505 830

CASES MISSING:
 781-810
 811-830
Article VIII: Judicial Department
Section 1. Judicial Power

Definition and Scope
505. Marbury v. Madison – Cranch 137 [1803]
FACTS: Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election.
Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the
Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president
more control over appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams
and his party to frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit
judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate,
but they would not be valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of
State.
William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of
Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court
to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents.
Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of
mandamus compelling the delivery of the commissions.
ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their
commissions?
RULING: Yes. The Court found that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was
illegal, but did not order Madison to hand over Marbury’s commission via writ of
mandamus. Instead, the Court held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789
enabling Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional,
since it purported to extend the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III,
Section 2, established.
Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a
remedy, but concluded the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned that the Judiciary
Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution. Congress did not have power to modify the
Constitution through regular legislation because Supremacy Clause places the
Constitution before the laws. In so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial
review, i.e., the power to declare a law unconstitutional.
506. Santiago v. Bautista – 32 SCRA 188 [1970]

FACTS: Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his
graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor
students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed
the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was
improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc the
graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part
of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising
judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function.
ISSUE: Whether the court may exercise judicial function in this case
RULING: No. The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial
nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that
there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under
which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from
is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine.
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise
of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In
order for an action for certiorari to exist, Test to determine whether a tribunal or board
exercises judicial functions: 1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of
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persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination; 2) that the tribunal
must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision; 3) the
tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at
least the not the legislative nor the executive. It may be said that the exercise of judicial
function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy.
507. Radiowealth v. Agregado – 86 Phil. 429 [1950]

FACTS: A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for Pho 585
and installed in the secondand third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the
Supreme Court. The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the
President) disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which
discontinues open market purchases. Petitioners also contend that judicial functions do
not include purchase of property. Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the
payment be approved however, the Auditor of theSC refused to countersign the warrant
for payment
ISSUE: Whether Judicial Department can make purchases without the prior approval of
the Executive
RULING: Yes. The prerogatives of the Supreme Court which the Constitution secures
against interference includes not only the powers to adjudicate causes but all things that
are reasonably necessary for administration of justice. It is within its power, free from
encroachment by the executive, to acquire books and other office equipment
reasonably needed to the convenient transaction of its business. These implied,
inherent, or incidental powers are as essential to the existence of the court as the
powers specifically granted. Without the power to provide itself with appropriate
instruments for the performance of its duties, the express powers with which the
Constitution endows it would become useless. The court could not maintain its
independence and dignity as the Constitution intends if the executive personally or
through subordinate officials could determine for the court what it should have or use in
the discharge of its functions, and when and how it should obtain them.
The Supreme Court is supreme and independent of the executive in this sphere.
In the requisition for fixtures, equipment and supplies both the executive and judicial
departments are on the same footing. They derive their authority from the same source
and represent the sovereignty in equal degree. It stands to reason that the Chief
Executive has no more authority to encroach on the Supreme Court in the choice of the
instruments needed to carry on its functions than the court has to dictate to the
executive what, when and how to get his.
508. In re Laureta – 148 SCRA 382 [1987]

FACTS: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M.
Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division.
Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered
unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to
inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel
Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of
the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself
from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986
after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed
letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to
another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly
circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s
Complaint.
ISSUE: Whether Illustre’s and Laureta’s actions violate the principle of separation of
powers
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RULING: Yes. In their persistence to overturn detrimental decisions, their threats of
“exposing” the supposed corruption of the SC to the media, and their unfounded
complaint to the Tanodbayan, Ilustre and Laureta attempted to subject the judiciary to
the executive, which is unjustifiable under separation of powers. The Supreme Court's
authority and duty to act to preserve its honor from attacks by an irate lawyer mouthed
by his client is clear and non-vindictive.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or
division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of
the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement
of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a
republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of government
are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can
interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
509. In re Borromeo – 241 SCRA 405 [1995]

FACTS: The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has
apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial
awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with
nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16)
years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings
in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the
courts, including the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether SC may held Borromeo in contempt
RULING: Yes. Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive
contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to
him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and
learn due respect for the Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a
term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of
1k. He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found
guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will
merit further and more serious sanctions.
510. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice – GR 132601, January 19, 1999

FACTS: Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177). The SC
issued a temporary restraining order for the execution until it ensures that there will no
longer be any repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA 8177. Such action
by the court was questioned since it already rendered a final judgment on the case.
ISSUE: Whether the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided with a final judgment
RULING: No. The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the SC of its jurisdiction to
execute and enforce the same judgment. Notwithstanding the order of execution and
the executory nature thereof on the date set, the date can be postponed. The power to
control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction – supervening
events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel the courts to intervene
and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. The SC did not restrain the
effectivity of the law enacted by the Congress. It merely restrained the execution of its
judgment to give reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress.
ART 8 SEC 1: Judicial Power Definition And Scope

511. Planters V. Fertiphil
Facts: Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations
incorporated under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals. President Ferdinand
Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among
others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale
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of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid ₱10 for
every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust
Company, the depositary bank of PPI. After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily
stopped the imposition of the ₱10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil
demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI
refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages
against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Fertiphil, hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise its power to judicially
determine the constitutionality of the subject statute in the instant case.
Ruling: Yes. The case was primarily instituted for collection and damages.
However, a perusal of the complaint also reveals that the instant action is founded on
the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and unconstitutional special
assessment. Consequently, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question
be the very lis mota of the case is present, making it proper for the trial court to rule on
the constitutionality of LOI 1465.16
Main point: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1)
the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and
substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)
recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
ART 8 SEC 1: Judicial Power Definition And Scope
512. Re: Letter to UP Law Faculty
Facts: 37 of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law’s

opinion is that the plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court. A Resolution
dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue: Whether or not the UP Law Faculty violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Ruling: Yes. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can
threaten the independence of the judiciary. The Court could hardly perceive any
reasonable purpose for the faculty's less than objective comments except to discredit
the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court's honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the
case on the comfort women's claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty
would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse
the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of
the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they
owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.
Art. VIII Sec. 1: Definition and Scope
513. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
FACTS: President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued EO No. 13, abolishing the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) which was created by previous Preident
Arroyo through EO NO. 12; transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
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Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-
established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Petitioner Prospero Pichay,
Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA) was issued an affidavit of grave misconduct among others by the ODESLA.
Hence, this petition challenging the constitutionality of EO No. 13 with the contention
that IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is reserved to the
Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the
legislature, to administrative agencies.
ISSUE: Whether or not IAD-ODESLA was vested with judicial powers through
EO No. 13.
RULING: NO. Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate
or hear administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government" and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President” which is a
duty maintained with the IAD-ODESLA. It is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to
the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.
MAINPOINT: Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is
not a judicial function.
Adjudicatory power – is a scope of judicial power which includes the duty of court to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable; and determining whether there had been a GAD amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Art. VIII Sec. 1: Limits
514. Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.
FACTS: This is a petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the

members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon
which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig Bridge of the
company and the compensation to be paid to the same by such transportation
companies, as the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators pursuant to Section 11 of Act No. 1446.
ISSUE: Whether or not legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that
capacity is right and valid.
RULING: No. The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law—a board of arbitrators is
not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction
which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine
its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by
the Organic Act. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the
Supreme Court.
MAINPOINT: Courts are given “judicial power” and nothing more. Hence, by the
principle of separation of powers, courts may neither attempt to assume nor be
compelled to perform non-judicial functions. (Bernas, p. 330)
Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to
Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to
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construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point
in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of
Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is
granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions
of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee
herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final."

515. Noblejas v. Teehankee
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and

qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No.
1151 or the Philippine Environmental Policy. On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas
received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, informing him for having
a prima facie case for gross negligence and conduct of prejudicial to the public order
and his suspension while the investigation was going on. Hence, this petition by
Noblejas with the contention that he is "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments
and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance” provided under RA
1151.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the SC, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 of the rank and
privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
RULING: No. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to
charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of judicial duties. But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that
character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the
judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have no
jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated
in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.
MAINPOINT: It is not a function of judiciary to be charged with administrative
functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
516. Erdito Quarto v. Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo et al
FACTS: Petitioner assails the Ombudsman’s resolutions which granted Luisito
M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and Luis A. Gayya (collectively, private respondents)
immunity from prosecution, resulting in the respondent’s exclusion from the criminal
informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner seeks to nullify the
immunity granted to the respondents, and to compel the Ombudsman to include them
as accused in the informations for estafa through falsification of public documents in the
DPWH. The Sandiganbayan, however, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and
advised the petitioner to instead question the Ombudsmans actions before this
Court.[23] Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court is bestowed the prerogative to review
immunities granted by the Ombudsman.
RULING: YES. An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by
the Court of the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion. Like all other officials under the
constitutional scheme of government, all their acts must adhere to the Constitution. The
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parameters of the review, however, are narrow. In the first place, what we review are
executive acts of a constitutionally independent Ombudsman.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is highly factual in nature, the
Court must, thus, generally defer to the judgment of the Ombudsman who is in a better
position (than the Sandiganbayan or the defense) to know the relative strength and/or
weakness of the evidence presently in his possession and the kind, tenor and source of
testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case
MAINPOINT: The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a
legislative prerogative and not within the judicial prerogatives. In the exercise of this
power, Congress possesses broad discretion and can lay down the conditions and the
extent of the immunity to be granted.
Art. VIII Sec. 1: Principle of Judicial Restraint
517. Francisco v. House of Representatives
FACTS: Francisco challenges the filing of a Second Impeachment Complaint
within the same year against SC Chief Justice Davide, Jr., on the ground that it was
barred by Art. XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution that “no impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that
the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment.
ISSUE: Whether or not judicial restraint may be employed with the case at bar.
RULING: No. The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an
option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not
legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred." Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its
duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with
authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In
the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a
solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would
be a dereliction of duty."
MAINPOINT: Judicial Restraint is a theory of judicial interpretation that
encourages judges to limit the exercise of their own powers. It asserts that judges
should hesitate to strike down laws unless they are obviously unconstitutional, though
what counts as obviously unconstitutional is itself a matter of some debate.
Art. VIII Sec. 1: Grave Abuse of Discretion
518. PCGG v. Desierto et al
FACTS: The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), herein
petitioner, charged Disini (private respondent) for bribing the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos as a means to induce him to assist and favor individuals and corporate
entities. The charge pertained to the negotiation, award, signing, amendment and
implementation of the main and related contracts for the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
(PNPP) project of the National Power Corporation (NPC), as a result of which the afore-
mentioned public official x x x accumulated and benefited from unlawful acquisition of
income or profits.
After Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino took over the Presidency of the Republic, petitioner
filed previously charges against Disini before the Office of the Ombudsman which the
decision did not favor the petitioner by exonerating the private respondent from the said
charges. Hence, the instant Petition.
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ISSUE: Whether or not that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RUILING: Yes. As a general rule, the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with
a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power
to pass upon criminal complaints. However, such authority is not absolute; it cannot be
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. Verily, the Constitution has tasked the Court to
determine if there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, including the
Office of the Ombudsman. Specifically, the Court is mandated to review and reverse the
Ombudsman’s evaluation of the existence of probable cause, if it has been made with
grave abuse of discretion.
MAINPOINT: Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of
jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It refers also
to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of
facts. The present Petition is one such exception, involving serious allegations of
multimillion-dollar bribes and unlawful commissions.
519. Estipona v. Lobrigo
FACTS: Estipona filed a Motion (before the time of trial) to allow the accused to
enter a Plea-Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead,
to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
The issue arose when Section 23 of the same Act provides for the prohibition of
plea-bargaining regardless of what the penalty imposed upon the accused. Hence, this
petition to challenge the constitutionality of the said provision and the grave abuse of
discretion committed by Lobrigo, the presiding Judge of the RTC who denied the plea.
ISSUE: Whether the regional trial court, as presided by Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
refused to grant the plea-bargain of the accused-petitioner.
RULING: No. Plea-bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or
even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case. Plea bargaining
during the pre-trial stage, is only allowed when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The trial court's exercise of
discretion into denying such bargain should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
MAINPOINT: "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or
tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

520. Domingo v. Scheer
FACTS: The issue arose when the respondent, who is resident alien here in the
Philippines was arrested and held in custody while awaiting deportation due to alleged
“offenses” committed in Germany. Petitioner, who is the Commissioner of Immigration
had contacted with the German Embassy and confirmed that the respondent was not
that “wanted” in his state. Even after so, the Commissioner still refuses to release the
respondent.
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The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and
detention were premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without
sufficient cause and without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The petition
was granted by the CA. hence, this petition by Domingo with the contention questioning
the jurisdiction of the Court over the case.
ISSUE: W/N the Court has jurisdiction to settle whether there had been a grave
abuse of discretion on the detention of the other party.
RULING: YES. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters
over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own
judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve
questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of
discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department violates the law or the
Constitution.
Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Grave Abuse of Discretion
521. Presidential Ad Hoc v. Desierto
FACTS: After considering the evidence adduced, the Ombudsman dismissed the
complaint of the PCGG on August 28, 1998 on the ground that "there is no sufficient
evidence against respondents, both public and private, so as to make them liable for
criminal prosecution in court for violation of the Anti-Graft Law xxx." In other words,
there was no probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion is

his determination of the existence probable cause.
RULING: No. In any event, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Ombudsman in his determination of whether or not probable cause exists against
the respondents. It his call basically.
MAIN POINT: As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman’s
investigatory power, exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority
to determine the presence or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

522. Reyes v. Belisario
FACTS: The CA held that the "Ombudsman did not decide the respondents’
(Belisario, et al, officers of Local Water Utilities Administration) complaint for
Harassment and Oppression on its merits, but relied on the non-finality of the
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. The Ombudsman ultimately ignored the
legal premises presented before it and acted to absolve the petitioner (Reyes, accused
of Graft and Corrupt Practices), thereby sustaining the illegal reassignments of the
complainants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held that the Ombudsman acted with
RULING: Yes. The SC fully support the finding of the CA that grave abuse of
discretion attended the Ombudsman’s decision.
MAIN POINT: Over and above our statutes is the Constitution whose Section 1,
Article VIII empowers the courts of justice to determine whether or not there has
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been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

523. Eloisa L. Tolentino v. Atty. Roy M. Loyola, at al.
FACTS: The CA sustained the Ombudsman dismissal of administrative

complaints of alleged malfeasance against the respondents for lack of merit. The
petitioner alleged that by the respondents’ concerted efforts to make it appear that the
inexistent positions were created, causing the unlawful payment of salaries to illegally
appointed employees, the respondents are liable for malversation of public funds thru
falsification of public documents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held that the Ombudsman acted with
RULING: Yes. The petition failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any
reversible error on the part of the Ombudsman in issuing its assailed administrative
decision, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which would compel the Court to overturn
it.
MAIN POINT: It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the

Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be made. In reviewing
administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for
that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Advisory Opinion

524. Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista
FACTS: The Solicitor General seeks a review of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, in this naturalization case, declaring that petitioner Danilo Channie
Tan, alias Tan Suy Chan, is a citizen of the Philippines and, accordingly, dismissing his
petition for naturalization as such citizen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has erred in declaring that petitioner is a
citizen of the Philippines.
RULING: No. The Court ruled that it had no authority to entertain an action for
judicial declaration of citizenship because there was no law authorizing the institution of
such proceeding. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as
naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.
MAIN POINT: Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable
and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a

controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their
status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.

525. Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista
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FACTS: Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days
before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the
honor students.
ISSUE: Whether or not judicial function be exercised in this case.
RULING: No. Judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers.

The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of
the court.
MAIN POINT: An award of honors to a student by a board of teachers may not

be reversed by a court where the awards are governed by no applicable law.

526. Felipe v. Leuterio
FACTS: Days after a contest has been conducted and the winners announced,
one of the judges confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the second
place winner should have been such as would entitle her to first place. The other judges
refuse to alter their verdict.
ISSUES: May the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new award,
reversing the decision of the board of judges?
RULING: No. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of
judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests,
beauty contests and similar competitions.
MAIN POINT: Not to be confused with advisory opinions is what is known as a

declaratory relief or judgment.
Section 1, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court defines an action for

declaratory relief as an action by any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive
order or regulation to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, executive order or regulation or statute and for a determination of his rights
or duties thereunder. However, the action for declaratory relief must be predicated on
following requisites:
1. There must be justiciable controversy
2. The controversy must be between two persons whose interest are adverse
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
4. The issue must be ripe for judicial determination.

527. Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio
FACTS: Ang Cho Kio was convicted of various offenses and was granted
conditional pardon in 1959. He was never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his
pardon, he returned in 1966 under the name "Ang Ming Huy". However, he was
identified by an inspector of the Immigration Bureau. Thus, he was arrested. The
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to
serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed on him, for having
violated the conditioned of his pardon. The CA affirmed the decision but made a
recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first available
transportation abroad.
ISSUES: Can the CA make recommendations?
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RULING: No. It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that
would suggest a modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive. The
matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or be
deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the Chief Executive to
decide.
MAIN POINT: Recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited
to those expressly provided in the law and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Justiciable Controversy

528. Angara v. Electoral Commission
FACTS: The Petitioner was proclaimed as member-elect of the National

Assembly. Pedro Ynsua, a losing party to the election, filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion for Protest” against the petitioner.
Ynsua contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
Electoral Commission solely regarding the merits of contested elections to the National
Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction over them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
RULING: Yes. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond
the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions.
MAIN POINT: Judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of
all authority.
Art VIII Sec 1: Justiciable Controversy

529. US vs Nixon
FACTS: The special prosecutor of the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the

production of certain tapes and documents relating to precisely identified conversations
and meetings between the President and others, with regards to the scandal. The
President, claiming executive privilege, filed a motion to quash the subpoena. They also
argued it was a non-justiciable question because it was a disagreement between parts
of the executive branch.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dispute between him and the Special Prosecutor was
non-justiciable as an "intra-executive" conflict
RULING: No. The dispute between the Special Prosecutor and the President
presents a justiciable controversy. The action of the Special Prosecutor within the scope
of his express authority seeking specified evidence preliminarily determined to be
relevant and admissible in the pending criminal case, and the President's assertion of
privilege in opposition thereto, present issues "of a type which are traditionally
justiciable," and the fact that both litigants are officers of the Executive Branch is not a
bar to justiciability
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MAIN POINT: The mere assertion of an "intra-branch dispute," without more,
does not defeat federal jurisdiction.
ADDITIONAL NOTE: The Watergate scandal was a major political scandal that
occurred in the United States during the early 1970s, following a break-in by five men at
the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at the Watergate office
complex in Washington, D.C. on June 17, 1972, and President Richard Nixon's
administration's subsequent attempt to cover up its involvement.
530. Marcos vs Manglapus
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the

presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But
President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Issue: Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.
RULING: No. The question for the court to determine is whether or not there
exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar
the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in
her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual.
The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
MAINPOINT: The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of
which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves
through a plebiscite or referendum
531. Daza vs Singson
FACTS: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting

to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the
Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP
member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new
set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza
who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. The respondent
argued that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature
and so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
RULING: No. The court held that the issue presented is justiciable rather
political, involving the legality, and not the wisdom of the discretionary act of the House
of Representatives, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as
prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still
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come within the judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
MAIN POINT: What was involved was the legality of the choice in light of the
requirement of the Constitution which was a justiciable controversy, thus, is subject to
the judicial power of the Court
532. Garcia vs Bureau of Investment
FACTS: Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) formed by a group of

Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI it have its plant site for the products
“naphta cracker” and “naphta” to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the
BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant
site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner
Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPC’s
application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their
plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project. BOI Vice-Chairman
asserted that in advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for the
petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made it clear in its view that the government
for that matter could only recommend as to where the project should be located. The
BOI recognizes and respect the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent
who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy which the Court has the
duty to settle
RULING: Yes. It was ruled that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into
this controversy and determine the paramount issue. There is an actual controversy
whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to
Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to
naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the
BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the
categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the
site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest
notwithstanding.
MAIN POINT: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion mounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government
533. Djumantan vs Domingo
FACTS: Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a

contract worker.He then embraced and was converted to Islam.
He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned
to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the
“guests” of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As
“guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her
children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael
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discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for
“concubinage”, however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of
petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner
was issued an alien certificate of registration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration
status from temporary to permanent resident legal.
RULING: No. There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioner’s entry into the country and the change of her immigration status from
temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through
misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent
residency.

534. Mariano vs COMELEC
FACTS: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act
Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati, as unconstitutional. Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the
constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states that
represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of
the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a
new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and
assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continue exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of
the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI
of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of petitioner is an actual controversy
RULING: No. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent

events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. The court ruled that considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to
ripen to an actual case or controversy.
MAIN POINT: They cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of

section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a
law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

535. PPI vs COMELEC
FACTS: COMELEC issued Resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide free

print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as “Comelec Space” which shall
be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in
which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to
make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
15 | P a g e
programs of government. The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. assailed the constitutional
validity of Resolution No. 2772. In addition, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of
the press and of expression.
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers.

