talk them
into dispersing} for anything more extreme on his part would be
counterproductive. Finally} at 11:00 P.M.} even Vanegas realized that his
policy of conquest by kindness had failed and he announced: ((The
situation is grave [and] we can't do any more." The National Army was
sent to end the disturbance.'I.8
Following the Bogota riot and much more serious labor troubles in
Cali a week later) the government stepped up its drive to increase
108 Chapter 4

control of the police. The ConseIVative position was cogently stated by

Laureano G6mez) who told Ospina during the night of October 31: ((We
have inherited an enemy police force that thinks it is still in service to
the Liberal party rather than to the government. To transform this
body isn't the labor of a day. The press) Congress) and Liberal leaders
all rise up in anger before any firing of a policeman} no matter how just
the action may be. The task is) therefore} very arduous. But we must
attack it) because one gets power in order to govern) and society
cannot remain defenseless. JJ27
Within two months of the Bogota and Cali upsets) General Carlos
Vanegas was on his way to Brazil at the head of a diplomatic mission.
He had asked to be relieved of his command when Chief of Security
Heman Quinones Olarte began firing police officers who he felt were
not loyal to Ospina's government. A new chief) retired army general
and ConseIVative Delfin TOrTeS Duran) was named as his replacement.
Not content with merely purging police ranks of militant Liberals}
Qumones Olarte conceived a plan for creating a special Upolitical
police" force to watch for crimes of that nature. A roar of protest went
up from Liberals} who branded the security chief's scheme as one of
ucreole czarism."28 Ospina Perez vetoed the proposal) which had
already won the approval of Minister of Government Roberto Urdaneta
and police commander Delfin TOrTeS} but the very fact that it had been
proposed by a high-ranking official seemed to be proof that the police
corps was on its way to becoming uConseIVatized."
Ospina's troubles with the CTC did not end when he smashed the
Cali strike. Early in 1947 he learned that) to dramatize its running
battle with his Unative ... gestapo/' as union spokesmen called the
armed forces} the CTC planned a general strike for the first of May.29
\\!hen that day arrived) the government was prepared for the worst}
though it need not have been. The general strike failed simply because
the CTC lacked the strength to make it effective. Several months
earlier) ConseIVative forces had effectively undercut the CTC by found-
ing the Church-dominated Uni6n de Trabajadores Colombianos (Co-
lombian Workers' Union) or UTC). Nevertheless} the support many
Liberals gave the abortive strike was a further demonstration to Ospina
and others of his official family that it was nothing more than a
frustrated coup attempt-a usubversive movement) international in
inspiration) planned and coordinated by known revolutionary agita-
Preface to the Violencia 109

tors ... and where not openly supported by [the Liberal party])
promoted by opposing Liberal factions. 1J3o The Conservative percep-
tion of Liberals as subversives was sharpened by the events of May
1947) and the two parties found it more difficult to reach a point of
accommodation.
A rule of thumb in Colombia during its time of political troubles was
that the most exaggerated and persistent violence occulTed in places
far removed from effective control by the central government. Yet) from
another perspective) the rule held that) when elites in Bogota blun-
dered) people in the provinces bore the brunt of their error. The
problem of removing sectarian Liberals from police ranks was a prime
case in point. As high-ranking Conservatives in the national capital
began their purge of Liberal police) provincial politicians scurried to
do the same. In Santander) Secretary of Government Pedro Manuel
Arenas searched desperately for loyal Conservatives willing to enter
the departmental corps. Whenever he happened on a likely candidate)
he recommended him to the departmental police chief) who was then
obliged to hire him. "My dear Colonel/' read one such directive to
Commander Luis M. Blanco) "Mr. Luis Francisco Herrera wishes to
join the police force. Permit me to recommend him highly) for he has
all of the qualities we seek in our trainees."
Eight months later) Colonel Blanco confronted the secretary of
government with that as well as other documents and accused Arenas
of turning the police of Santander into a "clan of criminals." The man
so strongly recommended turned out to be a convicted killer and
cattle thief. To further substantiate his claim) Colonel Blanco pro-
duced documents revealing that other of the secretary's "highly rec-
lJ
ommended recruits had committed as many as four homicides as
well as a variety of other crimes) including flight to avoid prosecution.31
Bureaucratic bickering in Santander sank to absurdity when Liber-
als in the departmental Assembly raffled off official vehicles) voted to
pay the governor's salary in centavos (cents) instead of pesos) and
reduced the departmental police force from five hundred to sixty
men.32 The tragicomic opera almost ended definitively three months
later. On an evening in late August) citizens of Santander heard over
their radios the Chamber of Deputies debate the killing of seven
Liberals by Conservative police just across the departmental line in
Moniquira) Boyaca. Liberals wanted to relate this tragedy to their own
110 Chapter 4

worsening violence. As the hour of adjournment drew near, it became

obvious that the Conservatives did not intend to yield the floor to their
adversaries. Finally, Liberal Deputy Ord6flez could stand it no longer;
he picked up a trash basket, hurled it at the Conservative speaker, and
reached for a concealed pistol. Deputies on both sides cried out and
dived for cover. Such pandemonium was created that listeners across
the department were sure that blood flowed in the aisles.33
Deputy Ord6flez did not draw his pistol that night, but no one
doubted that he and his colleagues were armed. Many who could
afford a handgun during those months of tension bought one, and for
the well-dressed legislator a shoulder holster was de rigueur. In May
1947 a minor political dispute in the Assembly of Valle had resulted in
deputies voting with their left hands while holding pistols in their
right.34 By mid-1947 the reconstituted police in several departments
were furnishing weapons to trustworthy Conservatives (gente de con-
jianza), even as Liberals were receiving large shipments of guns and
ammunition across the border from Venezuela.3s
Colombia's leaders were sitting on a powder keg and they knew it.
Election-related violence was nothing new, and neither was news that
some zealous policeman had overstepped his authority and abused
an innocent or not-so-innocent citizen. But the trouble facing the
country in the second year of Mariano Ospina's presidency seemed to
be passing the bounds of all reason and understanding. Bearing those
thoughts in mind} President Ospina faced radio microphones the
night of August 28, 1947, and read a long, rather melancholy address to
the nation. Figuring prominently in the speech was a section titled
simply tiThe Violence":

Recent events, which I have been the first to deplore} continue offering
up ne,,,, victims to senseless political hatreds. These incidents have been
used as decisive arguments against the thesis of National Union, to the
end of achieving its failure and liquidation. . . . But this tragic situation
cannot be used as an infamous accusation against the government over
which I preside, nor is it reasonable or logical to charge the present
administration with responsibility for all events which . . . have set into
motion the bloody cycle of reprisals which we are witnessing with a
disturbed spirit, even as we make desperate and heroic efforts to halt the
implacable storm of intolerance and madness. 3S
Preface to the Violencia 111

In the speech} Ospina praised Laureano G6mez and Jorge Eliecer

Gaitan} who met to draw up an agreement by which a bipartisan
commission would investigate all outbreaks of political violence.
Ospina expressed his faith that the pact would yield u very fruitful
results" because it was the handiwork of Utwo eminent political
leaders who control their respective parties and understand the grave
responsibility weighing upon them."37 Had it worked} the mutual
investigation pact might have detained the headlong rush to violence.
But} as an anomalous creature spawned by antithetical forces in an
inexplicable moment of harmony} it was doomed from the start.
Colombian political institutions were too weak to bear the burdens of
peacekeeping in 1947} and political leaders were too much prisoners
of their own rhetoric to change their ways. To abandon polemic would
have been to discard the weapon G6mez and Gaitan had wielded with
unparalleled success for more than two decades.
Conservatives characterized Laureano G6mez as the ((human
storm" for the way he buffeted opponents in parliamentary debate.
Standing in the public forum with arms outstretched and face flushed)
he delivered his tightly worded speeches in rolling cadences and with
a passion that held friend and foe in rapt attention.
Gaitan characterized himself as a man of the people} and he liked to
harangue large crowds at close quarters. While studying criminal law
in Italy in the 1920s} he had enjoyed the opportunity to observe the
oratorical style of fascist Benito Mussolini. Upon his return to Colom-
bia} Gaitan used some of these speaking techniques to excite his
listeners. He usually began addresses in a low} almost conversational}
tone and gradually increased the tempo of his phrases as well as the
pitch of his voice until the audience was caught up in the rhythmic
cascade of words} applauding and cheering wildly at every pause}
sometimes drowning out their caudillo. Gaitan's humble followers
idolized the short} muscular man who had made their cause his 0\VI1
over the years and who on so many occasions had stood before them}
fist upraised} pledging to defend them forever against venal oligarchs
and shameless plutocrats. He ended every major speech with an
emotional challenge: uIf I lead} follow me; if I falter} give me strength; if
they kill me} avenge me! ;A fa cargal"
The G6mez-Gaitan accord lasted all of a week. Disavowing the
112 Chapter 4

Jorge EliecerGaitan speaking in the Municipal Theater, 1947. (Courtesy Lunga)

document out of hand, the Conservatives in Congress claimed it

"would take away their complete liberty to express political opinions."
Gaitan again blasted the National Union as a farce "that feeds corrupt
Preface to the Violencia 113

and compromised caciques who assassinate the workers" and criti-

cized President Ospina for "pennitting official persecution."sB The
most telling blow in Gaitan's September offensive involved the receipt
of military supplies by the national army. Learning that tear gas was
included in the shipment} he accused the ConseIVatives of planning to
use it on members of his party. At the height of the Conspiracy of the
II

Gasses/' as Liberals called it} they demanded Ospina's resignation. He

protested that the materials had been ordered several years before by
President Alberto Ueras} but this failed to quiet the incensed Liberals.
One of them even suggested that Colombians imitate the Bolivians}
who had recently murdered their president and hung his body on a
lamp post in front of the presidential palace.S9 A month later} Gaitan's
newspaper} Jornada, juxtaposed a photograph of Ospina and his wife
at a fonnal ball next to a grisly photo of mutilated men} women} and
children in Boyaca. The photo was captioned "The Murderer Presi-
dent."40
Meanwhile the ConseIVatives had continued to pound away on the
old theme that the Liberals were able to draw on a store of 1.8 million
fraudulent voting cards whenever an election was in doubt. Laureano
G6mez had repeated this accusation for so many years that the
ConseIVatives no longer questioned its truth. On October 10} 1947}
G6mez made a nationally broadcast speech in which he once more
accused Liberals of voting fraud} carried out with the help of illegal
tarjetas. 41
The political rhetoric that spewed out of Bogota in the month of
September was generated by the approach of nationwide concejo
elections. Of Colombia's 800 municipal concejos, ConseIVatives con-
trolled only 194. Desperate to increase that total} they began flexing
their political muscles. In Tolima} sporadic trouble had erupted dur-
ing the first nine months of the year} and more serious outbreaks of
violence were occurring in several municipios of the northern cordil-
lera as elections approached. President Ospina was forced to send
military alcaldes to Anzoategui and Santa Isabel} which prompted
Governor Paris Lozano to submit his resignation. The military force
was soon withdrawn} and the governor resumed his official duties}
though the situation in Anzoategui remained tense.42 Liberals there
continued to protest that the alcalde was sabotaging their campaign
by invalidating many voting cards. They exploded with rage when} a
114 Chapter 4

week before the election} Conservatives attacked Liberal headquarters

and made off with 180 of the cards.43
Political bickering and close votes in concejo elections were nothing
new to Anzoategui and one or two other municipalities where mem-
bers of the two parties had battled for years to win or keep control of
the city council. The Conservatives and Liberals of Anzoategui and
Fresno were fairly evenly divided} and consequently one side strug-
gled to outvote the other at every local election. That question was
decided in Anzoategui on October 5} when Liberals managed to keep
control of the concejo by virtue of a single vote. Up the cordillera in
Fresno} the story was different. Conservatives took control of the
council for the first time in a decade by a margin of 131 votes out of
more than 3}200 cast.44 Around Tolima} little change took place in the
number of concejos held by the respective parties} but that was
normal for the department. Except for a few places} such as Anzoate-
gui and Fresno} the result of local elections could usually be predicted
in advance. Between 1937 and 1947 most of the northern cordillera
and the Saldana hinterlands consistently voted Conservative} and the
remaining municipios Liberal. The Conservatives of Tolima had stub-
bornly held on to seven or eight concejos at a time when their
compatriots in Boyaca and Santander were losing theirs. Yet} in the
late forties} when Conservatives in many parts of the nation were
regaining control of scores of town councils that had been lost during
years of the uLiberal Republic/' tolimense party members improved
their position only slightly-powerful proof of the correlation between
fluctuations in local voting and the early incidence of political vio-
lence.45
Even as tolimenses resisted violence} outside forces undermined
their fragile peace. Desperately searching for a way to staunch the flow
of police anns to Conservative civilians} Liberal leaders in Bogota
announced a plan for depoliticizing" the national police. They pro-
U

posed that the corps be removed from presidential control and placed
under the jurisdiction of the Chamber of Representatives} in which
they constituted a majority. Minister of Government Jose Antonio
Montalvo lashed out at the plan} which he called an attempted
subversion of government authority that would be answered with
Ublood and fire" if necessary. The Liberals countered by encouraging
their followers to take up weapons.46 The anns race} which had gath-
Preface to the Violencia 115

ered momentum rather slowly up to that time) was thus pushed to a

new level of intensity. Colombia became more than ever an armed
camp) and its problems assumed more nightmarish proportions. As
the year 1947 ended) members of the national Chamber of Representa-
tives were brandishing revolvers;47 and 1948 was ushered in by a small)
but intense) civil war in Santander del Norte) near the border with
Venezuela. ConselVative and Liberal gunmen murdered each other for
two appalling weeks until they were finally separated by the national
army.48
The little department of Tolima was shaken by these events) which
threatened to unravel the fabric of its civil life. Bandits appeared more
frequently in the hinterlands) and their depredations grew more
extreme. Authorities in Libano reported that one gang) not satisfied
with merely robbing their victim) a humble campesino named Gre-
gorio Rojas) hacked him to death with machetes.49 In many towns)
ConselVatives grew more outspoken in demanding a purge of Liberal
officeholders) and in a few they took matters into their own hands.
Santa Isabel) that perennial trouble spot) became a focus of dissension
during those months. Following the concejo election) which Liberals
won by 156 votes) the government sent in a detachment of fifty
policemen who had recently been recruited in Boyaca. Within a few
weeks) their commander) a Captain Guzman) was removed) which left
an inexperienced corporal in charge. Violence broke out immediately
because the young man) a ConselVative not long removed from the
flagellated campo of Boyaca) fell under the malevolent influence of
sectarian townspeople. Police detachments) accompanied by civilian
Itadvisers/' moved through the countryside searching the homes of
Liberals) abusing them physically) and sometimes threatening their
lives. The large) Liberal-owned hacienda ItCo16n" received special
attention. That estate and its environs had long been the only sizable
Liberal settlement in the entire municipio. Campesinos affiliated with
that party began fleeing the municipio early in 1948) and by April party
members of Santa Isabel were crying out) with justification) that law
and order were dead letters where they lived.50
The nation's Liberals turned increasingly to their party leaders
during those stormy months) particularly to the flamboyant Gaitan. He
addressed the problem of escalating violence in a series of moving)
highly publicized speeches early in 1948. The most dramatic of these
116 Chapter 4

was delivered before a mass of Liberals gathered in Bogota's Plaza de

Bolivar. Canying black handkerchiefs and in an attitude of mourning}
they heard the caudillo address Ospina: uMr. President/' Gaitan began}
Hit is under the burden of deep emotion that I address Your Excel-
lency} interpreting the will and desires of this immense multitude that
hides its tonnented spirit ... under a clamorous silence} begging that
there be peace and mercy for the fatherland."51 That speech and others
delivered in the following weeks were wildly applauded by gaitanistas
and other Liberals} who inundated him with messages of support.
Typical was a telegram sent by gaitanistas of tiny San Fernando}
Tolima: uThe Februcuy [7] meeting showed ConseIVative murderers
that we are an immense majority. This united village defends the red
banner [that is] draped around a single man."52
President Ospina answered the criticism with his own condemna-
tion of the violence} which he reminded his adversaries had started
many years earlier under the Liberal regime of Olaya Herrera.53 Stung
by what they regarded as the president's refusal to stop the persecu-
tion} Liberal leaders decided to end definitively all collaboration with
his government. On March 1 Gaitan ordered every Liberal holding a
political portfolio} no matter how insignificant} to renounce it.
Liberal Tolima was thrown into turmoil by the decision. Gaitanistas
were jubilant} for they interpreted the order as the first phase of a
strategy that would unite the party behind their hero and ultimately
carry them to the pinnacle of power. All across the department}
Liberals quit their posts} which produced temporcuy chaos in local
and regional administrations. Governor Paris Lozano again tendered
his resignation} though once more Ospina refused to accept it. The
same held for Major Luis Grimaldo} commander of the departmental
police} and numerous lesser officials. In Liberal municipios, police
walked off the job vowing to uoffer their blood} lives and spirits" as
private citizens Uto return Colombia to peace and justice."54 Others
were more forthright. A group of ex-policemen in Ibague wired Gaitan
that they had hung up their uniforms in order Uto enter the public
plaza and unleash the battle of reconquest with the people."55
Not all tolimense Liberals were happy with the order from Bogota.
Many influential ones were not gaitanistas and therefore balked at
blindly following the fiery leader. They took the pragmatic stance that}
occupying important government posts as they did} it was illogical to
Preface to the Violencia 117

tum them over to the adversary. Anti-gaitanista Liberals in the Assem-

bly censured Gaitan and threatened to oppose by force any govern-
ment attempt to establish a ConseIVative regime in Tolima. They
warned that they possessed the anTIS to back up their threat.56
A tense peace reigned in the department throughout March and
into early April 1948. Liberals worked feverishly to organize themselves
in the municipios they controlled and formulated plans to counter
anticipated violence on the part of ConseIVatives. On March 12 a
convention of Liberal representatives from all of Tolima's municipal-
ities met in Ibague to devise a strategy of Hcivil resistance." In the event
of ConseIVative-inspired violence, the salaries of offending alcaldes
and other city officials would be slashed by 90 percent, as would also
those of the municipal police. The delegates, most of whom were
gaitanistas, pointedly refused Governor Paris Lozano the customary
salutation, a discourtesy designed to show their anger over his collab-
oration with Ospina.57 They also protested the abuse of Liberals by
chulavita police in Santa Isabel and returned home vowing to create a
Hhomogeneous opposition" throughout the department.58 Other Liber-
als were more outspoken. HThere is a deep mystique of reprisal among
us. The only thing that stops us are the orders of our [party] director-
ate ... we shall have the last word."59
Skies were dark over Tolima that first week in April 1948. Citizens
scurried about their business with a sense of foreboding and hoped
the gathering storm clouds might pass over their department and
leave them unscathed.

Tolima Revolts
It was not yet 2:00 P.M. on the afternoon of April 9, 1948. Governor
Gonzalo Paris Lozano was taking his siesta in the Hotel Lusitania, in
Ibague, when a babble of voices outside in the street, and then a
pounding on the door, jolted him into wakefulness. In the hallway
stood a shaken and tearful functionary who brought chilling news:
HDoctor Paris, they've murdered Gaitan!" Paris Lozano pulled on his
shoes and, filled with a sense of dread, hurried away to his office. A
crowd was already starting to gather in the Plaza de Bolivar across the
street from the government building when he arrived, and he could
see the glint of machetes and revolvers. Inside the gobernaci6n all was
118 Chapter 4

confusion.80 Somewhere a radio} turned to full volume} blared the

news:

The ConseIVatives and the government have just assassinated Gaitan ...
comrades of Cauca and the Santanderes, now is the time to unsheath
your machetes because it is time to be glorious as you were in times
past At this moment Bogota is a sea of flames, as was the Rome of
Nero the corpse of Guillermo Le6n Valencia is hanging from a pillar
in the Plaza de Bolivar. The same fate has befallen Ministers Montalvo
and Laureano G6mez. The buildings of the assassin government are
burning. The people are raising an uncontrollable cry for vengeance of
their chief by dragging the corpse of Ospina Perez through the streets.
Arm yourselves; take the hardware stores and arm yourselves. 61

A group of the city's foremost Liberals awaited the governor in his

outer office. Led by the young lawyer and president of Tolima's Liberal
directorate} German Torres Barreto} they demanded that he create a
((Revolutionary Committee" as the first step in a party revolt against
the ((assassin" Conservative regime. Paris hesitated. He had) after all}
sworn to serve President Ospina and to uphold constitutional govern-
ment. If he did as Torres and the others demanded} he would be guilty
of treason. On the other hand} if Ospina were already dead and if
Liberal revolution were sweeping Bogota} refusal to support the move-
ment would definitively end his political career. As Paris Lozano
debated his course of action} sporadic gunfire sounded in the streets}
as did also the crash of shattering store windows as Liberal looters
broke into Conservative-owned businesses. In the background} the
national radio station continued its running account of the situation
in Bogota:

Here is the commander of the University with you again; all the young
people are with us. The National Police and the Army are with our
movement. The building of EI Siglo bums, and this gang of assassins and
calumny is no longer more than a handful of ashes, just as the Palacio de
la Carrera [presidential palace] will soon be, along with Senor Ospina.
We tell the country that Bogota has fallen, that the army and the police
are with us, and that they are guarding us here at the National Radio
buildings. Look for weapons wherever you may find them; break into the
stores where arms are sold; unsheath your machetes and with blood
and fire let us take the government. 82
Preface to the Violencia 119

Presently, the familiar voice of Liberal notable Jorge Zalamea Borda

could be heard advising that he had just communicated with ex-Presi-
dent Eduardo Santos, who was taking a plane from New York to direct
the tlPeople's Revolution" that had triumphed over Ospina's tlhated
regime."63 Then, another speaker declared:

Liberal police of Tolima. Because of the irreparable demise of the most

illustrious man in Colombia, Doctor Jorge Eliecer Gaitan J vilely assassi-
nated by the godos todaYJ we must unleash a revolution without parallel
in the country. Here we control the National Radio and the principal
departments of the Government. An enOmlOUS platoon of the Army and
the Police guard us. Seize the Government without fear; pull down this
infamous Conservative government. Long live the Liberal party!
Forvvaro !64

Within the hour the governor made up his mind. He agreed to join
Torres Barreto and purge his government of all ConseIVatives, not a
difficult task at that moment because every one of them in the city was
cowering in a place of refuge.
Outside, the riot gathered momentum. Seeing that neither the
police nor the militcuy tried to stop them, many people in the mob
became more daring. They cornered and murdered an unpopular
loan shark named Salazar; and, when ConseIVative store O\VI1er Ber-
nardino Rubio tried to defend himself, they killed him too. Floro
Saavedra's newspaper, El DerechoJ was set aflame, which sent a pall of
smoke over the city. A major target of the rioters was the tlStreet of the
Lawyers/ J where leading ConseIVative politicians maintained offices.65
Finding no godos keeping office hours that day, the crowd seized and
destroyed the files and furniture. One lawyer later recalled how he
escaped that afternoon. Octavio Laserna was in hiding at his sister's
home when a group of Liberals appeared in the street outside. Just as
they were about to storm the house, an anonymous benefactor
shouted that Laserna was not in the city, and they moved on. 66

Meanwhile, the position of Governor Paris had become tenuous.

Dario Echandia, the leading Liberal of Tolima and longtime member of
the national Liberal directorate, informed him by phone that OspinaJs
government had not fallen and that he, Echandia, Carlos Lleras
Restrepo, Plinio Mendoza Neira, and other Liberals were supporting
the president in his effort to restore public order. No prominent
120 Chapter 4

Conservative had been killed} the army was at that moment driving
leftist students from the radio stations} and the riot was confined to
the downtown area of Bogota where Gaitan had been shot. Further-
more} Paris learned he was the only governor who had joined the
revolutionaries. He reacted to this tum of events indecisively. He
withdrew support from the revolutionwy junta} but allowed it to
continue operating in his outer office. Deciding to do nothing about
the rioting} he said laconically HI would rather pick up broken glass
than corpses."87
Late in the afternoon} the cry was raised: HLet's take the peniten-
tiary!" All eyes shifted to the massive} forbidding Pan6ptico of Ibague}
located on the northern side of town across the stream called EI Piojo.
This regional prison housed more than five hundred inmates} most of
them hardened criminals who had been sent to the maximum-secu-
rity facility from all over central Colombia. It was manned by a corps of
guards who were solidly Liberal. When the mob began to assault the
main gate} the guards held their fire-understandably because they
could see that the attack was directed by municipal police-and in an
instant the Pan6ptico fell. At the last moment} several guards tried to
resist and died for their trouble. Soon every cell stood open and all 504
inmates were free. When Commander Eugenio Varon Perez tried to
halt their flight} a machete-wielding convict split his skull.8s Within
hours} the escapees made their presence felt among the civil popula-
tion. That evening} some of them robbed a bus on its way into town
from Rovira} and others raped two campesinas near Mirolindo.89
As the Ibague riot ran its course} the revolutioncuy junta} headed by
German Torres Barreto} was hard at work. Understanding the need for
department-wide coordination} it dispatched some thirty telegrams to
municipios with Liberal majorities advising them to form their own
revolutioncuy committees. A moment of comic relief occurred when
the man sent to have the messages transmitted} a party hanger-on
named Castillo} signed each one HComandante Castillo." Many a local
party chief was later chagrined to learn that the HComandante" to
whom he swore allegiance that day was none other than HEI Negro
Castillo" of Ibague.70
Revolutionary committees promptly sprang up in all Liberal munici-
pios, and in n10st cases they acted responsibly to see that order was
maintained. Because they tended to be made up of local political
Preface to the Violencia 121

leaders} they were functionally akin to the cabildo abierto of colonial

times. Committee members in Chaparral escorted Conservatives out of
town under armed guard} and in Libano they not only counseled
members of the party to stay inside their homes for protection but also
patrolled the streets to see that no acts of violence occurred. On April
11 the revolutionmy committee of Mariquita bragged that} thanks to its
leadership} not a single windowpane had been broken and only six
Conservatives arrested. A visitor remarked that true revolutionaries
would have found cause to arrest more than that number.
Annero} twenty-five kilometers south of Mariquita} was the site of
the single most atrocious act of the April revolt in Tolima. Located in
the midst of rich farmland} much of it owned by absentee landlords}
the town was plagued with high unemployment and a large transient
population. It was also heavily Liberal. The atmosphere was electric on
the nueve de abril. Numerous Liberals heeded the call to revolution
emanating from Bogota and vowed to avenge Gaitan's death with
blood. The revolutionary committee that was hastily formed began
arresting Conservatives en masse and searching their homes for con-
cealed weapons. Many of the revolutionaries believed that tolimense
Conservatives possessed large caches of weapons that would soon be
used to enforce a sectarian dictatorship over them Uwith blood and
fire/' as Ospina's own minister of government had promised six
months earlier. The fury and fear of Liberals intensified when a report
was received that a Conservative army was marching down from Santa
Isabel to fall upon and massacre them} and a heavily armed detach-
ment of volunteers was sent to fortify the banks of the Lagunilla River
at the southern edge of town. By late that afternoon} a hundred
Conservatives had been rounded up and crammed into the town jail}
and the following day another sixty were added to that number.71
A sense of fear and uncertainty continued to hover over Annero the
following day} April 10. The Liberal stalwarts who were maintaining
their battle lines along the river peered off toward the cordillera for
any sign of the rumored godo army from Santa Isabel. In town}
searchers continued to ransack Conservative homes for the arms
cache they were sure existed. However} within twenty-four hours after
Gaitan's murder} only a dozen rifles and pistols had been impounded.
Frustration over their inability to find what they were certain existed
put the searchers in an ugly mood and excited the scores of men who
122 Chapter 4

loitered in the central plaza. Suddenly} someone shouted that the

weapons were hidden in the church. The cry inflamed the mob and
sent it surging across the plaza and into the sanctuary. It was halfway
down the principal nave when a deafening blast rocked the building.
Convinced that the parish priest had hurled a bomb into their midst}
the Liberals retreated} crouched behind trees in the park across the
street} and began firing into the church.12
Father Pedro Maria Ramirez was in the parish house when the
Liberals approached. Hearing the explosion} he rushed to take refuge
in a private home. Terrified by the gunfire and sure he would be
discovered} he insisted on moving to a safer place. His hosts tried to
dissuade him from going out into the street} but he insisted and
arrangements were made for several Liberals to escort him to the jail.
This was a fatal mistake. \tVhen the crowd glimpsed Ramirez's cassock
through the cordon of Liberals} it descended on the group} dragged
him away} and hacked him to death with machetes.73 Further illustrat-
ing the depth of Liberal anticlericalism in AImero and the fury of the
mob} his body was not only stripped and dragged through the streets
behind a dump truck} but also nuns from the convent were later
forced to watch prostitutes trample on the corpse.74
The murder of the priest in AImero was only one of numerous acts
of violence against the Church in Tolima and elsewhere on the nueve
de abril. A historic community of interest between the Church and the
Conservative party helps explain Liberal anticlericalism} and the radio
broadcasts from Bogota supplied a rationale for individual acts of
violence. In his heart} every armeno Liberal knew that the ConseIVa-
tives had killed Gaitan; he knew that every priest was a Conservative;
and he heard with his own ears the news reports from Bogota: ((The
curas, the sons of God) the administrators of charity} are assassinating
the people . . . they are firing on the people from the tower of the
Church of San Ignacio.... The Christian Brothers are firing from the
windows of the La Salle High School!"7.5 In that ambience of passion
and violence} the mob that lynched Father Ramirez lacked any reason
to doubt his enmity. Neither did other tolimenses who jailed or
otherwise harassed priests in various parts of the department that
fateful day; nor did rioters in Bogota who set the torch to the bishop's
residence} looted the cathedral} and plundered and burned other
churches and parochial schools.
Preface to the Violencia 123

Armero remained tense for the entire week following Gaitan's assas-
sination. A hundred and sixty Conservatives were ultimately impri-
soned in the town jail} and some of their antagonists wanted to
execute them all. The fOITIler governor of Tolima} Rafael Parga Cortes} a
longtime leader of the Liberals there} visited Armero on April 11} and
again on the 13th} both times in an effort to calm passions. Although
he traveled through the northern part of the department after the
nueve de abril counseling moderation} only in Armero did he meet
resistance and threat of bodily harm. Members of the revolutionary
committee knew that party leaders like Parga and Governor Paris
Lozano had made peace with President Ospina and were in the
process of reconstituting the coalition government of ((National
Union." During his second visit to Armero) militant Liberals de-
nounced Parga as a traitor to the revolution and forced him to
withdraw to the safety of the alcadia, where the revolutionary commit-
tee was meeting. \Nhen he tried to leave the building on the evening of
April13} a group of partisans blocked the dooIWay and told him he
could only leave over their dead bodies. The peacemaker prudently
withdrew. After detaining him for several hours} the hostile Liberals
dispersed and he was able to leave the alcaldia unmolested. 76
A curious} yet revealing} incident during the tolimense revolt was the
((Salt War" that broke out between Liberal Libano and Conservative
VillaheITIlosa) two neighboring municipios in the cordillera. Armero}
on the llano} and Libano} in the mountains} had always been economic
rivals. The fonner sent essential commodities as well as trade goods
up the twisting road that led to Libano and also handled Libano's
coffee} warehousing much of it and transporting it on to the port of
Honda. A similar economic relationship existed between Liban 0 and
the small adjoining Conservative municipio of VillaheITIlOsa} lying
along its northern boundary. They kept up a lively trade across the
precipitous mule trail that linked their principal towns.
Following the fOITIlation of quasi-independent municipal govern-
ments in northern Tolima on the nueve de abril, the merchants of
Armero} reasoning that libanenses lacked any alternative but to pay}
boosted the price of their goods. Accepting the situation} Libano
entrepreneurs bartered their coffee for essentials such as salt} but they
also cut their losses by raising prices on goods shipped north to
VillaheITIlosa. The citizens there} interpreting this action in a partisan
124 Chapter 4

light} cried that it was just another example of Liberal perfidy. The
alcalde ofVillahermosa} Luis Felipe Yepes} responded by cutting off all
trade with Libano and seeking to strengthen economic ties with the
neighboring Conservative municipio of Fresno. He also ordered sus-
pension of work on the highway to Libano} an act that created
dissension in southern Villahermosa. Citizens in the veredas of Pavas
and Primavera began to talk about (( secession" from Villahermosa.
Those veredas, which possessed large Liberal minorities) had origi-
l1ally been part of Libano} but had been detached and added to the
Conservative municipio in the time of Rafael Nunez.
Ephemeral though it may have been} the ((Salt War" exerted an
enduring impact upon both Villahermosa and Libano. Their highway
link was not completed for another ten years) at a much higher cost
than originally projected.77 More importantly} the war underscored the
enduring regionalism that} by segregating Colombians into thousands
of patrias chicas, diluted their sense of common nationality. The
conflict was thus much more than a laughable episode of entrepre-
neurial greed and misunderstanding. It was a reenactment in micro-
cosm of the whole Patria Boba era of Colombian history} when
short-sighted regionalism had thwarted the revolution for indepen-
dence from Spain. The ((Salt War" was symbolic of the old) intractable
regionalism that} if not contained} promised years of tribulation for the
people of Tolima.
Eight days after the revolt in that department} troops of the national
army were in control of every municipio. Even the revolutionaries of
Arnlero and Ibague were forced to admit that their dream of building a
new Liberal-gaitanista republic on the ruins of Ospina's oligarchic}
Conservative regime was shattered. Those who lived through the
nueve de abril in Tolima remember it as an incident marked by
amorphousness and confusion of goals. In some municipalities} the
uprising manifested mildly revolutionary overtones} for in places
where local government was supplanted by revolutionary committees
the talk was passionate about realizing the martyred Gaitan's poorly
articulated social reforms. But} as in Bogota} the reaction of the average
Liberal was visceral} not cerebral} and the movement quickly came
under the control of leaders who possessed a decided stake in the
social status quo. That was evidenced in the speedy recreation of
President Ospina's bipartisan National Union government as well as by
Preface to the Violencia 125

the peregrinations of Liberals like the wealthy and influential Rafael

Parga Cortes.
Most tolimenses were relieved to see public order reestablished so
quickly after the events of April. For a fleeting few months, life seemed
to move at its prerevolt tempo. Damage to persons and property was
remarkably light, given the magnitude of the uprising, and Ospina
Perez took no reprisals against the rebels. His new military governor,
Lieutenant Colonel Hernando Herrera, bragged that {{because the
army re-established order so rapidly I was able to lift all restrictions by
June 30, except those on municipal concejos."78 Even they resumed
meeting in July. Tolima anticipated record-breaking harvests of cotton,
rice, sugarcane, and coffee. \tVhen a $700,OOO-peso decline in tax
revenues was reported that threatened bankruptcy, Herrera lifted the
department-wide curlew. 79 Tolimenses were thus able to consume
beer and aguardiente with pre-nueve de abril gusto, and tax monies
again flowed into departmental coffers. Better yet, the officials could
look forward to the opening of a new liquor distillery whose produc-
tive capability was to be seven times that of the old one.SO To complete
the illusion of normality, Governor Herrera included Liberals in his
government. Young Rafael Caicedo Espinosa, of Alvarado, and Nicolas
Torres, of Honda, held posts in his four-man Cabinet, and Rafael Parga
and Carlos Lozano sat on a {{fiscal assessment committee."81
In spite of the speedy return of public order and official disinclina-
tion to take reprisals against the rebels, the Liberals had lost much
ground in their struggle against the Conservatives.82 \tVhile the concejos
were in recess, Colonel Herrera freely replaced municipal officials
whose loyalty was suspect, and Conservative alcaldes were named to
every municipio except Chaparral and Armero.83 Bureaucratic power
was slipping from the hands of Liberals, and they were powerless to
do anything about it. Significant changes also occurred in the way
Conservative tolimenses perceived their Liberal neighbors after the
nueve de abril. More than ever before, the latter were seen as mani-
festly untrustworthy individuals who would probably commit barba-
rous acts if given the slightest leeway. Those feelings were not openly
stated during the tense calm that followed the April troubles, but were
insinuated. They were {{in the air," to be sensed and pondered by
sensitive Liberals like the upland campesino who related a nightmare
he experienced in June 1948. Conservatives caught and killed him after
126 Chapter 4

a chase across the village plaza and then sold his flesh for chicharr6n.
Soon nothing was left but his head) and nvo little boys who passed by
started using it as a football. 84 About this same time) an influential
Conservative foretold Tolima's fate in a conversation with Rafael Parga
Cortes: tilt's going to take a lot of shooting to make tolimenses respect
the govemment."85
 5

The Violencia

Governor and Lieutenant Colonel Hernando Herrera watched over

Tolima as best he could through 1948. His job was difficult and
frustrating given the range of problems he faced. Once martial law was
lifted not long after the nueve de abril, municipal governing bodies
resumed their meetings. Partisans who were still smarting from the
events of April and ready to raise a cry against political affronts} real or
imagined} glared at one another over concejo chamber tables. Herrera
was not himself subject to accusations of political favoritism because
the anny was considered to be relatively apolitical by Colombians} but
he did increase the number of Conservative officeholders at every level
of administration. This raised Liberal hackles and moved a party
member in Fresno to protest that all major appointive posts in his
municipio were held by members of the opposition. He went on to list
the offices as those of alcalde, solicitor} treasurer} secretary of the
concejo, registrar of voters} tax collector} municipal judge} director of
the jail} chief officer of the Alcaldia, and representatives of the national
liquor monopoly} the telegraph office} and the national finance min-
istry.l
Inasmuch as Liberals predominated in so many municipalities} they
found it easy to harass ConseIVative administrators through civil
resistance similar to that which had been practiced in Boyaca and the
Santanderes as early as 1947. However} this approach in Tolima was
not so extreme as in the other departments} where salaries were
slashed to next to nothing and official vehicles raffled off. This led

127
128 Chapter 5

HeITera to explain that the Liberal opposition was Itmotivated more by

personal antipathies than political beliefs."z
The govemor's most pressing task in 1948 was rebuilding and
reconstituting the departmental police forces. His work paralleled that
of a bipartisan ItPolice Reorganization Junta" President Ospina named
after the April rioting. Already severely weakened by 140 resignations
at Gaitan's order in March} Tolima's police corps was decimated by
the firing of 144 disloyal officers and agents after the nueve de abril. At
first maintaining public order with army troops} Herrera scoured the
department for loyal ConseIVative replacements} but he could not find
the necessary men in the limited population} particularly because
starting policemen eamed less than the average agricultural day
laborer. Help ultimately had to be sought in the departments of
Santander del Norte and Narifio.3 The corps was thus tumed into a
motley assortment of poorly trained outlanders} who were labeled as
Itsectarian wildmen" by Liberals.4 Neither could the recruits be joyful
over assignment to Tolima. Public order there was still disturbed by
the events of April} attributable in part to the 250 criminals from the
Pan6ptico who remained at large.5
A palpable sense of foreboding hung over the department during
the latter months of 1948 and early 1949. On the one hand} Italannist
rumors" were spread to the effect that Liberals} ConseIVatives} or
perhaps both were preparing uprisings; and it was common knowl-
edge that men were organizing guerrillas in the cordillera. Tolimenses
were not unique in their conviction that trouble lay ahead. They
merely acknowledged what one Colombian described as an atmo- It

sphere of conspiracy that could be sensed in the streets} in private

homes} in offices."e Public utterances of national leaders fed a universal
inquietude. Liberal Jorge Uribe Marquez accused ConseIVatives of
Itpreparing a subversive coup" by handing out arms to party members.
This charge was later verified by a priest who told of being offered
twenty-eight rifles by a police official for distribution to Itpeople who
could be trusted." Asked the reason for his unusual offer} the official
replied} Itit's that the conspiracy is coming."1 At about the same time} a
Itlarge cargo" of explosives destined for ConseIVatives in Guamo was
discovered in the Ibague railway station when a crate broke open and
spilled its contents.S
Unable to obtain firearms through official channels} Liberals bought
The Violencia 129

them from contrabandists or acquired them in other ways. A shipment

of pistols and ammunition was stolen from Ibague merchants in
Janumy 1949} and two months later a dozen Leftists were caught
manufacturing Molotov cocktails in Ibague's Banio Stalingrad. Late in
April the Colombian Army clashed with contraband runners who were
bringing weapons into Tolima along a mule trail near Cunday. The
nationwide demand for firearms even led to a raid on the national
Cavahy School} at Usaquen near Bogota} on the night of May 4. Rifles}
dynamite} tear gas} and ammunition were seized by thieves} who later
sold them at immense profit.9
As in 1946} old problems took on a more deadly aspect because of
the stepped-up flow of weapons. Campesinos who invaded land in
Cunday during March canied rifles and pistols in addition to hoes
and machetes; the army had to be called in to eject the intruders.
Conservatives in Guamo took to attending concejo meetings wearing
sidearms. \JVhen Conservatives and Liberals traded insults during
proceedings of the Regional Labor Court in Ibague} the session was
suspended for fear that gunfire might erupt. The elderly defender of
Tolima's Indian population} Quintin Lame} protested to Governor
HeITera that armed non-Indians were taking advantage of the mount-
ing tulmoil to abuse his people.10
Liberals declared a day of mourning throughout Tolima on the first
anniversmy of Gaitan's assassination} though the deterioration in
public order since his death perhaps gave tolimenses even more cause
for lamentation. Each day} departmental newspapers featured articles
that bore headlines such as HRivers of Blood" and HBlood Running in
the Gutters" and chronicled every sort of violent act. Tolimenses had
not seen such widespread and persistent violence since the nine-
teenth century} and by early 1949 they were describing it with the
generic name already in use elsewhere: aLa Violencia. nll Yet} a majority
of the nation's fifteen departments were far more violent. Santander
led all others with 86.5 homicides per 100}OOO population} followed
closely by Santander del Norte with 19.5. Tollma stood tenth on the list
with 13.9.12
As late as 1949} Tolima still had not succumbed to Violencia in the
same measure as the Santanderes} Boyaca} Caldas} and the Eastern
llanos} where the index of homicide doubled Tolima's and in some
cases exceeded it tenfold. Civil government had been breaking down
130 Chapter 5

in the Santanderes and elsewhere as far back as 1946. The recent

history of Tolima held nothing remotely like the near-gun battle in the
Santander Assembly chamber or the recruitment of known criminals
as police there. Neither had a full-fledged civil war broken out between
Conservatives and Liberals as in Santander del Norte a year earlier.
Although Tolima teetered on a razor's edge between Violencia and
the normal turbulence of an excessively politicized civil culture) it
suffered none of the despair and nihilism characteristic of populations
brutalized by Violencia. Tolimenses maintained faith in the traditional
mechanisms of social control. Departmental police forces were not
perceived as an avowed enemy) municipal concejales and departmen-
tal assemblymen did not wave pistols in each other's faces) partisans
did not do battle on coffee-covered mountain slopes. The difference
between Tolima and places already fallen to Violencia was that its
Liberal majority still felt secure in the faith that it controlled its
destiny. The party dominated most of the forty-one concejos} and
informal power structures functioned in the time-honored way.
But other factors were present that ensured Tolima's decline into
Violencia. Each time Liberal leaders in Bogota called for a break with
Ospina's regime) the party's control of departmental politics eroded
further. Conservatives) for their part) were convinced by the misguided
actions of tolimenses on the nueve de abril that they could not trust
the Liberals and that their government would be well rid of them.
Tolima's lack of regional autonomy within Colombia's centralized
political system was a third ominous factor. A weak) penurious entity
dependent upon an imperfect central bureaucracy) it lacked both the
resources and the integrity to resist the approaching trouble when the
government in Bogota became unable to lead the nation. The depart-
ment was hit hard by a fire that leveled its large) new distillery some
five months after Gaitan's assassination. The ensuing loss of liquor tax
revenues came at the worst possible time. These conditions) along
with an exceedingly rugged terrain that made it difficult for under-
staffed police forces to apprehend miscreants) made Tolima and its
people prime candidates for Violencia.
On June 5) 1949) a crucial election was to be held in the country.
Representatives to municipal concejos} departmental assemblies) and
the national Chamber of Representatives were to be chosen; and the
outcome would reveal whether or not Gaitan's death had damaged the
The Violencia 131

Liberals' chances for victory in the presidential contest of 1950. The

results of the election reassured them. They won all three contests
and} most importantly} remained in solid control of the Chamber of
Representatives. Through domination of the national lawmaking body}
they could resist Conservative encroachments at the presidential level
while laying the groundwork for a return to power in 1950. In Tolima}
members of the Liberal party were confident of their continuing
strength. They maintained control of thirty of forty-one concejos) just
one less than before the election} and won eight of thirteen seats in the
Assembly.13 But Conservatives} too} took heart from the elections. They
saw Liberal majorities shrink everywhere and predicted that the trend
would continue.
\Vhatever confidence the June elections may have inspired in toli-
menses was soon to be smashed. Neither President Mariano Ospina
nor his moderate Liberal collaborators had been able to contain the
evil genie of political extremism. As the toll of killings in the provinces
mounted} mostly as a result of police persecution of Liberals in such
persistent trouble spots as Boyaca} leaders of both parties intensified
their invective in Bogota. Two of the most outspoken were Carlos
Ueras Restrepo and Laureano G6mez.
Carlos Ueras was the self-proclaimed leader of the nation's militant
Liberals in 1949. A longtime.member of the national Liberal directorate
and minister of finance under Presidents Eduardo Santos and Alfonso
L6pez} the energetic} chain-smoking Ueras was one of those who
refused to accept the ConseIVative victory in 1946. After Gaitan's
assassination} he devoted his energies to defending his party's inter-
ests} damning rank-and-file Conservatives for the Violencia and Presi-
dent Ospina for allowing it to continue. Lleras orchestrated his
slashing attacks to bring maximum discredit to the government. On
the first anniversary of Gaitan's great silent demonstration against
Violencia} Ueras called thousands to Bogota's Plaza de Bolivar to hear
him accuse the Conservatives of conspiring to win the upcoming June
elections by unleasing a ((bloody persecution" in selected municipios
of western Caldas.
Then) in May 1949} Ueras announced that the Liberal directorate
had voted iITevocably to end its collaboration with the National Union
government} which meant that all Liberals serving in the ConseIVative
government must resign. Ueras again reviled the regime of Ospina
132 Chapter 5

Perez: H\\!hen history studies in detail Mr. Ospina's government, one of

the things that will doubtless astonish the impartial investigator is the
fact that most of the disorder, violence, death and destruction that has
clouded life in various departments is the direct result of actions of
hand-picked police forces, selected with truly criminal criteria to
wreak havoc."14 On May 22 Ospina accepted the resignations of his six
Liberal ministers and appointed in their place three Conservatives and
three army officers. In addition} he replaced several Liberal governors
with Conservatives and intensified the antiguenilla campaign in Vio-
lencia-plagued regions.15
The Liberals' final break produced the desired effect on Ospina's
government. It was much weakened, but not in a way that worked to
their advantage. By mid-1949 Ospina Perez was under increasing
pressure from within his own party to do something about the
Violencia} a phenomenon its members laid at the door of the Liberals
and their Hinfernal" mentors} the communists. By quitting the National
Union government} Liberal leaders lost their ability to answer the
accusations of Conservative extremists in any meaningful way, and
Ospina was unable to resist their demands.
The Conservative counterpart to Carlos Ueras was Laureano G6mez,
some twenty years Ueras's senior but youthful in his vigorous defense
of party. G6mez's steely enmity was at once simple and complex. For
sixteen bitter years} he had fought to return his party to power and
prevent it from becoming a permanent minority. The Liberal split of
1946 was a heaven-sent opportunity for him to engineer Ospina's
victory. It was obviously in G6mez's interest} as party leader, to oppose
the Liberals at every turn. But his opposition reflected more than the
simple desire to wield public power and feed at the public trough. To
Laureano G6mez the Liberals were not just political antagonists. They
were a menace to the nation.
During the 1930s G6mez had begun warning that some evil, alien
force was eroding the foundations of traditional society. The Liberal
party was its tool, and its goal was no less than the destruction of
Catholic Colombia, as he informed the nation during a radio broadcast
in 1936.18 He first seized on international Masonry as the agent that was
undermining national virtue. HA country is always in a situation of
grave corruption and moral decadence," he said on the Senate floor in
1942} Hwhen it is moved by the fatal action of the Masonic lodges."11
The Violencia 133

Later in the decade} he shifted his attention to international commu-

nism as the principal threat. Although he was unwilling to accuse the
Liberals of being outright communists} he did feel that their ideology
was compatible with Marxist thought. Mass movements such as
Gaitan's} and even democratic rule itself} awakened an unhealthy
materialism in the people that damaged consecrated values and
traditional forms. These beliefs explain G6mez's mistrust of majority
rule-the iniquitous ((one-half plus one" as he labeled it.
G6mez was in good company when he warned his countrymen of
communist subversion during the 1940s. The rapid gains of Marxist
regimes after World War II moved Winston Churchill to make his
famous ((Iron Curtain" speech in 1946) which warned the West of
Soviet expansionism. Two years later} when representatives of the
American republics held the Ninth Inter-American Conference in
Bogota} one of their principal achievements was the resolution that
urged every American republic to adopt legislation that would counter
the subversive acts of international communism. Anticommunism
reached fever pitch in the United States during the late 1940s and early
1950s} fed by the pronouncements of Red-baiters like Senator Joseph
McCarthy and General Douglas MacArthur. Little difference existed
between McCarthy's assertion in 1950 that ((we are engaged in a final)
all-out battle between Communistic atheism and Christianity" or
MacArthur's warning the following year of an ((eighteen year accumu-
lation of communists and fellow travelers in our government" who
have ((gravely weakened the structure and tone of our American way of
life" and the simultaneous blasts of Colombian ConseIVative Laureano
G6mez.18
The Bogota riot of April 9) 1948} resolved any doubts ConseIVatives
may have entertained that subversion was a real and imminent dan-
ger. Although it was never proved that the communists killed Gaitan or
coordinated the pillaging downtown} well-known Colombian commu-
nists were conspicuously present as the events of that day unfolded.
\Vho could forget the Leftists who seized radio stations and ordered
listeners to ((take the government" with ((blood and fire" or that more
than a thousand persons died during the ensuing two days of car-
nage.19 And rare was the ConseIVative who did not feel that) in rising
up against the government} the Liberals were either actively or pas-
sively collaborating with the communists. Bishop Miguel Angel Builes
134 Chapter 5

Laureano G6mez and Mariano Ospina Perez shortly before the bogotazo.
(Courtesy Lunga)

spoke for a majority of Conservatives when he said, "Before the nueve

de abril Liberalism allowed a communist sprig to branch from its
mighty trunk, and the sprig oveIWhelmed and strangled it. Liberalism
died and the tree produced only cursed fruit, like the nueve de abril
and the days that followed."'o
Laureano G6mez fled Bogota at the height of the bogotazo, narrowly
escaping with his life. Before the riot ran its course, his house on the
outskirts of the city was reduced to ashes. He made his way to Spain
and for the next fourteen months remained in close touch with events
in his homeland. He followed the attempts of Ospina Perez and
moderate Liberals like Dario Echandia to hold together the coalition
govemment, as well as those of Carlos Ueras to discredit it." G6mez no
doubt took special note of Ueras's assertion in February 1949 that
Liberalism "goes with the new revolutionary current that puts aside
instruments of economic oppression, enveloping monopolies and
inequality of opportunity and recourse."" When the Liberals broke
The Violencia 135

with Ospina for the last time and subsequently demonstrated their
continuing political power in the June elections) G6mez decided to
act. On June 12 he telephoned from Spain to announce: {(Now that the
electoral results are known ... I judge that it is incumbent upon the
Conservative party to save the republic . . . I return immediately-like
a soldier."23
On June 24 G6mez anived in Medellin to greet a huge and enthusi-
astic throng of Antioquian Conservatives. In the Plaza de Bemo) he
attacked the Liberal party in a memorable speech that compared it to
a terrible) mythical beast called the {(basilisk/}:

Our basilisk walks on feet of confusion and naivete} on legs of abuse and
violence} with an immense oligarchic stomach} with a chest of rage} with
Masonic arms and with a tiny communist head.... This creation is the
result of intellectual reasoning. It is the conclusion one reaches through
consideration of recent events} in the manner of a chemist in a labora-
tory who studies reactions in order to reach a conclusion ... the nueve
de abril was a typically communist phenomenon} but one canied out by
the basilisk. The diminutive} imperceptible head so disposed it} and the
body canied it out to the shame of the nation.

G6mez then placed the events in an international context and

explained the immediate strategy of his party:

All of you know that the present world phenomenon is that of the
successive fall of one country after another behind the Iron Curtain. Well
now} this fall has been produced} without exception} in every case} by
action of the basilisk-an agglomeration} a /tpopular front" as it is called
in times of leftist confusion when the little communist head isn't yet
visible} that moves darkly along in the same way Colombia is moving}
until the moment anives when the Curtain falls definitively and one
nation after another succumbs to the most teITible destruction....
Liberty is not a thing; liberty is not even a right. Liberty is a reward and
only those who merit it can enjoy it. Thus it is with great rejoicing that I
come to join you in the happy} the decisive} the energetic and powerful
battle to save liberty} menaced in Colombia as never before} to tell the
nation} and to tell you that the only solution for the nation is the
Conservative one. Any other that may glimmer from afar will unfailingly
bring the ruin of liberty and the death of the republic. 24

The words of G6mez and his willingness to lead his party into the
coming electoral battle sent a collective shudder through Liberal
136 Chapter 5

leaders. They always regarded "The Monster/' as they had nicknamed

him years before, as their archenemy. Outspoken, intransigent, and
absolutely convinced of the rightness of his cause, "The Monster" was
not an opponent to be taken lightly. No Liberal questioned the fact
that he must be deprived of the presidency at any cost. As the July 20
opening of Congress approached, the Liberals settled on a strategy:
they would use their majority in national representative bodies to
handcuff President Ospina and legislate themselves into an invincible
position by election time.
The opening session of Congress gave a taste of what would follow.
\\!hen Ospina entered the Senate chamber to deliver his annual
address, Liberals refused to honor him by standing, and then tried to
have him barred from the proceedings altogether. Failing to achieve
that, their spokesman, Senator Romero Aguirre, blistered Ospina with
the following accusation: "You cheated the party that is in the great
majority in Colombia-which extended its hand to you so you could
continue as chief of state. But later when this party [aided you] you
answered ignobly, allowing your subordinates to murder party mem-
bers. The Liberal majority in the Senate must say to you: You, Mr.
President, are responsible before God and history."25
Within two weeks, the Liberals had prepared a package of lirefonns"
that were designed to cripple Ospina for the duration of his tenn and
ensure their succession to power. The proposals included placing
police forces under congressional control; providing for the direct
election of governors; requiring congressional approval of Cabinet
appointments; and, most importantly, proposing a constitutional
amendment that would advance the presidential election from June
1950 to November 27, 1949. The latter bill, which became law in late
September, was conceived in the belief that the earlier the election, the
fewer the Liberals who would be kept from the polls by unfriendly
Conservative officials.26
Amidst the outcry of ConseIVatives that their party "would rather
die" than dishonor itself by peImitting the reforms, President Ospina
approached Liberals with a proposal that, if accepted, would deprive
G6mez of the presidency. Ospina had little love for him, and he feared
that both Colombia and moderates within his own party would suffer
should G6mez be elected on an anti-Liberal/communist platfonn.
Spurred by these thoughts, Ospina asked Liberals to endorse a plan by
The Violencia 137

which two ConseIVatives and two Liberals would rotate the presi-
dency on an alternating basis for four years beginning in 1950. Each
chief executive would hold office for one year, and over the joint tenn
all identification cards would be carefully revised, which would defini-
tively put to rest G6mez's old charge that Liberals won elections
thanks to an immense store of extra tarjetas. Liberal leaders would
have nothing to do with Ospina's offer. They flung it back in his face
and continued their maneuverings:~7
The Liberal parliamentcuy offensive so divided Congress that all
pretense of decorum vanished. During the last week of July, ConseIVa-
tives stonned the podium in the Chamber of Deputies and tried to
drag away Francisco Eladio Ramirez, Liberal president of the body, by
brute force. They were answered with a shower of ashtrays hurled by
Liberals. A week later, ConseIVatives brought police whistles into the
chamber and blew them continuously for more than two hours.28 The
legislative session of 1949 reached its tragic denouement early on the
morning of September 8. Shortly before midnight on the seventh,
members of the Chamber of Deputies had been debating the Violencia
in Boyaca and had just heard ConseIVative Carlos del Castillo call
Liberal Salazar Ferro a murderer for his role in the Gacheta massacre
of 1939. A two-hour recess failed to calm passions. At 2:00 A.M. Repre-
sentative Castillo, back from spending the inteIVening hours drinking
in the congressional bar, continued his harangue. Within moments,
Liberal Gustavo Jimenez interrupted and called Castillo an undistin-
guished son of common campesinos. The latter shot back that at least
he was not a bastard as was Jimenez. At that point, both men drew
revolvers and fired. Others joined in and seconds later Jimenez was
dead, shot by ConseIVative Amadeo Rodriguez. Bystander Jorge Soto
del Corral lay mortally wounded.29
Events like these played into the hands of extremist leaders of both
parties. Ospina Perez, Dario Echandia, and other moderates were
drowned out by the strident voices of G6mez and Ueras Restrepo. On
October 12 the ConseIVative party overwhelmingly endorsed Laureano
G6mez as its presidential candidate. He accepted the nomination and
again turned on the Liberals: "We are victims of a diabolical coercion.
We are forced and constrained by evil strategems of revolutionary
inspiration-strategems by which some hope to strike a death blow at
Christian civilization in Colombia."so Two weeks later Carlos Ueras
138 Chapter 5

replied: ((It is only natural that when this spirit of hate finally explodes
into violence) and when the casual calumny of the newspapers is
turned into great massacres} conflagrations} destructions) assassina-
tions) and exiles} Dr. Laureano G6mez shall understand that his hour
of destiny has arrived."31
Tolima's fate was sealed by the rush of events that took place in
Bogota following the elections of June 1949. The Liberal victory in
those elections frightened tolimense ConseIVatives with the threat of
Liberal success in the presidential election) which was only twelve
months away. To diminish that possibility} government officials-by
now all ConseIVatives-turned to the police to defend party interests.
As a first step} all Liberals were purged from police ranks) a task
accomplished with such dispatch during the first two weeks of July
that tolimense Liberals spoke of a ((big broom" sweeping their remain-
ing compatriots out of government. Replacements for departed police-
men were chosen hurriedly) and loyalty to the ConseIVative cause was
the only criterion in hiring recruits. In that atmosphere of partisan
militance) members of the police force soon began abusing their
power. When several Liberals were shot at police checkpoints in
mid-July) Liberals raised such a storm of protest that police com-
mander Hector Forero ordered the return of firearms to headquarters
in Ibague. The disarming of checkpoint guards was only a temporary
measure) and) within a month) the new director of departmental
police) Roberto Pereira Prado) promised publicly to try to control his
men.32 At the end of September) police joined a crowd that trapped
supporters of the Santa Fe soccer team in an Espinal cafe. The fans) on
their way to Bogota following a game in Cali} were taken for Liberals
because they wore the red and white colors of their team. Only after
hiding the incriminating garments were they able to continue on their
way.33
In October the Colombian Supreme Court declared in favor of the
November 27 presidential election) to which national ConseIVative
leaders responded by ordering all party members to step up efforts to
defeat the Liberal ((crypto-communists" in the imminent elections.
The order suffered a terrible metamorphosis as it filtered down
through society. In Ibague) the ConseIVative directorate lobbied for the
firing of any remaining Liberal officeholders; in smaller towns) intimi-
dation of Liberals occurred; in the campo} additional police were
The Violencia 139

dispatched to notoriously Liberal veredas. Day by day, the trouble

intensified. t(The political situation in the last few days has reached
unimagined limits; many of the bloody conflicts have left a high
number of victims" was the mournful assessment of Libano's newspa-
per.34 To the south of Libano, Liberals began fleeing Anzoategui, which
put to rest Conservative fears they would cast votes there on No-
vember 27.
It was not that Colombians of goodwill were insensitive to the
bloody events unfolding in the provinces, nor that they did not try to
quell Violencia. In fact, most citizens were appalled by its quickening
pace. National leaders like President Ospina and Dario Echandia, the
Liberal nominee for president, tried to work out compromise agree-
ments between the two parties. Echandia spent much of October
promoting a constitutional refoIm based on Ospina's power-sharing
plan of some weeks earlier, but everything worked at cross-purposes.
Liberals were split into Echandia's group, which sought to lessen
tension through means of a truce, and Lleras's, which worked to
prevent any reconciliation among partisans. ((We will have nothing to
do with members of the Conservative party from this time forward," he
told his followers on October 28, (( ... relationships already broken in
the area of public order must likewise be broken in the private
sphere."35 Public utterances were well seasoned with behind-the-
scenes maneuvering that combined to cast a pall of conspiracy over
Bogota in late October and early November.
During the first week of October, the national registrar of voters,
Eduardo Caballero Calderon, reported that Liberals were not being
allowed to register in fully one-seventh of national territory (120
municipios). Then, on October 7, Laureano G6mez announced that his
party rejected any power-sharing arrangement with the (( subversive"
Liberal party. Those two events set the Liberals on their final course of
action. They withdrew from the presidential contest and undertook
the impeachment of President Ospina Perez. In his angry speech of
November 7, the day he withdrew his candidacy, Dario Echandia
advised the Conservatives that his party would act to combat Violen-
cia: ((I want to notify the Conservative party and the government that
spread of official Violencia doesn't intimidate us: We are not going
passively to allow the murder of our defenseless and innocent compa-
triots, who are falling by the hundreds, for the simple crime of being
140 Chapter 5

Liberals."38 At 4:00 P.M. on November 9} Carlos lleras} Julio Cesar Turbay}

and others arrived at the Congress building to initiate impeachment
proceedings} but found their way blocked by army troops. Within the
hour} Ospina Perez declared public order disturbed and a state of
siege in effect. All representative bodies were suspended} press cen-
sorship imposed} public meetings forbidden} and departmental gover-
nors brought under direct control of the president.
Liberal party chiefs had played their trump card and lost-or had
they? All along they had expected Ospina to accept their parliamen-
tary coup d'etat. When he betrayed that naive faith by establishing
martial law} they turned to a second plan: they would paralyze the
nation and topple him with a general strike. Then} the Colombian
Army would step in as the Liberal-supported arbiter of national
destiny. The dissidents selected November 25 as the day for the strike}
and} for two weeks preceding it} party heads tried to decide whether it
should be passive or be accompanied by open protest against the
dictatorship. That decision was all the more difficult because} for at
least a month} they had been encouraging and aiding Liberal guerrillas
in the Eastern llanos. Nevertheless} on the twenty-third} the director-
ate proclaimed a passive strike. Then} at the last moment} Darlo
Echandia countermanded the directive and left home to attend a
public demonstration. As he and several companions walked along
Carrera Septima (Seventh Avenue) near the Bavaria brewery} police
fired on them. Echandia escaped unharmed} but his brother and three
others died in the fusillade. The strike subsequently failed for want of
support by organized labor and other key groupS.37
On the twenty-seventh} Laureano G6mez was elected as president
amid total abstention by the Liberals. Their clumsy attempts to seize
power threw their party into such disarray that it would not play a
significant role in national politics for half a decade. Some six million
partisans} severely compromised by their leaders} were suddenly left
to their own devices and were unrepresented in Bogota.

