Estafa – The Case of Dishonesty and

Deceit
“Estafador!”
How often have we heard this exclamation between business
partners? Deceit, breach of trust, abuse of confidence, severe
dishonesty. These constitute the crime of estafa.
Elements of Estafa in the Philippines
Estafa exists when two factors concur:
 One person is damaged by the acts of another and;
 The acts by the latter caused damage to the former is
consummated by through trickery. Deceit includes false pretense or
abuse of trust in which case the damaged party parts with property
or money that the offender eventually gains for himself.
Estafa is Mala in Se
Deceit that results in material damage is inherently evil and must be
punished. In the case of estafa, the penalty is imprisonment and a
fine. The most severe punishment is levied for monetary damage
exceeding P12,000.00.
The excerpted provision on estafa follows

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud

another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to

prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

How Does One Commit the Crime of Estafa

The felonious act of estafa presupposes abuse of confidence.
Critical is that one of the parties reposes trust and confidence in the
offender. Let’s take an example.

Estafa committed by abuse of trust

Mark, the offender, has the obligation to hold the victim’s property
in trust for the victim and the offender is mandated to return the
same property back to the victim. Estafa is thereby consummated
when the offender, instead of returning or delivering the same,
misappropriates the property.
Misappropriation entails that the offender uses the property as if it
were his own, or uses the property in a manner different from what
had been previously agreed upon.

Let us assume that Mark was given the authority to take Vic’s
Toyota86 in trust to be housed for 30 days and oil-changed. Instead
of complying with the agreement, Mark takes the car for several joy
rides until it breaks down. Not only does he fail to repair the vehicle,
he abandons the unit and hides from the owner.

Mark is guilty of estafa.

Estafa commited by deceit

Estafa may also be committed by deceit. The most common method

involves the use of false pretenses to fool the victim into believing
that the offender has the qualifications, power or influence to do
something, and the victim, relying on such pretenses, parts with
his property or money. Let’s look at an example.
Joy approaches a travel agency to contract the application for a
visa. The agency’s representative collects fees and promises to
render the same within five days. Unknown to Joyce, the
representative never had the intention of rendering such service.
When the due date arrives, Joy is informed that the application had
been denied.

The representative is guilty of estafa and the company employing

Joy can be held subsidiarily liable.
In both cases, the victim suffers damage, which value can be
ascertained by the courts.

Where does the aggrieved file the Estafa Case

Estafa has two essential elements which must concur. First element
is deceit , or abuse of confidence; and the second element is
damage. As estafa is a continuing crime, the action may be filed in
any court where any of its essential elements were committed.

Thus, if deception or abuse of confidence was made in Quezon

City and damage was caused in Taguig, then the case may be filed
either in Manila or in Makati.

Estafa Examples and Reasoning

Estafa By Deceit Example

Estafa can be commited by deceit whereby the offender
misrepresents facts to the victim and the latter relies on said
misrepresenation, thereby parting with property or money. Damage
ensues.

The case of Rosita Sy vs. People of the Philippines, GR No.

183879, April 14, 2010.sees Rosita Sy charged with estafa for
having deceived Felicidad Navarro. Rosita promised to process
Felicidad’s employment in Taiwan if Felicidad can pay her PHP120,
 000.00. Felicidad agreed contracted the job to Rosita. Therafter,
Rosita gave false documents to Felicidad to be used by the latter for
her application. The Taiwanese authorities rejected the false
documents. Rosita was charged with estafa at the RTC

After due process at the lower court level, the Supreme Court ruled
that Rosita should be held liable for estafa by means of
deceit. According to the Supreme Court, all the elements of estafa
by deceit were present.

First, Rosita falsely pretended that she had the qualifications to

faciliate Felicidad’s employment in Taiwan. Second Felicidad relied
on Rosita misrepresentation, and paid her the amount of P120,
000.00. However, despite Felicidad’s payment, Rosita’s promises
did not happen. So, the transaction has caused damage to
Felicidad.