— No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the
news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication
accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or
political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said
candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly
indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the
publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or
views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the argument of petitioner regarding Section 8 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 present an actual controversy.
RULING: No. The court held that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative
action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not
claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason
of Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the
precise constitutional issue here sought to be raised — whether or not Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under
Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution - is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an
actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of
Section 8.
MAIN POINT: Judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
536. SBMA vs COMELEC
FACTS: In line with RA 7227(BCDA), the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,

Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its
absolute concurrence, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. Garcia filed a petition
with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10,
Serye 1993. The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang
Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join
provided conditions are met. SBMA maintains that the proposition sought to be
submitted in the plebiscite, namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993,
is ultra vires or beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan to enact
ISSUE: WON the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or
beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan to enact
RULING: No. The court ruled that the local initiative is NOT ultra vires because
the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law. In the
present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution
No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does
not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been
promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower
court, for that matter. There is really no decision or action made by a branch,
16 | P a g e
instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire
jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
MAIN POINT: The Supreme Court is basically a review court. It passes upon
errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital
offenses) of lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or
instrumentality" of government. However, it does not have the same authority in regard
to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed
upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter.
537. Tanada vs Angara
FACTS: The State has ratified the World Trade Organization Agreement, which
opens access to foreign markets. Petitioners sought to nullify the WTO agreement
because it is an assault on the sovereign powers of the State, in a way that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be for the general welfare if such would not
conform to the WTO agreement. Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the
provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign
powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that
would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not
conform to the WTO Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
RULING: Yes. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground
that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
MAIN POINT: As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

538. Arroyo vs De Venecia
FACTS: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal

Revenue Code by imposing so-called” sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer
and cigarettes were challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral
committee after submitting its report to the House, the chairman of the committee
proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpellated. Arroyo also
interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and put to a
vote. The interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third
reading.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
RULING: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard
the respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure
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MAIN POINT: The duty of the Courts of Justice is to settle controversies whether
or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
539. CIR vs Santos
FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of certain provisions of the

NIRC and Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. It is their contention that the
present Tariff and tax structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry
manufacturers uncompetitive against other countries, in support of their position, they
submitted what they purported to be an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry
prevailing in other countries, in comparison to tax rates levied in the country.
ISSUE: Whether the petition states a cause of action or whether the petition
alleges a justiciable controversy between the parties
RULING: Yes. Considering the allegations of fact in the petition which were duly
proven during the trial, the Court holds that the petition states a cause of action and
there exist a justiciable controversy between the parties which would require
determination of constitutionality of laws imposing excise tax and customs duty on
jewelry.
MAIN POINT: The court has the power to declare the law unconstitutional, but
this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. It
can only look into the validity of a provision, that is whether or not it has been passed
according to the provisions laid down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons
for its existence
540. Garcia-Rueda vs Pascasio
FACTS: Petitioner requested NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body

ruling out that the death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in
administering anesthesia. NBI recommended that the physicians be charged for
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review
the recommendations of the government prosecutors after not finding fault. Petitioner
faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that
there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in “refusing to
find that there exist probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for
violation of RA 3019
RULING: No. While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman's action when there is an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court may exceptionally be invoked pursuant to Section I, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
MAIN POINT: The powers and functions of the Ombudsman are: investigatory
powers, prosecutor power, public assistance function, authority to inquire and obtain
information, and function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures.
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541. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA, GR 134577, NOVEMBER 18, 1997
Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according
to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the petition
Yes. The Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon
the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and
determine the issue.
MAIN POINT: Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in
defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
542. TATAD V. DOE – 281 SCRA 330 [1997]

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".
R.A. No. 8180 ends 26 years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.
Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions
for the upswing and downswing of our economy materially depend on the oscillation of
oil. Respondents contend they have no basis.
1. Whether or not petitioners failed to raise a justiciable controversy.
No. The petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues which
deserve the resolution of this Court in view of their seriousness and their value as
precedents. The statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petitioners
are assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not
because the law lacks wisdom.
MAIN POINT: Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government
543. TELECOM V. COMELEC - 289 SCRA 337 [1998]

FACTS: Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines
affected by the enforcement of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television
broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates
for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses in
providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the
1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to
do so again this year
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1. Whether or not the radio and television broadcast companies were denied equal
protection of the laws
No. In this case which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court upheld their
standing in view of the transcendental importance of the constitutional question raised
which justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar, as will presently be
shown, petitioners substantive claim is without merit.
MAIN POINT: A citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he
can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
544. MIRANDA V. AGUIRRE – GR 133064, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They alleged as ground
the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of
Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Respondent, provincial officials of Isabela,
defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of
petitioners. They also contend that the petition raises a political question over which this
Court lacks jurisdiction.
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case
Yes. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at
bar on the ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea
has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
MAIN POINT: Judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
545. CUTARAN V. DENR – 350 SCRA 697 [2001]

DENR created a special task force authorized to accept and evaluate and
delineate ancestral and claims within a particular area, and after due evaluation of the
claims, to issue appropriate land titles. The relatives of herein petitioners and heirs of
Apeng Carantes filed separate applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim
(CALC) inside Camp John Hay Reservation, land partly overlapped filed by Carantes’
heirs. Petitioners claimed that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim had yet been
issued by the DENR in favor of these people, the latter tried to acquire possession of
the land they applied for, including the portion occupied by petitioners. Petitioners assail
the validity of DENR Special Orders and Administrative Order in creating the special
task force for being issued without prior legislative authority, thus void for lack of legal
basis.
1. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy in this case.
No, there was no justiciable controversy as there was no actual or imminent

violation of the petitioners’ asserted right to possess the land. The DENR was still
processing the application for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which it may or may
not grant.
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MAIN POINT: There had to be an actual governmental act which imminently caused
injury to the alleged right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of
this Court could be invoked.
546. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO – GR 146740-15, MARCH 2, 2001 AND MR APRIL 3,

2001
Allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. Estrada was impeached by the HOR and impeachment proceedings were
begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made. PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd in EDSA People Power II. Estrada called for a snap presidential
election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections. Supreme Court
declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post”. Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA
as the 14th President. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition,
sought to prevent the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings
until after the term of petitioner as president is over and only if legally warranted.
1. Whether or not the petitions present a justifiable controversy.
Yes, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions (those questions
which are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity) despite the EDSA II.
Also, resignation of the sitting President and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.
MAIN POINT: Review of the inability of the President to perform his duties and the
decision of the Congress is no longer a political question but a legal question.
547. CAWALING V. COMELEC – GR 146319, OCTOBER 23, 2001

Former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "Act
Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon
In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor”. The petitioner filed
for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite made by COMELEC because it
was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806 and
Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty
(20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
before conducting the plebiscite. Petitioner instituted another petition declaring
enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional.
1. Whether or not the R.A. 8806 is unconstitutional.
No, the petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806. Every law, being the joint act of the
Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord
with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or
portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.
MAIN POINT: A political question is one in which the wisdom, expediency or justice of
the legislative enactment is being questioned. The courts cannot rule on the wisdom of
the laws.
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548. MONTESCLAROS V. COMELEC – GR 152295, JULY 9, 2002
This is a petition that seeks to prevent the postponement of the May 2002
elections, as well as to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering
the membership age in the SK. The COMELEC is mandated by RA 7808 to supervise
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections. Petitioner Antoinette V.C. Monteclaros sent
a letter to the COMELEC demanding that the SK elections be held on the given date.
The Senate and the HOR approved the consolidated bill which moved the SK and
Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at
least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. Because the date of the election was moved
and because the age requirements were changed, many members of the youth are now
disqualified from participating in the SK elections.
1. Whether or not there was a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality

of a proposed bill.
No, there can be no justiciable controversy. It is not yet a law. The judicial power to
review the constitutionality of laws does NOT include the power to prescribe to
Congress what laws to enact.
MAIN POINT: A proposed bill cannot be the subject of judicial review because it is not a
law. Judicial review may only be exercised after a law has been passed, not before it.
549. JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V. LIM, GR 119775,
OCTOBER 24, 2003
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420,
Series of 1994, “Creating And Designating A Portion Of The Area Covered By the
Former Camp John [Hay] As The John Hay Special Economic Zone pursuant To Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992.The Act likewise created and granted
the Subic Special Economic Zone incentives ranging from tax and duty- free
importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other
hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate.
And BCDA expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive
proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected,
other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark
military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John
Hay.. President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 which established a SEZ on a
portion of Camp John Hay.
1. Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for this Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues.
YES, only this Court which has the power under Section 21 of R.A.No. 7227 to
enjoin implementation of projects for the development of the former US military
reservations, the issuance of which injunction petitioners pray for, petitioners’ direct
filing of the present petition with it is allowed
MAIN POINT: The courts retain full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons or the nature and importance of the uses
raised, warrant. Remanding the case to the lower courts would unduly prolong the
case.
550. VELARDE V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, GR 159357, APRIL 28, 2004
SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde
and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño
Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano. SJS,
a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,
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specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective
office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact
that alleged that the questioned SJS’ petition did not state a cause of action and that
there was no justiciable controversy. The trial court junked the Velarde petition under
certain reason: it raised the separation of church and state, even tracing the historical
background of the principle.
1. Whether or not the Petition for Declaratory Relief raised a justiciable

controversy.
No, the petition stated no ultimate facts; it should contain a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim. The
petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by these religious
leaders might become indebted to the latter.
MAIN POINT: A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.
551. PANGANIBAN V. PHILIPPINE SHELL, GR 131471, JAN. 22, 2003

Carmelita Panganiban entered into a Sublease and Dealer Agreement (SLDA)
with Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Respondent is not the owner of the lot
subject of the sublease, only leasing the lot from its owner, Serafin Vasquez, for a
period of 15 years. Respondent notified petitioner that the SLDA was expiring, then
advised petitioner to wind up her business. Believing that the SLDA had not yet expired
and was still effective, petitioner continued to pay rentals for the gasoline station.
Respondent refused to accept the payments. Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory
relief with RTC of Makati City. Respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against
petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City. Both courts favored the
respondent.
1. Whether or not there was an actual controversy.
No, it appeared that it was petitioner who wants to avoid the adverse ruling in the
unlawful detainer case by insisting that the action for declaratory relief be given
preference even after the ejectment suit was already decided. The abuse feared by
petitioner does not apply in this case and yet, petitioner urged SC to reevaluate the
applicability of a doctrine based on a feared hypothetical abuse. SC can only rule upon
actual controversies, not on scenarios that a party merely conjures to suit her interest.
MAIN POINT: The court cannot rule of “feared hypothetical abuse”: not an actual case
or controversy. There is no cause of action. No injury or encroachment of right legally
enforceable or demandable.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

552. SMART V. NTC, GR 151908, AUGUST 12, 2003
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars which promulgated
rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners Smart
Communications, Globe Telecom, IslaCom, and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel)
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the memorandum circulars, alleging that
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NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods. Such jurisdiction
belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.
1. Whether or not NTC has jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case.
No, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction and CA erred in setting aside the orders
of RTC. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circulars was pursuant to its quasi-
legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the RTC to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances.
MAIN POINT: The court has jurisdiction over administrative issuances of agencies,
which were issued in the exercise of the agencies’ quasi-legislative, and not quasi-
judicial function.
553. BUAC V. COMELEC – 421 SCRA 92

A plebiscite was held in Taguig for the conversion of Taguig from a municipality
into a city (RA No. 8487) and the “NO” votes won. Petitioners wanted a recount but was
denied. Petitioners claimed that jurisdiction to decide plebiscite protest cases is
constitutionally vested with the COMELEC. Respondent contends that the rules and
regulations it has only covers election protests and not plebiscite protests.
1. Whether or not jurisdiction to decide plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally

vested with the COMELEC.
Yes. The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. If the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over this matter, our laws would have been amended to that effect.
MAIN POINT: It is of the COMELEC to decide in the case at bar because it is its
jurisdiction and not of the court. Sect.1, Art. VII provides that the duty of the court is to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable which in this
case, the controversies was over plebiscite and not rights.
554. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY V. COMELEC -460 SCRA 291

COMELEC issued a MOTION for Leave to Use the Automated Counting
Machines for the August 8, 2005 Elections in the ARMM. Respondent claimed that the
government lacked funds for the machines. On the other hand, petitioners contend that
the motion COMELEC is asking is to render an advisory opinion which is contrary to
what the court should do.
1. Whether or not the Motion COMELEC is asking is for the court to decide.
No. The Motion presents no actual justiciable case or controversy over which this
Court can exercise its judicial authority.
MAIN POINT: For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual
case or controversy which involves a conflict of legal rights. The controversy must be
justiciable, definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests.
555. SENATE V. ERMITA, GR 169659, APRIL 20, 2006
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President Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which prevents officials of the executive
branch to attend the congressional hearings unless it is approved by her. Petitioners
prayed for the E.O. to be declared unconstitutional due to the fact that it is contrary to
the powers vested by the constitution to the Congress.
1. Whether or not the court should adjudicate on the E.O 464.
Yes. The challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to
the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines which makes it a subject for
adjudication.
MAIN POINT: E.O 464 is against the Congress power of inquiry recognized in Section
21 of Article VI of the Constitution. It would be sheer abandonment of duty (Judicial
Review) if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of it.
556. GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY – 583 SCRA 119 [2009]

Petitioner questioned Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479, otherwise known as the Oil
Deregulation Law of 1998, for its timeliness when full deregulation would take effect. He
contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price control at a time
when the market is still dominated by an oligopoly would provide an opportunity for the
Big-3 oil companies to engage in price-fixing and overpricing.
1. Whether or not the court should exercise Judicial Review in this case.
No. The petition lacks the existence of an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power. An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict
of legal rights.
MAIN POINT: The issue raised by the petitioner cannot be ruled by the court on when
and to what extent deregulation should take place. The legislative department has the
full discretionary authority, given by the people, to formulate the policy.
DISTINGUISH FROM DECLARATION RELIEF

557. MACASIANO V. NHA – 224 SCRA 236 [1993]
Petitioner, consultant of DPWH, alleges that section 28 and 44 of R.A. No. 7279,
or the Urban Development Act of 1992, is unconstitutional. He alleges that the sections
make him unable to continue demolishing illegal structures. Respondents contended
that section 28 merely provides “Humanitarian approach” towards the less privileged
and section 44 only covers program beneficiaries. The petition is then deemed a
declaratory relief as his intention was for the rights of the landowners to be clearly
defined and the laws of demolition of illegal structures.
1. Whether or not the petition is viable as a declaratory relief.
No. The petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state
that he has property "being squatted upon".
MAIN POINT: The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy which the petitioner doesn’t have.
558. TANO V. SOCRATES – 278 SCRA 154 [1997]
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Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning
the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1,
1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters. Petitioners
filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the
said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said
ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade.
1. Whether or not the ordinances are unconstitutional.
No. The Supreme Court held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. Deeming the petition as a
declaratory relief, there is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
marginal fisherman.
MAIN POINT: The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy which the petitioner doesn’t have. Thus, the petitioners are not the proper
party to question the ordinances because not one of them is a fisherman
CONCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT

559. IN RE SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JAN. 11, 2011 – 614 SCRA 1
Atty. Lozano was found guilty of grave professional misconduct when they
misquoted or misused constitutional provisions in their pleadings in order to insult
members of this court and was suspended. In the past two years the suspension, he
has repeatedly admitted his error and to observe the rules and standards in the practice
of law he should be reinstated.
1. Whether or not Atty. Lozano should be reinstated.
Yes. The court ruled to reinstate him for the reason that he has serve the purpose
of what he was suspended of.
MAIN POINT: From Atty. Lozano’s letters-petitions, the SC discern that his suspension
had already impressed upon him the need for care and caution in his representations as
an officer of this Court. Thus, it served its purpose.
PLENARY JUDICIAL POWER; DERIVATIVE; PET

560. MACALINTAL V. PET – 635 SCRA 783 [2010]
Petitioner argues that Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional on
the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the
PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution. The Solicitor General contended
that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to
the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-
President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
1. Whether or not the creation of the PET is Constitutional.
Yes. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
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bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect.
MAIN POINT: The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
561. HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC, GR NO. 171101, NOVEMBER 22, 2011

Special civil action was filed in SC. Hacienda Luisita seeking to question and
reverse the PARC resolution issued implementing the notice of land distribution
coverage dated January 2, 2006. CARL (RA 6657) took effect, providing a new process
of land classification, acquisition and distribution which tested the application of law in
the current case.
1. Whether RA 6657 is constitutional
UNDECIDED. Although the court can review the constitutionality of the law, the time
of the filing of the complaint was not made on the earliest time possible. It took 18 years
before the constitutionality of the law was challenged. The court cannot rule on matter
hence it is upheld to be constitutional.
Main Point: The Judicial Plenary Power is a complete and absolute power to take
action on a particular issue, with no limitations. However, the Court is not compelled to
rule on the constitutionality of RA 6657. However, a determination of the existence of an
apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of
constitutionality, to which this Court ruled in the negative. All other points raised
concerning the constitutionality of RA 6657 deserve consideration.
562. SANA V. CESB, GR NO. 192926, NOVEMBER 15, 2011

The case is about the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Atty. Omar
Sana contending that EO 883 and the subsequent appointment of the 13 executive
officials to CESO rank are void for violating the constitutional ban on midnight
appointment under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
1. Whether the petition assailing executive order no. 883 is valid?
No. The factors are not obtained. The question of appointment to a CESO rank of
an executive official amounts to an appointment for purposes of the constitutional ban
on midnight appointment, holds no certainty of evading judicial review as the question
can be decided even beyond the appointments ban period under Section 15, Article VII
of the Constitution.
Main Point: The petitioner does not allege to have suffered any violation of a right
vested in him under EO 883. He was not among the 13 officials granted CESO ranking
by President Arroyo. The CESB itself stated that no conferment of CESO rank was ever
made by President [Arroyo] in relation to EO 883. Hence, for the Court to nevertheless
reach the merits of this petition and determine the constitutionality of EO 883 and the
absence of any resulting prejudice to petitioner’s rights is to depart from its
constitutional role of settling actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable
563. MADRIGAL V. DOJ GR NO. 168903, 726 SCRA 544, JUNE 18, 2014
On 23 June 2000, DOJ Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero (Sec. Tuquero) issued a
Resolution upholding the Resolution dated 16 October 1998 of the Manila Prosecutor's
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Office, with the modification that the charge against respondents should be for estafa
under paragraph 3(c), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondents moved for a
reconsideration of this last DOJ Resolution. Subsequently, a Resolution, then
Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez (Usec. Gutierrez) reversed and set aside the
Resolution dated 23 June 2000.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this reversed finding on 27 September

2001. Meanwhile, pursuant to the 7 September 2001 DOJ Resolution, Assistant City
Prosecutor Elseray Faith Noro filed a Motion to Withdraw the Information with the RTC
on 8 January 2002. On 17 March 2003, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution also signed by then Usec. Gutierrez.
The CA ruled that there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the Information
for estafa under paragraph 1(c), Article 315 against respondents.
1. Whether the DOJ Usec had the power and authority to reverse and set aside a
resolution of the DOJ Secretary
YES. The Court ruled that an official duty has been regularly performed applies in
favor of the Undersecretary of DOJ for all things are presumed to be correctly and
somlemnly done. It is the petitioner's burden to prove that the contrary was done by
DOJ USec. Mere allegations will not suffice without prior proof.
Main Point: Courts are not empowered to substitute their judgment for that of the
Secretary of Justice, save only when it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In this case, we find no abuse, much less
grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Secretary of Justice, [acting through Usec.
Gutierrez], as to warrant a reversal of the CA Decision.
564. TORRECAMPO V. MWSS, 649 SCRA 482

MWSS issued a resolution allowing DPWH to use the 60m right-of-way for
preliminary studies in the implementation of C5 road extension project. Torrecampo
argued that the existing route will put Metro Manila residents to great risk of losing water
supply, thus suggested to reroute and us RIPADA area.
1. Whether SC may issue TRO against government projects
NO. The court ruled that issues concerning the implementation of the project is
handled by the executive department, due to the nature (implementation of the project).
Main Point: Despite the judicial power provided to SC, it can only rule to cases
concerning the executive whenver there are grave abuse is discretion is
present.Without conducting the study, MWSS cannot decide whether to allow DPWH to
construct the road. No grave of discretion can be alleged against the respondents
warranting the exercise of the Court's Judicial Powers
SEC. 2. POWER OF LEGISLATIVE APPORTION JURISDICTION

565. MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS V. CA -179 SCRA 136 [1989]
MSI entered into a 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza
Hotel, where it would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or until such time that
the said properties are sold to MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP. However, MSI sent a
letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property for more than 1
year the agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired preference in
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buying the property, while emphasizing that MSI has a legal lien on the property
because of its advances for the hotel operations and repairs which amounted to P12
Million. Trial court granted, but the CA reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to
Sec 1 of Proclamation No. 50: "No court or administrative agency shall issue any
restraining order or injunction against the trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it.
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it up
held that it continues to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by
virtue of Section 3 Art. XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not been deprived of its property
rights since those rights are non-existent and its only property right was the alleged
reimbursable advances made to DBP, which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It
further held that the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the lower court against
APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial power for MSI does not have a
legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the said property.
1. Whether CA made an error in not declaring Sec 31 of Proclamation No 50

unconstitutional, prohibiting the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the
Trial Court
No. It does not impair the inherent power of courts to settle actual controversies
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the
legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block,
by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.
Main Point: There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an
administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or
commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
566. MALAGA V. PENACHOS – 213 SCRA 516 [1992]

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28,
1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the
submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2,1988, and that the
bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and
Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two
o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own
PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the
bidding as their documents were considered late. On December 12, 1988, the
petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their
refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of
pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding
and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already
been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution
of their complaint.On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting thebidding and award the project. The defendants
filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the groundthat the court is prohibited from
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issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatoryinjunction in
government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that
thepreliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had beenawarded and closed. On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the
restraining order and denied the petition for preliminaryinjunction. It declared that the
building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructureproject of the
government falling within the coverage of the subject law.
1. Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions

of PD 1818?
YES. Under the Administrative Code. ISCOF is a government instrumentality, not

integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction
by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations.
(Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
Main Point: P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities
committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence,
the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and
the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.
567. LUPANGCO V. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)

Oct. 6, 1986 - Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution
No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees" for those taking the
licensure exams in accountancy. Petitioners, filed a complaint for injunction with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against to restrain PRC from
enforcing the resolution, and to declare it unconstitutional. RTC declared that it had
jurisdiction, and it enjoined PRC from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105
which it found to be unconstitutional. CA declared the Order null and void and directed
the RTC to dismiss the civil case for want of jurisdiction, being co-equal with PRC. It
relied on NEA v. Mendoza where the SC held that a CFI cannot interfere with the orders
of the SEC, the two being co-equal bodies.
1. Whether PRC and RTC are co-equal bodies
YES. CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches.
SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason
why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of
SEC was that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said cases was it held
that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On
the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred
when it place he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the
next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC.
What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of the President for
general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even
acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the
foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from
enforcing its resolution.
Main Point: Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes
on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority
to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations especially if the steps they take are lawful.
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SEC. 3 FISCAL AUTONOMY
568. RADIOWEALTH V. AGREGADO – 86 PHIL. 429 [1950]
A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought for Pho 585
and installed in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the
Supreme Court. The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the
President) disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302 which
discontinues open market purchases. Petitioners also contend that Judicial functions do
not include purchase of property. Radiowealth, Inc. (vendor) is now requesting that the
payment be approved however, the Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the
warrant for payment
1. Whether the Judicial Department can make purchases without the prior approval
of the Executive?
No. Three department has co-equal functions, each independent and cannot control
or interfere with each other especial. Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence
and do necessary actions to preserve is integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure
effectiveness in the administration of jusctice
Main Point: The executive does not have powers over the purchases of the judiciary
due to the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary. Both the executive and judiciary have equal
footing when it comes to requisition and expenditures in government
569. BENGZON V. DRILON, 208 SCRA 133 (1992)

The petitioners question the constitutionality of the veto by the president of
certain provisions in the general appropriations act for the fiscal year 1992 relating to
the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the Supreme Court and the
court of appeals.
1. WON the questioned veto is valid.
NO, the judiciary must have the independence and flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The veto impairs the power of the chief justice to
augment other items in the judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the
constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."
Main point: The Supreme Court said that fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.
570. IN RE CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL
ACADEMY – 481 SCRA 1
Due to the increase in the programs and commitments of the PHILJA, the
Court en banc issued Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA for the purpose of
clarifying and strengthening the organizational structure and administrative set-up of the
PHILJA, including the key operating systems, staffing pattern, and the need to make it
more appropriate to an academic institution. The Court amended the staffing pattern of
the offices of the PHILJA. However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and
Compensation Action (NOSCA), the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
downgraded two positions and their corresponding salary grades.
1. WON the salaries of judges can be reduced.
No, downgrading the positions and salary grades of two positions in the Philippine
Judicial Academy, the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached upon the fiscal
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autonomy of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over court personnel, as
enshrined in the Constitution. The Supreme Court said that fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.
Main Point: Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal
autonomy.
RE: PETITION FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF GSIS
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, FEBRUARY 11, 2010
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs
under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The said provision states: “SEC. 22.
Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local
government corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations with or
without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees.” The GSIS anchors
its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997) enacted by the
legislators.
Issue/Ruling
1. May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on
GOCCs and local government units? NO.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional
safeguard of the Court’s independence − fiscal autonomy. Legal fees therefore do not
only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an
essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence.
Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess
and collect fees, including legal fees.
IN RE COA OPINION ON COMPUTATION OF APPRAISED VALUE OF

PROPERTIES
678 SCRA 1, JULY 31, 2012
The long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate

courts of purchasing for sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they
used during their tenure has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such
government officials. COA questioned the authority of the court in using CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government
property.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether COA’s interference violates the judiciary’s autonomy. YES.
The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies
violates the judiciary’s autonomy. This authority, however, must be read not only in light
of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with constitutional provisions on
judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and court rulings on these matters.
Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are
exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the
Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief
Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.
DE CASTRO VS. JBC

G.R. NO. 191002, APRIL 20, 2010
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court.
The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the
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nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of
nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed
constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the
ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether of not the incumbent president can fill the vacancy within 90 days from
the occurrence of the vacancy. YES.
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. Election ban on
appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17,
2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution
against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in
the Supreme Court.
FORTICH VS. CORONA