The breakdown of Colombia's traditional system of government in

late 1949 was the major causal factor in the Violencia. For the first time
since the sanguinary War of the Thousand Days} leaders of the
nation's principal two parties ceased all meaningful communication.
The Violencia 141

The Liberals had first attempted to regain power through parliamen-

tcuy maneuvering. Failing that) they tried to unseat their rivals through
a combination of general strike and military coup. Again frustrated)
they turned to the tactic of encouraging their members to armed
rebellion in the hinterlands) particularly in the Eastern llanos. Con-
seIVative elites were no less guilty of destroying the nation's oligarchic
but functional democracy. Intent upon keeping the enemy from
seizing power) they matched Liberal intemperance with extremism of
their own. Moderates on both sides were pushed into the background)
and the militants had their day. As in the nineteenth century) when
party leaders could no longer communicate) their final recourse was a
call to arms.
But Colombia had changed over the half century since the last great
civil war. The coercive power of the central government was such that
party heads no longer considered it possible to overthrow the party in
power by placing themselves at the head of campesino armies. They
simply instructed their followers to revolt) but did not attempt to lead
them in the field. \JVhere calls to revolution or counterrevolution were
heeded in 1946 and 1950) the fighting that resulted was amorphous
and leaderless) its nature shaped by a wide range of local factors.
The political breakdown that placed ConseIVative extremists in
control of the government and left opposition leaders fuming impo-
tently on the sidelines marked the end of the incipient phase of the
Violencia and the beginning of the generalized phase over most of the
country. Before turning to an examination of the local precipitants of
that conflict) it is useful to note where it existed and did not exist
during the incipient phase) 1946-50. For this purpose) the chart in
appendix B) a compilation of homicides committed in Colombian
departments and intendencies between 1946 and 1960) is usefu1.38 Data
contained in that chart clearly support the conventional wisdom that
Violencia came first to the Santanderes and Boyaca. ConseIVatives
there had never forgotten the persecution meted out to them by their
vengeful opponents in 1930. Beginning in 1946) they struck back with a
vigor that sent the fighting spiraling to civil war proportions the next
year. Meanwhile) the homicide rate for Tolima and many other parts of
the nation had been quite low.
The second phase of Violencia) 1949/50-1953) was marked by an
increase in homicide rates throughout Colombia) particularly in the
142 Chapter 5

Eastern llanos} shown in appendix B as "Intendencies/' where Liberal

leaders encouraged party members to take up amlS against the G6mez
government. In most cases} traditional antipathies coupled with the
failure of democratic institutions at the elite level allowed the Violen-
cia to begin. As Luis L6pez de Mesa pointed out in 1955} and as other
scholars have argued in recent years} the country suffered an "institu-
tional heart attack" in late 1949. The Ministry of Justice figures on
intentional deaths over the years of Violencia are especially pertinent
to this study. They suggest an absence of the phenomenon in Tolima
before the fateful institutional breakdown. Mter 1949 bloodshed in-
creased almost geometrically and carried the department to the
forefront of those suffering Violencia. These data argue the importance
of combining knowledge of events taking place at the national level as
well as in other departments and examining in detail a single region.
By carefully studying Tolima} a place whose Violencia clearly coin-
cided with the national collapse of late 1949 and 1950} and by moving
the focus of analysis to local and even neighborhood levels} the whole
complex process of the conflict becomes clear.
Tolima was a predominantly Liberal department whose Conserva-
tive minority had not suffered substantial persecution following the
Liberal return to power in 1930. Thanks largely to this} regional and
local power structures were able to resist the Violencia during its
incipient period. But tolimense Liberals made serious mistakes in the
late 1940s} the most important being their rebellion against the govern-
ment on the nueve de abril. Their actions demonstrated to Conserva-
tives that they were not to be trusted and that the department} lying
close to the seat of national government} must be kept in check. Once
the government passed into the hands of ConseIVative extremists}
which left their opponents in Tolima with no friends in Bogota and
shut out of local administrative and police power} the department lay
open to Violencia.
At that point} a veritable constellation of local variables came into
play that detemlined the nature and severity of the conflict. Among
the most important were the nature of leadership provided by local
elites} the relative isolation of the region} and its importance in the
general scheme of departmental and national life. Municipios and
veredas whose leaders were strong and responsible were often able to
moderate the impact of Violencia. An easily accessible region pos-
The Violencia 143

sessing little natural cover for violentos rarely suffered prolonged

trouble. A municipio that was the patria chica of some influential
individual was sometimes aided through his special pleading with the
ruling powers in Bogota. Conversely} isolated} mountainous munici-
pios that lacked influential friends and were burdened with a history
of violent and sectarian local leadership were prime candidates for
severe and prolonged suffering. The examples of !\vo municipios of
south-central Tolima} Rovira and Dolores} illustrate the relationship of
local variables and early Violencia in ostensibly similar places.
t(The magnificent creation of an artist jealous of his work and his
glory" was the way one native son described Rovira} a sparsely settled
municipality filled with narrow valleys and sharp ridges that sweep
away to high paramo in the west.39 Riomanso} the most distant village
in the district} lay half a day's ride from the cabecera along the river
from which it took its name and a dayJs ride from villages in the
municipio of Roncesvalles} to the south} and Ibague} in the north. The
population of Rovira was 20}OOO. Political loyalties were fairly evenly
divided be!\veen the !\vo parties} though the exact proportion was
impossible to detennine given the extensive fraud surrounding every
election.
Even before Violencia settled over their municipio) the people were
notorious for the warlike way they related to each other in politics and
every other kind of interpersonal relationship. Conservative or Liberal}
citizens living in the isolated municipality had routinely stabbed} shot}
dynamited} and otherwise committed mayhem upon each other as far
back as anyone could remember. \JVhen Conservatives in Bogota is-
sued frenzied warnings during October and November of 1949 that the
Liberals were anning citizens to overthrow the government} the police
in Tolima looked first to Rovira for signs of revolt. This anticipation of
trouble soon took on the look of self-fulfilling prophecy. Sectarian
police sent to the verdant valleys of Rovira terrorized Liberal campe-
sinos and unleashed Violencia there.
Among the first to suffer at the hands of police ((commissions"
moving through the countryside were several hundred Protestants
who lived in the area of Riomanso. ConseIVatives had no use for them
or their religion} an amorphous chaos of absurd sects ... born of
t(

arrogance and rebelliousness/' as Catholic church leaders character-

ized it in more temperate moments.40 More outspoken clerics did not
144 Chapter 5

hesitate to accuse Protestants} all of whom were Liberals} of being

uniformly tainted with the bacillus of communism. Police did not
question the parish priest of Rovira when he assured them that on the
nueve de abril Protestants ran through the streets of Riomanso shout-
ing uDown with Catholicism! Long live Protestantism and Commu-
nism!"41 Officers began beating and intimidating the evangelicals
whenever they happened upon them} and soon ordered their minis-
ter} Aristomeno POITas} to close his church and move out of Riomanso.
At first} he refused but later complied} and the police converted the
church into a baITacks. Within two years} only a handful of Protestants
remained in Riomanso .42
Had the Liberals of Rovira fled before the lash of police intimidation}
the Violencia there might be remembered as a brief episode of political
persecution undertaken by paranoid and sometimes sadistic Conser-
vative police. But resistance} not flight} was the solution preferred by
most men of the municipality. The mountains were all they had ever
known} and no godo policeman from Boyaca or Santander could make
them leave. Thus it was that the guerrillas of Rovira were born. Led by
campesinos like Leonidas Borja (HEI Lobo")} Tiberio Borja (UC6rdoba")}
Arsenio Borja (HSantander")} David Cantillo (HTriunfante")} and later
joined by the boy Te6filo Rojas (HChispas") as well as many others}
they armed themselves and faded into their emerald fastness. 43 For the
next four years} stalking the hated chulavitas and their ConseIVative
neighbors as well} they exacted a tenible toll in blood and treasure
from their municipality.
No other part of central Tolima was more devastated by the Violen-
cia than Rovira. Everything seemed to conspire against it and its
people. Their violent past} their isolation} the failure of local elites to
create an atmosphere of accord-all these factors combined to the
detriment of the community.
Not far from Rovira} some eighty kilometers to the southeast across
the Magdalena River Valley} lay the municipio of Dolores. Located in a
mountainous setting not unlike the land of HChispas" and the Borjas}
it enjoyed certain advantages that facilitated resistance to the worst of
Violencia. The predominantly Liberal population had lived in peace
with the political opposition until the tension-filled year of 1949} when
it appeared that the harmony had ended. The trouble first appeared in
a dispute between the alcalde and the ConseIVative police chief.
The Violencia 145

During the month of November} the police commander} a sergeant}

began jailing Liberals on the charge of suspected revolutioncuy subver-
sion. Each time that happened} the alcalde used his influence to have
them released. Finally} the sergeant flew into a drunken rage and fired
on the alcalde, accidentally killing a small girl who happened to be
standing nearby. A mob seized the killer} cut him to pieces with
machetes} and wounded three of his subalterns. Such acts} whether
justified or not} usually evoked stem response from national police
headquarters in BogotA.
But the bloody events of November 1949 passed without reprisal
against the Liberals of Dolores. That was probably because the munici-
pio had a powerful friend in the person of Dr. Rafael Parga Cortes} one
of its largest landowners and a well-known Liberal who had been
active in national and departmental politics for three decades. He was
a founding father of the National Federation of Coffee Growers} the
senior member of its bipartisan board of directors} and a longtime
friend of several top Conservative politicians.44 On more than one
occasion during the years of Violencia} "Lord Parga/' as he was known
throughout Tolima} interceded on behalf of his patria chica, thereby
lessening the danger that it would go the way of martyred municipal-
ities like Rovira.1IS
Driven by the rhetoric of impotent Liberals and paranoid Conserva-
tives in Bogota} Violencia marched across Tolima in the years between
1950 and 1953. Whole zones were depopulated in the central and
southern parts of the department as bands of men moved through the
entire cordillera between Rovira and the Nevado del Huila. Peace-lov-
ing campesinos fled in droves} and by September 1950 refugees had
choked Ibague and other population centers. Ghastly crimes were
occasionally committed by local authorities at the head of what
amounted to lynch mobs. One such was reputedly led by an ex-alcalde
of Venadillo named Remigio Nieto. His band of police and civilians}
operating in the Alvarado-Venadillo region during the period July
10-30} 1950} hunted down Liberal hacienda laborers} murdered them}
and then burned their bodies. Formal charges were brought by the
judge of Piedras some months later} but Nieto was never apprehended
and the crimes went unpunished.46
These types of episodes were repeated in infinite variation through-
out the country after November 1949. By mid-1950 an estimated 4}500
146 Chapter 5

guerrillas were under anns in Antioquia} Caldas} Huila} Cundina-

marca} Boyaca} the Eastern Llanos} and Tolima.41 Yet} Violencia con-
sisted of more than persecuted Liberal campesinos fonning guerrillas
to battle Conservative police. That image imputes a coherence to the
conflict that it did not possess. In fact} it was a tangle of perversities
loosely bound into an identifiable phenomenon: the basilisk described
by Laureano G6mez} a mythical beast of many parts that killed with its
glance. It moved on feet fonned by the millions caught up in the tragic
drama} the Protestants of Riomanso} Te6filo Rojas} the drunken ser-
geant of Dolores} Carlos Lleras Restrepo} and Laureano G6mez. Its
blood and muscle were the heroic themes of resistance to tyranny and
defense of honor} treasure} and ideals; the carnal themes of avarice}
lust for power} fear} and fury; the all-important intellectual themes
bound up in value-laden attachments to party schooled in citizens
from birth} though after Violencia began these intellectual responses
often became the subcortical reflexes of a creature whose head is
severed. The nation's body politic was in a sense decapitated by the
events of 1949} and its uncontrollable spasms created the basilisk that
stalked the country from 1949 well into the 1960s.
The Violencia was uniquely Colombian} yet it also drew sustenance
from events taking place elsewhere. Fear of communist subversion
was international in scope during the post-World War II era} and
Colombian leaders were no more vocal on the issue than were their
colleagues in other nations. True} the suspected ((communist tenden-
cies" of Liberals were constantly used by venal Conservative police
and petty officials as a convenient excuse to commit acts of terrorism)
but legitimate fear of communist subversion lurked in Conservative
hearts. As the Violencia gained momentum in the early 1950s} and as
Colombians struggled to understand it} they sought a scapegoat in
order to blame it on something other than their own mistakes. The
specter of communism served that purpose well.
To complicate matters} communists were active in Colombia.
Founded in the year 1930} the national Communist party (Partido
Comunista ColombianaJ had grown out of the labor and agrarian
unrest of the 1920s. Early leaders like Tomas Uribe Marquez had
represented the party at the national level) and in Tolima members
like Jose Gonzalo Sanchez and Eutiquio Timonte had fought to put its
platform into effect. But in Tolima and elsewhere the party failed to
The Violencia 147

win converts} a fact lamented by its leaders who} in the official history
of their first three decades of struggle} admitted that during the
Violencia the concept of class struggle was above the true level of
U

consciousness and alien to the nature" of most men under arms.48

Two weeks after it became apparent that Laureano G6mez would
win the presidential election of 1949} the Colombian Communist party
announced a policy of anned self-defense rAutodefensa de Masas)
against the organized violence of the ufalangist bandits/' as it charac-
terized the ConseIVatives. The communists established themselves in
three enclaves: the small municipio of Viota} not far from Bogota; the
Sumapaz region of southern Cundinamarca} along the eastern border
of Tolima; and extreme southern Tolima. Juan de la Cruz Varela
headed the Sumapaz enclave and Jacobo Prias Alape} better known as
uChaITo Negro/' led the one in Tolima. As if to underline the commu-
nist plaint that most guerrillas lacked true revolutionary conscious-
ness} the men of uCharm Negro" soon found themselves fighting for
their lives against Liberal guerrillas under the command of Gerardo
Loaiza and Leopoldo Garcia (uGeneral Peligro").49 For some fifteen
years) from 1949 to the early 1960s} the communists and the Liberals
fought for control of southern Tolima.
\Nhether Liberals were ordinary citizens or guerrillas hiding out in
the campo, they were constantly placed in the position of denying
ConseIVative accusations that they were unknowing dupes of interna-
tional communism} or were} by opposing the G6mez government}
playing into the hands of foreign subversives. The ConseIVative ten-
dency to tar Liberals with the brush of communism was illustrated by
an incident that scandalized tolimense Liberals in October 1950.
Shortly after a police raid on Banio Stalingrad in Ibague and the arrest
of thirty-eight self-proclaimed communists} a policeman broke into
the Hotel Lusitania and savagely beat its Liberal owner. As he did so}
he shouted that uLiberal communism and anti-Catholicism must
end." Tolima's new ConseIVative governor} Octavio Laserna} tried to
combat subversive influences in a less direct way. Shortly after taking
office} he ordered fines for schools that did not give religious instruc-
tion} teach Colombian history} recite the rosary every day} and place
pictures of the sacred heart as well as Sim6n Bolivar in every class-
room.50
As tolimense Liberals tried to disassociate themselves from the
148 Chapter 5

Laureano G6mez delivering his presidential address, August 7, 1950. (Courtesy

Lunga)

communist b~te noire, their leaders in Bogota frustrated them by

linking the party to those in revolt against the government. During
1950 Carlos Ueras and others furtively collected money to arm Liberal
guerrillas fighting in the Eastern Uanos and otherwise encouraged
resistance to Ospina Perez and President-elect G6mez.51 Conservatives
seized on these activities with grim satisfaction and used them as
rationalizations for stepping up persecution of the "revolutionaries."
On every occasion, they cited a clandestinely circulated directive said
to be written by the Liberal directorate, a portion of which read, "one
of the things of which Liberalism can be most proud is the sponta-
neous creation of rural guerrillas in the llanos, Cundinamarca, Tolima,
the Santanderes, Bolivar and Antioquia-guerrillas who are reacting
with virility against the dictatorship."52 Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez,
secretary of war under Laureano G6mez, articulated the government
position in a widely reported speech of 1951:
The Violencia 149

Anyone might think that these crimes would be abhoITed by any good
citizen! but not all feel that way. So far we have not heard a single voice
raised on the part of official elements of Liberalism; on the contrary . . .
they have printed fliers to be distributed by bandits! and they have also
had a clandestine radio station. This all obeys the famous ({Plan A/' of an
undoubted communist savor! which seeks to ruin the nation's economy
and hurl it into chaos. 53

While the charges and countercharges flew in Bogota) the people of

Tolima died at an increasing pace.
The Violencia grew more complex during 1951 and 1952. Although it
may have grown out of the traditional ConseIVative-Liberal struggle for
political dominance and the breakdown of democratic parliamentary
government at the elite level) it evolved into more than a purely
political phenomenon. The term HViolencia" became an umbrella
under which every variety of criminality could be found. As the
depredations of men under arms grew ever more ghastly) it became
clear that large numbers of psychopaths and common bandits had
joined those who claimed to be fighting to maintain their political
principles. At one point in 1951) a band of eighty violentos swept down
on a farm in the municipio of Chaparral) massacred a family of
thirteen) and left their heads impaled on fence postS.54 Pajaros invaded
the towns and cities of the department assassinating influential and
ordinary people alike) sometimes for pay and sometimes at whim. In
just three months' time) two attempts were made on the life of
Ibague's Liberal newspaperman) Hector Echeverri Cardenas) editor
and publisher of the daily Tribuna. Failing on both occasions) the
pajaros apparently settled for the Tribuna correspondent in Rovira)
who was murdered two weeks after the second attempt on Echeverri's
life.55
Because more than 50 percent of the department was under the pall
of Violencia) the economy began to suffer. Rich lands that had sup-
ported thousands of head of cattle or had produced abundant coffee
crops were deserted. In one single corregimiento of Ataco) rustlers
stole all but 200 of a herd of 10)000 cattle. In early 1951 the municipio of
Chaparral lost 90 percent of its coffee crop.58 Police and ConseIVative
civilians burned fifty houses in a rural area near Ortega late in 1950)
unofficially inaugurating the use of fire to wipe out thousands of
homesteads in the Indian country between Coyaima and Ortega.51
150 Chapter 5

In mid-1951 reports of bandit activity in the mountains of Santa

Isabel and Libano informed tolimenses that Violencia was spreading
northward. By the end of that year and on through the next} the
municipios of the northern cordillera slipped into bloodshed every bit
as savage as anything seen in the south. Prosperous Liban 0 suffered
irreparable damage during a brutal anny sweep in April 1952.58 One
month later} bandits fell on the hamlet of EI Topacio} in the municipio
of Falan. One of them who knew the place and its people strolled from
house to house playing a tiple. On that day} the musician was both
judge and jury} for} wherever he paused} the bandits dragged out and
shot every man and boy. Ninety-one died in that incident alone; those
not killed outright by bullets were consumed by flames when the
bodies were heaped up and burned.59
Based on the data on homicides presented in appendix B} Tolima
was Colombia's most Violencia-ridden department by the year 1952. A
reading of available printed sources from that year and conversations
with persons who then lived there suggest that most of the crimes
being committed by violentos were perpetrated by men who used
traditional partisanship only as an excuse to steal} bum} kill} and
mutilate. Activities such as cattle-rustling and the massacre of de-
fenseless farm families seem to speak more of avarice or mental
unbalance than of political coloration. Yet} the political motive was
usually present no matter how heinous the crime. ConseIVative and
Liberal violentos avoided murdering campesinos .who were clearly of
their political affiliation. How then can violent acts that sprang from
the desire of ConseIVative} Liberal} and communist violentos to pro-
tect} feed} and clothe themselves or to punish persons perceived as the
source of their misery be separated from those that were basically acts
of common criminality?
A rough generalization can be offered to distinguish areas of Tolima
where bandits operated from those where ((political" violentos were
active. Those groups whose principal goal was self-defense estab-
lished themselves in the wildest) most inaccessible parts of the depart-
ment. Hence} well-armed communist and Liberal cuadrillas could be
found in southern and eastern Tolima-mountainous} sparsely popu-
lated} heavily forested} and lacking roads. On the other hand} depreda-
tions inflicted in the mountains north of Ibague} a popUlated zone
given over to the cultivation of coffee} on the llano} and in towns or
The Violencia 151

cities were likely to be motivated by economic or other {(nonpolitical"

factors. At least before the mid-1950s) these acts were sporadic in
nature and perpetrated by unidentified persons or gangs.
An unusual reversal of Violencia) in that it occurred in urban) rather
than rural) Colombia) took place in the fall of 1952. During the first
week of September) Liberal guenillas in Rovira wiped out a six-man
police patrol and then fell upon the bodies with machetes) applying
what was known in guerrilla argot as the corte de salpic6n. Soon
thereafter) the six mutilated corpses were flown to Bogota for inter-
ment. A chill rain was falling on the capital as the crowd of mourners)
all Conservatives) filed by to view the bodies on September 6. Just six
weeks earlier) the partisans had learned in detail of another ambush)
in which Liberal guenillas under the leadership of Guadalupe Salcedo
had ambushed and liquidated an entire army column) consisting of
ninety-six men) in the Eastern Llanos.8o Now here were others) all
Conservatives) murdered and mutilated. The Liberals must be made to
pay!
Trouble started early in the afternoon during anti-Liberal demon-
strations in downtown Bogota. By nightfall) the crowds were out of
control) pillaging and burning the Liberal newspapers EI Tiempo and
and EI Espectador. The ringleaders next turned their attention to
Alfonso L6pez and Carlos Ueras. Both party leaders were at home
when friends called to warn that rioters were on the way. L6pez left
hurriedly with his family) and soldiers standing guard at the nearby
home of Acting President Urdaneta Arbelaez were forced to look on
passively as rioters destroyed the residence. \;\/hen the mob reached
Ueras's house) it was greeted by gunfire from none other than Lleras
himself. After holding out for an hour) he and his family escaped along
a ladder extended from the window of a nearby house) where) from a
concealed vantage point) they watched their home and possessions go
up in flames. Both L6pez and Ueras ultimately found refuge in the
Venezuelan embassy preparatory to leaving the country.81
Early in 1953 the governor of Tolima made a startling statement.
ttThings are going well in the department/' he said) ttthere is no
subversion) only criminality."82 This remark was particularly untimely
because it preceded by only a month the worst single act of Violencia
that occurred in Tolima until then: a mass execution near the village of
San Pablo) in the far eastern part of the department. It was located in
152 Chapter 5

the municipality of Villanica} which had recently been calVed off from
the southeastern comer of Cunday. Several factors singled San Pablo
out for special attention by the police. First} it was located in a region
of widespread rural unrest during the 1930s. That fact marked its
largely Liberal population as potential subversives in the eyes of
keepers of order. Second} it bordered on the highland region in
Cundinamarca that was dominated by communist Juan de Ie Cruz
Varela. Many residents of Villanica had voted for him in years past
when tolimense Liberals had sent him to the departmental Assembly
as their representative.
These factors} plus Villanica's intensely rural nature} made it a
prime candidate for the atrocity of February 15. Between eight and
nine o'clock in the morning} a detachment of national police blocked
trails leading into the aldea and ordered all its inhabitants to assemble
in the plaza. Conservatives were separated from Liberalsj credentials
were carefully checked to verify affiliation. Then} a column of some 140
men and adolescent boys of Liberal persuasion was marched out of
town along the trail leading toward the cabecera. Two local Conserva-
tives} Luis Vieda and Julio Castro} guessing that their neighbors would
never reach there} begged the police to leave them in peace} but were
almost shot for their trouble. At a point near the River Cunday} all 140
people were machine-gunned. In the words of a Conservative of San
Pablo who witnessed the episode} tlwith this mass assassination
everything [in the municipio] was ruined."83
By 1953 every part of Tolima had been touched in lesser or greater
degree by Violencia. For any municipio to have escaped a phenome-
non so amorphous and complex would have been inconceivable. Yet}
some municipios resisted the infection longer than others. One such
was Libano} the large} predominately Liberal municipality in the heart
of the northern cordillera. Blessed with a prosperous economy and an
elite proud of its patria chica} Liban 0 withstood Violencia until the
year 1951. But} when it finally fell} it did so in a particularly cruel way.
 6

Libano

Libano was a product of the human flood that rolled southward from
Antioquia early in the nineteenth century.l Not contained by the rich
lands lying between Antioquia Vieja and the Cauca River Valley} the
wave of paisa settlement broke through the high passes of the Central
Cordillera and spilled Jaramillos} Londofios} Mejias} and Echevenis
down its slopes into Tolima.2 The most important group of antioqueflo
colonizers moving into Libano was the one that departed Manizales in
1864} led by Isidro PaITa.3 Parra's expedition} made up of his seven
brothers} Alberto Giraldo} Nicolas Echeverri} and others} did not find
the land entirely unoccupied. Immediately upon crossing into Tolima}
they came upon a convergence of trails and a few buildings called
Casas Viejas near the timberline in the shadow of towering Nevado del
Ruiz. There} at the top of the world} arrieros and adventurers} petty
traders and outlaws had for many years paused to barter for salt}
aguardiente, tobacco} rubber} quinine} and firearms in the eternal cold
of that place.' The antioqueftos hurried past Casas Viejas toward the
warmer} more fertile lands lying below. For several days} they made
their way eastward} ever descending} searching for that elusive
meadow where they might place a town. At last they found it: an
ample} wooded} gently rolling valley nestled in the mountains halfway
between the paramo of Ruiz and the Magdalena Valley. A handful of
rude huts and wisps of smoke from cooking fires were the only signs of
human habitation.
The valley into which PaITa and his companions descended had not
always been the drowsy place it was in 1864. Thirteen years earlier}
153
154 Chapter 6

THE MUNICIPIO OF LIBANO

Municipio of Armero

"
, : LasPeiias

'~"'.' :__ " ~';(\'1;r;

SAN FERNANDO:: 0;:6'1>:;'1>'0 Versailles

,, 0"0>,.........
'
,;I.. T riangulo

... ., .. -...
' .. EIBosque RfoManso
SANTA TERESA
LaAmerica. .,
Junin

CONVENTIONS

Municipal Limit
Cabecera
Vereda
Corregimiento
.
I'f"'i"i";I
l.!..!...!..!J Municipio of Santa Isabel

costumbrista writer Manuel Pombo had passed that way and de-
scribed it as a beehive of activity:

Finally we arrived at the caserta of Libano, exalted by glorious afternoon

sunlight, breathing a temperate atmosphere and echoing to the rode
confusion of social life-contending voices, wood being cut, barking
dogs, lowing cattle. A few diligent and vigorous Antioquian families form
the nucleus of what in time will be a great settlement; they're the
advance guard of their compatriots, felling forests, clearing the virgin
land, seeding, building. All these wholesome, fiuitful foothills of the
cordillera will become an Antioquian colony.s

Pombo was accurate but premature in his prediction of what Libano

would become. Just two years after his visit, in 1853, a stranger
appeared on the scene. He was Desire Angee, a French industrial
engineer who had been awarded a contract by the government of New
Granada to supervise construction of a new capitol building during
the administration of President Jose Hilario L6pez. \\!hen financial
considerations forced suspension of the project, Angee struck out for
Libano 155

the wilds of Tolima} making his way into the valley from the east. He
offered to buyout the first settlers} some eighteen families who
occupied the land under an 1849 law granting fifty fanegadas to
anyone willing to homestead them. In the best tradition of frontier
speculators} they sold without qualm} pocketed the cash} and struck
out for still unsettled parts of the cordillera.6
For more than ten years} Angee lived in near-solitude on his nine-
hundred fanegada estate. He must have tired of his isolation} for
around 1863 he traveled to Bogota} from which he returned with
Mercedes Gonzalez} a fOITI1er nun. Libanenses are of differing opinions
about the relationship between the two. Some insist she was an aged
woman driven from her convent by religious persecution under Presi-
dent Mosquera. Others imply a romantic involvement: ('The truth is
that Angee was by nature an elegant adventurer ... for him to have
come alone with the ex-nun Mercedes Gonzalez) a most romantic and
novelesque hegira} is another adventure."7 \Vhatever the explanation}
this odd couple and a few seIVants were living in Liban 0 in 1864} when
Isidro Parra and his followers arrived there.
It is not known whether they bought the valley from Angee or simply
pushed him aside by citing an 1857 presidential decree ordering the
return of unimproved homesteads to the national domain. In any
event} the newcomers took over the valley.8 Within a year} some forty
wood and adobe houses stood in various stages of completion around
the carefully marked off central plaza} and nearby a small sawmill
operated continuously to meet the demand for lumber. The following
year} 1866} Libano's peITI1anence was assured when the Sovereign
State of Tolima granted it the legal status of aldea. Sixteen thousand
hectares of virgin land were also granted with the stipulation that they
be distributed in thirty-hectare plots to persons who would improve
them. Harking back to Spanish municipal custom} each homesteader
was entitled to a lot in town} where he would eventually construct his
peITI1anent residence.9
During the decades right after its founding} Liban 0 grew rapidly}
eventually dwarfing its sister municipios of northern Tolima. This
remarkable expansion must be viewed from the related perspectives of
economics} environment} and politics. Virtually all the municipality
was arable. Sugarcane flourished at lower elevations and potatoes in
the cold uplands. But it was coffee that made Liban 0 the department
156 Chapter 6

of Tolima's agricultural Potosi. The low} bush-like trees thrived in the

rich volcanic soil; innumerable quebradas, which ran down coffee-
covered slopes} provided water for irrigation systems consisting of
split bamboo or more elaborate channels; and tall trees and banana
plants provided luxuriant shade. Isidro Parra's first plantings of coffee
around 1870 on his property ({La Moca" were the first of more than five
million productive matas in Liban 0 by 1900.
Latifundia did not predominate in the municipality because of the
communal nature of its founding and because roughly 30 percent of it
was distributed as baldlo grants. In fact) nearly two-thirds of all coffee
fincas were of modest size} growing fewer that 5}000 trees. Small and
intermediate farms accounted for approximately 80 percent ofmunici-
pal coffee production (table 1).

Table 1.
Coffee Production in the Municipio of
Libano} 192610
Percent Total Percent
Size of Finca of Holdings Coffee Trees of Production

100,000 to 250,000 matas 1.5 1.22 million 20

5,000 to 100,000 matas 34.0 3.572 million 62
Less than 5,000 matas 64.5 1.019 million 18

Not only did Libano's coffee bonanza benefit a considerable cross

section of the farm population} but it also generated numerous subsid-
iary industries. Hundreds of arrieros were needed to haul the beans}
warehouses to store them} nimble fingers to grade them} and mills to
process them. At the tum of the century} large numbers of women
were employed as bean sorters in the warehouses.ll
Libano's early history must also be placed in political and cultural
contexts. The municipioJs extraordinary growth during the 1860s and
1870s was encouraged by Liberal governments that liked having a
party redoubt in the northern cordillera of Tolima. Significantly} just
two years after the Liberal fall from power} Isidro Parra's municipio lost
a substantial portion of its territory to the neighboring} ConselVative
Libano 157

municipality of Villahermosa.12 Politics were as important as land and

coffee in deteImining the municipio's future.
Whole rural neighborhoods in the coffee heartland were Liberal by
design. HI searched out this region/' said Uladislao Botero} a founderof
the corregimiento of Santa Teresa} Hbecause it was Liberal."13 He staked
out two sizable fincas J HLa Guaira" and HLa Argentina/' and fixed his
place in municipal leadership by marrying a niece of Isidro Parra. The
same was true of General Antonio Maria Echeverri} a founder of
Convenio. His hacienda HEI Tesoro/' just south of the trail linking the
cabecera with Armero} was one of the largest in all Libano. He also
married one of Isidro Parra's daughters. This commingling of eco-
nomic} political} and even familial interests gave rich} densely popu-
lated eastern Liban 0 a fine uniformity. From the cabecera northeast to
Convenio and then south and west in a sweeping arc that embraced
Tierradentro} Santa Teresa} and San Fernando lay the freeholds of
intransigently Liberal antioquefzo coffee cultivators.
Outside its coffee heartland} Libano's political homogeneity weak-
ened. The municipio was} after all} sandwiched between Conservative
Santa Isabel and Villahermosa} and many campesinos living along
those boundaries were naturally Conservatives. Nor was that acciden-
tal. During the Regeneraci6n and afteIWard} Conservatives missed few
opportunities to weaken the big district's political strength. In 1BBB} at
the height of the movement} Governor Manuel Casabianca sliced away
nearly two hundred square kilometers along Libano's northern edge-
about 25 percent of the municipality-and added it to Villahermosa.
The commission that offically recommended the new boundary
spelled out the political motives behind the act: ({The aldea [municipio)
of Villahermosa was created with certain boundaries that were later
unjustly altered for political reasons by influential persons in
Libano . . . this Commission proposes . . . that the boundary of the
municipios be changed."14
The redrawing of boundaries by government fiat left the predomi-
nately Liberal hamlets of Quebradanegra and Primavera under the
jurisdiction of Villahermosa and the heavily Conservative areas of La
Polka and EI Sirpe in Libano.15 Governor Casabianca himself owned
considerable land in Libano. His upland hacienda ({La Yuca" occupied
nine square kilometers along the boundary with Santa Isabel. His heirs
158 Chapter 6

Uladislao Botero and daughter Genoveva. (Courtesy Alberto G6mezl

later sold this large tract to Bishop Ismael Perdomo for his coloniza-
tion project, which eventually settled hundreds of Conservative fami-
lies in southwestern Libano.'·
The western portion of Libano, too, was unique, though its distinct
Libano 159

character sprang more from ecological and cultural than political

factors. Murillo was the administrative center of this area and the
largest of all five corregimientos. 17 Lying at an elevation of three thou-
sand meters} just two kilometers from Casas Viejas} it serviced a rich
district given over to dairy fanning and the cultivation of potatoes}
wheat} onions} and other cold-country crops. Antioqueftos were accus-
tomed neither to the climate of those uplands nor to husbanding the
crops that grew there} and left them for others to settle. \!Vhen 120
square kilometers were opened to homesteading in 1873} migrants
from highland central Colombia} the department of Boyaca in particu-
lar} began appearing to claim land around Murillo. So considerable
was this migration and so profoundly did the frontier process affect
the newcomers that older residents felt called upon to comment on
the phenomenon:

A powerful, striking change occurs in the boyacense who migrates ... to

the high country of the central cordillera. He arrives all stooped, with his
eyes fixed on the ground, walking at a little half trot, courteously taking
off his hat and holding it behind him to greet those he passes. He is not
that way because of poverty, for he carries money in his pocket to start
work with. But wait until he sells his first two crops, buys a riding horse,
and puts a machete on his belt. \Vhen that happens step aside! The
contact with other people and other customs lifts from him the weight
of ancestral oppression and little by little . . . turns him into an aggres-
sive person. 18

Libano entered the twentieth century with a well-developed munic-

ipal personality. The province was economically prosperous and
constantly in flux as new settlers moved in to take advantage of the
coffee boom. It also suffered the apparent paradox of physical isola-
tion from the rest of Colombia while being locked in intimate proxim-
ity to political events that stirred the nation. Local elites may have
dominated the municipal scene} but they danced to a tune played in
Bogota or Ibague. Thus} factors beyond their control} specifically the
civil war of 1895} robbed libanenses of their revered founder} Isidro
PaITa. He was assassinated as he slumbered in a hut along the trail to
Santa Teresa. Even ConseIVatives lamented the act. ((\!Vho killed him?"
asked Enrique Ramirez before the Colombian Supreme Court in 1896:
((A cowardly) criminal commission thirsting to please those in power
went searching for Parra along mountain trails} certain of taking a
160 Chapter 6

valiant prisoner ... Juan de Jesus Rengifo} alcalde of Libano} dis-

patched him! This same Rengifo was earlier the very Idignified' fore-
man of - - [probably Manuel Casabianca] during his stewardship
of [hacienda] ILa Yuca.' He later became an important member of the
staff that leader took with him when he went to defend our Atlantic
coast} and today he is the municipal administrator of Ibague."19
Parra's assassination gave Liban 0 a Liberal saint} and the War of the
Thousand Days} following close on its heels} heightened the politiciza-
tion of alllibanenses. 20 A participant later recalled that the municipality
was assaulted on forty separate occasions during the war.21 During the
twentieth century} every political dispute seemed to call its people to
arms} as the ItEcheverri Raid" of 1912 and the bloody 1915 election for
concejales demonstrated.22 The militance of Liberals during the years
of ConseIVative rule was attributable in part to the election-time
chicanery that continually deprived them of access to local political
offices. Liberal frustration in Liban 0 and elsewhere had built to dan-
gerous levels by 1922. That year} a unified party threw itself into the
presidential contest} which pitted its candidate} Benjamin Herrera}
against ConseIVative Pedro Nel Ospina. Although Herrera lost the
contest by a considerable margin nationally} in Libano he polled a
resounding 72 percent of the popular vote.23
Liberal libanenses consoled themselves with the knowledge that
they would surely win the upcoming concejo election} scheduled for
October the following year. The pain of defeat further abated when
General Herrera held a national Liberal convention in Ibague a month
after the election. It adopted a platform that called for proportionate
representation in political corporations and gave· a nod to traditional
party concerns} such as the abolition of Church and military fueros
and refonn of the 1887 concordat between Colombia and the Vatican.24
Defeat had only strengthened the resolve of Colombian Liberalism.
And} by choosing Ibague as the site of its convention} the party seemed
to look toward the land of Murillo Toro as a chief repository of hope
for future successes.
All Tolima anxiously awaited the municipal elections of October 15}
1923. As Liberals reflected on their need to fill concejos across the
department with loyalists} the ConseIVatives grew panicky at the
possibility of defeat. Alluding to Liberal overtures toward labor} the
Catholic weekly EI Carmen cautioned workers that they should not
Ubano 161

listen to those who were promising Ilwild improvement." Its editori-

alist went on to suggest that the Liberals of Tolima Ilwant to foment in
the Catholic nation of Colombia Protestantism and Masonry/' and
reminded his readers that Masons Ilworship the idol Baphomet} which
has a little goat's head."Z! The rhetoric flowed like aguardiente for
months before the contest} and by election day partisans on both sides
were ready to unleash the electoral battle that would test the old
municipal order.
Liberals in Liliano streamed toward the voting site on October 15
confident they would soon demonstrate their numerical superiority.
Several dozen tables stood in the central plaza} behind each of which
sat a Conservative election commissioner with a sheaf of papers that
listed the names of all eligible voters. Time and again} Liberal campe-
sinos identified themselves only to be dismissed with a terse Ilya vot6/'
indicating either that a double" from Villahermosa} Casabianca} Her-
Il

veo} or Santa Isabel had voted in their place or that voting lists had
been doctored before the election and Conservative votes cast for
them. As it became increasingly clear that the Conservatives did not
intend to lose the election} Liberal leaders besieged members of the
Jurado Electoral to protest the farce. Their efforts were to no avail.
By mid-afternoon a large crowd of angry Liberals stood massed on
the south side of the plaza and a smaller group of Conservatives}
accompanied by the parish priest and several policemen} stood across
from them} in front of the church. It was an ugly situation that Libano
had witnessed more than once. Suddenly} shots rang out} most of
them from the Conservative side} and libanenses scattered in panic}
save one Liberal who} swinging a ruana full of rocks above his head}
charged the godos. Halfway across the plaza a bullet shot away part of
his ear} and he retreated in confusion. No one died in that particular
outbreak of violence} though Liberals Jorge Uribe Marquez} Julio Toro
G6mez} Pedro Duran Solano} and Ruben Palacio Jaramillo were
wounded. Libana again justified its appellation IlThe Red City."26
The significance of this election-day incident lay in its immediate
aftermath. Fearing the outbreak of further violence} police commander
Ernesto Palanco assumed the role of peacemaker} huddling first with
the alcalde and other Conservatives. IlThese people are impossible to
put down/' he heard them snarl} Ilthis town would be better off if it
disappeared because they are a party of savages."27 Then he met with
162 Chapter 6

Isidro Parra. (Courtesy Horacio Echeverri Parra and Alberto G6mezl

Libano 163

Liberals} and finally with both groups simultaneously. After many days
of negotiations} during which Thousand Day War veterans General
Eutimio Sandoval and General Antonio Maria Echeverri played pivotal
roles} Libano's Upolitical Pact of Elections" was hammered out. Liber-
als agreed to accept permanent minority status in municipal adminis-
tration in exchange for the guarantee that in each Conservative
administration they would be given two judgeships} direction of the
jait secretaryship of the concejo, and the offices of municipal treasurer
as well as city attorney. The ConseIVatives agreed to free the Liberals
they had jailed for ucrimes against authority" in the October 15
elections.28 This compromise pact affected the most delicate area of
municipal life. That it was \tVritten and that it seIVed to reduce
electoral violence over the remainder of the decade was a tribute to
the local elites} who surmounted a pathological political tradition.
Not all Libano's municipal energies were spent in political battles
during the first decades of the century. At least as important to
libanenses was Isidro Parra's old dream of making the town a model of
cultural advancement for the entire department. A step was taken in
that direction during 1917} when Honda businessman Pedro A. L6pez
installed the municipio's first electric generator. Citizens greeted the
event with music} speeches} and fireworks. A local bard celebrated the
occasion in verse:

Lleg6 la electricidad
en cuerdas de fino alambre
y ya tiene la ciudad
buena luz y mucha arte;
por eso con claridad
a la luna Ie decimos
que se vaya pa' otra parte. 29

The coming of electricity to Libano wakened hopes that the next

major obstacle to progress} the lack of a highway down to the cities}
ports} and railroad terminals along the Magdalena River} might soon
be overcome. One citizen readied himself for that possibility in 1918 by
hauling a dismantled automobile up to the cabecera on muleback.
Marco Aurelio Pelaez assembled it in the central plaza and drove it
lurchingly about town to the amusement of some and the amazement
of others. But the highway was an infinitely more ambitious project
164 Chapter 6

than the power plant, and years stretched into a decade and more
before the long-awaited link was constructed. At first, libanenses
blamed the Conservatives for their lack of progress, but Liberal admin-
istrations followed and by 1930 the road still had failed to materialize.
In 1934 an airplane was forced down in Libano, which caused some
people to complain that they had entered the air age prior to that of
motorized land transportation. The irony of their situation was height-
ened by the long wait as gasoline needed to refuel the plane was
hauled up from Armero by pack mule.3D
Two years later, Libano had its highway link to the outside world,
something that Santa Isabel, Villahermosa, Anzo6.tegui, Casabianca,
and Rerveo could not boast for another fifteen years and more." At
last, the municipality could be reached by trucks, which would speed
her fine coffee down to the Magdalena and the world beyond. Arrival
of the long-awaited road underscored the capricious way that the
twentieth century came to Libano. Marco Aurelio Pelaez exemplified
that fact as he drove his auto around town in 1918, anticipating a road

SUlveying the Libano Highway, ca. 1930. (Courtesy Alberto G6mez)

Liliano 165

whose completion lay eighteen years in the future. That was also the
case with Libano's children} sophisticated moviegoers after 1915}
raised on a diet of Charlie Chaplin and Harold Lloyd comedies and
film classics like Captain Blood and Ben Hur} yet who stared incredu-
lously at the single-engine aircraft that was forced down in their midst
in 1934} reverently touching its tires and wings and stroking its
wondrous propeller.
It could also be argued that Liban 0 was not ready for the twentieth
century and the challenges it posed to traditional ways of life. Jailed
shoemaker Pedro NaIVaez must have thought that as he pondered the
failure of his uBolshevik Revolt" in 1929.32 Events of the following year}
when the Liberal return to national power was attended by acts of
violence in many parts of Colombia} particularly in Santander} San-
tander del Norte} and Boyaca} were sufficient to convince all but the
most idealistic that pernicious habits of political thought and action
continued to hold libanenses in their cloying embrace.
After the Liberals gained the presidency in 1930} they speedily fixed
their hold on all areas of local administration. Most alcaldes appointed
after 1930 were party members} and} subsequent to the election of
October 1931} the concejo became irrevocably Liberal. Libanenses were
heartened that the government in Ibague at last demonstrated some-
thing other than suspicion of them and opposition to their progress.
UIt was only yesterday that the people of Liban 0 knew they had a
government} a governor} or a representative assembly}" wrote the
editorialist for the Liban 0 weekly Renovaci6n in 1931. Although he
placed his remarks in the context of traditional ConseIVative-Liberal
partisanship} his words also had important implications relative to the
question of regionalism.
The time-honored habit among Colombian politicians of favoring
their copartisans} coupled with the tendency of Conservatives and
Liberals to settle in towns and neighborhoods dominated by their
party} heightened regionalism and local tensions. One neighborhood
might receive much more than its fair share of public money while
another} adjoining one peopled by political Uouts/' might be denied
national and departmental assistance for years or even decades. The
libanense journalist clearly stated the destructive consequences of
such practice. uRegionalism is so bitter in Tolima and in the nation/'
he wrote} Itthat one region does not even know what riches the people
166 Chapter 6

of another region might have. On the other hand the people of the
cordillera know what they must have} and want the government to
know about it alsO."33
Happiness with the Liberal takeover of the political bureaucracy in
Libana was not universal. Conservatives living there claimed that their
suffering continued. A wave of election-related outrages in early 1933
made it clear that some of their charges were well founded. Conserva-
tives were arbitrarily arrested in Murillo} and homicides occurred on
the main street of the cabecera. The most serious altercations were in
that perennial center of intractable Conservative resistance} the vereda
of La Yuca. Campesinos there had always found themselves cast in the
role of municipal pariahs-an image they never tried very hard to
dispel. Liberals} for their part} could not forget that a one-time foreman
of hacienda {{La Yuca" had murdered General Isidro Parra and that up
to the year 1930 Conservatives of the vereda had been protected by
friends in high places. Soon after that year} Liberals in Libano began
heary lobbying for establishment of a police post in La Yuca} from
which they could keep the vereda under close surveillance. ConseIVa-
tives all across Tolima condemned the proposal out of hand. In
February 1933 they reacted with fury when they learned that three
campesinos from La Yuca had been killed while on their way to vote in
Libano. Conservative representatives walked out of the departmental
Assembly} and no less a personage than Laureano G6mez spoke out
against the {{ ambush" and the {{hateful scene of cannibalism" later
enacted when the bodies were transported down to the cabecera. 34
A ludicrous yet significant event in Libana early in 1934 showed
irrefutably that the once-humiliated Liberal party could impose its will
with impunity upon the municipio. Conservative Jose del Carmen
Parra had received word from the national Conservative directorate
that electoral abstention was in effect and that no party member could
take part in the upcoming presidential contest. Obeying the order} he
refused to seIVe on the local Jurado Electoral} for which he was jailed.
His abrasive aloofness so ired his jailers that they drove several pigs
into his cell} which they said would help break the chill of the
evenings.35 One of the nation's well-known party leaders} Augusto
Ramirez Moreno} learned of the outrage and sent a heated communi-
que to the national directorate in Bogota asking for aid in informing all
Conservatives that the {{ authorities in Libana are martyring the emi-
Libano 167

nent Dr. Parra and threatening his health by ... driving fat pigs in to
sleep with him." Ramirez Moreno titled his message liThe Regime of
the Swine."s8
During the sixteen-year pax Liberal, Liban 0 continued its rapid
strides of earlier years. No other municipio in Tolima could approach
it in either the quantity or quality of its coffee, and libanenses main-
tained a remarkable level of intellectual achievement. Between its
founding and the year 1936, no fewer than nineteen newspapers were
published, and from 1936 to 1950 another nine appeared. Some of
them were weeklies of respectable size, sophisticated format, and long
duration.s1 And all of them served a metropolitan area whose popula-
tion was no more than 10,000 persons as late as 1946. The municipio
also boasted a popular choral group that toured the department, a
string ensemble, and even a chapter of the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals. If Isidro Parra's spirit hovered over the municipal-
ity during that cultural golden age, it undoubtedly smiled on the
reading and discussion of books by the literary elite. Ideas leaped to
life in the clear, cool air and sent intellects soaring beyond the
mountain aldea. That spiritual liberation sometimes occurred at tragic
cost. On May 24, 1945, seventeen-year-old Raul Gonzalez Londono
committed suicide after immersing himself in the philosophical writ-
ings of Friedrich Nietzsche. As he lay dying of strychnine poisoning,
the youth penned a long, melancholy farewell to his best friend,
Eduardo Santa. The letter was subsequently printed in Uni6n luvenil, a
literary review they had founded and edited.s8
Libano's reputation within Tolima as a bucolic Athens of the north-
ern cordillera did not extend far into the surrounding campo. Physical
comforts were scant there and the general level of life low. The
corregimientos of Tierradentro and San Fernando did not have elec-
tricity even as late as the 1940s, and neither village could be reached
except by mule or on foot. Health conditions were poor everywhere. In
November 1946 nearly a hundred children died in an epidemic of
measles and typhoid fever. s9 Absence of sanitary facilities and intestinal
parasitism in most rural areas were strong contributing factors.
Nor did the campo enjoy the same cultural diversions as the
cabecera. The entertainment was of a heartier, sometimes more dan-
gerous, sort. A timeless favorite, at least among spectators, was the
machete duel. One or more such duels were stored up in the folklore
168 Chapter 6

of every vereda in the municipio} and people would frequently titillate

one another with blow-by-blow recountings of those spectacular
happenings.40
These types of duels became less frequent as time went on} but they
continued to occur. On August 10} 1946} the press recorded a shotgun-
machete duel between two families. The Salinas and Calder6ns fought
their way across the veredas of Paraguas and Tapero} near Santa
Teresa} until every man involved was either dead or wounded.41
Another fact of campo life was endemic outlawry} particularly in the
sparsely settled highlands. Two traditional places of refuge for law-
breakers were the towering cordillera in the west and the Headless
and San Jorge ridges} a jumble of steep} forested mountains that
formed a natural boundary between Libano and Lerida} in the east.
Constant demands were made on local and departmental govern-
ments for the creation of a rural police force. A flurry of such requests
came each time someone was killed by bandits. Capture of the outlaws
was next to impossible because they crossed back and forth over the
cordillera with ease. During one three-month period in 1941} six
campesinos were murdered by "evil-doers from other departments
who ... united with some of our own thieves to carry out their sinister
plans."42 Police who searched the veredas of Salaneta and EI Tesoro} in
the easternmost corregimiento of Convenio} returned with several
knives} rifles} and even six hand grenades.
The impersonation of police officers was a particularly effective ploy
employed by criminals. It became increasingly frequent as political
tension grew during the 1940s. One reason that lawbreakers found it
easy to pose as police was the inferior quality of personnel in the
various municipal corps. Many officers were prone to exercise armed
force when it was not necessary} a tendency aggravated by the igno-
rance and incompetence from which all too many of them suffered. Of
course} this all was related to lack of training and professionalism in
the various corps. In 1942 the national police sent a particularly
worthless group of agents to Libano} and} within a short period of
time} they seemed well on their way to taking it over. Responsible
citizens were jailed and beaten for little or no reason} campesinos
abused and provoked} and some people set to running eITands at the
officers' whim. Anyone walking in the street late at night was subject to
arrest regardless of his or her reason for being there.43
Liliano 169

By the 1940s strange new political currents began swirling out of

Bogota that muddied the waters of municipal life. The first of these
was the Liberal party split in 1942} which caused some libanenses to
support presidential candidate Alfonso L6pez and others to back
dissident challenger Carlos Arango Velez. Antonio Marfa Echeverri
supported Arango in his losing cause} for which the lopista editor of La
Voz del Libano, Leonidas Escobar} chided the elderly general in a mock
letter from an old retainer of TieITadentro: ttWriting your grace is your
old negro Sancho} sending warmest regards to yourself and your
children. When you were elected to the Senate by the grace of the
Virgin Mary} I stayed as poor as ever with my wife on my little
rancho."44 ttFaithful old Sancho" went on to argue that L6pez could
help the poor and that his patr6n should support him. But Echeverri
was not convinced} and he led 25 percent of the municipio in voting for
Arango.
A serious new disruptive element in municipal life came when the
ConselVatives attacked Alfonso L6pez after 1942. When he was finally
driven from office in 1945} party members throughout the cordillera
knew the day of reckoning was near. Both sides sensed approaching
trouble and reacted in the time-honored way-by arming themselves.
Rumors circulated that a Spanish ship had ascended the Magdalena
in early 1945 and deposited large} hea")'} rectangular boxes at ports
along the way. Learning that several of them had been loaded on
trucks and taken into the cordillera for distribution to unknown
persons} Liberal officials conducted searches for suspected arms
caches in Santa Isabel} Libano} Villahermosa} Casabianca} and HeIVeo.
No weapons were found} but the rumors put neIVes on edge as the
1946 election drew closer.45
Liberals of Liliano were thrown into a panic early that year} when
their party divided its vote} which allowed Ospina Perez to win the
presidency. Anticipating the inevitable bureaucratic housecleaning}
they warned in their local newspaper that Liban 0 ttwas} is} and will
continue to be a citadel of Liberalism/' that ttmunicipalleadership will
probably continue in the hands of Liberals/' and that the new govern-
ment should not ignore the will of the majority in places such as
Libano.48 At first} it seemed that Ospina heard the warning} for he had
the governor appoint a respected local Liberal named Neftali LaITate
to the post of alcalde. In less than a month} however} the latter was
170 Chapter 6

replaced by ConseIVative Benjamin Villegas. The change generated

excitement among the Liberals} who sent several commissions to beg
Governor Melendro Serna to rescind the appointment} but all to no
avail. Villegas remained} but he promised to do a good job despite his
party affiliation. Nevertheless} he sent ConseIVative corregidores to
Murillo and San Fernando} and Liberals there soon complained of
unfriendly acts by their new administrators.47
Fortunately} the new alcalde quickly showed that he was a moder-
ate} interested only in doing his job and keeping partisanship to a
minimum. In fact} Villegas got along so well with the Liberals that in
late 1947 he praised the achievements of the heavily Liberal concejo.
The sweetness and light that suffused municipal administration was
all the more striking when compared with conditions elsewhere in the
northern cordillera. ConseIVative majorities in sister municipios rose
up to smite Liberal minorities with a vigor that sent militwy alcaldes
into Anzoategui} Santa Isabel} Villahermosa} HeIVeo} and Fresno within
a year after Ospina Perez took office. Santa Isabel} which had the worst
record of civil violence over previous years} actually began losing its
Liberal population by early 1948. Civil life in Santa Isabel is shattered/'
It

wrote a party member who lived there} and he went on to describe the
Itmystique of reprisal" harbored by ConseIVatives and Liberals alike.48
Early in 1948 tension began to mount in Libano. Neither Alcalde
Villegas nor the Liberal concejo could restrain the fiery oratory ema-
nating from the national capital and transmitted to the municipality
via radio and newspaper. On the same day that Jorge Eliecer Gaitan
held his giant silent march in Bogota} Libano's own weekly newspaper
heightened the malaise by publishing an extensive article titled ItThe
Barbarism Continues": ItBodies of Liberals sacrificed for the cause are
hung from trees in the villages and campo of Santander; they are tasty
dishes for the buzzards attracted by their putrefaction.... And what
is the reaction of President Ospina to all this?"49 Local Liberals took up
the cry against ConseIVative assassins" of their brothers in other parts
It

of Colombia.
After Gaitan's break with Ospina's National Union government on
March I} many of Libano's police resigned to devote themselves more
completely to the battles of gaitanismo. Liberals of the municipio
selected delegates to the ItConvention of Municipalities/' called for the
latter part of April} and took preliminwy steps toward effecting local
Libano 171

civil resistance. Two weeks before the nueve de abril, La. Voz del Libano
published on its front page the tenible composite photograph of
President Ospina and dead campesinos previously featured in Gaitan's
newspaper Jornada. Below was the caption: ((On Saturday) March 6)
while his excellency ... danced at the Venado de Oro) political delin-
quents of Boyaca murdered and mutilated the president of the con-
cejo of San Cayetano) Pedro Ignacio Sarmiento; his wife) Blanca Rojas;
his daughter) Saturnina; and his two small sons."SO
As in most other Liberal municipios of the department) local leaders
acted responsibly on the nueve de abril, but compromised themselves
nonetheless. A ((civic junta/' called by some a revolutionary junta) was
formed in the cabecera and in each of the five corregimientos. Alcalde
Villegas was replaced by Neftali Larrate. Liberal citizens and police
maintained combat units around the town to guard against surprise
attack by Conservatives from Santa Isabel and Villahermosa) and they
warned members of that party to stay off the streets. Thanks to their
action) no one was killed and property damage was slight. A few days
later) troops of the national army anived from Caldas bearing orders to
put down the Liberal rebellion. Frightened Conservatives had fled
across the cordillera while the town was still in turmoil over the news
of Gaitan's death and told of blood flowing in the streets) Liberals
violating Conservative women) and citizens of Libano and Villaher-
mosa engaging in a major battle. For more than a week} the com-
mander from Caldas held most Liberal leaders in jail and released
them only when assured their subversion was ended.51
During the year following Gaitan's death) the government dropped
all pretense of humoring the Liberal majority of Libano. Conservatives
were named to administer all five corregimientos) and the military
governor paid no heed to Liberal complaints about the alcaldes he
sent them. Conservative campesinos were also more aggressive than
ever before. They held self-defense meetings in the vereda of La Yuca
and met with fellow partisans from Santa Isabel for undisclosed
purposes. Liberals claimed their plan was to launch a coordinated
attack on Murillo and San Fernando. Members of the clergy joined
forces with the Conservatives. In the trying months of mid-1949)
priests began denouncing Liberals from the pulpit. Campesinos from
Villahermosa started bringing their children to Liban 0 for baptism
because their parish priest refused them that sacrament) and in
172 Chapter 6

Murillo a number of Liberals wrote saintly Father Jose Ruben Salazar

begging him to ask Fathers Heman Tello and Jesus Marla Soto to stop
delivering anti-Liberal sermons. The latter was so effective a speaker
that} when he gave an incendiary sermon in Murillo} police closed all
the bars in town to prevent trouble.52
Before the election of November 1949} ConselVatives stepped up
their abuse of Liberal libanenses. The local Liberal directorate de-
nounced persons who traveled through the campo collecting voting
cards from party members on the pretext that they were not valid for
the upcoming presidential election. On September 17 and October 8}
two local ConselVatives} noted for their sectarianism} were appointed
as police inspector of Convenio and corregidor of Tierradentro. Inter-
mingled with political maneuverings was considerable common delin-
quency eveI)Where in the municipio. A strangerJJ was said to have
it

organized an annyJJ of one hundred campesinos in the area of La

it

Yuca; north toward Villahermosa} Liberal farms were robbed; and}

above Murillo} organized thieves stole from members of both parties.
Normally peaceful campesinos were caught up in the excitement of
those days. The son of ConselVative Olivero Ord6fiez} a laborer on the
finca of Liberal Campo Elias Gonzalez} after an exchange of words with
his foreman} without warning hacked his face with a machete and
shouted: itThis is to make these red sons of bitches of Santa Teresa
mad!"53
Libanenses could not do much to stop the lawlessness of individuals
operating in a strictly illegal manner} but they could and did resist
violence-instigating factors introduced by departmental or national
political administrators. Before November 9} 1949} the concejo was
their strongest defense. In July} August} and September} outspoken
members remained in constant communication with Governor Arci-
niegas. "When he appointed an extremely unpopular ConselVative
named Mamerto Gonzalez as alcalde) the concejo called for civil
resistance throughout the municipio. The president of the body} in his
telegram to the governor} justified the reduction of some salaries and
the abolition of positions commonly filled by the alcalde by stating
that itMamerto Gonzalez's tragic antecedents with Liberalism in the
municipio are well known here ... making him completely unaccept-
able as alcalde. In July the concejo also threatened to abrogate the
JJ

contract by which Libano helped subsidize police stationed there

Lfban 0 173

unless the quality of personnel were raised. In both cases} the munici-
pality successfully defended itself against the central government.
Governor Arciniegas named prominent Liberal leader Luis Eduardo
G6mez as alcalde in the first week of August} and early the next month
withdrew Lieutenant Juan Alzate} commander of the chulavita police
in Libano. He was replaced by a more moderate man. 54
After the state of siege was declared in November 1949} the Liberals
of Lfbano moved to the defensive. The concejo was dissolved and the
civilian government replaced by a military one. At the end of 1949}
members of the party could only remark in the pages of their heavily
censored newspaper that they understood the necessity of closing
some openly subversive concejos, but added} ((when made up of
responsible people such as we have in Lfbano the concejo can do a
great deal of good.... its recent closing is a real tragedy."55
Alllibanenses, both Conservatives and Liberals) were unhappy over
their situation} but agreed that} in comparison with neighboring
regions} they had much to be thankful for. Their newspaper caught
this feeling in an editorial of March 1S} 1950 titled uLibano: Land of
j