It is easy to tell when there is estafa. Know the Elements:

 there should be an offender who represents himself to be

someone who he really is not, or to be someone capable of doing
something which he really cannot

 and there should be a victim who believed and relied on the

false representations of the offender.

What completes estafa is the damage that is caused to the victim

who gave money or property because he believed in the
false representations of the offender.

Estafa by Abuse of Confidence

The case of Asiatrust is cited for the following example.

Sometime in the early part of 1997, petitioner Anthony Ng, then
engaged in the business of building and fabricating
telecommunication towers under the trade name “Capitol
Blacksmith and Builders,” applied for a credit line of PhP 3,000,000
with Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust).

On May 30, 1997, Asiatrust approved petitioner’s loan application.

Petitioner was then required to sign several documents, among
which are the Credit Line Agreement, Application and Agreement for
Irrevocable L/C, Trust Receipt Agreements,4 and Promissory Notes.
Though the Promissory Notes matured on September 18, 1997, the
two (2) aforementioned Trust Receipt Agreements did not bear any
maturity dates as they were left unfilled or in blank by Asiatrust.

After petitioner received the goods, consisting of chemicals and

metal plates from his suppliers, he utilized them to fabricate the
communication towers ordered from him by his clients which were
installed in three project sites, namely: Isabel, Leyte; Panabo,
Davao; and Tongonan.

As petitioner realized difficulty in collecting from his client Islacom,

he failed to pay his loan to Asiatrust. Asiatrust then conducted a
surprise ocular inspection of petitioner’s business through Villarva
S. Linga, Asiatrust’s representative appraiser. Linga thereafter
reported to Asiatrust that he found that approximately 97% of the
subject goods of the Trust Receipts were “sold-out and that only 3%
of the goods pertaining to PN No. 1963 remained.

On March 16, 1999, Remedial Account Officer Ma. Girlie C.

Bernardez filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Consequently, on September 12, 1999, an Information for Estafa, as

defined and penalized under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC in
relation to Sec. 3, PD 115 or the Trust Receipts Law, was filed with
the RTC. The said Information reads:
That on or about the 30th day of May 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named petitioner, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously defraud Ma. Girlie C. Bernardez by
entering into a Trust Receipt Agreement with said complainant
whereby said petitioner as entrustee received in trust from the said
complainant various chemicals in the total sum of P4.5 million with
the obligation to hold the said chemicals in trust as property of the
entruster with the right to sell the same for cash and to remit the
proceeds thereof to the entruster, or to return the said chemicals if
unsold; but said petitioner once in possession of the same, contrary
to his aforesaid obligation under the trust receipt agreement with
intent to defraud did then and there misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit
and despite repeated demands made upon him, said petitioner
refused and failed and still refuses and fails to make good of his
obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the said Ma. Girlie C.
Bernardez in the amount of P2,971,650.00, Philippine Currency.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges.

Thereafter, a full-blown trial ensued.

During the pendency of the abovementioned case, conferences

between petitioner and Asiatrust’s Remedial Account Officer, Daniel
Yap, were held. Afterward, a Compromise Agreement was drafted
by Asiatrust. One of the requirements of the Compromise
Agreement was for petitioner to issue six (6) postdated checks.
Petitioner, in good faith, tried to comply by issuing two or three
checks, which were deposited and made good. The remaining
checks, however, were not deposited as the Compromise
Agreement did not push through.

For his defense, petitioner argued that: (1) the loan was granted as
his working capital and that the Trust Receipt Agreements he signed
with Asiatrust were merely preconditions for the grant and approval
of his loan; (2) the Trust Receipt Agreement corresponding to Letter
of Credit No. 1963 and the Trust Receipt Agreement corresponding
to Letter of Credit No. 1964 were both contracts of adhesion, since
the stipulations found in the documents were prepared by Asiatrust
in fine print; (3) unfortunately for petitioner, his contract worth PhP
18,000,000 with Islacom was not yet paid since there was a
squabble as to the real ownership of the latter’s company, but
Asiatrust was aware of petitioner’s receivables which were more
than sufficient to cover the obligation as shown in the various
Project Listings with Islacom, Smart Communications, and Infocom;
(4) prior to the Islacom problem, he had been faithfully paying his
obligation to Asiatrust as shown in Official Receipt Nos. 549001,
549002, 565558, 577198, 577199, and 594986,6 thus debunking
Asiatrust’s claim of fraud and bad faith against him; (5) during the
pendency of this case, petitioner even attempted to settle his
obligations as evidenced by the two United Coconut Planters Bank
Checks7 he issued in favor of Asiatrust; and (6) he had already paid
PhP 1.8 million out of the PhP 2.971 million he owed as per
Statement of Account dated January 26, 2000.

Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial on the merits, the RTC, on May 29, 2001, rendered a
Decision, finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. The fallo of
the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the petitioner,

Anthony L. Ng GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Estafa defined in and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 3 of Presidential Decree
115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years,
eight (8) months, and twenty one (21) days of prision mayor,
minimum, as the minimum penalty, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.
The petitioner is further ordered to return to the Asiatrust
Development Bank Inc. the amount of Two Million, Nine Hundred
Seventy One and Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P2,971,650.00) with
legal rate of interest computed from the filing of the information on
September 21,1999 until the amount is fully paid.

The Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court reversed the findings of the Regional Trial

Court and found that that petitioner is not liable for Estafa both
under the RPC and PD 115.

The key ground is that Goods Were Not Received in Trust

The first element of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC
requires that the money, goods or other personal property must be
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return it. But as we already discussed, the
goods received by petitioner were not held in trust. They were also
not intended for sale and neither did petitioner have the duty to
return them. They were only intended for use in the fabrication of
steel communication towers.

There is No Misappropriation of Goods or Proceeds

The second element of Estafa requires that there be

misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt.

This is the very essence of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b). The
words “convert” and “misappropriated” connote an act of using or
disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to
one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without a right.

Petitioner argues that there was no misappropriation or conversion

on his part, because his liability for the amount of the goods subject
of the trust receipts arises and becomes due only upon receipt of
the proceeds of the sale and not prior to the receipt of the full price
of the goods.

Petitioner is correct. Thus, assuming arguendo that the provisions of

PD 115 apply, petitioner is not liable for Estafa because Sec. 13 of
PD 115 provides that an entrustee is only liable for Estafa when he
fails “to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods x x x
covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the
entruster or as appears in the trust receipt x x x in accordance with
the terms of the trust receipt.”

The trust receipt entered into between Asiatrust and petitioner

states:

In case of sale I/we agree to hand the proceeds as soon as

received to the BANK to apply against the relative acceptance (as
described above) and for the payment of any other indebtedness of
mine/ours to ASIATRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK.19 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Clearly, petitioner was only obligated to turn over the proceeds as

soon as he received payment. However, the evidence reveals that
petitioner experienced difficulties in collecting payments from his
clients for the communication towers. Despite this fact, petitioner
endeavored to pay his indebtedness to Asiatrust, which payments
during the period from September 1997 to July 1998 total
approximately PhP 1,500,000. Thus, absent proof that the proceeds
have been actually and fully received by petitioner, his obligation to
turn over the same to Asiatrust never arose.
What is more, under the Trust Receipt Agreement itself, no date of
maturity was stipulated. The provision left blank by Asiatrust is as
follows:

x x x and in consideration thereof, I/we hereby agree to hold said

goods in Trust for the said Bank and as its property with liberty to
sell the same for its account within ________ days from the date of
execution of the Trust Receipt x x x20

In fact, Asiatrust purposely left the space designated for the date
blank, an action which in ordinary banking transactions would be
noted as highly irregular. Hence, the only way for the obligation to
mature was for Asiatrust to demand from petitioner to pay the
obligation, which it never did.