G.R. NO. 131457, AUGUST 19, 1997
This case refers to two motions for reconsideration with motion to refer the matter
to the court en banc filed by respondents and intervenors assailing the Court's
resolution dated November 17, 1998, otherwise known as "Win-Win" resolution, wherein
the division of the Court voted two-two. This resolution affirmed the decision of this
Court denying intervenors' motion to intervene. It is alleged that the "Win-Win"
resolution should have been referred to the Court sitting En Banc pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution when the 3-vote requirement was not secured.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the petition for motion for reconsideration may be heard by the
court en banc. NO.
A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and
matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters, which include
motions, are "resolved." Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases"; while
the word "resolved" must refer to "matters.”
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three
votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not "matter."
The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the
disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision.
Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The
assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such
was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
PEOPLE VS. DY
G.R. NO. 115326-37, JANUARY 16, 2003
Dy and Bernardino were both found guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
They both separately filed motions for reconsideration, in which motion Dy argued that
SC’s decision should have been merely recommendatory, because it was not decided
en banc, in view of the provision of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that
the Supreme Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
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Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the divisions are separate and distinct courts. NO.
Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are,
in effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and
distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same court.
Under Article 8 Section 4 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc
or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. At present, it is made
up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be
considered as separate and distinct courts.
PEOPLE VS. EBIO

G.R. NO. 147750, SEPTEMBER 29, 2004
Gerry Ebio was convicted by the Supreme Court of qualified rape and sentenced
him to suffer death penalty. The PAO moved for reconsideration on the ground that the
Court lacked quorum when the case was deliberated as it appears that the decision was
only decided between seven justices. In a Resolution, the Supreme Court granted the
motion for reconsideration, ruling that there is no question that the Court’s decision in
the case was concurred in majority of the members and the punishment was in fact
unanimously decided upon.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the seven concurring justices constituted a quorum of a 14-
member court. NO.
The constitution does not expressly state the number of justices required to
present to constitute a quorum of the court en banc but in case of doubt in a criminal
case, especially where the punishment imposed is death penalty, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused. The case should be readmitted for deliberation of the
Court en banc.
Since it was a capital criminal case, the court ruled that there should be eight
justices (not 7 or merely half of the14 justices).
FIRESTONES CERAMICS VS. CA

G.R. NO. 127245, JUNE 28, 2000
This case involves a 99-hectare land presumptively belonging to the Republic of

the Philippines which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged
to be without jurisdiction. The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of
the land in question when the herein private respondents obtained their decree of
registration. Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate of title as
well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of
subject area at the time it was so adjudicated determination of the validity of the
disposition thereof is in order.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the SC should hear the case en banc. YES.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let
alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as government
property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.
The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en
banc attention and consideration.
REPUBLIC VS. GARCIA

G.R. NO. 167741. JULY 12, 2007
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The Republic filed against Maj. Gen. Garcia and his family a petition for forfeiture
of unlawfully acquired properties, with a verified urgent ex-parte application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The petitioner said that it being a sovereign
political entity, it was exempt from filing the said attachment bond. Attachment bond is a
bond given by a defendant in order to have an attachment released that ensures
payment of a judgment awarded to the plaintiff. Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of the
Garcias.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion when
it rejected the Republic’s claim of exemption from the filing of an attachment
bond. YES.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. Here, the Sandiganbayan’s January 14, 2005
resolution was clearly contrary to Tolentino. In Tolentino case, this Court declared that
the State as represented by the government is exempt from filing an attachment bond
on the theory that it is always solvent. All courts must take their bearings from the
decisions and rulings of this Court. Tolentino has not been superseded or reversed.
Thus, it is existing jurisprudence and continues to form an important part of our legal
system.
The Constitution mandates that only this Court sitting en banc may modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division. Any court, the Sandiganbayan included, which renders a decision in
violation of this constitutional precept exceeds its jurisdiction. Therefore, the
Sandiganbayan could not have validly “reexamined,” much less reversed, Tolentino. By
doing something it could not validly do, the Sandiganbayan acted ultra vires and
committed grave abuse of discretion. The fact was, the revisions of the Rules of Court
on attachment, particularly those pertaining to the filing of an attachment bond, did not
quash Tolentino.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION INC. VS. LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 164195, APRIL 5, 2011.
Petitioners were registered owners of vast tracks of land which were sold to the
government. Payment of just compensation for the aforementioned land was not given
to the petitioners hence, complaints for the determination and payment of the said just
compensation were filed with the Regional Trial Court who fixed the compensation and
the corresponding interest. In a Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Third
Division of Court, the payment of the 12% interest and attorneys fee was deleted in its
resolution. The Court En Bancs reversed and set aside the said resolution after the
motion was referred to it by the same Third Division of Court.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the decision of the Third Division regarding denial of interest and
attorneys fee can be reversed and set aside by the Court En Banc. YES.
The issue raised in the case is of transcendental importance as it involved
agrarian reform. Furthermore, the Court En Bancs found that the resolution of the Third
Division is patently illegal and erroneous when it deprived the petitioners of the 12%
interest of the unpaid compensation.
While the Constitution grants the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the practice and procedure in all courts (and allows the Court to regulate the
consideration of 2nd motions for reconsideration, including the vote that the Court shall
require), these procedural rules must be consistent with the standards set by the
Constitution itself. Among these constitutional standards is the above quoted Section 4
which applies to “all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
35 | P a g e
heard en banc,” and does not make any distinction as to the type of cases or rulings it
applies to, i.e., whether these cases are originally filed with the Supreme Court, or
cases on appeal, or rulings on the merits of motions before the Court. Thus, rulings on
the merits by the Court en banc on 2nd motions for reconsideration, if allowed by the
Court to be entertained under its Internal Rules, must be decided with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations.
The Court En Bancs may reverse judgments and recall their entries in the
interest of substantial justice and when special and compelling reasons called for such
actions.
IN RE: LETTER OF ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA RE: G.R. NO. 178083 – FLIGHT
ATTENDANT AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP)
A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, MARCH 13, 2012
Respondent PAL filed a motion for reconsideration before the Special Third
Division Court to reverse and set aside the resolution where PAL was rendered guilty of
illegal dismissal of its employees and was ordered to reinstate cabin crew personnel
who were covered by its retrenchment and demotion scheme. PAL argued that the
Court was mistaken in its ruling that PAL acted in bad faith simply because it later on
decided to call or restore the employees it initially retrenched.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not PAL has sufficient grounds to merit reversal of the previous
resolutions by the Court. NO.
The Court found no reason to disturb its finding that the retrenchment of the flight
attendants was illegally executed. PAL failed to observe the procedure and
requirements for a valid retrenchment. However, a modification in the award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation was decided by the Court.
Each division of the court is considered not a body inferior to the Court En Banc
hence, decisions or resolutions made by the division are considered decision of the
Supreme Court itself.
Sec. 5. Powers of Supreme Court
Judicial Review Requisites
MACASIANO VS. NHA

G.R. NO. 107921, JULY 1, 1993
Petitioners sought for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Urban

Development Act (RA No. 7279) of 1992 and predicated his locus standi on him being a
consultant of the DPWH and him being a taxpayer. For his first locus standi, he alleged
that sections 28 and 44 of the said Act will render him unable to continue the demolition
of illegal structures which he carried out in the past. As a taxpayer, he alleged that he
has a direct interest in seeing to it that the public funds are properly and lawfully
disbursed. The Solicitor General contended that the instant petition is devoid of any
merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of extrajudicial
review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not judicial review can be exercised in the case at bar. NO.
Two of the fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy.
Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is
filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a
consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by
other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act. Hence, no
proper party to raise the question.
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In the exercise of judicial review involving cases that questioned the
constitutionality of the laws, the following requisites must be present (a) the existence of
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party, (c) the
constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.
LIBAN VS. GORDON

G.R. NO. 175352, JANUARY 18, 2011
In its decision, the Court held that Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate
when he accepted the chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors as it is not a government office or an office in a government-owned
or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Sec 13, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution. The Decision further declared void the PNRC Charter insofar as it creates
the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that it should incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with SEC if it wants to be a private corporation.
In his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, Gordon raised that the issue of
constitutionality of the Republic Act No, 95 was not raised by the parties and the Court
went beyond the case in deciding such issue.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the Court went beyond the case when it declared void the PNRC
Charter insofar as no question of constitutionality was raised. YES.
It is a well-established rule that the court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties. The second sentence in the previous Decision rendering void the
PNRC charter was deleted hence, modifying the Court Decision.
The Court cannot decide on the constitutionality of a law when the question itself
was not raised in the proper proceeding.
Administrative Agencies; No Power
SERRANO VS. GALLANT

G.R. No. 167614, MARCH 24, 2009
Petitioner is a seafarer who was repatriated back to the Philippines upon his
refusal to accept a downgraded employment contract contrary to what was promised to
him. He appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on his
entitlement to salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. He later on filed for a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration questioning the constitutionality of the clause in RA
No. 8042 which “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be
proven to have actually been performed, and for vacation leave pay.”
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the NLRC has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue
in the clause of RA No. 8042. NO.
The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function which
in this case is limited to determining the questions of facts to which the legislative policy
of RA No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in accordance with the
37 | P a g e
standards laid down by the law itself. Its foremost function is to administer and enforce
RA No 8042 and not to inquire into the validity of its provision.
Administrative Agencies have no competence to resolve cases involving
constitutionality of the laws.
First: Ripe for Adjudication
PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

G.R. NO. L-5279, OCTOBER 31, 1955
Petitioners requested that Act No. 2706 “An act making the inspection and
recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public
Instruction” be declared unconstitutional because they deprive the owners of schools
and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of law; they deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children
for civic efficiency; and their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education
unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute unlawful
delegation of legislative power.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the case at bar calls for judicial review. NO.
Petitioners suffered no wrong from the enforcement of the criticized statute. Mere
apprehension of the adverse effect to the petitioner does not constitute justiciable
controversy.
The first requisite for the exercise of judicial review is the existence of actual
case before the court. The question in the case must also be ripe for adjudication, that
is, the governmental act being challenged must have an adverse effect on the person
challenging it.
TAN VS. MACAPAGAL

G.R. NO. L-34161, FEBRUARY 29, 1972
Petitioners sought declaration of the alleged nullity of a resolution (Laurel-Leido

Resolution) of the Constitutional Convention in their capacity as taxpayers but
purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and Filipino people.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the case at bar merits judicial review at the instance of the
petitioner. NO.
The proposed amendment by the Constitutional Convention was still unacted
upon hence, not yet ripe for judicial review.
First requisite for judicial review is ripe for adjudication, that is, the governmental
act being challenged must have an adverse effect on the person challenging it.
SOLICITOR GENERAL VS. MMDA

G.R. NO. 102782, DECEMBER 18, 1991
Various letters of complaints were received by the court on the confiscation by

police authorities of driver’s license and removal of license plate for alleged traffic
violations. This is in contravention to the previous decision made by the Court in the
case of Gonong where it held that the confiscation of the license plates for traffic
violation was not among the sanctions that can be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission and such confiscation was permitted only in case of stalled vehicles
obstructing the streets. MMDA contended that there was no conflict between the
ordinance and the previously issued court decision because it was meant to supplement
the latter. Furthermore, the said ordinance can only be attacked in a direct action
challenging its validity.
38 | P a g e
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the Court can render decision despite absence of actual case or
controversy. YES.
With the great confusion created among motorists about the status of law on the
questioned sanctions which is detrimental to public order, the Court may relax the
general rule of challenging the validity of a law by direct action in court. In the interest of
the public, the court can render a decision on the matter at hand despite failure of
appropriate party to file the appropriate proceeding against the act complained of.
The first requisite for the exercise of judicial review is the existence of actual
case before the court. General rule is that the validity of a law can be challenged only in
a direct action and not collaterally, but in exceptional circumstances such as this, the
rule may be relaxed by the Court.
MILITANTE VS. CA
G.R. NO. 107040, APRIL 12, 2000
Petitioner, Militante, is the registered owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of

land in Balintawak, Caloocan City. President Marcos issued P.D. 1315 expropriating
forty (40) hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, which covered some of the
petitioner’s land. The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that
required the upgrading of basic facilities and services and the disposal of the lots to
their bona fide occupants. NHA started negotiations with petitioner for a just
compensation of the land. Petitioner rejected it and filed with the respondent CA a
“Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Declaration as Inexistent and
Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not said P.D. 1315 at least up to the extent of petitioner’s properties
adversely affected can be declared null and void for being unconstitutional. NO.
The court ruled that the Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition and to a
writ of mandamus and Petitioner’s procedure in assailing the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1315 is flawed.
Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks for a judgment ordering the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be
illegal. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do
the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
PIMENTEL VS. HRET

G.R. NO. 14189, NOVEMBER 29, 2002
Petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET
and CA. Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats
in the CA. Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel.
Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect,
defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of
the CA.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to
include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion. NO.
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There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA
in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any
power to reconstitute themselves.
Even assuming that party-list representatives comprise sufficient number and
have agreed to designate common nominees to HRET, their primary recourse clearly
rests with the House of Representatives and not with the Court.
CONSTANTINO, JR. VS. CUISIA

G.R. NO. 106064, OCTOBER 13, 2005
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to reduce
the country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts.
Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens,
averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not
constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the
Constitution. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity
specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission
that not respondents but the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the
country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts
which were entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program
for 1992.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not this case requires a judicial review. NO.
The exercise of the power of judicial review is merely to check—not supplant—
the Executive, or to simply ascertain whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction but not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act.—That the means employed to achieve the goal of debt-relief do not
sit well with petitioners is beyond the power of this Court to remedy. The exercise of the
power of judicial review is merely to check—not supplant—the Executive, or to simply
ascertain whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction but not
to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. In cases
where the main purpose is to nullify governmental acts whether as unconstitutional or
done with grave abuse of discretion, there is a strong presumption in favor of the validity
of the assailed acts. The heavy onus is in on petitioners to overcome the presumption of
regularity.
SENATE VS. ERMITA

G.R. NO. 169777, APRIL 20, 2006
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, citing the absence of the executive
officials invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464 (Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing Legislative
Inquiries), particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that
President Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the
invited officials. These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that
they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited
their attendance. Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the
hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend
without the President’s consent was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded
apprehension that the President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of
40 | P a g e
officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging
the validity of E.O. 464
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether the case is ripe for adjudication. YES.
The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her
consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in
determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is
concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or
an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing
before Congress. As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in
the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it
would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case
ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would
now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
DAVID VS. ARROYO

G.R. NO. 171396, MAY 3, 2006
Seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in
issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in
their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of
government as a clear and present danger. The Solicitor General argued that the intent
of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners
has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act. YES.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act.
Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s
interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the
police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly,
respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are
subject to judicial review.
SUPLICO VS. NEDA

G.R. NO. 178830, JULY 14, 2008
Legal Service Department of DOTC informed SolGEn of the decision of the

Philippine Government to not continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network
Project. Respondent then asked for dismissal of the case because there is no actual
case or controversy, given that the ZTE National Broadband Network Project will not be
continued. However, petitioners argued that the Supreme Court should relax the
procedural of mootness in view of the transcendental importance of the issues
raised in the petition, which among others, included the President’s use of the
power to borrow, i.e., to enter into a foreign loan agreement.
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Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President GMA.
YES.
Since we consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-Arroyo of
the proposed ZTE-NBN Project with the Chinese President in China as an
official act of the executive department, the Court must take judicial notice of
such official act without need of evidence.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of
mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court
generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live
subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or
make any pronouncement.
However, while there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues
although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic,
the instant case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases, the
Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance
of both bench and bar.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP PANEL

G.R. NO. 183591, OCTOBER 14, 2008
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding
of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication. YES.
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult
the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by
respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded
their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for
judicial review.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy — one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or
based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
LOZANO VS. NOGRALES

G.R. NO. 187883, JUNE 16, 2009
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as

concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No.
1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the
Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, upon Three-
fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.”
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Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a
definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the
procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the
prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the
Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution
and for lack of
thorough debates and consultations
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House
Resolution No. 1109. NO.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial
review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any
adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House
Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a
future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation
of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution
No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet
performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the case at bar,
petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the
standing to sue.
DRILON VS. DE VENECIA

G.R. NO. 134015, JULY 19, 1999
In August 2007, the Senate and House of Representatives elected their

respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments. In the 2nd week of August,
petitioners in the first petition went to Speaker De Venecia to ask for one more seat for
the Liberal Party, De Venecia said that he would study the demand. During the HoR
session, Taada requested from the HoR leadership one seat in the CA for the Liberal
Party. Respondents filed for dismissal of the petition.
In the meantime, Senator Madrigal sent letters to Villar and Nograles claiming
that the composition of the Senate and HoR in the CoA violated the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation. She requested for the reorganization of the
membership of CoA.
Issues/Ruling
1. Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned. NO.
2. Whether or not the recourse was initiated in the proper venue. NO.
The first petition has been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party
as member of the House contingent. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained
a direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not allege that she
(or her political party) was deprived of a seat in the CoA, or that she or her party
possess personal and substantial interest to confer with her locus standi.
Madrigal’s primary recourse rests with the Senate or HoR. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she
may bring her petition to the court.
DE CASTRO VS. JBC
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G.R. NO. 191002, APRIL 20, 2010
The case arose from the need to fill the vacancy of Chief Justice due to the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy,
however, the appointment falls within the election ban on appointments. Also,
intervenors questioned the propriety of the JBC to initiate the process of the nomination
when it could only do so once the vacancy has occurred, that is, after May 17, 2010.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. YES.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted.
The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to
continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees and the prohibition of
the President to appoint on the ground of election among others are sufficient basis.
The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions
that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or
that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a
constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge.
LAMP VS. SEC. OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

G.R. NO. 164987, APRIL 4, 2012
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers

filed an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Respondents argued that the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of
PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching
the evils of pork barrel.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. YES.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the
implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The
petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this
is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or
substantial controversy before the Court.
Second: Standing
Legislators and Government Officials
GONZALES VS. MACARAIG

G.R. NO. 87636, NOVEMBER 19, 1990
On December 16, 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 akaGeneral
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1989. December 29,1988, President signed the Bill
into law and had become Rep. Act No 6688. In the process, seven special provisions
and Section 55 on “General Provision” were vetoed.
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Gonzales, together with 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s
veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill. The filing of the suit was authorized
by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the Senate has the Legal Standing to sue. YES.
The court ruled that a member of the Senate has the legal standing to question
the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation
bill. Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority
vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of
the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises.
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ

G.R. NO. 113105, AUGUST 19, 1994
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of

1994. GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the
realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the
Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the petitioners as member of the Senate has the Legal Standing
to sue. YES.
The Court ruled that a member of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a
presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. Where the
veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the
President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive
into the domain of the Legislature arises.
DEL MAR VS. PAGCOR, G.R. NO. 138298, NOVEMBER 29, 2000;
SANDOVAL VS. PAGCOR, G.R. NO. 138982, NOVEMBER 29, 2000
(Two Consolidated Petitions)
Petitioner Raoul del Mar, a member of the House of Representatives, filed a

petition for certiorari to prevent respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating
the jai-alai or Basque pelota games, with Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and
Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME) on the ground that
the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the
Constitution or PAGCORs own Charter.
Issue/Ruling
1. Whether or not the petitioner as member of the HOR has the Legal Standing to
sue. YES.
Members of the HOR of representatives has legal standing when a case involves
an issue of transcendental importance to the public, operation of jai-alai constitutes an
infringement by PAGCOR of the legislatures exclusive power to grant franchise, to the
extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member.
A member of the HOR has the legal standing to sue on cases which involves
transcendental importance which in this case can diminish the plenary legislative power
of Congress, more especially its exercise of police power to protect the morality of our
people.
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601. Jaworski v. PAGCOR- 419 SCRA 420
Robert Jaworski, as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed a petition for certiorari, praying that the grant
of authority by PAGCOR in favor of Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation
(also referred to as SAGE) be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE
to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under
its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple
reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling at
the time of its enactment
Issue: Whether petitioner as member of the Senate has the Legal Standing to sue.
Ruling: YES, ordinarily, before a member of Congress may properly challenge the
validity of an official act of any department of the government there must be an
unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs his rights and
prerogatives as legislator, however, the case involves an issue of utmost
importance on public interest, the Court, in its discretion, can brush aside
procedural technicalities and take cognizance of the petition.
Main Point: A member of the Senate has the legal standing to sue on cases which
involves transcendental importance
602. SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary

GR 159085, Feb. 3, 2004
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown
leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue
of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under
the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their
barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the
State of Rebellion was issued.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit.
RULING: NO. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and Social
Justice Society Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep.
Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge
the subject issuances.
MAIN POINT: Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
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603. FARIÑAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of
RA 9006 or “The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices” as it repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office of one
who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a rider on the said law,
the same embracing more than one subject, inconsistent to what the constitution
mandates. Further, it violated the equal protection clause since the said law didn’t
repeal provision relating to appointive officials. Appointive officials would still be
considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUE: Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
RULING: NO. Section 14 is not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of

the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for
an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of the contested
law, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
doesn’t violate the “one subject- one title rule”. The Court has held that an act
having a single general subject, indicated in its title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and they may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject
604. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V. ROMULO

In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC. The
Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions
No.OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada
on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the
LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit
the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the
Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding
funds. Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of P5 billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for
the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the
release thereof.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have legal standing or locus standi to bring suit.
RULING: YES. The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite
standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks
relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.
This interest pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioners
constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
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2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution, mandating the automatic release to the LGUs of their share in the national
taxes
605. Disomangcop v. Datumanong

444 SCRA 203 [2004]
Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, are the constitutionality and
validity of Republic Act No. 8999 entitled “An Act Establishing An Engineering District in
the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefore,”
and DPWH Department Order No. 119 on the subject, “Creation of Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office.”
Petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it
violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged
Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions
that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are constitutional.
RULING: NO. The creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under
D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering
District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers,
functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two
offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are
in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs.
Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement
of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can
legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.
606. CHR- employees v. CHR

444 SCRA 300 [2004]
The officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA’s request is
denied in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office
that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CSC-Central Office denied the same. In this petition, CHREA contends that the
Court of Appeals and CSC-Central Office erred in approving of the CHR’s alleged
authority to upgrade, classify and create positions when the DBM’s approval is
indispensable for such scheme. CHREA also contends that the Court of Appeals erred
when it held that, according to the constitution, the CHR enjoys Fiscal Autonomy.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has a locus standi in this case.
RULING/ MAIN POINT: YES. CHREA has locus standi on the case since here,
the petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests
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that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper
level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank; and file
employees.
607. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

462 SCRA 622
On December 28, 2000, the Philippines through the Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A.
Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations, signed the Rome Statute which
established the International Criminal Court. Thus, herein petitioners filed the instant
petition to compel the respondents — the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs — to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate
of the Philippines for ratification.
ISSUE: Whether the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.
RULING: NO. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and
authorized in the external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with
foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs. In
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states
and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3
required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21,
Art VII). The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in
the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth.
608. Pimentel v. Ermita

495 SCRA 170 [2006]
While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo, through Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of
their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed
in an acting capacity. Petitioners senators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare
unconstitutional the appointments issued.
They assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments,
whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent. Respondent
secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the President can issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session.
ISSUE: Whether the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
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RULING: YES. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself
provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that
the temporary designation shall not exceed 1 year. In this case, in less than a year after
the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA
issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good
faith.
MAIN POINT: The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those
instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.
609. Prov. Of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel

564 SCRA 402 [2008]
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Invoking the right to information on matters
of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of
the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to pursue reforms that would
require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
RULING: Yes. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees
that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be
struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s
authority to propose constitutional amendments. Because although the President’s
power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace
negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed
as a certainty.
Re: disclosure - The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Section 28, Art. II recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a
concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the
State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the
exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people
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610. Concepcion v. COMELEC
591 SCRA 420 [2009]
Petitioner filed certiorari against COMELEC. Accordingly Petitioner attested that
COMELEC has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO.7798 which has no statutory basis in which it was
retroactively applied to NAMFREL. Respondent argued that Resolution 7798 was
issued by the COMELEC as a valid exercise of its quasi-legislative power to implement
elections laws. Hence, notice and hearing are not required for its validity.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi.
RULING: NO. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower
court (COA) can file a motion for reconsideration since a stranger to the litigation would
not have the legal standing to interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In
relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing
to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would
likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate
court via certiorari.
MAIN POINT: The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any
person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. The person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65 who
can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a
party in the proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case, before the COA.
611. Drilon v. De Venecia

594 SCRA 749 [2009]
In August 2007 the Senate and House of Representatives elected their
respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments. In the 2 nd week of August,
petitioners in the first petition went to Speaker De Venecia to ask one more seat for the
Liberal Party. De Venecia said that he would study the demand. During the HoR
session, Taada requested from the HoR leadership one seat in the CA for the Liberal
Party. Respondents filed for dismissal of the petition. In the meantime, Senator Madrigal
sent letters to Villar and Nograles claiming that the composition of the senate and HoR
in the CoA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. She
requested for the reorganization of the membership of CoA.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is the proper party concerned.
RULING: NO. The first petition has been rendered moot with the designation has
been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party as a member of the House
contingent. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained a direct injury as a
result of the act complained of. Her petition does not allege that she (or her political
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party) was deprived of a seat in the CoA, or that she or her party possess personal and
substantial interest to confer with her locus standi.
612. Biraogo v. PTC

637 SCRA 78 [2010]
Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 (Philippine Truth Commission) violates
separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation. While Respondents argue E.O. No. 1 does not
arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power
of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and
question E. O. No. 1.
RULING: NO. With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is
in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation
of E. O. No. 1.
MAIN POINT: plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is
entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
Taxpayers
613. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works
110 PHIL 331 [1960-1961]
Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief,
with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public
works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals.
Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings
attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not
yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta,
situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any
government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents'
contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will
directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains
from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its
owner to the government.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the standing to file for petition.
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RULING: YES. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer, but the
governor of the province of Rizal which is considered one of the most populated biggest
provinces during that time. Its taxpayers bear a substantial portion of the burden of
taxation in the country.
MAIN POINT: Public funds can only be appropriated for a public purpose.
614. Gonzales v. Marcos

65 SCRA 624 [1975]
The petitioner questioned the validity of EO No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of
the Philippines, having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as
donations received, financial commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts
that may be forthcoming in the future. It was likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees
did accept donations from the private sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of
New York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the National Investment & Development
Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from President Johnson of the United
States in the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the construction of the
Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48 million. The petition was denied by the
trial court arguing that with not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the absence of
any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be prejudiced
distinct from those of the general public.
ISSUE: Whether taxpayer has the capacity to question the validity of the
issuance in this case
RULING: NO. It was therein pointed out as "one more valid reason" why such an
outcome was unavoidable that "the funds administered by the President of the
Philippines came from donations [and] contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly,
there was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or monetary interest."
MAIN POINT: It is only to make clear that petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning,
has not satisfied the elemental requisite for a taxpayer's suit.
615. Gonzales v. Narvasa

GR 140835, August 14, 2000
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus,
assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers
and assistants. The PCCR was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by
virtue of EO no. 43 in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.”
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a
public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
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ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the standing to file the suit as a taxpayer.
RULING: NO. Petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR
in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a "personal and
substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of its enforcement."
MAIN POINT: Petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest — that he will
stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of
the suit.
616. Information Technology Foundation v. Comelec, GR 159131, Jan. 13 2004.