Peace." u\!Vhile political passions are tormenting our countrymen on

every side/' wrote editor Leonidas Escobar} uand while mourning and
pain are generalized} Lfbano continues to be a land of peace and work
where virtuous citizens have not been eclipsed."58
The sentiment was easily appreciated by EscobarJs readers} for not
far away serious political violence had been going on for more than
three years. South of Libano} in Santa Isabel} things remained tense. To
the north} in Villahermosa} political breakdown moved apace. A mili-
tary alcalde had to be sent there in September 1947} and} early the next
year} the homes of several local Liberal leaders were dynamited.
Shortly before the 1949 presidential election} the municipio was rife
with rumor that high-powered rifles were being distributed to some
Conservatives. A shoemaker named Luis Castillo was named as alcalde
a month before the election. According to Liberal refugees who fled
south into Lfbano} he began a fearful persecution} aided by police chief
Victor Cobo and ConseIVative director Umberto Espitia.57 By 1950 the
many Liberals who had fled to Libano from adjacent} predominately
ConseIVative areas could heartily agree that their new home was
indeed a Uland of peace."
It was something of a miracle that in Colombia of 1950-a nation
174 Chapter 6

living under a state of siege and writhing under the lash of escalating
Violencia-some places like Liban 0 were relatively free of the phenom-
enon. Even after the whole northern cordillera of Tolima had fallen
into anarchy} the unique municipio of Isidro Parra maintained a
degree of governmental responsibility. Through 1950 and 1951} tough
military alcaldes directed a successful running battle against cattle
thieves} outlaw bands} violence-prone Conservatives and Liberals} and
every other kind of illegal activity. Lieutenant Colonel Ram6n Pefiar-
randa Yanez} nicknamed ((Colonel Danger" by the Liberals) who heart-
ily disliked and feared him} kept the municipality under draconian
rule throughout his months of command. Between his direction of
military operations and the steady pressure of vocal civic leaders} the
rising violence was to some extent bottled up.
Then} in February 1951} an official in the government of Laureano
G6mez made a decision that set Libano on its road to ruin. Ordering
the withdrawal of Colonel Danger" and his troops of the regular
U

army} he apparently hoped the national police and a newly fOImed

departmental corps called the Rural Police could keep order.58 Liberals
later claimed that the action was part of a Conservative plot to throw
the municipio open to Violencia} thus more easily prostrating it before
the G6mez dictatorship. This conspiracy theory is one of the many ex
post facto accusations common in Violencia study and must be taken
with a grain of salt. But one part of it is absolutely certain: withdrawal
of the army troops so weakened Libano that the forces of order could
no longer slow the rush into Violencia.
During the early months of 1951} a new kind of lawlessness ap-
peared in the long-suffering uplands around Murillo. Heavily aImed
strangers crossed the mountains from Caldas and spread panic with
warnings that death awaited all who did not flee. This the campesinos
of the region did in increasing numbers over the course of the year}
and caldense outlaws plundered their property.59 Some of the Liberals
who were driven from their homes found refuge in parts of eastern
Libano} where they joined other refugees to form ((self-defense" units)
or guerrillas} as the authorities called them.
During the first two weeks of July} the northern cordillera was in a
state of tUImoil. Reports of killings poured in from the countryside}
large bands of armed men wandered through the mountains commit-
ting heinous crimes} and law-abiding citizens tried to stay as close to
Libano 175

their homes as possible.80 On July 14 Antonio Almansa) a person well

known around the cabecera as a militant Liberal and an alcoholic as
welt sat in a cantina drinking with several companions. He grew
violent-some say he attacked a Conservative with a knife-and was
arrested. \Vhile in jail) he was beaten to death by the police. Security
chief Pablo E. Casafranco informed his family that he died of Uacute
uremia/' but the true story was soon known by Liberals allover the
municipio.
Many were in the party that accompanied the horse-drawn hearse
bearing Almansa's body out of town for interment in the nearby
municipal cemetery. Those who watched the procession pass that
afternoon noted an ominous detail: following close behind were two
truckloads of police. Less than fifteen minutes later) the sound of
gunfire coming from the cemetery informed libanenses that Violencia
had at last made its appearance among them.81 Police later claimed
that the Liberals planned to attack their headquarters after the burial
and that they had followed en masse to prevent trouble. Although it
was never proved) Liberals accused police of planting one of their own
men among the mourners. \\Then the group neared graveside) some-
one never subsequently identified started a harangue against the
Conservative government and its chulavita minions. Words were ex-
changed) the police opened fire) and seven libanenses fell. Hugo
Forero Parra and Juan Sarmiento were killed outright) and several
others were gravely wounded. None of the police were injured.82
Word of the cemetery massacre spread quickly over Libano. Usually
the story was told angrily by one campesino to another as they met
along some winding mountain trail in the veredas of Convenio) Tierra-
dentro) and Santa Teresa. Life had grown more disturbed in the
eastern part of the municipality since refugees from economic vio-
lence in the western highlands had started arriving earlier in the year
bearing shotguns) pistols) and old Gras rifles last fired in anger during
the War of the Thousand Days. To the newly formed guerrillas of
Libano) the shooting of their compatriots was tantamount to a declara-
tion of war by chulavita police. Suddenly) it was open season on all
godos, whether police or campesinos. Four days after the cemetery
incident) forty to fifty guerrillas fell upon and annihilated a five-man
police patrol just south of Santa Teresa. Conservative civilians began
falling throughout the eastern part of the municipio in ambushes that
176 Chapter 6

seemed clearly to be reprisals for the cemetery deaths. Less than a

month after the massacre) seventeen Conservative campesinos were
reported murdered in scattered parts of the municipality.
Police were unable to make contact with the guerrillas on any
except their own terms. The commander of the Rural Police) Ernesto
Cardona Arias) described the impossible situation his men faced. He
told of a patrol that traveled up to a cabin above Convenio) where three
men and two women were arrested on the charge of aiding the
guerrillas. On the way back) the policemen met another detachment
that had been sent out to look for them and continued on back to
Convenio with the prisoners. The second patrol was left to reconnoiter
the surrounding countryside for signs of guenilla activity. A group of
forty to fifty Itbandits" soon fell upon the officers and drove them back
to a farmhouse) where they made a stand. Several of them were killed.
Aweek later) a large) well-organized force of army and police swept the
area between Convenio and San Fernando) but nothing was found.
The Liberal guerrillas had escaped over San Jorge Ridge into the
municipio of Lerida.83
Meanwhile) in the cabecera all was confusion. Libano's Liberals
found themselves blamed for the cemetery shooting by municipal
authorities and some ecclesiastical leaders as well. Hugo Forero and
Juan Sanniento were denied Catholic burial) and two prominent
Liberals who asked the bishop of Zipaquira) Monsignor Buenaventura
Jauregui) to intercede for them) were refused. Alcalde Jesus Rengifo
Reina) speaking to dumbfounded citizens from the balcony of the Casa
Cural on July 20) said) ItLibanenses: if you do not cease attacking the
legitimately constituted authorities and representatives of Dr.
Laureano G6mez) prison) exile) harassment) imprisonment and the
loss of your belongings is all you can expect."M
Between the cemetery massacre and attendant reprisals by Liberal
guerrillas) members of Liliano's political elite worked to restore a
measure of peace. Nevertheless) in the first week of August) when
Tolima Secretary of Govemment Daniel Valencia traveled to the cabe-
cera for a meeting with leading Conservatives and Liberals) he found
shops closed and streets deserted. The once open) prosperous com-
munity resembled a ghost town. Violencia had caused it to lose its
forward momentum; shattered its spirit of cohesion; and destroyed its
ability to lead the department in economic and cultural advances. The
LIbano 177

result of Secretary Valencia's consultation with representatives of the

two parties was a joint peace pact that condemned Ubanditry" and
promised their followers in the campo full protection of the law.8s
Participants in the upeace conference" were full of the best intentions}
and everyone in the municipality wanted nothing more fervently than
peace} but they could do nothing to slow what was going on in the
campo. Guenillas wandered freely through the countryside bullying
nearly defenseless farmers and laying traps for the police wherever
possible. Around Murillo} the Violencia was particularly severe in late
1951. An army officer stationed in the municipio at that time observed
the bodies of no fewer than fifty campesinos being brought into the
corregimiento during the latter months of that year.88
Guenilla units stepped up their terrorism early in 1952. Their usual
ploy was to take Conservative hostages} kill them} and set ambushes by
leaving their bodies in the roads leading to Convenio and Tierraden-
tro. \\!hen the police went out to collect the corpses and scout the
surrounding countryside} the violentos would attack. Life was so
insecure that people of all conditions began to migrate out of the
countryside and the municipio. Conservatives too foolhardy to leave
began receiving circulars warning that guenillas from Mesopotania}
between the cabecera and San Fernando} would eliminate them.87
The focus of guenilla activity was eastern Libano} an area almost
wholly Liberal in political makeup and dotted with hundreds of coffee
fincas, where lush foliage provided near-perfect cover for armed ma-
rauders. Along the northern edge of this region ran a dusty} twisting
road that linked Libana with the Magdalena River Valley} some forty
kilometers distant. All along its route were steep mountains and
scattered rustic stores that served as points of supply for hundreds of
campesino families who lived in the coffee hinterlands. Just east and a
little north of the cabecera was the settlement of Campoalegre} and
eleven kilometers farther on} the corregimiento of Convenio. Both
hamlets seIVed Liberal guenillas who ranged over Tierradentro} Santa
Teresa} and San Fernando.
By March 1952 the situation had become critical. Late that month}
local leaders made the fateful decision to ask for additional police
reinforcements for an operation against guenillas operating out of an
uninhabited knot of cuchillos southwest of the cabecera known as ULa
Tigrera." Governor Francisco GonzAlez happily complied with the
178 Chapter 6

request to strike at the Liberal guerrillas of Libano) and on Wednesday)

Apri12) he arrived in town with the commander of the national police)
General Rafael Galeano) Lieutenant Commander Eduardo Villamizar)
and special invited guest Enrique Urdaneta Holguin) the son of Acting
President Roberto Urdaneta ArbelAez.88 On Thursday their men began
a cautious sweep through the targeted region intent on what was
euphemistically called upacification." The day before the governor was
scheduled to return to Ibague) he took young Urdaneta to a vantage
point just west of town to give him a panoramic view of the theater of
military operations. To unregenerate Liberals) that short trip was
similar to a gentleman's excursion to watch professional hunters
pursue human game.69
By late Friday the pacification seemed well underway) and Governor
Gonzalez and his party made ready to leave early the next morning.
But) as he packed his bags) the Liberal guerrillas were preparing an
unpleasant surprise. They had learned when he intended to leave
town and moved swiftly to a point on the highway down which he
would soon travel. Twelve kilometers northeast of town) at a place
called Portugal) they laid an ambush of formidable proportions. By
dawn they were in position and ready to strike at the hated men they
felt had driven them into lives of outlaWl)'. Shortly after 7:00 A.M. the
official motorcade came into view. In the lead was an army Jeep)
followed by the governor's sedan) a pickup truck carrying five soldiers)
and several nonofficial vehicles full of high school students. With
almost perfect precision) an explosive charge went off and caused a
small landslide that blocked the road. Only the Jeep escaped. In a
matter of seconds) the sedan was riddled with bullets. The pickup met
the same fate. The soldiers who were not killed outright were cut
down by machete-wielding guerrillas who awaited them in heary
brush along the road. Only the high school students were spared. The
trucks in which they were riding retreated pell-mell to Libano to
report the awesome fate that had befallen their party.70
VVhen all was still below) the attackers climbed down the hillsides to
sUIVey the results of their handiwork and to collect weapons and
ammunition from the dead soldiers. Only one thing spoiled an other-
wise perfect ambush. All they found inside the governor's car were
gravely wounded women and children as well as three dead men from
Libano) two ConseIVatives and one Liberal. Governor Gonzalez) the
Libano 179

son of Acting President Urdaneta} and the driver of the lead Jeep were
at that moment speeding out of the cordillera. After pausing in Arrnero
to alert Bogota of the ambush} they rushed on to Ibague. From there}
Gonzalez asked the national government for all the reinforcements
necessary to Clexterminate the bandits of Libano."71
Within twenty-four hours of the attack at Portugal} troops sent by
the minister of government had encircled a large portion of the
municipio. Their orders were to advance on the guerrillas and kill or
capture anyone who resisted. For more than a week} the combined
national army-police force fought its way across the hills and valleys of
eastern Liban 0 and slowly reduced every pocket of Liberal opposition.
As the troops advanced} they seized a varied assortment of weapons}
including many that were homemade. Although the campesinos were
poorly armed} they fought to the last man-and woman. In many
cases} the only alternative was to die without resisting} for the average
soldier fired first and asked questions later. The combat was so furious
at La Tigrera that at the end of three days all the troops found alive
were two terrified infants.72 General Galeano} who directed the police
component of the Battle of Libano/' summed up the attitude of his
If

men in terms that could easily have been spoken during the bloodiest
months of the War of the Thousand Days: ClWe must finish them off
whatever the cost. If they prefer to give themselves up dead} that's
their business. In any event} we will be unflagging in our program of
pacification."73
The 1952 invasion of Libano by government forces has been called
both the worst single disaster the municipio ever suffered and the
major catalyst in breaking down the traditional structures that had so
long given stability to campo society. At least 1}500 libanenses died} 3.5
percent of the entire population} and an estimated 1}000 farmhouses
were destroyed} or 20 percent of all buildings outside the cabecera. 74 A
detachment of army-police forces swept south along a line extending
roughly from Murillo} in the west} to Headless Ridge, in the east, and
destroyed everything even remotely suspected of offering comfort to
the guerrillas. Other elements of the government force advanced from
Santa Isabel and Lerida. In that manner} they tightened the noose that
temporarily strangled the Lfbano guerrillas and crippled the munici-
pio. On the slightest pretext} campesinos were shot} houses burned}
and crops as well as foodstuffs destroyed. The underlying assumption
180 Chapter 6

was that every farmer was a Hbandit/' or potentially one} and should be
treated as such. The fight was not considered to be between Colom-
bians} but between the forces of order and a subversive} perhaps
communist} rabble. Members of the Colombian Army later admitted
that their philosophy of mounting large-scale offensives against poorly
anned campesinos was entirely mistaken both in conception and
execution} but that realization came too late to help Libano.75
Other than the ruin of the municipio, little was gained by the bloody
reprisal of April 1952. On the contrary} by that year it had become
almost a truism that Violencia created bandits and guerrillas} and not
vice versa. The attack on Governor Gonzalez and Urdaneta Holguin
was certainly an act of Violencia} but so too was the massive retaliatory
campaign that followed it. In that sense} the national government
inadvertently handed down a death sentence to hundreds of other
persons living in the municipio. A photograph taken in the Conserva-
tive vereda of Alto EI Toro} just two kilometers north of Portugal} bears
mute testimony to that truth. It shows twenty-four campesinos whose
throats had been cut by Liberal guerrillas?8 In October 1953 more than
a thousand orphans lived in and around the cabecera, and scores of
women widowed by the guerrilla-extennination campaign worked as
poorly paid prostitutes in the town's giant red-light district.l1 Perhaps
the saddest fact of all was that nothing could be done for Libano.
Massacred campesinos, wandering guerrillas} prostitutes} and or-
phans were to be pennanent features of life there well into the
foreseeable future.
 7

Tolima}s Tragedy
Deepens

Thirty-one-year-old Hector Echeverri Cardenas sat at his desk late on

the evening of July 11} 1953. His staff had gone home hours before}
leaving him at work on the next day's editorial for Tribuna. The streets
of Ibague grew quiet as time passed} and now only muted noises from
outside disturbed his solitude. For the first time since he had founded
the newspaper three years earlier} the nation too seemed quiet.
Laureano G6mez was gone} driven into exile a month earlier in a
militaI)' coup led by Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. Liberals
like Echeverri} who greeted the fall of G6mez enthusiastically} repeated
the line from the national anthem that went tithe terrible night has
ended." And} during his first weeks of rule} the new president cum
dictator had responded to the popular rejoicing with finn assurances
that his tlGovemment of the Armed Forces" would strive to heal the
wounds that partisanship had inflicted on the body politic.
Echeverri awoke from his musings with a start. Somewhere in the
darkened office} he heard a footstep} caught a glimpse of something.
Suddenly} four men stood before him staring with expressionless dark
eyes} ragged ruanas hiding the revolvers they bore at their sides. The
young newspaper editor said nothing at first. \VIlat was there to say?
Two attempts had already been made on his life. These men were
doubtless pajaros sent to dispose of the outspoken Liberal} and
tonight they would not miss. How could they not kill him at point-
blank range? As these thoughts raced through his mind} it may have
seemed ironic to him that} as Colombia's long night ended} his seemed

181
182 Chapter 7

to be beginning. Then one of the men spoke. ItI'm Tiberio Borja from
Rovira/' he said} Itand I've come to ask your help."l
Thus began a discussion that stretched into the night and ended
with the understanding that Echeverri Cardenas would seIVe as inter-
mediary between the anny and the Liberal guerrillas of Rovira. The
incongruous scene played out that night in Ibague was being dupli-
cated with minor variations at about the same time allover the
country as other guerrillas rushed to take advantage of the amnesty
being offered by the new government. Along with Tiberio Borja (lt C6r-
doba") were his subalterns: Andres Espinosa (ltCoronel Narifio")} Leon-
idas Borja (ltTeniente Tranquilo")} and Jaime Borja (ltSargento Cariilo").
They told of spending nearly four years in the mountains above their
old homes} pursued by and pursuing the police of Laureano G6mez.
Then came his fall on June 13. The next day} air force planes appeared
overhead} but} instead of dropping bombs as in the past} they dis-
pensed copies of EI Tiempo} EI Espectador} and other Liberal newspa-
pers that carried accounts of the coup. Later in the week} aircraft let
loose tens of thousands of fliers promising amnesty with guarantees to
all guerrillas} regardless of political sympathy} who would return to
peaceful pursuits.
Almost immediately all those of Liberal persuasion accepted the
offer. To them} the army was the best possible guarantor of peace} a
belief shared by most members of their party and effusively stated by
one of them at the height of enthusiasm for Rojas Pinilla:

Time and again the National Army, because of its Bolivarian patriotism
and high spirit of discipline, has been the only solution to our internal
political conflicts that drive us to destroction and roin. . . . Fortunately
the Military has had the absolute, unqualified support of the great
majority of politicians in the nation, of the masses, and even of the
national guerrilla movement-the guerrilla movement that trosted the
Armed Forces to successfully complete its stroggle. 2

Communist guerrillas in southern Tolima tried to stop the Liberal

entregas. On June 26 they held a general meeting} in which they
denounced Rojas Pinilla as Itthe vilest delinquent in the country} in
power as a result of murder and massacre ... one who carried out the
massacre at the Casa Liberal in Cali in 1949} while commander of the
army in that area" and warned} It don't believe the false promises of
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 183

Hector Echeverri Cardenas (center) and editorial staff of Tribuna, 1956. (Cour-
tesy El Tiempo)

propaganda thrown from airplanes of the dictatorship.'" But the en·

tregas could not be stopped, and the guenilla movement in Tolima fell
apart. As "Tiro Fijo," a lieutenant of communist leader "Charro Negro,"
later put it, "the anned popular struggle was defeated not through
anned struggle but by politics.'"
Gerardo Loayza, Liberal chieftain of Rioblanco and sometime collab-
orator of "Charro Negro," refused to support the communist position
and became one of the first tolimense guerrillas to make peace with
the government. He and his large contingent laid down their arms in
late July: Hard on their heels were the roughly 700 guerrillas of Rovira.
Tiberio Borja and Colonel Cesar Cuellar Velandia, military governor of
Tolima, had selected Monday, August 3, as the date of their entrega. At
9:00 on the appointed morning, Governor Cuellar's new Buick pulled
away from the Palacio del Mango, in Ibague, for the two-hour trip
south to Rovira. Riding with him were his secretary of government,
Colonel Ernesto Velosa, and several members of the press. When they
arrived in Rovira, an incredible sight greeted their eyes. In the central
plaza, drawn up in rough ranks, were 308 armed men, most of them
184 Chapter 7

dressed in irregular, tattered army unifoIms. Salutations and talks,

laced with light humor, followed. The governor then made a patriotic
speech, and cheers were raised to the new president, to the armed
forces, and to members of the departmental Assembly. Finally, after
more than three miserable years of life in the mountains, the campe-
sinos stacked their arms and returned to their mined farms. 8
The entregas continued for the next three months. The Rovira
guerrilla actually consisted of two groups, one headed by Tiberio
Borja, and another of equal size, led by David Cantlio Agudelo ("EI
Jl
Triunfante The latter band laid down its weapons at about the same
).

time as Borja's. Its loquacious chief, obviously relieved to be at peace

again, granted extensive interviews in which he described his way of
life during the Violencia of 1949-53.7 By mid-August nearly a thousand
guerrillas had given up in the eastern municipios of Prado and Do-
lores, and another 205 announced their intention to do so in Libano.8
During September, national attention shifted to the Eastern llanos,
where, in a series of dramatic, highly publicized entregas} approxi-
mately 3,500 guerrillas surrendered.9 Those in Tolima continued to
come in during the next two months. Five hundred more laid down
arms in Rioblanco; in EI Lim6n, HeIm6genes Vargas (UEI Vencedor Jl
)

and his 192 men gave up on October 19, followed four days later by
Jesus Marla Oviedo (UMariachi and 148 men. During November
Jl
)

another thousand stacked arms in Ataco and Dolores. One of the

largest of all entregas occurred at the end of October just east of
Tolima in the Sumapaz region of Cundinamarca when communist
Juan de la Cmz Varela led 1,200 guerrillas in declaring peace with the
government.tO However, his surrender was apparently not genuine, for
he was soon arming his followers again.
President Rojas wasted no time in reassuring the people of the
nation that he intended to halt the Violencia. Less than a month after
taking office, he attempted to depoliticize the national police by
removing its various divisions from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Government and placing them under the Ministry of Defense. Much
publicity was given to efforts of a new government agency called the
National Office of Rehabilitation and Aid to help refugees return to
their land. Photos were published showing busloads of campesinos on
their way back to abandoned farms or picking their way along trails
canying mattresses, suitcases, and babes in arms. The rehabilitation
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 185

office claimed it resettled more than 32}OOO persons between June and
November 1953 and the army an additional 5}OOO.11 In Tolima} Secre-
tary of Government Velosa Pefta directed alcaldes in each municipio to
take a "census of exiles" and tum it over to the departmental govern-
ment for use in relief efforts. Censorship was lifted toward the end of
the year} and by late November more than 1}600 political prisoners had
been released from the nation's jails.12
On December 8 Rojas Pinilla traveled to Ibague} where he addressed
a huge crowd of enthusiastic tolimenses. He began his speech by
reflecting on the "relentless scourge" of Violencia} which had replaced
the department's "happy music" with "anguished screams of friends
falling victim to traitorous trickery." Calling it "the most tremendous
orgy of blood in national memory/' he reminded his listeners that they
must also strive for a "spiritual disarmament" that would allow the
seeds of peace to germinate and grow. He closed on a note of
optimism: "I hope that next year finds us united in the shadow of the
national tricolor} without baniers between us.... From now into the
future let us march together . . . away from sterile} anti-Christian
political and class conflict} forgetful of past eITOrs and mistakes except
as they remind us that the concepts of nation and good government
must not be corrupted by human weakness and eITOr."13
His Ibague speech was one of the last Rojas made during the early}
euphoric period of his rule. Perhaps for that reason} it was more
serious in tone than most others he delivered in major Colombian
cities between July and December 1953. It dealt extensively with the
Violencia because} even as he spoke} Tolima continued to harbor
unregenerate violentos like "ChaITO Negro" and "Tiro Fijo" in the
south as well as vocal antigovernment forces in the extreme east. The
eastern contingent was led by unrepentant Juan de la Cruz Varela} the
old gaitanista Liberal and socialist} lately headquartered in the Suma-
paz region of extreme southern Cundinamarca} a rugged} sparsely
populated area contiguous with eastern Tolima.
The Ibague speech was an interesting political document that
reflected the dictator's growing concern over his legitimacy in a
historically democratic system. Already by 1953 it was becoming clear
that he did not intend to take orders from either political party} but
rather hoped the citizens could rise above partisanship and help him
create a virtuous nation suffused with Christian and "Bolivarian"
186 Chapter 7

principles.14 His rhetorical and natural inclinations were leading him

toward the creation of an authoritarian government based upon
populist} corporative} and nationalistic principles} not unlike the
Peronist system then in force in Argentina.15 Hence} he pleaded with
the people to Uforget" the error of past partisanship and follow him
Uwith martial briskness" toward a future of his own making.16
Although Rojas logically stressed national conciliation and forgetful-
ness of past error} tolimenses could no more shed their partisanship
than Bogota's political elites could forget that the dictator had closed
their usual channels to power and advancement. \tVhen it became
apparent he would not yield control to them} he became a counter-
elitist} whose presence was increasingly obnoxious to a veritable
constellation of interests. The threat he posed to the country's leaders
transcended politics to embrace all of society because it was in the
nature of Colombian culture that economics} politics} haute culture}
and even the ecclesiastical hierarchy were inextricably united in a
dense} infinitely complex web of human relationship.17 It was hardly
surprising that} even as they waxed eloquent in support of the man
who vanquished Laureano G6mez} national political leaders fervently
awaited the return of the traditional political arrangement.
Ex-President Alfonso L6pez voiced that hope in March 1954} when
he praised Rojas's announcement that a constituent assembly would
be called to reform the national constitution. uI am enthusiastic over
the idea of calling a Constituent Assembly} with parity given to our two
great political collectivities/' L6pez said in an El Tiempo interview:

Concord between ConseIVatives and Liberals, constitutional normality

and civil peace are urgent matters of common concern that make any
postponement ill advised. So that we may again experience the protec-
tion of the rule of law, not simply the law of individuals, it seems
necessary to search untiringly for bases of partisan accord, in order to
lift the tenor of the parties' activities to such level that they can
discharge their obligations to the nation. 18

These words did not please Rojas. Nor was he comforted when he
learned that the Liberals had contacted his own top Conservative
collaborator} Mariano Ospina Perez} suggesting that the two parties
actively pursue consensus. Rojas reacted to the incipient opposition
by increasing his surveillance of Liberals} particularly after he learned
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 187

that they suspected him of calling the constituent assembly for his
own purposes. He angrily prevented several members of that party
from touring the country to voice their suspicions about his inten-
tions.19
Then) in June 1954) the Rojas regime made its first serious error. On
June 8 a staff member of the National University called police to the
campus to break up a demonstration. Shouting and rock-thro\tVing
followed} and police finally fired on a group of students) one of whom)
Uriel Gutierrez) was killed. The follo\tVing day) thousands of students
descended on downtown Bogota to protest his death by marching on
the presidential palace. \Vhen they reached the spot of Gaitan's
assassination) just south of Avenida Jimenez on Carrera Septima) they
found their way blocked by soldiers of the Colombian Battalion) men
only days from being sent to serve in Korea. The police) who normally
would have been in charge) were confined to headquarters to avoid
further antagonizing the students. Unable to continue their march) the
demonstrators sat down in the street) sang verses of the national
anthem) and shouted slogans against the government. The confronta-
tion suddenly turned deadly when a second lieutenant named Burgos
exchanged words with a student. The two grappled) and a second
student tried to help his friend. At that instant) the officer's platoon
opened fire) and seconds later the street was littered with dead and
wounded. Another tragic incident occurred half an hour later) when
soldiers shot down yet another unarmed student who was resisting
arrest. That death brought the number of fatalities to eleven. Thirty
were wounded) including seven soldiers who were struck by rico-
cheting bullets .20
The ttJune Slaughters/' as many called the shootings) shocked and
distressed the nation. The bloody clash between students and soldiers
seemed fearfully like other incidents of Violencia that had occurred
under preceding civilian governments. Some Colombians reluctantly
concluded that perhaps Rojas Pinilla could not provide the solution to
national problems after all. For others) the shootings became a rallying
point for the first concerted opposition to the dictatorship. As Gabriel
Canol founder of El EspectadorJ cogently put it) ttmemory of the
martyred obliges us to fight for liberation of the living." The situation
underlined the fact that) insofar as Violencia was concerned) Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla faced several insoluble problems. He had initially been
188 Chapter 7

viewed as a welcome alternative to a traditional system of government

that had grown unworkable. People thought that, as the representative
of a historically apolitical military, he would halt the cancerous
violence that was consuming many parts of the country. The sponta-
neous entregas by thousands of guerrillas, particularly those in the
Eastern Uanos, at first justified that hope. But these sUIrenders were
more a leap of faith by men yearning for peace than the result of true
accord between ConseIVatives and Liberals. Nor did all the violentos
surrender. The many who were outright criminals and the few, like
((ChaITO Negro/' who harbored nontraditional political objectives,
remained at large.
In the final analysis, Rojas Pinilla administered Colombia a placebo
for its cancer, and a poorly disguised one at that. As a military man, he
could not deal with the purely political malaise that was the true and
enduring root of Violencia. Nor could he convince his countrymen he
was the apolitical paladin he claimed to be. Raised in a ConseIVative
boyacense family, he naturally found his closest political collaborators
in the party of Mariano Ospina Rodriguez and Miguel Antonio Caro.
No Liberal could forget that Rojas had failed to protect the Casa Liberal
in Cali) nor that he was on personal terms with some of the very
pajaros who perpetrated the massacre there. Eleven students lying
dead in the streets of Bogota) riddled with army and police bullets)
were evidence that he could not bring the peace he promised.
The Bogota killings of 1954 hardly came as a surprise to Colombians)
for they had witnessed an ominous resurgence of Violencia after the
first few months that Rojas held power. Only the Eastern Llanos
remained peaceful following the dramatic entregas ofmid-1953. Rojas
himself contributed to the renewed fighting in Valle by freeing a
number of violentos from departmental prisons during his amnesty
program of December 1953. Among them was Le6n Marla Lozano ("EI
C6ndor"). Before his aIrest) he had been one of the most notorious
pajaros in Valle. A personal acquaintance of the new president) called
a protege by some, the cold-blooded murderer was loosed again on
the department, where he added scores of new names to his already
extensive list of victims. By 1957 Valle rivaled Tolima and Caldas as the
most Violencia-ridden department in the nation.21 Cundinamarca)
Boyaca, Cauca) Santander) Santander del Norte) and Antioquia also
witnessed renewed Violencia under Rojas Pinilla but none) except for
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 189

Tolima} suffered more severely than the coffee-rich department of

Caldas. The fighting there increased appallingly between 1954 and
1958} waxing and waning in tempo with the biannual coffee harvest.
The theft of valuable coffee crops was clearly an important component
of the later Violencia in agricultural regions such as Caldas.22
In Tolima} the sudden return of thousands of guerrilleros to fanns
that had been abandoned for as many as four years placed new
economic strains on an already traumatized local society. Many of
them found strangers living on their land} and in some cases fanns
had been sold in the absence of their rightful owners. Southern and
eastern Tolima were most severely affected by such sales. Early in the
period of entregas, pressure was brought to bear for nullification of
land sales transacted in areas of heavy Violencia.23 No such voices were
raised in defense of the Indians of Ortega and ChapaITal} whose lands
had been whittled away by whites since the early years of the Violen-
cia. Indians suffered more than other tolimenses from the incessant
tunnoil of 195Q-53} when unscrupulous whites} Liberals as well as
Conservatives} sometimes paid violentos to prey on them. Houses were
being burned and people killed in Ortega even as Governor Cuellar
Velandia was accepting the entrega of Tiberio Borja in Rovira.Z4
Southern Tolima became an outlaw's paradise after the entregas
broke the guerrilla organization there. A few of the campesinos who
had anned themselves out of necessity in 1949 grew to like the life of
adventure and refused to give it up when offered the opportunity to do
so in 1953. They joined others of like inclination and fonned cuadrillas
that plagued Rovira} Ortega} Natagaima} and Purificaci6n. The land
was rich and well populated. Coffee and livestock were there for the
taking} and members of the enemy party were always at hand when
the passion to rob} rape} or kill ran high.
One of the Borjas of Rovira was such a man. Arsenio Borja (USan-
tander became so proficient in the art of Violencia that even uChis-
Jl
)

pas/' the most dreaded of all Colombian violentos, remembered him

with awe:

I can't forget his famous deeds; he did away with everything that passed
before him. He used to tell us and make us see that the enemy was the
gados, the police and the army} and he called them Hdirty gada bas-
tards," and said we've got to get rid of all of them. And since in reality he
was so brave and warlike nobody stayed behind when he led a mission;
190 Chapter 7

some went out of fear, others because they needed to go \tVith him, and
yet others because they admired the famous guerrilla chief. And since
he defended us, brought us clothing and usually gave us what we
wanted or needed, and since he didn't mind going out to kill and rob
godos, we made things as easy for him as we could.

ClSantander" did not return to the humdrum life of a farmer in

August 1953. As ClChispas" told it:

Arsenio continued doing bad things wherever he went, finishing off

everything that crossed his path, above all police, soldiers, godos and
pajaros. tilt's a comfort and a great relief to give it to them the way you
kill a snake" he would say with such relish that his mouth would water
as when you talk about a good meal. But I don't know, as evil and cursed
as he was you couldn't ignore his good nature, and the skill \tVith which
he perlonned such brave deeds.
IISantander," or Arsenio, committed so many crimes, murders, rob-
beries, set so many fires and did other things so frightening that even his
brothers, who were truly good men, decided to get rid of him, the way
you pull out a weed, to save the family name. They felt that by killing him
everybody would thank them for ridding the world of that kind of
person. So evil was his spirit that he wasn't satisfied seeing the corpse,
but he had to cut deep gashes in it saying it was so the damned godo's
life could leave him easier. And it wasn't just that he killed but that he
got really bad, stealing cattle, mules and everything that came his way.
\Vhenever he felt like it he satisfied his whim with machete and knife. 25

Traditional political Violencia increased in Tolima during 1954.

Since July of the previous year, reformed guerrillas had warily watched
the machinations of Conservative vigilante groups, often led by police,
who were pledged to cleanse Tolima of the Liberal chusma. Calling
themselves Clpatriots" or "'contrachusma," they operated out of the
Conservative veredas of Rovira and San Antonio. Their wariness was
quickly transformed into active resistance after the death of David
Cantillo r'Triunfante") under circumstances that were never satisfac-
torily explained. Cantillo, a well-liked former guerrilla, was killed while
assisting an army-police unit track down bandits in upland Rovira. His
friends, most notably Leonidas Borja ("Teniente Tranquilo"), Te6filo
Rojas ("Chispas"), and Jesus Maria Oviedo ("Mariachi"), assumed that
he had been killed by godo officials who seemed determined to kill off
former guerrillas in spite of guarantees offered under the original
amnesty agreements. Rather than waiting passively for ambush and
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 191

death} many Liberal guenillas left their farms and returned to their old
haunts.28 Attacks on police subsequently increased sharply. In early
November a particularly shocking example of the renewed Violencia
occurred when a large cuadrilla of Liberal guenillas crossed the
cordillera into Caldas and seized the town of Genova} killed a number
of Conservatives} and stole supplies before withdrawing into southern
Tolima.27
Near the end of 1954} the specter of communism once again drew
the government into a pattern of escalating activity. There were
reports of growing guenilla strength in the east} where Juan de la Cruz
Varela held sway. Irregular forces in eastern Tolima began flaunting
their strength} bragging that they possessed more weapons than the
army. The fact that Varela admitted to being a socialist made his
actions a particular worry to Rojas Pinilla and his ((Government of the
Armed Forces." Over the preceding two years) many officers in the
Colombian Army had spent time in Korea fighting communists} and
on their return were fed into the army's combat units. The number of
Korean veterans serving at home swelled after November 25} 1954}
when the last of the 3}200-man Colombian Battalion returned from
duty in Korea.28
The army intensified its surveillance of eastern Tolima in early 1955.
It had already targeted known campesino leaders for arrest and staged
surprise raids on villages suspected of sheltering socialists. One raid
on a church bazaar in the vereda of Mercadilla} Villarrica} netted
ex-guenilla and longtime socialist Isauro Yosa ("Lister") as well as
several lesser leaders. Sumapaz was not a region to be taken lightly} a
fact that became painfully apparent in late March 1955 when five
hundred guerrillas of Villarrica nearly wiped out an army infantry
company that was patrolling the municipio. An angered Rojas Pinilla
was moved to action. On April4} 1955, he decreed all of eastern Tolima
and southwestern Cundinamarca a "Zone of Military Operations" and
began readying his attack.29
Sensitive Colombians despaired over news of the military buildup in
Tolima. Since coming to power nearly two years earlier) Rojas had
repeatedly told them that peace was imminent. Now he was announc-
ing that lawlessness had reached crisis proportions in a wide expanse
of countryside just a hundred kilometers from the nation's capital.
Fearing that the impending operation spelled doom for hundreds of
192 Chapter 7

civilians trapped in the targeted area, leaders of the national Liberal

directorate sent a long, respectfully worded letter to Rojas asking that
he reexamine the nature of guenilla activity in Sumapaz. Treading very
carefully, they first applauded the president for dealing firmly with the
breakdown of public order in Tolima and Cundinamarca and re-
minded him of their party's historic opposition to communism and
all other pernicious influences and foreign doctrines infiltrating
It

national territory." Next, they obselVed that for many years the campe-
sinos of Sumapaz had struggled for possession of the land they
worked, and thus their belligerence was long-standing and rooted in
complex political, social, and economic factors. In such circum-
stances, they cautioned, it would be hazardous to assume that real
pacification could be achieved through military action alone.
That tactic had been used several years earlier by Laureano G6mez
when, convinced that the guenillas there were communists and
bandits, he had pushed pacification of the Eastern llanos to "execra-
ble extremes." Yet, after the entregasJ life quickly returned to normal
throughout the region without any lingering signs of either commu-
nism or banditry. The Liberals begged Rojas not to make the same
error. They ended their letter by stating their opposition to any
large-scale army action in Sumapaz:

It disturbs us that drastic repression of the banners raised in eastern

Tolima can be carried out under the guise of an anticommunist policy.
The Liberal party is anticommunist. Its entire history points to that fact.
But it must be understood that the fight against communism doesn't
mandate physical elimination of communists, nor does it justify the
application of tactics not authorized by law nor sanctioned by the
principles of Christian civilization. 30

Two weeks later, on May 13, President Rojas replied to the Liberals.
He informed them that, during months of activity in Sumapaz, the
army had gathered incontrovertible, printed evidence of communist
activity there. His predecessor possessed no such proof of subversive
activity in the Eastern llanos and had fabricated the issue of commu-
nism there as Ita pretext for reducing the llanos with blood and fire,
with no consideration for legality or simple humanity." In addition,
Rojas wrote, the guenillas of Sumapaz had constantly refused his
entreaties to lay down their arms. He explained their reluctance to
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 193

sUITender in economic terms. They were Hclosely linked to the Violen-

cia and to communist plottings/' he wrote, Hand they harbor shameful
ambition for the easy enrichment that comes through taking valuable
coffee crops, forcing their legitimate owners to abandon them. They
secure the support of native campesinos with false promises of divid-
ing the bounty with them."
After demonstrating what he considered to be specious aspects of
the Liberal argument, Rojas reached the CIUX of his own. It was a
classic statement of cold war anticommunism:

If, on the other hand, we examine the theme of communist intelVention

in Colombia, we must admit that it is naive to assume that given current
world-wide political conditions the enemy has forgotten the lands of
America-lands where Western Christian civilization has erected its
bulwarks, where we find the nation that for its talent and resources is
the most decisive obstacle to its enslaving dominion. It would be the
height of innocence to hope that for reason of a mysterious philan-
thropy, communism should exclude Colombia from its revolutioncuy
plans. To our general danger, communism cleverly disguises itself. We
must add that communism has an unfailing tendency to make use of
conflict situations and to foment problems in order to obscure its
implacable intent to divide and conquer. 31

The exchanges between President Rojas and members of the na-

tional Liberal directorate merely underscored the predicament of
Liberal campesinos in Sumapaz. Historically, they had fought for land
and party, usually under the leadership of nationally known, local
communists like Isauro Yosa and Juan Varela. The tension of the times
and the inability of Rojas to see their stmggle in anything but global
terms condemned them to fight a desperate and ultimately disastrous
battle.
During April and May 1955, the army began to tighten its noose
around Sumapaz. Campesinos not under arms were ordered to leave
their fincas, and thousands crowded into towns outside the combat
zone. Airplanes flew over select veredas bombing and strafing sus-
pected enemy concentrations, which swelled the flood of refugees.
Popular anxiety and the widespread desire for information about the
fighting moved Rojas to permit his commander in Sumapaz, Colonel
Hernando Forero G6mez, to explain publicly why the army was taking
such drastic action:
194 Chapter 7

The communist leaders began to organize themselves in earnest almost

immediately after the thirteenth of June 1953. The sUITender of arms
was a trick} a strategy to distract the government and take advantage of
our patriotism in order to prepare the attack. The so-called sUITender to
the Armed Forces was a disloyal and fictitious ploy: they turned over
two useless rifles and a few old shotguns. With basis in the old guerrillas
from the so-called ((era of Violencia/' eighty percent of whom are now
armed against the government} they have been murdering campesinos,
destroying the region and upsetting Tolima and the nation. Commu-
nists lead the guerrillas} but the old bandits form their nucleus and
commit crimes.
After the false surrender all these regions remained full of criminals.
We have proved that an absolute majority of the people who appear to
be residents of Villanica and Cunday did not own fincas before the
Violencia} and that they stole them after killing their original proprietors.
That way they got ready to implement their central plan} in operation
now for some year and a half} which began with the systematic extermi-
nation of ConseIVatives. As soon as they got rid of them} they started in
on Liberals who didn't help or support them. Thus} by coercion or force
they obliged almost every able-bodied man in the region to join the
guerrillas} either with financial support or personally. This is all just part
of a much larger plan of greater substance. 32

By early June the anny was ready to attack the guerrillas of Suma-
paz. Six regular army battalions ringed the area, and Rojas Pinilla
himself directed the large, costly operation from his vacation home in
nearby Melgar. Going on the offensive first, the guerrillas attacked
anny positions near Villanica with two thousand men. But they were
no match for the larger and better-equipped force. Taking, as well as
inflicting, heary losses, the guerrillas gradually retreated from Tolima
into Cundinamarca and Alto Sumapaz. The anny relentlessly pursued
them into the labyrinthian, forested valleys of the wild eastern cordil-
lera and continued patrolling it for many months to ensure that they
did not regroup.33
Many Colombians were skeptical that Rojas needed to launch his
mighty assault on Sumapaz. The image of soldiers attacking ragged
campesinos with jet fighters, bombers, and tanks struck them as a
futile, even obscene, exercise. At the height of the fighting, Semana
magazine commented gloomily that something very deep, something
tI

whose true nature escaped the nation}s understanding, must be

behind this incredible and useless action. I1M It was a none-too-veiled
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 195

criticism of Rojas and his brutally simplistic attempt to solve a com-

plex problem.
As always happened in the Violencia} those least able to defend
themselves suffered most. A campesina of eastern Tolima recounted
her perception of the events that led up to the Sumapaz fighting. First}
she spoke of the early Violencia:
Bullets started flying when chulos aITived from Rionegro, a vereda.
located between Dolores and Prado. With so many frightening rumors
the people decided to take refuge in the Coffee Mountains.... After a
while one IICorporal Tunjo" arrived where we were hiding. He was a
macho and fearless and had commanded guerrillas over in the south of
Tolima.
Since the chulos were so bloody and the Conservatives went with
them the thing was like this: if they caught a Liberal they killed him and
if they caught a Conservative, well they killed him too. \tVhat finally
happened was that all of us campesinos ended up killing each other....
Well, Tunjo was quite a manj I saw him' tie a bull to one stake and a
Conservative to another. Then he killed the Conservative with his
machete and afteIWard the bull. He made sure that all the children saw
it so they could learn young that's how you kill godos. That's the way
they always did with those so-called pajaros and with the ones who
made up the counter-guerrillas....
In our organization the children came first. But they died of poor
nutrition and simple starvation. My three-year-old daughter Gloria died
because I didn't have anything to give her, and no one else did
either-not even a little piece of panela. Many children died. We went
whole days without putting anything at all in our mouths. I remember
that in one part of the cordillera we spent two months, and a hundred
children and fifteen old people died. I know because I had to keep the
death list. sS

Early in 1955} friends warned the woman and her husband of the
impending anny campaign:

We escaped into the Coffee Mountains, but deep into them. There we
lived in camouflaged huts. We saw many people aITiving from VillaITica,
sick, naked, and dying from hunger because the airplanes and the
bombs didn't leave them in peace.... They wanted to kill all of us
because they said we were communists. Those who weren't killed at
VillaITica, they sent to the concentration camp at Cunday and killed
them there. s8 In the Coffee Mountains we lived for ten months without
medicine, without salt, and again with vel)' little food. Since we had fled
so far, we couldn't get food from our fields.
196 Chapter 7

The army killed many of us. We had to kill them in self defense....
The troops burned eveI)'thingi they cut down the coffee trees with
machetes, and did the same to fields of plantain and yuca and every-
thing else that produced food....
Of my seven children only three survived. The other four remained in
the mountains. 37

GueITillas and civilians fleeing the HZone of Military Operations"

spread their misery throughout the mountains of Sumapaz. \Vherever
they and their pursuers went} yet another kind of refugee was created:
the campesino upon whose land the running battle was fought.
Adriana Paez} widow of Miguel Moreno} described the situation she
and her husband faced during mid-1955:

... in June of that year, 1955, we heard people saying that Juan Varela
was coming from Tolima with armed people, and soon all our neighbors
started to leave on the ron, but my husband didn't want us to leave at
first because he didn't believe it. When he finally saw that we were
practically alone in the vereda, he agreed to leave the finca for Nazaret.
At a place called El paramo we discovered ourselves sUlTOunded by a
small troop of armed men and their families who belonged to the group
of Juan Varela. They took us up into the paramo and we came to a place
called El Plan de las Vegas} and there were something like 4,000 people
and a lot of animals. Men} women and children were included in the
group.... We hope you will help us ... clear our land of the people
from Tolima brought there by Varela.

The deposition of Luis Eduardo Romero} another campesino driven

from his land} reads in part:

Around 1955 I worked in Alto de Sumapaz, vereda of El Duda, jurisdic-

tion of the municipio of Bogota. I had a finca there where I grew com,
peas, arracacha, beans and potatoes. I also had nine head of cattle and
four saddle horses. My property consisted of about 150 hectares. I also
had pigs and chickens, and was helped by "poramberos," or friends to
whom I gave seeds and food, and what we raised was distributed by
shares. But it happened that in 1955 we got word that in Villanica there
were some revolutionary people who had taken up arms and who were
heading toward Cabrera, invading this region all the way up to Alto de
Sumapaz. They did invade that whole region and we found ourselves
forced to abandon it. 38

While the anny laid waste to their lands and drove armed campe-
sinos out of eastern Tolima and into the paramo of Sumapaz} Violencia
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 197

thrived elsewhere in the department. As in 1949) clashes between

improperly disciplined ConselVative police and Liberal campesinos
were to blame. The forces of order also contributed to the continuing
chaos in other ways. Desperate to eliminate persons they considered
responsible for ongoing Violencia) they paid parajos to hunt them
down. Governor Cesar Cuellar offered an invaluable perspective on
this problem in a communique sent to his superior) Colonel Luis E.
Ord6f1ez) on September 6) 1955. He complained that his raids were
being frustrated by members of the Colombian Intelligence SeIVice
(SIC) who tipped off the pajaros} most of them outlanders from the
Valle del Cauca. "I beg you most attentively/' wrote Cuellar) lito send
me two SIC agents to help with my investigation [of this matter that]
given its gravity constitutes a grave threat to peace in this section of
the nation."3B Underlining his plea were two new attacks on Hector
Echeverri Cardenas) editor of Tribuna. They were the third and fourth
attempts on his life) and) as in 1952) the unsuccessful assassins had to
settle for shooting the Tribuna cOITespondent who lived in Rovira.40
It was a despairing Rojas Pinilla who addressed tolimenses on
September 10 at an agricultural field day in Armero. The dictator
seemed to be coming to tenns with the idea that what was happening
in Tolima drew motive force from traditional political hatreds rather
than from communism. He spoke lugubriously of the need to rise
above sterile partisanship:

With patriotic anguish the Government of the Armed Forces invites all
God-fearing tolimense men and women who love their patria chica to
swell the national front that, superior to the parties, desires to save lives
and property and preselVe for all Colombians the traditions of Peace,
Justice and Liberty.... I want to reiterate my call to the nation's new
generations, that they bring a nationalistic criterion to party life that
overcomes destructive egotism-that they work with clear minds and
tenacious good will to cure the Colombian nation of the defects that
have for so long obstructed its forthright path to progresS.41

Rojas probably knew that his listeners would not accept his lofty
challenge any time soon) so he closed by complaining that his govern-
ment would much rather do good works for the people than listen to
their lIeternal recriminations" and tiresome discussion of lIlarge ha-
treds" and lIsmall contendings." lilt's not that the government wants to
198 Chapter 7

abolish [political] doctrines or extinguish the just spiritual restlessness

caused by ideas/ J he said plaintively} uit's just that the government is
trying to redirect this innate} exaggerated preoccupation of Colom-
bians for politics into channels of thought and action more propitious
for national progress. JJ42

The AImero speech represented an admission that Rojas had been

unable to govern Colombia effectively. And he knew the reason for his
failure: politics. Having alienated the entire political establishment}
even going so far as to close the foremost Liberal newspaper} EI
Tiempo, he was reduced to making antiparty speeches in the prov-
inces. It was an ineffectual} even ignominious} way of trying to answer
the growing criticism of his rule.
TolimaJs Violencia grew steadily worse as Rojas Pinilla's fortunes
declined. People of the department felt no special affinity for the
dictator} particularly after his troops laid waste to Sumapaz. Rojas} on
the other hand} looked upon the area as a thorn in his side. The
attention he lavished upon it was aggressively militaIy} as streams of
refugees fleeing Violencia areas attested. uAmbalema Asks that No
JJ
More Exiles Be Sent from Tolima's War Zone read a headline express-
ing the despair of toUmenses over the seemingly endless military
campaigning.43 Because the central government was unable to address
their problems except with gunfire} they fell back on their own
resources} however paltry they were.
The Church continually provided aid and comfort to the thousands
driven from their homes. A major chronicler of the Violencia} himself a
clergyman} spoke of the "magnanimous} silent} virtually unknown
JJ
work of many parish priests who sacrificed to maintain varied chari-
table works even though they received little monetaIy support. Poor in
financial resources but umillionaires in goodwilr' was how Father
German Guzman described his fellow priests in Tolima and else-
where." The departmental government was as staIVed for money to aid
displaced citizens as the Church} but it enjoyed an option not open to
that institution: it was able to tum to vice in its hour of need. All
proceeds from the state lottery were turned over to tIle Beneficencia
del ToUma, a charitable organization administered by Floro Saavedra}
editor of the wildly anti-Liberal newspaper EI Derecho during the
1930s and 1940s. Under his care} the Beneficencia prospered. Through-
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 199

out the later Violencia, refugees reported directly to the agency) which
provided them with medical care and relocation assistance.45
The powerful Federaci6n Nacional de Cafeteros (National Federa-
tion of Coffee Growers) joined those searching for a solution to
Violencia. During 1956 it began sUIVeying its members who lived in
violence zones to learn of their suggestions for halting the fighting. The
findings were then fOIWarded to departmental authorities.46 At the
same time, Tolima's administrators were articulating their own pro-
grams for controlling the conflict. One of the most remarkable came
from the newly named military governor) Colonel Alfonso Guzman
Acevedo. With apparent sincerity, he proposed formation of a ttcampe-
sino self-defense league" to protect their interests-in a department
where seven to ten thousand citizens were already under arms) all of
them fighting to safeguard their interests as they perceived them.47
Liberal guerrillas in southern Tolima had, in fact, created their own
military government long before the ttingenuous" suggestion of Guz-
man Acevedo. One of the largest groups, which called itself ttThe
Liberal National Revolutionary Movement of Southern Tolima," led by
Leopoldo Garcia (((General Peligro")) operated under a strict hierarchy
of generals, colonels) and lesser officers. In late 1956 its members
formulated an elaborate set of laws under which they would ttgovern"
their area of operation. Their desire to control Violencia was evident in
a letter sent to twenty-year-old Te6filo Rojas (((Chispas") in December
1956. Jesus Maria Oviedo (ttMariachi") offered asylum to ttChispas" in
exchange for the opportunity to ((try" the young violento. The objective
of the proposed trial was to determine which of the 168 murders
charged against Rojas during 1956 had actually been committed by
· 48
h lffi.
Private citizens intensified their efforts to reduce the suffering early
in 1957. A well-known physician named Daniel de la Pava entered into
negotiations with HChispas" during the month of March and aITanged
a midnight interview with him in a residential area of Ibague. De la
Pava was perhaps moved to undertake this dangerous rendezvous by
the pastoral letter of Ibague's Bishop Rodriguez that protested the
violent deaths of three hundred tolimenses during the last three
months of 1956. ttChispas" and his cuadrilla were accused of ninety of
them.49 The meeting between the physician and the violento did not go
200 Chapter 7

as the former had planned. He was shot to death, and tlChispas" fled
the scene to continue teITOrizing the countryside. Between that time
and the end of May, he was accused of an additional fifty-eight
murders in south-central Tolima.
In mid-March, Rafael Parga Cortes met with the tlRevolutionary
Movement" of tlGeneral Peligro" under much more propitious circum-
stances. For many months, Liberal guerrillas and noncombatants alike
had petitioned the govemment for peace in southern Tolima. Parga
agreed to seIVe as their intermediary, and on the appointed day
departed from ChapaITal on the grueling sixteen-hour muleback ride
to Herrera, the most distant village in the isolated, Violencia-tom
municipio of Rioblanco. His trip to meet with the long-suffering cam-
pesinos was the first of several by representatives of the departmental
government that culminated in an epoch-making ucabildo abierto on JJ

peace at the end of the month. Guerrillas greeted the representatives

of Rojas Pinilla warmly and pledged to support the government if it
would cease warfare against them and help relieve the misery of the
people. For years, they had done without adequate schools, hospitals,
roads, and other such amenities of civilized life.
The durable Echeverri Cardenas was there taking pictures that
would appear in the April 11 edition of Tribuna. He even had himself
photographed sUITOunded by several of the legendary leaders: Leo-
poldo Garcia (tlGeneral Peligro"), AIist6bulo G6mez (tlGeneral San-
tander"), Luis Carlos Hernandez (tlCapitan Tarzan")., Jose Giraldo
(tlCapitan Pimienta"), Jose Antonio PaITa (tl Revoluci6n"), Jose Garcia
(tlTeITOr") (brother of Leopoldo Garcia), and Pablo E. Garcia (tlMirUs").
Olimpio Ochoa (tlBernal") represented tlGeneral Mariachi," who was
unable to attend the conference. The latter's headquarters were in
Cocora Canyon, eighteen hours north by mule in the municipio of
Rovira-the same base of operations used by tlChispas."
A series of inteIViewsaccompanying the news story revealed the
fearsome guerrillas as timid, illiterate campesinos. "General Peligro"
was only thirty-two years old and the owner of a two-hundred hectare
finca. tlWe fought because they made us," he said, asking that Governor
Guzman Acevedo visit Herrera so he could see that "Peligro" and his
men were keeping their promise to stop fighting. tlGeneral Santander"
was a fifty-year-old Liberal whose scarred face bore witness to battles
with communist guerrillas in the war for hegemony in southern
Tolima's Tragedy Deepens 201

JJ
Tolima. He bragged that his "'limpios had pushed the "'comunesJ} of
Isauro Yosa (ItLister") almost out of the department} and he wished the
army good luck in its pacification program because peace would make
it possible for him to return to his own fann. 50 ItCapitan Pimienta/'
ItCapitan Tarzan/' and ItTeniente Marin" were all middle-aged campe-
sinos who were profoundly wecuy of fighting. They had chosen the
cabildo abierto, the most direct mechanism of traditional Hispanic
governance} as their forum for announcing that it was time for Violen-
cia to end.
One of those interviewed by Echeveni Cardenas seemed tenibly out
of place among the hard-bitten Liberals of HeITera. He was a Conserva-
tive schoolteacher named Silvestre Bermu Triana} called ItCapitan
Mediavida" CtHalf-alive") for the mutilation he had suffered early in the
Violencia. On the nueve de abril, a Liberal mob in Prado cut off his left
hand and beat him so badly that he nearly died. Later in HeITera} he
won the respect ofttGeneral Peligro" and the others for his intelligence
and willingness to fight alongside them against both government
forces and communists. Like the others} he wanted peace and under-
standably longed for the day when Conservatives and Liberals could
live together in harmony.51
Within a month of the HeITera meetings} on May 10} 1957} Rojas
Pinilla was deposed by his own generals and a coalition of urban
groups that included students} organized labor} the Church} busi-
nessmen's associations} and leaders of the traditional political parties.
Receiving the news with jubilation} city-dwelling Colombians staged
motorized demonstrations through downtown streets; and in Cali}
principal nesting place of the pftjaros, vengeful citizens hunted down
and killed fourteen of the better-known hired assassins.52 The reaction
in rural areas} like Tolima} was more restrained. People there knew
that their misery had not brought Rojas's downfall. In fact} Violencia
continued to lash them mercilessly. Psychopathic killers like ItChis-
pas" and others still ranged at will across the countryside} and pajaros
lurked in towns and cities. In May alone} ItChispas" and his gang were
accused of murdering an additional fifty-one campesinos in and
around Rovira. And Hector Echeveni Cardenas's luck finally ran out
on July 14. A pftjaro, later identified as a former policeman named
Joselin Vargas Guatama} shot him down near the offices of Tribuna
before the honified eyes of his young son.53
202 Chapter 7

The people of Tolima greeted the new government more in a mood

of hope than relief. The five-man junta of generals} headed by Gabriel
Paris} announced that Laureano G6mez and Alberto Lleras Camargo
had worked out an agreement by which their parties would form a
power-sharing "National Front" to take charge of the government on
August 7} 1958. All the generals asked was popular approval of the plan
in a national referendum set for December 1. \;\/hen the appointed day
arrived} the people of Tolima turned out in droves to give the Frente
Nacional their overwhelming approval. \;\/hUe Rojas Pinilla fumed that
ignorant campesinos really thought they were voting for someone
named "Senor Plebiscito" ("Mr. Plebiscite")} 81 percent of all the
eligible tolimenses participated in voting} as compared to 68.5 percent
nationwide. In the once-prosperous municipio of Libano} all ambula-
tory voters made their way to the polls to register an astronomical 97
percent vote of confidence} or perhaps of prayerful optimism} in the
new political arrangement.54 Tolima had spoken. Now it was Bogota's
tum to prove that the trust was not misplaced.
 8

More Than a
Political Solution

May 1958 was a month of contrasts in Tolima. It began on a note of

optimism} even euphoria} when 73 percent of eligible voters registered
a near two-thirds majority in favor of Frente Nacional candidate
Alberto Ueras Camargo.1 The orderly contest heralded a return to
civilian government on August 7} and with it hope that the rampant
lawlessness afflicting the department would diminish. Yet} it surged
ahead more furiously than ever before. The departmental index of
murders per 100}000 population stood at an atrocious all-time high of
212 during the first seven months of the year} or an average of 162
people each month.2
On the very day of Ueras's election} bandits descended upon the
municipio of Alvarado and massacred twenty-seven campesinos. At
that same time} farther south at Casa Verde} in the municipio of Ataco}
Jesus Maria Oviedo (UMariachi") tried in vain to dissuade Te6filo Rojas
Varon from taking more lives. The dreaded uChispas" paid no heed
and within four months had added another forty-one names to his
long list of homicides.3 Nine days after the election} citizens of Libano
petitioned the government to construct a military post in their munici-
pio ubecause of the horrible genocide being committed there ."4 To-
ward the end of the month} departmental administrators announced
their impotence before the crisis and claimed that Tolima was bank-
rupt. uTolima Asks That Its Problem Be Resolved/' read a front-page
plea directed to the government in Bogota. The accompanying article
detailed a state of Violencia-induced fiscal chaos that made it neces-
sary to take out bank loans to continue rudimentary public services.s
203
204 Chapter 8

The junta of generals who were directing the nation until President-
elect Ueras could be sworn in was acutely aware of the problem in
Tolima. Every month it faced the unpleasant task of studying reports
of army and police patrols ambushed and wiped out by the violentos.
On May 27 it named a seven-man National Commission to Investigate
the Causes of Violencia. Making up this body were two generals} two
scholars} one politician} and two priests. One of the priests} Father
German Guzman Campos} had obseIVed much Violencia} for he had
seIVed several years in the parroquia of Libano.8 Rarely has the work of
an investigative commission been more relevant than that performed
by him and his colleagues} for it focused on a phenomenon that
seemed to grow stronger and more senseless as time passed.
During a four-day period in early June} groups of fifteen and
thirty-eight campesinos were murdered in Natagaima} twenty more in
Dolores} and ConseIVative politician Carlos Lis and his seven-man
military escort were annihilated in Prado. Hundreds of families were
again fleeing eastern Tolima} and the municipio of Alpujarra was
temporarily isolated from the rest of the department by roving bands
of outlaws. Elsewhere in Tolima} twelve other cases of random may-
hem were reported? Later in the month} a bus traveling between Rovira
and Ibague was assaulted and all the passengers either killed or
wounded. tlChispas and his cuadrilla were blamed for the attack} and
lJ

soon two hundred soldiers were fruitlessly pursuing them.8

Few Colombians were surprised to hear Alberto Lleras announce in
his August 7 inaugural address that Violencia was his major concern
and the top priority of his government. He addressed the issue with
characteristic lucidity:

First of all we must decide what is to be our conduct vis-a-vis the upset
occasioned by the continuous phenomenon of Violencia. I hasten to say
that I don't believe it will disappear quickly} and that the nation must
prepare itself for an intense pacification campaign of unknown dura-
tion. The state of insecurity has existed for ten years at the least}
lessening at fleeting intelVals} increasing tremendously at others} with-
out our having found an effective cure for it up to the present time.
There is no denying that the failure of pacification is owed to the
[sectarian] spirit with which Colombians} governors and the governed}
have approached this greatest single disaster of our time. . . . From the
first moment we must direct all our resources} energies and abilities
against the savage epidemic of Violencia} to prevent its continuance, or
More Than a Political Solution 205

the greater danger of our becoming accustomed to it.... Until public

order is re-established and the Violencia diminished} the government
will give priority to nothing else. 9

President Alberto Ueras was as good as his word. Not only did he
undertake a measured} effective strengthening of military posts in
Violencia-ridden parts of Tolima} Caldas} and Valle} but he gave toIi-
menses reason to believe that he was particularly interested in helping
them. One of his first official acts was to name their most distin-
guished native son} Dario Echandia} as governor of the department.
Calling the appointment ttthe best thing the national government can
offer Tolima/' Ueras added ominously that Echandia perhaps repre-
sented Tolima's last chance ttto escape the brutal nightmare that has
been destroying the lives and treasure of all the department's inhabi-
tants."lO
Echandia titled his first gubernatorial address ttThe Restoration of
Peace in Tolima/' in which he revealed that he understood his people
well. The speech contained no mention of communist subversion} no
strictures that toIimenses must respect constituted authority} no con-
demnation of lost souls like ttChispas/' ttDesquite/' and ttSangrenegra."
In fact} the governor barely discussed Violencia and focused instead
upon the disastrous effect of corrosive traditional partisanship upon
public life as well as the role of the Frente Nacional in depoliticizing
the nation. ttThe work of pacification/' he said} ttrequires the elimina-
tion of old prejudices} and the forgetfulness of sectarian hatreds."
Simple partisanship and the COITllpting spirit of fraud and favoritism
had led the ordinary citizen to regard public servants tt as if they were
the warriors of a barbarian tribe who conquered a hostile land by
violence} and whose rule consisted in keeping the conquered at all
cost under domination of the conqueror."
Echandia assured toIimenses that} as representative of the biparti-
san compact} he would see to it that the old abuses ended:

This means that persons who perceive the nation as consisting of good
and evil citizens, identified strictly by party affiliation} no longer have a
place in public administration. Neither do those who believe that simple
affiliation with one of these groups entitles him to special privilege not
enjoyed by members of the other; nor those who use public office to
gain disciples by favoritism or intimidation; nor those who lack the spirit
of justice necessary to apply the law fairly to all of the governed. In sum,
206 Chapter 8

no one lacking the equanimity and good will required to treat members
of one party exactly as they do those of the other has any place in public
administration.

