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A Black Soldier’s Story
A Black Soldier’s Story
-
ricardo batrell
Edited and Translated by Mark A. Sanders
The map of Matanzas was drawn by Philip Schwartzberg for Meridian Mapping.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Dedico este libro a mis hijos,
Isaiah Anthony Wallace Sanders
y Joshua Allen Wallace Sanders:
Acknowledgments 223
Index 235
This page intentionally left blank
r i car d o b atre ll and t h e
cuban racial narrat ive
An Introduction to A Black Soldier’s Story
Mark A. Sanders
Before peace, I want liberty for the country and the preservation
of its revolutionary ideals; and if in order to defend them against
aggressors, it is necessary to fight in the streets or to take to the
mountains and breathe its pure air, I will do so knowing that I have
served my country . . .
—Juan Gualberto Gómez
ix
Introduction
On February 2, 1896, an illiterate black field hand, just five days shy of
his sixteenth birthday, went to war for the independence of Cuba. Though
poor and uneducated, Ricardo Batrell (he would add Oviedo after the
war) fully understood the broader implications of his contributions to the
rebellion. He believed in Cuba Libre, a vision of a democratic and egali-
tarian Cuba, and thus he believed in the full participation of Afro-Cubans
in the national struggle for independence and the creation of a new repub-
lic. Indeed, for Batrell and his compatriots, Cuba’s fight for independence
was an intensely racial one, a struggle not simply to throw off the yoke
of colonial rule but to replace its social and political hierarchy, largely de-
fined by race and caste, with a society founded on Enlightenment ideals:
liberty, fraternity, equality.
Yet by the time Batrell published his manuscript in 1912 ( just ten
years after the founding of the republic), he was acutely aware of how far
short the young democracy had fallen in achieving these ideals. Political
corruption was rampant; economic resources and political power were
concentrated in effectively the same hands as before the war; the prom-
ise of land reform had been reneged; blacks were largely excluded from
private schools and social clubs; black veterans found it increasingly dif-
ficult to reap the same benefits for their military service that their white
counterparts did; racist stereotypes were still commonplace in popular
culture; and perhaps worst of all, blacks who criticized the government
or the society at large for its assaults on black civil rights were called
racists themselves, a devastating manipulation of José Martí’s vision of
a society free of racial discrimination.
Despite this increasingly hostile political and social environment for
Afro-Cubans, Batrell entered the fray, continuing his struggle for racial
equality. Soon after the war, he taught himself to read and to write, and
began to compile notes for his autobiography: Para la historia: Apuntes auto-
biográficos de la vida de Ricardo Batrell Oviedo. Also, he wrote letters to govern-
ment officials and coauthored a manifesto protesting discrimination and
calling for a return to the ideal of Cuba Libre. In a sense, Batrell exchanged
his gun and machete for literacy, thus arrogating to himself the power
to recount the birth of the nation in a new rhetorical battle over the defi-
nition of the state and therefore over its future. And it was the narrative
x
Introduction
of his own experiences in the war that served as his most potent weapon
in the struggle for racial democracy. Indeed, in the Liberation Army,
which was between 60 and 80 percent black,1 he was the only black sol-
dier, as far as we know, to write and publish his own narrative account.2
In a context of postwar memoirs, written almost entirely by white offi-
cers, the interjection of this black voice is of enormous significance.
Where the other narratives either minimized the issue of race or ignored
it altogether, Batrell placed it at the center of this memoir, indeed at the
center of the national narrative, and ultimately judged the success of
Cuba Libre by it. That Batrell focused on race in his account of the final
war for Cuban independence was by no means a distortion of the his-
torical record or a manipulation of the facts. Part of his argument, in fact,
is that to ignore race, either in politics or in historical accounts of the
war, is a crime against the nation. Or, put another way, his text asks us
what happens to Cuban history if we posit race as its very engine. Here,
race means more than the mere presence of Europeans, Africans, Native
Americans, and their respective and collective descendants, but the racial
categories—white, black, Indian, mulato, mestizo, and so on—wielded in
the ongoing struggle over resources, wealth, and power. What happens
to our understanding of Cuban society if the African slave trade, slav-
ery, and race relations figure as pivotal elements of Cuban history from
its earliest moments, and particularly across all three wars of indepen-
dence? How is the history of the entire region ultimately transformed if
we take the implications of Batrell’s narrative at face value—that black
Africans and their descendants have played crucial roles in the greater
history of the Caribbean and the Americas, indeed laying the founda-
tion of democracy perhaps for the entire hemisphere?
This introduction addresses the central roles Batrell and the larger
concept of race play in Cuba’s struggle toward democracy, first by re-
viewing the history of race in Cuba through the colonial period, the three
wars of independence, and the early years of the republic leading up to
Batrell’s publication. The introduction will then consider Batrell as author
and historical protagonist in order to examine his specific role in Cuba’s
early history as a republic, to assess his political and literary legacy, and
to read his text in light of extraordinary political circumstances.
xi
Introduction
Although the history that concerns us most begins in the late eighteenth
century, needless to say, phenotypic, cultural, and linguistic differences
were of central importance at the first moment of European contact with
the indigenous population of what would become Cuba. Columbus and
his Spanish cohorts immediately identified the indigenous Arawak, Taino,
and Sub-Taino groups as populations ripe for domination and exploita-
tion. They were the first groups to be enslaved, and when their numbers
plummeted as a result, they were replaced by black Africans at a mod-
erate yet steady rate through the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
centuries. By the last decade of the eighteenth century, the enslaved
African population had exceeded fifty thousand, and the black popula-
tion overall amounted to approximately 42 percent of the island’s total
population.3
It is at this point that the Haitian Revolution set in motion the titanic
changes in Cuban economic and political history that led directly to Ba-
trell and the overwhelmingly black racial makeup of his Liberation Army.
In 1791, the beginning of the rebellion, the French colony was the eco-
nomic gem of the Caribbean, as far as Western European moneyed inter-
ests were concerned. Saint-Domingue generated more revenue through
the production of sugar, coffee, indigo, and cotton than did any other
Caribbean colony; as for sugar, Saint-Domingue produced more than
did Brazil, Jamaica, and Cuba combined, accounting for 30 percent of
the world’s production.4 When the French Revolution erupted, the Jaco-
bins were in a quandary as to the extent to which the Rights of Man
should be applied in the colonies. Would the Revolution abolish slavery
in the colonies, or should the new republic continue to profit from slave
labor? While scholars still debate whether the Haitian Revolution was
fomented first by small landowners seeking to wrest power from grands
blancs (wealthy whites) or by enslaved Haitians themselves, it is quite
clear that blacks striking for freedom quickly took up the rhetoric of
the French Revolution and sought to claim the newly won freedoms in
France for themselves.
As testament to the Haitian revolutionary resolve, one of the insur-
gents’ chief strategies was a scorched-earth policy in which they burned
xii
Introduction
cotton fields and sugar and coffee plantations to the ground, forcing mod-
erates on the island to choose sides and depriving France of the revenue
necessary to promote the war to reconquer the colony. As a result, by
mid-decade Haitian sugar, coffee, and cotton production had plummeted,
creating an opportunity of which Cuba took full advantage immediately.
Because of late-eighteenth-century transformations in Cuban society,
the island was well positioned to fill the production void created by the
Haitian Revolution. The larger Cuban population in general, the rap-
idly growing free and enslaved black population in particular, and the
modernization of sugar production set the stage for the events of the last
decade of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. Spe-
cific to sugar, Cuba’s newly modernized plantations were able to increase
production dramatically. For example, in 1790 Cuba exported only 15,423
tons of sugar; by 1829 it was exporting 84,187 tons (Pérez, Cuba, 77).