Again, it also makes the Court wonder as to why Asiatrust decided

to leave the provisions for the maturity dates in the Trust Receipt
agreements in blank, since those dates are elemental part of the
loan. But then, as can be gleaned from the records of this case,
Asiatrust also knew that the capacity of petitioner to pay for his loan
also hinges upon the latter’s receivables from Islacom, Smart, and
Infocom where he had ongoing and future projects for fabrication
and installation of steel communication towers and not from the sale
of said goods. Being a bank, Asiatrust acted inappropriately when it
left such a sensitive bank instrument with a void circumstance on an
elementary but vital feature of each and every loan transaction, that
is, the maturity dates. Without stating the maturity dates, it was
impossible for petitioner to determine when the loan will be due.

Moreover, Asiatrust was aware that petitioner was not engaged in

selling the subject goods and that petitioner will use them for the
fabrication and installation of communication towers. Before
granting petitioner the credit line, as aforementioned, Asiatrust
conducted an investigation, which showed that petitioner fabricated
and installed communication towers for well-known communication
companies to be installed at designated project sites. In fine, there
was no abuse of confidence to speak of nor was there any intention
to convert the subject goods for another purpose, since petitioner
did not withhold the fact that they were to be used to fabricate steel
communication towers to Asiatrust. Hence, no malice or abuse of
confidence and misappropriation occurred in this instance due to
Asiatrust’s knowledge of the facts.

Furthermore, Asiatrust was informed at the time of petitioner’s

application for the loan that the payment for the loan would be
derived from the collectibles of his clients. Petitioner informed
Asiatrust that he was having extreme difficulties in collecting from
Islacom the full contracted price of the towers. Thus, the duty of
petitioner to remit the proceeds of the goods has not yet arisen
since he has yet to receive proceeds of the goods. Again, petitioner
could not be said to have misappropriated or converted the
proceeds of the transaction since he has not yet received the
proceeds from his client, Islacom.

This Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that petitioner has
fully paid his obligation to Asiatrust, making the claim for damage
and prejudice of Asiatrust baseless and unfounded. Given that the
acceptance of payment by Asiatrust necessarily extinguished
petitioner’s obligation, then there is no longer any obligation on
petitioner’s part to speak of, thus precluding Asiatrust from claiming
any damage. This is evidenced by Asiatrust’s Affidavit of
Desistance21 acknowledging full payment of the loan.

Reasonable Doubt Exists

In the final analysis, the prosecution failed to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty of Estafa under Art. 315,
par. 1(b) of the RPC in relation to the pertinent provision of PD 115
or the Trust Receipts Law; thus, his liability should only be civil in
nature.
While petitioner admits to his civil liability to Asiatrust, he
nevertheless does not have criminal liability. It is a well-established
principle that person is presumed innocent until proved guilty. To
overcome the presumption, his guilt must be shown by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, we held in People v. Mariano22
that while the principle does not connote absolute certainty, it
means the degree of proof which produces moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind of the culpability of the accused. Such proof
should convince and satisfy the reason and conscience of those
who are to act upon it that the accused is in fact guilty. The
prosecution, in this instant case, failed to rebut the constitutional
innocence of petitioner and thus the latter should be acquitted.

At this point, the ruling of this Court in Colinares v. Court of

Appeals is very apt, thus:

The practice of banks of making borrowers sign trust receipts

to facilitate collection of loans and place them under the
threats of criminal prosecution should they be unable to pay it
may be unjust and inequitable, if not reprehensible. Such
agreements are contracts of adhesion which borrowers have
no option but to sign lest their loan be disapproved. The resort
to this scheme leaves poor and hapless borrowers at the
mercy of banks, and is prone to misinterpretation x x x.23
Such is the situation in this case.

Asiatrust’s intention became more evident when, on March 30,

2009, it, along with petitioner, filed their Joint Motion for Leave to
File and Admit Attached Affidavit of Desistance to qualify the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by Felino H. Esquivas, Jr.,
attorney-in-fact of the Board of Asiatrust, which acknowledged the
full payment of the obligation of the petitioner and the successful
mediation between the parties.
From the foregoing considerations, we deem it unnecessary to
discuss and rule upon the other issues raised in the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated August 29, 2003 affirming
the RTC Decision dated May 29, 2001 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner
ANTHONY L. NG is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge of violation
of Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC in relation to the pertinent provision
of PD 115.
SO ORDERED.