Toward the end of his talk) the governor did speak of Violencia) which
he called a kind of tremendous vicious circle [that] stimulates or
U

favors crime ."11 However) he blamed it on failings not of the governed

but of the governors. In a sense) the old Liberal from Chaparral had
perlormed a rite of political expiation for the people of Tolima. Next
would come exorcism of the demon Violencia.
As in the early months of Rojas Pinilla's presidency) an initial burst
of enthusiasm greeted the new regime) coupled with a significant
decline in levels of Violencia throughout Tolima. Intentional deaths
dropped into the eighties during August and September) half of what
they had been in each of the previous seven months; and) during one
seventy-two hour period in early August) violentos took no lives. The
Tribuna called attention to the happy non-news in a headline reading
uThree Days of Peace in Tolima!"i2 Contributing significantly to the
falling levels of bloodshed was an amnesty program that gave depart-
mental governors and certain military officers leeway in offering spe-
cial inducements to guerrillas. Most important of these was the
extension of governmental protection to reformed violentos who were
willing to help the army track down lawbreakers.13 Two of Tolima's
better-known guerrillas) Leopoldo Garcia and Jesus Maria Oviedo)
UPeligro" and uMariachi/' took advantage of the offer) and others
followed suit. Even Teodoro Tacuma) the Coyaima Indian and Conser-
vative guerrilla ofVelu (Natagaima)) entered into nego.tiations with the
army.
Of extreme significance in the entregas of 1958 was the fact that the
guerrillas began making peace with each other as well as with the
national government. ConseIVative and Liberal combatants in south-
ern Tolima signed a series of upeace pacts" during late August and
early September 1958. Members of the National Commission to Investi-
gate the Causes of Violence were on hand to witness one such
declaration in Casa Verde) Ataco) on September 4. They heard ex-guer-
rillas roundly condemn Violencia and wax eloquent on the joys of
peace. Then) two days later) came word that the guerrillas of uCharro
Negro" had agreed to lay down their weapons. Military officials in
More Than a Political Solution 207

southern Tolima received a written statement to that effect signed by

Manuel Marulanda Velez} Ciro Castano} Isias Pardo} Jorge Arboleda}
and Guillermo Suarez. For some unexplained reason} uCharro Negro JJ

did not sign the document.14

uChaITO Negro/' the communist} was not the only violento who
rejected the amnesty offered by the Frente Nacional. In fact} the
entregas of 1958 were merely the beginning of the end of Tolima's
Violencia} for they involved only those guerrillas who considered
themselves Conservatives or Liberal party partisans. uCharro Negro"
and his followers clearly did not fit into that category} and neither did
thousands of other violentos in Tolima and elsewhere. The data in
appendix B support generalizations about changes in Colombia's
Violencia prior to and after formation of the Frente Nacional. During
the years of General Rojas Pinilla's rule} the conflict grew more intense
in coffee-rich zones} such as Tolima} Caldas} and Valle} than in places
of more traditional} political Violencia: the Eastern Llanos} Boyaca} and
Santander del Norte.
This implies that economic factors were playing an ever bigger role
in Violencia during the 1953/4-1958 phase and that udepoliticization"
was merely the first step in halting the bloodshed. Table 2} based on
information gathered by the Colombian Army} suggests the extent to
which coffee-growing central Colombia was the focal point of Violen-
cia during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

TABLE 2.
Violentos in Colombia} ca. 196015

Department Active Periodically Communist

Cuadrillas Active CuadriIlas Cuadrillas
NUMBER MEMBERS NUMBER MEMBERS NUMBER MEMBERS

Tolima 6 98 15 1)613 3 217

Cundinamarca 2 46 4 70 7 655
Caldas 9 57 4 27
Valle 5 67 5 252 2 20
Cauca 6 40
Antioquia 9 73 5 39
Boyaca 3 25 1 50 2 10
Santander 3 65 1 11 1 10
208 Chapter 8

These data reveal that by 1960 "periodically active" and communist

cuadrillas predominated over "active" cuadrillas. The communists
avowed their opposition to the government of the Frente Nacional and
entertained hopes that they might overthrow it. The thirty-five "peri-
odically active" groups were made up principally of opportunists who
operated for economic gain. In most cases} the" active" cuadrillas were
remnants of old ConseIVative and Liberal groups whose members had
become so brutalized and which had so many enemies that they
simply could not return to peaceful pursuits. In this category were the
cuadrillas of "Chispas/' "Desquite/' and "Sangrenegra," Finally} the
absence of cuadrillas in major areas of early political Violencia} such as
Santander del Norte and the Eastern Llanos} and the reduced number
of identifiable violentos in Santander and Boyaca} should be noted.
Tolima's Violencia stood on four legs at the inception of the Frente
Nacional. The first leg was formed by ConseIVative and Liberal guer-
rillas who were defending their lives and property; the second} and
most diminutive} by communist units who were fighting what might
be called a battle for "nontraditional" political goals; the third and
fourth} by bandits and psychopaths who had been spawned by the
years of upset.
Because of the rapid depoliticization of traditional Violencia after
1958 and because the communist guenillas did not appear to pose an
imminent threat to national stability} the new government resolved to
concentrate its efforts on destruction of the criminal and psycho-
pathic components of Violencia.18 The reasons for that decision were
particularly apparent in Tolima} the focal point of violence of the
random} homicidal variety during the late Violencia} which occurred
between 1958 and 1965. By 1958 and later} that kind of bloodshed
embraced every imaginable kind of lawlessness. Domestic miscreants
and many from outside the department took advantage of the continu-
ing upset to plunder campesinos at will. They often stepped up attacks
during the twice-yearly coffee halVest} in March-May and September-
November. The periodic nature of such violence and the anonymity of
its perpetrators made it impossible to prevent and difficult to prose-
cute. A particularly brutal example of late Violencia took place on a
misty paramo called Alto EI Oso} in the municipio of Libano.
On the morning of October 18} 1959} three men sat around an
elevated cooking fire in a rude fannhouse located not far from que-
More Than a Political Solution 209

brada EI Oso. They talked quietly} sipping sweet black coffee and
watching Marla de Novoa busy herself with their breakfast. Twelve-
year-old Virgelina Cortes helped her sister-in-law prepare the caldo
and arepas as well as hot chocolate for her little brothers} four-year-
old Gustavo and two-year-old Pedro. Were it not Sunday} and had not
the head of the household} Ignacio Cortes} and his wife left the
previous day for Murillo} things would have been quite different at the
finca called "Corrales." Son-in-law Ignacio and the two hired hands
would have left hours earlier to tend their cattle} before the sun
burned away paramo mists. They} and Ignacio Cortes himself} would
have been away from the fannhouse-perhaps far enough to escape
the slaughter that silently approached.
Without warning} the kitchen door flew open and anned men}
campesinos themselves} burst into the room. Several of them carried
thick links of cabuya, or hemp rope} with which they quickly bound
the hands of the men and dragged them out of the kitchen and into
another room of the house. There they hacked them to death with
machetes. The women and children were not bound} though perhaps
little Virgelina should have been. She seemed to have fought} for her
body bore more wounds than any of the others: nine machete blows
and a bullet wound. Marla de Novoa's throat was cut} Gustavo Cortes
received five mortal machete blows} and his little brother was stabbed
to death with a dagger. It all happened so quickly and so quietly that
no one at the neighboringfinca of Matias Alarc6n suspected that their
own doom was nigh.
By preaITanged plan} the fifteen men left and cautiously made their
way up to the Alarc6n cabin} which stood atop Corrales hill. They
murdered five people there. Jaime and Julio PaITa} two brothers who
had come from AImenia in search of stolen mules} were shot to death}
and hired hand Martin Castillo was dispatched by machete. An
eighteen-month-old infant named Berta Lucinda Rodriguez was be-
headed. The child's mother} Ana Olivia Rodriguez} was raped and then
also decapitated. The following note was found on her body:

liThe Phantom" will not rest until the cachiporros stop killing godos.
Until then} liThe Phantom" will avenge the death of every murdered
ConseIVative, regardless of time or place.
Your friend, liThe Phantom "17
210 Chapter 8

Their principal work accomplished} the bandits rewarded them-

selves by stealing everything of value on the farms of Pedro Cortes and
Matias Alarc6n-such things as cattle} pack animals} tools} weapons}
harnesses} medicine for livestock} kitchen utensils} and bedding. They
then headed east} pausing long enough at the vereda. of La Esperanza
to plunder an unoccupied house belonging to Ruben CorteS.18
Like the phenomenon of which they formed a part} the massacres at
Alto El Oso are explicable} if no less honible} when woven into the
historic context of time and place. The man who directed the assaults
was Jose Vicente Yate G6mez} a former police agent from Santa Isabel.
ttCorporal Yate" was in the employ of two businessmen from Santa
Isabel} Leonidas Millan Espitia and Miguel Antonio Arevalo} both
moderately prosperous family men. Three months prior to the assault
by liThe Phantom" on Alto El Oso} ttCorporal Yate" and his men had
operated with a cuadrilla of Conservative bandits who preyed on Santa
Isabel and surrounding municipios. Among the crimes attributed to
the gang} numbering at times a hundred men} were cattle-rustling in
Anzoategui} the murder of Liberals and theft of their coffee in Santa
Isabel} the massacre of fifteen Liberals at coffee hacienda ttMalabar" in
the municipio of Venadillo} and the harassment of Liberal property
owners across a wide expanse of upland Santa Isabel. The situation
was so bad that} by late August 1959} every Liberal family in the vereda.
of El Paramo had abandoned its landj they left behind thirty-five fincas J
covering more than seven thousand hectares in highland Santa Isa-
bel.19
The incident at Alto El Oso was just one in a catalog of outrages
committed by a single} identifiable outlaw gang that was clearly
economically motivated. Yet more was involved than the simple desire
to steal the paltry possessions of a few campesinos or to force them
from the land. None of the twelve persons who were killed owned the
land they worked} and their very poverty made robbery an unconvinc-
ing motive for a crime of such magnitude. \'\!hat then did cause the
dreadful acts of October 18} 1959? In large part} the answer lay in the
note left upon the body of Ana Rodriguez: (The Phantom' will avenge
tt

the death of every murdered Conservative} regardless of time or place."

Indeed} revenge was the motive. Just one day earlier} unidentified
persons had assaulted the finca of Jose Buritica} located in the same
corregimiento of Murillo. Jose and Isaura Buritica} their sons} daugh-
More Than a Political Solution 211

ters} and grandchildren-all ConseIVatives-died in the attack.20 The

fallen numbered twelve. By the brutal logic underlying so much of
Colombia's Violencia} twelve Liberals would need to answer for the
crime. Alto EI Oso was a gloomy} high-country courtroom; (tThe
Phantom" was judge) jury} and executioner; Ana Rodriguez} her baby}
and ten others were the condemned victims of a circumstance they
could neither control nor escape.
One thing distinguished Alto EI Oso from earlier episodes of the
Violencia. HCorporal Yate" and the others paid for their crimes} though
not before taking an additional twenty-eight lives in the municipio of
Anzoategui two months later. Yate G6mez was tracked down with the
help of a ConseIVative campesino, who collected a ten-thousand-peso
reward for his efforts. The violento fell in May 1961 during a gun battle
with army troops in the corregimiento of Murillo. Killed with him was
Alejandro Espitia.21
Yate's accomplices were soon brought to justice. They stood trial a
year later for the Murillo and Anzoategui killings. Leonidas Millan
Espitia and Miguel Arevalo} who conceived the crimes} received the
maximum penalty allowable under Colombian law} twenty-four years
in prison. Six members of the cuadrilla were given maximum sen-
tences for murder} five were assessed seventeen years each for homi-
cide} and the others were sentenced to three or fewer years on lesser
charges. A total of 269 years in prison was assessed in closing the case
of Alto EI OSO.22
The fate ofYate G6mez and his cohorts was an increasingly familiar
one in Tolima after civilian government returned to power in August
1958} particularly subsequent to June 1959} when amnesty expired and
the hunt for violentos began in earnest. Cuadrillas and their leaders
were pursued tenaciously by the anny and the police; and increasing
numbers of pajaros were arrested} tried} and sent to jail.23 As the
number of active violentos began to decline} the army found it easier to
learn about the modus operandi of the remaining guerrilla chieftains
and to pinpoint their approximate location at any given time. Im-
proved sources of information made it possible to ascertain that only
six cuadrillas remained active in Tolima around the year 1960.24
In August of that year} the Colombian Army published a profile of
the average violento that showed him to be an illiterate campesino
eighteen to twenty-five years of age} an orphan who had witnessed the
212 Chapter 8

injury or death of family members} and one who lacked any remaining
close family ties. Upon questioning} violentos revealed that they felt
little sense of guilt over their crimes and admitted that they often
tortured victims before killing them. These acts provided them with a
sense of enhanced valor as well as achievement} and they experienced
a catharsis when they mutilated the bodies of their victims.25
Because citizens in regions dominated by violentos feared reprisals
for cooperating with authorities} the army was forced to devise ever
more sophisticated techniques for breaking up the cuadrillas. 28 This
was especially the case when the military sought to end the career of
ttChispas/' the most famous violento. In 1959} trying to take advantage
of the amnesty offered by Alberto Ueras} he moved back to his family
finca, in the vereda La Esperanza} Rovira. But his past hung heary over
him. Authorities charged him with 555 murders} a majority of them of
ConseIVatives from Rovira. After a brief time} he took up arms again
and made the following explanation to the authorities:

\lVhat's happening is that the ConselVatives are uncomfortable with my

being in the region and they spread slanders about me, trying to get
them to hunt me down; and they are declaring all-out war on me. If this
keeps on happening I can't stay here with my arms crossed so they can
murder me. My self-defense instinct makes me defend myself. I declare
my desire to work and be a peaceful and honorable citizen, and for no
reason will I cause the government any problem. 27

On April 14, 1959} ItChispas" wrote a plaintive letter to a friend}

probably Father German Guzman} member of the National Commis-
sion to Investigate the Causes of Violencia: ItI tell you that the army is
persecuting me a lot. At any rate} tell these people not to harass me.
Just three weeks ago I was in hiding at my ownfinca; my ambition is to
work if they'll let me. Anyway} answer this letter because I am very
bored with being in hiding. All I want is to work and live in peace." A
month later, on Corpus Christi Day, police approached and fired into
his house. Only his pregnant wife was home at the time; otherwise,
that most infamous of tolimenses might have died then. Instead, he
fled to the mountains once again and built a cuadrilla that soon
numbered sixty-five of the most dangerous violentos yet seen in
Tolima. Young men like ttTriunfo" and Kairus/' and at times uDes-
It

quite," became the scourge of all central Tolima.28

More Than a Political Solution 213

"Chispas" (second from right) and members of his cuadrilla. (Courtesy El

TiempoJ

After reconstituting his cuadrilla, "Chispas" found himself under

intense pressure of two kinds. The first was applied by reformers like
Father Guzman, who saw the young man as a living symbol of shared
guilt in allowing Violencia to befall Colombia. To them, he was "the
most active of that generation condemned to criminality by our two
traditional parties.... The system made and shaped him."'· He was a
victim of circumstance, but he had also possessed international noto-
riety as a mass murderer. When he wrote a letter blaming the govern-
ment for his predicament, El Tiempo published it without hesitation;
and, when foreign correspondents visited Colombia to learn about
Violencia, they tried to consult him as a leading authority on the
214 Chapter 8

phenomenon. One such journalist} an attractive and buxom Finnish

woman named Helina RautavaITa} actually succeeded in interviewing
and having herself photographed embracing him} much to the embar-
rassment of the nation's authorities} who had hunted him for years. 30
The second kind of pressure applied to ttChispas" was military in
nature. Every time he and his gang killed another godo} they found
themselves fleeing the scene hotly pursued by a platoon} or even a
company} of specially trained antiguerrilla troops from Sixth Brigade
headquarters} in Ibague. At last} after taking thirty lives in 1961}
ttChispas" fled Tolima altogether. He established himself in southern
Caldas near Calarca} a town on the major highway linking Ibague and
AImenia. He and his men chose this region for a base of operations
because of its natural wealth and fine highway network. Merchants
there were always willing to accept stolen merchandise from violentos
in exchange for needed supplies. The many roads provided rapid and
easy mobility never possible in Rovira.
Once ensconced in his new theater of operations} ttChispas" had
little fear of anyone but the Eighth Brigade} headquartered in AImenia.
Civil authorities} justifiably feaIful of reprisals from his cuadrilla} did
not even try to apprehend him. Their inaction fit the pattern of judicial
malfunction everywhere in Violencia areas. 'Where judges and police
chiefs could not be intimidated} a simple cash payment was usually
sufficient to ensure immunity from prosecution.31 IIChispas" was ob-
viously not suffering the accustomed rigors of outlaw existence in
1962} for he looked well-fed} clean} and happy in the photograph with
Helina RautavaITa late that year.32
Early in January 1963} a coffee farmer from the municipio of Calarca
approached authorities with news of the famous outlaw. According to
one account} ttChispas/' seeking to take the man's daughter as his
mistress} had threatened to kill him if he did not cooperate. That} and
the standing offer of a large reward for information on ttChispas/' led
the campesino to act. Once convinced that its informant would not
lead it into a trap} the army perfected a system of signals to indicate
when an ambush should be laid. A stone left in the roots of a large tree
near the Ibague-AImenia highway meant that ttChispas" was outside
the regionj a dried platano leaf} that he was in the areaj a green platano
leaf} that new information must be relayed immediately. On January 20
word came that he had been seen getting out of an automobile along
More Than a Political Solution 215

the Ibague-AImenia highway. The next day) a dry platano leaf was left
in the tree's roots.
During the night of the 21st) four small army patrols took up
positions on key trails in the area. The soldiers lay in ambush all day
on the 22d) each cradling a high-powered .30 caliber Belga rifle and
watching apprehensively for a sign of their prey. At 5:00 P.M. he
emerged from a cafetal some distance up one of the trails and warily
advanced fifty meters toward the hidden soldiers. Then he paused)
signaled) and a man and woman emerged from the underbrush. They
advanced slowly) and the soldiers waited) scarcely breathing. \tVhen
the small group reached a predetermined spot) an infantry sharp-
shooter fired. ((Chispas" died before he could even discharge the
carbine he carried; his unarmed companions were allowed to flee. The
final army dispatch on Te6filo Rojas Varon was a terse summary of the
events leading to his death and a year-by-year listing of crimes
attributed to him. ((Total computed over nine years/' the document
read: ((592 killed) 81 wounded) 2 disappeared) 4 kidnapped."33
Now that the ((Prince of Violentos" was dead) attention again shifted
to Tolima) this time to the municipio of Libano. Around 1960 a host of
bloodthirsty and notorious bandits moved into its forested mountains
and spread destruction over all of northern Tolima) llano and cordil-
lera alike. Some of them bore names as teITible as their deeds:
((Almanegra" (((Black Soul")) ((Sangrenegra" (((Black Blood")) ((Desquite"
C'Revenge"). Others) like ((Tarzan" and ((Pedro Brincos/' both native
libanenses, were no less fearsome.
((Almanegra" (Miguel Villarraga) led a small cuadrilla in Libano
before most of the other men entered the municipio. When he was
killed around 1960) ((Sangrenegra" assumed leadership of his gang)
which also included William Aranguren (((Desquite") and Lombana
Noe (((Tarzan"). The man who called himself ((Black Blood" was an
archetypical product of the Violencia. Driven from his hometo\VIl of
Cairo) Valle) following a fight in which he killed the son of a prominent
Conservative) he had hurled a teITible parting threat to all members of
that party: ((Some day I shall return to avenge myself."
((Sangrenegra" was an odd bundle of contradictions in that he
neither smoked nor drank and was pleasant with fellow members of
his cuadrilla, though he was the very model of machismo. Yet) he flew
into a blind) homicidal fury when confronting Conservatives. One
216 Chapter 8

story widely told about him was of the time he and his fifty "mucha-
chos" fell upon the finca of a hapless ConseIVative family} herded its
members together} and beheaded them one by one. Not satisfied with
that} they drove all the farm animals into a COITal and beheaded them
too. That happened during a six-month period in 1962} when the
cuadrilla murdered 120 persons.
Although he entertained no qualms in decapitating a godo} even a
babe in arms} HSangrenegra" could never be accused of attacking just
the defenseless. Once} while camped somewhere on Libano's high
paramo} he penned the following challenge to the Sixth Brigade
soldiers who were stationed at Murillo:

Carbineros of Murillo: Greetings from your friend Sangrenegra, who

invites you to the Cuchillo de Requintaderos, October 21st to the 25th,
for a test. Bring about 150 friends to see if we can have a little talk. I'll be
waiting to test your valor, to see how brave you really are because it
seems that you're all right as long as you stay in town. Don't go showing
any fear or cowardice. Good-bye chulos pajaros. Your friend and servant
Sangrenegra says goodbye. Long live Red [Liberal] solidarity and the
M.R.L., and its campaigns! I'll be waiting for you from the 21st to the
25th, or else we'll be paying some courtesies in the region a week from
Sunday. 34

HSangrenegra" may have been brave} but he was also prudent. Rather
than meet the carbineros at the Cuchillo de Requintaderos} he chose
to surprise them at a place called EI Taburete. He} HDesquite/' HTar-
zAn/' and some hundred other violentos from all over Libano joined
forces to murder twelve soldiers and the two civilian owners of the
truck in which they traveled.
The man who planned and coordinated the shocking attack at EI
Taburete was William Aranguren} the son of upper-middle-class cam-
pesinos of Rovira. HDesquite" claimed to have become a violento in the
mid-1950s after a ConseIVative killed his father by firing through the
window of their home. The guerrilla began his career around his
patria chica of Rovira. He first gained notoriety in 1957 as part of a gang
that ambushed a truck owned by the Colombian Tobacco Company}
killed its four occupants} and made ofIwith a $20}000 peso payroll. The
group was quickly apprehended} formally charged} and brought to
trial. One newspaper account of the proceedings carried a photograph
of HDesquite" naked from the waist up and chained to a tree along
More Than a Political Solution 217

with his eight cohorts. His la\V)'er argued that he had only fallen in
with evil companions and obviously could not be a bandit because his
family owned fincas valued at $180}OOO pesos. The la\V)'er also men-
tioned the recent murder of his father and pointed out that since then
his client had suffered periodic attacks of insanity. He was acquitted
along with two others.35
Although HDesquite" was as proficient as any other guerrilla in
slaughtering entire families of godosJ his real forte was ambushing
motor vehicles. His first major violent act was an ambush} and before
leaving Rovira he aided HChispas" in several assaults on buses. Early in
1962} soon after the attack at EI Taburete} he and his gang stopped five
of them on the Libano-Murillo road} robbed all the passengers} and
killed three of them. All previous incidents seemed to be dress re-
hearsals for the violento's greatest single atrocity. On August 5} 1963} he
stopped a bus between the towns of La Italia and Marquetalia} Caldas}
and murdered all forty passengers.
Fortunately} this was one of his last crimes. In mid-March 1964
HDesquite" and a girl friend were hiding at a shack in the mountains of
Lerida} not far from the border of that municipio with Libano. A young
campesino happened upon them and} seemingly ignorant of the
stranger's identity} agreed to go into town to buy batteries for his
portable radio. The boy made straight for the authorities and reported
his encounter. Before many hours passed} the anny had surrounded
the hut. The scene that followed was cruel but explicable in the light of
EI Taburete and all that had gone before.
First} the girl was allowed to escape. Then the soldiers began to
taunt HDesquite/' shouting that he was about to die} gleefully describ-
ing just how they intended to kill him} how he would die slowly}
without a chance at self-defense. They would destroy him as one
would exterminate a dangerous animal} in such a way that none of
them would run the slightest risk of injury. Then they lobbed hand
grenades toward the hut until both it and its occupant were blown
away. The anny had one more indignity in store for the despised
HDesquite." It called in a helicopter and for the next several days
transported his remains to every village in Libano and surrounding
municipios. Thousands of campesinos came to gaze at one of the last
famous violentos and to hear the soldiers describe how EI Taburete
was avenged.38
218 Chapter 8

Graves of "Desquite" and his followers. (Courtesy El Tiempo)

The death of "Desquite" in March 1964 followed that of "Pedro

Brincos" by a year and preceded that of "Sangrenegra" by only two
months. Ironically, it was one of his own brothers who led police to
the latter violento, who, except for "Chispas," killed more of his fellow
Colombians than any other."
Violencia stood on its last leg by the early 1960s. The bandits and
psychopaths were well on their way to extinction, most Consetvative-
Liberal fighting had long since ended, and it was at last time to
address the problem of the scattered groups of communist cuadrillas.
The government had not given them top priority in early counterguer-
rilla operations for several reasons. Juan de la Cruz Varela's group
never recovered from the blow dealt it in 1955. Victor MerchAn's
nearby enclave of Viota, in the coffee country of southwestern Cundi-
namarca, was primarily a self-defense campesino cooperative whose
members were little concerned with proselytizing." The forces of
More Than a Political Solution 219

((ChaITo Negro" in southern Tolima remained locked in a death

struggle with the same Liberal guerrillas he had battled since the
Violencia began. After 1958 the Colombian Army actually encouraged
Leopolda Garcia and Jesus Maria Oviedo to maintain their guerrillas,
so effective were they in keeping ((ChaITo Negro" and his men bottled
up. The Frente's amnesty program was a flexible one indeed!
Intraguerrilla warfare escalated sharply in southern Tolima during
1960 and changed the complexion of things there. On January 11
((ChaITo Negro" ordered his lieutenants Francisco Rojas (((Kika"), a
relative of ItChispas", Arquimedes Carvajal, and Eliecer Triana to slip
into the headquarters of ((Mariachi," at Planadas, and steal a machine
gun. \tVhen he learned of the theft, the Liberal commander sent three
of his own men to recapture the weapon. Not only did they fail, but
they were intercepted by a communist patrol, taken back to headquar-
ters in Gaitania, and executed. Enraged, ((Mariachi" plotted his re-
venge. Early one morning in mid-1960, three of his men rode into
Gaitania and asked for an inteIView with ((ChaITO Negro." They said
the governor of Huila had requested their help in investigating a gang
of cattle-rustlers who were known to be in the area and that they
wanted to consult with the communists on the matter. ((ChaITo
Negro" walked out to greet them and was shot dead. In the ensuing
confusion, his murderers escaped.a9
This assassination was the signal for a general mobilization of
Liberal and Communist guerrillas in southern Tolima. For several
weeks, intense fighting raked the lush mountains there. The running
battle might have continued indefinitely had the guerrilla balance of
power not been upset by the death of ItChaITo Negro." The success of
((Mariachi" in eliminating his old rivalled to a split between Leopolda
Garcia and himself. That, coupled with a growing backlog of com-
plaints to authorities that ((Mariachi" was taking advantage of his
protected status, led the army to join Garcia (ItGeneral Peligro") in
attacking him and forcing him to retire from active guerrilla life.40 Of
even more import was the elevation of Manuel Marulanda Velez (((Tiro
Fijo") to leadership of the communists. Far more ambitious than
((ChaITO Negro" had been, he was committed to the idea of using
southern Tolima as the staging ground for a nationwide revolution in
the style of the bearded Fidel Castro's recently successful revolution in
Cuba. ItTiro Fijo" and his colleague Ciro Castano, leader of the nearby
Jesus Maria Oviedo ("Mariachi"), center, and friends, Planadas, Tolima, 1960.
(Courtesy EI Tiempo)

Aerial view of "Marquetalia." (Courtesy EI Tiempo)

More Than a Political Solution 221

The people of Gaitania, Tolima, talk of Violencia with a reporter from EI

Tiempo. (Courtesy EI Tiempo)

communist enclave of Rio Chiquito, Cauca, were students of the

Castro movement and enjoyed ready access to the latest theoretical
works on Castroite tactics, such as Che Guevara's Guerra de Guer-
rillas."'
In 1961 "Tiro Fijo" began referring to the territory under his control
as "Marquetalia:' Soon major newspapers in Bogota picked up the
name and began referring to the communists' "independent republic"
of Marquetalia, in Tolima.·· That sent visions of a bearded "Tiro Fijo"
marching victoriously into Bogota at the head of a campesino army
dancing through the heads of Alberto Ueras as well as his generals
and spurred them to action. The army launched a surprise attack on
Marquetalia in January 1962, hoping to capture or kill the communists.
"Tiro Fijo" and forty of his followers received word just in time and
slipped through the dragnet. The "First Marquetalia Campaign" failed
in its principal objective, but it did lead to the establishment of army
outposts at Gaitania and Planadas.43
Even as the army became involved in its first concerted attempt to
222 Chapter 8

capture "Tiro Fijo/' it was evolving a much more elaborate strategy to

break the communist hold over Marquetalia. Dubbed tlPlan Lazo" and
directed by Major General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, the five-phase program
was issued to anny units in May 1962. First came a two-year prepara-
tion for attack. Anticommunist propaganda was distributed through-
out the region, and elaborate cartographic studies of southern Tolima
were undertaken. Advisers from the United States Army contributed
militaI)' supplies and counsel based upon their knowledge of guerrilla
warfare as practiced by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap.
By early 1964 the entire country knew that Marquetalia was about to
be invaded and waited tensely to see if the elusive "Tiro Fijo" would at
last be caught. The Conservative newspaper La. Republica anticipated
with relish the fall of the tlcommunist agitators" who "have devoted
themselves to creating confusion in zones still dominated by the
bandits." Voz Proletaria, the Communist party newspaper, published
in Bogota, suggested darkly, "we're going to see which forces are
capable of opposing the military strategy plotted against Colombia by
the North American government."44 Father Guzman, by then a political
activist, did his best to stop the militaI)' phase of Plan Lazo. Along with
his colleague Father Camilo Torres Restrepo, sociologist Orlando Fals,
and others, he directed a letter to Minister of War Gabriel Rebeiz
asking that the militcuy pennit them to carry out a socioeconomic
study of Marquetalia before further action was taken there. General
Rebeiz thanked them for their offer, but declined it with regrets.45
Preparations for the invasion continued.
On May 13, 1964, suspected guerrilla strongholds in Marquetalia
were bombed and strafed by jet aircraft and pounded by heary
artillery. Regular anny infantry and police units encircled and rapidly
closed in on the guenillas, while platoons of infantry swept through
mountainside hamlets in search of communists. In spite of these
efforts, the army again failed to capture "Tiro Fijo." He escaped the
lazo (lasso) and left Tolima to continue his struggle far to the east in
the trackless jungles of Caqueta.46 Ostensibly, then, Plan Lazo failed in
its objective to stamp out the communist guerrillas.
A year later, General Rebeiz was gloomily warning of the grave U

problems of subversion" confronted by his armed forces, and those

sympathetic to the guenillas criticized the government for persecut-
More Than a Political Solution 223

ing campesinos who were simply fighting for their rights. In April 1965
the French intellectuals Jean-Paul Sartre} Simone de Beauvoir} Regis
Debray} and others published a condemnation of Colombian author-
ities for ttVietnamizing n their country with arms and strategies sup-
plied by the Unit~d States.41 However} for tolimenses the debate was of
academic interest only. The fourth leg of Violencia in their department
was broken. It and most other affected zones were free of guerrillas for
the first time in fifteen years.48
Many people in the nation complained that Plan Lazo was a useless
waste of their money} 183 million pesos to be exact} and noted that as
many innocent civilians as communist guerrillas had been killed. The
army countered by arguing that the ttindependent republic n of Mar-
quetalia would never be recreated. It could prove that contention by
pointing to a wide-ranging program of improvements in the region}
most notably the construction of a highway to Planadas and Gaitania}
that} when completed} would make those outposts a real part of
Tolima for the first time.49

By 1965 the Violencia in Tolima} and in Colombia at large} was at an

end. Beyond departmental boundaries} in political and academic
circles} citizens and others debated the causes of that most traumatic
of all episodes in the country's history. Most tolimenses were too busy
trying to reconstruct their lives to spend much time calculating their
losses} but at least one attempt had been made to estimate just how
many lives were taken and how much property destroyed in the
department. Shortly after the fall of Rojas Pinilla} the secretary of
agriculture commissioned such an analysis. Published in 1958} at the
peak of the Violencia and when nearly a decade more of it was yet to
come} the study presented a picture of ruin and devastation. It
counted more than 16}OOO dead} more than 40}OOO pieces of agricul-
tural property abandoned-43 percent of all farms owned in the
department-and some 34}300 houses burned.50 The pamphlet ruffled
feathers and was promptly withdrawn from circulation} perhaps be-
cause its estimates seemed too high to be believed. Nevertheless} later
estimates for the department} based upon a study of the entire period}
were in accord with them. A study published two decades later
224 Chapter 8

estimated that 36}000 persons died in Tolima} that 54}900 agricultural

holdings were lost} and that a third of the department's population
changed its place of residence by reason of Violencia.51
Perhaps because of the uniqueness of the Violencia} most scholarly
analysis of it has focused on the effort to understand what it was and
why it came about. Where scholars have tried to judge its impact on
Colombia and its people} they have tended to employ macro analysis
to answer the question of how it influenced patterns of migration}
voting} party allegiance} and the like. Although such studies are useful
and necessary} they have been made at the expense of micro analysis}
through which the following questions might be answered: Where did
Violencia occur and who was usually killed} rich or poor campesinosJ
men or women? Did Liberals die with greater frequency than Conser-
vatives} and to what extent did the political coloration of the victims
relate to the general political makeup of the municipality in which
they lived? Did population growth remain stable or decline as a result
of severe Violencia in a given area? Where the flight was heavy from
infected places} was it permanent or temporary? Did those who fled
return once peace returned? Were those who returned landowners or
agricultural laborers? Were traditional systems of social control
changed? If so} did class-consciousness increase in the citizenry} as
perhaps registered by an increased vote for the Communist party? The
answers to such questions are important both in furthering under-
standing of the effects of Violencia upon those most directly involved
in it and of the nature of Colombians themselves. Fortunately} answers
for all these questions are suggested by data that were gathered in the
tolimense municipio of Libano} one of the few municipalities in the
nation for which empirical data on the Violencia have been compiled.
One of the most valuable collections of information of this type is
the record of mortality kept by Jose del Carmen Parra} longtime
coroner of the municipio and also one of its leading ConseIVatives. He
kept careful records of mortalities during the years of Violencia-"fif-
teen years of torture and hOITOr/' as he called them.52 He knew the
phenomenon and its victims well} for} throughout the early 1950s} he
performed autopsies on many of the same persons he himself had
brought into the world.53 He estimated that Violencia killed between
2}000 and 2}500 libanenses out of a total population that averaged
50}000 persons over the period. Mortality figures for the 1957-64
More Than a Political Solution 225

period, presented in table 3 and appendix C, reveal that the munici-

pality's average of intentional deaths per 100,000 population was an
astronomical 151, rising to 252 in the year 1959, or 54 percent greater
than the highest annual rate of violent death recorded for any depart-
ment in the history of the Violencia:'"
The Parra data also imply that the Violencia retained a traditional
political coloring even after inception of the bipartisan Frente Na-
cional. Analysis of the political affiliation of persons killed in Libano
between 1957 and 1964 reveals that two-thirds of them were ConselVa-
tives-in a municipio where they constituted a third of the population.
In other words, violentos apparently sought out Conservatives and

Jose del Carmen Parra and Luis Eduardo G6mez, ca. 1965. (Courtesy Aura de
G6mez)
226 Chapter 8

killed them at four. times the rate of Liberals.55 This fact allows the
deduction that} in municipios where Liberals predominated} Conser-
vatives were much more likely to fall victim to the Violencia} and vice
versa.
Another useful perspective gained from Parra's figures involves the
sex} age} occupation} and location of persons who were killed during
the 1957-63 period. An oveIWhelming number of them were adult
male campesinos, most of humble origin and status} murdered in rural
parts of the municipio. Only forty-seven of the nearly five hundred who
died between 1957 and 1964 were women} most of whom died in mass
murders} such as the one at Alto El Oso in 1959. The Parra list also
reveals the action-reaction dynamic so important in creating Violen-
cia. Time and again} one murder was a reprisal for another} as seen in
the slaying of the Conservative Buritica family in the vereda of Murillo}
October 17} 1959} and the killing of twelve Liberal campesinos at Alto EI
Oso} also in the vereda of Murillo} one day later.
Wide property destruction and economic decline occurred in
Libano. After July 1951 agricultural production declined} businesses
closed} and human as well as monetcuy capital fled. After two decades
as Tolima's strongest provincial tax producer} Libano fell to fourth
place. It suffered the added indignity of seeing neighboring Armero}
located in the secure Magdalena River Valley} increase in prosperity as
coffee warehouses and mills withdrew from the violence-ridden cor-
dillera. Of four coffee mills} five iron foundries} and numerous other
plants and factories that existed in Libano in 1950} only a small wheat
mill remained at the end of the decade. Hundreds of houses were
burned and many fanns deserted. Productivity of the land declined
drastically} plunging the municipality to tenth among Tolima's thirty-
seven coffee-producing municipios in terms of coffee yield per hect-
are.56
One of the most surprising trends shown by the data on Libano is
that} in spite of its extreme and prolonged Violencia} its rate of
population growth was not perceptibly slowed} nor did a drastic loss
of rural population occur. The overall population increased markedly
during the entire period of the Violencia} 1951-64} more than doubling
the rate of increase of the preceding thirteen years. Over the same
period} urbanization of the municipio increased by only 6 percent.51
This fact is particularly surprising given the danger of life in the campo
More Than a Political Solution 227

during the years when the likes of ltDesquite/' ltTarzan/' USangrene-

gra" and their cuadrillas were at large.
It also seems to contradict the conclusion of a study of three
uinvasion" barrios in the cabecera of Libano that was made in 1960.
Sociologist Roberto Pineda Giraldo noted a heavy and permanent
migration out of the campo and into the cabecera during the years of
Violencia. He based his study upon interviews with persons who lived
in the barrios, many of whom told him that the violence drove them
into town. \\!hat the Pineda study did not reveal was that many of
those interviewed subsequently returned to the campo once the
danger there subsided. And those with whom he talked did not
represent a true cross section of the campo population) but rather an
inherently transient part of it. Some 70.5 percent of them did not own
the land they had worked before they were forced into town. It must
be deduced that) in a municipio where 60 percent of campesinos
owned the land they worked) a large proportion of the rural popula-
tion preferred the risks of campo life at the time to a miserable
existence in an invasion barrio. 58
The bloody) destructive Violencia was not without its positive fea-
tures. Most scholars agree that it loosened the grip of gamonales over
the common folk. Many a gamonal fled the campo, which left tenants
and renters more freedom to make their own decisions than they had
enjoyed in past decades. Greater self-confidence and broader hori-
zons within the poorer population were presumed by-products of
gamonal dispersal. Yet) traditional allegiances remained strong. It is
instructive that) in the hotly contested presidential elections of 1930
and 1974) the political allegiance of libanenses showed little change. As
revealed in appendix E) they voted overwhelmingly for the Liberal
party.
Considerable scholarly effort has been expended to show that
Violencia led to increased class-consciousness among Colombian
campesinos. According to this theory) best stated by cleric/sociologist
Camilo Torres in 1963) those who became guerrillas for reason of
self-defense acquired the group solidarity" that in time could be
U

employed to transform the nation's society.59 Camilo Torres so firmly

believed in the revolutionary potential of newly class-conscious cam-
pesinos that he gave his life trying to mobilize them.60 However) his
thesis does not seem to apply in the case of Liban 0 . The wide dispersal
228 Chapter 8

of privately owned property there and the persistence of traditional

political loyalties remained stronger than the tendency toward group
solidarity that Torres thought he observed in northern and southern
Tolima during the early 1960s. Even in the communist enclaves of
Viota and Surnapaz} traditional patterns tended to reassert themselves.
Although initially organized along communal lines} they assumed a
hierarchical structure of leadership and slowly returned to the system
of private ownership.8t The whole subject of the persistence of tradi-
tional class fonns within Colombia's "independent republics" is an
intriguing one that warrants closer examination than can be given
here.
Libano's Violencia was exceedingly diffuse} more so than that in
southern and eastern Tolima. After the fonnation of small Liberal
self-defense groups in the early 19508 and the attendant military
reprisal against the municipio in April 1952} Violencia became a brutal-
izing mix of vendetta} criminality} and political partisanship. Its aim-
lessness and disorganization in the municipality account for the
barely appreciable drop in the level of violence when Rojas Pinilla
overthrew the G6mez government in mid-1953. After a brief honey-
moon period during which Violencia declined sharply in other parts
of Tolima} in Libano it reached new heights. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s} the municipio experienced its highest levels of strife (table
3).

TABLE 3.
Homicides per 100,000 Population82

Year Colombia Tolima Libano

1957 41.1 115.6 130.0

1958 51.8 133.7 172.0
1959 40.1 100.7 252.0
1960 34.0 62.8 120.0
1961 86.0
1962 174.0
1963 120.0

The people of Libano were demoralized by their fifteen years of

tunnoll, as was all of Tolima. The optimism and confidence of earlier
More Than a Political Solution 229

times became anguish and dread when violence stalked the country-
side} and not until formation of the Frente Nacional did things begin to
change. Conservative-Liberal accommodation removed the oldest
cause of Violencia: traditional political antipathies. By 1958 the phe-
nomenon was so much more complex than it had been a decade
earlier that more than a political solution was required to end it
definitively. That final remedy called for an additional six years of
vigorous} even savage} pursuit} first of criminal violentosJ then of the
communist guenillas of ((Tiro Fijo." But at last it was over. By the
mid-1960s tolimenses could once again pause during their daily
routine) savor the beauty of their land} and be happy to reside in it.
 9

Aftermath

During the years immediately following the Violencia) it seemed as

though tolimenses wanted to confound the casual visitor to their
department. A traveler on its busy east-west highway noted with
satisfaction the well-tended fields of cotton and sugarcane that
stretched out on either side. Crop dusters could be seen circling lazily
on limpid llano air) palpable symbols of progress framed against the
perfect snowcap of Nevado del Tolima. The ride south from Honda
was equally heartening. Pineapple) sugarcane) and sesame luxuriated
in irrigated fields; cattle grazed on fenced hacienda lands. Yet) the
llano of irrigated) highly mechanized haciendas told just part of
Tolima's story in the early 1960s. The gently rolling) open terrain
offered little shelter to violentos and made possible rapid deployment
of police forces whenever trouble threatened. Violencia had simply not
been allowed to prosper on the llano. Thus) to appreciate what it did
to Tolima and how the department recovered in later years) a look
toward the cordillera is necessary. That is where the burden weighed
most heavily.
The economic cost was obvious to anyone who climbed into the
area in the early 1960s. Not a single upland municipio had more than a
dirt road linking it to the valley) and that was frequently closed by
landslides during the rainy season. Many upland veredas could be
reached only by horseback. Little of southern Tolima was accessible to
wheeled vehicles of any sort. Long years of violence had brought
severe declines in agricultural productivity) as weed-choked fields and
poorly tended coffee fincas attested. Coffee growers were particularly
230
Aft ennath 231

hard hit. The hcuvest of one small lando\\lIler in martyred eastern

Tolima plummeted from fifty-six cargas in 1954 to fifteen in 1959} and
finally to eight in 1961.1 His story was typical of most farmers in the
region. Nearly a third of all campesinos in Cunday were severely
malnourished} and a third of them suffered from tuberculosis; mortal-
ity rates were far higher than normal. Few persons more than fifty
years of age could be found in that municipio, the rest having suc-
cumbed to the rigors of previous years.2
With Violencia rapidly becoming a thing of the past everywhere in
the country during the 1960s} the national government moved into the
campo with a variety of programs aimed at raising living standards of
campesinos. Bearing most directly upon fonner Violencia areas was
Acci6n Civica Militar, a Colombian AImy program designed to inte-
grate isolated regions into the nation at large. In Tolima} that meant
linking Marquetalia with the rest of the department by a road to the
villages of Planadas and Gaitania. \Vhen it was completed late in the
1960s} the campesinos of far-southern Tolima enjoyed access to Neiva
by way of a southern route and Ibague by way of a northern one.
A second aspect of Acci6n Civica Militar was its social welfare
program. The army improved sanitation} installed electric generators}
built schools} and even undertook campaigns of adult education.
Soldiers were sent into the countryside with paper} pencils} and other
implements of instruction to teach grizzled campesinos who only
recently had fought with leaders like ((Mariachi" and ((General Peligro."
In places no soldier had dared enter a few years before) the populace
witnessed the incongruous spectacle of seventeen-year-old recruits
nervously clutching M-1 rifles while attempting to teach primeras
letras to equally uncomfortable campesinos. Although the effective-
ness of such teaching may be surmised} it was infinitely preferable to
what had gone before.3
One of the national government's earliest acts on behalf of its rural
population was the launching of a nationwide self-help program
called Acci6n Comunal. Campesinos were to fonn local juntas} or
committees} which would be aided by government-paid organizers
knO\\lIl as ((promoters/' that would work to improve their veredas
through communal labor. Once the juntas achieved legal recognition)
or personeriajuridica, they were eligible to apply for government loans
and to undertake civic improvements. School construction} installa-
232 Chapter 9

tion of electric generators} and improvements in sewerage and water

systems were typical projects. By 1970 more than four hundred juntas
had been organized in Tolima-15}000 nationwide4-all theoretically
inculcating the program's stated goal of depoliticizing the population
through communal labor and diminishing paternalism.s
The reception of Acci6n Comunal by tolimenses was mixed. Early in
the 1960s} they accepted it as part of the government's overall thrust to
reduce political tensions and thus lessen Violencia. In southern To-
lima} the people cooperatively built barracks to house the soldiers who
would protect them from violentos. 8 As time passed} campesinos be-
came skeptical that much would come of Acci6n Comunal programs}
and a majority came to view them cynically as proof that the govern-
ment wanted to save money at their expense.7 Coloring this lukewarm
acceptance of the agency by tolimenses was their own independence
of spirit} strengthened over the years by knowledge that little of note
was likely to come their way from any level of government. No
significant tradition of communal work existed among tolimenses. All
this helps explain the assessment of Acci6n Comunal by a small farmer
of Chaparral: ttl can't understand it-maybe it's something for chil-
dren; I like politics} but of Liberals and ConseIVatives} not this [biparti-
san] stuff that we have so much of today."8
By the end of the decade} it was clear why 52 percent of the
tolimenses who were sUIVeyed in 1968 perceived that Acci6n Comunal
benefited few or none of them. Local leaders had gradually taken over
leadership of the juntas} thus recreating within the program the
system of hierarchical} elite domination that it was pledged to dimin-
ish. That the rate of participation in Acci6n Comunal by the people of
Tolima was lower than for any other Colombians save in neighboring
Caldas is not surprising.9 Only 152 of the department's 437 juntas were
the result of cooperative action by the campesinos themselves. All the
rest were founded by government ttpromoters/' priests} and U.S. Peace
Corps workers.10
Operating concurrently with community action" in Tolima during
tt

the 1960s was the nation's heralded agrarian refonn (Law 135)} inau-
gurated in 1961. Long and hotly debated by lawmakers} the bill was
passed amid fears that failure to do so would lead to a Cuban-style
revolution.ll The legislation created what was lauded as a thoroughgo-
ing program of land redistribution} to be directed by a powerful new
Aftermath 233

state agency known as the Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria

(INCORA). It began operation possessing apparently limitless power to
expropriate poorly utilized land and sign it over to the landless. When
teams of experts moved into areas targeted for intensive reform effort}
the excitement of campesinos living there rose to a fever pitch.
Eastern Tolima was the site of the inaugural program. It was called
uTolima 1/' and embraced parts of ravaged Cunday} Icononzo} and
Villarrica. Haciendas expropriated during this first phase of reform
bore names well known to tolimenses: Escocia} Canada} Guatimbol}
Varsovia} and many others. All were old estates where landlords and
tenants had battled during the 1930s and the army and guerrillas in
the 1950s. Teams of health workers sent to ((Tolima 1" in 1962 were
appalled by the infrahuman conditions they found. StaIVation stalked
the mountains) and a score of serious diseases were endemic among
the people. Adult males averaged but 5'5" in height and 119 pounds in
weight} and women were only 5' tall and weighed 112 pounds.
Near-universal malnutrition played a dominant role in the high levels
of infant mortality. A few land invasions had occurred on abandoned
haciendas} but they were caused by the simple desire for survival
rather than the quest for property. Only 10 percent of the land was
owned by the people who lived there} and unemployment ran to
nearly half the work force. 12
For four years} INCORA technicians worked in the valley of the River
Cunday building schools and health centers} improving highways}
establishing cooperatives} and most importantly} assisting in land
redistribution. They made uTolima 1" the sho\N}Jlace of the country's
agrarian reform} in the process settling some six hundred campesino
families on more than ten thousand hectares of land formerly claimed
by thirty-one hacendados. 13
The Cunday project was followed by five others in Tolima. Although
not as ambitious as ((Tolima 1/' the other INCORA parcelings did
benefit the campesinos who were involved. Titles to nearly five thou-
sand fincas were awarded in Tolima during the first eight years of
INCORA) and the properties in question averaged between fifteen and
twenty hectares each.14 These figures suggest that} when compared
with the situation in Colombia at large} the landless campesino in the
department received favored treatment from INCORA. Although con-
stituting just 5 percent of the national population} tolimenses received
234 Chapter 9

nearly 20 percent of all the titles deriving from parcelizations. Perhaps

that was the government's way of acknowledging that they had suf-
fered more than any other people.
As the 1960s drew to a close} it became increasingly clear that the
land reform of INCORA} like the community development program of
Acci6n Comunal, promised more than it eventually delivered. \JVhen
Law 135 had been passed} all of Tolima's 90}000 landless agricultural
workers had reason to hope they might soon become landowners. But
the land distribution dragged on with excruciating slowness} and by
mid-1969 only 1}115 titles had been awarded. Another 3}759 tolimenses
received them} but those cessions were to parcels they had long
occupied as squatters.15 Moreover} the land turned over to squatters
was not guaranteed to be of sufficient quality or quantity to provide
them a decent standard of living-a fact loudly proclaimed in a 1967
newspaper article which reported that 40 percent of such land in
Guamo} Prado} Suarez} Purificaci6n} and Chicorallay abandoned.16
Neither did INCORA grapple with the problem of the 4.2 percent of
the owners who possessed 57.7 percent of the farmland in the depart-
ment. A mere 4.5 percent of the agency's acquisitions came through
expropriation or purchase of large holdings. The remaining 95.5 per-
cent was acquired from baldlo lands that no one else wanted. Such
tracts were either too far removed from transportation routes to be
desirable or were of such poor quality to be of dubious value to
farmers. 17 The unmistakable conclusion drawn by tolimenses, whether
urban or rural dwellers} was that INCORA's labors had not been
particularly fruitful. By one computation} fewer than one-half of 1
percent of all Colombians benefited from the program during its first
eight years of existence} and only 3.4 percent of the national domain
was involved.18
If the agrarian reform fell short of expectations during its first eight
years} the Frente Nacionallived up to immediate hopes during its first
ten. The success of this organization} which was formed to reestablish
the old political status quo on a basis of bipartisanship} lessen political
tension} and end Violencia} was unqualified. But the price paid for
depoliticization was rather high. The cooling of "hereditary hatreds"
led to spiraling electoral abstention and a growth in the number of
citizens who were inclined to judge without passion the nature and
performance of their government. \JVhat voters perceived was a system
Aftennath 235

controlled by the same leaders whose previous errors had made

possible the Violencia and whose inability to grapple with pressing
national problems made day-to-day existence ever more difficult for
the ordinary citizen. INCORA's insipid perlonnance damaged the
interests of only the rural poor. Persistent inflation, running at more
than 10 percent throughout the 1960s, higher than that of all but a
handful of American nations, hurt everyone.19
Speaking for a majority of those who opposed the Frente was a new
political party called the National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional
Popular)} or ANAPO, led by none other than fonner dictator Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla. Following his 1958 trial for malfeasance in office and his
political rehabilitation several years later, he built a considerable
following by lashing out against the oligarchs" of the Frente Nacional
j(

and promising relief from inflation and all other socioeconomic ills if
he attained the presidency. Typically holding aloft a block of panela at
some point in his campaign addresses, he promised anapistas\ that,
once elected, he would return the dietary staple to its price of a
decade earlier.20 An amorphous coalition of urban poor, lesser political
elites, nonconfonning Conservatives, less than affluent middle classes,
and a scattering of Leftists rallied around the aging general and nearly
won the presidency for him in 1970.21
ANAPO never did as well in Tolima as elsewhere in Colombia,
though the party polled a substantial 39 percent of the popular vote in
1970. Analysis of departmental voting in that election tells much about
tolimense politics in the post-Violencia period. Indicative of ANAPO's
urban, blue-collar strength, as well as widespread unhappiness over
Frente perlonnance, was the fact that Rojas carried the departmental
capital as well as the traditionally Liberal-Leftist port municipios of
Ambalema and Honda.22 Elsewhere, he carried or nearly carried
twenty-one municipios} a majority of them historically Conservative-
voting ones that split their vote between him and the Frente candi-
date, Misael Pastrana Borrero.
The strong anapista showing in Tolima notwithstanding, analysis of
the 1970 vote shows a continuing allegiance of tolimenses to their
traditional parties. Fifty-five percent of all eligible voters simply did not
cast ballots in the contest, in part because the Liberal party fielded no
candidate. Representing the Frente Nacional was the Conservative
Pastrana Borrero. The two lesser challengers were also Conservatives.
236 Chapter 9

Rojas himself had similar party origins and was hence unacceptable to
the more intransigent Liberals of Tolima. Four years later} when open
party competition resumed} more than 70 percent of eligible toli-
menses voted. The Liberal candidate amassed 62 percent of the votes
cast. The ConseIVative candidate won 27 percent} and the ANAPO
candidate but 6 percent.23
Voting patterns in traditionally ConseIVative municipios also indi-
cated that political sentiments in Tolima had not been substantially
altered either by ANAPO or the Violencia. For example} Alpujarra split
its vote between Betancur and Rojas in 1970} but gave the ANAPO
candidate only 8 percent of its vote four years later when clearly
labeled ConseIVative and Liberal candidates opposed each other in
the contest. Alpujarra reverted to its historic voting pattern in 1974}
giving 88 percent of its vote to Alvaro G6mez} son of Laureano G6mez.
Influencing the 1970 balloting was the hatred of Rojas on the part of
many tolimenses. Voters in the heavily Liberal municipios of Villamca}
Icononzo} Ataco} Rioblanco} and Chaparral gave oveIWhelming majori-
ties to Frente candidate Pastrana.24 Their vote represented opposition
to the man who had persecuted them as communists in the 1950s as
well as an endorsement of the political arrangement that ended their
Violencia.
No sooner was the anapista challenge met and at least temporarily
turned back by the Frente Nacional than a new kind of mass move-
ment arose to test the nation's bipartisan government. During Febru-
ary 1971 some seventeen to twenty thousand campesinos began
invading large haciendas in widely scattered parts of the nation.
Tolimenses were prominently involved in these invasions. Some two
thousand of the department's poorest citizens seized valuable llano
land along the Saldafia and Magdalena rivers in the municipios of
Natagaima} Coyaima} Purificaci6n} Guamo} and Espinal. Reporters
from the newspaper El Espectador were on hand at one such invasion
site near the vereda. ofVehl} in the municipio of Natagaima. On Sunday
and Monday} Februcuy 25 and 26} 1971} six hundred campesinos
moved into three zones} each separated from the other by about two
kilometers. Entering under cover of darkness} they erected rude huts
and set to work tilling and planting the fallow earth. Later} they hung
white as well as Colombian flags from windows of the huts and
Aftermath 237

listened to transistor radios carrying news bulletins describing their

actions.
On Monday afternoon) February 26) a jeep from the alcaldfa arrived
bearing municipal officials) who angrily denounced both the campe-
sinos and the newspaper reporters who were interviewing them.
"Can't you see that what you're doing is bad?" one of the officials
asked the farmers) and added) "this isn't the way to make a living; you
can make it in some other way." After some nventy-five minutes) three
trucks loaded with heavily armed police appeared) and the officers
deployed themselves around the field. Clearly outnumbered) the in-
vaders offered no resistance. They angrily gathered their meager
possessions and left the land} the official's promise that "there will be
a solution" ringing in their ears.25
Interviews with several of the Natagaima invaders revealed that they
were all married men who owned too little property to provide
adequate support for their families. Unhappy over the slow pace of
land redistribution} they were) nevertheless) optimistic that their inva-
sions would push INCORA to redouble efforts on their behalf. On one
matter they were in complete accord: under no circumstance would
they use violence to gain their ends. \!Vhen questioned on that point by
the reporters} ((all of them) almost in chorus and for some two minutes
explained that they would not risk the use of violence."26
The land invasions of 1971 illustrated campesino fear of renewed
Violencia as well as the belief that INCORA had done some good for
others of their condition and would} if prodded) eventually get around
to helping them too. Thus} the campesino of Tolima bore out the thesis
that} where a government is strong enough to initiate even a modest
land reform program} it will "immunize" its rural population against
the impulse to fight for the revolutionary redistribution of land.27
Campesinos staged the 1971 land invasions under the aegis of their
own agricultural union. A million-member organization called ANUC
(Asociaci6n Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos), it acted as a rather
effective pressure group for its members. Following the invasions)
many landowners who had previously been reluctant to sell underuti-
lized property to INCORA entered into negotiations with the agency.
In December of that year) Law 135 of 1961 was hastily modified to
speed the process of redistribution.28 \!Vhere the small coffee farmer in
238 Chapter 9