New lands were cleared for greater sugar production; former tobacco
and coffee plantations were also converted to sugar; and more and bet-
ter railroads lowered the price of transportation. Indeed, the entire Cuban
economic profile shifted; where, in the eighteenth century, farms had
produced foodstuffs and supplies for domestic consumption primarily,
by the turn of the nineteenth century, sugar had replaced a major per-
centage of domestically produced materials. In the span of barely twenty
years, Cuba had gone from a relatively self-sufficient colony with healthy
exports to one fully committed to the production of sugar (and thus one
dependent on the importation of basic foodstuffs) (ibid.).
Needless to say, slave labor was the engine that drove Cuban eco-
nomic expansion. As the world demand for sugar continued to rise in
the wake of the Haitian Revolution, and as Cuban planters tried to keep
pace, the demand for slave labor increased as well, and thus the popu-
lation of free and of enslaved blacks. Between 1763 and 1862, approxi-
mately 750,000 Africans were imported for slavery; by 1827, more than
half the population was black (roughly 56 percent), a combination of
free and enslaved black Cubans. And though the percentage of blacks
in the greater population began to decline by the 1830s, by 1862, just six
years before the first war for independence, the black population was
still slightly more than half, approximately 52 percent (85–87).
xiii
Introduction
At the same time, the general population of the island grew expo-
nentially. Where in 1791 the total population was only 272,300, by 1862
it was well over one million: 1,396,470 (85). Spaniards emigrated from
Florida after its sale to the United States in 1819, while planters and
displaced military personnel came from newly independent countries
across Central and South America. Consequently, these white immi-
grants tended to have a vested interest in Spanish colonial rule and thus
its chief moneymaking institution: slavery. At the same time, white crio-
llos (native-born Cubans, usually of Spanish descent)—planters, farm-
ers, shopkeepers, laborers, artisans, merchants, and so on—chafed under
the privileges new Spanish émigrés enjoyed, particularly their control
over finance capital and access to peninsular markets. Tensions between
Cuban growers and Spanish mercantilists over pricing, financing, and
access to global markets continued to increase throughout the period, an
element that would play a major role in all three wars for independence.
Yet, while Cuban economic and social elites resented Spanish colo-
nial rule, they continued to invest in slave labor, even as prices for slaves
rose dramatically as a result of the banning of the slave trade, first in
1817, again in 1835, and in 1845. These elites invested in a particularly
brutal form of slavery, in a region known for working slaves to death.
Enslaved blacks often worked eighteen-hour days and six-day work-
weeks, first under the tropical sun cultivating and harvesting sugarcane,
then in overheated boiler rooms to complete the sugar-refining process.
They were beaten and tortured in efforts to coerce them into greater
productivity; many collapsed and died of exhaustion. Indeed, prior to
the great rise in prices, planters debated the economics of working slaves
to exhaustion and death over a relatively short period of time, or of car-
ing for them and thus extending their lives and productivity over time.
Either way, the death rate for enslaved blacks exceeded births. Disease,
epidemics, malnutrition, and backbreaking work contributed to a life
expectancy for blacks of less than seven years after their arrival on some
plantations (98). And although the majority of enslaved blacks suffered
under brutal conditions on plantations, often slaves hired out to work in
urban centers fared little better. Subject to the whims of their owners or
employers (or both), they too had little choice over working conditions,
and no defense against physical abuse. Also, taking into account the
xiv
Introduction
xv
Introduction
xvi
Introduction
xvii
Introduction
over financing and markets, Cuban planters grew more and more frus-
trated over their relatively small portion of the growing profits. So too,
as the enslaved population increased after 1820, the date at which
Spain’s 1817 treaty with England to prohibit slave trading went into effect,
those Africans imported illegally (some 350,000 between 1821 and 1860)8
were technically free, if in fact the treaty were enforced. Thus, the insta-
bility of the slave system itself, a growing free black population, and
increasing frustration with Spain’s mercantile system worked to arouse
revolutionary sentiments and activities.
Indeed, well prior to the 1868 uprising beginning the Ten Years’
War, several annexationist groups had rebelled—in 1848, 1850, and
1851—in an attempt to wrest Cuba from Spanish control and to deliver
the island to the U.S. South, where slavery seemed much more secure.
Although this attempt to preserve slavery lost much of its allure after the
Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, the efforts demonstrated the wide-
spread and long-standing discontent with Spanish rule. Subsequent and
effective rebellion on the part of white criollos would not move toward
annexation but toward independence, yet an independence that would
have to incorporate the rights and interests of Afro-Cubans, both free and
enslaved, in a radically reconceived and reconstructed national vision.
The first war for Cuban independence, the Ten Years’ War (La Guerra
Grande), 1868–78, began with an eastern criollo planter’s discontent with
Spanish rule and his strategy to win the support of blacks for Cuban
independence by championing emancipation. On October 10, 1868, Car-
los Manuel de Céspedes addressed his slaves, declaring them free and
imploring them to fight with him for the independence of Cuba.9 Later
known as “El Grito de Yara” (the Cry of Yara), this proclamation of
Cuban sovereignty effectively wed Cuban independence and black free-
dom. Although fraught with tension and contradictions, this comingling
of Cuban national identity and black civil rights would persist across all
of Cuba’s revolutions. Other eastern planters quickly joined Céspedes,
freeing their slaves, recruiting enlistees, and, by the early 1870s, garner-
ing close to forty thousand supporters.10
xviii
Introduction
xix
Introduction
Spanish troops,12 the rebellion remained largely confined to the east, and
by the late 1870s had fizzled to isolated guerrilla maneuvers. By 1878,
the majority of the insurgent leadership welcomed negotiations and
signed the Pact of Zanjón on February 10. The provisional government
agreed to local rule similar to that granted Puerto Rico, namely, amnesty
for insurgents and legal freedom for former slaves and Chinese laborers
who had joined the rebellion. Because the agreement fell far short of
Cuban independence and immediate island-wide emancipation, com-
manders such as Antonio Maceo viewed Zanjón as a betrayal of Cuba
and chose to continue fighting. In what was known as La Guerra Chi-
quita (the Little War), Máximo Gómez, José and Rafael Maceo, Gui-
llermo Moncada, and Quintín Bandera (all of whom would be heroes in
the War of Independence) resumed fighting in August 1879 and fought
well into 1880. But finally, as a result of casualties, desertions, and lack of
arms and popular support, the forces disbanded, many leaving Cuba and
vowing to return to renew the battle under more favorable conditions.
Although the two wars for independence ultimately failed to deliver
the full range of rights hoped for by so many Afro-Cubans, they did pro-
duce moderate yet important gains in black civil rights. Chief among
these gains was a plan for abolition. Passed in 1870, the Moret Law, or
free womb law, mandated that all blacks born after 1870 were free,
regardless of the status of the mother. The law also implemented the
patronato system in which enslaved Afro-Cubans were made apprentices
and obligated to work for a designated number of years for their patrón.
As a means of indemnifying hacendados (plantation owners), the system
would gradually replace slave labor with contract labor. According to the
original plan, the last patrocinados were to be freed by 1888, but because
there were so few left by the mid-1880s (approximately fifty-three thou-
sand),13 slavery was officially ended by royal decree in 1886.
