Chronology of A Collapse (: 3262,00.html
Chronology of A Collapse (: 3262,00.html
Chronology of A Collapse (: 3262,00.html
During the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, more and more special purpose
vehicles were created that allowed the company to keep debts off the books
and inflate assets. These entities, along with other accounting loopholes and
poor financial reporting, let Enron ultimately hide billions in debt from special
deals and projects. (For more on corporate disclosure, read The Importance of
Corporate Transparency.)
Sell-Off
In August of 2001, shortly after the company achieved $100 billion in
revenues, then-CEO Jeff Skilling unexpectedly resigned, prompting Wall
Street to question the health of the company. Kenneth Lay once again took the
helm, and both Lay and Skilling, in addition to other Enron executives, began
selling large amounts of Enron stock as prices continued to drop – from a high
of about $90.00 per share earlier in the year, to less than a dollar. The
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) opened an investigation.
(For more on the structure of the commission, check out Policing The
Securities Market: An Overview Of The SEC.)
Dec. 2, 2001
Less than a week after a white knight takeover bid from Dynegy was called
off, Enron filed for bankruptcy protection. The company had more than $38
billion in outstanding debts. In the following months, the U.S. Justice
Department initiated a criminal investigation into Enron's bankruptcy. Several
Enron executives and Enron's auditor firm, Arthur Andersen, have since been
indicted for a variety of charges including obstruction of justice for shredding
documents and conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, and some have
been sentenced to prison.
New Regulations
Enron's collapse, and the financial havoc it wreaked on its shareholders and
employees, led to new regulations and legislation to promote the accuracy of
financial reporting for publicly held companies. In July of 2002, President
Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, intended to "enhance corporate
responsibility, enhance financial disclosures and combat corporate and
accounting fraud." (For more on the 2002 Act, read How The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act Era Affected IPOs.)
Conclusion
At the time of Enron's collapse, it was the biggest corporate bankruptcy ever
to hit the financial world. Since then WorldCom, Lehman Brothers and
Washington Mutual have surpassed Enron as the largest corporate
bankruptcies. The Enron scandal drew attention to accounting and corporate
Enron Report November 9
Enron shocked the world from being “America’s most innovative • Lay again talks to Treasury's O'Neill.
company” to America's biggest corporate bankruptcy at its time. At its
peak, Enron was America's seventh largest corporation and was by November 29
1992 the largest seller of natural gas in North America, their earnings • The SEC expands its investigation to include auditor Arthur
before interest and taxes was $122 million. Enron gave the illusion that Andersen.
it was a steady company with good revenue but that was not the case,
a large part of Enron’s profits were made of paper. This was made
possible by masterfully designed accounting and morally questionable December 2
acts by traders and executives. Deep debt and surfacing information • Enron files for bankruptcy.
about hiding losses gave the company big problems and in the late Stock Close: 26 cents
2001 Enron declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code. December 12
• Andersen CEO Joseph Berardino testifies his firm discovered
Chronology of a Collapse "possible illegal acts" committed by Enron.
November 1997
• Enron buys out a partner's stake in a company called JEDI and sells January 9, 2002
the stake to a firm it creates, called Chewco, to be run by an Enron • The Justice Department launches a criminal investigation.
officer. Thus begins a complex series of transactions that enable Enron
to hide debts.
January 10
• Attorney General John Ashcroft rescues himself from the
February 20, 2001 investigation because of contributions he received from Enron.
• A FORTUNE story calls Enron a "largely impenetrable" company that Andersen acknowledges destroying Enron files.
is piling on debt while keeping Wall Street in the dark.
Stock Close: $75.09 Cause of Collapse
Accounting Problems
April 17 The conventional wisdom is that it was "innovative" accounting
• Enron chairman Ken Lay meets with Vice President Dick Cheney and practices and their consequences that started the tide of losses
other energy-policy officials; it's one of six such visits. that brought the energy giant down. Enron collapsed not so much
because it had gotten too big, but because it was perceived to be
August 14 much bigger than it really was in the first place. By decentralizing
• CEO Jeffrey Skilling resigns, becoming the sixth senior executive to its operations into numerous subsidiaries and shell corporations,
leave in a year. Lay says in a conference call with stock analysts, "I Enron was able to hide huge derivative losses that would have
never felt better about the company." He deflects analysts' pleas for halted its growth much sooner if widely understood. Publicly
more disclosure. They lower their ratings on Enron stock, which drops traded corporations are required to make their financial
in after-hours trading to a 52-week low. statements public, but Enron's finances were an impenetrable
Stock Close: $39.55 maze of carefully crafted imaginary transactions between itself
and its subsidiaries that masked its true financial state. In other
words, losses were held off the book by subsidiary companies,
October 12 while assets were stated.