Tolima had been allowed but 6 percent of all CajaAgraria loans during
the years prior to the 1971 invasions} afterward they received nearly 20
percent of such loans.z9
An unusual feature of ANUC was its character as a union created for
campesinos, rather than organized by them. It was the brainchild of
President Carlos Lleras Restrepo} who proposed its fOImation in 1967
as a means through which the users of government seIVices might act
collectively to better their lives.30 In just four years} it mushroomed to
more than a million members} which showed that Lleras had rightly
judged the temper of rural Colombia. More importantly} ANUC's
success was proof that rank.-and-file citizens of even the poorest} least
sophisticated class were capable of acting in concert to advance their
own ends.
Tolimenses were a heterogeneous population of a million souls late
in the 1970s} nearly half of them urban dwellers} or residents of
communities numbering at least 1}500 persons. The department's
urban populace was occupationally diverse. Some 27 percent of the
wage earners worked in manufacturing} transportation} and allied
blue-collar occupations; 13 percent of them held white-collar jobs.31
Significant numbers of urban-dwelling tolimenses worked for one of
thirty-nine decentralized governmental agencies} and virtually all
blue- and white-collar workers were members of an aITay of special-
interest associations.3Z Some} like labor unions} were private} num-
bering fifty-nine in the mid-1960s.33 These groups gave average citizens
a way of bringing pressure to bear on their government. The associa-
tions also filled the void left as popular allegiance to political party as
well as patr6n eroded and provided their members with a sense of
place in a society that was growing more complex and impersonal
every day.
Rural tolimenses were no less users of special-interest associations
than their urban counterparts. The faImer's union ANUC was but one
of several organizations designed to improve rural life through loan
programs} technical assistance} and political lobbying. Preeminent
among such groups was the semiofficial Federaci6n Nacional de
Cafeteros. Membership was open to any Colombian who owned at
least two hectares of land and produced a minimum of 355 kilos of
coffee annually. The association not only marketed this commodity
but also extended credit} operated cooperatives} gave technical assis-
Aftermath 239

tance) and concerned itself with rural hygiene and education. In some
parts of the country) its social programs were so effective that the
national government opted to let the organization take over develop-
ment chores) such as the construction of roads and schools.34
Although the giant Federaci6n Nacional de Cafeteros is organiza-
tionally complex) it is quite traditional in governance. In other words)
the top decision making is not democratic. The board of directors has
historically been a closed body of large landowners and other elites
who govern with neither the advice nor consent of rank-and-file
members. Thus) its extension agents annually pay thousands of visits
to coffee growers in departments like Tolima} but usually because they
are sent rather than demanded by farmers. \JVhere possible} the
extension agents make use of traditional social institutions to aid them
in their work. They have enjoyed moderate success with uFriendship
Groups" (Grupos de Amistad), self-help associations modeled on the
traditional form of group labor known as the convite. 35
Tolima was a bustling) dynamic society late in the 1970s. Old cliches
about rural misery became less credible in extensive upland zones as
the coffee bonanza of the mid-1970s lifted many campesinos out of the
marginal class. At the same time) more of the marginal population
than ever before left the department to seek better lives in Bogota and
other cities. From 1960 to 1970 a striking reduction occurred in the
percentage of Tolima farmers in the minifundia category} which
caused agencies such as the Banco Cafetero and Caja Agraria to step
up their loan programs in an effort to keep them out of the over-
crowded cities.36 Those loans represented a concerted attempt by
government to improve the quality of rural life. The relationship
between burgeoning urban slums and the low standards of rural life
was clearly recognized. Illiteracy in the campo exceeded 60 percent
among the rural poor) and birthrates remained quite high.37
Change came to Tolima in the fifteen years after the Violencia}
though it sometimes seemed that the land and people obstinately
refused to yield. Some sense of this commingling of old and new
during the era was apparent in the highland municipio of Libano. The
highway there in the late 1970s was a far cry from that of earlier days.
Not only was it paved with asphalt halfway to Convenio} but concrete
drain pipes were also installed under the surlace at frequent} critical
points to prevent landslides and washouts. Beyond Convenio} where
240 Chapter 9

the paving had not yet reached} a rock-like clay hauled up from the
valley contributed to a miraculously smooth ride-at least smooth by
all previous standards. Another casualty to progress were the most
precipitous sections of the old route} abandoned in the early 1970s
when new} less-dangerous sections of roadway were cut. Travelers no
longer passed through the narrow defile where violentos had once
tried to ambush and murder the son of a national president-an event
that brought down a ghastly vengeance upon the campesinos of
Libano.
Gone too was the dense undergrowth that had covered many
hillsides along the way. Fabulous prices for the municipality's fine
mild coffee set landowners scrambling to plant seedlings on every hill
and precipice. Hillsides lay stripped of trees and underbrush} and row
after row of caturra coffee marched away over ridges and hilltops into
the distance. The poorest libanenses bore a look of prosperity pro-
duced by new pants} shoes} ruanasJ and machetes. They were living
arguments in favor of the t(trickle down" theory that was debated by
economic developmentalists} though it was whispered that some of
the newfound wealth came from surreptitious cultivation of that other
prized Colombian money crop} marijuana.
Signs of modest progress were apparent in the cabecera itself. The
houses in Barrio Jaramillo, the first residential area passed on entering
town} had been built in the 1950s by refugees from the Violencia. Over
the years, they were gradually improved until the whole barrio passed
from t(invasion" slum to middle-class neighborhood. Half a kilometer
beyond} just north of the main street, there had once functioned a
Church-run orphanage for daughters of Violencia victims. When the
last orphans left in the mid-1970s} the departmental government
bought the building for use as a girls' school.
By far the most impressive structure in town was the new four-story
hospital. Begun during the regime of Rojas Pinilla} it lay uncompleted
for nearly two decades. It was finally finished in 1974 and opened the
following year-a monument to years of lobbying by the local citi-
zenry. Pivotal in obtaining funds for the hospital was longtime Liberal
leader Alfonso Jaramillo} a physician. He received recompense for his
labors in 1978} when Liberal President Julio C. Turbay Ayala appointed
him as national minister of health. The hospital and the ministry were
Aftermath 241

rewards of sorts to the entire municipio} whose people had steadfastly

voted Liberal for more than a century.
Past the hospital} continuing in the direction of downtown} were yet
other signs that Libano might be recapturing its vitality of former
years. In a single two-block area stood three new structures: a huge
Federaci6n Nacional de Cafeteros warehouse} a large telephone build-
ing} and a bank. Curiously} the central plaza was least changed of all}
though crowded cafes and bars} well-stocked shops} and many pedes-
trians made it seem far different from the melancholy place it had
been during the 1950s. On the northwestern comer of the plaza stood
the church} which showed signs that construction} long halted at the
bare brick stage} had at last been resumed. Inside} the nave was
completed in marble} calVed wood} and gilt; outside} the two towering
steeples boasted a new pink and green surface that contrasted oddly
with the dull} unfinished red below.
In the geometric center of the plaza} under old} stately trees} the
square} whitewashed crypt of Libano's founder} Isidro PaITa} still
reminded townspeople of their origins. He had died secure in his
nineteenth-century liberal faith that Libano would someday lead
Tolima in culture} industry} and civic virtue. His vision inspired all who
followed and helped sustain them during the long years when cruel
fratricidal strife threatened to destroy all that had been created. The
municipality eventually recovered from the Violencia-that peIVerse
but explicable consequence of national political tradition. If recent
signs of municipal prosperity are true auguries} then Parra's to\tVI1 may
yet live up to its founder's lofty conception of what it would someday
become.
 10

The Violencia and Tolima:

An Assessment

This volume was based on two premises. The first is simply that the
Colombian Violencia was too complex and long-lived to be treated in
its entirety in a single monograph. For this reason) a regional approach
was employed to simplify its amorphousness. The second) more
involved) premise is that most previous scholars have) through over-
reliance on structural approaches) failed to explain clearly what the
Violencia was and why it came about. Their failure lies more in the
nature of contemporary social science methodology than in errors of
omission by the writers themselves.
Most recent writing in the field of history has been dominated by
the search for theoretical constructs that make possible rigorous study
of historical data. This approach leads to the building of an edifice
that) though impressive in overall design) renders merely incidental
the empirical data riveting it together. The result is a splendid view of
the paradigm) but little feel for the specific infonnation that gives it
meaning. Stated another way) most persons writing about the Violen-
cia have done so from clearly stated ideological or methodological
perspectives that) whether or not set forth in a structural" way) lend a
(t

highly subjective coloration to their findings. They have written as

Conservatives) Liberals) or Marxists; or from the perspective of social
modernization) economic dependency) anomie) or some other explicit
or implicit ordering of the data of human experience.1 The usefulness
of such paradigmatic approaches to Colombian history cannot be
denied. But they cannot) and usually do not pretend to) serve as
inclusive treatments of the ostensible object of inquiry.
242
The Violencia and Tolima 243

The author of this work has not rejected the notions that patterns of
behavior must be sought that can be empirically verified and that such
evidence as it relates to theoretical frameworks must be considered.
However} a fundamental contention of this study is that the Violencia
can be understood only if it is seen in the context of the broader
Colombian culture and history. It occuITed in a single place and
moment and sprang from an intricate mix of conditioning factors and
imponderables that triggered the fifteen years of turmoil. In the
foregoing pages} an attempt has been made to capture the singularity
of the Violencia} while at the same time to reveal broadly applicable
cultural patterns within and underlying it.2
It might be argued this implies a search for paradigms} and that
undoubtedly is the case. Fully half the study is taken up with the
exploration of social and political institutions that the writer considers
to be integral to the Violencia. But such paradigms are seen as
value-laden structures that not only overlap and penetrate one an-
other but also render unique the society and history under study.
Colombia is portrayed as a distinct culture} yet one whose component
parts may be examined empirically and to an extent independently of
one another. This methodological approach is akin to that employed
in studying fingerprints. The arches and whorls that characterize all of
them are examined in order to establish the uniqueness of a single
one.
Like the rest of Spanish America} Colombia developed a hierarchical}
inegalitarian society that was philosophically oriented by the doc-
trines of the Roman Catholic church. In the political realm} the
Church taught that all the citizens in a Christian state should subordi-
nate their private interests to the public good} respect those consid-
ered their betters} and honor their ruler as the repository of public
virtue and authority.3 Social relations were little changed when Colom-
bia severed its connection with Spain early in the nineteenth century}
but political affairs were thrown into chaos. Lacking any powerful
symbol of political unity} Colombians fell to fighting among themselves
until the mid-nineteenth century} when they found dual symbols of
political legitimacy in their antipathetic ConseIVative and Liberal
parties. The ideology of European liberalism was the catalyst for party
formation. Those of the political elite who valued traditional ways}
particularly the close cooperation of Church and State} formed the
244 Chapter 10

Conservative party. Their friends} relatives} and retainers as well as the

like-minded} followed them into the party. A similar process of affilia-
tion took place on the Liberal side.4 Within a very short time} virtually
all citizens came to define their interests and ideals in partisan terms.
As years and decades passed} party ideology took on the quality of
revealed truth} and party pronouncements became metaphorical
statements of principle that were worth defending to the death.5
Even though the parties separated people} they unified the nation.
This integrative function goes far toward explaining their durability
over time and their importance to the Violencia. On the one hand} they
helped Colombians overcome their intractable regionalism. {(Thanks
to this [partisanship] we've maintained national unity in an extensive
territory that for more than a century of independent existence
enjoyed no clear link between its most distant regions other than that
established by political sentiments/' wrote Rafael Azula in 1956.6 He
went on to point out the paradox of creating national unity through
party partisanship. It was no less paradoxical that the parties served to
minimize social strife of a nontraditional political nature} particularly
class conflict. That was because both the Conservative and Liberal
parties were multiclass and hierarchical in structure} functioning
through clientelist networks that united the interests of citizens of
unequal social status. In that sense} the parties replicated the struc-
ture of traditional Colombian society.7 Yet another element in the
unifying role of the parties was their ability to embrace new political
ideologies. The leaders of potential third parties always found their
programs and themselves coopted by one or the other traditional
party.
These were the chief patterns and structures underlying the Violen-
cia. Colombia was an intensely politicized nation that was dominated
by the venerable Conservative and Liberal parties. The complex role
they played rendered them much more than vehicles of mass political
participation. Structurally consistent with national social reality} they
served to integrate the geographically diverse state even as they
polarized its citizenry. As ideological parties claiming to represent
encompassing philosophies and ways of life} they played a psychoso-
cial role of significant dimensions.
Political power changed hands three times in Colombia between
formation of the parties in 1849 and the breakdown of the bipartisan
The Violencia and Tolima 245

system a centuIy later. The first change came in 1886} when the
ConseIVatives took over and set about strengthening the central gov-
emment and reestablishing close ties between Church and State.
Then} in 1930} the Liberals returned from their long sojourn in the
political wildemess and attempted to undo what their rivals had done
over the previous forty-four years. The time was ripe for change} and
during the ensuing sixteen years} a turbulent period known as the era
of the illiberal Republic/' the Liberal party turned the forces of
growing social modernization to its advantage. Although it was unable
to mend the split that made possible a return of the ConselVatives in
1946} the party was clearly the larger} more dynamic political body by
that year. ConselVatives reacted warily to its growth. They obselVed
that} as social modernization accelerated during the years of the
Liberal Republic} their opponents successfully appealed to new
groups--organized labor} populists} and even socialists--not only
moving their party leftward, but also swelling its membership.8
It seemed likely that the Liberals would continue to dominate
national life into the foreseeable future. Thus, the ConselVatives deter-
mined that they should press their advantage to the fullest when the
Liberal split allowed them to regain power in 1946. Confident that
their fall was an accident, Liberals continued to press their numerical
superiority even in defeat. ConselVative paranoia, coupled with Liberal
heavy-handedness, placed the nation's political system under such
strain that it collapsed in 1949, the year the Liberals attempted to
unseat the ConseIVatives through parliamentary finagling.
The Violencia, which resulted from this institutional breakdown,
has been compared with the War of the Thousand Days/ though in
reality it was much worse. It lasted six times longer, took twice as
many lives, and, most importantly, was leaderless. \tVhereas elites led
troops into battle during the War of the Thousand Days, campesinos
who fell in the Violencia did so while waging a lonely struggle against
anarchy. The latter situation resulted from the failure of the complex
political system that had ordered Colombian civil life for precisely a
hundred years.
The Violencia did not start in late 1949. It simply became general-
ized over much of the country following the collapse of traditional
governance during the course of that year. As early as 1946, fighting
had taken place between ConseIVatives and Liberals in Santander and
246 Chapter 10

Santander del Norte. Little by little, it spread to other regions, gaining

momentum after Gaitan's assassination in 1948 and again the next
year, when feeble attempts at bipartisan accommodation failed be-
cause of acrimonious partisanship. The Violencia was defined in its
particulars according to the regions and localities where it flared.
Indeed, several parts of Colombia were never seriously affected. Most
notable in that respect were the northern coast and the far southwest-
ern department of Narifto, adjacent to Ecuador.
A variety of factors help explain the near-absence of Violencia along
the Atlantic littoral and, to a lesser extent, in the department of Narifto.
Those regions were both physically and psychologically distant from
the nation's political heartland. A sense of their psychological distance
is conveyed in the novels of Gabriel Garcia Marquez. He suggests a
costeflo perception of the highlanders as dour rigid people-a race
alien to inhabitants of the steaming lowlands. On the other hand,
people from the interior disparaged the northern coast and often
couched their criticism in racial terms. Costeflos resisted intense
politicization thanks in part to their more cosmopolitan view of the
world, and consequently were less willing to attach overweening
importance to party labels. This explains why Conservative and Liberal
costeflo elites were able to unite to minimize Violencia in their region
in spite of political breakdown at the national level. \lVhile conflict was
breaking out in other regions, costeflo leaders employed their armed
forces in such a way that they were not perceived by the people as
sectarian shock troopS.l0
The department of Narifto suffered some Violencia between 1946
and 1949, but little after those years. Here again, physical/psychologi-
cal factors seem to explain why some local elites were more successful
than others in holding bloodshed to low levels. Heavily indigenous in
racial makeup, their accent quite unlike that of other Colombians, the
"Indians" of Pasto were and continue to be the butt of tlpastuso jokes,"
which portray them as naive provincials. These differences, perceived
and real, between the people of Narifto and those of the interior may
well account for the reduced levels of Violencia in far southwestern
Colombia.
Narifto and the Atlantic coast were the only parts of the nation
immune to heavy Violencia. Those regions that were highly politicized
by a hundred years of recurrent partisan conflict reacted to the Liberal
The Violencia and Tolima 247

decision in 1949 to resist the government that they viewed as illegiti-

mate. Consequently} the violence that existed prior to that year in the
departments of Santander and Santander del Norte} and to a lesser
extent in BoyacB.} was easily transported to the Eastern llanos until
the fall of Laureano G6mez in 1953. Other Liberal guenillas organized
simultaneously to oppose the ConseIVative-dominated police in To-
lima} Huila} Cauca} Valle} and Antioquia. When the military coup of
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla unseated the G6mez government} most
of the country was experiencing serious Violencia.
After the fall of Laureano G6mez} economic motives began to sup-
plant political ones as its principal engines. Further complicating the
issue was the existence of many hundreds of violentos who were too
young to have knO\NI1 anything but lives of outla\Nl)'} and who conse-
quently were so damaged by their experience that they could not lay
dO\NI1 their weapons. Also counted among the thousands of violentos
who roamed the nation's backcountry were hundreds of genuine
social revolutionaries} whose plan was to overthrow the military
regime that succeeded G6mez} and} after 1957} the bourgeois govern-
ment of the Frente NacionalJ and replace it with a Marxist one. This
was the complex Violencia of 1953-65.
The Frente NacionalJ by institutionalizing partisan cooperation}
seIVed its chief function in that it depoliticized the Violencia. Once the
ConseIVative and Liberal elites were again ensconced atop their party
pyramids} directing the nation as they had in times past} the conflict
lost its raison d'~tre and its motive force. Still} the bloodshed did not
simply cease with the power-sharing compact. The Violencia had long
since transcended its initial dynamic and had become much more
than the persecution of Liberal civilians by sectarian ConseIVative
functionaries and homicidal police. Thus} it could only be ended
through the coordinated and tenacious action of the national military
establishment} supported and assisted by a profoundly weary civilian
population. Slowly} over a span of time embracing the better part of
eight years-nearly half the period of the Violencia-the fighting was
brought to an end. The army and police hunted dO\NI1 and killed the
most dangerous violentosJ drove the Marxists out of their old redoubts}
and gradually reestablished public order throughout central Colom-
bia.
By this schema} the Violencia is necessarily seen in a regional
248 Chapter 10

context and in terms of distinct chronological phases. The incipient

phase} 1946-49} was restricted largely to Santander, Santander del
Norte} and Boyaca. During the first phase} 1949-53, the conflict spread
to every part of the country save for the Atlantic coast and the
department of Narifio. During the 1953-57 period, the focus shifted to
the coffee mountains of central Colombia} though fighting continued
elsewhere} and came to an end only in the Eastern llanos. This points
to the growing use of the phenomenon as a convenient cover for the
theft of coffee crops and the appropriation of rich croplands after
1953.11 Central Colombia-the departments of Antioquia, Caldas} Valle}
Huila} and Tolima-witnessed the protracted denouement of the
Violencia. Its pall was lifted last from Tolima.
Its mountainous teITain, IUral character, and largely mestizo popu-
lation make this department something of a microcosm of Colombia.
Because of its central location} not far from the national capital} it was
subjected to all the external political precipitants of Violencia that
emanated from Bogota during the late 194Os. By examining the history
of this small} geographically coherent department} the conflict can
clearly be seen as an explicable part of the greater Colombian political
culture. Limiting the field of inquiIy also eliminates the problem of
tracing the complex phenomenon as it unfolded in each region.
Even in Tolima} where the fighting was the most severe, some places
were little touched. Urban areas} such as Ibague, and other well-set-
tled regions that enjoyed good transportation and a flat, open teITain}
tended to be Violencia-free. Army bases and police headquarters were
located in and tended to protect such places. Likewise, antiguenilla
forces could be deployed quickly anywhere along the Magdalena River
Valley} where lack of cover for violentos and the existence of an
adequate road network made them especially vulnerable. Nearly as
important was the ability of local leaders to maintain political coher-
ence at the community and even neighborhood levels. Ways of achiev-
ing this continuity were quite varied} but, as long as the local elites
managed to avoid disruptive partisanship} they were often able to
ensure that the Violencia was no more than sporadic in their areas. It
can thus be said that the history} location} political coloration} and, to
an extent} the economic character of each municipio in Tolima com-
bined to determine the intensity and duration of the conflict. \Nhere
local history was one of bitter ConseIVative-Liberal strife, such as in
The Violencia and Tolima 249

Santa Isabel and Rovira} it often predated 1949} the year of its general
inception in Tolima. Where a degree of accommodation had existed
between local elites} as in Libano} the impact was mitigated} or at least
postponed.
Perception of the municipio by the state was also a factor of
consequence. During the first phase of the Violencia} 1949-53} for
example} the large} prosperous Liberal municipalities of Libano and
Chaparral were seen as potentially subversive to Conservative hege-
mony in the department. Consequently} officials and politicians
watched them closely. The harshness of that vigilance provoked a
popular reaction that produced guerrillas and} ultimately} severe
Violencia in each place. During its second phase} 1953-57} the eastern
municipalities of Cunday and Villarrica were singled out by the
government as areas of communist subversion. That zone} as well as
the adjoining Sumapaz region in Cundinamarca} were subjected to
militaty operations that took a heary toll of life and property.
The most hapless of all tolimense regions were the sparsely popu-
lated} remote ones where the Liberals were the large majority. The
total absence of roads in such places} notably in southern and eastern
Tolima} allowed violentos easy movement and caused maximum diffi-
culty for the military. In such places} the fighting hung on well into the
1960s.
The Violencia was a protracted and bloody civil conflict in Colombia
that took place between the mid-1940s and the mid-1960s and drew
motive force from a breakdown of the national government in the year
1949. Because it sprang from an institutional malfunction rather than
from popular protest of a class nature} it ended only after the country
returned to its political status quo.12 The Violencia was thus a conser-
vatizing force in national history that caused Colombians to shy away
from apocalyptic visions of social change. That in part explains why
they continued voting for their traditional parties} even in their her-
maphroditic Frente Nacional fonn. 13 Except for the populist} heavily
urban challenge of General Rojas Pinilla during the late 1960s and
early 1970s} the citizens continued to scorn political parties that
offered alternatives to the traditional ones.
This is not to say that the society was unchanged during the years of
Violencia or that popular attitudes toward the Conservative and Lib-
eral parties were the same as before. Nothing could be further from the
250 Chapter 10

truth. During the era} the nation evolved from a predominantly rural to
a predominantly urban one. The conflict speeded urbanization} but it
was not the principal cause of migration to the cities. The rate of
population growth was stupendous. Multifaceted modernization
worked to raise the level of the collective conscious} which made
social inequities more apparent. Meanwhile} Colombians perceived
the connection between their traditional political allegiances and the
Violencia. They knew that blame for the bloodshed could not be
placed at the door of any single person or social group and that it
sprang from a political system ordered by two monolithic} intensely
competitive parties. The Violencia dealt a mortal blow to uncritical
party allegiance.
The long-range significance of the phenomenon lies in the eye of the
beholder. If the contention is accepted that it weakened the mystique
of party} making way for a more meaningful attack on national social
ills} then the Violencia can be seen as having at least one beneficial
result. But} if one believes that only through revolution can Colombia
achieve genuine improvement in national life} then the conseIVatizing
Violencia must be judged as negative in every respect.

Since the Violencia} Tolima has steadily recovered from its effects
and experienced accelerated social modernization. Working to make it
quite a different place have been various factors: the opening of
previously isolated municipios to vehicular traffic; rural electrification;
the concomitant spread of radio and television into outlying areas; the
proliferation of government agencies and semiautonomous associa-
tions} such as the Federaci6n Nacional de Cafeterosj and the rural
extension and social programs of the Cafeteros.
These changes and the broadened} more cosmopolitan outlook they
foster make it unlikely that social conflict even remotely like the
Violencia will return to plague rural Colombia. That tragedy stands as
a sad reminder of a moment in history when old habits of thought and
action assumed pathological proportions. But} in spite of its unique-
ness and essentially negative character} the Violencia cannot be dis-
missed lightly-as something so exotic as to be of little use in helping
to understand the people and nation that endured it. To adopt such
an attitude} just as comprehension of what it was and how and why it
The Violencia and Tolima 251

came about is improving} would be an error of major proportions. And

to dismiss a phenomenon of such magnitude by attributing it to the
error of a few national leaders is to strip it of its human reality and
reduce those who suffered it to little more than automatons.
The Violencia and its consequences deepen understanding of the
country's politics. The long years of tUlmoil did not substantively alter
the national political scene. Colombians continued to vote for Conser-
vative and Liberal candidates even after the Frente Nacional ended.
This disinclination to seek new political solutions for national prob-
lems suggests the need for thoughtful reexamination of the persis-
tence of traditional politics. Several new approaches to the study of
that old theme suggest themselves. One leads in the direction of
economic history. Some scholars have hypothesized that the rise of
widespread coffee cultivation and export in the nation between 1880
and 1930 worked to strengthen the political status quo. According to
that theory} large and small coffee growers alike Ufully endorsed the
liberal political ideology} social conseIVatism and pro-export eco-
nomic policies" that then dominated politics.14 If that was the case
prior to 1930} then the theory doubtless helps explain the persistence
of traditional politics in broad expanses of rural Colombia since that
year. A longitudinal study of changes in voting behavior in selected
coffee-growing municipios over the entire period of coffee cultivation
and its analysis in relation to rural social structure would provide
much useful data.
Another theme demanding renewed study is the functional role of
the parties in enabling Colombians to resist authoritarian government.
As nations once thought to be more politically advanced are losing all
vestiges of representative government} Colombia's ability to retain a
nominally liberal democratic system takes on renewed significance.1s
Although the traditional parties are unique in many ways-the case
might even be made for calling them Uproto-parties"-they have
consistently seIVed as vehicles of mass political participation. Never
was this clearer than during the era of the Violencia. Liberals refused
to accept their loss of political representation between 1949 and 1957.
Only when their party was reinstated as a vehicle of political expres-
sion was the government perceived as legitimate by a majority of the
people in the nation. And only then could the Violencia be dealt with
successfully.
252 Chapter 10

Yet another area sorely in need of further investigation is that of

political ideas in post-Violencia Colombia. That Itideas have conse-
quences" is accepted as an article of faith eve1jWhere activists attempt
to change power relationships by propagating particular political
visions. For that reason, it seems curious that little serious attention
has been devoted to the ideology of Colombian conseIVativism and
liberalism since 1957.18 This neglect is perhaps explained by the
widespread belief among social scientists that ideology is formulated
and conveyed by the political elite and passively received by the
masses. Without entering that debate, it should at least be pointed out
that the process through which human beings come to believe what
they do is a complex one about which generalizations are risky. Suffice
it to repeat that a new critical spirit is abroad in Colombian politics.
Yet voters continue casting ballots for the traditional parties, giving
virtually none to competing parties-even since the demise of the
Frente Nacional in 1974. This suggests that the citizens still find
something of value in the ConseIVative and Liberal parties. To what
extent this ongoing support is a function of the conseIVative and
liberal principles that the traditional parties profess to represent must
be determined.l1
Much remains to be explored and learned in the field of Colombian
political history. Obviously, the traditional parties, though they are
much less strong than they once were, still loom large on the political
scene. It is equally apparent that the Violencia played a decisive role in
shaping the nation's political attitudes. As the study of Colombian and
Latin American political history continues to evolve new and more
sophisticated forms, techniques, and approaches, the nature and
impact of the phenomenon will be better understood. That will,
through comparative study, broaden knowledge of political processes
in other Third World areas and beyond.18 And, if this new research is
enlightened through work carried out in that lovely comer of Colom-
bia known as Tolima, then so much the better.
 Appendixes

Appendix A
Partial Listing of ConseIVative-Liberal Voting in Libano}
Santa Isabel} and Villahermosa} 1922-1949*

Libano Villahermosa Santa Isabel

Election Cons. Lib. Cons. Lib. Cons. Lib.

a
1922 (Presidential) 1,312 3,524 588 180 -
1930 (Presidential) 1,047 2,524 881 b
491 1,108 235
absten. c
1937 (Concejo) 972 410 absten. 765 362
1941 (Nat'l Congress) 451 1,588 d
521 260 23 607
1941 (Concejo) e
655 2,075 871 784 905 93g

1942 (Presidential) 1,170 f

3,686 879 237 900 793
g
1943 (Dept. Assembly) 527 1,990 577 337 453 283

1943 (Concejo) 661 1,868 873 1,087 862 93f

i
1945 (Nat'l Congress) 413 2,268 690 399 473 671

1946 (Presidential) 1,786 j

5,223 1,185 907 961 896
k
1947 (Dept. Assembly) 1,674 4,889 1,140 869 870 1,031
1
1947 (Concejo) 1,345 4,806 1,181 absten. 895 1,051

1949 (Concejo; Dept. Assem- m

bly; Nat'l Congress) 1,629 5,738 1,386 976 1,057 1,101

1949 (Presidential) 1,654 absten. 1,651 absten. 1,199 absten. n

*Between June 1930 and June 1949, some 28 elections were held in Colombia, or an
average of 1.47 per year. See~, June 4, 194<).

Sources: a. £1 Nuevo Tiempo, Bogot~, Feb. 13-28, 1922; b~ El Tiempo, Feb~ 12,
1930; c. £1 Derecho, Oct. 9, 1937~ d. Tolima, Co~traloria, Anuario Estadistico,
1940, p. 44; e. Tol!ma, Contraloria, Anuario £stadistico z 1941, p. 227;
f. Tolima, Contraloria, Anuario Estadistico z 1941, p. 228; g. El Derecho,
March 27, 194}; h. El Derecho, October 14, 1943; i. Tolima"Contraloria,
Anuario £stadistico, 1944, pp. 182-83; j-l. Tolima, C~ntraloria, Anuario
Estadistico, 1949, pp. 332-34; m-n. Tolima, Contraloria, Anuario Estadistico,
!2!!2, pp. 382-85.

253
 Appendix B
Homicides per 100,000 Population in Colombian Departments and Intendencies, 1946-1960
DEPARTMENTS 19q6 19q7 19q9 19~9 1950 1951 1952 1953 195q 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

Antioquia 8.7 6.2 8.8 lq.5 25.8 25.0 q5.6 33.9 21.3 23.5 29.q 2q.2 38.q 38.3 ql.6
Atl~tico 3.'1 3.0 9.2 9.2 12.1 9.7 6.2 7.6 7.6 6.6 7.5 q.7 6.0 6.6 6.3
Bolivar 3.0 1.5 2.q 5.2 q.3 6.0 5.5 6.q 6.1 6.1 q.6 7.6 5.2 5.0 11.8
Boyac~ 12.8 17.8 32.1 50.6 33.5 35.9 38.2 25.3 20.1 17.0 19.2 19.7 26.6 22.3 27.9
Caldas 6.6 7.9 lq.l 29.0 30.1 3q.7 37.0 ql.8 q2.2 51.8 59.5 91.0 117.0 81.1 q3.5
Cauca 9.3 7.0 11.9 12.6 11.7 15.5 lq.8 15.9 19.9 26.1 27.6 32.1 qq.8 27.1 25.9
C~rdoba 1.q 2.9 9.3 5.1 9.5 8.5 8.1 6.q q.7
N
en CWldinamarca
~ 11.9 9.3 11.5 17.5 23.6 31.2 35.0 22.q 17.5 22.3 18.0 18.9 2q.7 22.9 23.7
Choc~ 1.8 3.6 9.8 13.3 18.6 5.9 8.1 3.6 lq.3 12.1 lq.7 10.q 11.0
Huila 6.0 3.8 8.5 12.2 10.0 23.2 18.q 59.0 50.9 q7.6 99.9 q7.3 68.3 21.8 31.9
Magdalena 5.3 6.3 12.1 17.9 17.2 lq.9 9.5 17.9 15.1 12.2 11.5 lq.l lq.2 12.5 11.8
Nariiio 9.6 11.q 8.6 9.2 5.9 8.9 6.9 6.q 9.1 11.0 5.6 8.5 9.0 10.3 8.0
Norte Santander 48.0 77.1 46.0 79.5 53.5 43.5 52.0 51.0 q6.3 47.7 51.5 q9.6 62.7 66.4 56.8
Santander 16.1 30.0 40.3 86.5 37.4 43.5 57.0 q6.9 36.1 qO.2 ql.9 36.2 59.0 50.6 56.0
Tolima 8.5 7.2 11.4 13.9 31.2 47.6 86.7 63.q 47.9 98.1 164.1 115.6 133.7 100.7 62.8
Valle 19.4 16.7 21.6 69.3 76.2 68.1 83.5 4q.9 33.1 57.0 5q.6 87.5 97.3 62.q 51.2
Intendencies 14.5 5.7 15.2 27.1 35.3 45.7 60.9 qO.3 20.4 24.4 21.2 28.8 27.4 29.6 27.9

Source: Colombia, Ministerio de Justicia, Cinco aiios, anexo, p. ql.

 Appendix C
Deaths Caused by the Violencia in Libano J TolimaJ
January 1957-November 1963

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

1957, January

Antonio Serrato 8 La Rampla unknown truck driver

no name 8 x La Rampla unknown driver's helper

Gustavo Mogoll~n 14 x unknown unknown farmer

Esperillon Vel~squez 19 x Rio Recio unknown farmer

Javier Hern~dez 21 unknown unknown farmer

Pedro J. Bernal 22 unknown unknown farmer

Rafael Puerto 22 x unknown unknown farmer

Pedro Bonilla 22 ~ unknown farmer

Luis A. Castro P. 25 x unknown unknown farmer

Belisario Patarrollo 27 x unknown unknown farmer

Diego Cai'i~n 27 San Fernando unknown farmer

Belisario Carrillo 28 x Alto del Toro unknown farmer

Saulo Celis Cruz 28 x San Fernando unknown farmer

H~ctor Ignacio Vargas 28 x San Fernando unknown farmer

1957, February

Elicenia Quintero v. 3 unknown San Fernando unknown farmer

(female)

Gabriel M'uiioz 4: unknown unknown farmer

Samuel Nieto 4: x unknown unknown farmer

Jos~ Ruiz 5 x unknown unknown farmer

Teodoro Avila 5 x unknown unknown farmer

Jos~ Maria Pineda 10 x El Papayo unknown farmer

Marco A. Basto 10 Convenio unknown farmer

Gilberto A1arc~n 11 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Romual do GUzm.~ 11 San Fernando unknown farmer

Teodoro Avila (sic) 11 x Convenio unknown farmer

Pantale~n Cruz 15 x El Taburete unknown farmer

Jos~ del Carmen Aguirre 15 El Taburete unknown farmer

Juan B. Basto 17 x unknown unknown farmer

255
256 Appendix C
Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of
Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Betsab; Palac io 21 Wlknown Wlknown Wlknown farmer

(female)

Rufino Soto 22 x unknown Wlknown farmer

Luis Arcadio Castro P~ez 25 x WLknown unknown farmer

1957z March

Jos; Arias x Santa Teresa Wlknown farmer

Israel Mill~ 6 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Lui s Medardo Guti ;rrez 7 Wlknown WLknown farmer

Ismael T;11ez 7 Wlknown WLknown farmer

To~s Quiroga 7 Santa Teresa WLknown farmer

Luis Eduardo Al aguna 17 La Esmeralda police bandit

Luis Enrique Martinez 19 WLknown unknown farmer

Guillermo Monz~n 24 x unknown WLknown farmer

1957z April

Luis Enrique Usma L~pez 8 x unknown WIknown farmer

Guillermo Morales Diaz 9 x unknown WIknown farmer

Leonardo Ro j as 15 x Santa Teresa WIknown farmer

J 0 s; Domingo Granados 28 unknown WIknown farmer

1957z May

Rub;n Camelo Reina 10 Campo Al egre WIknown farmer

Eduardo Silva Delgado 10 x unknown Wlknown farmer

Samuel Avila 17 x Wlknown unknown farmer

Alcides LondoI;o 18 x WLknown WLknown farmer

Isidoro S~ez Valencia 19 Wlknown unknown farmer

1957z JWF

Alfonso D~vila 4 Santa Teresa Wlknown farmer

1957z July

Amilcar Granada 8 unknown unknown farmer

Lui s Miguel Luengas 30 x ~ unknown farmer

1957z September

Jos; Antonio Flores 15 x unknown WIknown farmer

 Appendix C 257
Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of
Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Saul Romero 20 ~ wiknown farmer

Rodrigo Amari s Rodriguez 22 Wlknown unknown farmer

Marco Tul io Herrera 27 Wlknown Wlknown farmer

1957, October

Medardo Garz~n Wlknown unknown farmer

Fany Herrera Gallego 12 Scut FernCUldo unknown farmer

(female)

Abraham Palac io Lozada 13 x La Floresta unknown farmer

Federico Arguello 20 Wlknown unknown farmer

Luis Eduardo Espejo 26 SCUl Fernando unknown farmer

1957, November

Gilberto Le~n 4: x Wlknown unknown farmer

Arcenio ,Espitia 18 x Wlknown unknown farmer

Gutierrez

1957, December

Marco Luis ~pez 10 x SCUlta Teresa unknown farmer

Arturo Santos 17 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Tobias Palma 17 x Santa Teresa unlmown farmer

Juan de la Rosa Rivera 19 La Laguna unknown farmer

Lisimaco Martinez 23 x wiknown unknown farmer

1958, January

Pablo Arias 20 x unknown unlmown farmer

Eli;cer Franco 23 unknown unlmown farmer

1958, February

Ignacio Echeverry 2 x Delicias unknown farmer

Narciso V~squez 15 x unknown unknown farmer

Campo Elias Leyton z. 16 Murillo unknown farmer

Angel Maria Rojas 24: x Murillo Wlknown farmer

1958, March

Luis E. Gonz~lez 14: El Convenio unknown farmer

Calixto Medina Aponte 14: x SCUlta Teresa unknown farmer

258 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Rosebel t Valencia 20 x unknown unknown farmer

Eladio Cardona Bonilla 22 x San ta Teresa Wlknown farmer

Isaias Cruz 26 x unknown unknown farmer

1958, April

Aquimin Gonz~l ez .)
El Convenio unknown farmer

Cas imiro Rodriguez 13 x El Co-nvenio Wlknown farmer

Segundo Arce Pineda 13 x El Convenio unknown farmer

Carlos Barrero 19 x El Convenio wlknown farmer

Edgar Barrero 19 x El Convenio unknown farmer

Adolfo Pulido 19 x El Convenio Wlknown farmer

Adonai Gonz~lez 19 El Convenio Wlknown farmer

Jos~ de Jes{;.s C~rdenas 19 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Dario Duarte 25 x San Fernando unknown farmer

1958, May

Marco Emilio Cruz 3 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Gustavo Hincapi; 3 Sa,n Fernando unknown farmer

Luis Enrique Hern~dez 8 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Campo Elias Bobadilla 11 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Alejandro Quiroga 11 San Fernando unknown farmer

Domingo M. Quiroga 11 x Murillo unknown farmer

Fermin Valiente 15 x policeman

~ unknown

Hernando Rico 15 x Bulgaria unknown farmer

Luis Carlos Rico 15 Bulgaria unknown farmer

Isaac Palacio 17 x Convenio Wlknown farmer

Jorge Galindo 19 x Convenio unknown farmer

Pedro Pablo Guzm~ 20 Las Palmeras unknown farmer

Luis Grisales 25 x unknown unknown farmer

Guillermo Gil Gil 29 x Versalles unknown farmer

1958, June

Si~n Duarte Laguna 8 x San Fernando unknown farmer

 Appendix C 259

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Jos~ Medin Diaz 8 Sml Fernando unknown farmer

~alom~n Giraldo 27 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Isidoro Pineda 29 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Hortencio Bautista 29 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Jos~ Vicente Vii'ia 29 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Adolfo Rodriguez 30 SiUlta Teresa unknown farmer

1958, July

Alcides Londoi'io Duarte 13 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Eladio ~mez 13 x ~ unknown businessman

Roberto Rodriguez 14 ~ unknown farmer

Alberto Martinez 14 x Murillo unknown farmer

Guillermo C~~n C. 14 x Murillo unknown farmer

Ana Lucia Contreras 14 x Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

Virgilio Avila Moreno 14 x Murillo unknown farmer

Hernando Ramirez L~pez 14 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Carlos V~squez Quintero 24 ~ unknown farmer

Oscar de J. Villa B. 25 x soldier

~ unknown

Adolfo Rodriguez 28 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

28 x farmer
Alberto Mendieta ~ unknown

Al e j andro Bernal O. 28 x Murillo unknown farmer

Antonio Parra Pul ido 28 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Ignacio S~chez Hern~dez 28 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

1958, August

Mois~s Zapata 13 x El Agrado unknown businessman

Ever Alfonso S~chez S. 13 x El Agrado unknown farmer

Rub~n Rivas 13 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Emilio Be~dez 27 x ~ unknown farmer

J!oliciano Patii'io 11 Murillo unknown farmer

260 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

1958. September

Juana de la Rosa P;rez ~7 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

(female)

Onofre S~chez 17 x Wlknown unknown farmer

Carlos Enrique Hern~dez 26 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Arquimedes Escovar D. 29 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Jos; Lisandro Moreno 31 x cabecera unknown farmer

1958. October

Pedro Nel Castro 2 x unknown unknown farmer

Floresmiro Castro 2 Wlknown unknown farmer

Demetrio Casas 14 x Bulgaria unknown farmer

Justo Pastor Vel~squez 18 San Fernando unknown farmer

Jos; Hoyos 26 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Buenaventura Jim;nez 29 x La Laguna unknown employee

1958. November

Gustavo Lei ton 9 x Murillo unknown farmer

Amala de la Parra S. 13 San Fernando unknown domestic

Pedro Rui z Arango 13 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Dniliano Millan P;rez 16 x San Fernando unknown farmer

J es~s Arturo Toro 23 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

H;ctor Ospina 25 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Jorge Diaz 26 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Neftali Arias Vera 27 x ~ unknown farmer

Eduardo Boh~rquez F. 30 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

1958. December

Hernando Diaz z. 2 x ~ unknown farmer

Secundino Callejas 13 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Pedro Hel i Hern~dez P. 15 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Abel Sierra Caii~n 15 Murillo unknown farmer

26 x unknown farmer
Pablo Antonio Martinez ~
 Appendix C 261

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

1959, January

Juan Francisco Navarrete 11 Alto Rosario lUlknown farmer

Jos~ Miguel C~rdenas l~ x unknown lUlknown farmer

Salvador MtIDoz G. 15 La Tolda unknown farmer

Sigifredo Loai~a L. 17 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Jul io Hurtado ~~ x Bulgaria unknown farmer

Omar Antonio GU~ 31 x ~ unknown soldier

1959, February
, -
Jose Oscar Patino Tovar 4 x ~ unknown farmer

Jos; Ram~n Var~n 14 x Bulgaria unknown farmer

Cel so Antonio Cort~s 15 x Bulgaria unknown farmer

Filem~n Martinez Su~ez 15 x Santa Teresa unlmown farmer

Gildardo Harulanda 15 x Bulgaria unknown farmer

Agapi to Velandia 23 x Sebastopol unknown farmer

1959, March

Arnulfo Castiblanco 9 x Bulgaria unlmown farmer

Oscar Pulido 9 San Fernando wumown farmer

Marco Tulio Rodriguez 13 x ~ unknown farmer

Jos; Castaneda 21 x unknown unknown farmer

Marco Or juel a ~l x San Fernando wlknown farmer

Roberto Rinc~n ~2 x El Orian wlknown farmer

1959, April

Alejandro Moreno 4 x El Delirio unknown farmer

Neftali Escovar 14 x El Bosque unknown farmer

H;ctor Barrag~ 14 x Lagunilla lUlknown farmer

Alcides Ceballos 17 x E1 Silencio unknown farmer

Genaro Restrepo M. 17 x Lagunilla unknown farmer

Graciliano Rodriguez 22 x Murillo unknown farmer

1959, May

Ger~nimo Leyton 4 x E1 Tesoro wlknown farmer

262 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Armando Diaz Rodriguez 10 x ~ Wlknown soldi er

Luis Carlos Gonz~lez A. 10 Campo Al egre unknO~l farmer

Reinaldo P;ez 11 x Santa Teresa unknown soldier

Jos; Vel~squez 12 x Cnmpo Alegre unknown farmer

Salom~n Quiroga V. 15 x La Am~rica unknown farmer

Tiberio Mulloz 24 x La Polka unknown farmer

Ram~n Maria Hern~dez 24 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Lui s Eduardo Gallego 29 x Primavera unknown bandit

1959. June

To~s Alfonso Benitez ~ Wlknown farmer

Crist~bal Nivia 13 x El Rosquete unknown farmer

Francisco Casallas 13 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Benjamin Escovar 16 San Fernando unknown farmer

Gilberto Marin 20 Bulgaria unknown farmer

Efraim Chaparro Romero 21 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Jorge Chaparro Izquierdo 21 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Miguel Urrego 29 x Murillo unknown farmer

Lisandro Pinilla 29 x Murillo unknown farmer

1959. Julv

Lorenzo Caicedo 10 Murillo unknown farmer

Eutimio Caicedo 10 x Murillo unknown farmer

Hernando Forero 12 Murillo unknown farmer

Pedro Vicente Acosta 12 Murillo unknown farmer

N. Forero 12 Murillo unknown farmer

Belisario Carrillo 15 El Del irio unknown farmer

Na~ario Gu~n Amaya 20 El Pensilvania unknown farmer

Jural do Pinilla Cardona 28 Murillo unknown farmer

F('rnando Antonio Chac~n 28 Murillo unknown farmer

1959. August

Gonzalo Lancheros Rodriguez 9 x Murillo unknown fanner

 Appendix C 263

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. JJib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Eny Agudelo 15 x San Fernando Wlknown farmer

Manuel Filem~n Cast~eda 15 x La Ceiba Wlknown farmer

Amanda Castillo 17 Bulgaria Wlknown fanner

(female)

Amadeo Castillo A. 17 x La Flor unkJIOwn farmer

Elber santamaria A. 17 x Santa Teresa Wlknown farmer

Saul de J. Sierra v. 18 x El Porvenir unknown farmer

Luis Maria Rocha 22 x El Bosque unknown farmer

Jos~ Ricaute Rocha 22 El Bosque Wlknown farmer

Luis Alfonso Sierra 23 x Santa Teresa Wlknown farmer

Buenaventura Agudelo G. 23 x Santa Teresa Wlknown fanner

Rafael Aristides Rodriguez 28 x El Orian Wlknown farmer

Jorge M~quez 31 x Murillo Wlknown farmer

1959, September

Carmen H. Avend~o Ro 3 x San FermUldo Wlknown farmer

(female)

Hernando Pineda 3 San Fernando Wlknown farmer

Dagoberto Pineda 3 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Benedicto Pineda 3 San Fernculdo unknown farmer

Benedo Arias 4 San Fernando Wlknown farmer

Eduardo Quintero M. 25 La Picota WIknown farmer

Domingo Parra u. 25 x Tierradentro WIknown farmer

Jos~ del Carmen Parra E. 25 Ticrradentro unknown farmer

Pablo Palma 29 Ticrradentro unknown farmer

1959, October

Edilberto Bland~n C.. 7 Rio Recio unknown farmer

Manuel Antonio S~chez 7 San Fernando Wlknown farmer

Marco Rinc~n Gonz;l ez 11 Murillo unknown farmer

Jos~ de J. Buri tic; 17 Murillo Wlknown farmer

Isaura Buri tic; 17 x Murillo Wlknown farmer

(female)
264 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Si~n Buri tic~ 17 Murillo Wlknown farmer

Marina Buri tic~ 17 x Murillo Wlknown farmer

(female)

~nE. Buritic~ 17 x Murillo Wlknown farmer

Benilda Buri tic~ 17 Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

Carmen H. Buri tic~ 17 Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

Libardo Buri tic~ 17 Murillo unknown farmer

Antonio Buri tic~ 17 Murillo unknown farmer

Ram~n E. Buri tic~ 17 Murillo unknown infant

Josefina Buri tic~ 17 Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

Maria de Buri tic~ 17 Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

01 iva Rodriguez 18 Murillo J. v. Yate farmer

(female)

Berta L. Rocha 18 Murillo J. v. Yate farmer

(female)

Ignacio Novoa 18 Murillo J. V. Yate farmer

Noelba de Novoa 18 Murillo J. v. Yate farmer

(female)

Virgel ina Cort~s Novoa 18 Murillo J. v. Yate farmer

(female)

Gustavo Cort~s Novoa 18 Murillo J. v. Yate farmer

F~l ix Antonio Vargas 18 Murillo J. V. Yate farmer

Pedro Arc enio Cort~s 18 Murillo J. v. Yate farmer

Julio A. Puerto Parra 18 Murillo J. V. Yate farmer

Jaime Puerto Parra 18 Murillo ,I. V. Yate farmer

Jos; del Carmen Herrera 18 Murillo J. V. Yate farmer

Martin Castillo Alonso 18 Murillo J. v. Yate farmer

Fabio Villegas 18 Platanillal unknown farmer

1959, November

Ofelia L. de Hern~dez 6 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

(female)
 Appendix C 265

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Miguel Antonio Villa 7 Delicias Wllmown farmer

Gustavo Rodriguez 10 Convcnio unknown farmer

1959, December

Angel Maria Castellanos 10 Primavera unknown farmer

Rafael Antonio Triana 10 cabecera Wlknown farmer

Maria v. de Mendieta 13 Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

N. N. (girl, Mendieta) 13 Murillo Wlknown

(female)

Jos~ Manuel Pinedo 13 Murillo Wlknown farmer

Jos~ Vincente Pena 13 Murillo unknown farmer

Carmen Pena 13 Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

Luis Franco Rodriguez 13 Murillo unknown farmer

Julio S~nchez 13 Murillo Wllmown farmer

Gerardo Avila 13 Murillo unknown farmer

Luis G. Hoyos Murillo 18 x ~ unknown businessman

Hernando Echeverry R. 24 La Linda unknown farmer

Marco Fidel Sierra P. :!9 Murillo unknown farmer

Zoila Arias Arenas :..>q x La Linda wtknown farmer

(female)

Berta Arenas 29 La Linda unknown farmer

(female)

Pablo E. Rodriguez 29 x Santa Teresa Wlknown farmer

Jos~ Maria Casas 29 x El Espejo unknown farmer

Marco A. Celis G. 29 x El Espejo Wlknown farmer

Maria Evel ia Cunchinch~ 29 x Las Penas unknown farmer

(female)
farmer
Roberto ~pez 29 Las Penas unknown

Pedro Maria Arenas 29 Las Penas unknown farmer

:..>q x Las Penas unknown farmer

Carlos Arturo Arenas

1960, January

Carlos E. Garcia 25 x Convenio unknO'Wll farmer

266 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Luis Alfredo Castano 30 x Bulgaria unknown farmer

Higinio Gaviria 30 La Divisa unknown farmer

1960, February

Noel Parra Rodriguez 6 La Flor unknown farmer

Alirio Parra Rodriguez 6 La Flor unknown farmer

Augusto Valencia 19 x La Flor unknown farmer

1960, March

Maria Hern~dez 13 x San Fernando unknown farmer

(female)

Juan la R. Galarza 15 San Fernando unknown farmer

Jos~ Arnulfo Gil 22 x San Fernando Wlknown farmer

Jos~ de J. Dominguez 23 x Murillo unknown farmer

Pedro Casallas P~rez 26 La EsperiUlza unknown farmer

Alfredo Serna 30 La Pradera w1k:nown farmer

Catal ina Boh~rquez 31 x Las Penas unknown farmer

(female)

Maria Luisa Boh~rquez 31 x Las Penas unknown farmer

(female)

1960, April

lsmenia Avendano ~l San Fernando Wlknown farmer

(female)

1960, May

Jos~ Ignacio Garcia Toro 5 x El Retiro unknown farmer

Miguel Antonio Cer~n D. 7 x ~ unknown farmer

Heliodoro S~chez 8 San Fernando unknown farmer

Jos~ pio Martinez 16 x San Fernando Wlknown farmer

Maria J. Martinez 1& San Fernando unknown farmer

( female)

Cassio N. (deaf-mute) 17 San Fernando wUrnown farmer

Jos~ Vlcellte Yate ~mez 18 Murillo army ex-police

c<irporul
Alejandro Espi tia 18 Murillo army farmer

Alvaro Alvarado lq Sinai wUrnown farmer

 Appendix C 267

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Teresa de Mendieta 20 Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

Fabriciano Mendieta 20 x Murillo unknown farmer

Isaac Cort;s Guerrero 24 Murillo unknown farmer

Agustin Delgadillo 26 La Pradera unknown farmer

Luis Carlos Vargas 29 Murillo unknown farmer

1960, June

Jos; Garz~n Murillo 3 Murillo unknown farmer

Jos; del C. Sandoval '3 Murillo unknown farmer

1960 z July

Efraim Skiner 5 Rio Recio lUlknown farmer

Salvador Dominguez 24 La Esperanza unlOlown farmer

Jos; To~s Mayorga 24 Hurillo unknown farmer

Jorge To~s Sayago 25 Murillo unknown soldier

Norberto Pineda 30 Murillo unknown farmer

Horacio Pineda 30 Murillo unknown farmer

1960, August

Salvador Cancelado F. Planes unknown farmer

unknown farmer
Aurelio de J. Peralta ~

Rafael Bonilla ~mez 13 ~ unknown farmer

Alfredo Rodriguez 1'3 Murillo unknown farmer

Rafael Cort;s 21 La Polka unknown farmer

Maria Abell 0 de Quiroga 23 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

(female)

1960, September

Carlos H;ctor Hoyos 6 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

1960, October

Pioquinto Zuluaga 17 Mina Pobre unknown farmer

Ernesto Zuluaga 17 Mina Pobre unknown farmer

Humberto Zuluaga 17 Mina Pobre unknown farmer

Jos; Zuluaga 17 Mina Pobre unknown farmer

268 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Plac(' Killed Crimp Victim

Rosendo Arango 17 x Hina Pobre W1known farmer

Edgar Antonio Botero 17 x Hina Pobre W1known farmer

Evaristo Llanos 17 x Mina Pobre unknown farmer

Jaime Betancourt 17 Mina Pobre unknown farmer

Everarso Sierra 18 x Murillo unknown farmer

1960, November

Jaime Piiieros Vargas 16 x E1 Sosiego unknown hacendado

1960, December

Jos~ Tobias AJn~rtegui 6 San Fernando unknown farmer

Jos~ Joaquin Gonz~lez 6 Armero police bandit

Luis Carlos Rodriguez 13 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Arquimedes Duarte 21 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Marco Tul io C~rdenas 21 San Fernando Wlknown farmer

Hugo Nel Pinz~n R. 23 x Wlknown Wlknown farmer

196L January

Juan Gonz~l ez 5 x Santa Teresa W1known farmer

Gonza10 Gonz~lcz 5 x Santa Teresa W1known farmer

Juan de J. Gonz~lez 5 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Beni1da Gonz~lez 5 x Santa Teresa W1known farmer

(female)

Jul ia Gonz~lez 5 x Santa Teresa W1known farmer

(female)

Omaira Gonz~lez 5 x Santa Teresa W1known farmer

(female)

Araminta de Gonz;l ez x Santa Teresa W1known farmer

(female)

J os ~ Marul anda 5 x Santa Teresa W1known farmer

Hanuel Alfredo S~chez 5 Santa Teresa W1known farmer

N. Gonz~lez ( child) 5 Santa Teresa W1known

1961, February

Fabio Caldas 7 x Bulgaria W1known farmer

Rosa del C. Combariza 7 x Tierradentro W1known farmer

(female)
 Appendix C 269

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Jorge Mill~ 10 La Pradera unknown farmer

Dora Cifuentes 19 x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

(female)

Eduardo Mi 11 ~ 19 La Pradera unknown farmer

Joselin Combariza ~1 Tierradentro unk:nown farmer

Fidelino Cuestas 21 Tierradentro unknown farmer

Rosa Combariza de Bustos 21 Tierradentro unknown farmer

(female)

1961, March
x
Jos~ Antonio Duarte l~ San Fernando wlknown farmer

Jes~s Maria Zuluaga 15 San Fernando unknown farmer

Clodosindo Reyes CastMo 15 Murillo unknown farmer

Nelly Cruz S~nchez 29 cabecera unknown farmer

(female)

1961, April

Isabel Pinilla Murillo unknown farmer

(female)

Antonio Cante MlU'illo wlknown farmer

Jaime Rodriguez x Murillo unknown farmer

N. N. 22 x Santa Teresa unk:nown farmer

victor Manuel Truj ill0 24 Pei;ones unk:nown farmer

Jorge S~chez 24 Pei;ones unknown farmer

1961, May

Maria del Carmen Garcia 6 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

(female)

Leonel Duarte M. 10 Santa Teresa army bandi t

1961, June

Abel Rodriguez 18 Santa Teresa unk:nown farmer

F~liz Antonio Lozada 24 San Fernando unknown farmer

1961, July

Lui s Antonio Sarria C. 23 Santa Teresa unknown soldier

1961, August

Efraim Beni tez 20 San Fernando unk:nown farmer

270 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Margari ta Beni tez 20 San Fernando unknown farmer

(female)

Policiano Cifuente~ 29 ~ Wlknown businessman

1961, September

Jos~ Nelson Rubi~n 20 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

.!261 , October

Avelino Riascos :.n La Trinidad unknown soldier

Hernando Rivillas 30 Primavera unknown farmer

1961, November

Luis Gabriel Robayo 30 unknown unknown farmer

1961, December

Manuel Arcila Hoyos Rio Recio unknown farmer

Vicente Elnilio Cort~s 7 Bulgaria unknown farmer

Valentin Avila M~ndez ~6 x cabecera Wlknown businessman

1962, January

Olivo Ord~~ez 11 La Honda Wlknown farmer

1962, February

Gustavo Torres Gil 2 Aguador Desqui te farmer

Narciso Rodriguez A. 10 Sabaneta Wlknown farmer

Humberto Moreno 10 Sabaneta unknown farmer

Eulogio Id~raga 10 Sabaneta unknown farmer

Pedro S~chez 19 San Fernando Wlknown farmer

Miguel Castellanos 22 x unknown unknown farmer

196~, March

Benedicto L~pez V. 21 La Trinidad Wlknown farmer

 Appendix C 271

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

1962 z April

Hernando Mendieta R. 3 El Taburete Desqui te truck driver

Miguel Antonio Var~n T. 3 unknown El Taburete Desqui t.e soldier

Gildardo Rodriguez R. El Taburete Desqui tc truck driver

Filem~n A1arc~n P. unknown El Taburete Desqui te soldier

Alfonso Angari ta L. unknown EJ Taburete Desqui te soldier

Mario Wilches C. unknown El Taburete Desqui te soldier

Bernardino Torres G. unknown El Taburete Desqui tc soldier

Rosendo Vidal C. unknown EJ Taburete Desqui te soldier

Miguel Antonio Daza. 3 unknown El Taburete Desqui te soldier

Juan C. S~nchez M. unknown El Taburete Desqui te soldier

Benigno Torres o. 3 unknown El Taburete Desqui tf' soldier

Gustavo Arbel~cz L. unknown El Taburete Desqui te soldier

Manuel Vicente Castellanos unknown El Taburete Desqui te soldier

Te~filo Navarro S. unknown El Taburete Desqui te soldier

victor Guzm~n 19 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

1962 z May

Heriberto Giraldo 2 unknown unknown farmer

Alfonso Delgado V. 9 ScU1 Pern<.U1do unknown farmer

Carlos A. G~mez 9 San Fernando unknown farmer

Campo E. S~chez 14 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Elisabeth Martinez 16 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

(female)

Luis E. Ramirez R. 30 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

1962 z June

Gerardo Vallejo 8 Piomorro unknown farmer

Marco Sierra 8 Piomorro unknown farmer

Pablo Giraldo 8 Piomorro unknown farmer

Lalo Londo~o 8 Piomorro unknown farmer

272 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Georgina de Frec iado ~'O x Santa Teresa unknown farmer

(female)

Severo Sarmiento J. 20 Ti erradentro unknown farmer

Jos~ Manuel Lesmes 26 Tierradentro unlrnown farmer

1962, July

Alfonso Alzate 6 P('~ones unknown farmer

Everardo L~pez 6 Campoalegrc unlrnown farmer

Gonzalo Lancheros 6 x Murillo unlrnown farmer

~abriel M~oz 7 ~ unlrnown farmer

1962, August

Pedro Antonio M~ndcz S. 19 El Tesoro Tarz~n farmer

Antonio M~ndc:t S. 19 El Tesoro Tarz~ farmer

Pedro Amaya 1<) El Tesoro Tarz~ farmer

Salom~n Espejo 19 El Tesoro Tarzan farmer

Jes~s Aldancl 19 El Tesoro Tarz~ farmer

Ro sal bina S~chez 19 x El Tesoro Tarz~ farmer

(female)

Edilma S~chez 19 El Tesoro Tarz~n farmer

(female)

Miguel Antonio Garcia 31 x Alto del Toro unknown farmer

Flavino N~ez 31 Tierradentro unknown farmer

Heracli to Palma 31 Ti erradentro unknown farmer

Dario Ca£tellanos 31 Tierradentro unknown farmer

1962. September

Jes~s Maria Valencia G. Murillo Desqui te farmer

Luis Carlos Valencia 5 Muri.llo Desqui te farmer

Guillermo Valencia Murillo Desqui te farmer

Mariela Valencia 5 x Murillo Desqui te farmer

(female)
Appendix C 273

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Sigifredo Valencia 5 Murillo Desqui te farmer

Ana J. Valencia 5 x Murillo Desqui te farmer

(female)

Jorge Valencia 5 Murillo Desqui te farmer

Evel io Val encia 5 x Murillo Desqui te farmer

Miguel Valencia 5 Murillo Desqui te farmer

Alirio Valencia 5 Murillo Desqui te farmer

Luis Anibal Valencia 5 Murillo Desqui te farmer

Maria Velandia 5 Murillo Desqui te farmer

(female)

Emil se Gal vis Murillo Desqui te farmer

(female)

Gustavo Vel~squez 7 Murill 0 Sangrenegra fa.rmer

victor Manuel Casas V. 7 Murillo Sangrenegra. farmer

Jer~nimo Varela 7 Murillo Sangrenegra farmer

Carlos S~chez 7 unknown Wlknown farmer

Gustavo P~rez 7 Ti erradentro army bandi t

David Garcia 7 Murillo unknown farmer

Guillermo Rodriguez 7 Murillo unknown farmer

Vicente Rodriguez M. 18 Ti erradentro unknown farmer

1962. October

Laberto Moreno 6 El Retiro unknown farmer

Ismael Piraz~ 15 El Sosiego unknown farmer

Cipriano Alarc~n 25 La Linda unknown farmer

Francisco Gallego V. 29 Bulgaria unknown farmer

Rodolfo Villamizar 29 La Maria Desqui te police

Pablo E. MlIDoz G. 29 La Maria Desqui te police

Jos~ Silverio Villanueva 29 La Maria Desqui te police

Carlos Bel tr~n 29 La Maria Desqui te police

Wiliam Herr~ 29 La Maria Desqui te police

274 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Juan de los Santos Hurtado 29 x La Maria Desqui te police

Carlos Taboada C. 29 x La Maria Desqui te police

Miguel Rond~n D. 29 La Maria Desqui te pol ice

19S2. November

Euripides S~chez 23 Versalles unknown bandi t

1962. December

David Maldonado 15 El Cortijo Wlknown soldier

H~ctor Guasca 15 El Cortijo unknown soldier

1963. January

Enrique Salcedo x S<.Ulta Teresa unknown soldier

Abrah<.Ul Hern~dez 9 Murillo unknown soldier

Balbina Castro 9 x Murillo unknown soldier

1963. February

Luis Maria Hoyos 14 Wlknown unknown soldier

Efraim Bel tr~n 15 Wlknown Wlknown soldier

Aurelio Serna C. 18 x Wlknown Wlknown soldier

Gabriel Rico G. 26 Corali to army bandi t

Ignacio S~nchez 27 La Linda army bandi t

Jos~ de los Rios Sandoval 27 La Linda army bandi t

Jos~ Antonio Gonz~lez 27 La Linda army bandi t

1963. March

Siervo Calder~n ~l. La Idalia Wlknown farmer

Nohora Marin Valencia 9 La Flor unknown domestic

(female)

Jos~ del Carmen Orteg~n 10 Penones Wlknown farmer

 Appendix C 275

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

C~dido Casas P. 10 Pe~ones unknown fanner

Salvador Pe~a 10 Pe~ones unknown fanner

Gui 11 enno Duque R. 10 Primavera unknown farmer

Leonardo Uri be 10 x Primavera Desqui te fanner

Manuel Flores 10 Mina Pobre Desqui te fanner

1963, April

Oscar Gamboa Gil 18 La Maria army bandi t

Ra~l Torres 20 La Am~rica unknown farmer

1963, May

Pluma Roja (pseud. ) 25 Tarapac~ unknown bandi t

1963, June

Manuel L. Garcia 12 Convenio Tarz~ fanner

Policarpo Rico G. 12 Convenio Tarz~ farmer

El i ~c er Rodriguez 12 x Convenio Tarz~ fanner

Hernando Rengifo 12 Convenio Tarz~ fanner

Silvio Montilla 12 unknown Convenio Tarz~ soldier

Segundo M. Romero 12 unknown Convenio Tarz~ soldier

Policarpo Herrera 17 Santa Teresa unknown farmer

Jos~ E. Mendieta 30 unknown unknown fanner

1963, July

Luis E. Duque 30 El Tri~gulo Desqui te farmer

Ana de Duque 30 El Tri~gulo Desqui te farmer

(female)

Luis E. Duque 30 El Tri~gulo Desqui te farmer

Urbano Duque 30 El Tri~ngulo Desqui te fanner

276 Appendix C

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

Orlando Duque 30 El Tri~gulo Desquite farmer

Emigdio Duque 30 El Tri~lo Desqui te farmer

Edulcarina Duque 30 El Tri~gulo Desqui te farmer

(female)

1963z August

Antonio Mendoza 4 La Florida Desqui te farmer

Marco T. Mendoza 4 La Florida Dcsqui te farmer

JI~ctor Mendoza La Florida Desqui te farmer

N.N. ( child, Mendoza) 4 x La Florida Desqui te

N.N. ( child, Mendoza) 4 La Florida Desqui te

Alfonso Toro 7 cabecera Wlknown farmer

Enerio Diaz 7 La Calera unknown farmer

Lel)nel Gil Farf~ 11 San Fernando police bandit

1963z September

Miguel Ibagu~ l~ Murillo army bandi t

Antonio Ibagu~ l~ Murillo army bandi t

Miguel A. Sanabria 16 x La Idalia unknown farmer

1963z October

Neftali Palacio 7 x San Fernando unknown farmer

Ernestina de Palacio 7 San Fernando unknown farmer

(female)

Ana Julia Palacio 7 San Fernando unknown farmer

(female)

Jos~ Arnago Alarc~n 10 El Tesoro unknown bandit

Bertul f 0 Marin 10 El Tesoro unknown bandi t

Miguel Vega 10 El Tesoro unknown bandit

Francisco Antonio Solano 12 Las Palomas W1.known bandit

Appendix C 277

Pol. Coloration Author of Occupation of

Year, Month, Name Date Cons. Lib. Place Killed Crime Victim

1963. November

Gabriel Vanegas P. Bulgaria wUrnO'Wll farmer

Source: Archives of Jos~ del Carmen Parra, Libano, Tolima.