Yet, despite the legal end of slavery, colonial Cuban society in the
1880s remained extremely hierarchical, with blacks, poor whites, and
newly immigrated Chinese laborers sharing in few of the benefits of an
expanding postwar economy. Indeed, Afro-Cubans still faced pervasive
discrimination in access to education, higher-paying jobs, public transpor-
tation, housing, theaters, restaurants, and parks. Even after antidiscrim-
ination laws passed, largely because of protests led by Juan Gualberto
xx
Introduction
xxi
Introduction
xxii
Introduction
the Protest of Baraguá that rejected the Zanjón pact. Affectionately known
as the “Bronze Titan,” by the mid-1890s he had come to embody the
cause of a free and egalitarian Cuba. After the end of the Ten Years’
War, Maceo had traveled throughout the Caribbean, Central America,
and the eastern United States soliciting funds and support for a new
insurrection. In New York City, he met with African American writer
Frank Webb and conferred with Martí over the activities and progress
of the CRP; and in Key West, he won the support of poor and wealthy
Cuban expatriates eager to advance the final struggle for Cuban inde-
pendence. Equally important, Maceo shared with Martí a vision of racial
equality for Cuba, a society that would transcend racial differences and
forge a new unified identity (una alma nacional ). Indeed, his often-quoted
proclamation—“aquí no hay blanquitos, ni negritos, sino cubanos” (here
there are no petty little whites nor petty little blacks, only Cubans)—suc-
cinctly collapses racial identity (expressed with the diminutive) into a race-
neutral national identity, one decidedly free of the condescending “ito.”
The journalist and activist Juan Gualberto Gómez also played a
large role in shaping Cuba Libre and prewar politics, but with impor-
tant ideological distinctions and with different tactics. The son of slaves,
Gómez nonetheless received an advanced education in both Havana
and Paris. He wrote extensively for black periodicals of the day, such as
La Fraternidad and La Igualdad, advocating for equal rights for blacks.
Indeed, Gómez’s career as both journalist and activist began during a
period of growing Afro-Cuban political activity. The post–Ten Years’
War period was marked by a flourishing of the black press in which new
periodicals engaged the debate over the evolving Cuban national iden-
tity and the role of Afro-Cubans in that evolution. New mutual aid soci-
eties and black schools, all supported by a growing black middle class,
also contributed to a growing sense of political self-awareness and enti-
tlement. And while Gómez was in accord with both Martí and Maceo
concerning racial fraternity under Cuba Libre and the image of the loyal
black insurgent, he argued that blacks and mulatos should create their
own organizations and institutions in order to address the specific needs
of Afro-Cubans.
For example, in 1892, Gómez created Directorio Central de las Socie-
dades de la Clase de Color (Central Directorate of Societies of Color) to
xxiii
Introduction
xxiv
Introduction
xxv
Introduction
xxvi
Introduction
They [the Spanish] went crazy when they saw us, and they threw
themselves into the thick of it, but the fight didn’t last long
because at almost the same instant, we started to chop off their
heads. But really chopping them off. The Spaniards were
scared shitless of the machete. They weren’t afraid of rifles but
machetes, yes. I raised mine, and from a distance said: “You
bastard, now I’m going to cut your head off.” Then the starched
little soldier turned tail immediately and took off.20
The chronic shortage of guns and ammunition also forced the Cuban
forces to employ guerrilla tactics. A U.S. filibuster prevented the impor-
tation of arms from the States, while funds were scarce for buying guns
from other Caribbean or Central American countries. Therefore, insur-
gents relied heavily on arms and ammunition taken from fallen Spanish
soldiers and from prisoners of war. Thus, not only outnumbered in the
field, but also usually having insufficient ammunition to sustain a pro-
longed fight, a given unit often fought until its ammunition ran out, then
retreated to meet another unit that might be able to resupply it.
In addition to such tactics against the Spanish army, insurrectionists
attacked the means of financing the war: sugar production. Soon after
his arrival, Máximo Gómez declared a moratorium on the production of
cash crops, particularly the cultivation and refining of sugar. Any plan-
tations found harvesting or processing sugar would be destroyed; using
the strategy often called la candela (literally “the candle”),21 he ordered the
torching of numerous sugarcane fields and the razing of sugar process-
ing plants in both the east and the west.
In fact, the seizing and destruction of estates looked forward to more
radical land-reform policies after the war. In July 1896, the provisional
government issued a land-reform decree, declaring all confiscated lands
property of the Cuban Republic, to be reapportioned among its defenders:
xxvii
Introduction
xxviii
Introduction
The campaign went so badly for Weyler that by the winter of 1897 the
Spanish were confined to fortified cities and towns, and the insurgents
roamed the countryside virtually unmolested. By late 1897, insurgents
began to take strategic cities, and by April 1898, Calixto García, head of
the Liberation Army in the east, began to prepare an assault on Santiago
de Cuba, Cuba’s second-largest city. For insurrectos, Cuban independence
seemed to be simply a matter of time.
Unfortunately for Afro-Cubans and all Cubans who pursued the full
realization of Cuba Libre, Cuban independence was anathema to U.S.
political and financial interests in the region. Long coveted, first by ante-
bellum Southern planters hoping to expand slave territories into the
Caribbean, then by post–Civil War industrialists and sugar producers,
Cuba loomed as a lucrative prize newly made available by what North
Americans regarded as Spanish weakness and mismanagement. Need-
ing authorization to intervene, President William McKinley gained tacit
approval from Congress through the Teller Amendment. Passed in April
1898, this amendment authorized North American troops to intervene
in order to “pacify” the country, and once pacification was achieved, the
xxix
Introduction
resolution stipulated that the troops were “to leave the government and
control of the island to its people.”25
But well before arrival, most civilian and military officials regarded
Cubans as a mongrel horde, largely unfit for self-rule. The military gov-
ernor, General Leonard Wood, wrote back to McKinley dismissing the
concept of Cuban independence out of hand, describing Cubans as “a
race that has steadily been going down for a hundred years and into
which we have to infuse new life, new principles and new methods of
doing things.”26 As far as Wood was concerned, Cubans were little bet-
ter than children in need of constant supervision. Needless to say, North
American attitudes would profoundly shape the postwar occupation and
Cuban efforts to form a republic; but even before the end of the war,
North American disregard for Cubans and their cause was manifested
in the first appraisals of conditions on the ground. With the war largely
at a standstill, North Americans arrived and reported that Cubans were
not fighting. Three years of warfare were quickly dismissed, as U.S. troops
took on the final offenses on Santiago de Cuba and other major towns,
all of which fell in quick succession. What was quickly dubbed in the
United States as that “splendid little war” proved to be so much adven-
ture for the U.S. military, and a boon for North American businesses.