• Arthur Andersen legal counsel instructs workers who audit Enron's
books to destroy all but the most basic documents. Fallout From Fraud
The auditor can commit fraud by knowingly issuing a more favorable audit
October 16 report than is warranted. This may occur when the auditor accepts a bribe or
• Enron reports a third-quarter loss of $618 million. Moody's investors bows to client pressure or threats as in the case of ESM Securities v.
Service indicates that it is considering lowering its credit rating on Alexander Grant (Maggin, 1989). The auditor can be unduly influenced by
Enron debt securities. having a direct or indirect financial interest in the client. For example, an
Stock Close: $33.84 auditor who is performing significant consulting engagements for an audit
client may be reluctant to insist on accounting adjustments because of the fear
October 22 of losing the client to another CPA firm as in the case of Enron v. Arthur
• Enron discloses that the Securities Exchange Commission has Andersen (Powers, 2002). Another example of this occurs in a weaker form
opened an inquiry. when the auditor is not performing any consulting but is still reluctant to stand
up to the client on accounting issues for fear of being fired.
October 24 Management Culture
• Chief financial officer Andrew Fastow, who ran some of Enron's Of course, the Enron fiasco did not happen by accident. It was
stealth partnerships, is replaced. facilitated by a corporate culture that encouraged greed and
fraud, as exemplified by the energy traders who extorted
October 26 California energy consumers. Rather than focus on creating real
• The Wall Street Journal reports the existence of the Chewco value, management's only goal was in maintaining the
partnerships run by an Enron manager. Ken Lay calls Fed Chairman appearance of value, and therefore a rising stock price. This was
Alan Greenspan to alert him of the company's problems. exacerbated by a fiercely competitive corporate culture that
Stock Close: $15.40 rewarded results at any cost. Some divisions of Enron replaced
as much as 15 percent of its work force annually, leaving
October 28 employees to scramble for any advantage they could find to
• Lay calls Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. In October and November, justify their continued employment.
Enron's president phones an O'Neill deputy at least six times, seeking
help. Preferential Treatment
While the internal integrity of the company remained thusly
challenged, the facade was the exact opposite. The company
October 29
leveraged political connections in both the Clinton and Bush
• Lay calls Commerce Secretary Donald Evans, suggesting he help
administrations, as well as on Wall Street, for preferential
Enron.
treatment and the air of legitimacy that allowed it to perpetrate its
frauds. In this context, the accounting practices widely
November 8 considered the cause of the Enron collapse can be seen as just a
• Enron admits accounting errors, infalting income by $586 million symptom of a larger management culture that exemplified the
since 1997. dark side of American capitalism.
Prevention not exist in Germany.lix In Britain, auditors grew more dependent on
Bar auditor conflicts. the expertise of accountants over the years until the audit function
The big auditing firms already have promised major changes in the way they became dominated by the accounting profession. The concepts of
do business. Most will no longer act as internal and external auditors for the “auditing” and “accounting” are often used interchangeably in Britain.lxi
same firm. Two of the three major accounting firms that still act as consultants Where there is potential for conflicts of interest to arise, it may be well
will no longer sell many of those services to the same companies they audit. worth reducing the use of external auditors in such circumstances. As
Putting distance between accountants and the companies they audit should stated by Polizatto. the appropriateness of delegating on-site
increase public confidence in the auditors' judgments. Those restrictions inspections to external auditors would very much depend on an
should be imposed by the government and monitored by the U.S. Securities assessment of whether it is best able to perform the on-site verification
and Exchange Commission. Former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt attempted to function. This requires consideration of factors such as skills,
enact such reforms but was rebuffed by the industry's strong lobbying efforts competence, experience and independence from political or other
in Washington. influence.
Increase disclosure. However, weighing the immense benefits which external auditors
The public needs more information about the financial relationships of contribute to the supervisory process, it could be worthwhile
executives and board members of publicly traded companies. Do executives implementing a law like that of Sarbanes Oxley in Britain. The
have investments in corporate subsidiaries? Do board members have outside Sarbanes Oxley Act would discourage the dual role of auditors and
jobs with groups financed by the company? Are financial ties allowed to exist reporting accountants/skilled persons thereby encouraging greater use
between board members, executives and employees? One problem found by of external auditors within the financial supervisory
the Enron board was that many in a position to blow the whistle were process.
apparently compromised by their own sweetheart deals.
Sure, kicking around Ken Lay and other former Enron executives may satisfy
the blood lust back at home, but where was the concern in Congress for these
reforms when Enron was flush a year or two ago? The public doesn't need
politicians to add to the heat. Instead, it needs a clear, detailed and workable
plan for preventing this from happening again.
External Auditor
Mandatory rotation of audit firms
The risk of having an auditor becoming too familiar with a particular
business, hence becoming too close to a company and compromising
his independence is the main reason why mandatory rotation of audit
firms has been proposed. Whilst supporters of mandatory rotation
believe that the auditor's independence would be strengthened as a
result of making companies change their auditor after a fixed period of
years, many have opposed the idea of mandatory rotation, arguing that
it is a costly exercise.