 Appendix D
Tolimense Voting in the 1957 Plebiscitej Voting by
Tolimense Municipio in the 1958 Presidential Election

Plebiscite of December 1, 1957

Percent Voting Number Voting

a
Colombia 4,397,090
b
Tolima 80.96 257,913

Presidential Election of May 4, 1958

Tol imense Municipio Frente Nacional Candidate Opposi tion Candidate

Ibagu~ 82.96%
Alpujarra 2.37
Alvarado 83.58 16.41
Ambalema 99.58 .41
Anzo~tegui 33.19 66.80
Armero 100.00
Ataco 78.20 21.79
Cajamarca 17.37
Carmen de Apical~ 81.85 18.08
Casabianca 96.18
Chaparral 90.08
Coello 91.29 8.70
Coyaima 93.89 5.91
Cunday 26.64 73.32
Dolores 100.00

Espinal 41.60

Falan 82.07 17.92

Flandes

Fresno 25.45
Guamo 54.05
Herveo 56.45 43.54
Honda 99.75 .21
Icononzo 95.86
100.00
Libano 14.11

278
Appendix D 279

Tolimense Municipio Frente Nacional Candidate Opposi tion Candidate

Mariquita 91.97 7.97

Melgar 65.72 34.27

Natagaima 84.49 15.50

Ortega 59.85 40.14

Piedras 99.41

Prado 86.34

Purificaci~n 51.35 48.23

Rioblanco 100.00

Roncesvalles 99.67 .32

Rovira 10.96 89.22

San Antonio .78 99.21

San Luis 44.86 54.88

Santa Isabel 13.88 86.10

Su~ez

Valle de San Juan 26.91 73.08

Venadillo 83.27 16.47

Villahermosa 20.79 79.10

Villarrica 86.68 13.31

Sources: a. Colombia, DANE, "Comportamiento Electoral Durante el Frente Nacional,"

Boletin Mensual de Estadistica (Bogot~: DANE, 1972 ), nos. 250-51, 3~; b. Colombia,
DANE, "Tendencias Electorales en Colombia," Boletin Mensual de Estadistica (Bogota:
DANE, 1969), no. 221, 104; c. Colombia, DANE, "Comportamiento Electoral del Municipio,
1930-1970, Elecciones Presidenciales," Boletin Mensual de Estadistica (Bogota: DANE,
1973), nos. 268-79, 278-86.
 1930 Election 1970 Election 1974 Election
Municipio Cons. Lib. Total Votes Frente Naciona1 ANAPO Total Votes Cons. Lib. ANAPO Total Votes

, ~
Ibague 40% 60% 4,914 40% 46% 33,857 19% 70% 7% 59,205 r::
::J
.....
A1pujarra 100 669 41 36 1,640 88 4 8 1,709 - (j
a ~.
Alvarado 81 18 1,077 16 77 2,409
r:: ~
Amba1ema 9 91 1,301 41 58 1,583 9 87 3 2,118 ::J <
p.. 0
14 40 2,450 CD ,....
Anzo;tegui 19 74 2,312 45
p.. Er
,....Orrr-.
Armero 42 54 5,123 5 89 2 9,384 o ~V\oC.
~.....
Ataco 77 23 419 75 13 3,304 27 65 6 4,763 ::J c.c ::J
~ C/.)
t-3-5"
Cajamarca 20 80 510 48 44 1,946 18 76 5 5,022 ~?O'"'d
12 86
{l)~~CD
~ Carmen d, 28 72 713 73 22 996 1,932 ,....c.c~::s
o Apica1a
~
CD
~ ~ ,-I»
a:
~.
Casabianca 88 12 1,017 39 33 1,440 86 3 11 1,672
d~~~
Chaparral 99 3,678 76 21 3,423 10 80 2 9,452 CD c.c C13
~ -...::t (l)
~ ~ .....
Coello 21 7~O 58 1,728 12 76 3 2,919 S" c" p..
7fJ 37
~ CD
Coyaima 27 71 611 68 11 2,334 20 54 3 4,731 CD ::J
,....
~ .....
Cunday 36 64 626 38 53 3,602 37 43 17 4,633 o ~
Ef
,.... t%1
~
Dolores 19 81 533 54 37 1,465 3 89 7 3,540
- CD
(j
Espinal 65 35 2,619 31 49 11,801 46 41 11 14,833 ,....
.....
o
Fa1an 81 17 2,167 14 83 2 3,647 ::J
(l)

F1andes 50 50 221 33 55 3,174 13 73 11 4,630

 1930 Election 1970 Election 1971:t: Election
Municipio Cons. Lib. Total Votes Frente Naciona1 ANAPO Total Votes Cons. Lib. ANAPO Total Votes
~
~
(1)

='Q.
Fresno 5l:t:% l:t:6% 1,953 38% l:t:7% 3,893 5l:t:% l:t:0% 5% 5,693 ~.

Guamo 8l:t: 16 2,335 32 l:t:5 7,890 57 27 15 8,506 tr1

Herveo - - - 38 l:t:2 2,568 78 9 13 3,10l:t:

Honda 13 87 1,702 l:t:l:t: 52 l:t:,792 9 80 7 7,0l:t:5

Icononzo 10 90 1,389 83 12 1,82l:t: 8 70 -- 3,725

L~rida 12 88 583 l:t:9 l:t:8 905 7 90 -- 2,685

Libano 29 71 3,j71 l:t:8 l:t:5 5,l:t:9l:t: 18 76 -- 13,622

Mariquita 7 93 1,53l:t: 51 l:t:2 2,55l:t: 6 88 l:t: 5,020

Melgar 51 l:t:9 610 53 l:t:l:t: 2,l:t:18 27 57 15 3,229

Natagaima 2l:t: 76 1,332 58 30 3,515 -- 60 3 5,668

Ortega 28 72 1,38l:t: 66 18 5,605 l:t:2 55 2 9,838

Piedras 1 99 573 95 3 302 2 97 -- 1,518

P1anadas - - - 79 18 1,830 1 92 1 3,983

Prado 72 28 252 66 26 909 12 75 - 2,269

Purificaci~n 53 l:t:7 2,366 l:t:9 32 5,172 37 57 l:t: 7,616

Riob1anco - - - 96 3 1,177 -- 99 - 3,908

Roncesva11es 33 67 1,04:5 65 23 608 22 76 - 1,172

Rovira - - - l:t:8 30 l:t:,017 53 l:t:5 2 6,888

N
00
Saldana 97 3 808 5l:t: 23 2,381 76 18 5 2,966 ~
 1930 Election 1970 Election 197q Election N
00
N
Municipio Cons. Lib. Total Votes Frente Nacional ANAPO Total Votes Cons. Lib. ANAPO Total Votes

San Antonio 6% 9q% 975 32% 35% 3,506 81% 2% 17% q,015

San Luis 67 33 172 q2 5q 3,018 39 37 22 q,082

Santa Isabel 83 17 1,3q3 q5 ql 1,713 60 25 lq 2,502

Su~rez -- - - q9 ql 1,101 69 28 2 1,3q2

Valle de San Juan qO 60 310 50 q2 1,187 65 30 5 1,682

Venadill0 10 90 1,782 57 39 2,118 12 85 1 q,677

Villahermosa 62 38 1,302 36 37 2,030 90 9 1 2,981

Villarrica -- - - 83 11 1,578 q 89 1 3,622

Sources:, a. Colombia,. DANE, "Comportamiento Electoral, 1930-1970," nos. 278-86; b. Colombia, DANE, Boletin Mensual
de Estadistica (Bogota: DANE, 1975), no. 283, 69.

~
"'C
CD
='
0..
~.

tr1
 Notes

Introduction
1. La Voz del Libano, June 11, July 9, 1949. For the convenience of the
reader, key Spanish tenns used in this volume are defined in the GlossaI)'.
2. The number of Colombians killed during the Violencia has long been a
matter of debate. Approximately 200,000 is the figure cited in both the earliest
and latest Itscientific" estimates. See Gennan Guzman Campos, Orlando Fals
Borda, and Eduardo Umana Luna, La violencia en Colombia, I, 2d ed. (Bogota:
Tercer Mundo, 1962), p. 292; and Paul Herbert Oquist, Jr., ItViolence, Conflict,
and Politics in Colombia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1976), p. 385. Russell W. Ramsey, in his liThe Modem Violence in Colombia,
1946-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1970), p. 449, uses statisti-
cal analysis to aITive at a total of 159,200. Because of the rural and sporadic
nature of Violencia, coupled with statistical vagaries and inconsistencies, the
exact number of deaths will probably never be known.
3. Registrars were employed by the office of the national registrar of voters
in Bogota (Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil), and they were pledged to
nonpartisanship.
4. These parties have been endlessly studied and discussed in Colombia
and elsewhere since their fonnation in the mid-nineteenth century. A provoc-
ative, though by no means definitive, recent analysis of their raison d'~tre is
Frank Safford, ItBases of Political Alignment in Early Republican Spanish
America," in Richard Graham and Peter H. Smith, eds., New Approaches to
Latin American History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), pp. 71-111.
5. John Gunther, Inside Latin America (New York: Harper, 1941), pp. 164,
160.
6. Luis L6pez de Mesa, Escrutinio socio16gico de la historia colombiana
(Bogota: Editorial ABC, 1955), p. 209.

283
284 Notes to Introduction

7. Gennan Arciniegas} The State of Latin America (New York: Alfred A.

Knopf} 1952)} p. 155.
8. See} for example} the .numerous references to Arciniegas in Vernon Lee
Fluharty} Dance of the Millions, Military Rule, and the Social Revolution in
Colombia, 1930-1956 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press} 1957); and
John D. Martz} Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey (Chapel Hill: Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press} 1962).
9. Antonio Garcia} Gaitan y el problema de la revoluci6n colombiana
(Bogota: Cooperativa de Artes Grflficas} 1955); Carlos Ueras Restrepo} De la
republica a la dictadura (Bogota: Editorial ARGRA} 1955).
10. Rafael Azula Barrera} De la revoluci6n al orden nuevo (Bogota: Editorial
Kelly} 1956). Azula was President Ospina's personal secretcuy.
11. Jose Maria Nieto Rojas} La batalla contra--el comunismo en Colombia
(Bogota: Empresa Nacional de Publicaciones} 1956); Roberto Urdaneta Arbe-
laez} El materialismo contra la dignidad del hombre (Bogota: Editorial Lucros}
1960).
12. Fidel Bland6n Bemo} La que el cielo no perdona, 2d ed. (Bogota: Editorial
ARGRA} 1954); Augusto Angel} La sombra del say6n (Bogota: Editorial Kelly}
1964).
13. Daniel Caicedo} Viento seco (Bogota: Artes Grancos} 1954); Eduardo
Santa} Sin tierra para morir (Bogota: Editorial Iqueima} 1954); Alvaro Valencia
Tovar} Uisheda (Bogota: Imprenta Canal Ramirez} 1969); Eduardo Caballero
Calderon} El cristo de espaldas, Vol. III} Obras (Medellin: Editorial Bedout}
1964). Valle} Tolima} and Boyaca are Colombian departments. The Eastern
llanos is a grassland zone lying beyond the Eastern Cordillera. The last work
mentioned} written by one of the nation's finest prose stylists} is considered to
be the best from a literary point of view. Of particular interest} because they
also deal with the Violencia in Tolima} are Victor Arag6n} Los ojos del buho
(Bogota: Editorial Revista Colombiana} 1966); and Alirio Velez Machado} Sar-
gento Matacho (Liliano: Tipografia Velez} 1962). Other novels} such as Gabriel
Garcia Marquez's Cien anos de soledad, deal extensively with the Violencia and
its antecedents. Readers interested in fiction of the Violencia should consult
Russell W. Ramsey's ({Critical Bibliography on the Violencia in Colombia}" Latin
American Research Review, 8 (spring 1973)} 3-44.
14. Gennan Guzman} La violencia, I} pp. 423} 424.
15. Orlando Fals Borda's introduction to Gennan Guzman} La violencia, II}
pp. 15-52} provides a history of the reaction to the book.
16. Gennan Guzman} La violencia, II} p. 21.
17. The remark was made by ConselVative Representative Gustavo Salazar
Garcia during debate in the Chamber of Representatives on July 26} 1962.
Gennan Guzman} La violencia, II} p. 21.
18. Gennan Guzman} La violencia, II} p. 23.
19. Ibid.} p. 31.
20. Miguel Angel Gonzalez} ((La violencia en Colombian: AnAlisis de un libro
(Bogota: Centro de Estudios Colombianos} 1962).
Notes to Introduction 285

21. Gennan Guzman} La violencia, II} pp. 410-17.

22. Camilo TOITes Restrepo} HSocial Change and Rural Violence in Colom-
bia/' in lIVing Louis Horowitz} ed.} Masses in Latin America (New York: Oxford
University Press} 1910)} pp. 503-46. The essay was originally published under
the title HLa violencia y los cambios socio-culturales en las areas rurales
colombianas/' in Asociaci6n Colombiana de Sociologla, Memoria del Primer
Congreso Nacional de Sociologla (Bogota: Editorial Iqueima} 1963).
23. Camilo TOITes} HSocial Change/' p. 543.
24. L. A. Costa Pinto} Voto y cambio social: el caso colombiano en el conte~o
latinoamericano (Bogota: Tercer Mundo} 1971)} pp. 34-35.
25. E. J. Hobesbawm} HPeasants and Rural Migrants in Politics/' in Claudio
Veliz} ed.} The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (New York: Oxford
University Press} 1961)} p. 52.
26. PieITe Gilhodes} La question agraire en Colombia, 1958-1971 (Paris:
Annand Colin} Foundation National de Sciences Politiques} 1974)} pp. 284-85.
21. In his Ph.D. dissertation} Hpolitical Modernization in Colombia" (Colum-
bia University} 1967)} p. 53} Richard S. Weinert cited the example of another
scholar who "tried in vain to find cOITelations between party strength and
sociological variables such as per capita income} literacy and land tenure in
Violencia areas." Weinert used other data to establish that there is little
If

necesscuy cOITelation in economic deprivation and Violencia in the hard-hit

coffee-growing areas...." See his "Violence in Pre-Modem Societies: Rural
Colombia/' The American Political Science Review, 60:2 (1966)} 343. Data on the
Hlow levels of anomie" in people who suffered Violencia are contained in
Joseph William Monahan} "Social Structure and Anomie in Colombia" (Ph.D.
dissertation} University of Wisconsin at Madison} 1969)} p. 125 et seq. By the
1910s most Violencia scholars agreed that the phenomenon in Colombia did
not have revolutioncuy overtones. See the comment to that effect contained in
Ronald Lee Hart} HThe CoiombianAcci6n Comunal Program: A Political Evalua-
tion" (Ph.D. dissertation} University of California at Los Angeles} 1914)} p. 124.
28. This point was made in Orlando Fals Borda} "Violence and the Break-Up
of Tradition in Colombia/' in Claudio Veliz} ed., Obstacles to Change in Latin
America (New York: Oxford University Press} 1969)} p. 198.
29. Cf. chapter 9.
30. Three works chronicling the last years of Father Camilo Torres are
Gennan Guzman Campos} Camilo, presencia y destino (Bogota: SeIVicios
Especiales de Prensa} 1967); Walter J. Broderick} Camilo Torres: A Biography of
the Priest-Guerrillero (New York: Doubleday} 1975); and Alvaro Valencia Tovar}
El fina.l de Camilo (Bogota: Tercer Mundo} 1976).
31. Richard Weinert} Hpolitical Modernization/' p. 56.
32. Weinert's piece was written in response to inconsistencies he found in
Robert C. Williamson's HToward a Theory of Political Violence: The Case of
Rural Colombia/' Westem Political Quarterly (March 1965)} 35-44. Weinert
found Williamson's rooting of the Violencia in anomie and social} political} and
economic fmstration unconvincing} especially because it did not logically
286 Notes to Introduction

account for the rural nature of Violencia. Those same inconsistencies ap-
peared in chapter 13 of Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of
Change (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 360-86. That
chapter, titled liLa Violencia," begins with the claim that Violencia arose out of
II

superimposition of Colombia's crisis of modernization on the patterns of the

country's hereditary hatreds" (p. 360). Dix, who had read Williamson's expla-
nation for Violencia, was apparently unable to consult Weinert's cogent
revision of it before completing his research. Nevertheless, he appeared to
recognize weaknesses in the IIcrisis of modernization" theory because he
waffled in applying it rigorously.
33. Francisco Posada, liLa violencia y la vida colombiana," Documentos
Politicos, 67 (May-June 1967), 14.
34. Everett E. Hagen, El cambio social en Colombia (Bogota: Tercer Mundo,
1957), pp. 97-101.
35. Personal interview with Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, Bogota, July 15, 1968.
36. Cited in Robert Dix, Colombia, p. 366.
37. Bernardo Gaitan Mahecha, Misi6n hist6rica del Frente Nacional: De la
violencia a la democracia (Bogota: Editorial Revista Colombiana, 1966), p. 36;
GeIman Guzman, La. violencia, II, p. 395; Luis L6pez de Mesa, IIUn Historial de
la Violencia," El Tiempo, September 30, 1962.
38. Paul Oquist, IIViolence, Conflict, and Politics," p. 388.
39. Alexander Wiley Wilde, IIConversations among Gentlemen: Oligarchical
Democracy in Colombia," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown. of
Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 39.
40. John Pollock, IIEvaluating Regime PerloImance in a Crisis: Violence,
Political Demands, and Elite Accountability in Colombia" (mimeographed,
Stanford University, 1969), p. 98.
41. James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1968), passim.
42. Steffen W. Schmidt, liLa Violencia Revisited: The Clientelist Bases of
Political Violence in Colombia," Journal of Latin American Studies, 6 (May
1974),102.
43. Conservatives mark the beginning of Violencia in 1948, when Gaitan was
assassinated, and the bogotazo, or 1930, with initiation of the sixteen-year
Liberal hegemony. Liberals, on the other hand, date Violencia from 1946 and
the Conservative return to power. The author of this volume prefers to use the
broader concept of lIincipient phase" because Violencia began at different
times at different places after 1946 and only became generalized across the
nation subsequent to 1950.
44. Others who have periodized the Violencia are GeIman Guzman, La.
violencia, I, pp. 23-140; Eduardo Santa, Sociologia politica de Colombia (Bo-
gota: Tercer Mundo, 1964), pp. 64-70; and Russell W. Ramsey, Civil-Military
Relations in Colombia, 1946-1965 (N.p.: Regent Publishing Company, 1978), pp.
2-3.
45. GeIman Guzman acknowledged this by dividing the Violencia chrono-
Notes to Introduction 287

logically into a Itfirst wave" and a Clsecond wave" as well as regionally. The five
regions singled out for extended treatment were Tolima, the Eastern Llanos,
Boyaca, Cundinamarca, and Antioquia. Valle, Choc6, Cauca, Santander, San-
tander del Norte, Huila, and Bolivar also received special attention. See
Gennan Guzman, La. violencia, I, pp. 39-140.
46. Some idea of these variations is conveyed in appendix B and elsewhere
in this study.
47. Three of them were: Russell W. Ramsey, ItThe Modem Violence in
Colombia"; James David Henderson, ItOrigins of the Violencia in Colombia"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1972); and Paul Oquist, ItVio-
lence, Conflict, and Politics."
48. Russell Ramsey, ItCritical Bibliography," p. 44. Political scientists alluded
to the need for regional studies that could shed light on Colombian political
processes. In the introduction to his valuable municipio-level study ItCompor-
tamiento Electoral del Municipio Colombiano, 1930-1970, Elecciones Presi-
denciales," Boletln Mensual de Estadlstica, 268/269 (Colombia, Departamento
Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica-DANE, 1973), p. 79, Paul Oquist ad-
vised that it is necessary to undertake intensive departmental studies that
CI

include fundamental socio-economic data framed within global structural

analysis."
49. Girardot lies across the Magdalena River in the department of Cundina-
marca.
50. Colombia, Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario, Informaci6n basica del
departmento del ToUma para programas de desarrollo agropecuario (Bogota:
ICA, 1972), p. 4.
51. Departmental population increased from 712,490 in 1951, to 841,424 in
1964, to an estimated 904,000 in 1973. Sources: Colombia, ICA, Informaci6n
basica, p. 23; Colombia Infonnation SeIVice, Colombia Today: Regions of
Colombia (New York: Colombia Infonnation SeIVice, 1974), p. 71.
52. They were Anzoategui, HeIVeo, Rioblanco, Roncesvalles, San Antonio,
and Villahennosa. Detail on general physical conditions in Tolima is pre-
sented in Contraloria del Tolima, Anuario estadlstico-hist6rico-geografico de
los municipios del ToUma, 1956 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1957).
53. Of Colombia's sixteen departments, Tolima stood near the bottom in
teImS of homicides committed by its citizens in 1949. Cf. appendix B. Although
the Spanish "municipio and the English Itmunicipality" are not equivalent
1J

teIms, they are used interchangeably in this study.

54. Contraloria General de la Republica, Geografla econ6mica de Colombia,
Vol. VII: Tolima, edited by Gonzalo Paris Lozano (Bogota: Contraloria General
de la Republica, 1948), p. 430.
55. James J. Parsons, Antioquefio Colonization in Western Colombia (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1949), p. 98.
56. Diego Monsalve, Colombia cafetera (Barcelona: Artes Graficas, 1927), p.
549.
288 Notes to Chapter 1

57. Contralorla del Tolima} Anuario estadlstico-hist6rico-geografico de los

municipios del ToUrna, 1956 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental} 1957)} p. 331.
58. Rufino GutieITez} Monograflas, Vol. II (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional} 1921)}
p.212.
59. Contralorla del Tolima} Anuario estadlstico (Ibague: Imprenta Departa-
mental} 1937)} p. 33.
60. Electoral data for Santa Isabel in the 193()-70 period suggest that Liberals
made up between 15 and 20 percent of the total. See DANE} tlElecciones
presidenciales/' p. 285.
61. See chapter 4.
62. La Voz del Libano, May I} 1948.
63. For voting in Santa Isabel during the 1930s and 1940s} see appendix A.
64. Just a few months after President Ospina Perez was inaugurated} the
local press denounced tlgrave political disturbances in Santa Isabel/' in which
ConseIVatives and police were intimidating Liberals. La Voz del Libano, De-
cember 27} 1947.
65. German Guzman} La violencia, I} p. 51.
66. Ibid.} pp. 183-84. These events were described to GeIman Guzman in
1958 by Te6filo Rojas Varon C1Chispas"). They occurred in the municipio of
Rovira} some fifty kilometers south of Santa Isabel} in the Central Cordillera.
67. GeIman Guzman} La violencia, I} p. 212.
68. Orientaci6n, March 25} 1933.
69. ConseIVative party leader Laureano G6mez made much of the incident
in his Comentarios a un regimen (Bogota: Editorial MineIVa} 1934)} published a
year later.
70. La Voz del Libano, November I} 1947.
71. Manuel Marulanda Velez} Cuadernos de campana. (Bogota: Ediciones
Abej6n Mono} 1973)} p. 76.

Chapter 1
1. Pedro Jose Ramirez Sendoya} Diccionario indio del Gran Tolima (Bogota:
Editorial MineIVa} 1952)} pp. xxi-xxii.
2. Enrique Ortega Ricaurte} ed.} San Bonifacio de [bague del Valle de las
Lanzas (Bogota: Editorial MineIVa} 1952)} pp. xv-xvi.
3. Jij6n y Caamafio} SebastiBn de Benalc8.zar, I (Quito: Imprenta del Clero}
1936)} pp. 313-17.
4. R. B. Cunninghame-Graham} The Conquest of New Granada (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin} 1922)} pp. 141-42.
5. Cesareo Rocha Castilla} Prehistoria y folclor del ToUrna, 2d ed. (Ibague:
Imprenta Departamental} 1968)} pp. 1()-13.
6. Juan de Borja, tlGueITa de los Pijaos}" Boletin de historiay antigiiedades,
14 (September 1922)} 13Q-64.
Notes to Chapter 1 289

7. Don Baltazar, or tlCombeirna," as he was known before becoming a

Christian, is said to have joined the Spanish after Calarca had his infant
mestizo son kidnapped and murdered. The events sunuunding Calarca's
death on the plains of ChapaITal are unclear; some historians claim that the
Pijaos would never have fought a pitched battle upon an open plain because
they preferred guerrilla combat in the mountains. That Don Baltazar killed the
Pijao chieftain with his lance is apparently beyond question. At least the
people of Ibague believed it to be so, for they enshrined the lance in their
cathedral and lauded its magical powers for more than two hundred years in
an epic poem, the first stanza of which reads:

This is the lance that was

Owned by Don Baltazar,
That for being so exceptional
Is worshiped by all of Ibague.

The Spanish destroyed the relic during the wars of independence, perhaps
fearing its power might be used against them. The IIInvocation to the Lance" is
quoted in full in Enrique Ortega Ricaurte, San Bonifacio de Ibague, pp. 199-208.
The conflicting accounts of Calarca's death can be studied in Rocha Castilla,
Preh is toria, pp. 25-45; and Jesus Arango Cano, Aborlgenes legendarios de
Colombia (Bogota: Cultural Colombiana, n.d.), pp. 29-56.
8. Vicente Restrepo, Estudio sobre las minas de oro y plata de Colombia
(Bogota: Banco de la Republica, 1952), pp. 122-35.
9. Juan Rodriguez Freyle, El carnero (Medellin: Editorial Bedout, 1970), pp.
339-40.
10. Vicente Restrepo, Estudio, p. 135.
11. Jose Manuel Groot, Historia eclesifJstica y civil de Nueva Granada, II
(Bogota: Editorial ABC, 1953), pp. 99-160, especially 123.
12. New Granada first became a viceroyalty in 1717. Six years later, it was
redesignated as a captaincy-general. The viceroyalty was reinstated in 1739.
13. Pablo E. CArdenas Acosta, El movimiento comunal de 1781 en el Nuevo
Reino de Granada, II (Bogota: Editorial Kelly, 1970), pp. 77-96.
14. Or, as historian Jaime Jaramillo Uribe states it, tithe whole Comunero
movement was raised on the old Castillian and Aragonese custom of voting
taxes with the consent of the governed, and the right of petition." El pensa-
miento en el siglo XIX (Bogota: Editorial Temis, 1964), p. 114.
15. In Colombia the terms caudillo, gamonal, and cacique are sometimes
used interchangeably, though the first usually designates a leader of national
stature and the last is often used pejoratively. Gamonal does not usually
possess a military connotation. Gamonal and cacique designate lesser leader-
ship figures. Cacique is an indigenous word, originally used for Indian chief-
tains.
16. Constituci6n del Estado de Mariquita, Title I, Article 7; Title II, Article 2;
Title III. The constitution is reproduced in Miguel Antonio Pombo and Jose
290 Notes to Chapter 1

Joaquin GueITa} eds.} Constituciones de Colombia, II (Bogota: Imprenta Na-

cionat 1951)} pp. 289-337.
17. These ideas are exhaustively explored in Glen Dealy} IIProlegomena on
the Spanish American Political Tradition/' Hispanic American Historical Re-
view, 48:1:37-58.
18. Constituci6n de Mariquita, Title XXIII} Article 1.
19. For an acerbic description of the process of oligarchic internal colo-
/t

nialism" that followed the wars of independence} see Indalecio Lievano

Aguirre} Los grandes conflictos sociales y econ6micos de nuestra historia, 2d
ed. (Bogota: Tercer Mundo) 1966)} pp. 639-70.
20. Guillermo Hernandez de Alba} /tHomenaje a la memoria del General
Domingo Caicedo/' Boletln de historia y antigiiedades, 30:346:719-35.
21. Tolima} Anuario estadlstico, 1956, p. 337.
22. Guillermo Hernandez, /tHomenaje/' p. 721.
23. Steffen W. Schmidt} /tPolitical Clientelism in Colombia" (Ph.D. disserta-
tion) Columbia University} 1972)} p. 207. See also Catherine C. LeGrand}
/tperspectives for the Historic Study of Rural Politics and the Colombian Case:
An OveIView/' Latin American Research Review, 12:1 (spring 1977)} 15-19} for
further insight on patron-client linkages in Colombia.
24. F. Pereira Gamba} La vida en los Andes colombianos (Quito: Imprenta /tEl
Progreso/' 1919)} p. 146.
25. The name Colombia as well as New Granada will be used to designate
the nation between 1831 and 1886.
26. Jesus Marla Henao and Gerardo Amlbla} Historia de Colombia, 8th ed.
(Bogota: Editorial Libreria Voluntad) 1967)} p. 648. SecretaIy of Interior Mariano
Ospina Rodriguez offered the estimate in 1842.
27. Gustavo Arboleda} Historia contemporanea de Colombia, I (Bogota: Edi-
torial Arboleda y Valencia) 1918)} p. 403. The circular was sent over the
signature of Lino de Pombo} secretaIy of the interior and foreign relations.
28. David Bushnell} EI regimen de Santander en la Gran Colombia (Bogota:
Tercer Mundo) 1966)} pp. 154-58.
29. Luis Eduardo Nieto Arleta} Economla y cultura en la his to ria de Colom-
bia (Bogota: Siglo Veinte) 1942)} p. 87.
30. Much has been written about the nineteenth-century liberal reforms. A
recent work that provides bibliographic references is Gerardo Molina} Las
ideas liberales en Colombia, 1849-1914 (Bogota: Tercer Mundo) 1973).
31. Jose Marla Quijano Wallis} Memorias autobiograficas (GottafeITata) Italy:
Tipografia italo-oriente} 1919)} p. 307.
32. An excellent work that discusses utopian visions in Colombian history is
Orlando Fals Borda} La subversi6n en Colombia (Bogota: Tercer Mundo) 1967).
33. Cited in Felipe Antonio Molina} Laureano G6mez: historia de una re-
beldla (Bogota: Libreria Voluntad) 1940)} p. 21.
34. Jaime Ospina Ortiz} Jose Eusebio Caro, gui6n de una estirpe (Bogota:
Publicaciones Tecnicas) 1957)} p. 281.
35. J. Le6n Helguera and Robert H. Davis} Archivo epistolar del General
Notes to Chapter 2 291

Mosquera (Bogota: Editorial Kelly) 1966)} pp. 266-67. The passage is from a
letter of General Ram6n Espina to Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, September 3,
1856.
36. Frank Safford's IlBases of Political Alignment," pp. 71-111, is an insightful
inquiIy into the causes of politicization in New Granada.
37. Luis Nieto} Economia y cultura, pp. 278-79.
38. Anihal Galindo} Recuerdos hist6ricos, pp. 4-6.
39. Tolima, Anuario estadistico, 1956, p. 187.
40. Quijano Wallis} Memorias, p. 302.
41. Luis Eduardo G6mez, IlEI Libano" (typescript draft) Libano} Tolima, n.d.).
42. Augusto Ramirez Moreno, El libro de las arengas (Bogota: Librerla
Voluntad) 1941)} pp. 294-95.
43. This is the principal finding of Frank Safford in his The Ideal of the
Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form a Technical Elite (Austin: University of
Texas Press) 1976).
44. Luis Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecci6n en Colombia, 1810-1930
(Bogota: Editorial Santafe) 1955), p. 195.
45. See Luis Nieto} Economia y cultura, pp. 283-86, 300-302, 306-30, for
statistics on tobacco, quinine} and indigo production from 1843 through the
end of the century.
46. Joseph Le6n Helguera} IlThe First Mosquera Administration in New
Granada" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1958)} p. 12; Gaceta
del Tolima, Vol. III, No. 10 (June 26) 1866)} p. 34.
47. La. Imprenta, January 31} 1852.
48. Jose Marla Nieto Rojas} La. batalla, p. 49; Helen V. Delpar} IlThe Liberal
Party of Colombia, 1863-1903" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1967),
pp.187-88.
49. William Paul McGreevey} An Economic History of Colombia, 1845-1930
(New York: Cambridge University Press) 1971)} pp. 178-81. This volume statisti-
cally assesses the ((benefits and losses of the policies of laissez faire experi-
enced by the peasantry."
50. Joaquin Ospina) Diccionario biografico y bibliografico de Colombia, I
(Bogota: Editorial Aguila, 1939), pp. 500-502.
51. The standard work on this population movement is James Parsons}
Antioqueiio Migration.
52. James Parsons, Antioqueiio Colonization, p. 98.

Chapter 2
1. Anibal Galindo} Recuerdos, p. 193.
2. Ibid.} pp. 291-93.
3. Helen Delpar} IlRoad to Revolution: The Liberal Party of Colombia,
1886-1899," The Americas, 32 (January 1976)} 348-71.
4. Economic causation and the war are explored in Charles W. Bergquist,
292 Notes to Chapter 2

"Coffee and Conflict in Colombia} 1886-1904: Origins and Outcome of the War
of the Thousand Days" (Ph.D. dissertation} Stanford University} 1973).
5. Charles Bergquist} tlCoffee and Conflict/' p. 278.
6. Luis Martinez} Historia e~ensa de Colombia, Vol. X} Book 2} pp. 136-39.
7. Gonzalo Paris Lozano} Guerrilleros del ToUma (Manizales: Editorial
Arturo Zapata} 1937)} pp. 114-16.
8. Ibid.} pp. 129-30.
9. Ibid.} pp. 132-35. After the war} the ex-soldier tried to hide his disgrace
by fleeing to the Eastern llanos.
10. Eduardo Santa} Sin tierra, pp. 18-23; Gonzalo Paris} Guerrilleros del
ToUrna, pp. 119-22. Some moments of compassion occurred during the war.
The following story is told of one of its famous Liberal generals} tiEl Negro
Marin/' under whom Cantalicio Reyes fought: tlOne day his troops captured
two persons suspected of espionage} court martialed and sentenced them to
death. The sentence was presented to EI Negro Marin so he could approve it
with his signature. General Marin paused} gazing at the judges} and at length
spoke: tThe ConseIVatives steal} and we have stolen; the ConseIVatives kill} and
we're going to kill. So what's the difference?' Then he annulled the sentence."
See the photograph of Marin with the sons of General Isidro PaITa and other
veterans of the war in chapter 2.
11. The quotation is from Hernando Martinez Santamaria} in Carlos
Martinez Silva} Por que caen los partidos pollticos, IV (Bogota: Imprenta de
Juan Casis} 1934).
12. Luis Martinez} Historia e~ensa, Vol. X} Book 2} p. 304} proposes that the
Liberals supported Reyes in the hope that his heavy-handed measures would
provoke ConselVative rebellion. Reyes would then be forced to seek support
tI

in Liberalism/' which would allow them to regain power. A more convincing

argument is that many of Reyes's programs were compatible with those of
Liberal leaders} the most notable ofwhom was Rafael Uribe Uribe. See Eduardo
Santa} Rafael Uribe Uribe: Un hombre y una epoca (Bogota: Ediciones Trian-
gulo} 1962)} p. 328.
13. Mario H. Perico Ramirez} Reyes, de cauchero a dictador (Tunja: Universi-
dad Pedag6gica y Tecnol6gica de Colombia} 1974)} pp. 458-59. For an account
of Reyes's reasons for fonning the new departments} see Eduardo Lemaitre}
Rafael Reyes, biograjIa. de un gran colombiano (Bogota: Editorial Espiral} 1967).
Lemaitre also points to the danger of regional separatism following the War of
the Thousand Days.
14. Nicolas Garcia Samudio} liLa divisi6n departamental y los origenes del
municipio en Colombia/' Boletfn de historiay antigiieda.des, 20 (Febrnary 1933)}
1-14.
15. Christopher Abel} IIConseIVative Politics in Twentieth-Century Antio-
quia} 1910-1953" (mimeographed} Occasional Paper III} Latin American Centre}
St. Anthony's College} Oxford} England} 1973)} p. 13.
16. Ospina Vasquez} Industria y protecci6n, pp. 330-31.
Notes to Chapter 2 293

17. Christopher Abel, tlConseIVative Politics," p. 13.

18. Carlos E. Restrepo, Orientaci6n republicana, II (Bogota: Banco Popular,
1972), pp. 85-92.
19. Ibid., I, p. 201.
20. Gerardo Molina, Las ideas liberales, 1849-1914, p. 185.
21. These refonns are summarized in Gustavo Humberto Rodriguez, Ben-
jamin Herrera en La guerra yen la paz (Bogota: Imprenta de Eduardo Salazar,
1973), pp. 213-14.
22. Gerardo Molina, Las ideas liberales, 1849-1914, pp. 285-86.
23. Carlos E. Restrepo, Orientaci6n republicana, II, p. 84:tI • conflicts such
••

as the one in Ibague have flared and have reached the point of causing a war."
24. La. Voz del Tolirna, December 29, 1910.
25. Tolima, Secretarla del Gobierno, Informe del Secretario de Gobierno,
1912, pp. 4-8.
26. El Cronista, November 2 and 23, 1912. At the time, Armero was called
Santana.
27. La. Cordillera, JanuaIy 4, 1913.
28. Tolima, Contraloria, Anuario estadlstico (Ibague: Imprenta Departamen-
tal, Part I, 1937), pp. 81-82.
29. Uladislao Botero is quoted as having said ttl searched out this region ...
Liliano ... because it was Liberal. I married a niece of Isidro PalTa." Luis
Eduardo G6mez, tiEl Liliano."
30. Editorial from La. Idea of Manizales, reprinted in La. Cordillera, Februcuy
20,1913.
31. El Pals, Janucuy 25,1913; La. Cordillera, January 25, Februcuy 20, March 1,
1913.
32. Echevem's defense appeared in La. Idea, of Manizales, a ConseIVative
newspaper, which printed a telegram in which he gave his view of the raid.
The piece was reprinted in La. Cordillera, March 1, 1913.
33. El Tiempo, Februcuy 26, 1913.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., Februcuy 27, 1913.
36. Joaquin Ospina, Diccionario, II, pp. 571-75.
37. La. Cordillera, March 15, 1913. General Eutimio Sandoval, founder and
editor of Cordillera, was one of the ConseIVative deputies.
38. Carlos E. Restrepo, Orientaci6n, II, p. 81.
39. The foregoing account is drawn from Carlos E. Restrepo, Orientaci6n, II,
pp. 221-52; El Tiempo, April 7, 1913; and La. Cordillera, April 19, 1913.
40. Coincidentally, one of the best studies of Latin American clientelism
concerns Colombia. See Steffen Schmidt, tlpolitical Clientelism."
41. The foregoing account is drawn from Eduardo Santa, Arrieros y funda-
dares, aspectos de la colonizaci6n antioquefu:i. (Bogota: Editorial Cosmos, 1961),
pp. 111-13; Luis Eduardo G6mez, tiEl Libano"; Tolima, Secretario del Gobierno,
Infonne del Secretario de Gobiemo, 1916 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental,
294 Notes to Chapter 2

1916), p. 117; Eco del Norte, November 22,1915; personal interview with Luis
Eduardo G6mez, Libano, Tolima, March 3, 1971; and personal interview with
Eduardo Santa, Bogota, February 13, 1971.
42. Half a century later, they were still talking about the tragedy. In the 1960s
Dr. Luis Eduardo G6mez wrote in his unpublished history of Libano, ((men of
greater experience have not forgotten October 4, 1915 ... a Sunday morning of
voting and bloodshed." Luis Eduardo G6mez, ((El Libano."
43. The delights of champan travel on the Magdalena are described in
Semana, September 18, 1948.
44. Jose Raimundo Soja discusses the growth of Colombia's internal trans-
portation dUring this period in his EI comercio en la historia de Colombia
(Bogota: Camara de Comercio de Bogota, 1971), pp. 170-79.
45. Diego Monsalve, Colombia cafetera, p. 550.
46. Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions, p. 32.
47. Tolima, Gobernaci6n, Mensaje del Gobernador a la Asamblea, 1923
(Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1923), p. 65.
48. Jose Marla Samper, Ensayo sobre las revoluciones pollticas (Bogota:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1969), p. 268.
49. EI Carmen, June 2, 1923.
50. Miguel Unutia, His to ria del sindicalismo en Colombia (Bogota: Ediciones
Universidad de los Andes, 1969), pp. 81-82.
51. Christopher Abel suggests this in his paper (( ConseIVative Politics."
52. Tolima, Gobernaci6n, Mensaje del Gobernador a la Asamblea, 1918
(Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1918), p. 12.
53. Miguel Unutia, His to ria del sindicalismo, p. 99.
54. Diego Montana Cuellar, Colombia, pals formal y pals real (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Platina, 1963), p. 132; Luis Nieto, La. batalla, p. 10.
55. Tolima, Secretaria del Gobierno, lnforme del Secretario del Gobierno,
1922 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1922), pp. 5-6.
56. Ignacio TOITeS Giraldo, Maria Cano, mujer rebelde (Bogota: Publica-
ciones de la Rosca, 1972), pp. 65-69.
57. Tolima, Gobernaci6n, Mensaje del Gobernador a la Asamblea, 1927
(Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1927), p. 9.
58. Tolima, Secretaria del Gobierno, lnforme del Secretario del Gobierno,
1928 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1928), pp. 5-8.
59. This, of course, was true, as William Paul McGreevey points out in his An
Economic History of Colombia, 1845-1930 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1971), pp. 16~9.
60. Gonzalo Sanchez, Los "Bolcheviques del Libano," Tolima (Bogota: El
Mohan Editores, 1976), p. 38.
61. Ibid., pp. 48-52.
62. Ibid., pp. 53-58.
63. An excellent collection of documents concerning the ((Massacre of the
Banana Pickers" is 1928, La. masacre en las bananeras (Bogota: Ediciones los
Notes to Chapter 3 295

Comuneros) 1972). See also J. Fred Rippy) The Capitalists and Colombia (New
York: Vanguard Press) 1931).
64. Ignacio TOITes) Los inconfonnes, IV) pp. 151-59.
65. Ibid.) p. 153; Gonzalo Sanchez) Los "'Bolcheviques", p. 73.
66. Gonzalo Sanchez) Los "'Bolcheviques", pp. 74-75. Other information on
the HBolshevik Revolt" has been gathered from Miguel Urrutia) Historia del
sindicalismo, p. 132; Eduardo Santa) Arrieros, pp. 112-14; Jose del Carmen
Parra) letter to the author dated March 16) 1971; personal interview with
Octavio Lasema Villegas) Bogota) March 28) 1971; and personal interview with
Luis Eduardo G6mez) Libano) Tolima) March 16) 1971.
67. The Gras was a single-shot French army rifle manufactured after the
Franco-Prussian War. Several thousand were purchased for the Colombian
Army near the end of the nineteenth centuI)'.
68. Gonzalo Sanchez) Los "'Bolcheviques", p. 80. This failure on the part of
the Conservatives to oppose the Bolsheviks may have been a sign of their tacit
sympathy with NaIVaez as a result of his announced goal to improve their
situation) or may have indicated an incipient class-consciousness.
69. Malcolm Deas) HAlgunas notas sobre la historia del caciquismo en
Colombia/' Revista de Occidente (October 1973)) p. 135.

Chapter 3
1. La Oposici6n, April 22) 1934; Tolima, Secretaria del Gobiemo) Infonne del
Secretario de Gobierno, 1932 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental) 1932)) pp. 5-6.
2. El Tiempo, December 8 and 16) 1930; Tolima) Secretarial Infonne, 1932,
p.6.
3. Tolima) Gobemaci6n) Mensaje del Gobernador a la Asamblea, 1931
(Ibague: Imprenta Departamental) 1931)) pp. 35-36.
4. Colombia) Archivo Nacional de Colombia) Gobierno del Tolima, I) p. 183.
Letter to the Colombian minister of government from the secretaI)' of govem-
ment of Tolima) November 7) 1889.
5. Tolima) Gobemaci6n) Mensaje del Gobernador a la Asamblea, 1924
(Ibague: Imprenta Departamental) 1924)) p. 17; Tolima) Gobemaci6n) Mensaje
del Gobernador a la Asamblea, 1925 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental) 1925))
pp. 17-18. A broader discussion of the plight of Colombian Indians after
independence is found in Juan Friede) El indio en lucha por la tierra (Bogota:
Editorial La Chispa) 1972).
6. Diego Castrill6n Arboleda) El indio Quintin Lame (Bogota: Tercer Mundo)
1973)) p. 216.
7. Tolima) Secretarial Infonne, 1924, pp. 3-4. By his own count) Quintin was
jailed 108 times in Tolima alone. He had studied law and always served as his
own counsel in court. Manuel Quintin Lame) Las luchas del indio que baj6 de
296 Notes to Chapter 3

IJ
la montaila al valle de la "civilizaci6n (Bogota: Publicaciones de la Rosca,
1973), p. 59.
8. Diego Castrill6n, El indio, pp. 211-12, 233-37.
9. Few tolimenses supported the communists. In the 1937 local elections,
for example, the communists polled only 0.7 percent of the vote department-
wide. Tolima, Contralorla,Anuario estadistico (Ibague: Imprenta Departamen-
tat 1937), p. 181.
10. Tolima, Secretaria del Gobiemo, Infonne del Secretario de Gobierno
(Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1931), pp. 3-4; Diego Castrill6n, El indio, p.
236.
11. Luis Eduardo Nieto, Economia y cultura, pp. 295-303.
12. Tolima, Contralorla, Anuario, 1956, pp. 175, 253; Luis Eduardo Nieto,
Economia y cultura, pp. 295-303.
13. Diego Monsalve, Colombia cafetera, pp. 539, 542. All the figures are based
on the 1926-27 period.
14. Gloria Gaitan provides an excellent summary of the process by which
land titles were adulterated in her Colombia: La lucha por la tierra en la decada
del treinta (Bogota: Tercer Mundo, 1976), pp. 17-18.
15. An army company was used to drive invaders from a hacienda in
Icononzo in one such case. El Tiempo, December 4, 1930.
16. Minister of Industries Francisco Jose Chaux pointed this out in a
celebrated address before the Colombian Congress in 1933. Among the best of
several discussions on this important era in Colombian history are Albert O.
Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in
Latin America (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 133-213; Gloria Gaitan, Colom-
bia, passim; Gustavo Ignacio De Roux, ((The Social Bases of Peasant Unrest: A
Theoretical Framework with Special Reference to the Colombian Case" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1974), pp. 98-349; and
Orlando Fals Borda, Historia de la cuesti6n agraria en Colombia (Bogota:
Publicaciones de la Rosca, 1975), passim.
17. All the foregoing passages are taken from pp. 27-46 of the secretaIjls
1932 message.
18. Tolima, Secretarla del Gobiemo, Infonne del Secretario de Gobierno,
1934 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1934), pp. 10-17.
19. Tolima, Contralorla, ((Organizaciones sindicales en el Tolima/' Anuario
estadistico, 1939 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1939), p. 210; Colombia,
Ministerio de Trabajo, Boletin de la Oficina Nacional del Trabajo, October-
December 1933, pp. 1632-38.
20. Colombia, Ministerio de Trabajo, Boletin, October-December 1933, pp.
1632-38. For the provisions of the contract, see Gloria Gaitan, Colombia, pp.
32-33.
21. Tolima, Secretarial ((Los Pactos de Icononzo/' Infonne, 1934, pp. 11-21.
The haciendas involved were ((Balsara/' ItSiberia/' ItUribe/' ItSanta Ines/' ItQue-
bradagrande/' ItCastilla," ItCanada," ((Guatimbol," "La Magdalena," and ItEsco-
cia."
Notes to Chapter 3 297

22. Colombia} Presidencia} La. polftica oficial (Bogota: Imprenta Nacionat

1934)} p. 71.
23. The hacienda} called HSan Luis/' was located in Cunday} and had 80}000
coffee bushes in 1927.
24. See Eduardo Zuleta Angel} EI Presidente L6pez (Medellin: Editorial
Albon} 1966)} pp. 9-49} for a short account of L6pez's early years.
25. William Marion Gibson} The Constitutions of Colombia (Durham} N.C.:
Duke University Press} 1948)} p. 23.
26. Ibid.} p. 26.
27. Tolima} Secretaria del Gobierno} Infonne del Secretario de Gobierno,
1937 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental} 1937)} pp. 6-7.
28. Colombia} Ministerio de Trabajo} Boletin, p. 373.
29. Those forces were as follows: national police} departmental police} fiscal
police} town gendarmes, Rural Guard} and miscellaneous security police
employed at the departmental and national levels.
30. Naturally} this is not a matter of public record} though it is widely
accepted by scholars and was an article of faith among ConseIVatives. L6pez
apparently hoped to counteract fascist elements within the army. See David
Bushnell} Eduardo Santos and the Good Neighbor (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press} 1967)} p. 104; Russell W. Ramsey} liThe Modern Violence/' p. 141;
Carlos Galvis G6mez} Porque cay6 L6pez (Bogota: Editorial ABC} 1946)} pp.
37-38; Rafael Azula} De la revoluci6n, pp. 84-85; and Robert H. Dix} Colombia, p.
297.
31. El Tiempo, August 7} 1933.
32. El Derecho, May 8} 1937.
33. La. Voz del Libano, October 19} 1941.
34. El Derecho, May 22} 1937.
35. EI Tolirna, September 5 and 16} 1936.
36. The results of that and other elections of the 1930s and 1940s in
Villahermosa} Santa Isabel} and Liliano are presented in appendix A.
37. EI Derecho, August 28} 1943. It must be added that} when Governor
Lozano Agudelo learned of the abuses, he summarily fired the Liberal police of
Pavas} Primavera} and Quebradanegra. Poor administration in the provinces
was simply often a result of the inability of the people to make their com-
plaints heard in faraway Ibague.
38. EI Derecho, October 23} 1943.
39. Ibid.} November 13} 1943.
40. Ibid.} Apri115} 1944.
41. Ibid., Januaty 18} 1936.
42. Juan Manuel Saldarriaga Betancur} EI regimen del terror, 0 16 anos en el
infierno (Medellin: Imprenta Departamental} 1951)} pp. 134-45; Augusto
Ramirez Moreno} La crisis del partido conservador en Colombia (Bogota:
Tipografia Granada} 1937).
43. Oscar Teran} ed.} La Constituci6n de 1886 y las reformas proyectadas por
la Republica Liberal (Bogota: Editorial Centro} 1936)} II} p. 13.
298 Notes to Chapter 4

44. Augusto Ramirez} La. crisis, p. 93.

45. Antonio Cacua Prada} His to ria del periodismo colombiano (Bogota:
Editorial Cacua Prada} 1968)} pp. 302-03.
46. James L. Payne} Patterns of Conflict, p. 168.
47. Silvio Villegas} No hay enemigos a la derecha (Manizales: Editorial
Zapata} 1937)} pp. 215-16.
48. Rafael Azula} De la revoluci6n, p. 116.
49. Colombia, Diario Oficial, Vol. 79, No. 25326 (August 20,1943), pp. 446-47.
50. Antonio Garcia, Gaitan, pp. 88-89.
51. Hugo A. Velasco} Biografla de una tempestad (Bogota: Editorial ARGRA,
1950)} p. 170.
52. Guillermo Fonnegra Sierra} El parlamento colombiano (Bogota: Graficos
Centauro, 1953)} pp. 188-90.
53. Colombia} Presidencia} Documentos relacionados a la renuncia del Presi-
dente L6pez y el orden publico, noviembre 16 de 1943 ajulio 26 de 1945 (Bogota:
Imprenta Nacional} 1945)} p. 47. At the time of G6mez's arrest, the president
was not in the country.
54. Jaime Quintero} Consaca. (Cali: Editorial Eza, 1944)} pp. 131-35. See also
J. A. Osorio Lizarazo} Gaitan, vida, muerte, y permanente presencia (Buenos
Aires: Ediciones L6pez Negri} 1952), p. 240; and Vernon Fluharty} Dance ofthe
Millions, pp. 71-73.
55. Luis Ospina} Industria y protecci6n, pp. 473-74.
56. Colombia, Presidencia} Un ano de gobierno, 1945-1946 (Bogota: Imprenta
Nacional} 1946)} p. 235.
57. Atilio Velasquez} El padre de la victoria liberal y el autor de la derrota
(Bogota: Editorial Kelly} 1946[?])} pp. 214-15.
58. Colombia, Presidencia, Un ano de gobierno, p. 235.
59. Ibid., pp. 236-37.