Indeed, the North Americans claimed victory over Spain, negotiated bilat-
erally with Madrid for cessation of hostilities, and in turn took responsi-
bility for shaping the Cuban government. What had been the Cuban War
of Independence was quickly transformed into the “Spanish-American
War,” a transformation that would undermine any real sense of Cuban
independence.27
Moving quickly to check the populist thrust of Cuba Libre, the U.S.
occupation, beginning on January 1, 1899, backed white criollos and Span-
ish elites, a class historically cool to Cuban independence.28 The North
Americans also sought to restrict voting rights, requiring voters either to
own a minimum of $250 worth of property, to be literate, or to have
served honorably in the Liberation Army. As a result of the restrictions,
two-thirds of Cuban men and all Cuban women were denied the vote,
limiting the franchise to 5 percent of the adult population.29 These restric-
tions were not corrected until the ratification of the Cuban Constitution,
xxx
Introduction
Although the end of the war brought relative peace to Cuba, the North
American occupation, Cuban moneyed interests, and long-standing cul-
tural biases against blacks largely prevented the young republic from real-
izing the promise of equality for all citizens. In a sense, the United States
attempted to export to Cuba a post-Reconstruction model of American
democracy, one that secured white privilege at the expense of black dis-
franchisement and economic deprivation. Thus, North Americans favored
white Cuban pacíficos and Spanish volunteers for government positions
and for access to U.S. investment capital. Whites who had sat out the
war, who had openly campaigned for annexation, or who had remained
loyal to Spain often found well-paying jobs in government service sectors
or were able to return to their plantations and revive their production of
sugar, tobacco, cotton, or coffee. By contrast, the exclusion from govern-
ment jobs and the failure of land reform had devastating effects on black
veterans and Afro-Cubans more generally.
The North American occupation also inaugurated a longer period
of intensified foreign investment in Cuban utilities, manufacturing, and
agriculture. By 1905, nearly 60 percent of all rural land was owned by
North American individuals or firms. The American Sugar Company, the
United Fruit Company, and the Taco Bay Commercial Land Company,
xxxi
Introduction
for example, bought vast tracts of land for the production or cultivation
of sugar, bananas, coffee, tobacco, indigo, and other crops. Furthermore,
North American firms bought controlling interests in mines, railroads,
and electric and telephone companies, and took control of the banking
industry. Further jeopardizing black political and economic inclusion, the
Platt Amendment served as a convenient lever for Cubans and North
Americans alike to destabilize Cuban politics.
All in all, by the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century,
peasants—black, white, and Asian—returned to the land, not as owners
but as renters or seasonal laborers. The majority of black mambises were
again poverty-stricken, struggling to find gainful employment. “When
the army was disbanded,” Montejo recounts, “the black revolutionaries
were unable to remain in the city [Havana]. They returned to the coun-
try, to the cane fields, tobacco fields, to whatever, except to the offices.
The partisans had more opportunities, even being traitors all.”30 Batrell
also documented the situation in a 1906 letter to Juan Gualberto Gómez
in which he complained that the only employment he could find was as
a policeman in Bolondrón, and that his salary allowed him to do little
more for his family than to secure food and shelter.31
In addition to the failure of land reform, more racially specific
attacks further threatened the promises of Cuba Libre for black Cubans.
As we have seen, they were largely barred from government jobs, and
were increasingly shunned from civil society. White social clubs began
to exclude them, while some public parks were designated for whites
only. And while publicly funded education remained open to all, private
schools began to exclude blacks. Many American-owned restaurants and
shops refused service to blacks, to which public officials responded not
with protest but with appeals to blacks to respect American prejudices,
so as not to threaten the tourist industry.
The federal government conspired as well, implementing an immi-
gration policy to “whiten” the country. By restricting immigration from
other Caribbean nations and by promoting immigration from Europe,
particularly Spain, the Estrada Palma administration sought to increase
the number of whites dramatically and thus to dilute black political and
cultural influence. This policy had widespread support on both the Left
xxxii
Introduction
and Right, where most Cubans (including many blacks) felt that Cuban
society should be shaped primarily by European cultural influences.
Furthermore, just as in the colonial period, many white Cubans
still felt that blacks were not yet fully civilized. Racist attitudes toward
African-derived religions persisted, as did assumptions of black sexual
excess and savagery; the increased popularity of comparsas—public cele-
brations often featuring raucous music (often son), bawdy lyrics, sexu-
ally suggestive dancing, and public drunkenness—seemed to underscore
blacks’ backwardness. Cuban popular cultural representation of blacks
again marked their distance from cultural norms, and thus raised the ques-
tion of citizenship. Advertising, cartoons in newspapers, literature, and
theater all traded on well-recognized stereotypes forged in the colonial
period. For example, the bembón or negrito bembón (thick-lipped darkie)32
served as a prevalent feature of Cuban poetry and fiction. Poor, un-
educated, of limited intelligence, and semantically grotesque, the bembón
served as the antithesis of culture and refinement, and lacked the acuity
necessary for self-improvement and progress in the modern world. He
further marked his backwardness through jitanjáforas, “nonsense words
of highly onomatopoetic and rhythmic effect”33—a broken Spanish some-
what analogous to African American dialect of the plantation tradition.
The bembón’ s female counterpart, the negrita or mulata, emphasized
black female sexuality as a sign of black inferiority. Young, attractive,
fair-skinned—usually of mixed European and African descent—poor or
working-class (and thus economically vulnerable to the sexual advances
of white male elites), the mulata used her sexuality as a means of economic
and social advancement. A temptress of sorts, she lured rich white men
for material gain.
While these two figures were almost ubiquitous across Cuban pop-
ular literature of the second half of the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth, the popular stage offered additional black stereotypes. In par-
ticular, the teatro bufo (the comic stage) offered spoofs and burlesques
that often traded on exaggerated black figures. In addition to the bembón
and the mulata, the teatro bufo featured the bufo cubano or the negrito, a white
actor in blackface, rendering a comic depiction of black life and speech.
With its origins in early-nineteenth-century Cuban culture, negritos “sang
and danced in the style of their nation,”34 signifying black contentment
xxxiii
Introduction
and happiness under slavery. Furthermore, the negrito spoke the language
of bozal or dialect, a corrupted form of Spanish again marking black dif-
ference and inferiority.
The teatro bufo also featured the catedrático, the black professor, or
more generally an urban dandy, with airs and social ambitions beyond
his station and education.35 This figure feigned erudition, but uttered
malapropisms, comically portraying the absurdity of black intellect. And
finally, another urban figure, the candela—the “streetwise, sexually potent
black male”36—dramatized the threat of blackness through violence or
unbridled sexuality. All in all, these stereotypes, much older than Cuba
Libre and the rhetoric of racial fraternity, perpetually questioned black
preparedness for citizenship, and, at heightened moments of racial con-
flict, effectively sanctioned attacks on political rights. By 1912, they would
sanction state-sponsored murder.
In reaction to the assault on Afro-Cuban political rights during
Estrada Palma’s first administration, expectedly, blacks became increas-
ingly frustrated. Largely excluded from government jobs, competing for
work with new Spanish immigrants, confronting new forms of social dis-
crimination in the public square, Afro-Cubans blamed the Palma admin-
istration for deteriorating circumstances and thus opposed his reelection.
By August 1906, a campaign year, both blacks and whites, under the
command of José Miguel Gómez, staged a liberal rebellion to overthrow
Palma’s administration. In what was dubbed the August Revolution,
Independence War veterans, some twenty-five thousand strong, formed
the Constitutional Army, in which Batrell was an officer. And just as with
the Liberation Army, the Constitutional Army too was overwhelmingly
black. In response to black dissatisfaction, Gómez promised soldiers that
if he became president, they would receive officer commissions in the
Rural Guard and that he would specifically reward Afro-Cuban veter-
ans.37 Although the August Revolution did succeed in bringing down the
Palma government, it also prompted a second U.S. occupation, which,
like the first, thwarted most of the hopes for Afro-Cuban advancement.