The COMELEC issued an “Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid”. There are
57 bidders who participated therein. The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) found
MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. Both were
referred to Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST). However, the DOST said in its Report on the Evaluation of
Technical Proposals on Phase II that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of
failed marks in technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, the COMELEC en
banc issued Resolution No. 6074, awarding the project to MPC.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have standing to file suit as taxpayers.
RULING: YES. The issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance
and of national interest." Allegedly, COMELEC's flawed bidding and questionable award
of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the
failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the
expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic
system of government.
MAIN POINT: The award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public
funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing
the transaction must be followed strictly.
617. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656 [2004]
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they
complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the
PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was
declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
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Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the
Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit as
taxpayers.
RULING: NO. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue as taxpayers, because no such illegal
disbursement is alleged. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances.
MAIN POINT: A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves
the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
618. Velarde v. SJS
428 SCRA 283 [2004]
Social Justice Society, a registered political party, assailed the constitutionality of
the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or
requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
ISSUE: Whether SJS has legal interest/standing in the controversy.
RULING: NO, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that

taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed. Parties suing as taxpayers must
specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation. A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when
there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
MAIN POINT: Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
619. Brillantes v. COMELEC

Petitioners assailed COMELEC Resolution No. 6712 captioned GENERAL
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION AND CONSOLIDATION
OF ADVANCED RESULTS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS which authorizes the
"unofficial" count via electronic transmission of advanced results for the May 10, 2004.
Petitioners aver that the conduct of an advanced count by the COMELEC may affect the
credibility of the elections because it will differ from the results obtained from
canvassing and that there was no appropriation.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have standing to sue
RULING: YES, since the implementation of the assailed resolution obviously

involves the expenditure of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as
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taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question its validity as they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.
MAIN POINT: Taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or where the petitioners seek to restrain the respondent from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
620. Domingo v. Carague

456 SCRA 450
Petitioners assailed legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the Commission on
Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan on the ground that it is
intrinsically void for want of an enabling law authorizing COA to undertake the same.
COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have standing to sue.
RULING: NO, There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they
admitted that they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or
improvident act against the respondents.
MAINPOINT: A party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an
injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an
invocation of the courts jurisdiction and justify the exercise of judicial power on his
behalf.
621. Republic v. Nolasco

457 SCRA 400
A Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) was constituted by DPWH for the purpose
of conducting procurement of the contract for Package IIthe Guide Channel to
Bayambang under Phase II of the Project. Six (6) pre-qualified contractors submitted
their bids for the project, among them the present intervenors Daewoo. A legal
challenge was raised on the ground that the Daewoos bid was illegal, immoral, and
prejudicial to the government and the Filipino taxpayers.

RULING: NO, there was no sufficient evidence to establish any direct injury to
him should the Project be awarded to Daewoo. The mere invocation of standing as a
tax payer does not mean that in each and every instance where such a ground is
invoked courts are left with no alternative except to hear the parties.
MAIN POINT: The taxpayer-plaintiff must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation, and that he
will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract.
622. Constantino v. Cuisia

472 SCRA 305
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FACTS: Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino
citizens, object to the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing
Program as beyond the powers granted to the President and assuming it is
constitutionally permissible; such power may not be delegated to respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have standing to sue.
RULING: YES, the court reiterated that the prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s
suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national
government or government owned and controlled corporations allegedly in
contravention of law.
MAIN POINT: A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law
623. Abaya v. Ebdane

515 SCRA 720 [2007]
A petition for certiorari and prohibition sought to set aside and nullify Resolution
No. PJHL-A-04-012 dated May 7, 2004 issued by the Bids recommending the award to
private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation on improvement/rehabilitation of
the San Andres (Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road in the province of Catanduanes,
funded under the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between JBIC and the Phil Govt.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have standing to sue
RULING: YES, they have sufficiently demonstrated that, notwithstanding the fact
that the project is primarily financed from loans obtained by the government from the
JBIC, nonetheless, taxpayers’ money would be spent on the project considering that the
Philippine Government is required to allocate a peso-counterpart therefor.
MAIN POINT: Taxpayers are allowed to question contracts entered into by the national
government or government- owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention
of law. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity
624. Planters v. Fertiphil
548 SCRA 485 [2008]
Fertiphil questioned LOI No. 1465 which require the payment of P10 for every
bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA).
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RULING: YES, theysuffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No.
1465. As seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of
severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to
Fertiphil.
MAIN POINT: One can invoke locus standi as taxpayer if there is direct injury and if it
involves not only the constitutionality of a tax law but, more importantly, the use of taxes
for public purpose.
625. Roque v. COMELEC

599 SCRA 62 [2009]
This is a petition seeking to nullify respondent award of the 2010 Elections
Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of TIM and (Smartmatic)
and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or
implementing the corresponding contract-award.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have standing to sue.
RULING: YES. There is no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or
is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is
assumed on issues of public importance.
MAIN POINT: There is no necessity to show that the suitor has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed
on issues of public importance.
626. Mamba v. Lara, GR 165109

December 14, 2009
FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cagayan authorized Gov. Lara to

engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation (PVC) as financial
advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects
of the governor without cost and commitment. Respondents (PVC), Asset Builders
Corporation, RCBC, MICO and LBP were all impleaded as indispensable or necessary
parties. Petitioner Mamba filed a Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with
prayer for a Temporary Restraining to Gov. Lara.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers
RULING: YES. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites
must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is
committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
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MAIN POINT: A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.
627. De la Llana v. Chairperson, COA

665 SCRA 176 [2012]
Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the
dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial
transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the
pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer.
RULING: YES. The petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he
would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.
MAIN POINT: A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional

issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.
628. Galicto v. Aquino

667 SCRA 150 [2012]
Pres. Aquino issued EO 7, provided for the guiding principles and framework to
establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for the government
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and government financial institutions (GFIs).
The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he “stands to be prejudiced by EO
7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or
increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCCs and curtails the prerogative of
those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacks locus standi to file this suit as a
taxpayer.
RULING: YES. The petitioner lacks locus standi to file this suit as a
taxpayer, since, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other
benefits cannot be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. He has no
vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the
petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. Locus standi or legal standing has been
defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.
629. Initiatives for Dialogue v. PSALM

682 SCRA 602 [2012]
Respondent, PSALM, is a GOCC created by virtue of RA 9136, otherwise known
as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). Said law mandated
PSALM to manage privatization of NPC. When PSALM commenced the privatization an
invitation to bid was published and the highest bidder K-Water was identified. The sale
to K-Water was sought to be enjoined by petitioners who contend that PSALM gravely
abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it violated the people’s right to
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information without having previously released to the public critical information about the
sale.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner lacks locus standi to file this suit as a taxpayer.
RULING: YES. Petitioners here technically lack the requisite legal standing to file
the petition as taxpayers, as they have no direct and personal interest in the
controversy. As stated in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, “there must be a showing that the citizen personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act.”
MAIN POINT: A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue
when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution.
Citizens and Associations; Transcendental Importance
630. Legaspi v. CSC
150 SCRA 530 [1987]
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Legaspi against
the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in
the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligible who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s petition is of transcendental importance and has

legal standing to bring this suit
RULING: YES. The court held that when the question is one of public right and
the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people
are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws. The SC ruled that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen
only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are
unequivocally set forth in the Constitution.
MAIN POINT: A writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right
to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocally set forth in the
Constitution
CITIZENS AND ASSOCIATIONS: TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE

631. OPOSA v. FACTORAN JR. G.R. NO. 101083, JULY 30, 1993
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the SC to order the respondent,
then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country
is causing vast abuses on rain-forest affecting the rights of their generation and the
rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology.
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Whether the petitioners have a locus standi. YES.
Petitioners represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. Their

personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature”. Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because
the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for
several but for all citizens of the Philippines.
632. PASEI v. TORRES GR 81958 June 30, 1988

PASEI and PEEPA allege that their member agencies, which enjoy protection
against competition by new licensees pursuant to LOI 1190, will suffer irreparable injury
with the repeal of LOI 1190 by EO 450, considering further that there is no additional
demand for Filipino workers abroad.
Whether or not the issue posed in this petition is of transcendental
importance and recognize the standing of the petitioners
No. The “proper-party” requirement is satisfied if it is alleged that petitioners and

intervenors have sustained or are in danger of sustaining immediate injury resulting
from the acts or measures complained of. Hence, any gain made by the new agencies
on the supposed exclusive preserve of existing agencies necessarily results in the
latter’s loss.
633. JOYA v. PCGG GR 96541; 225 SCRA 568

The RP through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with
Christie’s of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized
from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila, a non-profit and non-stock
corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts, alleged to be part of the ill-
gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. COA questioned the
Consignment Agreement. Nevertheless, it proceeded with the auction sale and the
proceeds were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
All 35 petitioners here invoked Article XIV, Sec. 14 which refer to the policy of the
State on protection of the arts and that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the
art pieces, they have been deprived of their right to public property without due process
of law in violation of the Constitution.
Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition
The petitioners' zealous concern to keep and preserve within the country great
works of art by well-known old masters is commendable. Such artistic creations give us
insights into the artists' cultural heritage — the historic past of the nation and the era to
which they belong — in their triumphant, glorious, as well as troubled and turbulent
years. However, petitioners' themselves allege that the paintings were donated by
private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the
foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given
the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the
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valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal
right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
634. Kilosbayan v. Morato G.R. NO. 118910, July 30, 1993

Petitioners assailed the validity of Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) between
PCSO and Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) on the ground that he
contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter (RA 1169) which prohibits PCSO
from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint
venture. Petitioners insisted that they are suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens it
is of “paramount public interest”.
Whether or not petitioners have standing to sue and question the validity of
contract between PCSO and PGMC.
NO. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators have indeed been
allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under
certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing. The case
does not raise issue of constitutionality but only of contract law which petitioners cannot
raise, not being privies to the agreement. Kilosbayan’s status as a people’s organization
does not also give it the requisite personality to question the validity of contract in this
case.
634. Tatad v. Garcia Jr. 243 SCRA 436, 473 (1995)
A petition was filed by respondents, in their capacity as Senators and as
taxpayers, to prohibit respondents from further implementing and enforcing the Revised
and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for
EDSA. This is to alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem.
Respondents claimed that petitioners have no legal standing to initiate the instant
action.
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to initiate the instant action
Yes. When the subject in issue is of transcendental interest to the public, the
Court entertains suit even if those suing do not have a personal and direct interest such
that they are stand to suffer harm.
635. Board of Optometry v. Collet
Petitioners alleged that respondent Judge Collet gravely abused his discretion in
finding that private respondents have locus standi to file the petition for declaratory relief
on the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law (R.A. No. 8050) or
any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder. Private respondents asserted in
their comment that the petition was filed in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens,
under the concept of Public Right, to bar the enforcement of the law because it
endangers public health and that it is in the nature of a taxpayers class suit.
Whether or not private respondents have locus standi to file the petition
No. Private respondents failed to show that they are juridical entities and have
substantial interest in the case, hence, deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring
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an action. Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties
in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Private respondents also failed to allege the existence and prove
the requisites of a class suite. Furthermore, there is yet no actual case or controversy
involving both petitioners and private respondents with respect to rights or obligations
under RA 8050.
636. Anti-Graft League of the Philippines v. CA

Petitioner was created to protect the interest of the Republic, its instrumentalities,
political subdivisions and its constituents against abuses of its public officials and
employees. 4 parcels of land were acquired from Ortigas & Co., Ltd pursuant to an EO
issued by Pres. Marcos for the establishment of the Technological Colleges of Rizal.
The project construction did not materialize. 12 years later, the idle property was sold to
Valley View Realty Development to fund the 5-year Comprehensive Development
Program of the province. Petitioner, filing in their capacity as taxpayers, claims that the
Provincial Board of Rizal illegally disbursed public funds. The board denied the
allegations and challenged the capacity of the petitioner to file the same.
Whether or not the petitioner has a locus standi to question the transaction
entered into by the Provincial Board of Rizal and private respondent Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
No. As a taxpayer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an illegal

use of public money but no such spending has been shown in the case at bar. Petitioner
cannot question the transaction validly executed between the Province and Ortigas &
Co., Ltd. being not a privy to such contract.
637. Telecom v. COMELEC

Petitioners assailed the validity of BP Blg. No. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) on
the ground that (1) the requirement that radio and television time be given free takes
property without due process of law and without just compensation, (2) it denies radio
and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws, and (4) it is in
excess of the power given to COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
communication or information during the period of election. Petitioners are suing in their
capacity as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters.
Whether or not petitioners have a legal standing to sue
Only petitioner GMA Network, Inc has a standing because it will allegedly suffer
losses by the enforcement of BP Blg. No. 881 which requires radio and television
broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates
for campaign and other political purpose. Petitioner TELEBAP has no standing as it
failed to show its interest in the case as citizen, taxpayers, and registered voters.
Moreover, the mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast
industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of the
affected companies.
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638. Chavez v. PCGG
Petitioner, as a taxpayer and citizen, seeks to prohibit and enjoin respondents
from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of
the late President Marcos concerning his properties and assets located in the
Philippines and/or abroad, including the so-called Marcos gold hoard. He submits that
since ill-gotten wealth belongs to the Filipino people, any compromise would constitute
a diminution of the public funds. Petitioner emphasizes that the matter of recovering the
ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue "of transcendental importance to the
public." He asserted that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute
actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are "of paramount public interest" and if they
"immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people."
Whether or not petitioner has a standing to initiate the legal action
Yes. The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and
access to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino
citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional
law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2)
espoused by a Filipino citizen, the Court ruled that the petition at bar should be allowed.
Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutional question being raised is of
transcendental importance to the public.
639. IBP v. Zamora

Petitioner seeks to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of Pres. Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility
patrols around the metropolis. The said order was issued in view of the alarming
increase of violent crimes in Metro Manila with the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression.
Whether or not petitioner can initiate the legal action
Yes. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of the Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order
are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the
petition almost certainly will not go away. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the
rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later. Although the party who
brought the suit did not stand to suffer specific injury to themselves, the issue herein is
of transcendental importance that warrants the Court’s pronouncements.
640. Bayan v. Zamora

Petitioners assailed the legality of the VFA between the Philippines and the US.
Respondents challenge petitioners standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have
not shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners failed to substantiate that they
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have sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA.
Petitioners, on the other hand, counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a
matter of transcendental importance which justifies their standing
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers,

and legislators to question the legality of the VFA
No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of
sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. Inasmuch as no
public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any
allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended,
petitioners as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
641. Cruz v. Secretary of DENR

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 8371(Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 and IRR. The
Petitioners argued that certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
WON the issue posed in this petition is of transcendental importance and

recognize the standing of herein petitioners
No. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Legal standing has
been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.
642. Lozano v. Macapagal-Arroyo

The Petition asks the Court to issue a "definitive ruling on whether or not Joseph
Estrada is still the President" and hence exempt from all criminal suits.

recognize the standing of herein petitioners?
No, petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits. There was no direct and
personal injury as a result of President Arroyo’s oath-taking. Specifically, Petitioner
Lozano’s alleged interest as a taxpayer is far too detached from the ultimate objective of
his Petition: nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo and declare Estrada as "President-on-
leave." The herein Petitioners have miserably failed to present justiciable controversies
brought by the proper parties to deserve further considerations by this Court.
643. Lim v. Executive Secretary

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that respondents be
restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice
and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or
prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being
illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Respondent argues that first, petitioners may
not file suit in their capacities as, taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been shown that
"Balikatan 02-1" involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending
powers. Second, their being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to
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initiate the case. Third, petitioners have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of
direct personal injury.
WON the issue posed in this petition recognizes the standing of herein
petitioners?
Yes. The Balikatan exercises pose direct injury to some of the petitioners
(intervenors) who live in the affected areas. The presence of us troops in the combat
zones "assisting" and "advising" our troops in combat against the ASG is a blatant
violation of the Constitutional proscription against the stationing of foreign troops to fight
a local insurgency and puts the country in peril of becoming a veritable killing field.
645. Chavez v. PEA

A petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for
brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's on-going renegotiations with Amari Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. PEA argues that petitioner has
no standing to institute mandamus proceedings without showing that PEA refused to
perform an affirmative duty imposed on it by the Constitution. PEA also claims that
petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the
exercise of the power of judicial review.

YES, We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of
natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the
requisite locus standi. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly
information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which
the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second
issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
646. Tolentino v. COMELEC

Pres. GMA nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President, thus, leaving a
vacancy in the Senate. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC,
enjoining them from the final proclamation the 13th senator. Respondent questions
petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because
petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do
petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of
Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
WON petitioners have standing to file the petition.
Yes. The Court have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised its
discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. In their
capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 involves a harm
classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized grievance is shared in
substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in
that election. Supreme Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does
not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. Thus,
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when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure.
647. Agan v. PIATCO

Motions for Reconsideration was filed by respondent Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) of the Decision of this Court dated May 5, 2003 declaring
the contracts for the NAIA IPT III project null and void. PIATCO contends that
petitioners failed to show any legally demandable or enforceable right to justify their
standing to file the cases at bar. Further, they allege that although designated as
petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the cases at bar are actually actions for nullity of
contracts over which the trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction.

YES. The petitioners are employees of service providers operating at the existing
international airports and employees of MIAA and they will all sustain direct injury upon
the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. As the cases at bar merely concern the
construction of the Constitution, the interpretation of the BOT Law and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations on undisputed contractual provisions and government
actions, and as the cases concern public interest, this Court resolved to take primary
jurisdiction over them. The petitioning service providers stand in imminent danger of
losing legitimate business investments in the event the PIATCO Contracts are upheld.
648. Tichangco v. Enriquez

Petitioners assailed the 08 Aug 2001 decision and the 29 Oct 2002 resolution of
the Court of Appeals affirming that there were no legal grounds to initiate
proceedings to nullify original certificate of title no. 820 and 7477 and the subsequent
titles derived therefrom Transfer Certificate of Title and all covering parcels of land in
Tondo, Manila registered in the names of private respondents.

NO, petitioners do not have any legal standing to ask directly for their annulment.
Since the parcels they claim are properties of the public domain, only the government
can bring an action to nullify the TCTs. Petitioners fail to convince the Court that the
facts they rely upon to justify a review of the decree in question constitute actual
extrinsic fraud. Being too vague, too highly speculative and uncertain, their presumed
interest does not suffice to constitute a legal right or interest that would grant them
standing in court. Petitioners were neither applicants nor claimants of any preferential
right over the aforesaid disputed lands.
649. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo

Petitioners, composed of ten (10) labor unions, call upon this Court to exercise its
power of judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an executive order, which grants
authority by the President to the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative
supervision over the National Labor Relations Commission. The respondents alleged
that the petition does not pose an actual case or controversy upon which judicial
review may be exercised and that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the
validity of E.O. No. 185, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor
unions are exempt from paying taxes. Petitioner contend that they are suing for and in
behalf of their members estimated to be more or less fifty thousand (50,000) workers
who are the real parties to be affected by the resolution of this Court.