Chapter 4
1. Except where othelWise indicated, these and other statistics on Tolima
around the year 1946 are from Colombia} Contraloria General de la Republica}
Geografla econ6mica, VII} pp. 31-218.
2. Colombia} DANE} La. fuerza de trabajo en la producci6n de arroz y
algod6n (Bogota: DANE} 1973)} Cuadro Al.
3. Based on the 1938 census; in fact} probably higher.
4. Tolima, Gobernaci6n} Mensaje, 1946, pp. 5-6.
5. Colombia} Contraloria Nacional} Anales de economiayestadistica, suple-
mento a los numeros 17y 18 (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional} May-June 194~)} p.~}
gives the following results: Ospina} 565}849; Turbay} 441}199; Gaitan} 358}957.
6. Gonzalo Buenahora, Biografla de una voluntad (Bogota: Editorial ABC,
1948)} p. 147.
Notes to Chapter 4 299

7. Colombia} DANE} Boletin mensual de estadistica, No. 221 (December

1969)} 111-13.
8. La. Voz del Libano, July 20} 1946.
9. Ibid.} July 13} 1946.
10. Ibid.} June 22} 1946.
11. Ibid.} August 10} 1946.
12. It should be noted that nearly half of Colombia's national territory lies
outside the departments} in sparsely populated administrative units called
intendencias and comisarias.
13. A study of municipal voting in the 1930 and 1946 presidential elections
reveals that thirty-six of the nation's hundred most ConselVative-voting muni-
cipios were located in Boyaca and the Santanderes} and that forty of the
hundred most Liberal-voting municipios were located in those departments.
Citizens in the hundred most ConselVative-voting municipalities gave an
average of 85.96 to 100 percent of their votes to ConselVative candidates in 1930
and 1946; citizens in the hundred most Liberal-voting municipalities} 87.43 to
100 percent of their votes to Liberal candidates. Colombia} DANE} Boletin
mensual de estadistica, nos. 268-69 (Novembel'-December 1973)} 98-330.
14. Attributed to a writer in El Tiempo by Dr. Elias Sabogal in a speech
before the Assembly of Tolima in March 1933. Orientaci6n, April 8} 1933.
15. See} for example} an article titled uViolencia} la clave politica/' Semana,
January 4} 1947} on the II docility" of boyacenses in relation to the national
government and their Ilinclination to politics."
16. The small ConselVative vote in 1942 is partially explained by the policy of
party abstention in presidential elections.
17. J. A. Osorio} Gaitan, p. 189.
18. La. Voz del Libano, August 24} 1946.
19. El Tiempo, July 26} 1946.
20. Alberto Nifio H.} Antecedentes y secretos del 9 de abril (Bogota: Editorial
Pax} 1949)} p. 11.
21. Atilio Velasquez} Tres libros en uno (Bogota: Editorial Kelly} 1963)} p. 162.
22. Jorge Eliecer Gaitan} Gaitan, antologia de su pensamiento econ6mico y
social (Bogota: Ediciones Suramericana} 1968)} pp. 329-47.
23. Guansu Sohun} liLa novela colombiano de protesta social: 1924-1948"
(Ph.D. dissertation} University of Oklahoma} 1976)} p. 141.
24. In an article titled IIA HalVest of Martyrs/' Semana magazine described
the violence and its worst outbreak} that in Nemoc6n in northern Cundina-
marca} where six voters were killed. Others died in Boyaca} the Santanderes}
and Valle del Cauca. One person was murdered at Gualanday} Tolima. Se-
mana, March 29} 1947; La. Voz del Libano, March 22} 1947; Rafael Azula} De la
revoluci6n, pp. 256-57.
25. Semana, August 16} 1947.
26. Rafael Azula} De la revoluci6n, p. 224.
27. Ibid.} p. 225.
300 Notes to Chapter 4

28. Semana, May 31, 1947.

29. Ibid., May 17, 1947.
30. Rafael Azula, De la revoluci6n, p. 271.
31. German Guzman, La violencia, II, pp. 252-53.
32. Semana, May 17, 1947.
33. Ibid., August 30, 1947.
34. Ibid., May 17, 1947.
35. Russell W. Ramsey, tiThe Modem Violence," p. 144.
36. Colombia, Noticias de Colombia, September 1947, p. 705.
37. Ibid.
38. El Tiempo, September 4, 7, and 10, 1947.
39. German Guzman, La violencia, I, p. 240.
40. Hugo A. Velasco, Mariano Ospina Perez (Bogota: Editorial Cosmos, 1953),
p.128.
41. Semans, October 18, 1947.
42. La Voz del Llbano, September 13, 1947. It was the naming of military
alcaldes that drove Governor Gonzalo Paris Lozano to submit his resignation.
Ospina, anxious to maintain a bipartisan balance in governorships, rejected ~t.
43. El Tiempo, September 30, 1947.
44. Statistics on the four concejo elections considered here and below are
from Tolima, Anuario estadistico,1937, p. 43j 1943, p. 162j 1946-48, p. 332j 1947,
p.382.
45. In the 1937 election, they won majorities in 8 of 39 concejosj in 1943, in 7
of 32j in 1947, in 8 of 40j and in 1949, in 9 of 40. Nationwide the change was
striking. Before the 1947 election, ConseIVatives held only 194 of 800 concejosj
after the election, 350 of 800. Rafael Azula, De la revoluci6n, p. 283.
46. An excellent, though partisan, account of the events sUlTOunding Mon-
talvo's tlblood and fire" remark is that of Rafael Azula, De la revoluci6n, pp.
288-99.
47. Semans, December 13, 1947, contains a photograph of the incident.
48. Russell W. Ramsey, tiThe Bogotazo: Tentatively, as History" (unpublished
manuscript, University of Florida at Gainesville, 1969), p. 11.
49. La Voz del Llbano, December 27, 1947; January 3, 1948.
50. This description of early violence in Santa Isabel was pieced together
from news articles that appeared in La Voz del Llbano between February 28
and April 3, 1948.
51. Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, Los mejores discursos de Gaitan, 2d ed. (Bogota:
Editorial JoIVi, 1968), pp. 506-07.
52. La Voz del Llbano, Febrncuy 14, 1948.
53. Colombia, Ministerio de Gobierno, El gobierno de Uni6n Nacional y los
acuerdos patri6ticos, V (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional, 1948), p. 321. Ospina's
remarks were made during a nationally broadcast radio speech on February
13, 1948.
54. La Voz del Llbano, March 13, 1948. See also Semans, March 6, 1948.
55. La Voz del Llbano, March 6, 1948.
Notes to Chapter 4 301

56. Alberto Nino, Antecedentes secretos, p. 25.

57. La. Voz del Libano, March 13, 20, and 27, 1948.
58. Semana, April 3, 1948. Attributed to Mauricio Jaramillo of Liliano.
59. La. Voz del Llbano, April 3, 1948.
60. Semana, April 17 and 24, 1948.
61. Gonzalo Canal Ramirez, 9 de abril, 1948 (Bogota: Editorial IICahur," 1948),
pp.9-10.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p. 13. Zalamea Borda later insisted that he had spoken over
national radio in an effort to calm passions. ConseIVatives accused him of
treason.
64. Rafael Azula, De la revoluci6n, pp. 361-62.
65. Most of the offices were located in Calle 10, between Carreras 3 and 4.
66. Personal interview with Octavio Laserna Villegas, Bogota, March 28,1971.
67. Semana, April 17, 1948; Laserna interview.
68. Tolima, Gobernaci6n, Mensaje del Gobernador a la Asamblea, 1948
(Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1948), pp. 9-10. Varon's murderer was found
working on a finca near Ibague some four years later. Tribuna, FebIUaI)' 4,
1951.
69. Ram6n Manrique, A sangre y fuego (BaITanquilla: n.p., 1948), p. 48.
70. One of them was twenty-six-year-old Rafael Caicedo Espinoza of Al-
varado, a future governor of Tolima and Cabinet member under President
Misael Pastrana BOITero, 1972-76. Personal interview with Rafael Parga Cortes,
Ibague, Tolima, March 24, 1971.
71. Parga inteIView.
72. This description of the nueve de abril in Armero is from inteIViews with
Octavio Laserna, March 28, 1971, and Rafael Parga, March 24, 1971; La. Voz del
Libano, April 24, 1948; Diario del Tolima, JanuaI)' 27, April 10, 1953; Rafael
Azula, De la revoluci6n, p. 412; Gennan Guzman Campos, La. violencia en
Colombia, parte descriptiva (Cali: Ediciones Progreso, 1968), p. 58; and James E.
Goff, liThe Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia" (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, San Francisco Theological SeminaI)', 1965), pp. 340-41.
73. Accounts of the incident vcuy. Some Liberals claim Ramirez hurled the
bomb inside the church and was then seized; others say he threw it from the
church balcony and was then captured while in flight. The description given
here is taken from a lengthy account of the incident that was printed five years
later in Diario del Tolima, April 10, 1953.
74. Rafael Azula, De la revoluci6n, p. 412.
75. Canal Ramirez, 9 de abril, pp. 11-13. Those persons llfiring on the
people" from the Church of San Ignacio were snipers disguised in priestly
garb.
76. Parga inteIView.
77. La. Voz del Libano, May 15, 1948; personal inteIView with Luis Eduardo
G6mez, Libano, Tolima, March 5, 1971.
78. Tolima, Gobernaci6n, Mensaje, 1948, pp. 6-7.
302 Notes to Chapter 5

79. Semana, July 17, 1948.

80. Ibid., May 22 and 29, 1948. Data on the productive capability of the new
distillery are presented in Tolima, Secretaria del Gobierno, Informe del Secre-
tario de Gobierno, 1946, p. 35.
81. Semana, May 15, 1948.
82. Seven men were arrested in connection with the murder of Father
Ramirez. Semana, May 15, 1948.
83. Tolima, Secretaria del Gobierno, Informe del Secretario de Gobierno,
1949 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1949), p. 17.
M. La Voz del Llbano, June 26, 1948.
85. Parga interview.

Chapter 5
1. El Mundo, January 5, 1949.
2. Tolima, Gobernaci6n, Mensaje del Gobernador a la Asamblea, 1949
(Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1949), pp. 7-8.
3. Ibid., pp. 49, 50.
4. Parga interview.
5. Tolima, Gobernaci6n, Mensaje, 1948, pp. 9-10.
6. Eduardo Franco Isaza, Las guerrillas del llano, 2d ed. (Bogota: Libreria
Mundial, 1959), p. 9.
7. La Voz del Llbano, June 12, 1948; Gennan Guzman, La violencia, parte
descriptiva, pp. 65-66.
8. El Mundo, April 9, 1949.
9. Ibid., January 12, March 12, April 20, 1949; Russell Ramsey, ((The Modem
Violence," p. 204; El Tiempo, May 6, 1949.
10. El Mundo, March 29, April 2, February 16, January 27, 1949.
11. One of the earliest uses of the term to describe events in Tolima was
March 11, 1949, when La Voz del Llbano carried an editorial titled uLa
Violencia. "
12. Colombia, Ministerio de Justicia, Cinco aflos de criminalidad aparente,
1955-1959, II (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional, 1961), Anexo, p. 41; appendix B.
13. Tolima, Secretaria de Gobierno, Informe, 1949, p. 7.
14. Carlos Ueras, De la republica, p. 134.
15. Enrique Cuellar Vargas, 13 aiios de Violencia, asesinos intelectuales de
Gaitan, dictaduras, militarismo, alternaci6n (Bogota: Ediciones Cultura Social
Colombiana, 1960), p. 90; Semana, May 28, 1949; James M. Daniel, Rural
Violence in Colombia Since 1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965),
p. 56; Richard S. Weinert, ((Political Modernization," pp. 69-70.
16. Oscar Teran, ed., La Constituci6n de 1886 y las reformas proyectadas por
la Republica Liberal, II (Bogota: Editorial Centro, 1936), p. 13.
17. Guillenno Fonnegra, Parlamento colombiano, p. 188. For more on
G6mez's fear of Masonry, see Augusto Ramirez Moreno, La crisis, p. 93.
Notes to Chapter 5 303

18. Lately Thomas} When Even Angels Wept (New York: William Morrow}
Inc.} 1973)} p. 93 (speech to the Republican Women's Club of \Vheeling} West
Virginia); John Beaty} The Iron Curtain over America (Dallas: Wilkinson Pub-
lishing Co.} 1951)} pp. 172} 193 (speech to the Texas legislature).
19. One of the most thorough bogotazo scholars set the figure at 1,200 killed}
plus another 2}800 to 3}800 outside the national capital. Russell W. Ramsey}
ItThe Bogotazo}" p. 29. At one point} two broadcasters fell to arguing over
whether the revolution was by and for the Liberal party or whether it was a It

movement of the people against the oligarchs." Gonzalo Canal, 9 de abril, pp.
9-10.
20. Luis Nieto} La batalla, p. 287. For a lengthy Conservative interpretation of
the nueve de abril as a strategic international operation of the Kremlin," see
It

Joaquin Estrada Monsalve} .ABE fue la revoluci6n (Bogota: Editorial Iqueima,

1950).
21. G6mez's thirty-year-old son Alvaro was at least as outspoken against the
coalition government. On March 10 the laureanista newspapers El Siglo and
Eco Nacional opened a violent attack upon Dario Echandia, whom they
characterized as a ItLiberal Trojan horse," for they reasoned he would be the
Liberal presidential candidate for the 1950-54 tenn. Enrique Cuellar} 13 anos,
p.88.
22. Carlos Ueras} De la republica, p. 109.
23. Semana, June 18} 1949.
24. Juan Manuel SaldaITiaga Betancur} Laureano G6mez, 0 la tenacidad al
servicio de lajusticia y de la patria (Medellin: Editorial Granamerica} 1950)} pp.
113-14.
25. Guillenno Fonnegra} Parlamento colombiano, pp. 217-18.
26. Conservatives said the election was advanced so that the government
would not have enough time to invalidate fraudulent identification cards held
by Liberals. Hugo A. Velasco, Biografta de una tempestad, p. 269.
27. Enrique Cuellar discusses this plan of Ospina Perez and the Liberal
response in his 13 anos, pp. 96-109.
28. Guillenno Fonnegra} Parlamento colombiano, pp. 217-18. A photo of
Alvaro G6mez and others blowing the police whistles appeared in Semana,
August 13} 1949, p. 5.
29. Guillenno Fonnegra} Parlamento colombiano, pp. 233-38. The Septem-
ber 10 and 17, 1949} issues of Semana contain additional infonnation on the
shootings.
30. Juan SaldaITiaga} Laureano G6mez, p. 130.
31. Carlos Lleras} De la republica, p. 211. Lleras's speech was prompted by a
massacre of twenty-four Liberals at party headquarters in Cali on October 22.
The military governor of Valle} Colonel Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, had done nothing
to prevent hired assassins} known as pajaros, from descending on the Casa
Liberal and wreaking teITible vengeance there.
32. La Voz del LEbano, July 2, 9} 16, 23; August 27, 1949.
33. Semana, October 1,1949. Less fortunate were three bona fide Liberals of
304 Notes to Chapter 5

Ansermanuevo, Valle, who were mentioned in the same issue of Semana. They
were reportedly forced to eat their own ears and noses by a police lieutenant
named Mancera and then killed along with eight other Liberals.
34. La Voz del Libano, October 22, 1949.
35. Carlos lleras, De la republica, p. 212.
36. Guillermo Fonnegra, Parlamento colombiano, pp. 251, 254-55, 258.
37. The events of November 1949 are confused and controversial. For
example, Liberals never openly admitted that important party leaders wanted
to help finance armed uprisings in the provinces. However, Eduardo Franco,
Las guerrillas, passimj German Guzman, La. Violencia I, p. 64j Guillermo
Fonnegra, Parlamento colombiano, p. 259j Jorge Villaveces, La. derrota, 25 aflos
de historia, 1930-1955 (Bogota: Editorial JOM, 1963), p. 49j and most others
who have written on the period rather matter-of-factly state that was the case.
Top leaders did repeatedly urge the rank and file to arm themselves and
promised that help was forthcoming. Also subject to varied interpretation was
the shooting of Liberal notables on November 25. The picture of that event
commonly created outside of Colombia was one framed by Liberals: that the
attack was simple telTOrism against them to help solidify the ConseIVative
dictatorship. New York Times, November 27,1949, p. 21j John Martz, Colombia,
p. 95j Russell W. Ramsey, HThe Modem Violence/' p. 221j German Arciniegas,
The State of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 175j James
Daniel, Rural Violence in Colombia, p. 59. However, the shooting was not so
clear-cut. A more balanced interpretation of it emerges from a remarkable
document that was published under the title La oposici6n y el gobierno, del 9
de abril de 1948 al 9 de abril, 1950 (Bogota: Imprenta Nacional, 1950). This
pamphlet consists of two letters, the first signed by 144 prominent Liberals,
including Alfonso L6pez, Eduardo Santos, Darlo Echandia, Carlos Lozano y
Lozano, and Carlos lleras Restrepo, and delivered to President Ospina on
November 28, 1949. The other is Ospina's forty-four page reply, dated April 9,
1950. According to the Liberals, the shooting was Hwithout any provocation ...
directed not against those who lost their lives, but against the man on whom
the Liberal party conferred its representation when it thought it would be able
to vote" (p. 9). In his reply, Ospina condemned the Liberals' unsubstantiated
accusation that the killings were part of a plot against Echandia. Ospina
stressed that Echandia and the others were violating restrictions imposed by
the state of siege, that the police did not know who they were beforehand, and
that someone fired first at the three-man police patrol and wounded its leader
(p. 51). A good point of departure in fathoming the events of November 1949 is
HOe la huelga a la delTOta/' pp. 45-50 of La derrota, by Jorge Villaveces, an
essay depicting a waffling, confused, and distraught Liberal leadership that
made repeated errors of judgment during November 1949. At that time,
Villaveces was president of the Liberal directorate of Bogota and one of the
signers of the letter sent to Ospina Perez on November 28.
38. The author assumes that the data given in this chart, compiled by the
Colombian MinistIy of Justice, are accurate. The figures contained in it are
Notes to Chapter 5 305

only slightly lower than those compiled for Colombia as a whole by the United
Nations and published in the UN Demographic Yearbook, VIII. That publica-
tion shows a nationwide homicide index of 34.0 for Colombia in.the year 1960)
which made it the most violent nation in the world at that time. The
Colombian Ministry of Justice figure for that year is 29.6. See Paul Herbert
Oquist) Violencia, conflicto y politica en Colombia (Bogota: Banco Popular)
1978)) p. 11.
39. Tolima) Contralorla) Anuario estadistico, 1956, p. 321.
40. Eduardo Ospina) El protestantismo (Medellin: Editorial Bedout) 1956))
pp. 6) 101.
41. Eduardo Ospina) Las sectas protestantes en Colombia; breve resefia.
hist6rica con un estudio especial de la llamada "'Persecuci6n Religiosa,JJ 2d ed.
(Bogota: Imprenta Nacional) 1955)) pp. 139-40.
42. Ibid.) p. 71.
43. Specifically) Leonidas Borja claimed he was assaulted by a Conservative
between Playa Rica and Guadualito. He killed the man and fled to the
mountains. The police who came to retrieve the body abused Liberal campe-
sinos of the region) which caused some of them to join Borja. German
Guzman) La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 99-100.
44. Once in the 1950s Parga was informed by none other than Laureano
G6mez that he, G6mez) possessed infoImation about an assassination plot
against Parga. Thanks to the timely warning) Parga was able to avoid the
attempt. Parga interview.
45. Parga told of asking high-ranking police officials not to send sectarian
police to Dolores. He earned his nickname because he was formally educated
in England. Parga interview; Semana, November 12) 1949. Simply having an
influential friend-one with economic interests in a municipio threatened by
Violencia-was not sufficient in itself to dampen the impact there. Some
municipios, such as ChapaITal, experienced much conflict) though wealthy
and influential persons owned property in them. Likewise) no one of wealth or
fame hailed from AlpujaITa) a municipality relatively free of the strife.
46. Tribuna, September 3) December 10) 1950; February 21) 1951.
47. Russell Ramsey) ((The Modem Violence)" p. 233.
48. Partido Comunista de Colombia) Treinta aiios de lucha del partido
comunista en Colombia (Bogota: Ediciones Paz y Socialismo) 1960)) p. 88.
49. Manuel Marulanda Velez (((Tiro Fijo")) a lieutenant of IIChaITO Negro,"
devotes more than half his Cuademos de campafia. to discussion of these
battles.
50. Tribuna, September 27) October 6, November 1) 1950.
51. In his bitter diatribe Patricios 0 asesinos? [Patricians or Murderers?]
(Medellin: Editorial Ital Torina) 1969)) p. 304) historian Gilberto Zapata Isaza
derides the Liberal drive to raise money for the purchase of munitions for
Liberal guerrillas in the llanos: liThe sum was fantastic-on paper. But in cash
it didn't total eighty thousand pesos-for the purchase of eighty rifles at a
thousand pesos each! Nevertheless a frightening IUIDor began circulating in
306 Notes to Chapter 5

the government: a fortune had been collected! Now the guenillas would come
out well-armed and dangerous! They envisioned Ueras Restrepo dressed in
combat fatigues." See also Eduardo Franco} Las guerrillas, p. 63.
52. Luis Nieto} La. batalla, p. 216.
53. Colombia} Presidencia} Un ana de gobierno, 1950-1951 (Bogota: Imprenta
Nacional} 1951), pp. 180-81. Urdaneta's speech was made on July 26} 1951.
Shortly thereafter, on November 5} he became acting president of the nation.
54. Tribuna, April 3} 1951.
55. Ibid.} December 19, 1950; March 8, 20, 1951.
56. German Guzman, La. violencia, parte descriptiva, p. 105; Tribuna, May 5}
1951.
57. Tribuna, November 30} 1950.
58. See chapter 6.
59. The victims were probably ConseIVatives} who were killed in retribution
for the Libano massacre. But} by that time} so many campesinos of both parties
were dying that political coloration was becoming of only academic interest.
The massacre was undoubtedly closely connected with the Libano incident
mentioned above and described fully in chapter 6. Five to six hundred persons
died during the Violencia in Falan-one of every thirty residents! Jaime
Chaparro Galan, Un pueblo que venci6 a la violencia: Falan, Tolima (mimeo-
graphed} Falan} Tolima} 1968)} p. 12. The EI Topacio massacre is also treated in
German Guzman, La. violencia, parte descriptiva, p. 226; and Tribuna, Septem-
ber 30, 1958.
60. Russell Ramsey, I(The Modem Violence in Colombia/' p. 271} provides a
good technical description of how Salcedo's men set up the ambush.
61. Enrique Cuellar} 13 aTlOS, p. 124. By far the most interesting and com-
plete, though hardly objective, account of the attack on Ueras is given in
Gilberto Zapata, Patricios, pp. 338-57. The ladder by which the Ueras family
escaped was held in place by a laureanista, a former alcalde of Bogota.
62. Tribuna, Janucuy 17, 1953.
63. Most of the foregoing account of Tolima's worst single massacre is taken
from German Guzman} La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 100-101. Guzman}
who learned of it from eyewitnesses} states that 140 people were killed. The
mass murder is also treated in the context of Carlos H. Pareja's novel El
Monstruo (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nuestra America} 1955), pp. 157--62. Pareja
states that 130 were killed and provides a credible explanation for the
incredible act:1( • the drunken chulavitas began the march toward Cunday}
••

taking the bound prisoners with them. They had gone three kilometers from
San Pablo when something suddenly occurred to the second lieutenant: it
would be better not to take the prisoners to Cunday} where feeding them
would pose a problem since they were all poor people and nothing of value
had been taken when they were frisked. It would be more economical to lfix
things' right there. He had them enter a nearby hacienda and form a line....
127 lay dead after the second round of machinegun fire. Three had sur-
vived ... and the patrol attacked them with machetes until none remained
Notes .to Chapter 6 307

alive to tell the story." According to Tribuna, September 2,1959, at a later time
the secretary of government of Tolima distributed the fincas of the murdered
Liberals to Conservative pajaros.

Chapter 6
1. Libano was probably so named because its tall evergreens called to
mind the famed cedars of Lebanon.
2. Antioquia Vieja, or Old Antioquia, designated the state, or department, of
Antioquia, as distinguished from departments settled largely by antioquefLos:
Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindio.
3. For other comment on Parra and the Antioquian migration, see chapter
1.
4. Luis Eduardo G6mez, Monografla del Llbano y biografla de su fundador,
General Isidro Parra (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1961), p. 27.
5. Quoted in Eduardo Santa, Arrieros, p. 30. Santa's book is a history of
Libano, published to commemorate its first century of existence.
6. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
7. The first opinion is from Luis Eduardo G6mez, /tEl Libano"j the second is
from Eduardo Santa, Arrieros, p. 37.
8. Angee felt he had been cheated of his land. Over the next twelve years,
he petitioned the state and national governments for clear title to the six
hundred fanegadas of land that he had bought between 1853 and 1854.
Eduardo Santa, Arrieros, pp. 39-42, contains an exhaustive discussion of the
legal dispositions that surrounded the founding of Libano.
9. The /tPlano del Liliano, Area Urbana, 1874," which is in the municipal
archives of Libano, shows forty-three blocks neatly laid out in a north-south
configuration, each marked off into numbered, designated lots. Lot #1, at the
comer of the Plaza Mayor, belonged to Isidro Parra. See also Eduardo Santa,
Arrieros, pp. 53-66, for more detail on the layout of the cabeceraj and James
Parsons, AntioquefLo Colonization, pp. 96-100, for additional information on
this system of land distribution and urban planning.
10. Diego Monsalve, Colombia cafetera, pp. 543-45.
11. In his unpublished manuscript /tEl Libano," Luis Eduardo G6mez sets
the number at six hundred, distributed over the municipio.
12. See chapter 7.
13. Luis Eduardo G6mez, /tEl Libano."
14. Luis Eduardo G6mez, Monografla, pp. 33-34.
15. Dr. Luis Eduardo G6mez contends that this redrawing of boundaries
caused Violencia in those areas sixty years later.
16. Cf. Introduction.
17. Liliano's corregimientos, in order of size, are Murillo, Santa Teresa,
Convenio, TieITadentro, and San Fernando. La Yuca, later renamed EI Bosque,
became a corregimiento of Libano during the 1950s.
308 Note8 to Chapter 6

18. ColombiaJ ContraloriaJ Tolirna, pp. 82-83.

19. Augusto Ramirez Moreno J El libro, pp. 191-95.
20. \Vhereas a statue of Sim6n Bolivar dominates the central plaza of most
Colombian towns and cities J the people of Liliano have placed Isidro Parra's
crypt in the center of theirs.
21. Luis Eduardo G6mez Monografla, p. 15. Dr. G6mez was given that
J

information by General Antonio Maria Echeveni.

22. Cf. chapter 2.
23. See appendix A. HistoricallYJ two-thirds of all libanenses have voted
Liberal.
24. Some criticized the platform for not containing more planks favorable to
land reform J organized laborJ and other social issues. Accounts of the Ibague
convention are found in Felipe Paz and Armando Solano J Convenci6n de
Ibague, 1922 (Bogota: Editorial Cromos 1923); Gustavo Rodriguez J Benjamin
J

Herrera, pp. 253-57; Gerardo MolinaJ Las ideas liberales en Colombia, 1915-
1934 (Bogota: Tercer Mundo J 1974)J pp. 83-88; Jose Joaquin GueITaJ Estudios
hist6ricos, III (Bogota: Editorial KellYJ 1952)J pp. 17-18; and Otto Morales
Benitez, Muchedumbres y banderas (Bogota: Tercer Mundo J 1962)J p. 174.
25. El Carmen, September 8 J 1923.
26. Luis Eduardo G6mez HEI Libano"; personal inteIView with Alberto
J

G6mez Botero J Libano J TolimaJ March 3 J 1971.

27. Quoted from Palanco's report J in TolimaJ Secretaria, Informe, 1924, p. 6.
28. The text of the pact is reproduced in TolimaJ Secretaria, Informe, 1924,
pp.53-54.
29. liThe electricity anived on lines of fine wire J and now the city has good
light and much art; now we tell the moon he can go somewhere else."
Eduardo SantaJ Arrieros, p. 137.
30. After fifteen minutes of circlingJ his fuel nearly exhaustedJ the pilot set
his frail craft down in a providentially located pasture just west of the
cabecera. Captain Cuellar Vargas and his copilot J a Captain Cotrino J were
subsequently taken into custody by municipal authorities J who were unsure
of the proper procedure to be followed in cases of emergency airplane
landings on municipal property. Eduardo SantaJ Arrieros, p. 161.
31. For example J Villahermosa did not have a highway until 1957J and the
road connecting that town with Libano was not completed until the early
1970s!
32. Cf. chapter 2.
33. Renovaci6n, November 14J 1931.
34. Orientaci6n, March 25 J 1933; Laureano G6mez, Comentarios, pp. 3()-81.
G6mez was refening to the incident described in the Introduction of the
present volume.
35. Personal interview with Jose del Carmen ParraJ Libano J TolimaJ March 4 J

1971; La. Oposici6n, Februcuy 18 J 1934.

36. Juan SaldarriagaJEl regimen, pp. 115-17. This was not PaITa's first run-in
with Liberal police. In a letter protesting the naming of Aristides Duran as
Notes to Chapter 6 309

police chief of Liliano in November 1936 J he recounted the time six years
before when Durfm had prevented him from making a speech in Murillo. PaITa
and his group arrived in town just as a Liberal conference was ending. When
he rose to address the ConseIVatives Duran pushed a pistol into his chest and
J

ordered him to stop. By that time J a mob had gathered and might have
lynched PaITa had not he and his group beat a hasty retreat. EI Derecho,
November 14J 1936. Another ugly incident occurred in the turbulent year 1930.
Two Liberal notables Felipe Lleras Camargo and Rafael Parga CorteSJ naITOwly
J

escaped injul)' when set upon by ConseIVatives during political speechmak-

ing in Liliano. Young Parga} who had only recently returned from many years
residence in England} was still far from fluent in the language of his native
land; and his compatriots repeated with relish the sound J though stilted}
advice he gave to Lleras at that tense moment: "Francamente J Felipe} no veo la
raz6n para que procuremos el demunamiento de nuestra sangre." ("FranklYJ
Felipe} I don't think there is any reason that we should try to bring about the
spilling of our blood.") Semana, August 9} 1952.
37. Those newspapers are named in Eduardo Santa Arrieros, pp. 166-76.
J

38. Uni6n Juvenil, June 1945; personal inteIView with Carlota Gonzalez de
G6mez J Liliano} Tolima J July 10 J 1974; personal inteIView with Daisy de
Pifieros J Liliano} TolimaJ July 10} 1974; Eduardo SantaJ Arrieros, pp. 175-76.
Carlota Gonzalez de G6mez is the sister of Raul Gonzalez.
39. La. Voz del Llbano, December 14 1946. J

40. Uladislao Botero J founder of the village of Santa TeresaJ described one
such duel that was fought on the main street of his town in 1920. Alberto
G6mez Botero J to whom Uladislao told the stol)'J took delight in recounting it
to the author of this book in 1971.
41. La. Voz del Llbano, August 10} 1946.
42. Ibid.} September 6 J 1941.
43. Ibid.} Februcuy 28 J March 7 J September 26 J 1942.
44. Ibid.} March 18} 1942.
45. Ibid.} July 14J 1945.
46. Ibid. July 13 1946.
J J

47. Ibid. October 5 and 26 1946.

J J

48. Ibid. J November 8} 1947; April3} 1948. For more detail on Santa IsabelJ see
the Introduction.
49. Ibid.} Februcuy 7} 1948.
50. Ibid.} March 27 J 1948.
51. Ibid. April 24 1948.
J J

52. Ibid.} July 3} 1948; July 23 April 16 1949.

J J

53. Ibid.} August 13} 17} September 10} 17J 24} October 8 J l l J 1949.
54. Luis Eduardo G6mez refused the job J and a young ConseIVative lawyer
from Villahermosa named Eduardo Alzate was named in his place. La Voz del
Libano, July 23} 30} August 6 September 10 1949.
J J

55. Ibid. December 10 1949.

J J

56. Liliano was far from unique among Colombia's municipios in having
310 Notes to Chapter 6

Hvirtuous citizens" who were willing to compromise differences for the good of
the whole. Paul Oquist, in HViolence, Conflict, and Politics," p. 381, describes
the way political elites in Aguadas, Caldas, across the cordillera from Libano,
held annual IImutual allegiance" ceremonies during the years of Violencia
expressly to strengthen municipal resistance to the phenomenon. Aguadas is,
however, a ConseIVative municipio in a department where that party predo-
minated. The IImutual allegiance" ceremonies were, in effect, pledges by the
three-fourths ConseIVative majority that the Liberal minority had no need to
fear for their lives, migrate, fonn guerrilla bands, and the like. How different
was Aguadas from ConseIVative Santa Isabel, in Tolima! How tragic was
Libano, where local elites were overtaken by events that frustrated and
negated their best efforts!
57. La. Voz del Libano, October 11, 22, 1949.
58. \tVhen the withdrawal was announced, one libanense was heard to say,
HIt's too bad they aren't withdrawing the police. If they left me alone I would
respect the law." Tribuna, FebmaIy 25,1951; Parga inteIView, March 24, 1971.
Octavio Laserna, who was then governor, said that soldiers were stationed in
Libano lIat least through December of 1951." Although some officers and
enlisted men may have seIVed in the municipio, no pennanent anny installa-
tion was maintained there.
59. German Guzman, La. Violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 96-97.
60. Tribuna of Ibague, July 1-15, 1951, conveys the impression that civil life
had broken down all through the campo of northern Tolima, particularly in
the area of Libano and Santa Isabel.
61. \tVhether Almansa attacked the alcalde on July 16 or some days before is
disputed. Gennan Guzman, La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 96-97, says the
former; Luis Eduardo G6mez, IIEI Libano," the latter. See also Tribuna, July 28,
1951; personal inteIView with Alberto G6mez Botero, Libano, Tolima, March 4,
1971.
62. Luis Eduardo G6mez, IIEI Libano."
63. Tribuna, July 26, August 7, 1951. Tribuna for August 12, 1951, reported
the names of ConseIVatives who were killed in Libano over the previous month
and added that the guerrillas responsible for their deaths were at that moment
committing depredations in Lerida.
64. The source for Alcalde Rengifo's remarks is an unpublished manuscript
in the possession of Dr. Luis Eduardo G6mez's heirs, of Libano. G6mez and
Evelio Gonzalez Botero were the two who traveled to Zipaquira. G6mez,
though an eyewitness to many of the events described in his manuscript, was
not a disinterested obseIVer. By the same token, neither was Alcalde Jesus
Rengifo, who resigned his post three weeks after the alleged remarks from the
balcony of the Casa Cural. He did so after leveling a parting blast at the
IIbandits" of Libano, who he claimed were organized by outsiders from the
Valle de Cauca, and after exculpating himself for responsibility in the cemetery
affair. In fact, he commended himself and his assistant, Abel de la J. Guifo, for
ordering the police to stop firing on the Liberals. In his final account of the
Notes to Chapter 7 311

situation in Libano} Rengifo listed the names of fourteen Conservatives and six
Liberals who had been killed in the municipio since the cemetery shootout}
and said twenty-six houses were burned. He stated that calm had returned by
the first week in August and that families who had fled were starting to return
to the campo. Father Ruben Salazar and Conservative chief Eusebio Barrero y
Barrero were commended for helping stop attacks against Liberals who were
living on the outskirts of the cabecera. Tribuna, August 12} 1951.
65. Semana, August 11} 1951.
66. The officer's letter to Luis Eduardo G6mez is included in the latter's
unpublished manuscript ttEI Libano."
67. Personal interview with Luis Eduardo G6mez} Libano} Tolima} March 3}
1971; EI Siglo, April 27} 1952.
68. EI Siglo, April 6} 1952. Roberto Urdaneta had been acting president since
October 1951} when ill-health had forced Laureano G6mez to step down.
69. Personal interview with Mario Mejia Arango} Medellin} March 27} 1971.
70. EI Siglo, April 6} 1952.
71. Ibid. The news could not be sent from Libano because the guerrillas had
cut the telegraph lines between Libano and Armero.
72. Tribuna. September 11} 1954} contains an article on this phase of the
Libano operation. It also has a photograph of the orphans} who were} ironi-
cally} adopted by the police of Tolima and brought up in the Ibague headquar-
ters.
73. EI Siglo, April 7} 1952.
74. As in most figures of this nature} estimates vary widely. Those given here
are prudent compromises} based upon all available data. The Colombian Army
said that 250 guerrillas died in the attack; the Liberals claimed that 6 }OOO to
B}OOO persons were killed} most of them civilians. The author's estimate of
1}500 is in agreement with GeIman Guzman} La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp.
95-96; and Carlos Lleras} De la republica, p. 401. Saul Pineda} writing in
Tribuna, March 10} 1960} stated that 7}000 libanenses died during the two days
of military operations. The figures on housing are from Colombia} DANE} XIII
censo nacional de poblaci6n y II de edificios y viviendas (1964) (Bogota:
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica} 1970)} p. 99.
75. Personal and confidential interview with an officer of the Colombian
Army} Ibague} Tolima} March 12} 1968.
76. Juan Manuel Saldarriaga Betancur} De Cain a Pilatos, 0 10 que el cielo no
perdon6 (Medellin: Testis Fidelis} 1955)} p. 144.
77. Semana, October 12} 1953.

Chapter 7
1. Semana, September 7} 1953; GeIman Guzman} La. violencia, parte de-
scriptiva, p. 142; personal interview with Flor Marla Segura de EcheveITi}
Bogota} April 11} 1971.
312 Notes to Chapter 7

2. Fidel Bland6n Benio (Ernesto Le6n Herrera), La que el cielo no perdona,

pp. 291, 294. Bland6n was writing his historical novel of the Violencia in
southern Antioquia during the entregas. He was a Liberal priest who blamed
departmental political administrators for encouraging Violencia against Liber-
als through the use of chulavita police.
3. Manuel Marolanda, Cuademos, p. 103. The passage is from "Military
Dictatorship in Colombia: A New Reactionary Plot Against the People," a
mimeographed flier distributed throughout southern Tolima after June 26,
1953. The document is reproduced on pp. 102-05 of Cuadernos.
4. Manuel Marulanda, Cuademos, p. 76. "Charro Negro" was known by two
names: Fennin Chany Rinc6n and Jacobo Frias Alape.
5. Tribuna, July 23, 1953.
6. The best account of this ceremony is in Semana, September 7, 1953. The
Palacio del Mango ("Palace of the Mango"l, a nickname for the government
building in Ibague, was so designated because of the immense mango tree that
stood on the edge of the plaza across the street.
7. The interviews appear in Tribuna, August 5-8,1953, and are accompa-
nied by numerous photos.
8. Tribuna, August 6, 13, 20, 1953.
9. Documentation on the entregas in the Eastern Uanos is abundant.
COITespondents for Tribuna covered several of the ceremonies and returned
with articles and photographs, which appeared in the September 28 edition.
See also Diario del Tolima, September 18, 1953; Eduardo Franco, Las guerrillas,
pp. 314-29; and German Guzman, La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 142-57.
The 3,500 figure is from the count of General Duarte Blum, cited in Robert Dix,
Colombia, p. 316.
10. Tribuna, October 15, 20, 24, 31; November 17, 18, 1953.
11. Diario de Colombia, November 3, 1953. Photographs of the returning
refugees are in Colombia, Presidencia, 6 meses de gobiemo, p. 293.
12. Tribuna, July 24; October 30; November 26,1953.
13. Colombia, Presidencia, 6 meses, pp. 218-21.
14. See Robert Dix, Colombia, p. 117, for a short exegesis of what Rojas
meant by the "Christian and Bolivarian" principles to which he repeatedly
refeITed after June 13, 1953.
15. All of Rojas's utterances and actions point to this. For example} in early
March 1954 he began wooing the masses with promises that he would
intercede on their behalf; and, late that year} made good on his promise by
establishing SENDAS, the National Secretariat of Social Assistance rSecre-
tariado Nacional de Asistencia Social), an agency that unified all the nation's
welfare organizations. Rojas placed his daughter Marla Eugenia in charge of it}
in much the same way that Juan Peron's wife, Eva, headed Argentina's heavily
funded Social Aid Foundation. See Semana, March 8, 1954} for a report on one
of Rojas's earliest addresses to the downtrodden; and Robert Dix} Colombia,
pp. 118-19} for observations on similarities between rojismo and peronismo.
16. Colombia, Presidencia, 6 meses, p. 221.
Notes to Chapter 7 313

17. This historic interconnection was a cultural inheritance dating from the
Hispanic founding of Colombia in the mid-sixteenth century. It has been the
bane of reformers since that time and generates an ongoing stream of analytic
work under titles such as What is the Colombian Oligarchy?, Colombia: Outline
of a Seignorial Republic, Why the System?, and The Domination ofClass in the
Colombian City, to name only a few of the more recent titles. See Alfonso
Torres Melo} Que es la oligarqula colombiana.? (Bogota: Editorial del Caribe)
1966); Antonio Garcia} Colombia: Esquema de una republica sefiorial (Bogota:
Ediciones Cruz del Sur) 1977); J. Emilio ValdelTama} El sistema, para que?
(Bogota: Editorial Revista Colombiana) 1967); and Jose Fernando Ocampo,
Dominio de clase en la ciudad colombiana (Bogota: Editorial la Oveja Negra)
1972).
18. El Tiempo, March 25} 1954.
19. Richard Weinert} IIpolitical Modemization/' pp. 84-85.
20. The foregoing account is from Luis E. Agudelo Ramirez and Rafael
Montoya y Montoya} Los guerrilleros intelectuales (Medellin: Editorial Bedout,
1957)} pp. 17-21. Angel de Dios Arbelaez and Guillermo Hernandez Munoz,. the
soldiers who killed Jaime Pacheco Mora} were later court-martialed and
convicted for their act.
21. German Guzman, La. violencia, I} pp. 165-69; James Daniel} Rural Vio-
lence, p. 88; Russell Ramsey} liThe Modem Violence," p. 313.
22. Rafael Parga Cortes stressed this in conversations with the author. He
pointed out that violentos even made use of airplanes to transport stolen
coffee.
23. Tribuna, July 31, 1953.
24. Ibid., August 3, 1953.
25. German Guzman} La. violencia, I} pp. 186-87. The same inteIView can be
found in Tribuna, July 19} 1958. \Nhether or not his brothers eliminated
Arsenio Borja is not known.
26. El Tiempo, March 2} 1959; German Guzman, La. violencia, I, pp. 178-88;
James Daniel} Rural Violence, p. 87.
27. Luis Nieto} La. batalla, p. 247.
28. The Colombian Battalion is discussed in Russell Ramsey} ((The Colom-
bian Battalion." See also Russell Ramsey) liThe Modem Violence/' p. 308.
29. German Guzman, La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 166-69; Russell
Ramsey, ((The Modem Violence," pp. 328-29.
30. Colombia, Cancilleria) IIEI Excelentisimo Senor Presidente de la Repub-
lica da respuesta a la carta que Ie dirigi6 la Direcci6n Nacional Liberal,"
Noticias de Colombia, Serie III, no. 2 (June 14, 1955), pp. 8-11.
31. Ibid., pp. 1-7.
32. Luis Nieto, La. batalla, p. 249.
33. German Guzman, La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 161-62; Russell
Ramsey} liThe Modem Violence," pp. 326-29.
34. Semana, June 13, 1955.
35. German Guzman} La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 170, 172.
314 Notes to Chapter 7

36. Not much is known about the Cunday concentration camp because the
ItZone of Military Operations" was not open to the public, and the government
of Rojas Pinilla had no desire to publicize its existence. However, mention of it
is made in various secondary sources, and the Liberals who wrote Rojas Pinilla
the letter quoted from above mentioned Itthe death of prisoners under
custody of the authorities." The camp, Itwhere the summary execution of
prisoners of varied political leanings was carried out" is also discussed in
Partido Comunista, Treinta mos, p. 121; and German Guzman, La. violencia,
parte descriptiva, p. 176.
37. German Guzman, La. violencia, parte descriptiva, p. 178.
38. Alonso Moncada Abello, Un aspecto de la violencia (Bogota: Italgraf Ltda.,
1963), pp. 275,285,328-29. The first deposition was taken from Adriana Paez de
Moreno in the offices of the Colombian Intelligence Service rServicio de
InteUgencia ColombianaJ, September 2, 1958. The second was taken from Luis
Eduardo Romero Contreras, September I, 1958.
39. From a military communique cited in German Guzman, La. ·violencia,
parte descriptiva, p. 164.
40. Tribuna, July 12, 26, September II, 1955.
41. Colombia, Cancillelia, ItEI gobiemo nacional y los partidos politicos,"
Noticias de Colombia, Serle III, no. 8 (September 20, 1955), pp. 2-3.
42. Ibid., p. 3.
43. Tribuna, October 30, 1955.
44. German Guzman, La. violencia, II, p. 435.
45. See Saavedra's lengthy report on the Beneficencia del Tolima in Contra-
lolia del Tolima, Anuario estadlstico-hist6rico-geografico de los municipios del
ToUma, 1962 (Ibague: Imprenta Departamental, 1962), pp. 33-66.
46. Tribuna, October 12, 1956.
47. Ibid., December I, 1956. Estimates of the number of guenillas in Tolima
at that time range between 7,000 and 10,000. See German Guzman, La. violencia,
II, p. 422; and Tribuna, July 6, 1956. The military, desperate for success in the
Tolima operations, may have deluded itself into believing that few violentos
remained. Five days after Colonel Guzman's naive proposal, another high-
ranking officer fighting in the department, General Navas Prado, announced
that only about three hundred Itbandits, guerrillas, pajaros, chusmeros or
whatever name you want to give them are left, and most of them are from
somewhere else. They are not tolimenses." Tribuna, December 6, 1956.
48. The Ittrial," really an inteIView, was held some eighteen months later.
Tribuna, July 19, 20, 1958. A listing of the dates and places of murders
attributed to ItChispas" between 1955 and 1961 is in German Guzman, La
violencia, II, pp. 341-43.
49. Tribuna, December 30, 1956; German Guzman, La. violencia, II, pp.
341-42.
50. ItSantander" inCOITectly identified Yosa as a European. The Colombian
socialist called himself "Lister," after Enrique Lister, a leader of communist
guerrillas during the Spanish Civil War.
Notes to Chapter 8 315

51. Tribuna, March 16; April 11, 1957.

52. Luis Agudelo, Los guerrilleros, pp. 30~5.
53. Antonio Cacua, Historia del periodismo, p. 216; Tribuna, May 20,24, 1958;
Gennan Guzman, La. violencia, II, pp. 341--42.
54. See appendix D for figures on Tolima's participation in the plebiscite.
Nationally, 4,169,296 voted in favor of the aITangement, 206,864 against it,
20,738 cast blank ballots, and 194 cast null ballots. Jose de Jesus L6pez y L6pez
and Hilda Isabel Guevara de L6pez, EI plebiscito de 1957 y la alternaci6n de los
partidos politicos en la presidencia de la republica (Bogota: Editorial CaIVajal,
1966), p. 70.

Chapter 8
1. The remaining votes were cast for ConseIVative dissident Jorge Leyva,
who garnered 20 percent of the popular vote nationwide.
2. These figures are based upon an official report which states that 1,132
tolimenses were killed during the first nine months of 1958. The report,
reprinted in Tribuna, October 8, 1958, indicates that a 50 percent decline in
Violencia-related deaths occurred in August and September. At the time,
Tolima's population was about 800,000.
3. Tribuna, July 19-20, 1958; Gennan Guzman, La. violencia, parte descrip-
tiva, pp. 407--08. The conversation between the two men was transcribed by
"Mariachi" and released to Tribuna. It was later published in Gennan Guz-
man's study of the Violencia.
4. Luis Eduardo G6mez, "EI Libano."
5. Tribuna, May 23, 1958.
6. The other members were Father Fabio Martinez, Dr. Otto Morales
Benitez, Dr. Absal6n Fernandez de Soto, Senator Augusto Ramirez Moreno,
General Ernesto Caicedo L6pez, and General Hernando Mora Angueira.
7. The bandits who killed Carlos Lis were seeking the weapons carried by
his militaI)' escort. Parga inteIView; Tribuna, June 10, 1958.
8. Tribuna, June 24, 1958.
9. Alberto Ueras Camargo, Sus mejores paginas (Bogota: Campania Gran-
colombia de Editores, 1959), pp. 222, 225.
10. Darlo Echandia, Humanismo y tecnica (Bogota: Editorial Kelly, 1969), pp.
281, 182.
11. Ibid., pp. 267, 271, 173.
12. Tribuna, August 12, 1958.
13. Russell Ramsey, liThe Modem Violence," pp. 357-58.
14. Tribuna, September 3, 4, 6, 13, 1958. The communists of Gaitania, in
southern Ataco, were buying time. They did not intend to surrender to the
anny, as later events revealed.
15. Russell Ramsey, liThe Modem Violence," p. 402. Ramsey complemented
the army data with his own field research.
316 Notes to Chapter 8

16. GeIman Guzman} La violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 394-401} estimates

that 1}704 communist violentos were in Colombia at the inception of the
Frente Nacional, an inflated figure.
17. Literally transcribed} the note reads as follows:" 'El Fantasma' no dejara.
de actuar mientras los cachiporros no dejen de matar godos; mientras tanto
todo conselVador que asesinen} 'el fantasma' 10 vengara tarde 0 temprano en
cualquier parte del pais. Su amigo} 'el Fantasma'." Tribuna, Febn.uuy 14} 1961.
18. This description of the murders committed at Alto El Oso is taken from
an extensive account of the trial of those charged with the crime that was
printed in Tribuna, Janumy 14} 18} 1961.
19. Ibid.} August 1-25} September 1-8} 1959.
20. See appendix C} October 1959.
21. Jose del Cannen PaITa archives; Tribuna, May 20} June 8} 1960. Espitia
was a cousin of the man who was later convicted of having sent Yate to take
twelve lives at Alto EI Oso.
22. Most members of the gang were campesinos from Santa Isabel.
23. Tribuna for September 1959 reported the trials and convictions of several
pajaros in Ibague.
24. Cf. table 2. The gang of Yate G6mez probably fell into the Hpassive"
category specified in the table.
25. Victor A. Delgado} "EI delito sexual y la violencia/' Revista de las Fuerzas
Armadas, I (August 1960)} 609-13. Some violentos liked to force their victims to
eat parts of their bodies before killing them. GeIman Guzman} La violencia, I}
pp. 226-29} discusses various "cuts" perfoImed upon corpses by the violentos.
They were given such names as the "flannel cut/' Hnecktie cut/' Hmonkey cut/'
"French cut/' "ear cut/' and "salpic6n cut."
26. A fascinating autobiographical account of a soldier who infiltrated gangs
of violentos in order to sabotage them is Evelio Buitrago Salazar} Zarpazo the
Bandit: Memoirs of an Undercover Agent of the Colombian Anny, edited by
Russell W. Ramsey and translated by M. Muny Lasley (University} Ala.: Univer-
sity of Alabama Press} 1977). This account is exaggerated in places} but conveys
an excellent "feel" for the later Violencia.
27. GeIman Guzman} La violencia, I} p. 192.
28. Ibid.} pp. 192-93.
29. La Nueva Prensa, FeblUmy 8} 1963} quoted in Gennan Guzman} La
violencia, parte descriptiva, p. 408.
30. Alonso Moncada} Un aspecto, p. 226} contains the photo. The letter from
"Chispas/' printed in El Tiempo, September 15} 1962} was in fact sent to beauty
queen Olga Botero.
31. The subject of conuption in the legal system fOIms a special chapter in
the history of the Violencia. Literature of the 1950s and 1960s is replete with
condemnations of judges and police commissioners who routinely freed
violentos out of fear or because they received bribes. During the years under
examination here} the departmental press of Tolima contained many articles
Notes to Chapter 8 317

on this topic, such as the series appearing in Tribuna titled IIHow They Laugh
at Justice in Tolima" (May 2-13, 1959). Alonso Moncada, Un aspecto, pp. 35-44,
cites interesting documentcuy evidence on breakdowns in the system of
justice in Violencia areas and includes information on a particularly flagrant
case ofbribety that took place in Fresno, Tolima, in 1959 (p. 39). A more recent
study, Jaime Arocha, liLa Violencia in Monteverde (Colombia): Environmental
and Economic Determinants of Homicide in a Coffee-Growing Municipio"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975), pp. 158-67, details the process
by which the Colombian legal system malfunctioned in the region of Caldas
frequented by IIChispas" in 1961. Monographic studies on the problem in-
clude Jorge Enrique Gutierrez Anzola, Violencia y justicia (Bogota: Tercer
Mundo, 1962); and Eduardo Umafia Luna, El ambiente penal de la "Violencia))j
factores socio-jurldicos de la impunidad (Bogota: Tercer Mundo, 1962).
32. Jaime Arocha, liLa Violencia/' pp. 169-70, discusses the ability of ItChis-
pas" to make use of the highway network as well as the close connection
between violentos and merchants in southern Caldas. Arocha finds that
ItChispas" was used by petty capitalists in the rich coffee zone Itto maximize
their dominion over labor, haciendas, fincas and cafetales." This seems to
contradict studies which conclude that the Violencia was It an aborted social
revolution" and people like IIChispas" were social revolutionaries in the
making. The debate concerning the nature of Violencia is treated further in
chapter 10 of the present volume.
33. German Guzman, La. violencia, parte descriptiva, p. 406; Cromos, October
lS, 1965; Russell Ramsey, ItThe Modem Violence," pp. 430-31.
34. Literally transcribed, the message reads: ItCaravineros de Murillo: los
saluda su amigo Sangre negra quien los solicita el 21 al 25 de Dctubre en la
cuchilla de Requintaderos para un ensayo; llebense unos 150 compafieros a
ver si charlamos; los espero para probar su balor aber que tan guapos son
porque parece que ustedes pueden es en el pueblo; los espero; no bayan a
mostrar el miedo nila cobardia. Adios chulos pajaros, se despide su serbidor y
amigo Sangre negra. Viva la uni6n Roja y el M.R.L. y las campafias que a echo.
Los espero del 21 al 25, 0 asemos unos cortesitos manana domingo en esa
regi6n." The MRL (Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal) was a Liberal splinter
group that was formed and led by Alfonso L6pez Michelson in the early 1960s.
Sources for the discussion of ItSangrenegra" are Jose del Carmen PaITa
archives; German Guzman, La. vio Iencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 408-15; and
Cromos, October lS, 1965.
35. Tribuna reported the trial in its editions of April 14, 16, 22, 1957. The
remarks of ItDesquite" on why he became a violento were made to a young
libanense Liberal named Mario Mejia Arango. Mejia inteIViewed him at Cora-
lito, not far from the cabecera of Libano, in September 1963. It may well be that
the guenilla met with him to ease a guilty conscience over an atrocity he had
committed in Caldas the previous month. Personal inteIView with Mario Mejia
Arango, Medellin, March 27,1971.
318 Notes to Chapter 8

36. Alberto G6mez and Mario Mejia inteIViewsj EI Tiempo, September 16}
1962; Tribuna, July 9} 28} 1959. Alberto G6mez was one of those who saw the
body displayed in Libano.
37. German Guzman} La violencia, parte descriptiva, p. 409.
38. Since the 1920s life in Viota had been controlled by a communist elite
headed by Merchan.Immune to traditional political hatreds} the campesinos
there easily withstood Violencia. A scholar who specializes in the region has
written that tlwhen the government sent an armed expedition into the valleys
during the period of repression} the men of Viota-all armed and mobilized-
ambushed it and killed all the invaders. Thereafter the government left them in
peace." E. J. Hobesbawm} tiThe Anatomy of Violence/' New Society, No. 28
(April 11) 1963)} p. 17. See also Richard Gott} Guerrilla Movements in Latin
America (New York: Doubleday) 1972)} pp. 231-32.
39. Alonso Moncada} Un aspecto, pp. 354-55j German Guzman} La violencia,
parte descriptiva, pp. 418-19.
40. This scenario is suggested by a series of articles that were published in
Tribuna between July 7 and August 14} 1960} describing the pursuit of
IIMariachi" by tlPeligro" and the army. In the second volume of his study La.
violencia en Colombia, German Guzman indicates that} at some time between
1960 and 1963} IIMariachi" became an inactive guenilla.
41. Alonso Moncada} Un aspecto, p. 361.
42. The principal tlindependent republics" were Marquetalia} Rio Chiquito}
and EI Uraba (Antioquia).
43. German Guzman} La violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 68} 419; Russell
Ramsey} liThe Modem Violence/' pp. 415-16.
44. La. Republica, April 9} 1964j Voz Proletaria, April 20} 1964.
45. The letters are reproduced in German Guzman} La violencia, parte
descriptiva, pp. 420-22.
46. tlTiro Fijo" gives his perception of Plan Lazo in Cuadernos de campana.
47. German Guzman} La. violencia, parte descriptiva, pp. 443-44.
48. In the words of Russell W. Ramsey} an expert on the militcuy aspects of
Violencia} tlby the opening of 1965 it was difficult to pinpoint 500 violentos in
all the rural zones of the nation." Rams~y} tiThe Modem Violence/' p. 445.
49. The army's program} called Acci6n Clvica Militar (Militcuy Civic Action) is
discussed in more detail in chapter 9. See also James Daniel} Rural Violence,
p.129.
50. Tolima} Secretarla de Agricultura} La violencia en el Tolima (Ibague:
Imprenta Departamental) 1958)} pp. 11-14.
51. Paul Oquist} Violencia, conflicto, pp. 322-23.
52. Jose del Carmen PaITa to James D. Henderson} March 16} 1971.
53. The Jose del Carmen PaITa archive contains seven notebooks of autop-
sies that were performed in Libano between September 14} 1949} and March
31} 1954.
54. Indices of 30 per 100,000 are considered exceptionally high.
55. This estimate is based upon data contained in appendix C.
Notes to Chapter 9 319

56. Luis Eduardo G6mez inteIView; Roberto Pineda Giraldo, EI impacto de la

violencia en el Tolima: EI caso de el Llbano (Bogota: Universidad Nacional,
Departamento de Sociologia, 1960), p. 25; Tolima, Secretarla de Agricultura, La
violencia, pp. 20-21; Colombia, DANE, LajUerza. de trabajo en la zona cafetera,
p.209.
57. Colombia, DANE, LajUerza de trabajo en la zona cafetera, p. 27; Colom-
bia, DANE, "Monografia del Liliano" (unpublished study, DANE, Bogota, 1971),
p.9.
58. Roberto Pineda, EI impactoj Colombia, DANE, "Monografia del Libano,"
table 13.4.1. Others have reached similar conclusions. See William McGreevey,
Causas de la migraci6n interna en Colombia (Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Latin
American Studies, Institute of International Studies, University of California,
Reprint No. 301, 1968), pp. 212-13.
59. Camilo Torres, "La violencia y los cambios socio-culturales," pp. 94-152.
60. Camilo Torres joined Fabio Vasquez's communist ELN and was killed in
IUra! Santander during a skirmish with aImy troops in FeblUaI)' 1966.
61. Orlando Fals Borda, "Violence and the Break-up of Tradition," p. 198.
62. National- and departmental-level data are from Colombia, Cinco aflos,
Anexo I. The figures for Libano are derived from the portion of the PaITa
archives reproduced in appendix C. Libano's population between 1957 and
1963 was estimated at 50,000. The figure for 1951 was 42,980 and for 1964 it was
54,574, according to Colombia, DANE, XIII censo, p. 74.

Chapter 9
1. Victor Bonilla, "Tolima 1, biografia del primer proyecto de la refoIma
agraria colombiana," in Tierra (Bogota: Tercer Mundo, September 1966), p. 16.
2. Ibid.
3. Colombia, Ministerio de Guerra, De la violencia a la paz (Manizales:
Imprenta Departamental, 1965), pp. 69-97.
4. Reza Rezazadeh, "Local Government and National Development in
Colombia: A Study of Law in Action" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wiscon-
sin at Madison, 1973), p. 284.
5. Humberto Triana y AntolVeza, La acci6n comunal en Colombiaj resul-
tados de una evaluaci6n en 107 municipios (Bogota: Impre,nta Nacional, 1970),
p.16.
6. Matthew David Edel, "The Colombian Community Action Program: An
Economic Evaluation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968), pp. 106-08.
7. Humberto Triana, La. acci6n comunal, p. 35.
8. Colombia, DANE, La. jUerza de trabajo, p. 152.
9. Ronald L. Hart, "The Colombian Acci6n Comunal Program," pp. 306-33.
10. Matthew Edel, "The Colombian Community Action Program," p. 73.
11. In July 1960 ConselVative Senator Diego Tovar Concha said, "I do not
wish to be a prophet of doom: but if the next Congress fails to produce an
320 Notes to Chapter 9

Agrarian Refonn, revolution will be inevitable." The passage is found in Albert

Hirschman, Joumeys Toward Progress, p.193. Pages 192-213 of the Hirschman
essay summarize the political events sUITOunding passage of the law.
12. Victor Bonilla, tlTolima 1," pp. 14-16.
13. Ibid., pp. 52-61.
14. Colombia, DANE, Decimotrece censo nacional, pp. 159-60.
15. Colombia, DANE, Debate agrario, documentos (Bogota: DANE, 1970),
p.159.
16. EI Tiempo, October 5, 1967.
17. Colombia, DANE, Debate agrario, pp. 151-63.
18. Kenneth A. Switzer, tiThe Role of Peasant Organizations in Agrarian
Refonn: A Case Study of the Colombian National Association of Peasant
Governmental Services Users" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver, 1975),
p.61.
19. That inflation averaged 12.9 percent for the 1961-65 period and 10.2
percent during the years 1966-70. Between 1970 and 1974 Colombian inflation
averaged 15 percent per year. Latin America, Vol. IX, No. 21 (May 30, 1975).
20. Robert Dix, Colombia, p. 282.
21. There is reason to believe that Rojas did win a majority of the popular
vote. An insightful, retrospective analysis of ANAPO in the context of Colom-
bian modernization is Robert H. Dix, tiThe Developmental Significance of the
Rise in Populism in Colombia" (Houston: Program of Development Studies,
Rice University, April 1974).
22. Data on municipal voting in the 1970 presidential election, as well as in
the 1930 and 1974 contests, are presented in appendix E.
23. See appendix E.
24. Rojas received a cumulative 1,569 of 12,577 votes cast in those munici-
pios. Pastrana received 9,025. Some 1,271 blank votes were cast.
25. EI Espectador, FeblUaIY 21, 1971.
26. Ibid.
27. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 375-76.
28. Colombia, DANE, tlColombia-Refonna agraria e instituciones: Resul-
tados politicos," Boletln mensual de estadistica, No. 242 (1971), pp. 152-53.
29. Colombia, DANE, La. fuerza. de trabajo, p. 122. The Caja de Credito
Agrario, Industrial y Minero is one of Colombia's largest credit institutions.
30. Colombia, Ministerio de Agricultura, Organizaci6n campesina (Bogota:
Imprenta Nacional, 1967), pp. 127-32.
31. Colombia, DANE, Decimotrece censo, pp. 78-86.
32. Hans Jiirgen Piitz, EI desarrollo socio-econ6mico en Colombia (Bilbao:
Ediciones Deusto, 1968), pp. 70-75.
33. Tolima, Contralorla, Anuario estadistico del Tolima (Ibague: Imprenta
Departamental, 1966), p. 201.
34. Richard L. Smith, tlLos cafeteros: Social and Economic Development in a
Notes to Chapter 10 321

Colombian Coffee Municipality" (Ph.D. dissertation) University of Oregon)

1974)) p. 162.
35. Ronald Hart) "The Colombian Acci6n Comunal Program/' pp. 105-07.
36. Between 1960 and 1970 Tolima lost more of its population through
migration than any other department. The relationship between its decline in
population and increased government loans is discussed in El Tiempo,
Janucuy 3O-Februcuy 1) 1971; and in Ramiro Cardona) ed.) Las migraciones
intemas (BogotA: Asociaci6n Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina) 1970))
p.66.
37. Tolimenses reproduced themselves at a rate of 3.4 percent. Colombia)
Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario) Informaci6n bfJsica, pp. 19) 32.