Yet, while U.S. political and financial interests partially succeeded in
undermining many of the original goals of Cuba Libre, the constitutional
convention of 1901 did ratify universal male suffrage (women would win
the vote in 1924), guaranteeing “electoral rights to all males regardless
xxxiv
Introduction
xxxv
Introduction
directly refuted the claims that the party sought to create a new Haiti in
Cuba, and it rejected the pseudoscientific claims of innate white superi-
ority and innate black inferiority, instead insisting on the theological and
scientific truth that all humans were of the same species.42 The newspa-
per also stressed the record of black patriotism and overrepresentation
in the Liberation Army.
Addressing culture, Previsión rejected African dance and drumming
or other forms of “African atavism” (148), again attempting to promote
blacks’ entrance into the mainstream. On the other hand, the newspaper
promoted racial pride, stressing the African origins of mankind (150).
Indeed, as Aline Helg points out, letters to the editor expressed pride in
being black, as the newspaper pressed a nationalist message combining
blackness and cubanidad (ibid.). Emblematic of its agenda, the party’s logo,
an unharnessed horse rearing up with its mane swept back by the wind,
was not simply a nod toward the romance of the War of Independence
but a reference to Changó (ibid.), the Yoruba god of lightning and thun-
der and an orisha in Santería’s system of deities. Thus, the party appealed
to the specificities of Afro-Cuban culture and addressed Afro-Cuban–
specific political issues, while claiming and promoting black access and
inclusion in the greater Cuban body politic. Ultimately, the party’s “polit-
ical message,” according to Helg, “profoundly challenged the dominant
ideology, including the myth of racial equality. And last but not least, it
comprised a nationwide independent structure capable of competing with
mainstream political parties” (159).
Despite the PIC’s position of inclusiveness, the response to the
party’s focus on race and its platform was quick and vociferous; both the
Left and the Right attacked the notion of a party devoted to the redress
of racially specific grievances as an affront to Martí’s vision and as threat
to Cuban polity and civil society. White government officials and liberal
and conservative newspapers spread rumors of a black conspiracy to
attack whites and to foment a Haitian-style revolution in Cuba. Editorials
castigated blacks and the party as racist, antiwhite, and thus unpatriotic.
Indeed, liberals and conservatives reiterated the myth of racial equality,
insisting that through the war racial equality had been achieved, and
thus, to cite racial discrimination and to promote race-based remedies
was to be in fact racist.
xxxvi
Introduction
xxxvii
Introduction
after the May 20 protest, both liberal and conservative newspapers pub-
lished editorials that again used long-standing racial prejudices and stereo-
types to denounce the protests and to inflame antiblack hysteria, and
both sanctioned reprisals on the part of the government and private cit-
izens. Led by José de Jesús “Chucho” Monteagudo, a Liberation Army
veteran, government troops marched on independiente protesters in Ori-
ente province; concurrently, private companies, many foreign-owned,
hired and deployed their own militias to protect crops and manufactur-
ing equipment, and private citizens formed their own militias.
By late May, repression and reprisals were widespread. As Gómez
suspended constitutional rights in Oriente province, government troops
and private militias attacked blacks across the country, as most were sus-
pected of being independiente sympathizers and so were subject to arrest,
beatings, and murder. In the province of Havana, for example, black sug-
arcane workers were arrested on suspicion of being sympathizers, while
black mambises were arrested and accused of inciting a race war. In Ciego
de Ávila, blacks were banned from public parks on weekends. Haitians
and Jamaicans were prohibited from landing at Cuban ports. In Holguín
and Nipe Bay, black bodies were left hanging in trees or lying by the
side of the road as a warning to would-be protesters; and in Boquerón
in Guantánamo Bay, a captain and militia regulars beheaded a black
policeman and killed five black soldiers for allegedly conspiring with
Jamaicans.44 Perhaps the worst atrocity was the massacre at Hatillo, where
approximately 150 Afro-Cubans—unarmed men, women, and children—
were gunned down in their homes in a display of military aggression
against independiente protesters.
As the repression continued to intensify, officials hunted the PIC
leadership. On June 27, Estenoz was captured and killed; just three weeks
later, on July 18, Ivonnet was captured and shot to death while allegedly
trying to escape. The deaths of the two leaders marked the effective end
of the protests and served as the crushing blow to the party. Final esti-
mates of casualties of the 1912 massacres ranged between two thousand
and six thousand dead.45
According to the Constitution and to national mythology, Afro-
Cubans were full citizens, free to participate in Cuban social and politi-
cal life as they saw fit. Yet the quotidian political reality was far different
xxxviii
Introduction
In short, the period of the early republic was a dire one for Afro-Cubans.
The August Revolution to protest discrimination and corruption was
met with fear of black retribution and thwarted by U.S. occupation; inde-
pendiente protests, largely confined to the single province of Oriente,
were met with nationwide repression and brutality, resulting in the deaths
of thousands of blacks. While the atrocities raged across the island, few
white citizens protested; in fact, the vast majority approved of the assaults
either through silence or through active participation. Furthermore, this
decade-long period of eroding black civil rights played out against the
backdrop of long-standing fears and racial prejudices. The fear of black
reprisal and of African cultural roots, coupled with popular cultural rep-
resentations of black buffoonery and sexual excess, gave license to these
more brutal and overt forms of oppression. Such was the context in which
Para la historia was published; indeed, such were the conditions Batrell
hoped to reverse through his account of the war.
xxxix
Introduction
xl
Introduction
into a sugar-producing province that both before and after the Ten Years’
War drove the national, sugar-dependent economy. Nevertheless, work-
ers under the new patronato system and local merchants resented the rad-
ically inequitable distribution of wealth and Spanish control of the local
economy.
Known as “little Africa” because of its high concentration of enslaved
Afro-Cubans and their descendants,49 the area of Sabanilla in particular
was known historically as a site of political unrest. In November 1843,
for example, a slave rebellion broke out on the Triunvirato sugar plan-
tation, and Esteban Santa Cruz de Oviedo discovered a conspiracy on
his Santísima Trinidad plantation. So too the conspiracy of La Escalera,
later the same year, implicated many blacks in Sabanilla. And though Ba-
trell was born free (thanks to the free-womb law of 1870), his early life is
indicative of the persistent racial hierarchy and economic deprivation that
fueled ongoing unrest. Batrell’s mother may well have been enslaved in
the area; at the very least, she took her name from the Oviedo family.50
We have no record of Batrell’s father, but by the 1850s the Santísima
Trinidad plantation had become notorious for breeding slaves. Esteban
Oviedo “appeared to have run his three plantations like a Simon Legree,”
Robert Paquette writes. Oviedo was charged by area planters “with sex-
ual abuse of his female slaves,” and he fathered “at least twenty-six mu-
latto children.”51 Indeed, Batrell himself went by either Ricardo Batrell
or Ricardo Oviedo until approximately 1906 when he began to sign let-
ters and public documents with both names.52
Because Batrell’s mother was too poor to send him to school, he
worked from early youth on the Santísima Trinidad plantation as a field
laborer. When the Liberation Army finally arrived in Matanzas in the
winter of 1896, Batrell and his brother Bernabé enlisted. (In chapter II,
Batrell mentions another brother only once, Sixto Oviedo, though he pro-
vides no additional information about him.) Both fought in the First Divi-
sion of the Fifth Corp of the Liberation Army, then in General Pedro
Betancourt’s escort squadron.