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NO, Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
sustaining any personal injury and will prejudice their rights and interests considering
that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to
the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions.
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.
650. Pimentel vs ES 462 SCRA 662

This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the the Executive
Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal
Court for the Senate’s concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution. The petitioner contends that it is the duty of the executive department to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its
discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. The SolGen questioned the standing of
the petitioners to file the instant suit. Respondents argue that the executive department
has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
Only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant suit. The other
petitioners, who maintain their standing as advocates and defenders of human rights,
and as citizens of the country, have not shown that they have sustained or will sustain a
direct injury from the non-transmittal of the signed text of the Rome Statute to the
Senate. Thus, legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators. The petition seeks to order the executive branch to transmit the copy of the
treaty to the Senate to allow it to exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member
of the institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such authority of the Senate.
651. Senate vs Ermita 488 SCRA 1 (2006)

PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its
legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in
the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be
resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches
of the government. PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in
view of the transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve
in order to avert a constitutional crisis.
Whether or not PDP-Laban has legal standing to file the petition.
For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,

however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets
involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised. PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its
allegation is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it
shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or
threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a
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form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as
a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
652. Purok vs Yuipco 489 SCRA 382 (2006)

Parcels of land located in Kaskag, Surigao City was illegally occupied by 400
private individuals who constructed their houses and other improvements. The
occupants formed an association called Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc (PBSAI).
The legitimate owners, Lydia Kaimo and others filed a cased in the RTC and was
favored by to recover the real property. The decision was not appealed making it final
and executory. CA issued a TRO in enforcing the writ of demolition. PBSAI then
filed petition for prohibition before SC.
Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the suit.
No. The court ruled that, although RTC and CA can issue extraordinary writs, the
issuance of the writ must be proscribed unless special and important laws are clearly
and specifically set forth in the petition. The petitioner has not alleged any special and
important reasons why it sought relief from SC before seeking in the respondent court
or CA. Moreover, CA had already issued a TRO to stop implementing the writ of
demolition issued by respondent Judge. Despite the capacity of associations to have
legal standing to complain an injury to its members and/or file suit for its members
despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action, the original
jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
653. David vs Arroyo 489 SCRA 162 (2006)

Due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan to
assassinate GMA, she issued PP 1017 to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government, directing the members of the AFP and PNP
"to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." David, et al. assailed PP
1017 due to the fact that it (1) encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it
is a strategy to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law;
and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful
search” committed by police operatives, pursuant to PP 1017.
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Yes. Cases of transcendental importance, must be settled promptly and definitely

and standing requirements may be relaxed. The case involves actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence which affects the rights of the
stakeholders. Thus, it is of great importance that the issue be settled promptly and
definitely.
654. Holy Spirit vs Defensor 497 SCRA 581 (2006)

Holy Spirit Homeowners Association seeks to prevent the enforcement of the
IRR of RA 9207 (National Government Center Housing and Land Utilization Act) which
was signed to law by PGMA in 2003. NHA then promulgated IRR to govern the
implementation of the said act and shall facilitate the orderly disposition if the National
Government Center (in QC) to bonafide residents. The OSG contends that the petitioner
violated that doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the petition directly in the SC.
Whether the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy is applicable in the
case
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NO. The Court ruled that the validity and constitutionality of rules and regulations
issued by an administrative agency does not need to exhaust all the available
administrative remedies before going to the court. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies provides that all non-judicial remedy must be taken into
consideration before the court takes jurisdiction of the case. The doctrine only applies to
the act of the administrative agency concerned pursuant to its quasi-judicial function.
655. Henares vs LTFRB 505 SCRA 104 (2006)
A writ of mandamus was filed by the petitioner to stop LTFRB and DOTC in
requiring public utility vehicles in using Compressed Natural Gas as an alternative fuel.
The petitioner contends that the end goal of the clean air act will still not be met due to
the continuing use of fuel by the energy and transport sectors. In addition, the petitioner
alleged that the complex mixture of dust, dirt, smoke, and particles emitted to the air by
various engine combustion is detrimental to the health.
Whether the petition of questioning the implementation of the issuance of LTFRB

and DOTC on alternative fuel is valid
NO. The Court ruled that the speedy, and adequate remedy sought by the
petitioner is unavailing. The duty of DOTC is to implement emission standards and set
the maximum limit of for the emission of motor vehicles set pursuant to RA 8748.
LTFRB is tasked to franchises to operators based on the result of DOTC surveys. The
petition is procedurally infirm, thus the court cannot preempt the actions of future
changes in both legislation and its implementation. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies provides that all non-judicial remedy must be taken into
consideration before the court takes jurisdiction of the case. In this case, the legislature
should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is
taken.
656. Francisco vs Fernando 507 SCRA (2006)
Ernesto B. Francisco filed a petition for the issuance of the writs of prohibition
and mandamus with the SC for the implementation of the MMDA Flag scheme. The
petitioner contends that the scheme violates due process, disregards constitutional
protection against cruel degrading and inhuman punishment and violates pedestrian
rights due to its exposure to potential hazards. The respondent contended that the
petitioner violated doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Whether the issues raised deserves direct intervention from SC
NO. The Court ruled that the petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
by filing the petition directly with SC. This Court is not a trier of facts. The SC jurisdiction
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, while
in concurrent with the RTC and CA, does not give litigants absolute freedom to choose
forum where to seek such relief. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
provides that all non-judicial remedy must be taken into consideration before the court
takes jurisdiction of the case.
657. Public Interest Center vs Roxas 513 SCRA 457 (2007)
National Power Corporation entered a partnership with WESA to construct a 620-MW
nuclear power plant at Morong, Bataan. President Corazon Aquino then issued an EO
transferring ownership to the national government. PICI filed a case with RTC to nullify
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the contract. OSG then moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that Public
Interest Center Inc (PICI) were engaged in forum-shopping. The Solicitor General
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that PICI were engaged in
forum-shopping, their counsel Atty. Reyes having previously filed cases with causes of
action identical thereto.
Whether or not the case should be dismissed.
YES. The court said that granted the PICI were initially unaware of the existence
of the first set of cases, albeit their counsel was one of the petitioners therein; such fact
was already brought to their attention during a hearing. They failed to report the
pendency of the petition for mandamus before the appellate court bearing on the
dismissal by the Manila RTC. Thus, the dismissal of PICI‘s complaint is in order. PICI
violated the requirement to report to the courts the fact that a similar action had been
filed or is already pending before the courts, regardless of who initiated such similar
action.
658. Garcia v. J.G. Summit

Enrique T. Garcia comes to this Court a third time on a matter involving the
establishment of a petrochemical plant in the country.
On the first occasion, in G.R. No. 88637, Garcia v. Board of Investments, he was
sustained by this Court that the amended application for registration of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) must be published so that those opposing it might be
given an opportunity to be heard, and that access to the amended application and its
supporting papers be allowed by the Board of Investments (BOI or the Board), subject
to limitations, in line with the constitutionally guaranteed right to information on matters
of national concern.
In the subsequent case, G.R. No. 92024, similarly entitled Garcia v. Board of
Investments, this Court affirmed that the BOI’s approval of the amended certificate of
registration of the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC, formerly the BPC) should be
nullified, by virtue of which the original certificate of registration with Bataan as the plant
site.
Whether or not the BOI’s ruling was correctly affirmed by the court.
The BOI has been specifically tasked by law to "[p]repare or contract for the
preparation of feasibility and other pre-investment studies for pioneer areas . . ., to
"[p]repare or contract for the preparation of industry and sectoral development programs
and gather and compile statistical, technical, marketing, financial and other data,
including recommendations on investment policies," to "[c]ollate, analyze and compile
pertinent information and studies concerning areas that have been or may be declared
preferred areas of investments" and to prepare and submit the IPP. As has been this
Court's consistent holding, administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, which have
acquired special knowledge and expertise on matters falling under their jurisdiction, are
in a better position to pass judgment thereon. As a general rule, their findings of fact are
generally accorded great respect by the courts.
659. Kilosbayan v. Ermita

Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita announced the appointment of Gregory
S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the
retirement of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim that Ong is a
Chinese citizen as evidenced by his own birth certificate indicating Chinese citizenship.
The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth,
his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. Ong subsequently obtained
from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he
is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,
since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
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Whether or not the Bureau of Immigration has preemptive primary jurisdiction to
make a determination as regards the citizenship of Ong.
The Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ong’s petition to be
admitted to the Philippine bar. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be
submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. It was on the
basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that
this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer. It is clear, therefore,
that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an
entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a
change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative
proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to
a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of
persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition
filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Until this is done, respondent Ong
cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
Constitution.
660. TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF

APPEALS
DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda. Pres. Estrada issued EO No
102 (Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the DOH). In view of the functional
and operational redirection in the DOH, and to effect efficiency and effectiveness in its
activities, the Department shall prepare a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP)
which shall be the basis of the intended changes. The RSP shall [be] submitted to the
Department of Budget and Management for approval before the corresponding shifts
shall be affected by the DOH Secretary. Petitioners averred that the implementation of
the RSP was not in accordance with law and that it was allegedly implemented even
before the DBM approved it. They maintained that the Office of the President should
have issued an administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do
so.
Whether or not the President should have issued an administrative order.
NO. Such objection cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of the
DOH Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts of the
President. The members of the Cabinet are subject at all times to the disposition of the
President since they are merely his alter egos. Thus, their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved by the
President, presumptively acts of the President. Significantly, the acts of the DOH
Secretary were clearly authorized by the President who issued a Memorandum Circular
No. 62 sanctioning the implementation of the RSP.
CASE NO. 661 Article VIII, Sec. 5: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative

Remedy
ANAK MINDANAO V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Facts: Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI), both members of Congress, assail the constitutionality of
E.O. Nos. 364 and 379. EO. 364, as amended by EO. 379, among other things, orders
that the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) placed under the
supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform, and the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the
Department of Land Reform. AMIN alleges that by issuing Eos 364 and 379, the
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Executive has impaired the powers of Congress. AMIN contends that since the DAR,
PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed, merged or
attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.
Issue: Whether or not any reorganization of these administrative agencies should be
the subject of a statute, not by mere executive orders.
Ruling: No, the Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over
executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a
limitation on the legislative power. The President is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Main Point:The President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
CASE NO. 662 PHARMACEUTICAL V. DUQUE

FACTS: This case concerns a petition challenging the validity of a Department of Health
(DOH) Administrative Order which is the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations,
claiming that it contained provisions that went beyond the scope of the law as it was
supposed to implement (Milk Code). The Milk Code gave effect to the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA). The WHA had since adopted several Resolutions to the effect
that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected.
Issue: Whether or not DOH, as an administrative agency, acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.
Ruling: No, RIRR is valid as it is within the DOH's rule making power. It does not
provide for the repeal of laws but only orders, issuances and rules and regulations. An
administrative agency like DOH possesses quasi-legislative power which allows
administrative agencies flexibility in formulating and adjusting details and manner by
which they are to implement the provisions of a law, in order to make it more responsive
to the times.
Main Point: The express grant of rule-making power to an administrative agency

necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal laws. It is a standard
provision in administrative rules that prior issuances od administrative agencies that are
inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
CASE NO. 663 Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and National
Telecommunications Commission
Facts:As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact
disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-
President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent
DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition
to nullify the "acts, issuances, and orders" of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez
(respondents).
Issue: Whether or not NTC has power to impose content-based prior restraint on
expression.
Ruling:No, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be
subject to prior restraint. NTC may regulate the bandwidth position, transmitter wattage,
and location of radio and television stations, but not the content of the broadcasts.
Main Point:Only the courts have the power to adjudciate on the factual and legal issue
of whether the airing of Garci tapes presents a clear and present danger of bringing
about a substantive evil that the state has a right and duty to prevent.
CASE NO. 664 AKBAYAN v AQUINO
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Facts:Prior to President’s signing of Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement, petitioners (non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers) demanded the full text of JPEPA including Philippine and Japanese offers
during the negotiation process. The respondent alleged that the request of the
Petitioners must be denied on the ground that the issue is under the executive privilege
and is confidential until the negotiation is complete.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court can exercise primary jurisdiction of this case
and take cognizance of the instant petition.
Ruling: Yes, the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in the court's jurisdiction. The JPEPA negotiations constituting no
exceptions.
Main Point:Despite the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy, SC is allowed

to exercise primary jurisdiction if the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of the SC's primary jurisdiction.
CASE NO. 665 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

Facts: Petitioner, a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing Sec.
36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. Section 36 thereof
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take jurisdiction in this case.
Ruling:Yes, the right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a
facet of the right protected guarantee against unreaonable reach and seizure. The
provision gave unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner
of drug testing instead of entrusting to administrative agencies.
Main Point:The Court takes cognizance of cases with the transcedental importance and
the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of a law.
CASE NO. 666 VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES
Facts: The conversation of President Arroyo and the petitioner Virgilio Garciliano,
COMELEC regional director arised regarding the desire of the president to have a
favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and
was played during the house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of
events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally
seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law.
Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy in this case.
Ruling: NO, while it is true that the Court is not absolutely precluded from resolving
issues that are otherwise moot, no compelling circumstance is present in the case that
would warrant the exercise of judicial review.
Main Point:Courts are prohibited from deciding hypothetical, conjectural or anticipatory
questions despite their vast judicial power.
CASE NO. 667 White light v. City of Manila

FACTS: Respondent, approved by Mayor Alfredo Lim, issued an ordinance (City
Ordinance No. 7774) which prohibits Hotels, Motels, Inns and Similar Establishments to
accept short-time admissions. Petitioners argued that it directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances is unreasonable and oppressive interference in
their business.
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RULING: Yes. The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed
infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as
a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure.
MAIN POINT: Exhaustion of administrative remedies is exempted because there was a

violation of due process.
CASE NO. 668 Chamber of Real Estate v. Romulo

FACTS: Petitioner argues that imposing minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on
corporations violates the due process clause because it levies income tax even if there
is no realized gain and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties
classified as ordinary assets is contrary to law because they ignore the different
treatment of RA 8424 to ordinary assets and capital assets. The respondent, Executive
Secretary Alberto Romulo, argued that the petition did not need the calling for judicial
review, is not ripe for adjudication and the petitioner has no locus standi in the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is valid.
RULING: No. Petitioner has miserably failed to convince the Court that the imposition of
MCIT and CWT is unconstitutional and resulted to the dismissal of the case.
MAIN POINT: The petitioner should appeal the issue first to its superior agency, which
is the Office of the president, before it appeals to the court. Otherwise, the complaint will
be dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action.
CASE NO. 669 Chamber of Real Estate Builder’s Association (CREBA) v. Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC)
FACTS: Petitioner argues that Section 2-6 of the Distribution services and Open access
Rule (DSOAR), which obligate certain customers to advance the amount needed to
cover expenses of extending lines and installing additional facilities is unconstitutional
because it is oppressive. Respondent argues that petitioner lacks the standing to file the
present suit since the petitioner is not affected on the administrative issuance
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner’s has locus standi.
RULING: No. Even though the issue does not affect the petitioner’s rights and
obligations, he still claims that its rights to due process and equal protection have been
violated by an administrative issuance.
MAIN POINT: The issue was not yet for the court to decide on. It should be appealed
first to the Office of the President, superior to the ERC, in line with the doctrine.
CASE NO. 670 Southern Hemisphere v ATC

FACTS: Six petitions were made challenging the constitutionality of (RA 9372 or the
Human Security Act of 2007. All 6 filed their petitions to the SC with their respective
rights and standings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper.
RULING: No. Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper because respondents does not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions which is a qualification for certiorari.
MAIN POINT: The issue should be exhausted first with administrative remedies,
specifically to the OP, before seeking judicial intervention to prevent the case to be
prematurely dismissed.
CASE NO. 671 Orlando A. Reyes v. City of Manila

FACTS: The City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 7949 authorizing the City Mayor to
acquire by legal means the parcel of land co-owned by defendants and offered them
₱1,000.00 per square meter. Defendants were willing to sell the property to the city of
Manila but at the price of ₱50,000 per square meter which they claim is fair at that time.
In the course of the proceedings, one of the petitioner died and his son substituted him.
He then argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional and the case of JIL vs.
Municipality of Taguig is applicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case cited is applicable.
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RULING: No. The Petitioner failed to how or why the facts in this case are similar to the
cited case in order to resolve this case in the same manner.
MAIN POINT: In line with the doctrine, the petitioner should appeal the issue first to its
superior agency, which is the Office of the president, before it appeals to the court.
Otherwise, the complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for having no cause
of action.
CASE NO. 672 Jelbert B. Galicto v. HE President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
FACTS: EO no. 7 was established in response to the inquiry made by the senate
stating that there was excessive disbursement of money to the governing boards of the
government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and government financial
institutions (GFI). The petitioner, as a PhilHealth employee is affected, claims that the
implementation of EO 7 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it has no sufficient standards.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has locus standi
RULING: No. He has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence
of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.
MAIN POINT: The issue should be exhausted first with administrative remedies before
seeking judicial intervention to prevent the case to be prematurely dismissed.
CASE NO. 673 Bayan v. Romulo

FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the
Rome Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by
the signatory states. In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which
aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits
that might be brought against them in international tribunals. Petitioner imputes grave
abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays
that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and
effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding
and ratifying the agreement.
RULING: No. The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from,
the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other.
MAIN POINT: The issue should be exhausted first with administrative remedies before
seeking judicial intervention to prevent the case to be prematurely dismissed.
Case No. 674 Magallona vs. Ermita (G.R. No 187167)

FACTS: Petitioners, who filed for writs of certiorari and prohibition, submit that RA 9522
dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related
treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any
treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters.
ISSUE: Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522.
RULING: No. In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds,
respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of
respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.
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MAIN POINT:The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental
shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest.
Case No. 675 Article VIII Section 5 – Other Rules: Raise at Earliest Opportunity
and Constitutionality is the Very Lis Mota
People vs. Vera (G.R. No. L-45685)
FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a
new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Vera, upon another request by
petitioner, allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered
alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in
violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting
provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is
only indicated therein that only provinces are covered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in
these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional.
RULING: No. Act No. 4221 declared unconstitutional and void. It constitutes an
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards
MAIN POINT: It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature
will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and
presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
Case No. 676 Mirasol vs. CA (G.R No. 128448)

FACTS: Petitioners, sugar land owners and planters financed by PNB, were asked to
settle their dues and demandable accounts, where they continued to ask for account of
the proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset whatever deficiency claim they had.
The latter contended that there was no accounting under the law because all the
earnings of the export sales, as stated by PD 579, went to the National Government.
Petitioner filed a suit for damages and contented constitutionality of the PD issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to
submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
RULING: Yes. It has already been settled that the Trial Court have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive
order.
MAIN POINT: Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of
this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication.
Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge.
Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
Case No. 677 Matibag vs. Benipayo (G.R. No. 149036)

FACTS: Matibag questions the constitutionality of the appointment by President Arroyo
of Benipayo (Chairman of the Commission on Elections), and Bora and Tuason
(COMELEC Commissioners). She questions the legality of appointment by Benipayo of
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Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the COMELEC’s EID and reassigning her to the Law
department. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the raising of constitutionality of ad interim was made on time by
the petitioner
RULING: Yes. Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest
opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. Unless the
constitutionality of Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of office is
resolved, the legality of petitioner's reassignment from the EID to the Law Department
cannot be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue
raised by petitioner.
MAIN POINT: It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the
constitutional issue was raised at the earliest point. The earliest opportunity to raise a
constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleading.
Case No. 678 Estarija vs. Ranada (G.R. No 159314)

FACTS: The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the
necessary berthing permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been
demanding monies ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of
berthing permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution. The association reported his
activities to the NBI. The NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked
money used to entrap him. Consequently, the Ombudsman ordered petitioners
preventive suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove
from government service an erring public official
RULING: Yes. The constitutional question on the Ombudsman's power cannot be
entertained because it was not pleaded at the earliest opportunity. The CA said that
petitioner had every opportunity to raise the same in his pleadings and during the
course of the trial. Instead, it was only after the adverse decision of the Ombudsman
that he was prompted to assail the power of the Ombudsman in his motion for
reconsideration.
MAIN POINT: When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the
Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question
raised is the very lis mota of the case.
Case No. 679 Moldex vs. HLURB (G.R. No. 149719)

FACTS: Petitioner claims that since the completion of the subdivision, it had been
subsidizing and advancing the payment for the delivery and maintenance of common
facilities where the respondent denied and refused to take over responsibility. The
petitioner elevated the matter of to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari, praying not only for the reversal of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, but also the unconstitutionality of the resolution. They dismissed
the petition on the ground that petitioner should have raised the constitutionality of the
resolution directly to SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner complied with the time requirement of the
constitutionality issue to be raised
RULING: Yes. Petitioner had already raised the question of constitutionality in its
petition filed with the Court of Appeals, which is the earliest possible time. They erred in
ruling that a question on the constitutionality of a regulation may be brought only to
Supreme Court.
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MAIN POINT: When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional
or invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the
regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the
party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been
raised at the earliest opportunity.
(HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994 - "subdivision owners/developers shall

continue to maintain street lights facilities and, unless otherwise stipulated in the
contract, pay the bills for electric consumption of the subdivision street lights until the
facilities in the project are turned over to the local government until after completion of
development in accordance with PD 957, PD 1216 and their implementing rules and
regulations.")
Case No. 680

Gobenciong vs. CA (G.R. No. 159883)
FACTS: The petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 6670, AN ACT PROVIDING
FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, insofar as it grants the
Ombudsman and his deputies the authority to investigate, prosecute and penalize any
act or omission, administrative or otherwise, of any public officer or employee, or to take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question of RA 6770 constitutionality can be used in this
petition
RULING: The issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; this means before the Office of the Ombudsman, or at least before the CA.
Withal, it cannot now be considered in Gobenciong's petitions for review.
MAIN POINT: While the Court may declare a law or portions thereof unconstitutional, it
is imperative that the petitioner shows a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. And it is basic that the matter
of constitutionality shall, as a rule, be considered if it is the lis mota of the case and
raised and argued at the earliest opportunity
Case No. 681 Heirs vs. Marasigan (G.R. No. 156078)

FACTS: RTC issued an order approving the recommendations embodied in the
Commissioners’ Report on the division of property by the deceased Cesar Marasigan,
particularly that the property be assigned to one of the heirs. Petitioners, elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65,
claiming it was unconstitutional and that it was grave abuse by the RTC judge in
approving the Commissioners’ Report. CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the RTC
acted within its authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against the unconstitutionality of Sec 5 Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court can be used by the petitioners
RULING: No. The present problem of partition by co-heirs/co-owners can be resolved
without elevating their case to one of constitutionality. At most, the petition pertains to
an error of judgment, and not of jurisdiction, for clearly under Section 5 of Rule 69, the
question of whether a party's interest shall be prejudiced by the division of the real
property is left to the determination and discretion of the Commissioners.
MAIN POINT: A constitutional issue raised by petitioners may only be resolved if

essential to the decision of a case and controversy. Even if all the requisites for judicial
review are present, this Court will not entertain a constitutional question unless it is the
very lis mota.
Case No. 682 Abakada vs. Purisima (G.R. No. 166715)
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FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner established factual and legal basis to support its
claims as essential requisite of judicial review
RULING: No. these allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress,
who actually spend them according to their sole discretion.
MAIN POINT: Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial
review is subject to limitations. the Courts hands are tied in deference to the
presumption of constitutionality lest the Court commits unpardonable judicial legislation
Case No. 683 ABS-CBN vs. Phil. Multimedia (G.R. No. 175769-70)
FACTS: ABS-CBN demanded for PMSI to cease and desist from rebroadcasting where
PMSI replied that the rebroadcasting was in accordance with the authority granted it by
NTC. ABS-CBN contends that PMSIs unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and
23 is an infringement of its broadcasting rights and copyright under the Intellectual
Property Code and that Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 excludes DTH satellite
television operators because it allows the taking of property for public use without
payment of just compensation
ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum's constitutionality can be contented
RULING: No. With regard to the issue of the constitutionality of the must-carry rule, the
Court finds that its resolution is not necessary in the disposition of the instant case. One
of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into constitutional questions is
that the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary in deciding the case.
MAIN POINT: As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised
in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
Case No. 684 CSC vs. Andal (G.R. No. 185749)

FACTS: Respondent, a security guard who took and passed the CSPE, allegedly
authorized Vito to claim his results in his behalf, where it was discovered that the ID of
respondent and the photo in the attached picture seat plan had dissimilarities. Civil
Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding
the respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal
from the service. The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA, who favored
respondent when he elevated but was denied. Hence, the present petition for reversal
of the decision of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC’s disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and
the personnel thereof. The Supreme Court also emphasized that in case of violation of
the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to
bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case
against him.
MAIN POINT: By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges’ and court personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power
CHAM
Case No. 685 BPI vs. Shemberg (G.R. No. 162291)
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FACTS: BPI prays that the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation be
rendered unconstitutional and void. This insofar as it alters or modifies and expands the
existing law on rehabilitation contrary to the principle that rules of procedure cannot
modify or affect substantive rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitaion is
unconstitutional and void
RULING: No. The petition was dismissed. BPI failed in clearly proving its assertion. Its
failure to so prove defeats the challenge. In addition, the challenge on the
constitutionality of the Interim Rules is a new and belated theory that we should not
even entertain. It was not raised before the CA. This Court did not entertain the
constitutional issue because it was belatedly raised at the RTC.
MAIN POINT: The rule is that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case.
Case No. 686 Macalintal vs. PET (G.R. No. 191618)