Chapter 10
1. Notable exponents of ConseIVative) Liberal) and Marxist approaches to
Violencia etiology are discussed in the Introduction of this study. Richard
Weinert) "Violence in Pre-Modem Societies/' has examined the phenomenon
from the standpoint of political modernization; Jaime Arocha) "La Violencia/'
from that of political dependence; and Joseph Monahan) "Social Structure/'
from that of anomie.
2. The word "pattern" is used in the way that the word "structure" is
employed by many cultural historians) particularly those of the French
Annales school. That is) as "long enduring patterns [and] associated groups of
activities that change their mutual relations but slowly." This passage is from
Samuel Kinser's discussion of the word "structure" as it was used by Femand
Braudel. See Samuel Kinser) "Analiste Paradigm? The Geohistorical Structure
of Femand Braudel/' The American Historical Review, 86:1 (Februcuy 1981))
80-86.
3. Two excellent expositions on the political origins of Latin America are
Richard M. Morse) tiThe Heritage of Latin America"; and Glen Dealy) tiThe
Tradition of Monistic Democracy in Latin America." Both are contained in
Howard J. Wiarda) ed.) Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct
Tradition (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press) 1974)) pp. 25-103.
4. The process through which citizens selected their parties provides an
ongoing source of debate among Colombianists. See chapter 1. An excellent
recent discussion is found in Helen Delpar, Red Against Blue: The Liberal Party
in Colombian Politics, 1863-1899 (University) Ala.: The University of Alabama
Press) 1981)) pp. 1-59.
5. For comment on the metaphorical aspect of political ideology) see
Clifford Geertz) "Ideology as a Cultural System/' in David E. Apter) ed.) Ideology
and Discontent (New York: The Free Press) 1964)) pp. 47-76.
6. Rafael Azula) De la revoluci6n, p. 12.
7. The Morse and Dealy essays cited above contain information useful in
322 Notes to Chapter 10

understanding the inegalitarian origins of Colombian society, as does Fred-

erick B. Pike's HThe Social Matrix of the Andean Past," in The United States and
the Andean Republics (Cambridge: Hcuvard University Press, 1977), pp. 24-46.
8. Charles W. Anderson describes the process through which competing
"power contenders" are accommodated by dominant political regimes. His
essay is highly relevant to twentieth-century Colombian politics. See his essay
HToward a Theory of Latin American Politics," in Howard J. Wiarda, ed.,
Politics and Social Change in Latin America, pp. 249-65.
9. Charles W. Bergquist, Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910 (Dur-
ham: Duke University Press, 1978), p. 5.
10. Paul Oquist, Violencia, conflicto, p. 314.
11. A recently published monograph that dwells at length on economic
motives as a cause of the later Violencia is Jaime Arocha, La Violencia en el
Quindlo, detenninantes ecol6gicos y econ6micos del homicidio en un munici-
pio caficultor (Bogota: Tercer Mundo, 1979).
12. Alexander Wilde, "Conversations/' p. 67, phrases it as follows: tlUlti-
mately the best argument for emphasizing that political institutions (rather
than class or ideology) explain the breakdown of 1949 is the way democracy
was reestablished in 1958.... Democracy died as it had lived, oligarchical, and
so it rose again."
13. Rodrigo Losada argues that Colombians supported the Frente Nacional
not only because they perceived it as a mechanism through which the
Violencia could be ended, but also because electoral participation did not
noticeably diminish during the sixteen years that the bipartisan pact was in
effect. See his HElectoral Participation," in Albert R. Berry, Ronald G. Hellman,
Mauricio Solatin, eds., Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Co-
lombia (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), pp. 87-103.
14. Charles Bergquist, Coffee, p. 261.
15. A recent attempt to explain this movement toward nonrepresentative
government in Latin America is David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in
Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). The analysis of
nonauthoritarian systems, such as Colombia's, does not figure prominently in
the book.
16. A volume that traces liberal ideas in Colombia up to the year 1958 is
Gerardo Molina, Las ideas liberales en Colombia de 1935 a la iniciaci6n del
Frente Nacional (Bogota: Tercer Mundo, 1977).
17. Kalman H. Silvert indirectly spoke to this issue when he warned that
wholesale rejection of major belief systems because they have proved insuffi-
cient in some particulars is to fail to take advantage of the best that those
systems offer. To dismiss terms such as ttdemocracy" and ttcivilliberties" as
code words for political authoritarianism and economic exploitation, he
wrote, is to arbitrarily "throw out the best of the Enlightenment and of
classical Liberalism," and with it Htheoretical room for freedom." See Silvert's
HIn Search of Theoretical Room for Freedom," in Essays in Understanding Latin
Notes to Chapter 10 323

America (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues) 1977)} pp.
55-66} especially p. 58.
18. An excellent discussion of innovative approaches to the study of Latin
American political history is Peter H. Smith's Itpolitical History in the 1980s: A
View From Latin America/' paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Historical Association} Washington} D.C.} December 1980.
 Glossary

aguardiente: literally, "firewater"; a strong anise-flavored liquor taken neat.

a la carga: a battle cry; FOIWard!; Charge!
alcalde: mayor, or chief magistrate, of a municipio. In Colombia, the alcalde is
appointed by the departmental governor.
alcald1a: town hall.
aldea: hamlet.
anapista: follower of the ANAPO party.
antioquefio: person from the province, or department, of Antioquia.
arepa: a cornmeal griddlecake.
annefio: resident of Armero.
arrieros: mule drivers.
arroba: one arroba equals twenty-five pounds.
baldio lands: unsettled, nationally owned lands.
barrio:ne~borhood.
benemeritos: founding fathers; patriots.
bogotazo: the bloody Bogota riot following the assassination of Jorge Eliecer
Gaitan on April 9, 1948.
boyacense: resident of the department of Boyaca.
cabecera (de municipio): municipal seat; the administrative seat of a municipio
and usually its principal town.
cabildo abierto: open assemblies of the citizenry, usually called to discuss
matters of urgency.
cachiporro: pejorative word for Liberal.
cacique: Indian chieftain.
cafetal: field planted in coffee trees.
caldense: resident of the department of Caldas.
caldo: broth.
campesino: country person; fanner.
carga: unit of we~t; 125 kilos.
324
Glossary 325

caserlo: small, often isolated mral neighborhood.

caturra: type of coffee plant that does not require shade.
caudillo: military or civilian chieftainj leader.
cedula (royal): law or edict emanating from the Spanish Crown.
centavo: cent.
chichB1T6n: fried pork rind.
chulavita: pejorative name for police used by Liberals after the nueve de abril.
chulo: pejorative term for a Conservative.
chusma: pejorative term for a bandit of the lowest category.
collarejo: pejorative term for a Liberal used by Conservatives.
colona: homesteader.
compadre: godfather of one's childj close friend.
concejales: members of a concejo
concejo: popularly elected municipal governing council.
corbata: necktiej petty bureaucratj political hack.
corregidor: a provincial magistrate.
corregimiento: administrative designation for villages lying outside the cabe-
cera, or the municipal seat of government.
corte de salpic6n: salpic6n cutj cut to pieces. Salpic6n is a fiuit cocktail served
with ample amounts of natural juice.
costefto: resident of Colombia's Atlantic or Pacific coastal regions.
costumbrista: one who writes about regional customs and manners.
cuadrilla: gang of criminals.
cuchillo: literally, a Hknife"j an extremely steep ridge.
cura: priest.
designado: person designated by Congress to serve as president when the
individual elected to that office becomes unable to serve.
entrega: surrenderj abandoning of arms. This phase of the Violencia is known
as the Hperiod of the entregas."
fanegada.: variant of fanega, equal to 6,434 square meters or 1.59 acres.
finca: farm.
fueros: privileges, exemptions.
gaitanista: follower of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan.
gamonal: local leader whose social and/or economic position allows him to
exercise inordinate power over his fellow citizens.
garrapata: literally a Hfoot-grabber"j a tick.
gente de confianza: tmstworthy people.
gobernaci6n: government building.
"gobernista excessively willing to follow the dictates of the national govern-
Jl
:

ment, be it Conservative or Liberal.

godo: pejorative word for a Conservative, except when used by Conservatives.
guerrilla: cadre of guerrillas.
hijo de puta: son of a bitch.
jurado electoral: electoral commission.
laureanista: follower of Laureano G6mez.
326 Glossary

libanense: resident of Liliano.

limpios: literally) Hclean ones"; Liberal guenillas of southern Tolima during the
early 1950s.
lopista: follower of Alfonso L6pez.
manzanillo: deprecatory term for a local political leader who is without
scruples and interested only in personal gain and who selVes as an
intermedicuy between voters and elected officials.
mata: bush; shrub.
muchachos: boys.
municipio: basic political division of Colombian departments. In this study)
this word is used interchangeably with the word Hmunicipality."
negro: term of affection used for a person who has a comparatively darker skin.
nueve de abril: date of the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan.
paisa: nickname for a person from Antioquia.
pajaros: literally) Hbirds"; hired assassins who were active during the Violencia
and were so named because of their peripatetic nature.
panela: hard) caramel-colored blocks of crudely processed cane sugar univer-
sally consumed in Colombia.
paramo: cold) barren high country lying above the timberline.
parroquia: parish.
patria chica: hometown; native province.
patr6n: patron or boss; a person of standing in his community who is often
employer) godfather) and political adviser to his neighbors.
pegaduras: Hhard licks."
peinilla: small machete.
peronismo: the programs) actions) and beliefs of Juan Peron) of Argentina.
platano: plantain; large banana) eaten cooked.
primeras letras: elementary education; ABC/s.
quebrada.: small stream.
resguardo: communally held Indian lands.
residencia: a formal inquiIY into the conduct of colonial bureaucratic officials
upon conclusion of their term in office.
rojismo: the programs) actions) and beliefs of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.
mana: a square poncho.
santaisabeleno: resident of Santa Isabel.
tarjeta: card.
tienda.: small general store.
tiple: a treble guitar.
tolimense: person from the department of Tolima.
vereda.: rural neighborhood.
villahermosense: resident of Villahermosa.
violento: perpetrator of Violencia; literally) one who is violent.
yuca: a starchy tuber) also called cassava and manioc.
 Bibliography

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InteIViews
G6mez Botero, Alberto. Libano, March 4, 1971; August 9, 1973; July 11, 1974.
G6mez, Luis Eduardo. Libano, March 3, 5, 16, 1971; August 10, 1973.
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Outcome of the War of the Thousand Days." Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University, 1973.
ChapaITO Galan, Jaime. tlUn pueblo que venci6 a la violencia: Falan, Tolima."
Mimeographed. Falan, Tolima, 1968.
Delpar, Helen Victoria. tiThe Liberal Party of Colombia, 1863-1903." Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University, 1967.
De Roux, Gustavo Ignacio. tiThe Social Basis of Peasant Unrest: A Theoretical
Framework with Special Reference to the Colombian Case." Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1974.
Edel, Matthew David. tiThe Colombian Community Action Program: An Eco-
nomic Evaluation." Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1968.
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Goff} James E. liThe Persecution of Protestant Christians in Colombia." Ph.D.

dissertation} San Francisco Theological Semincuy} 1965.
G6mez} Luis Eduardo. "El Liliano." Typescript draft. Liliano} Tolima} n.d.
Hart} Ronald Lee. liThe Colombian Acci6n Comunal Program: A Political
Evaluation." Ph.D. dissertation} University of California at Los Angeles} 1974.
Helguera} Joseph Le6n. liThe First Mosquera Administration in New Granada}
1845-1849." Ph.D. dissertation} University of North Carolina} 1958.
Henderson} James David. "0riginS of the Violencia in Colombia." Ph.D. disser-
tation} Texas Christian University} 1972.
Monahan} Joseph William. "Social Structure and Anomie in Colombia." Ph.D.
dissertation} University of Wisconsin at Madison} 1969.
Oquist} Paul Herbert. "Violence} Conflict} and Politics in Colombia." Ph.D.
dissertation} University of California at Berkeley} 1976.
Park} James William. "Rafael Nunez and the Politics of Colombian Regionalism}
1875-1885." Ph.D. dissertation} University of Kansas at Lawrence} 1975.
Pollock} John. liEvaluating Regime Perfonnance in a Crisis: Violence} Political
Demands} and Elite Accountability in Colombia." Mimeographed. Stanford
University} 1969.
Ramsey} Russell W. liThe Bogotazo: Tentatively} as History." Mimeographed.
University of Florida} 1969.
___, liThe Modem Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965." Ph.D. dissertation}
University of Florida at Gainesville} 1970.
Rezazadeh} Reza. 'lncal Government and National Development in Colombia;
a Study of Law in Action." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin at
Madison} 1973.
Schmidt, Steffen Walter. "political Clientelism in Colombia." Ph.D. dissertation}
Columbia University} 1972.
Smith} Peter H. "political History in the 1980s: A View From Latin America."
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Associa-
tion} Washington} D.C.} December 1980.
Smith} Richard L. "Los Cafeteros: Social and Economic Development in a
Colombian Coffee Municipality." Ph.D. dissertation} University of Oregon}
1974.
Sohn, Guansu. liLa novela colombiana de protesta social: 1924-1948." Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Oklahoma at Nonnan, 1976.
Switzer} Kenneth Allen. liThe Role of Peasant Organizations in Agrarian Re-
form: A Case Study of the Colombian National Association of Peasant
Governmental Services Users." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver, 1975.
Weinert} Richard S. lipolitical Modernization in Colombia." Ph.D. dissertation}
Columbia University} 1967.

Archives
Liliano} Tolima} Colombia. Jose del Carmen PaITa archive.
 Index

Abadia Mendez, Miguel, 78 50, 53, 54, 146, 188, 207, 247-48, 287 (n.
Abstention, electoral: of 1935, 84, 89, 90, 45), 307 (n. 2)
100; of 1949, 139-40 Antioquian migration, 18, 47, 56, 96, 153,
Acci6n C£vica Militar, 231, 318 (n. 49) 157, 159, 291 (n. 51), 307 (n. 3)
Acci6n Comunal (Community Action), ANUC rAsociaci6n Nacional de Usuarios
231-32,234 Campesinos), 237-38
Agrarian refonn. See INCORA, Law 200 of Anzoategui (Tolima), 22, 47, 53,74,96,113-
1936, Law 135 of 1961 14, 139, 164, 170, 211, 287 (n. 52)
Aguadas (Caldas), 310 (n. 56) Arango Velez, Carlos, 169
Alianza. Nacional Popular (National Popu- Aranguren, William ("Desquite"), 8, 205,
lar Alliance). See ANAPO 208, 212, 215, 216-18, 317 (n. 35)
Almansa, Antonio, 175, 310 (n. 61) Arboleda, Jorge, 207
AlpujaITa (Tolima), 98,204,236,305 (n. 45) Arciniegas, Angel Antonio (Governor), 172-
Alto El Oso (Liliano), 208-11, 226, 316 (n. 73
18) Arciniegas, Gennan, 3
Alto El Toro (Liliano), 180 Arenas, Pedro Manuel, 109
Alvarado (Tolima), 125, 145, 203 Argentina, 50, 186, 312 (n. 15)
Amador, Rafael, 23 Armenia (Caldas), 214-15
Ambalema (Tolima), 41, 46, 56, 68,198,235 Armero (Tolima), 21, 56, 80, 96, 121-25, 179,
Amnesty, 182, 190, 206-{)7, 212. See also 197,226
Entregas
Armero, carlot, 31
ANAPO (National Popular Alliance), 235,
Armero, Leon, 31
320 (n. 21)
Andes mountains: Central Cordillera of, Army (Armed Forces), 5, 83, 86,92, 107, 113,
18, 28, 47, 153; Eastern Cordillera of, 18, 115,118,127,128,140,150,151,174,180,
103 182, 191-202, 207, 211-23, 231, 249, 296
Angee, Desire, 154-55, 307 (n. 8) (n. 15), 297 (n. 30), 310 (n. 56), 314 (n. 36)
Angel, Augusto, 4 Assembly of Tolima, 57-65, 81,99,102,117,
Annales school, 321 (n. 2) 130, 152, 166, 184
Ansennanuevo (Valle), 304 (n. 33) Ataco (Tolima), 96, 98, 147, 184, 203, 206,
Antioquia, department of, 4, 18, 38, 40, 44, 236, 315 (n. 14)

341
342 Index

Atlantic coast. See Colombia, Caribbean Bosque, El. See Yuca, La

coast of Botero, Olga, 316 (n. 30)
Athintico (department 00, 53 Botero, Uladislao, 56, 157, 293 (n. 29), 309
Aya, Maximiliano, 78 (n.40)
Azula BaITera, Rafael, 3, 107, 244 Boyaca (department 00, 4, 14, 21, 89, 103,
104, 109, 113-15, 127-29, 131, 137, 141,
Baltazar, Don (Coyaima chieftain), 28, 289 146, 159, 165, 171, 188, 207-08, 247, 248,
(n.7) 287 (n. 45), 299 (n. 13, n. 15, n. 24)
Banana zone massacre of 1928, 71 Boyaca, Battle of, 31, 34
Banco Cafetero, 239 Builes, Bishop Miguel Angel, 133
BanditI)', 115, 147, 149, 150, 167, 174, 176- Buitrago Salazar, Evelio, 316 (n. 26)
77,179-80,203,208,314 (n. 47). See also
Libano, criminality in; Tolima, crimi- Caballero Calderon, Eduardo, 4, 139
nality in Cabildo abierto, 121,200-201
Barrancabermeja (Santander), 107 Cacique, 113, 289 (n. 15)
BaITero y BaITero, Eusebio, 311 (n. 64) Cadiz, Cortes of, 34
Beauvoir, Simone de, 223 Caicedo, Daniel, 4
Belalcazar, Sebastian de, 27 Caicedo, General Domingo, 34-36, 37,40,
Beneficencia del ToUrna, 198 41
Bermu Triana, Silvestre (IiCapitan Media- Caicedo, Luis, 36, 40
vida"), 201 Caicedo Espinoza, Rafael, 125, 301 (n. 70)
Betancur Cuartas, Belisario, 236 Caicedo LOpez, General Ernesto, 315 (n. 6)
Bipartisan government, 52, 54, 102, 104-{)5, Cairo (Valle), 215
111-13, 202, 234, 236, 247. See also Na- Caja Agraria rCaja de Credito Agrario, In-
tional Front dustrial y Minero), 238-39, 320 (n. 29)
Blanco, Luis M., 109 Cajamarca (Tolima), 19
Blandon Berno, Fidel (Ernesto Leon Her- Calarca (Caldas), 214
rera) , 4, 312 (n. 2) Calarca (Pijao chieftain), 28, 289 (n. 7)
Bogota, 15,28,29,30,32,34,40,41,52,62, Caldas (department oft, 19, 20, 53, 71, 129,
66,81,92,98,104,106,107,109,113,116, 146, 171, 174, 188-89, 191, 205, 208, 214,
120, 121-22, 131, 133, 138, 148, 151, 170, 248, 307 (n. 2), 317 (n. 35)
187-88, 202-03, 221-22, 248 Cali (Valle), 105, 107, 108, 138, 182, 201
Bogotazo,2,ll,l17-19,122,133-34,303(n. Campoalegre (Libano), 177
19). See also Nueve de abril IlCanada" (hacienda), 77-80, 233, 296 (n.
Bolivar (department 00, 89, 287 (n. 45) 21)
Bolivar, Simon, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, Cano, Gabriel, 187
147 Cano, Maria, 68, 69, 71
Bolivar, Vicente, 34 Cantillo Agudelo, David riEl Triunfante"),
Bolshevik uprising of 1928, 69-72, 165, 295 144, 184, 190
(n. 66, n. 68) Capitanejo (Santander), 103
Bonilla, Ricardo, 99 Caqueta (intendency 00,222
Borja, Arsenio (IiSantander"), 144, 189-90, Cardenas, Leonidas, 56, 60
331 (n. 25) Cardona Arias, Ernesto, 176
Borja, Captain General Juan de, 28 Caribbean. See Colombia, Caribbean coast
Borja, Jaime (IiSargento Carino"), 182 of
Borja, Leonidas (IIEI Lobo," IITeniente Cannen, El, 67, 160-61
Tranquilo"), 144, 182, 190, 305 (n. 43) Caro, Jose Eusebio, 39, 82
Borja, Tiberio ("Cordoba"), 144, 182-84, Caro, Miguel Antonio, 188
189 Casabianca (Tolima), 47, 161, 164, 169
Index 343

Casabianca, Governor Abel, 67 Cocora Canyon (Rovira), 200

Casabianca, General Manuel, 20, 46-47, 59, Coello (Tolima), 42, 68, 80
157, 160 Coffee. See Federacion Nacional de Cafe-
Casafranco, Pablo E., 175 teros; Liliano (Tolima), coffee in; Tolima,
Casa Liberal Massacre (1949), 182, 188 coffee in
Casas Viejas (Liliano), 153, 159 Cold war, 3, 192-98
Casa Verde (Ataco), 203, 206 Colombia, Caribbean coast of, 246; demo-
Castafio, Ciro, 207, 219 cratic tradition of, 251; economic his-
Castillo, Carlos del, 137 tory of, 251-52; inflation in, 235, 320 (n.
Castro, Fidel, 219-21 19); legal system, 214, 217, 316-17 (n. 31);
Castro, Julio, 152 political culture, 203-05, 244-47, 313 (n.
Catholic church. See Church, Roman 17),322 (n. 8, n. 12); breakdown in 1940s,
Catholic 90-93; political ideas in, 252; regional-
Cauca (department ofl, 29, 68, 118, 188, ism in, 32, 52-53, 244-52; social struc-
205, 221, 247, 287 (n. 45) ture, 321-22 (n. 7); urbanization in, 250.
Cauca River Valley, 27, 47, 153 See also Liberal and ConseIVative par-
Caudillo, 32, 33-34, 37,44,50,52,65,289 (n. ties, strife between; Voting patterns
15) Colombian Battalion, The, 187, 191, 313 (n.
Chamber of Representatives, 99, 114, 130- 28)
31 Colombian Intelligence SeIVice (SIC), 197,
Chaparral (Tolima), 28, 41, 42, 53, 59, 83, 96, 314 (n. 38)
121,125,149,190,200,232,236,249,289 Colombian Tobacco Company, 216
(n. 7), 305 (n. 45) IICo16n" (hacienda), 115
Chaplin, Charlie, 165 Colonialism, internal, 290 (n. 19)
IICharro Negro." See Prfas Alape, Jacobo Colonos. See Squatters
Chany, Hector, 52, 53 Communications, mass media, 103-04
Chany Rinc6n, Fermin flChanu Negro"). Communism, 26, 69-71, 75, 80, 133, 144,
See Prfas Alape, Jacobo 146, 182, 191-98, 207, 218-23, 229, 247,
Chaux, Francisco Jose, 296 (n. 16) 249, 315 (n. 16), 318 (n. 38)
Chicoral (Tolima), 234 Communist Party of Colombia, 71, 146-47,
IIChispas." See Rojas Varon, Te6filo 224, 296 (n. 9)
Choc6 (department ofl, 287 (n. 45) Communists, conspiracy theories con-
Chulavita (Boyaca), 21 cerning, 2, 14, 132, 191-96, 205
Chulavita (ConseIVative police), 21-22, 115, Community Action. See Accion Comunal
117, 144, 174-75, 306 (n. 63), 312 (n. 2) Comuneros, revolt of, 30-31, 289 (n. 14)
Church, Roman Catholic, 32, 172, 176,201, Concejos (municipal councils), 113, 115,
243; and labor organization, 67-69, 92, 125,127,130-31,160,163,165,170,172-
160-61; and Violencia, 198-99. See also 73
Protestants Concordat of 1887, 92, 160
Churchill, Winston, 133 Confederacion de Trabajadores Colom-
Church-state relations, 82, 243 bianos (CTC), 107-08
Civil Guard, 80 Congress of Colombia, 2, 89, 108, 112, 136
Civil wars. See War, civil IIConsaca" (hacienda), 92
Claridad, 80 ConseIVative party, 20, 40-41, 84, 244; di-
Class consciousness, 147. See also Violen- rectorate of, 166. See also Liberal and
cia, class consciousness and ConseIVative parties
Clientelism, 7, 79, 238, 244, 290 (n. 23), 293 ConseIVative presidency, 11
(n. 40); political, 10, 34-36, 62-63, 244, Constituent assembly of 1910, 54-55
293 (n. 40) Constitution of 1853, 38
344 Index

Constitution of 1863 (Rio Negro Constitu- "Echeverri Raid" of 1913, 57, 63, 74, 160
tion), 38, 46 Ecuador, 246
Constitution of 1886, 46, 50 Elections: of 1904, 52; of 1923, 160-63; of
Constitution of the State of Mariquita of 1930,65,72,75, 165; of 1934, 81; of 1942,
1815,32-33 91, 169; of 1946, 101, 169, 298 (n. 5); of
"Contreras," estate of Luis Caicedo, 36, 40 1947, 106, 113, 300 (n. 45); of 1949, 130-
Convenio (LIbano), 56, 64, 104, 157, 168, 31, 138; 1949 presidential, 139-40, 147,
172, 175-77, 239, 307 (n. 17) 172; of 1970, 320 (n. 21)
Coralito (LIbano), 317 (n. 35) Electoral fraud, 64-65, 84, 88, 90, 113, 137,
Cordillera, La, 56 160....61. See also Political corruption
Cortes, Enrique, 45 ELN (Army of National Liberation), 319 (n.
Costa Pinto, L. A., 7 60)
Costeflo. See Colombia, Caribbean coast of Entregas, 183-84, 188-89, 206-07. See also
Coyaima (Tolima), 69, 75, 80, 149, 236 Amnesty
Cronista, EI, 56 Escobar, Leonidas, 101, 169, 173
Cruz Usma, Jacinto C'Sangrenegra"), 8, "Escocia" (hacienda), 77, 80, 233, 296 (n.
205, 208, 215-16, 218 21)
Cuchillo del Tambo, battle of, 34 Espectador, EI, 101, 151, 182, 187,236
Cuchillo de Requintaderos (Liliano), 216 Esperanza, La (Rovira), 212
Cuellar Vargas, Captain, 308 (n. 30) Espinal (Tolima), 98, 138, 236
Cuellar Velandia, Colonel/Governor Cesar, Espinoza, Andres ("Coronel Nariiio"), 182
183, 189, 197
Cunday (Tolima), 77-78, 80, 128, 152, 194, Falan (Tolima), 150, 306 (n. 59)
195, 231-34, 249, 297 (n. 23), 306 (n. 63), Fals Borda, Orlando, 4, 6-7, 222, 284 (n. 15)
314 (n. 36) Federaci6n Nacional de Cafeteros, 238-39,
Cunday Coffee Company, 80 241,250. See also National Federation of
Cundinamarca (department ofl, 15, 29, 40, Coffee Growers
46,82,89,106,146-47,152,185,188,207, Fedennann, Nikolas, 28
219,249,287 (n. 45),299 (n. 24) Ferdinand VII, 30
Fernandez de Soto, Absalon, 315 (n. 6)
Debray, Regis, 223 Ferreira, Antonio, 56
Derecho, EI, 86, 88, 89, 119, 198 First Workers Congress of 1924, 68
jjDesquite." See Aranguren, William Flandes (Tolima), 98
Diaz, Eran, 68 Forero, Hector, 138
Diaz, Porfirio, 54 Forero Gomez, Colonel Hernando, 193-94
Dix, Robert H., 286 (n. 32) Frank, Waldo, 2
Doima (Tolima), 68 Fraud in elections. See Electoral fraud,
Dolores (Tolima), 143-45, 146, 184, 195, 204 Political corruption
Duque GOmez, Luis, 9 Frente Nacional. See National Front
Fresno (Tolima), 47, 114, 124, 127, 170
Eastern Uanos. See Llanos
Echandia, Dario, 119, 134, 137-40, 205, 303 Gacheta massacre, 91, 137
(n. 21), 304 (n. 37) Gaitan, Gloria, 296 (n. 14)
Echeveni, General Antonio Maria, 56-58, Gaitan, Jorge Eliecer, 3, 11, 24, 100, 101,
62, 63, 64, 157, 163, 169, 293 (n. 32), 308 104-06,111-13,115-23,128-30,133,170,
(n.21) 187,246
Echeveni, Juan B., 71 Gaitania (Tolima), 219, 221-23, 231, 315 (n.
Echeveni Cardenas, Hector, 149, 181, 197- 14)
201 Gaitanistas, 106, 116-117
Index 345

Gaitan Mahecha, Bernardo, 9 Guamo (Tolima), 53, 98, 128, 234, 236
Galan, Jose Antonio, 30 IIGuatimbol" (hacienda), 78, 80, 233, 296 (n.
Galeano, General Rafael, 178-79 21)
Galindo, Anihal, 42, 49 Guenillas, 128, 140, 151, 174, 175-76, 177-
Galindo, Tadeo, 42-44 80, 182-229, 247, 249, 314 (n. 47); com-
Gamonal, 32, 33, 52, 227, 289 (n. 15) munist guerrillas, 182, 184, 188, 191,
Garcia, Antonio, 3, 91 200-01, 207-08, 218-23, 316 (n. 16). See
Garcia, Jose ('ITerror"), 200 also LIbano, guenillas in; Tolima, guer-
Garcia, Leopoldo (IiGeneral Peligro"), 147, rillas in
199-200,206,219, 318 (n. 40) Guevara, Ernesto IIChe," 221
Garcia, Pablo E. (IiMirUs"), 200 GutieITez, Marco Tulio, 85-86
Garcia Marquez, Gabriel, 246, 284 (n. 13) GutieITez, Uriel, 103
Genova (Caldas), 191 Guzman Acevedo, Colonel Alfonso, 199-
Giap, Vo Nguyen, 222 200, 314 (n. 47)
Gide, Andre, 2 Guzman Campos, German, 4-7, 9, 14, 198-
Gilhodes, PieITe, 8 99, 204, 212-13, 222, 286 (n. 45), 288 (n.
Giraldo, Jose (IiCapitan Pimienta"), 200 66), 306 (n. 63)
Girardot (Cundinamarca), 18, 66, 68, 287
(n.49) Hagen, Everett, 9
Gomez, Aristobulo ('IGeneral Santander"), Headless ridge (Lihano), 168, 179
200 Henderson, James David, 287 (n. 45)
Gomez, Laureano, 2, 3, 9, 89-92, 100, 104, Hernandez, Luis Carlos C1Capitan Tar-
108, Ill, 113, 132-40, 146-49, 166, 174, zan"), 200
176,181,182,186,192,202,228,236,247, HeITera (Rioblanco), 206
288 (n. 69), 298 (n. 53), 303 (n. 21), 305 (n. HeITera, Benjamin, 55, 160
44),311 (n. 68); on Liberal party, 90, 91, HeITera, Colonel Hernando, 125, 127-28,
100-01,104-06,108,118, 132-33; on ma- 129
jority rule, 91-92, 131-33; on Masonry, HeIVeo (Tolima), 47, 53, 86, 98, 161, 164,
90, 92, 132, 135, 302 (n. 17) 169-70, 287 (n. 52)
Gomez, Luis Eduardo, 173,294 (n. 42), 308 Hitler, Adolph, 91
(n. 21), 309 (n. 54), 310 (n. 64) Hobsbawm, E. J., 8
Gomez Botero, Alberto, 309 (n. 40), 318 (n. Honda (Tolima), 15, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 41, 42,
36) 49,60,66,68,80,81,85,96,123,125,163,
GOmez Hurtado, Alvaro, 236, 303 (n. 21) 230,235
Gonzalez, Governor Francisco, 177-80 Huila (department ofl, 4, 53, 98, 146, 219,
Gonzalez, Luis V., 60 247,287 (n. 45)
Gonzalez, Mamerto, 172
Gonzalez, Mercedes, 155 Ibague (Tolima), 18,21,22,28,29,41,42,53,
Gonzalez, Miguel Angel, 6 62,66,68,81,83,85,87,92,96,102,116,
Gonzalez, Roberto (IiPedro Brincos"), 215, 117-20, 128-29, 138-39, 143, 149, 160,
218 181, 185, 199,204,214-15,248,297 (n.37)
Gonzalez Botero, Evelio, 310 (n. 64) Ibague Convention of 1922, 160, 308 (n. 24)
Gonzalez Londono, Raul, 167 Icononzo (Tolima), 77-79, 80, 98, 233, 236,
Gran Tolima, 9, 27-48, 53, 55 296 (n. 15)
Grimaldo, Luis, 116 IIIcononzo, The Pacts of," 8(}-81
Guaca (Santander), 103 INCORA (Instituto Colombiano de la Re-
Guadualito (Rovira), 305 (n. 43) forma Agraria), 232-35,237
Gualanday (Tolima), 299 (n. 24) Indians, 129, 189, 246, 295 (n. 5); Caribs, 27;
IIGuamitos" (hacienda), 80 Coyaimas, 27, 28, 206; Natagaimas, 27;
346 Index

Pijaos, 27, 28, 289 (n. 7); Vaguaras, 83; 63-64, 69, 74, 80, 81, 83, 96, 97, 101, 115,
resguardos of, 33, 74-75; twentieth cen- 121,123-24,139,150-80,202-04,208-11,
tury activism.among, 68, 74-77; Violen- 217,224-29,239-40,249,306 (n.59), 307
cia and, 189 " (n. I, n. 5),308 (n. 31), 309 (n. 36),318 (n.
Inflation. See Colombia, inflation in 53); agriculture in, 155, 224-28; campo
Inter-American Conference, Ninth, 133 life, 167~8, 179-80, 226-27, 240; class
Intrepid Action, 91, 92 consciousness in, 227-28, 295 (n. 68);
Isaacs, Jorge, 59 coffee in, 155-57, 159, 167, 240;corregi-
Italia, La (Caldas), 217 mientos of, 159, 167, 171, 307 (n. 17);
criminality in, 168, 171, 174, 228; guer-
Jaramillo, Alfonso, 240 rillas in, 178-80, 184, 215; Liberals in, 44,
Jaramillo Uribe, Jaime, 9, 289 (n. 14) 56, 157, 166, 171, 308 (n. 23); upolitical
Jauregui, Monsignor Buenaventura, 176 Pact of Elections," 163; population of,
Jesuits, 29-30 319 (n. 62); settlement of, 153-57, 307 (n.
Jimenez, Gustavo, 137 8); Violencia in, 174-80, 208-11, 224-28,
Jimenez de Quesada, Gonzalo, 28 239-40, 241, 307 (n. 15), 310 (n. 60); Vio-
Jornada, 113, 171 lencia in, mortality, 224-46, 311 (n. 74);
Justice, distributive, 33 voting in, 227, 297 (n. 36)
Liberal and Con~eIVative parties: social
Korea, 187, 191 bases of, 37-41, 321 (n. 4); strife between,
2,14,20,52,65,72,73,74,90-93,101,108,
Labor organizations, 68, 77-81, 83, 105, 127, 132, 169, 232, 243, 248; Violencia
107-08, 129, 238. See also Confederacion and,2,5,20,21,38-39,149,186,195-207,
de Trabajadores Colombianos (CTC), 211, 216, 228, 248-50
Union de Trabajadores Colombianos Liberal-communist connection averred,
(UTC) 2-3,20,108-09,132-35,138,146-49,180,
La Dorada Railroad, 68 236
Lagunilla River, 121 Liberalism: economic, 45, 290 (n. 30), 291
uLa Laja" (hacienda), 80 (n. 49); ideology of, 243,322 (n. 16, n. 17)
Lame, Quintin, 68, 75-76, 129, 295 (n. 7) Liberal National Revolutionary Movement
Land invasions, 77-81. See also Squatters of Southern Tolima, 199
Land refonn. See Law 200 of 1936, Law 135 Liberal party, 45, 81, 109, 140, 235, 244;
of 1961, INCORA anticlericalism, 122, 160; anticommu-
Largacha, Juan E., 85 nism, 192; convention of 1922, 160; di-
Larrate, Neftali, 169, 171 rectorate, 131, 140, 149, 192-93, 304 (n.
Laserna Villegas, Octavio, 119, 147 37)
Latifundia, 77, 156,234 Liberal Republic, 84, 114,245; breakdown
Latin America: political culture of, 321 (n. of,92-95
3), 323 (n. 18) Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL),
Law 135 of 1961, 232, 237, 319-20 (n. 11) 216, 317 (n. 34)
Law 200 of 1936,82,84 Limon, EI (Chaparral), 82, 184
Leo XIII, Pope, 67 Lis, Carlos, 2M, 315 (n. 7)
Leon Herrera, Ernesto. See Blandon Llanos (eastern plains), 4, 6, 14, 129, 140,
Bemo, Fidel 141-42,146,148,157,184,188,192,207-
Lerida (Tolima), 168, 176, 179, 217, 310 (n. 08,247,284 (n. 13),287 (n. 45), 312 (n. 9)
63) Ueras Camargo, Alberto, 90, 92, 94-95, 113,
Leyva, Jorge, 315 (n. 1) 202, 203-05, 212, 221
LIbano (Tolima), I, 20, 23, 41, 44, 47, 53, 56, Ueras Camargo, Felipe, 309 (n. 36)
Index 347

Ueras Restrepo, Carlos, 3, 83, 119, 131-34, 183,185,207,219-22,229,305 (n.49),318

137-39,146,148,151,238,303 (n.31),304 (n.46)
(n. 37), 306 (n. 51, n. 61) Masonry, 90, 92, 135, 161. See also Gomez,
Uoyd, Harold, 165 Laureano, on Masonry
Loffiza, Gerardo, 147, 183 Medellin, 42, 135
Lombana, Noe rCTarzan"), 215-16 Mejia Arango, Mario, 317 (n. 35)
LOpez, Jose Hilario, 154 Melgar (Tolima), 77, 194
LOpez, Pedro A., 45, 81, 163 Mena Loyola, Gaspar de, 29
LOpez de Galarza, Andres, 28 Mendoza Neira, Plinio, 103, 119
LOpez de Mesa, Luis, 2, 9, 142 Mercadilla (Villanica), 191
LOpez Michelson, Alfonso, 317 (n. 34) Merchan, Victor, 218, 318 (n. 38)
Lopez Pumarejo, Alfonso, 81-84, 89-93, Mesopotania (Liliano), 177
104, 131, 151, 169, 186, 297 (n. 24, n. 30), Mexico, 50, 54; revolution, 1
304 (n. 37) Minh, Ho Chi, 222
Lozano, General Juan de Dios, 59 Mirolindo (Tolima), 120
Lozano, Leon Maria ("EI Condor"), 188 Modernization, 11,245,250,320 (n. 21). See
Lozano Agudelo, Governor Alfredo, 297 (n. also Tolima, economic development in
37) Mommsen, Theodor, 26
Lozano ToITijos, Fabio, 59-63 Moniquira (Boyaca), 109
Lozano y Lozano, Carlos, 125, 304 (n. 37) Montalvo, Jose Antonio, 114, 118, 300 (n.
46)
MacArthur, General Douglas, 133 Mora Angueira, General Hernando, 315 (n.
McCarthy, Joseph, 133 6)
Magdalena River, 15, 18, 29, 40, 45, 49, 66, Morales Benitez, Otto, 315 (n. 6)
83, 98, 164, 169, 236 Mortality rate in Violencia. See Violencia,
Magdalena River Valley, 15, 27-29, 32, 40, levels of; mortality in
67-68, 80, 83, 98, 144, 153, 163, 177, 226, Mosquera, Tomas Cipriano de, 44, 155,291
248 (n.35)
Manizales (Caldas), 47, 98, 153 MRL. See Liberal Revolutionary Movement
Manjarres, General Francisco, 52 Murillo (Liliano), 23, 64, 71, 74, 159, 166,
Manzanillo, 84 170-02,174,177,209-11,216,226,307(n.
"Mariachi." See Oviedo, Jesus Maria 17), 309 (n. 36)
Marijuana, 240 Murillo Toro, Manuel, 38, 42-44,160
Marin, General Ramon rCEI Negro Marin"), Mussolini, Benito, 111
51, 58, 292 (n. 10) Mutis, Jose Celestino, 77
Marin Vanegas, Senator Dario, 5
Mariquita (Tolima), 29, 30, 32, 42, 68, 80, Napoleon Bonaparte, 30, 34
121 Narino (department of), 53, 92, 128, 246,
Mariquita, Constitution of the State of, 32- 248
33 Nariilo, Antonio, 34
Marquetalia (Caldas), 217 NaIVaez, Pedro, 69-72, 165, 295 (n. 68)
Marquetalia (Tolima), 221-23, 231, 318 (n. Natagaima (Tolima), 75, 80, 189, 204, 206,
42) 236-37
Marquez, Jose Ignacio de, 37,42 National Commission to Investigate the
Martinez, Fabio, 315 (n. 6) Causes of Violencia, 4, 204, 206, 212
Martinez Santamaria, Hernando, 292 (n. National Federation of Coffee Growers,
11) 145, 199
Marulanda Velez, Manuel (UTiro Fijo"), National Front (Frente Nacional), 4,11,14,
348 Index

202--{)8, 212, 225, 229, 232, 234-36, 247, Panama, 42, 52, 66
251-52, 316 (n. 16), 322 (n. 13) Panoptico of Ibague, 120, 128
National Military Academy, 53 Paramo, EI (Santa Isabel), 210
National Office of Rehabilitation, 184-85 Pardo, Isias, 207
National Popular Alliance. See ANAPO Pareja, Carlos H., 306 (n. 63)
National Secretariat of Social Assistance. Parga Cortes, Rafael, 87, 123, 125-26, 145,
See SENDAS 200, 305 (n. 44, n. 45), 309 (n. 36)
National Union, 102, 1M, 11~13, 123-24, Paris, General Gabriel, 202
131, 170 Paris Lozano, Gonzalo, 106, 113, 116-20,
National University of Colombia, 118, 187 123, 300 (n. 42)
Navas Prado, General, 314 (n. 47) Parra, Isidro, 44, 56, 58, 153-59, 163, 166-
Neiva (Huila), 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,40, 53, 59, 66 67, 241, 292 (n. 10), 293 (n. 29), 307 (n. 3,
Nemocon (Cundinamarca), 299 (n. 24) n. 9),308 (n. 20)
Nevado del Huila, 145 Parra, Jose Antonio C1Revolucion"), 200
Nevado del Ruiz, 153 Parra, Jose del Cannen, 166,224-28, 308-
New Granada, Viceroyalty of, 29-33, 34, 289 09 (n. 36), 318 (n. 53)
(n.12) Participation, political, 244, 322 (n. 13)
Nieto, Remigio, 145 Partisanship, 94
Nieto Rojas, Jose Maria, 3 Pasto (Narino), 246
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 167 Pastrana Borrero, Misael, 235-36, 301 (n.
Norte de Santander. See Santander del 70)
Norte Patria Boba, 124
Novels of the Violencia. See Violencia, lit- Patronage, 85. See also Clientelism
erature of Patron-client relationship. See Clientelism
Nueve de abril (April 9, 1948), 21, 22, 117- Pava, Daniel de la, 199-200
25, 127, 130, 133-35, 142, 144, 171, 201 Pavas (Villahermosa), 88, 124, 297 (n. 37)
Nunez, Rafael, 46, 50, 82, 124 Payne, James, 10
IIPedro Brincos." See Gonzalez, Roberto
Obando, General Jose Maria, 42 Pelaez, Marco Aurelio, 163-65
Ii
Ochoa, Olimpio ( Bemal"), 200 IIPeligro, General." See Garcia, Leopoldo
Olaya Herrera, Enrique, 55, 72, 83, 89, 103, Penarranda Yanez, Lieutenant Colonel
116 Ramon, 174
Oquist, Paul, 9, 287 (n. 45) Perdomo, Bishop Ismael, 20, 23, 59, 67-68,
Ordonez, Colonel Luis E., 197 158
Ortega (Tolima), 69, 75, 80, 149, 189 Pereira Prado, Roberto, 138
Ospina, Pedro Nel, 160 Peron, Eva Duarte de, 312 (n. 15)
Ospina Perez, Mariano, 2, 21, 10~26, 131- Peron, Juan, 186, 312 (n. 15)
34, 136-40, 148, 169, 17~71, 186, 300 (n. Piedecuesta (Santander), 103
42, n. 53), 304 (n. 37) Piedras (Tolima), 68, 145
Ospina Rodriguez, Mariano, 39, 188 Pijao Indians, 9. See also Indians, Pijaos
Oviedo, Jesus Maria C1Mariachi"), 184, 190, Pineda Giraldo, Roberto, 227
199,200,203,206,219-20,315 (n.3), 318 Pineda LOpez, Francisco, 77
(n.4O) Planadas (Tolima), 219-21, 223, 231
Plan Lazo, 221-23, 318 (n. 46)
Pacific coast, 18, 29 Playa Rica (Rovira), 305 (n. 43)
Paez, Adriana, 195-96 Plebiscite of 1957, 202, 315 (n. 54)
Pajaros, 149,181,188,190, 195-97,201,211, Police, 132, 143-44, 146, 149, 168, 177, 182,
216, 307 (n. 63), 314 (n. 47), 316 (n. 23) 187, 190, 197, 211, 237, 247; departmen-
Palanco, Emesto, 161 tal, 87-88, 115, 116, 117, 128, 130, 138;
Index 349

municipal, 117, 120, 170-71, 172-73, 175; See also Violencia, urbanization during
national, 92, 102, 106-08, 109, 114, 118, HRegeneration" of Rafael Nunez, 46, 47, 56,
128, 138, 143-52, 168, 174, 178, 184, 197, 157
211-12, 237, 297 (n. 29), 310 (n. 58); re- Rengifo, Juan de Jesus, 160, 310-11 (n. 64)
cruitment, 83,109,115; rural police, 174, Rengifo Reina, Jesus, 176
176, 297 (n. 29) Renovaci6n, 165
Political abstention. See Abstention, elec- Republica, La, 222
toral HRepublican Union," 54-59
Political corruption, 54, 65, 84-89, 205. See Rerum Novarum, 67
also Electoral fraud, Spoils system Restrepo, Antonio Jose, 87
Political culture. See Colombia, political Restrepo, Carlos E., 54-65, 84
culture Reyes, Cantalicio, 51, 292 (n. 10)
Political parties, traditional. See Liberal Reyes, Rafael, 52-54, 55, 292 (n. 12)
and ConseIVative parties Reyes Daza, Vicente, 77
Polka, La (Libano), 157 Rimbaud, Arthur, 2
Pollock, John, 10 Rioblanco (Tolima), 82, 184, 236, 287 (n. 52)
Pombo, Lino de, 290 (n. 27) Rio Chiquito (Cauca), 221, 318 (n. 42)
Pombo, Manuel, 154 Riomanso (Rovira), 143-44, 146
Populism, 249 Rionegro (Prado), 195
Porras, Aristomeno, 144 Rio Negro constitution. See Constitution
Portugal (Libano), 178--80, 240 of 1863
Prado (Tolima), 184, 195, 201, 204, 234 Risaralda (department ofl, 307 (n. 2)
Frias Alape, Jacobo ("Charro Negro"), 147, Rocha, Antonio, 74
183,185,188,206-07,219,305 (n.49),312 Rodriguez, Amadeo, 137
(n.4) Rodriguez, Bishop Ismael, 199
Primavera (Villahermosa), 88, 124, 157, 297 Rojas, Francisco (HKiko"), 219
(n.37) Rojas, Joba, 22
Protestants, 143-44, 146, 161 Rojas, Maria Eugenia, 312 (n. 15)
Pumarejo de LOpez, Rosario, 81 Rojas Pinilla, General Gustavo, 7, 14, 25,
Purificaci6n (Tolima), 189, 234, 236 181--88, 191, 197-202, 206-07, 223, 228,
235-36,240,247,303 (n.31),312 (n.14,n.
Quebradanegra (Villahermosa), 88, 157, 15), 314 (n. 36), 320 (n. 21)
297 (n. 37) Rojas Varon, Te6filo (HChispas"), 8, 144,
Quijano, Anibal, 56 146, 189-90, 199-200, 201, 203-05, 208,
Quindio (department ofl, 307 (n. 2) 212-15, 218-19, 288 (n. 66), 314 (n. 48),
Quindio Pass, 18,28 316 (n. 30), 317 (n. 31, n. 32)
Quinones Dlarte, Heman, 108 Romero, Luis Eduardo, 196
Romero Aguirre, Alfonso, 136
Ramirez, Enrique, 159-60 Roncesvalles (Tolima), 143, 287 (n. 52)
Ramirez, Francisco Eladio, 137 Rovira (Tolima), 120, 143-45, 149, 151, 182-
Ramirez, Father Pedro Maria, 21, 122, 301 83, 189-90, 197, 200, 204, 212, 216, 249,
(n. 73), 302 (n. 82) 288 (n. 66)
Ramirez Moreno, Augusto, 89, 166-67, 315 Rubio, Bernardino, 119
(n.6) Ruiz Novoa, General Alberto, 5, 222
Ramsey, Russell, 14, 284 (n. 13), 287 (n. 45), Russell, Bertrand, 2
303 (n. 19), 315 (n. 15), 318 (n. 48)
Rautavarra, Helina, 214 Saavedra, Floro, 89, 119, 198
Rebeiz, General Gabriel, 222 Sabogal, Elias, 299 (n. 14)
Refu~ees from Violencia, 174, 175, 193, 199. Saboya (Boyaca), 103
350 Index

Saenz, Captain Marco, 71 Semana, 194, 299 (n. 24)

Salamina (Caldas), 19,42,47 SENDAS (National Secretariat of Social As-
Salazar, Jose Ruben, 172, 311 (n. 64) sistance), 312 (n. 15)
Salazar Ferro, Julio, 137 Serna, Governor Melendro, 170
Salazar Garcia, Gustavo, 284 (n. 17) SIC. See Colombian Intelligence SeIVice
Salcedo, Guadalupe, 151, 306 (n. 60) Siglo, EI, 89-90, 92, 118, 303 (n. 21)
IISaldana," estate of Domingo Caicedo, 34, Sirpe, EI (Liliano), 157
36 SOCaITaS, Jose, 9
Saldana River, 74, 98, 114, 236 Socialist RevolutionaIY party, 68, 69-70
IISalt War, The," 123-24 Soto, Jesus Maria, 172
Samper, Jose Maria, 67 Soto del Corral, Jorge, 137
Samper, Miguel, 41, 45 Spain, 30-33, 134, 243, 289 (n. 7)
San Antonio (Tolima), 190, 287 (n. 52) Spoils system, 83-88, 101, 138, 165. See
Sanchez, Jose Gonzalo, 75, 146 also Political conuption
Sandoval, General Eutimio, 56, 57, 62, 64, Squatters (eolonos), 78-80, 234, 236-38
163, 293 (n. 37) Suarez (Tolima), 234
San Fernando (ubano), 64, 116, 157, 167, Suarez, Guillenno, 207
170-71, 176-77, 307 (n. 17) Sucre, Antonio Jose de, 42
IISan Francisco" (hacienda), 78, 79 Sumapaz (region of Cundinamarca), 78,
"Sangrenegra." See Cruz Usma, Jacinto 147, 184-85, 191-98, 228, 249
San Jorge ridge (Liliano), 167, 176 Supreme Court, 138, 159
San Jose de Indias, 75, 77
IISan Luis" (hacienda), 297 (n. 23) Taburete, EI (Llbano), 216-217
San Luis (Tolima), 36,40 Tacuma, Teodoro, 206
San Pablo (Villanica), 151-52, 306 (n. 63) Tafur, Francisco, 55
Santa, Eduardo, 4, 167, 307 (n. 5) "Tarzan." See Lombana, Noe
"Santa Ines" (hacienda), 80, 296 (n. 21) Tello, Heman, 172
Santa Isabel (Tolima), 1, 19-23,47,74,85- "Tesoro, EI" (hacienda of General Antonio
87, 96, 113, 115, 121, 150, 157, 161, 164, Maria Echeverri), 56, 168
169-71,173,210,249,288 (n.64), 297 (n. Tiempo, EI, 101, 151, 182, 186, 198, 213
36),310 (n. 60),316 (n. 22); Liberal voting Tierradentro, (ubano), 57, 157, 167, 169,
in, 288 (n. 60) 172, 175, 307 (n. 17)
Santa Marta (Magdalena), 29 Tigrera, La (Llbano), 177-79
Santander (department ofl, 14,46,89,103, Timonte, Eutiquio, 75, 146
107, 109-10, 114, 118, 127-30, 141, 165, "Tiro Fijo." See Marulanda Velez, Manuel
170,188,208,245,247,287(n.45),299(n. Tolima (department ofl, 1,4,6,14-19,205,
13, n. 24), 319 (n. 60) 247; agriculture in, 98, 125, 230; Antio-
Santander, Francisco Paula de, 37, 44 quian colonization in, 41, 47, 56, 96;
Santander del Norte, 14,89, 103, 115, 118, eaudillismo in, 33-35; characterization
127-28, 141, 165, 188, 207, 208, 246, 247, of, 14-19, 248-49; Civil War of 1899-1902
287 (n. 45), 299 (n. 13, n. 24) in, 50; class conflict in, 46, 67-72; coffee
"Santander, General." See G6mez, Arist6- in, 18, 19,47, 77,99, 156,230-31,238-39;
bulo colonial era, 27-34; Conservative and
Santa Teresa (Liliano), 56, 64, 157-58, 172, Liberal regions of, 40-45, 53, 55; crimi-
175, 307 (n. 17), 309 (n. 40) nality in, 55, 115, 145, 149, 151, 168,208;
Santos, Eduardo, 91, 119, 131, 304 (n. 37) economic development in, 65-67, 230-
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 223 41; economy of, 40, 45, 125; elites in, 33;
Schmidt, Steffen, 10 guerrillas in, 26, 128, 144-51, 182-229,
Second World War. See World War II 314 (n. 47); guerrillas, liberal vs. commu-
Index 351

nist, 147, 219-22; hierarchical society in, Urbanization. See Colombia, urbanization
33; Indians in, 68, 74, 129, 149, 189; jus- in
tice system, 87-88; labor force in, 67-69, Urdaneta Arbelaez, Roberto, 3, 108, 148,
78-79; labor organization in, 67-70, 80- 151, 178, 306 (n. 53), 311 (n. 68)
81, 83, 237-38; land disputes in, 77-81, Urdaneta Holguin, Enrique, 173-80
82-83, 236-38; literacy in, 97, 231, 239; Uribe Marquez, Tomas, 71, 128, 146
middle class in, 99; migration and, 18, Uribe Uribe, Rafael, 50, 55, 292 (n. 12)
321 (n. 36); mortality in, 287 (n. 53); nine- Usaquen (Cundinamarca), 129
teenth century history, 30-51; police Utopianism in Colombia, 290 (n. 32)
forces in, 83, 87-88, 102, 297 (n. 29);
population of, 18, 96, 238, 249, 287 (n. Valencia, Daniel, 176
51), 315 (n. 2), 319 (n. 62), 321 (n. 37); Valencia, Guillermo, 90
population, occupations of, 18, 238; Valencia, Guillermo Leon, 118
population, racial composition of, 18; Valencia Tovar, Alvaro, 4
regionalism in, 32, 124, 165, 249; reve- Valle (department 00, 4, 53,72,89,105,110,
nues of, 106, 125, 130, 203; standard of 188,197,205,207,247,287(n.45),299(n.
living in, 96-97, 231; transportation in, 24), 304 (n. 33), 310 (n. 64)
19, 65-66, 97-98, 124, 163-64, 230, 239- Vanegas, General Carlos, 107-08
40; Violencia, damage in, 223-26; Violen- Varela, Juan de la Cruz, 147, 152, 184-85,
cia, incidence of, 142, 149; Violencia, 191-98,218
zones of, 150, 248-49, 287 (n. 45). See Vargas, Hermogenes ("El Vencedor"), 184
also Gran Tolima Vargas, Pedro de, 77
Topacio, El (Falan), 150, 306 (n. 59) Vargas Guatama, Joselin, 201
Toro, Ana, 42 Varon, Tulio, 51
TOITeS, Nicolas, 125 Varon Perez, Eugenio, 120, 301 (n. 68)
TOITes Barreto, German, 118-19, 120 Vasquez, Fabio, 319 (n. 60)
TOITes Duran, Delfin, 108 Vasquez Cobo, Alfredo, 90
TOITeS Galindo, Manuel, 59 Vega, Jose de la, 89
TOITes Giraldo, Ignacio, 71 Velasquez, Nicanor, 86
TOITes Restrepo, Camilo, 7-8, 222, 227-28 Velosa Pena, Colonel Emesto, 183, 185
Tovar Concha, Diego, 319-20 (n. 11) Velu (Natagaima), 75, 206, 236
Tribun~ 149, 181, 197, 201, 206 Venadillo (Tolima), 68, 145, 210
"Tronco Quemado" (hacienda), 80 Venezuela, 110, 115, 151
Turbay, Gabriel, 101 Vezga, Jose Maria, 42
Turbay Ayala, Julio Cesar, 140, 240 Vieda, Luis, 152
Villahermosa (Tolima), 47,86-88,102,123-
Umai'ia Luna, Eduardo, 4, 6-7 24, 156-57, 161, 164, 169-71, 173, 287 (n.
Union de Trabajadores Colombianos 52), 297 (n. 36), 308 (n. 31)
(UTC), 108 Villamizar, Lt. Commander Eduardo, 178
Union Juvenil, 167 Villarraga, Miguel ("Almanegra"), 215
"Villarrica" (hacienda), 77
Unions. See Labor organizations
Villarrica (Tolima), 152, 191-98, 233, 236
United Frui~ Company, 71
Villaveces, Jorge, 304 (n. 37)
United Provinces of New Granada, 32
Villegas, Benjamin, 170, 171
United States Anny, 222 Villegas, Silvio, 90-91
United States of America, 2, 66, 68, 133, Violence,74,81,86-87,90-91,102,103,106,
222-23 109, 110, 115, 129, 161, 165-66
United States Peace Corps, 232 Violencia, 1-26, 110, 129-32, 137, 138-52,
Uraba, El (Antioquia), 318 (n. 42) 170-241, 242-52; and legal system, 214,
352 Index

217, 31~17 (n. 31); anomie and, 285 (n. War, civil: of 1840-42 (War of the Chief-
27, n. 32); cattle rustling, 149, 150, 219; tains), 37, 42-43; of 1859, 46; of 1885, 50,
class consciousness and, 147, 227; cof- 59; of 1895; 50, 159; of 1899-1902 (War of
fee and, 149, 189, 207~8, 226, 285 (n. 27); the Thousand Days), 50-52, 56, 59, 90,
denouement of, 203-29, 247-48; eco- 140,160,175,179,245,291-92 (n.4), 292
nomic impact of, 223, 22~27; economic (n.13)
motive in, 149, 15~1, 175,189,207-11, War of the Thousand Days. See War, civil,
214,247,313 (n. 22), 317 (n. 32), 322 (n. of 1899-1902
11); etiology of, 1-11, 14-15, 140-46, 149, Weinert, Richard S., 8, 285 (n. 27), 285-86
227-28,242,317 (n. 31, n. 32),321 (n. 1); (n.32)
geography and, 130, 142-43, 150, 177, Wilde, Alexander W., 9
230, 248; levels of, 129, 141-42, 150, 177, World War I, 68
188, 190, 203-04, 206, 228, 305 (n. 38); World War II, 91, 104, 133, 146
literature of, 1-11, 14-15; mortality in,
224-29, 283 (n. 2); occupations of vic-
tims, 226; periodization of, 11, 14-15, Yaguara (Tolima), 75
141-46,246-50,286 (n. 43),286.....87 (n. 45); Yate Gomez, Jose Vicente (liThe Phan-
population growth during, 226; regional tom"), 210-11, 316 (n. 17, n. 21, n. 24)
nature of, 14-15, 18-24, 242-52, 287 (n.
Yepes, Luis Felipe, 124
48); road network and, 214, 248; rural Yosa, Isauro ClUster"), 191, 193, 201, 314 (n.
nature of, 285-86 (n. 32); significance of, 50)
249-50; urbanization during, 174, 227, "Yuca, La" (hacienda), 20, 157, 160, 166
250 Yuca, La (LIbano),23, 74, 166,171, 172, 307
Viota (region of Cundinamarca), 82, 147,
(n.17)
223, 228, 318 (n. 38)
Voting patterns, 235-36, 299 (n. 13). See
also LIbano, voting in
Voz del Lfbano, La, 101, 169, 171 Zalamea Borda, Jorge, 119, 301 (n. 63)
Voz Proletaria, 222 Zaldua, Francisco, 41