The war in Matanzas was the bloodiest and most devastating of any
Cuban province. Both Spanish and rebel forces pinned success on occu-
pying the province; thus, when Máximo Gómez and Maceo invaded in
December 1895, the province effectively became the entire war; whoever
xli
Introduction
won Matanzas won the war. The rebels quickly took towns and villages,
but were unable to hold them indefinitely. When the Spanish retook ter-
ritory, they often retaliated against the civilian population, using their own
scorched-earth tactics, reconcentration, and at moments outright murder.
In Sabanilla, in fact, just weeks before Batrell enlisted, Cuban forces
were forced to withdraw from the area; and according to the U.S. consul
report, when the Spanish retook the region, over a two-day period they
murdered a number of civilian blacks and mulatos in retaliation for their
earlier losses.53 The Spanish, though, pursued warfare against the civil-
ian population more extensively through reconcentration, as we have
seen, a policy that resulted in the deaths of sixty thousand civilian mata-
ceros, between 24 and 34 percent of the civilian population. Adding fatal-
ities through combat, the province lost well over one-third of its popu-
lation during the war.54
In short, the war in Matanzas simply devastated the entire province.
At the war’s end and through 1899, the drop in population, the lack of
livestock and farm equipment, overgrown fields, crippled infrastructure,
and the absence of investment capital brought economic activity to nearly
a complete halt. Elites and poor alike struggled to survive, while rebuild-
ing the province in the wake of the war seemed unimaginable. Making
matters worse, banditry—robberies, kidnapping, and extortion—became
a viable means of survival for men made destitute by the war. Although
1900 and 1901 showed signs of significant economic recovery, the severe
economic inequalities that had fueled the war persisted, and even inten-
sified after the war.
The irony of the postwar reality was not lost on Batrell, who also
struggled to find work that would support him and his family. In 1898,
he found employment as a police officer and later as a night watchman
in Bolondrón, Matanzas. As part of his job was to ensure the security of
the area, he hunted bandits who preyed on the local population, and in
1905 was charged with murder after killing one. Although the charge
was dropped, he was imprisoned twice that same year for “delitos de
injuria a la autoridad” (offenses of abuse against the authorities).55 The
following year, the record finds him living in Havana, and as we have
seen, he became an officer in the Constitutional Army during the August
Revolution of 1906. Equally, if not more importantly, it was during these
xlii
Introduction
early years of the republic that Batrell sequestered himself in his house,
as he says, and taught himself to read and write.
After the August Revolution, Batrell emerged as an even more active
public figure. As a former officer in the Constitutional Army and now as
a protégé of Juan Gualberto Gómez, Batrell garnered considerable recog-
nition as a radical liberal in the Liberal Party. For example, on March
16, 1909, La Lucha reported that he presided over a meeting between
black liberals and José Miguel Gómez in which a list of pressing con-
cerns were presented to the president;56 he worked closely with Estonez
and Ivonnet, the future leaders of La Agrupación and the PIC; and al-
though he never became an official member of either group, he contin-
ually agitated for many of the same rights and causes for which these
groups were known.
It was during this period, too, that he wrote a number of political
tracts advancing black civil rights and leveling criticism at officials, poli-
cies, and practices that stood in the way of black progress. In 1907, for
example, he published “Manifiesto al Pueblo de Cuba y a La Raza de
Color” (Manifesto for the People of Cuba and for the Race of Color);
he distributed a different leaflet titled “Al Pueblo de Cuba,” and in 1912
lectured in Pinar del Río on his leaflet.57 On August 21, 1908, Batrell sent
a letter to Juan Gualberto Gómez describing problems and providing solu-
tions for a failed election in which he was a candidate, and Batrell was
arrested and incarcerated in 1910 and in 1912, largely for his political
activities. By 1910 he had completed his memoir,58 and by early 1912 he
was circulating individual chapters59 and was jailed for their critical con-
tent. During this period, Batrell was also under surveillance by both the
U.S. and Cuban secret services.60
After the massacre of 1912, Batrell virtually disappeared from public
life, perhaps, as Blancamar Rosabal suggests, because of the ongoing per-
secution of blacks and because of the critical nature of his narrative.61 Ba-
trell’s book seems to have disappeared just as he did. The volume was
published by Seoane y Alvarez Impresores, but we know little about this
publishing house—the kinds of books it published, its institutional mis-
sion and philosophy, or why it chose to publish Batrell’s memoir. Further-
more, critics have been unable to find any extant reviews or any other
accounts of the book’s reception or impact. We do know that there are
xliii
Introduction
still several copies in Cuba in private hands, and one copy is housed at
la Biblioteca Nacional José Martí. The copy with which I have worked,
bought from a private library, passed through several hands, as the mar-
ginal notes indicate. Thus the book did enjoy some circulation within
Cuba. And according to WorldCat, four copies are owned by libraries
in the United States, indicating a broader, international awareness of the
book’s historical importance. Yet, despite these modest indicators of ex-
posure and circulation, we still know very little of the volume’s publica-
tion history; indeed, subsequent critical addresses of Batrell will need to
unearth this crucial information.
Further contributing to the book’s obscurity, Batrell never published
a second volume as he said in the first that he would; and his life in politics
seems to have come to an abrupt end. In fact, the last extant letter, dated
1922, is one that solicits financial help from Juan Gualberto Gómez.62
After this communiqué, Batrell does not appear again in the public record.
Nevertheless, the larger cache of documents—letters, essays, mani-
festos, and unpublished episodes of his memoir—helps to shed consider-
able light on his life and the political work he hoped Para la historia would
do. As we have seen, Batrell was incarcerated during the nationwide
repression of 1912. Upon his arrest, authorities searched his house on
June 12 and found “a sea of papers”—some one hundred pages of what
appeared to be the second volume of his autobiography, titled “La Paz”
(The Peace), another set of papers titled “Fatalidad. Para la historia”
(Fate: For the Record), yet another set called “Pautas Políticas” (Political
Directions) addressed to General Ernesto Asbert, numerous letters and
telegrams, and a certificate of delegation to the Liberal Party assembly.63
In both the literal and the figurative sense, the unschooled farm boy
became indeed a man of letters. The Liberation and Constitutional Army
veteran had traded in his gun for a pen in the ongoing struggle for Cuban
democracy and for Afro-Cuban equality. As Omar Granados points out,
Batrell’s transformation invokes Cuban cultural mythology concerning
male leadership and national identity, a symbolic transformation in which
men of letters ultimately take up arms, become men of action, and lead
the nation into its glorious future. In the classic sense, intellectuals such
as José Martí and Juan Gualberto Gómez conceive and promote a new
vision of Cuban society, then lead the armed struggle for its realization.
xliv
Introduction
Reversing the trajectory while retaining the symbolic arc, Batrell, the free-
dom fighter, lays down his guns, learns to read and write, then devotes
his life to letters as a means of leading his country.64 “I weighed all of
the sacrifices and hardships that I endured in the war,” Batrell recounts
toward the end of his narrative, “and I realized that in order to be truly
respected in our society, it was imperative that I learn how to read and
write.” Thus, his status as man of letters should accord him the author-
ity to criticize the nation and to call on it to return to its founding ideals.
Fernando Martínez Heredia notes that a recurring set of themes and
issues runs across the bulk of Batrell’s writings. First and foremost, race
looms central for Batrell, manifesting itself in several important ways.