FACTS: Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questioned the constitution of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as illegal and unauthorized. While petitioner concedes that the
Supreme Court is, authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose, he chafes at the
creation of a reportedly, separate tribunal, complemented by a budget allocation, a seal,
a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET violates Article VIII of the Constitution
RULING: No. The decision therein held that the PTC finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution. A plain reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e.,
last paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch,
reveals that the two are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the
Executive and the Judicial Branches of government
MAIN POINT: Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect.
Case No. 687 Carbonilla vs. Airline Board of Representatives (G.R. No. 193247)
FACTS: Petitioners assail the Resolution promulgated on 5 August 2010 by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103250. Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. filed an Omnibus
Motion to Intervene before the Court of Appeals on the ground that as customs
personnel, they would be directly affected by the outcome of the case. CA denied the
petition and held that the intervenors case was for collection of their unpaid overtime
services and their interests could not be protected or addressed in the resolution of the
case. The Court of Appeals ruled that Carbonilla, et al. should pursue their case in a
separate proceeding against the proper respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the
intervention of Carbonilla
RULING: No. The Court of Appeals ruled that it has the power to resolve the
constitutional issue raised against CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Section 8, Article IX of the Constitution prohibits an appointive public officer or
employee from receiving additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law.
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MAIN POINT: The permissive tenor of the Rules of Court shows the intention to give
the courts the full measure of discretion in allowing or disallowing the intervention. Once
the courts have exercised this discretion, it could not be reviewed by certiorari or
controlled by mandamus unless it could be shown that the discretion was exercised in
an arbitrary or capricious manner.
Case No. 688 Office of the President vs. Bar (G.R. No. 194276)
FACTS: The Office of the President ruled that the BOC was merely exercising its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power when it issued CAO 1-2005. The Office of the
President ruled that since CAO 1-2005 was issued in the exercise of BOCs rule-making
or quasi-legislative power, its validity and constitutionality may only be assailed through
a direct action before the regular courts. The Office of the President further ruled that,
assuming that BARs recourse before the Office of the President was proper and in
order, the appeal was filed out of time because BAR received the letter-decision of the
Secretary of Finance on 4 September 2006 but it filed its appeal only on 4 December
2006, beyond the 30-day period provided under Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12
February 1987.
ISSUE: Whether BARs appeal before the Office of the President was filed on time
RULING: Yes. The Court has ruled that the Court of Appeals is imbued with sufficient
authority and discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if
it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution
of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.
Further, while it is true that the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the first
opportunity, this Court, in the exercise of sound discretion, can take cognizance of the
constitutional issues raised by the parties
MAIN POINT: When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional

or invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the
regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the
party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been
raised at the earliest opportunity.
Case No. 689 MOLDEX VS HLURB ( same case #679)
Case No. 690 Hacienda Luisita vs. PARC (G.R. No. 171101)
FACTS: FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the
corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an
arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers
under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for allegedly being
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform
RULING: No. The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must
be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not
present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case.
MAIN POINT: When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review
over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative
departments, it does so only when the following essential requirements are first met, to
wit:(1) there is an actual case or controversy; (2) that the constitutional question is
raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper party or one with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
691. SANA V. CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD (CESB):

NOVEMBER 15, 2011
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The petition seeks a review of the constitutionality of EO 883 (which granted
Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) rank to eligible lawyers in the executive
branch) and CESB Resolution No. 870 for being repugnant to Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution, for being midnight appointments. At the time this petition was filed,
however, President Aquino had already issued EO 3 revoking EO 883 expressly and
CESB Resolution No. 870 impliedly.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE SATISFIED THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW. NO.
EO 883 and CESB Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force and
effect, the Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the petition and pass upon these
issuances’ validity. To do so would transgress the requirement of case and
controversy as precondition for the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
MAIN POINT: Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it really
is unavoidable or is the very lis mota.
692. GAMBOA V. TEVES

652 SCRA 690 (2011)
PLDT is engaged in telecommunications business. Stockholder, Wilson Gamboa,

the petitioner, assails the constitutionality of the sale by the Philippine Government of
46.125 percent of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC)
shares in the PLDT to its stockholder, First Pacific through the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council. The petitioner contends that with the sale, First Pacific and PTIC
common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent
violating Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution’s 60-40 capitalization
scheme. Hence, this petition. But the Court stands being not a trier of facts. Factual
questions raised by petitioner, indisputably demand a thorough examination of the
evidence of the parties, which are generally beyond the Court’s jurisdiction
.
W/N THE COURT IS BARRED TO EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW GIVEN THAT
THE PETITIONER RAISED FACTUAL QUESTIONS WHICH ARE GENERALLY
BEYOND THE COURT’S JURISDICTION?
NO. It is well-settled that this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one
for mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications. That is why the Court
adhered to the principle and confined with the resolution of the instant controversy
solely on the threshold and purely legal issue of whether the term capital in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the total
outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares)
of PLDT, a public utility.
MAIN: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if there is (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
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Lis mota literally means “the cause of the suit or action.” This last requisite of judicial
review is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in
the principle of separation of powers. Given the presumed validity of an law or an
action, the petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden of showing first that the case
cannot be resolved unless the constitutional question he raised is determined by the
Court.
MOOT CASES
693. DAVID V. ARROYO

489 SCRA 162 2006
As the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. The lifting of
PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a supervening event – would have normally
rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative,
illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF PP 1021 RENDERED THE CASE MOOT

AND ACADEMIC. No.
There remained the need to determine the validity of Proclamation No. 1017 and
G O. No. 5, because during the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it and only in
resolving the issue can it be determined if the acts committed by the implementing
officers were justified.
MAIN: Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if there is: First, a
grave violation of the Constitution; Second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; Third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
And fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be

"evaded" and they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.
(Public interest and repetition, second and third requisite above)
694. SUPLICO V. NEDA

GR 178830 JULY 14 2008
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) respectfully avers that in an Indorsement
dated October 24, 2007, the Legal Service of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) has informed it of the Philippine Government’s decision not to
continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project. That said, there is no more
justiciable controversy for the Honourable Court to resolve. (Note: The validity of the
project of the ZTE with the PH government has been heavily criticized since nvolved
allegations of corruption in the awarding of a US$329 million construction contract
to Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE for the proposed government-managed
National Broadband Network (NBN).
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE
DESPITE OF THE MOOT ASPECTS (BASED ON FACTS ABOVE) OF THE
PRESENT PETITION. No.
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The issues raised in the petition do not call for a clarification of any constitutional
principle or the interpretation of any statutory provision. In the case at bar, the resolution
of whether a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to prevent the implementation
of the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal of factual considerations which are
peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in this controversy. Except for the
determination of whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction which
is now moot, the issues raised in this petition do not call for a clarification of any
constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory provision.22
Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose to disregard the foregoing
considerations and brush aside mootness, the Court cannot completely rule on the
merits of the case because the resolution of the three petitions involves settling factual
issues which definitely requires reception of evidence. There is not an iota of doubt that
this may not be done by this Court in the first instance because, as has been stated
often enough, this Court is not a trier of facts.
MAIN POINT: Where there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court
ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.
695. MATTEL INC. V. FRANCISCO

GR No. 166886 July 30 2008
Mattel Inc. is seeking a ruling on whether Uy's "Barbie" trademark is confusingly

similar to its (Mattel's) "Barbie" trademark. However, given Uy's admission that he has
effectively abandoned or withdrawn any rights or interest in his trademark by his non-
filing of the required Declaration of Actual Use (DAU), there is no more actual
controversy, or no useful purpose will be served in passing upon the merits of the case.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT SHOULD RENDER THE CASE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC AFTER UY’S NON-FILING OF DAU. Yes.
Uy’s non-compliance with the DAU requirement is tantamount to declaring that

he renounces his right to the trademark. Thus, the issues raised in the petition do not
call for a clarification of any constitutional principle or the interpretation of any statutory
provision.
MAIN POINT: A ruling on the matter would practically partake of a mere

advisory opinion, which falls beyond the realm of judicial review. The exercise of
the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies.
696. ARAULLO, ET. AL V. AQUINO, ET. AL

GR NO. 209287 JULY 1 2014
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) was challenged on ground that money

was released from DAP as authorized by Senators to those voted in favour of the
impeachment of CJ Corona. It further opened to allegations that non-Executive projects
were also funded which is violative of constitutional mandate for appropriation (“no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.”)
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WHETHER OR NOT THE DISCONTINUANCE OF THE DAP RENDERS THE
CHALLENGES MOOT AND ACADEMIC. No.
They meet the “ripeness” requirement since these allegedly unconstitutional acts
were already being implemented by the DBM. Moreover, DAP entailed the allocation
and expenditure of huge sums of public funds.
MAIN POINT: It falls under all exceptions for mootness to be disregarded: There
was a grave violation of the constitution; The case involves a paramount public
interest; The constitutional issue raised here requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and This case is capable of
repetition yet evading review (there is nothing to stop the DBM from re-
implementing DAP).
POLITICAL QUESTIONS: REQUISITES
697. BAKER V. CARR 369

SCRA 169 (1962)
Charles Baker, a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee, filed suit against Joe Carr,
Tennessee’s Secretary of State. The Tennessee State Constitution required that
legislative districts for the Tennessee General Assembly be redrawn every ten years
according to the federal census to provide for districts of substantially equal population
(as was to be done for congressional districts). Baker's complaint was that
Tennessee had not redistricted since 1901, in response to the 1900 census.
By the time of Baker's lawsuit, the population had shifted such that his district in
Shelby County had about ten times as many residents as some of the rural districts.
The votes of rural citizens were overrepresented compared to those of urban citizens.
Baker's argument was that this discrepancy was causing him to fail to receive the "equal
protection of the laws" required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The state of Tennessee argued that the composition of legislative districts was
essentially a political question, not a judicial one.
W/N THE PETITION OF BAKER CALLS FOR PURELY A POLITICAL QUESTION.

NO.
Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Federal Constitution provides that “ judicial power shall extend
to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution xxx”
Main: The Political Question doctrine could be read narrowly or more broadly.
Read narrowly, the political question doctrine should be invoked only when the issue
presented to the Court is one that has been textually committed to another branch of
government; that is, if the framers of the Constitution made clear their intention that the
judiciary not resolve a particular question of constitutional interpretation, that
determination must be respected. Like the case of Tanada v. Cuenco.
More broadly, the political question might be invoked when there is a lack of
judicially manageable standards to decide the case on the merits, when judicial
intervention might show insufficient respect to other branches of government. So,
Justice William J. Brennan has attempted the political question doctrine, identifying six
factors to help in determining which questions were "political" in nature.
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Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department.
A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;"
"The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind

clearly for nonjudicially discretion;"
"The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;"
"An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already

made;"
"The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various

departments on one question."
698. TORRECAMPO V. METROPOLITAN

649 SCRA 482 (2011)
Torrecampo asserts that "the right of the eight million residents of Metro Manila to
clean and portable water is greatly put at risk" and alleges that the MWSS and the
DPWH violate Section 16, Article II (healthful ecology) and Section 6, Article XII
(ancestral lands and domain) of the Constitution should they choose to proceed with the
C-5 Road Extension Project using MWSS’ properties instead of the RIPADA area.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE ASSAILED BY THE PETITIONER IS WITHIN
THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT’S POWER TO DECIDE.
No. The issues raised by Torrecampo would delve into matters that are exclusively
within the wisdom of the Executive branch. The determination of where, as between two
possible routes, to construct a road extension is obviously not within the province of this
Court.
MAIN POINT: Political questions are to be decided in regard to which full

discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government.
TEXTUALLY DEMONSTRABLE COMMITMENT
699. OSMENA v. PENDATUN

109 SCRA 683 (1960)
Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President without evidence to substantiate
such imputations. He was suspended for 15 months by the House thereafter for being
guilty of serious disorderly behaviour. Osmeña, before the SC, invoked that his
parliamentary immunity for speeches in the congress is violated. The authority of the
legislature to exercise its disciplinary power over its members is in question and may
the courts scrutinize it for grave abuse.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE ASSAILED BY THE PETITIONER IS WITHIN

THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT’S POWER TO DECIDE.
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No. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall
not be questioned in any other place."
MAIN POINT: The legislature’s power to suspend a member for disorderly

behavior and the manner of its imposition were something in regard to which full
discretionary authority had been given to the legislature. (Textually Demonstrable
Commitment)
Textual Type of Political Questions: where there is found a textually

demonstrable commitment of the issue to a political question.
700. ARROYO V. DE VENECIA

277 SCRA 268 1997
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the
House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COULD INTERVENE IN A CASE WHERE

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WAS SAID TO HAVE DISREGARDED ITS
OWN RULE.
No. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved or violated but only
those of a member who, instead of seeking remedy in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.
MAIN POINT: The matter complained is about the internal procedures of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. (Textual Type of Political
Question)
701. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. GUIGONA

GR 134577 November 18 1998
Senators Santiago filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto,
alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to her,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
W/N THE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION TO INQUIRE WHETHER THE SENATE

OR ITS OFFICIALS COMMITTED VIOLATION AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION OR
GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR
FUNCTIONS.
YES. The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice
of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. It is clear that this Court has
jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
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Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
Main: It is one of the guidelines of determining whether a question is a

political question as formulated by Court Justice Brennan in the case of Baker v.
Carr, “prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political
question”
In the case at bar, the choice of the members of Senate should have not
depended on their "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory
constitutional limitations, therefore committing grave abuse of discretion falling
under the jurisdiction of the Court.
702. ICMC v. CALLEJA

GR No. 85750 Sept. 28 1990
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION (ICMC) was one of

those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing
center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the
Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary
work.
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the
rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the
ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations
and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
WHETHER THE COURT HAS THE DUTY TO ACT UPON THE PETITION
CONSIDERING ICMC IS GRANTED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AS A SPECIALIZED
AGENCY.
NO. Article III, Sections 4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly and concurred by the
Philippine Senate provides that specialized wherever located and by whomsoever held,
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process.
Main: It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of

separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch
of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is
then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting
under his direction. This is a textually demonstrated commitment for the
Judiciary.
703. Tanada v. Angara

272 SCRA 18 (1997)
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On April 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine
Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade
Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December the same year,
Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement submitted to the
Court.
WHETHER THE PETITION PRESENTS A POLITICAL QUESTION OR IS
OTHERWISE NOT JUSTICIABLE. YES.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it

contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
MAIN: Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a

constitutional provision is raised before the Court, it becomes a legal issue which
the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
This is still under the first guideline of determining whether the case poses a political
question or not as formulated by Judge Brennan in the case of Baker v. Carr,
“prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political question.”
Where the case obviously assails constitutionality and grave abuse of discretion, the
jurisdiction of the Court automatically stands.
704. GARCIA v. CORONA

GR No. 132451 Dec. 17 1999
As a result of the Tatad Case decision (No. 39 Art. 2 case), Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 8479, a new deregulation law without the offending provisions of the
earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of Congress, has now brought this
petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the time of full deregulation,
unconstitutional. After failing in his attempts to have Congress incorporate in the law the
economic theory he espouses, petitioner now asks us, in the name of upholding the
Constitution, to undo a violation which he claims Congress has committed.
WHETHER THE PETITION ARISES THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BY
THE COURT. NO.
For this Court to declare unconstitutional the key provision around which the law's
anti-trust measures are clustered would mean a constitutionally interdicted distrust of
the wisdom of Congress and of the determined exercise of executive power. There is no
showing of a constitutional violation in this case. It is true that the President and
Congress, not this Court, have the power and the prerogative to determine whether to
adopt such market policies and, if so, under what conditions and circumstances.
However, all such policies and their ramifications must conform to the Constitution.
Otherwise, this Court has the duty to strike them down, not because they are unwise or
inconvenient, but because they are constitutionally impermissible.
Main: Having decided that deregulation is the policy to follow, Congress and
the President have the duty to set up the proper and effective machinery to
ensure that it works. This is something which cannot be adjudicated into
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existence. This Court is only an umpire of last resort whenever the Constitution
or a law appears to have been violated.
JUDICIALLY DISCOVERABLE AND MANAGEABLE STANDARDS
705. LIANG V. PEOPLE

GR NO. 125865 MARCH 26 2001
Jeffrey Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) who
was charged with two counts of oral defamation against fellow worker. Immunity from
legal process was invoked; case was dismissed. The plaintiff (Joyce Cabal) after a
motion of reconsideration was denied by the RTC, brought the case to the Supreme
Court with the prayer to reverse the decision of lower courts.
WHETHER THE PETITIONER BEARS IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
PROCESS THAT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED BY THE COURT. NO.
Petitioner cannot seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal
process" accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is
absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official
acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law which seeks to
narrow the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to
personnel of international organizations, while at the same time aims to increase the
prerogatives of international organizations.
MAIN: It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system

of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government but where the immunity is not granted, the
court stands affirm that it is within its power to resolve. In the case at bar,
judicially discoverable and manageable issue when the petitioner committed oral
defamation.
EFFECT OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY: PAR. 2(a) OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE
706. Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
707. DE AGBAYANI V. PNB

38 SCRA 429 1971
Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB secured by real estate mortgage. 15 years after
the maturity of the loan, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the
recovery of the balance of the loan unpaid. Plaintiff contented that the mortgage sought
to be foreclosed had long prescribed, 15 years elapsed from the day of maturity. PNB
countered that prescription would not be available if the period between the
voided legislations, EO 32 and RA 342, would be deducted from the computation
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of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan.
The lower court favored the plaintiff. Hence, this petition of PNB before the Court.
WHETHER THE PERIOD OF EFFECTIVITY OF EO 32 AND RA 342 BEFORE IT
WAS DECLARED INVALID, TOLLED THE PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION OF THE
MORTGAGE. YES.
During the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342
were in force, prescription did not run being an “operative fact”. In the language of an
American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."
MAIN: The period before a moratorium law was declared unconstitutional was not
allowed to toll the prescriptive period of the right to foreclose a mortgage
because the law was deemed effective prior to its declaration of nullity pursuant
to the Doctrine of Operative Fact.
Moratorium – delay or suspension of a law; it may refer to the temporary

suspension of a law to allow a legal challenge to be carried out.
Under E.O. 32 "Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary

obligations payable within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations
entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation that such area
has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending
action by the Commonwealth Government."
Per the declaration of policy in Republic Act No. 342 (1948), Executive Order No.
32 remains in full force and effect for the war sufferers as for them the emergency
created by the last war was still existent. Then came this specific provision: "All debts
and other monetary obligations payable by private parties within the Philippines
originally incurred or contracted before December 8, 1941, and still remaining unpaid,
any provision or provisions in the contract creating the same or in any subsequent
agreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not be due
and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war
damage claim of the debtor by the United States Philippine War Damage Commission,
without prejudice, however, to any voluntary agreement which the interested parties
may enter into after the approval of this Act for the settlement of said obligations."
708. PHILIPPINE COCONUT V. REPUBLIC, SUPRA

Petitioners seek the reversal of the court’s judgments, they contend that the
Sandiganbayan committed gross and irreversible error when it sanctioned the taking of
COCOFED property by the respondent Republic without due process of law and
through retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the coconut
levy laws, an act that is illegal and violative of the settled Operative Fact Doctrine
because it is inequitable to the coconut farmers whose only possible mistake, offense or
misfortune was to follow the law.
WHETHER OR NOT OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE WAS VIOLATED.
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NO. Said farmers or alleged claimants do not have any legal right to own the
UCPB shares distributed to them.
MAIN POINT: The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of

unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law.
709. HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. V. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

GR NO. 171101 NOV. 22 2011
Executive Order 229 and later RA 6657 allows either land transfer or stock transfer
as two alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. 93% of the then
farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) accepted the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan
(SDP). The DAR then constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues
relating to the SDP of HLI. After investigation and evaluation, the STF found that HLI
has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the
SDP. On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-
01, recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject
lands be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition
scheme of the CARP.
IS THE REVOCATION OF THE HLI’S SDP VALID? YES.
However, the revocation must, by application of the operative fact principle, give
way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in
1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDP approved by PARC. MAIN POINT:
Operative fact doctrine applies to unconstitutional executive act.
710. CIR V. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION
GR No. 187485 Oct. 8 2013
San Roque filed with the BIR claims for tax refund. After 13 days, because of the
CIR’s inaction on the subject claims led to the filing of the Petition for Review with the
CTA. The CTA Second Division ordered the Commissioner to refund or issue a tax
credit in favor of San Roque. The Commissioner filed a Petition for Review assailing
that San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period, the time expressly
given by law to the Commissioner to decide whether to grant or deny San Roque's
application for tax refund or credit.
WHETHER OR NOT OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED. No.
CTA or CA rulings are not the executive issuances covered by Section 246 of
the Tax Code, which adopts the operative fact doctrine. CTA or CA decisions are
specific rulings applicable only to the parties to the case and not to the general public.
CTA or CA decisions, unlike those of this Court, do not form part of the law of the land
MAIN POINT: Operative fact doctrine does not apply to a mere administrative
practice; there must be a law or executive issuance.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW: PAR 2D
711. GARCIA, ET AL v. PEOPLE 138 SCRA 434

Amado Garcia was armed with a bottle, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon the latter fatal
injuries which caused his death. Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued where Amado Garcia was found guilty beyond
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reasonable doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE by the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with
reclusion perpetua. Accused filed a petition to review the said pronouncement before
the SC.
WHETHER OR NOT SUPREME COURT HAS AUTOMATIC REVIEW ON THE
CASE
No. It is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that the trial
court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court. Where the penalty
imposed is merely reclusion perpetua, the accused should appeal the decision of
conviction, otherwise, the judgment of conviction will become final and executory.
MAIN POINT: In case the sentence is death, there is automatic review by

the Court of Appeals and ultimately by the Supreme Court. This is mandatory and
neither the accused nor the courts may waive the right of appeal.
712. PEARSON V. IAC

GR No. 74454 SEPT. 3 1998
The petitioners claim to have inherited the beneficial interest of the Tambis Gold
Dredging Co., Inc. upon its dissolution. But IAC ruled in favour of the respondent that
their claim was null and void. This petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injuction and Prayer for Restraining Order seeks to annul the decision of respondent
Intermidiate Appellate which in effect upheld the private respondent's mining claims and
directed respondent Regional Trial Court to resolve the motion to dismiss in their case.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT IS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
NO. We find the petition entirely devoid of merit. Thus we see, in regard to the first
principal issue, no reversible error committed by the IAC when it assumed jurisdiction
over private respondents' petition for certiorari involving interlocutory orders of the trial
court. Well established is the rule that findings of fact made in the decision of the
Minister of Natural Resources (then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources) appealed from will not be reviewed by this Court unless there has
been a grave abuse of discretion in making said findings by reason of the total
absence of competent evidence in support thereof. As shown above, the public
officials' judgments are well supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, by the
Pearsons' own admission, they failed to file the affidavit of annual assessment works
and to pay the real estate taxes from 1957-1974, which were filed and paid only later in
1974. MAIN POINT: The Supreme court has the power to affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
713. PEOPLE V. MATEO 433 SCRA 640

The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of 10 counts of rape with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Mateo appealed to the CA.
Solicitor General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of
appellant.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTION PROSCRIBE INTERMEDIATE
REVIEW BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. NO.
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The Supreme Court allowed an intermediate review by the CA before such
cases are elevated to them. It is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the
direct mandate to review factual issues that would minimize the possibility of error on
judgment. MAIN POINT: In cases of Reclusion perpetua or life, such cases must be
reviewed by the Court of Appeals before they are elevated to the Supreme Court
714. PEOPLE V. DUAVIS GR 190681 07 December 2011

Lino Duavis, hacked Largado, Sr., with a bolo hitting him on the face, leaving a
wound so severe that he immediately fell to the ground and caused his instantaneous
death. Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. Duavis then appealed the case to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
transferred the cases to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. The CA,
finding that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, ruled that appellant is guilty of the crime of homicide instead of murder
for reasons of factual findings that Duavis acted in self-defense. But Duavis then
assailed the decision of the CA.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM TO THE