In his view, the black struggle for equality and citizenship is ultimately
emblematic of the larger national struggle for Cuban democracy, justice,
and equality. He asserts quite frequently that black freedom fighters in
the War of Independence (and in the Ten Years’ War) were the most
patriotic, brave, and heroic, and that it was their sacrifices that made the
republic possible. So too, Batrell argues on several occasions that the
Afro-Cuban, as a political entity, is a product of the War of Indepen-
dence and the subsequent struggles for black equality leading up to 1912.65
Indeed, it is precisely their sacrifices that justify the contemporary Afro-
Cuban claim as a political group to equality and full citizenship. For
Batrell, the black struggle for inclusion should remind the republic of its
highest ideals, that the point of the War of Independence was not mere
independence, but the fullest realization of Cuba Libre.
As an activist, he articulates strategies for furthering this struggle,
particularly the organization of black-specific social clubs to promote black
causes. For example, in 1907 he argues that efforts for black mobilization
should be more closely united, and thus he proposes the organization of
a kind of Ateneo de Color (cultural club), a social club in which blacks
would meet to discuss pressing racial issues and find solutions for them.
It would “transcend” the political parties and the larger political system
to advance a “decisive social battle” for the higher ideal of “reciprocidad
humana” (human reciprocity).66
Furthermore, Batrell’s papers criticize people, practices, and institu-
tions that thwart the advancement of racial equality. Heredia notes that
Batrell often comments on the disheartening discrepancy between the
xlv
Introduction
xlvi
Introduction
xlvii
Introduction
xlviii
Introduction
xlix
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
koe, det hja wiste, hwet al dit bitsjutte en dy-t him ornaris stjûre koe
as in laem, det wie syn lyts wyfke, syn pipenútsje en hja siddere, as
hja der om tochte, hwa nou yntkoart syn wrake treffe en ho-t dy
útfalle scoe. Hwent dit op him sitte litte, noait! En as se him
ûnderstie oer ien en oar, den lake ’r, de brede geve tosken bleat en
hâldde hjar pleagjend fen him ôf en sei, hiele lytse wyfkes mei sokke
moaije eagen moasten net sokke domme dingen freegje oan greate
manljue.
Nou wie hy den wer better, mar hy bleau sa stiif as in peal. Do
moast Gajus de Filder, wiidforneamd om syn wriûwkinst, komme en
dy kaem der deis trijeris oanhompeljen op syn knolfoet en knypte en
striek en aeike him den sa gemiene goed, det Haeije Trompetter
flokte him heas fen pine en tankberens. Mar it holp, it dûrre al net sa
bare lang, as mei syn help en it biproefde middel fen âlde Betteke út
it gasthús, hynstemoanjefet, griene oalje en brandewyn, fielde
Haeije Trompetter him op ’t lêst wer sa linich as in baleinen swipe yn
jongfeinte hânnen.
Do hiene se op in joune in wûndere ontmoeting. Hy siet hwet to
pluchsnijen for de skoenmakker en pluze der in jounbrogge by op en
it wiif siet der by to fesje forsetten for de jonge, do waerde de doar
op dien en der stie me dy rike minhear Josua de Metz fen
Amsterdam foar hjar noas. Hy koe him wol.... al sont jierren koft ’r it
bêste fé fen ’t merk op en de minsken setten him allegear heech,
hwent hy scoe nin earmen driûwer om in sint bikrinke en tingje him
’t hert út it liif en hy bitelle graech goed jild for goed gûd.
Hja rekken allebeide hwet fen ’e wize, hy en ’t wiif en stiene rjucht
oerein de bisite oan to sjen. En waerliken, efter him oan kaem âlde
minhear Ripperda ek noch en minhear Baerdt. Hy, Haeije Trompetter
wie bang for nin divel noch donder, nou waerd it him dochs
krappernôch en for ’t earst yn syn hiele trouwen seach ’r, ho lyts en
earmoedich syn keammerke wie, ho sober it húsrie, ho rikkerich it
skiûwdefjûr! Mar skjin! skjin! Gjin wiif yn hiele Ljouwert koe tsjin syn
Dúfke út!
„Joun!” seine de hearen, de rike Josua de Metz it earste en
alderdanigste frjeonlik en hy kaem op him ta en stiek de hân út. Nei
him! nei him! nei Haeije Trompetter, trijeris gisele, earme
forskoppeling yn in steechje! stiek in ryk minhear, stiek minhear
Josua de Metz fen Amsterdam de hân út, in moaije skjinne wite lytse
hân fol ringen en kostlikheit. En hy krige him foarsichtich yn syn
forile knúst fol barsten en groeden, mar ek goed skjin, en hja
fûsken. Mar hy waerde suver raer fen dit gefal, syn skonken trillen
der him fen en hy seach skean nei ’t wiif om help. Frouljue binn’
redsum, hwer in man, stadich fen bigryp, net in mûzzegat fine kin,
sjogge hja noch wol in skûrredoar iepen.
„Gien sitten, hearen!” sei se en det wie mar hânsum trije stoellen
by ’t bedsket wei en om ’e hird hinne, hwer yn ’t moai opstoelle
skiûwdefjûrrountsje de houtsjes knapten. En alsa sieten de hearen
en hja ek, mar op in earbiedige distânsje en diene it swijen der ta en
biskammen hjar djip yn it hert oer hjar needrigheit. O dit
holderhúske! dy toskeinde reauwkes, dy âld tafel, hwer gjin drip
farwe op siet! Mei hokker nidasserigge eagen seagen se it joun!
Minhear Josua de Metz naem in snufke út syn goudene snúfdoaze
en mei in swierige bûging noege ’r de oare hearen ek to priûwen. Do
brimde ’r ris en sette fen ein mei syn petear, wylt ’r frege: „Wer
hielendal de âlde, Haeije? Ik hearde sa fen ien en oar....”
„Det scoe ’k sizze, minhear”, andere dy, bliid, det ’r de mûle
opdwaen koe, hwent dy finnige lytse eachjes fen dy Amsterdammer,
der hie hy it einliks mar neat op stean. Dy seagen him tróch en der
wie wol ris in skûlherntsje yn syn hert, hwer hy ljeafst mar nimmen
ta ’n yn loere litte woe. En hy strûpte de mouwe fen ’t baitsje op oer
’e earmtakke en minhear Josua de Metz seach de sterke earm en der
skean oerhinne de reade groeden fen ’e wrede striemmen. De
wounen wierne hiel, mar de groeden? dy scoene der noch jierren
bliûwe! En hy tochte om ’e sterke rêch fen dizze reus en ho dy wol
lykje scoe! En hy riboske ûnder syn waerme tichte mantel.
En minhear Josua de Metz knypte de lippen stiif op inoar en
makke yn dizze amerij in birekken, in nuvere birekken, hwer selst
minhear Ripperda en minhear Baerdt, âlde, bitûfte rekkenmasters
fen wit hofolle saken en affysjes gjin flau bisef fen hiene.
„En ha jou al wer wirk? Nei ’t sin?”
De brede mûle fen ’e reus waerde noch greater fen in glimke. „’t
Is by de runmounle en fjouwer goune wyks. En jouns noch learsnije,
hiele lapen. De learloaijers leanje net al to ryklik. Den noch
pluchsnije. En yntkoart wer de bisten.”
„Dos jy ha al wer bisten dreauwn?” en minhear Josua de Metz
seach skerp. Wist ’r al, det in patty him de bisten ûnthâlden, omt se
bang wierne for de Frânsken? Det ’r al twa kear op ’t merk west hie
en gjin oanslach krije kind hie? Der loek him in flau biwyske read oer
’e meagere, biklonkene wangen.