DECISION OF THE CA.
YES. In the absence of proof that the CA and the trial court failed to appreciate
facts or circumstances that would have merited appellant's acquittal, this Court has no
reason whatsoever to disturb the ruling of the CA and the trial court. MAIN POINT: The
constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily
prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused.
QUESTION OF LAW: PAR 2E
715. CEBU WOMAN’S CLUB V. DE LA VICTORIA
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in a
Civil Case*, which dismissed its complaint for interpleader and damages against private
respondent due to the pendency of two other cases.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN RESORT TO THE SUPREME COURT.
NO. Petitioners direct resort to this Court is erroneous. The case at bench does
not involve pure questions of law as to entitle petitioner to seek immediate redress from
this court.
A scrutiny of the issues raised in this case shows that it includes factual matters.
The resolution of the interpleader case necessitates a determination of whether the
other pending cases relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the former case involves
the same matters covered by the latter cases. There is a need to determine whether the
pending civil cases arise out of the same facts and circumstances as those involved in
the interpleader case. As such, petitioner's direct resort to this court must fail
considering that this court is not a trier of facts. 6 Besides, in a petition for review
on certiorari, the trial judge should not even be made a party to the case as petitioner
erroneously did.
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MAIN POINT: Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to the
Supreme Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A
question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.
* The present controversy started with the construction of the Cebu School of
Midwifery Building owned by petitioner. In a bidding held on January 7, 1994, the
construction of the building was awarded by petitioner to respondent CAMSAC which
sub-contracted PR Senoron to undertake the said consruction. No payment was
received from the P after construction of building.
CHANGE OF VENUE: 4
716. PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ 36 SCRA 172

A group of armed person set fire to various houses in Ora Centro and Ora Este,
both in Bantay, Ilocos Sur. The prosecutors charged 17 men, together with 82 other
unidentified persons, with the crime of arson, at the Court of First Instancein Vigan,
Ilocos Sur. The Secetary of Justice issued Administrative order No. 226, authorizing
Judge Gutirrez to transfer the criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court. The
respondent Judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that AO No. 266 merely
authorized the court below, but did not require or command it.
WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HAS THE POWER TO
DETERMINE WHAT COURT SHOULD HEAR SPECIFIC CASES. NO.
Judge Gutierrez was correct in regarding the AO as merely directory rather than
mandatory. MAIN POINT: The Supreme Court has the power to order a change of
venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES: PAR 5: ENFORCEMANT OF

CONSTITUTIONAL: Rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
717. FIRST LEPANTO V. CA
Petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. was registered as a non-pioneer

enterprise with public respondent BOI having been so issued a Certificate of
Registration (No. EP 89-452) under Executive Order No. 226, also known as the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, in the manufacture of glazed floor tiles. First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s applied to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing
the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Petitioners
sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and assailed the
conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by
the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases
decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER APPEALS
FROM THE DECISIONS OF THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS. YES.
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Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as
the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed
to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of
Appeals. MAIN POINT: The rules promulgated by the Supreme Court must
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases; they must be uniform for all courts of the same grade; and must not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
718. LINA V. PURISIMA 82 SCRA 344 (1978)

Petitioner seeks to annul the two successive orders of dismissal. Estaban
Cabanos, as president of the Philippine Veterans Bank, in grave abuse of discretion and
authority forcibly excluded petitioner from the position without valid cause, nor basis in
law. Cabanos averred that since the removal of petitioner is pursuant to a Letter of
Instruction issued by the President Marcos, the validity or legality of said act is
beyond the power of the courts to review. This is one of the express limitations upon
the power of Courts imposed by General Order No. 3 issued by the President.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT MAY DISPENSE WITH THE USUAL
PROCEDURE. Yes.
If in any case elevated to this Court for the correction of any supposed
procedural error of any lower court, it should be found that indeed there has been a
mistake, and it further appears that all the facts needed for a complete determination of
the whole controversy are already before the Court undisputed or uncontroverted by the
parties, the Supreme Court may at its option whenever it feels the best interests of
justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding
the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the Supreme Court
may already resolve the pertinent determinative issues and render the final judgment on
the merits. MAIN POINT: The Supreme Court, under certain conditions may, at its
option, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding a case to the lower court
for trial on the merits and, instead, render final judgment thereon
719. SANTERO V. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE-CAVITE

This is a petition that questions the order of the respondent court granting the
Motion for Allowance filed by private respondents. Petitioners argue that private
respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority
age, two are gainfully employed and one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule
83, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners also allege that there was misrepresentation on
the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school
materials because these wards have already attained majority age so that they are no
longer under guardianship. They further allege that the administrator of the estate of
Pablo Santero does not have sufficient funds to cover said allowance because whatever
funds are in the hands of the administrator constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of
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whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds
now held by the administrator are derived.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO
ALLOWANCES AS ADVANCES FROM THEIR SHARES IN THE INHERITANCE
FROM THEIR FATHER PABLO SANTERO.
Yes. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married
is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to
allowance. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse
and his/her children without distinction. MAIN POINT: Substantive law, gives the
surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule
83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however
that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse"
720. DAMASCO V. LAQUI 166 SCRA 214 (1988)

The petitioner was charged with the crime of grave threats (the crime was
committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or
after the lapse of 71 days), but was only found guilty by the court of light threats
(with a prescriptive period of 2 months or 60 days).
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER CANNOT BE CONVICTED SINCE IT
HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
Yes. The Supreme Court, in agreeing with petitioner's contention that he cannot
be convicted of light threats since it had already prescribed, held that where an
accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible with the
graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already
prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on
prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver
offense.
Main point:. While it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before
pleading, is deemed to waive all objections, yet this rule cannot apply to the
defense of prescription, which under art 69 of the rpc extinguishes criminal
liability.
To disregard the rules on prescription in the guise of presumption of regularity

can be done only "through an overhaul of some existing rules on criminal
procedure to give prescription a limited meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the
commencement of a criminal action and therefore, waivable. But this will have to
contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and the legal assistance to
the underprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.
ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PLEADING, PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURES IN ALL COURTS
721. Carpio v. Sulu Resources
G.R. No. 148267 August 8, 2008
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FACTS: This case originated from a petition filed in the Court of Appeals by
respondent for Mines Production Sharing Agreement, covering certain areas in Antipolo,
Rizal. Petitioner filed an adverse claim thereto, alleging that his landholdings in Cupang
and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential
right to explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.
RULING: Yes. Decisions and final orders of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB)
are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Although not expressly included in the Rule, the MAB is unquestionably a quasi-
judicial agency and stands in the same category as those enumerated in its provisions.
MAIN POINT: When the Supreme Court, in its exercise of its rule-making power,
transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions
(Mines Adjudication Boards), such transfer only relates to procedure and it does not
impair substantive rights because the aggrieved party’s right to appeal is preserved and
what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided.
ART VIII SEC 5: POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES: PARAGRAPH 5

722. Baguio Market Vendors v. Hon. Cortes
GR 165922, February 26, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner, as mortgagee, filed a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a

mortgage under Act 3135 (An act to regulate the sale of property under special powers
inserted in or annexed to real estate mortgages), as amended. Under Section 7(c) of
Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees
based on the value of the mortgagees claim. Petitioner invoked Article 62 (6) of RA
6938, that it exempts cooperatives from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees
payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought
under the Cooperative Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is

exempt from legal fees.
RULING: No. The Court ruled that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner
to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the
fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is
not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions
to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
MAIN POINT: The rule making power of this Court was expanded. The 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be
validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress.
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723. In re Petition for Recognition
612 SCRA 193 [2010]
FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on
government-owned or controlled corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees)
of the Rules of Court. The said provision states, “government-owned or controlled
corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees”
GSIS anchored its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, the GSIS Act of 1997, that “the
GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be
exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds.”
ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) from legal fees imposed by the Court on government-owned and controlled
corporations and local government units?
RULING: No. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court
to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Legal fees therefore do not only
constitute a vital source of the Courts financial resources but also comprise an essential
element of the Courts fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal
fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local
government units will necessarily reduce the Judiciary Development Fund and the
Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund.
more so with the Executive. The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules
promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be
validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress.

724..In Re Exemption of National Power Corporation
615 SCRA 1 [2010]
FACTS: On 2005, the Court resolved to declare that the National Power
Corporation (NPC) is still exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeals bond, and
supersedeas bonds on the basis of Sec 13 of RA 6395, an act revising the charter of
NPC. On 2009, the Court deny the request of NPC for exemption because the request
appears to run counter to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, in the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not National Power Corporation is exempt from the payment
of legal fees.
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RULING: No. Under Sec 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, it states that
“government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are
not exempt from paying such fees” On privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that
the NPC shall remain as a national government-owned and controlled corporation.
more so with the Executive.

725. In re: in the matter of classification of Exemption from payment of all Court
Sheriff’s Fees of Cooperatives
A.M. 12-2-03-0,13 March 2012-668 SCRA 1 [2012]
FACTS: Perpetual Help Community Cooperative, contends that as a

cooperative, it enjoys the exemption from the payment of court and sheriffs fees
provided for under Section 6, Article 61 of RA 9520 (Philippine Cooperative Act)
ISSUE: Whether or not cooperatives are exempt from payment of court and
sheriff fees.
RULING: No. Cooperatives can no longer invoke RA 9520, as basis for

exemption from the payment of legal fees. As one of the safeguards of Courts
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
more so with the Executive.
ART VIII SEC 5: POWERS OF SUPREME COURT

Power to promulgate rules: Paragraph 5
Enforcement of Consti rights, Pleadings, Practice, & procedure in all courts
726. Sto Tomas v. Paneda
685 SCRA 245 [2012]
FACTS: These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain

provisions of RA 8042 otherwise known as the migrant workers and overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995. RA 8042’s purpose is to set Government’s policies on overseas
employment. It also establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the
welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress. Petitioners
want to prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing further issuing rules
and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs); and also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation
mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.
ISSUE: WON RA 8042 enforces Constitutional rights
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RULING: Yes. RA 8042 intends to regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It
aims to curb, if not eliminate the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs
seeking to work abroad. State under police power may prescribe such regulations that
will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against
the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. RA
8042 renders the issues they raised by their action moot and academic. The Court has
no reason to disagree.
MAIN POINT:
The SC has the power to promulgate rules concerning protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,

727. Admission in the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, Disciplinary powers, and
Legal Assistance to the Underprivileged
In re Cunanan
94 PHIL. 534 [953-1954]
FACTS:Congress passed RA 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of

1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72% by raising it to 75%.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. There are also others who have sought the reconsideration of
their grades without, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972
ISSUE: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid
RULING:NO. RA No. 972’s objective is to admit to the Bar, candidates who

suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. The
ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to the
Supreme Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license. RA 972 is unconstitutional.
MAIN POINT:
Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
on admission to the Bar. The congress cannot pass a law lowering the passing mark
and declaring the same candidates as having been passed

Admission in the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, Disciplinary powers, and
728.Javellana v. DILG
212 SCRA 475 [1992]
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FACTS:This involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his
profession while employed in the Government. Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an
elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental and that Javellana also
appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city.
City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case against Atty. Javellana
for: (1) violation of DILG Memorandum Circular nos. 80-38 and 90-81 (2) for oppression,
misconduct and abuse of authority. Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose
from the Regional Director. Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
prohibits lawyers who are members of a local legislative body to practice law was
upheld against the challenge that it was an infringement of the power of the Court to
provide rules for pleading, practice, and procedure and the practice of law. Javellana
filed a Motion to dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground that DILG
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the
Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law
Issue: Whether or not Section 90 of LGC is an infringement on the power of SC
RULING: NO. The LGC and DILG memorandum 90-81 simply prescribe rules of
conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their
duties and private practice of their profession.
MAIN POINT: The law must be seen not as a rule on the practice of Law but as a rule
on the conduct of officials intended to prevent conflict of interest. Moreover, even if it
were a rule on the practice of law, as already seen, it would be within the inherent
legislative power of Congress to promulgate.

729.Velez v. De Vera
A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006
FACTS: Atty De Vera was the counsel of Willis who was involved in an accident.
De Vera was authorized for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de
Vera received a check in which he then deposited to his personal account The Hearing
referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended
from the practice of law for three years; Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar
which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California. Atty. de Vera
insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client’s funds as
the latter’s father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that,
unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the
fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he “expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days. Petitioner claims that such information was concealed by the
respondent. Such and other circumstances which the IBP board deems that respondent
is not fit to be a member of the board, hence his removal was sought.
ISSUE: W/N De Vera who was suspended from the practice of law in California
be sanctioned in the PH as a member of PH bar
RULING: NO. The judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign

jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines, although It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own
account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the
noble profession to which he belongs
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MAIN POINT: The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California,
standing alone, is not proof of malpractice. The power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed. Atty De Vera is suspended for 2 years

730. In re letter of UP Law Faculty
644 SCRA 543 [2011]
FACTS: After the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in Vinuya v. ES

Sec, The court formed ethics committee tasked to investigate the alleged plagiarism in
the decision in the mentioned case asserting that the decision came from different
sources were twisted by the ponente (Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid
down in said decision. The authors who were allegedly plagiarized sent their respective
letters to the Supreme Court, noting the misreading and/or misrepresentation of their
articles. In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with
a statement (Restoring Integrity Statement) Said statement was posted online and at
the College’s bulletin board and was submitted to the Supreme Court. The manner in
presenting the arguments and the language used therein, the Court believed, were
inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a
Show Cause Resolution directing 37 respondent law professors to show cause why
they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar
ISSUE: Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution violates respondents’

academic freedom as law professors
RULING: No. Freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be

circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. In cases where
the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of
fair comment and common decency
MAIN POINT: The purpose of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is to enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively
Limits of Power; Simplified and inexpensive procedure for speedy disposition;
Uniform for all courts of the same grade; not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights
731.Bustos v. Lucero
81 PHIL. 648 [1948]
FACTS: The accused filed a motion to the court so that the accused-petitioner
can cross examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony on the strength of the warrant that arrested the accused. The accused,
assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the
justice of peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not,
upon which he pleaded not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present
her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross examined in
the manner and form provided by law the motion was denied, and for that reason the
present special civil action of Mandamus was instituted. Petitioner squarely attacks the
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validity of the provision of section 11, Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the
right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution,
contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an
violation of the SC limitation (to not diminish, increase, or modify substantive right)
RULING: NO. Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law
and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive
rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive
rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system
prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion
MAIN POINT:
The SC’s power is to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, which is a power to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to
their source and discarding old ones.
M
substantive rights
732. PNB v. Asuncion
80 SCRA 321 [1977]
FACTS: PNB granted in favor of respondent Fabar Incorporated various credit

accommodations and advances. All of the credit accommodations are secured by the
joint and several signatures of Jose Ma. Barredo, Carmen B. Borromero and Tomas
Borromeo and Manuel Barredo. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated
demands so PNB filed a case for collection. Before the Case could be decided Manuel
Barred died. The court dismissed the case in view of the death of the defendant and
pursuant to Sec 6 Rule 86 of the RPC. PNB filed a Motion for reconsideration, the court
denied for lack of merit
ISSUE: Whether or not lower court erred in dismissing the motion to reconsider
RULING: YES. The rules laid down in Section 6, Rule 86 of the RPC reveals
that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary
debtor. Article 1216 of NCC provides that “proceed against anyone of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.” The RPC cannot prevail over the NCC,
the former being merely procedural while the latter, substantive
MAIN POINT:
Section 5, Article VIII, provides that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
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substantive rights
733.Fabian v. Desierto
GR 129742, September 16, 1998
FACTS: Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT

Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business with Nestor Agustin.
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin.
Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led
an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself.
But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero. The deputy
ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian
appealed the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not it SC violated Sec 5(5) of Art VIII
RULING: NO. The Court said that what was done was merely procedural
because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law.
The right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or
decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in
a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested
rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.
MAIN POINT:
The test is whether the rule really regulates procedure that is the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure."

substantive rights
734. People v. Lacson
400 SCRA 267 [2003]
FACTS: The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder
for the shooting and killing of eleven men bandied as members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the
respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases, all the
heirs of the victims were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing and
were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven
cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To
apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co
accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair,
reduce, and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple
106 | P a g e
murder. Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover
procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused.
Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 Rule 117 of RPC was meant to reach back in time to
provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to
speedy trial
ISSUE: whether or not the rule should be applied retroactively
RULING: NO. The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both
the State and the accused. The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld
the petitioners’ contention that while Sec. 8 of RPC secures the rights of the accused, it
does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public
justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule
may not be given a retroactive application
MAIN POINT:
the SC must promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts
ARTICLE VIII SEC 5: POWERS OF SUPREME COURT

LIMITS OF POWER: SIMPLIFIED AND INEXPENSIVE PROCEDURE FOR SPEEDY
DISPOSITION; UNIFORM FOR ALL COURTS OF THE SAME GRADE, NOT
DIMINISH, INREASE OR MODIFY SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
735.Planters v. Fertiphil
426 SCRA 414 [2004]
FACTS: Respondent Fertiphil sought refund of the Capital Recovery Component

(CFC) it had paid to Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), pursuant to LOI No. 1465
which was later declared unconstitutional for it remitted the CFC to petitioner’s
rehabilitation. The RTC ruled in favor of Fertiphil. PPI filed an appeal in 1992 but
Fertiphil moved to dismiss it citing as grounds the non-payment of the appellate docket
fee and alleged failure of PPI to prosecute the appeal within a reasonable time. The
case was elevated to the CA, which ruled that although PPI filed its appeal in 1992, the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which required that appellate docket and other lawful
fees should be paid within the same period for taking an appeal, should nevertheless be
followed since it applies to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage.
Hence this petition by PPI.
ISSUE: W/N the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure can be given retroactive effect
and apply to the appeal filed by PPI in 1992.
RULING: NO. As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, hence, retrospective in nature. However, that
retrospective application is allowed if no vested rights are impaired. In the instant case,
at the time PPI filed its appeal in 1992, all that the rules required for the perfection of its
appeal was the filing of a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or
order appealed from, within (15) days from notice thereof, with which PPI complied.
PPI’s appeal was therefore already perfected at that time. Thus, failure to pay the
appellate docket fee when the 1997 Rules of Procedure took effect cannot operate
to deprive PPI of its right, already perfected in 1992, to have its case reviewed on
appeal.
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MAIN POINT: While the right to appeal is statutory, the mode or manner by
which this right may be exercised is a question of procedure, which may be altered
and modified only when vested rights are not impaired.

736.Tan v. Bausch
478 SCRA 115 [2005]
FACTS: Petitioners were accused of distributing and selling counterfeit RAY

BAN sunglasses to the damage and prejudice of respondent Bausch and Lomb, Inc.,
the exclusive owner of trademark RAY BAN on sunglasses. Respondent filed a motion
to transfer the case to Branch 9, RTC, arguing that AO No 113-95 designated the said
branch to handle violations of intellectual property rights, and that AO No 104-96,
pursuant to BP 129, had already transferred exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide
violations of intellectual property rights from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC. Petitioners
contended that the penalty for the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC). The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners but the same was
reversed by the CA. Hence, this petition for review was filed, contending that CA erred
in reversing the correct ruling of the trial court that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
offense of unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisdiction over the crime allegedly committed by
petitioners is vested on the RTC.
RULING: YES. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts. The limitations to this rule-making power are the following: the rules must (a)
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases; (b)
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and (c) not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The transfer of jurisdiction from the MTC and MTCC to the RTC did
not in any way affect the substantive rights of petitioners. The administrative orders did
not change the definition or scope of the crime of unfair competition with which
petitioners were charged.
MAIN POINT: The rule-making power of the Supreme Court is subject to the
following limitations: the rules must (a) provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases; (b) be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
(c) not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

737.Republic v. Gingoyon
478 SCRA 474 [2005]
FACTS: The present case has its roots in Agan v. PIATCO which nullified the
agreement between the Philippine Government and the Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), which authorized PIATCO to build NAIA 3. When the
contracts were nullified, NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were
108 | P a g e
nearing completion. Since then, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of
PIATCO. The Government now seeks to take immediate possession and control over
the NAIA 3 facilities. However, following the 2004 Resolution (Agan), in order for the
government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as
builder of the said structures. The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, which only requires an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary,
should govern the expropriation proceedings. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it
is RA 8974 and its IRR, which had amended Rule 67, that must apply. Under RA 8974,
the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the
filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern
the expropriation proceedings.
RULING: NO. It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply
Rule 67 in lieu of RA 8974. Under Rule 67, it would not be obliged to immediately pay
any amount to PIATCO before it can obtain the writ of possession since all it need do is
deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized government
depositary. PIATCO would then be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just
compensation before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of
possession. Further, the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive
matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did
through the enactment of RA 8974. Section 14 of the Implementing Rules, however
recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on procedural
aspects.
MAIN POINT: In answering the question whether Congress may amend the
Rules of Court, the Court said that since expropriation involves both procedural and
substantive matters, the substantive aspect is always subject to legislation.

738.Camp John Hay v. BIR
GR 172457, December 24, 2008
FACTS: Proclamation No. 420 was issued by then President Ramos to create a
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in a portion of Camp John Hay in Baguio City. Pursuant
to such Proclamation, BIR and BOC issued two issuances which provided the IRR
for the Camp John Hay SEZ. Subsequently, however, Section 3 of the Proclamation (on
applicable incentives, such as tax exemptions, of Special Economic Zones). BOC and
BIR then demanded payment representing CHJ’s duties and taxes, and subjected CHJ
to regular corporate income tax, respectively. CJH filed a declaratory relief and claimed
that the assessment by the BOC was null and void. The OSG contends that the remedy
of declaratory relief is inapplicable because an assessment is not a proper subject of
such petition. CJH alleges that CA No. 55, which proscribes the use of declaratory relief
in cases where a taxpayer questions his tax liability, has already been repealed by the
Rules of Court; thus, the remedy of declaratory relief against the assessment made by
the BOC is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA No. 55 has already been repealed by the Rules of
Court.
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RULING: NO. The failure to incorporate the above proviso [CA No. 55] in section
1, Rule 66, [now Rule 64] is not due to an intention to repeal it but rather to the desire to
leave its application to the sound discretion of the court, which is the sole arbiter to
determine whether a case is meritorious or not. And even if it be desired to incorporate
it in rule 66, it is doubted if it could be done under the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court considering that the nature of said proviso is substantive and not
adjective, its purpose being to lay down a policy as to the right of a taxpayer to contest
the collection of taxes on the part of a revenue officer or of the Government. The power
of taxation being legislative, all incidents are within the control of the Legislature.
MAIN POINT: The Court cannot repeal, modify or alter an act of the Legislature.

PROCEDURE OF SPECIAL COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES EFFECTIVE
UNLESS DISAPPROVED BY SC
739.LBP v. De Leon
GR 143275, September 10, 2002
FACTS: The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) filed separate appeals using different modes from the decision of RTC
of Tarlac, Branch 63, which acted as a Special Agrarian Court. DAR filed a petition for
review while LBP interposed an ordinary appeal. DAR’s petition was given due course,
while LBP’s was dismissed primarily holding that LBP availed of the wrong mode of
appeal. LBP filed for review with SC which held that Section 60 of RA 6657 (The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) is clear in providing petition for review as the
appropriate mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 (the
provision on which LBP bases its argument that ordinary appeal is the correct mode of
appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts) merely makes a general reference to
the Rules of Court and does not prescribe ordinary appeal as the correct way of
questioning decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Hence, LBP filed the instant motion
maintaining that a legislative act like Section 60 of RA 6657 infringes on the exclusive
rule-making power of this Court in violation of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 60 of RA 677 infringes on the exclusive rule-

making power of this Court in violation of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
RULING: NO. Section 60 of RA 6657 is constitutional and does not violate this
Court’s rule-making power. The Rules of Court does not categorically prescribe ordinary
appeal as the exclusive mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that "rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court." Since Section 60 is a special procedure and this
Court has not yet provided for a particular process for appeals from decisions of
agrarian courts, the said section does not encroach on its rule-making power.
MAIN POINT: Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that
"rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."