„Noch net, minhear”, andere hy hwette mismoedich, „yn nije wike
scil ’k it ris wer bisykje. Myn fêst plak wer ynnimme.”
„Hwer is det?”
„Op de hoeke fen ’t steechje, det nei de Nijested ta giet. As
minhear ek ris hwet for my hat....”
„Det ha ’k”, sei minhear Josua de Metz der ynienen flotwei
oerhinne, „en der komme wy hjir om. Wy Israëliten binn’ Oranje ek
tagedien en wy ha heard, det jou it ek binne en ’t biwys levere ha. It
biwys fen de dingen, Haeije.... der komt it op oan. Jou ha nou alle
patriotten tsjin.... as ’t kin scoene se jou wol fen honger krepeare
litte wolle, omt jou it for Oranje opnaem ha yn ’e persoan fen jonker
Ripperda. En sjoch, der scille wy nou ris in stokje foar strike. Ik moat
in nije preamfarder ha for myn bisten nei de sted fen Amsterdam ta.
Der sit gâns jild ûnder, sims tûzenen en derom, ik moat in man ha,
dy-t ik yn alle stik bitrouwe kin. En dizze hearen hjir neamden jou....
„Minhear!” rôp Haeije Trompetter en koe hast net mear stilsitte op
’e stoel. Mar Dúfke skodholle stoef en Haeije Trompetter siet wer as
in laem, alhowol hy trille oer al syn lea, sa raer waerde ’r fenbinnen.
Giseljen wie neat by dit.
„Hja neamden jou”, gyng minhear Josua de Metz troch mei syn
praet, „en dy-t fen sokken in goed getúgenisss mei kriget, dy kin ik
wol yn myn tsjinst nimme. De nije pream, in bêst iken-ien mei izeren
bânnen bislein en in roefke for ’t gerief, is al ûnderweis hjir hinne en
scil klear lizze yn ’e Snitser feart. En der farre jou op nei Amsterdam
for myn rekken alle wiken. En der binne jou baes mei twa feinten
ûnder jou. Dy kinne jou sels wol hiere. En for kosten is hjir noch
fyftich goune.” En hy krige it pongkje út de bûs en telde it jild op ’e
earmtlike tafel út. Dy hie noch noait it gerinkink heard fen tsjien
goune, lit stean fen fyftich! fyftich!! In kaptael, in takomst, in
jildwinning, in eigen húske, in douwehok, en simmers sims to fiskjen
nei de mar ta, Dúfke en de jonge mei, in hearlike lange sinneskyn
dei!
Hy wie sa forslein, det hy sei gjin wird en liet it jild stil op ’e tafel
lizze. Hy seach fen Josua de Metz op Baerdt en den wer op
Ripperda, it wie him allegear to great, om dit leauwe to kinnen.
Jister noch yn ’e slimste druk en nou ynienen yn ’e folop! En hy
fielde him as de skoaijer út it mearke, dy-t sliepende wei yn ien
nacht kening waen is.
„Nei de Reade Sé fen binauwinge komt der altyd in Kanäan fen
hearlikheit,” sei minhear Baerdt hiel plechtich mei syn swier lûd,
hwer it lytse keammerke noch lytser fen waerde. „Krij mar oan,
jonge en wêz bliid mei ’t wyfke. It lot is keard, Haeije.”
Do bigoan Haeije Trompetter einliks to praten, hiel stadich, krekt
as moast ’r de wirden ien foar ien ta de kiel útwringe. „Minhear scil
net bidroegen mei my útkomme.... ik bin der.... tige bliid ta.... ’t
aldermeast for ús.... jonge.” En hy stiek de greate hân út en rearde
yn ien taest al dy skoane gounen nei him ta. Do seagen syn wrede,
earlike eagen yn ’e lichte en sochten it antlit fen ’e lytse âlde joad en
der yn de snoade swarte giteagen, glinsterjend as kralen en de
loaitsen fen dy eagen troffen inoar en elts for oar lies der yn, hwet ’r
witte woe en ’e bifestiging fen inkelde oare dingen.
Seis dagen letter stie Haeije Trompetter yn ’t rountsje fen al syn
getrouwen op ’t wykmerk. Hy hie him ’t hier knippe litten en
fetsoenlik skeard, hy hie in nij buis oan, in lekkense pet op en
prachtige nije klompen, gleon op glânze, mei greate bosken strie der
yn, oan ’e foetten. Dúfke en ’e jonge stiene fen fjirrens mei in optein
sin dit alles oan to sjen. Gol wonk ’r Brike Lubbert, Gajus de Filder,
Gosse Ketsje en Kaeije Klapdermarop en hja fandelen it fé for him
fen ’t merk, det minhear Josua de Metz dizz’ kear koft hie. En it wie
gâns in poarsje.
En sels krige ’r de âldermoaijsten by ’t hoarntou, in pear fen dy
alderkostlikste bistkes, suver siden fen fel en fyn fen kop as jifferkes
en der in pear hoarnen op, as wierne se bislipe, der wie nou suver
gjin wryt noch slyt oan! pronkjes wierne it! en hiel stadich kuiere ’r
net troch ’t steechje nei de Nijested, né, hja gyngen ’t hiele merk
lâns, de Wirdumer Dyk op en sa nei ’t Breed fen ’e Nijested ta. Alle
âlde getrouwen der efteroan en alle Ljouwter bern en hounen fen
fjirren. Der hat noch nea in kening sa yn top fen gloarje stien as
Haeije Trompetter dy moarne.
En by de Waech, der lei de nije, greate pream klear, sines. Der
stiene de feinten to wachtsjen, der hy baes oer wie, der stie minhear
Josua de Metz op him to wachtsjen, nou syn breahear en hokfoar
ien! En hja biseagen en bitûmken de kostlike bistjes noch ris en do
hearde ’r as in moai mesyk it bossen fen hjar poaten oer ’e barte yn
syn pream!
En foar ’t finster fen ’e soosjeteit, der stie âlde fen Rhé to smoken
en ’t wykmerkfortier oan to sjen. Sûnder erch seach ’r sa nei it folk,
nei it fé, nei dy greate kearel, dy-t boppe alles útstike. Haeije
Trompetter, dy smycht! wie dy det? Op syn Sneins! suver yn ’t brat
as in riken rintenier? En hwet moast dy der by dy pream fol bisten?
Hastich liet ’r de skel rinkelje yn ’e hân. Sibren, de jonge út it
Wetterlân, al sont tiiden syn hantsjemoaisknecht en neisneuper fen
alle ding, hwer greate jonges de noas mar ynstekke doare, kipe om
’e hoeke fen ’e doar. En dy al gau, wiis fornim der op út.
It wie Haeije Trompetter, ta eare en oansjen kleauwn. En fen Rhé,
âlde bitûfte foks, bignúvde det spultsje fen fjirren. Ripperda kaem en
fûske mei dy joad en Falentijn en Hopperus.... Do wist ’r genôch....
Haeije scoe de ôfgesant wirde twisken Ljouwert en Amsterdam fen
dy oranjerazers. De brieven rekken wei.... nou founen se der dit op.
Hy gnyske húnsk en forflokte lûd de dei, det hy dy dogeneat giselje
litten hie. Det skreauwde wech en der wear. Min moast folle stilder
wraek nimme kinne.
Hjir setten se him nou pyk mei. Scoe hy oan ’e koartste ein lúke
moatte? scoe ’r?
Hy koe wol gûle fen spyt.—
IX.