PROCEDURE OF SPECIAL COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES EFFECTIVE
UNLESS DISAPPROVED BY SC
740.Tan v. COMELEC
110 | P a g e
507 SCRA 352 [2006]
FACTS: COMELEC en banc, in a Joint Resolution, dismissed the petitions filed

by the petitioners Abubakar and Burahan, for Declaration of Failure of Elections
because of the alleged systematic fraud in the Sulu 2004 elections. However, the Joint
Resolution was not concurred in by COMELEC Commissioner Sadain, who signed it
with a note: “Dissenting Opinion to Follow.” Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking
to set aside COMELEC’s Joint Resolution only after they received a copy of the Sadain
Dissenting Opinion, maintaining that the reglementary period to file the petition for
certiorari started to run on the day they received a copy of the Dissenting Opinion,
which completed the Joint Resolution. The timeliness of the petition is now in question.
Under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, when
an extended opinion is reserved, such as that of Sadain, the 30-day reglementary
period starts to run only upon the receipt by the parties of the reserved extended
opinion. However, it contravenes Article IX, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently provides: Sec. 7. x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty [30] days from receipt of a
copy thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was filed on time.
RULING (MAIN POINT IN BOLD & UNDERLINED): NO. As stated in Section 7

of Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution, a decision of COMELEC is considered complete
when there is concurrence by the required majority of the Commissioners, not upon the
submission of a dissenting opinion. Hence they should have filed the petition upon
receipt of the copy of the Joint Resolution. Further, in the case at bar, although Sadain’s
dissenting opinion is an extended reserved opinion, the Court declared that Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 18, COMELEC Rules of Procedure to be unconstitutional. The SC has a
rule-making power provided in Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph (5) —the
constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, the Court exercised
this power and authority in voiding Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 18, COMELEC Rules
of Procedure for contravening Article IX, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

SUPERVISION OVER THE JUDICIARY
741 .Ampong v CSC
563 SCRA 293 [2008]
FACTS: Petitioner Sarah Ampong took and passed the Professional Board
Examination for Teachers (PET) in behalf of Evelyn Decir. At the time of the PBET
examinations, both were public school teachers under the supervision of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) until Ampong transferred to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III. CSC
found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from service.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction.
She contended that at the time the case was instituted on August 23, 1994,
the CSC already lost jurisdiction over her. She was appointed as Interpreter III of the
RTC Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani Province, on August 3, 1993. Petitioner later
elevated the matter to the CA. She insisted that as a judicial employee, it is the
Supreme Court and not the CSC that has disciplinary jurisdiction over her.
ISSUE: Whether or not CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an employee of

the Judiciary for acts committed prior to her appointment to the judiciary.
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RULING: NO. It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil
service. However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. At the time of
commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the administrative supervision
of the DECS and, in taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner
surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When
she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised
examination. That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not
take her case out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court.
MAIN POINT: Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the

Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.
ART VIII SEC 6: SUPERVISION OF COURTS

742.Maceda v. Vasquez
221 SCRA 464 [1993]
FACTS: Respondent alleged that petitioner Maceda, presiding judge of Branch

12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, had falsified his Certificate of Services by
certifying that all civil and criminal cases submitted for decision for a period of 90 days
have been decided, when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been
rendered in some of the civil and criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the SC an
extension of 90 days to decide the aforementioned cases. Petitioner also contends that
the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case since the offense charged arose
from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision
over all inferior courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman may investigate irregularities in the

performance of a judge independently of any administrative action taken by the
Supreme Court.
RULING: NO. Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in
the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. It is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. In the case at bar, in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to the petitioner’s certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
MAIN POINT: Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee
arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said
Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. The
Ombudsman may not investigate a judge independently of any administrative
action of the Supreme Court.
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743.De Vera v. Pelayo
GR 137354, July 6, 2000;
FACTS: Petitioner instituted with the RTC a special civic action to enjoin the
municipal trial court from proceeding with a complaint for ejectment against petitioner.
The trial court, presided by respondent Pelayo, denied petitioner’s application for a
temporary restraining order and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence,
petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint against Judge
Pelayo, accusing him of violating Articles 206 (Unjust interlocutory order) and
207(Malicious delay in the administration of justice) of the Revised Penal Code and
Republic Act No. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT). The Office
of the Ombudsman referred the case to the Court Administrator, Supreme Court.
However, petitioner insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a
judge, it was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme Court to resolve
whether a crime was committed and the judge prosecuted therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal

charges filed against a judge of the regional trial court in connection with his handling of
cases before the court.
RULING: NO. As laid down in the case of In Re: Joaquin Borromeo, the rule is
that, before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205
(knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be entertained, there must first
be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration" that the decision or order in question is
indeed "unjust". The pronouncement may result from either (a) an action of certiorari or
prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment; or (b) an
administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the determination of whether a
judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial
function.
MAIN POINT: No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution
or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision -- whether final and executory or not --
and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative
complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the
courts alone.

744.Judge Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001;
FACTS: Judge Caoibes filed a petition to refer the case filed against him on the
Office of the Ombudsman by private respondent Judge Florentino Alumbres to the
Supreme Court, stating that only the Supreme Court, and not the Office of the
Ombudsman, has jurisdiction over criminal complaints against judges or court
employees arising from their administrative duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on
case No. OMB-0-97-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.
RULING: Yes. As stated in Maceda v. Vasquez, the Ombudsman must defer action on
a criminal complaint against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises from
their administrative duties, and refer the same to this Court for determination whether
113 | P a g e
said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
In the case at hand, two members of the judiciary were entangled in a fight within court
premises over a piece of office furniture. This is pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, stating that the Supreme Court is vested with exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel
745.Judge Fuentes v. Ombudsman, GR 124295, October 23, 2001
FACTS: On January 15, 1996, Director Valenzuela of the Office of the

Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Fuentes be charged before
the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise
be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a judge
for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution the petitioner issued.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent encroached on the power of the Supreme Court
of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a
judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts
before the Supreme Court.
RULING: No. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action. It is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and
court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation of the laws of the land.
MAIN POINT: Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
746.Judge Dolalas v. Ombudsman, 265 SCRA 819 [1996]
FACTS: Petitioner Judge Dolalas, among several others, were charged
administratively by private respondent Benjamin Villarante, Jr. concerning the failure to
resolve a criminal case of alarms and scandals filed against private respondent by
Police Sgt. Salutillo, which, according to him, was in connivance with petitioner judge in
order to discourage the former from instituting a criminal complaint against said police
officers for abuse of authority and police brutality with physical injury.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman may take cognizance of the
complaint against petitioner for purposes of investigation and possible prosecution or
alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
RULING: No. The Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate an

investigation into the alleged undue delay in the disposition of the case as said charge
relates to a judges performance of her official duties over which the Supreme Court has
administrative control and supervision. The complaint against petitioner-judge before
the Office of the Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature.
MAIN POINT: It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and
courts’ personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
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against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
747.Garcia v. Judge de la Pena
299 SCRA 776 [1994]
FACTS: A criminal case for grave oral defamation was filed by Dr. Melencio de la
Peña against Ignacia G. Garcia, petitioner’s wife. Judge Meljohn de la Peña in his
capacity as acting judge of Naval, Leyte’s MTC took cognizance of the criminal case.
He issued a warrant of arrest to petitioner’s wife and was detained for twenty hours
since they cannot process the posting of bail due to respondent judge’s absence as well
as of the Release Order which was unknowingly left with his wife. On June 15, 1992,
they received a copy of the criminal complaint, affidavit of the witnesses and respondent
judge's inhibition order. Petitioner then filed an administrative case against Judge de la
Peña for partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion in connection with
Criminal Case No. 2577 which was filed by the Judge’s brother against his wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge de la Pena should have inhibited
himself from the case considering that the complainant was his brother.
RULING: Yes. His act constitutes partiality in his part, since respondent took
cognizance of the criminal case despite the fact that private complainant is his brother
— a relative within the second degree of consanguinity — in violation of the rule on
compulsory disqualification of judges.
MAIN POINT: Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution vests the Supreme
Court the sole authority to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk.
748. Maningas v. Barcenas, AM P-99-1315, Nov. 3, 1999

FACTS: Clerk of Court Jesusa P. Maningas charged respondent Carlito C.
Barcenas, Court Stenographer III of Branch 26 of said court, with grave misconduct,
insubordination, and conduct unbecoming of a government employee. Petitioner asserts
that the respondent, who was apparently drunk at the time, went amuck and threatened
the petitioner and her companion when his time card was not signed. Petitioner’s action,
or the lack of it, was justified since respondent was reprimanded for absenteeism,
tardiness, habitual drunkenness during office hours, loafing, and deliberate
disobedience to orders of the court. It was then recommended that respondent be
dismissed from the service.
ISSUE: Whether or not such fiasco constitute an action subject to the
administrative oversight of the Supreme Court.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that what transpired during the event is to be
considered as a regular administrative matter. The Court found out that respondent’s
acts simply do not just constitute failure to give due courtesy and respect to his
superiors or to maintain good conduct and behavior, but defiance of the basic norms or
virtues which a government employee must at all times uphold.
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MAIN POINT: Administrative oversight is exercised by the Supreme Court to ensure
that the judges and court employees will adhere to the rules, pursuant to Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
749. Spouses Grospe v. Judge Sandoval, AM RTJ-00-1534, Feb. 15, 2000

FACTS: This is a complaint against respondent Judge Sandoval and another
employee of the court charging them with grave abuse of authority and grave
misconduct. The charge arose from the judgment of respondent judge finding
complainants guilty of indirect contempt, when petitioners failed to present themselves
in court for estafa charges filed against them, and lied about doing so. It is noteworthy
that The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that respondent judge have committed
grave abuse of authority, and was fined for his judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the City Administrator erred in recognizing
the case against respondent judge.
RULING: Yes. The alternative to this case should have been the referral of the
case to the Supreme Court since it has been vested with the ability to oversee
administrative cases filed against court employees and judges.
MAIN POINT: Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution vests the Supreme Court
the sole authority to exercise administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel.
751. Fuentes v. OMB,

GR 124295, October 23, 2001
MAINPOINT:
The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public
officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate
action.
The case is a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the Ombudsman’s
action investigating petitioner for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e).
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence in granting permits. Petitioner alleged respondent encroached on the power
of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
1. WN the Ombudsman may initiate/investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint filed before his office.
No. The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative

complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate
public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.
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Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
752. Adajar v. Develos-

475 SCRA 361 [2005]
MAINPOINT:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
A case for misconduct was filed before the Office of Ombudsman Mindanao
against government employees stationed in RTC Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon
for non fulfillment of an agreement to pay the balance of the jewelry price of petitioner,
Respondent acted in badfaith and committed ill mannered acts to petitioner.
Respondents contend that the acts of respondents Celsa Ellorin and Teresita Develos
being complained of by complainant were not in relation to their functions as court
employees but were in connection with the pecuniary activity of complainant.
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, acting on the complaint for misconduct

filed by herein complainant, rendered a Decision dismissing the administrative case
against herein respondents as well as the counter-complaint filed by the latter against
herein complainant in which the Supreme Court adopted the ruling of Ombudsman.
hence this issue
1. Should Ombudsman Mindanao take cognizance of the instant case?
No. The Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao should not have taken cognizance of
the instant case the same being administrative in nature. Article VIII, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
753. Garcia v. Miro-

582 SCRA 127 [2009]
MAINPOINT:
The Supreme Court’s administrative supervision over all inferior courts and court
personnel, does not extend to a criminal case filed against a judge which is not related
to the performance of his duties as a judge.
The complaint arose from the death of Julieta’s husband, Francisco C. Ortega,
Jr. as a result of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by the
petitioner judge and the motorcycle driven by the deceased. A Criminal case was filed
by petitioner in relation to the performance of duties of the Judge. Office of the
ombudsman conducted investigation on the judge case, hence this issue that it
encroached on the SC power to oversee judges and it employess regarding
administrative case.
1. WN the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a criminal case filed against a judge
which is not related to the official performance as member of the judiciary.
No. The present petition was directly filed in the Supreme Court in utter disregard of
the rule on the hierarchy of courts warranting outright dismissal. The Supreme Court’s
administrative supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, does not extend
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to a criminal case filed against the petitioner which is not related to the performance of
his duties as a judge. However, that prerogative only extends to administrative
supervision.
In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was in no way related to the
performance of his duties as a judge.
754. Escalona v. Padillo,

AM P-10-2785, September 21, 2010
MAINPOINT:
No affidavit of desistance can divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under Section
6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and decide complaints against erring
officials and employees of the judiciary—the issue in an administrative case is not
whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the
employee has breached the norms and standards of the courts.
Complainant Lourdes S. Escalona filed a complaint charging respondent

Consolacion S. Padillo, Court Stenographer III of the RTC of Branch 260, Parañaque
City with Grave Misconduct.
Escalona submitted an Affidavit of Desistance alleging that the P20,000 was

“refunded” to her and this she “voluntarily accepted” in the presence of Florante
Gaerlan, Interpreter of RTC, Branch 119, Pasay City and Erlinda Dineros, Interpreter of
RTC, Branch 260, Parañaque City.
1. WN the withdrawal of the complaint or the desistance of a complainant warrants

the dismissal of an administrative complaint; thus, the Supreme Court can no
longer investigate and decide on the complaints against erring officials and
employees of the judiciary.
No affidavit of desistance can divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under
Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution to investigate and decide complaints against
erring officials and employees of the judiciary—the issue in an administrative case is not
whether the complainant has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the
employee has breached the norms and standards of the courts.
755. In re JBC v. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
MAINPOINT:
“Dishonesty” means “disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity.”
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing
authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications
specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the RTC Davao
City on May 17, 2003. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator
received confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed
against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National
Police Commission as a result of which he was dismissed from the service per
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.
In the Personal Data Sheet submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council on
November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases filed
against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative
case was disclosed by Judge Quitain in his PDS.
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1. WN Judge Quitain deliberately disclosed the dismissal from service by virture of
AO 183, thus, he is disqualified to hold such position.
Yes. Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and
dismissed from the service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995
by no less than the former President of the Philippines.
It is clear that respondent judge deliberately misled the Judicial and Bar Council in his
bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary.
“Dishonesty” means “disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity.”
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing

authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such
circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications
specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution.
756. Kilosbayan v. Ermita,

GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 526 SCRA 353
MAINPOINT:
As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the initial competence to do so.
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through

respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and
incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship.
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by
naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
1. WN JBC is the proper forum for resolving the issue on qualifications of judiciary
members.
Yes. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims
under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue,
even as the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has the initial competence to do so.
It is clear that from the records of the Supreme Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized
Filipino citizen, that is why he was allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath in the first place.
757. Topacio v. Ong,

GR No. 179895, December 15, 2008 574 SCRA 817
MAINPOINT:
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to
the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment; For a quo waranto
petition to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right to the
contested office.
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Ferdinand Topacio via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, to
prevent Justice Gregory Ong from further exercising the powers, duties and
responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, because of his questioned
Filipino citizenship [in relation to Kilosbayan vs Ermita (2007).
1. WN Justice Ong should be ousted from his position because of his citizenship.
RULING:
No, petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the
office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.
758. Republic vs Sereno
Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief

Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents,
among which are “all previous SALNs. SALN of Sereno was found to be lacking.
impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. OSG seeks to oust Sereno
from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of
proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary
under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution
1. Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination

pursuant to the JBC rules.
Yes. Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission
of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave
offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person
aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the
law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt
upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a
public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have
considered Sereno for interview.
759. Chavez v. JBC-

676 SCRA 579 [2012]
MAINPOINT:
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only. JBC’s composition, term and functions are provided under Section 8,
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having
only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC—one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
1. Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow
more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of
having two (2) representatives from each house of Congress with one (1) vote
each sanctioned by the Constitution?
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. JBC’s composition, term and functions are provided under
Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution.
XXX the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the
120 | P a g e
members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in

the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed.
760. De Castro v. JBC

615 SCRA 666 [2010]
MAINPOINT:
Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the Judicial and Bar Council began
the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to
decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to
the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next
steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”
JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be
included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of
them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice, even though the
position is not yet vacant.
1. WN the act of the JBC is subject to judicial determination when it began the
nomination process for the next Chief Justice even though the position is not yet
vacant.
Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the Judicial and Bar Council
began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet
to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or
to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the
next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”
755. Nitafan v. Tan,

152 SCRA 284
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR,
all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
No. imposition of income tax on salaries of judges does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against decrease in salaries. The salaries of members of the
Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Justices and
judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in
government and yet subject to income tax. Such is also true of Cabinet members and all
other employees.
Sec 11.
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756. Vargas v. Rilloraza
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth
Act 682, which provides among others that it authorizes the appointment of members of
supreme court who do not possesses qualifications as provided in constitution, and
removes from office the member of the supreme courts by means of impeachment.
1. W/N sec 14 of CA 682 is constitutional?
No. Court ruled that No act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution can
become a law. For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an
actual removal of the disqualified Justice from his office for were it not for section 14 of
the People’s Court Act there would have been an uninterrupted continuity in the tenure
of the displaced Justice and in his exercise of the powers and fulfillment of the duties
appertaining to his office, saving only proper cases of disqualification under Rule 126.
What matters here is not only that the Justice effected continue to be a member of the
court and to enjoy the emoluments as well as to exercise the other powers and fulfill the
other duties of his office, but that he be left unhampered to exercise all the powers and
fulfill all the responsibilities of said office in all cases properly coming before his court
under the constitution, again without prejudice to proper cases of disqualification under
Rule 126. Any statute enacted by the legislature which would impede him in this
regard simply cannot become a law.
757. De la Liana v. Alba,

112 SCRA 294
BP 129 was enacted, titled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds therefor and for Other Purposes” De la Llana is a judge that would be removed
from his position because of this law, so he assailed the validity of this law, because
according to him, it goes against the constitutional provision on the security of tenure of
incumbent justices and judges. it was held that B.P. 129 was a valid reorganization law,
and that, therefore, the abolition of then existing judicial offices did not violate security of
tenure.
1. W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional since it collides with security of tenure among

judges
No. What involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and
justices from their services. But the validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
758. People v. Judge Gacott,

246 SCRA 52
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC
Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The
respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for
gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.
His Honor relies on the second sentence of Section 11, Article VIII of the present
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Constitution which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts and not the second division.
1. Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to

administratively discipline respondent judge
Yes. it was held that the first clause in the said section is a declaration of the grant of
the disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof
by, the Court en banc. It did not intend that all administrative disciplinary cases should
be heard and decided by the whole Court. The second clause, intentionally separated
from the first by a comma, declares that the Court en banc may order their dismissal by
a vote of a majority”. Thus, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are
specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc.
Doctrine: a decision en banc is needed only when:
1. Dismissal of a judge’
2. Disbarment of a lawyer
3. Suspension of either for >1 yr or fine exceeding 10,000 pesos
765. Lumapas v. Tamin
Gregorio Limpot Lumapas charged respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin with

grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law for failure to issue a writ of
execution of the final and executory judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 31820. He also
claimed that it was indefiance with this Court's Resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519
dated June 27, 2000 wherein respondent was ordered to pay a fine for failing to fulfill
the ministerial duty of issuing a writ of execution in the above-stated case and to obey
the writ of mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals relative thereto.
1. W/N Tamin could be held accountable for refusing the writ of mandamus issued
by CA?
Yes. SC held that respondent had no option but to obey the writ of mandamus
issued by the CA and to issue the writ of execution his refusal to obey being "a clear
violation of the order of, and a manifest disrespect towards a court of superior
jurisdiction."
The delay in the execution of the Court of Appeals' decision, despite its having attained
finality as early as March 13, 1995, works great injustice to the complainant. It is an
injustice that this Court cannot countenance. Indeed, it is frustrating for the complainant
to be declared that he possesses the legal right to occupy a piece of land and have that
same right trampled upon by respondent. If the people believed that they cannot expect
justice from the courts, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. Courts exist to promote justice. The
adage that justice delayed is justice denied finds particular application in this case.
766. In re Judge Manzano
Judge Manzano was designated member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial

Committed on Justice by the Provincial Governor. The function of the committee is to
receive complaints and make recommendations towards the speedy disposition of
cases of detainees, particularly those who are poor.
1. May the Judge accept the designation?
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No. the committee performs administrative functions, i. e., functions which “involve
the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
welfare band the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of
the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic
law of existence.
767. Macalintal v. PET,

G.R. No. 191618, Nov. 23, 2010
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s
decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the
respondent PET as constitutional. petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-
judicial power and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII
of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
1. W/N the contention of petitioner that PET is unconstitutional for exercising judicial
powers?
No. It is beyond cavil of the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. The PET is
an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the SC.
The SC’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
through the PET, is derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
constitution.
768. Consing v. Ca
BERNAS: The purpose of the certification required under this section is to ensure
implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the SC and lower
collegiate courts such as the CA, Sandiganbayan and CTA, are reached after
consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc or in division before the case
is assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing. The absence of certification,
however, would not have the effect of invalidating the decision. It would only serve as
evidence of failure to observe certification requirement and may be basis for holding
the official responsible for the omission to account therefor.
Plaintiffs-petitioners filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against a

defendant for taking the possession of Haciendas Aida and Fe despite a contract for
sub-lease executed between the former as sub-lessee and the latter’s father as sub-
lessor. Petitioners first raise the issue of the Court of Appeals' non-compliance with the
certification requirement under Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
1. W/N failure of compliance with the necessary certification would render the
judgement ineffectual?
No. [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of
the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification
requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission to
account therefor [See I Record of the Constitutional Commission 460]. Such
absence of certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
The certification requirement, however, is a new provision introduced by the framers

of the 1987 Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the
constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate
124 | P a g e
courts, such as the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, are
reached after consultation with the members of the court sitting en banc or in a
division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing. The
decision is thus rendered by the court as a body and not merely by a member
thereof [I Record of the Constitutional Commission 498-500], This is in keeping with
the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after
deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required
majority vote.
769. Air France v. Carrascoso
Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that

left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager
of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was
occupying because there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better
right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be
expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body; a commotion ensued.
Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
the issues properly laid before it.
1. W/N should the Court review the case of the findings of CA?
No. it is settled that A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is

open to direct attack. The law, however A decision is not to be so clogged with details
such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of
Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said
court to withhold therefrom "any specific - finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense". Because, as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so
requires". Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same
contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution".
770. People v. Bravo
Mario Bravo was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the death of his mother-in-law.
He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He assails the validity of
the decision because it does not contain “the facts of the case for or against and only of
selected facts in favor of a party.” It is argued that this is unconstitutional.
1. W/N the Court erred in making its decision
No. the court did not find it has been violated in the challenged decision. It is for the
judge to determine from the narration of facts, relevant or irrelevant, and the assertions
by the parties, truthful or not, what actually happened in the case before him. Judge
Dizon did this when he made what the appellant calls a “selective finding of facts.” Of
course, it had to be selective. That is how a trial judge separates the chaff from the
grain, extracts the truth from the mass of conflicting claims, and determines the basis of
the decision he will have to make.
771. Hernandez v. CA
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In this case, petitioner purchased several pieces of expensive jewelries from de
Leon and paid post-dated checks. These checks were either drawn against insufficient
funds or closed accounts. RTC convicted the petitioner of estafa and violation of BP blg.
22 (5 cases of estafa & 4 cases of BP 22 violation). CA affirmed RTC decision in 8
cases but acquitted the petitioner in one estafa case. Petitioner filed this petition
alleging that CA violated sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution.
In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as summarized
in the Appellee’s Brief are as follows:" and then quoted in full the statement of facts of
the Solicitor General. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own
"independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by
the advance party.
1. W/N the court erred in adopting 3rd party opinion
What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented
by the Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The constitutional mandate only
requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no
proscription against the court’s adoption of the narration of facts made in the briefs or
memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words. Precisely,
briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions.
SC dismissed petition and affirmed CA decision.
772. Francisco v. Permskul
The decision simply said:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case ,
this court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decision of the MTC of Makati, MM Branch 63 and finds that there is
no cogent reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
1. W/N this sufficient compliance with Art. 8, sec 14?
RULING: The purpose of this requirement is to inform the person reading the decision,
and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the
pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.
There are various reasons for this:
1. to assure the parties tthat the judge studied the case;

2. to give the losing party opportunity to analyze the decision and possibly appeal
or, alternatively convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the
verdict in good grace
3. to enrich the body of case law, especially if the decision is from the Supreme
Court.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be
sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional
condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where
the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by the judge
and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple
litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously
126 | P a g e
groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it. However, this
ruling is not to be applied retroactively to this case at bar.
773. People v. Landicho
Judgment promulgated by RTC was challenged to be a nullity because:
I. In holding that the crime of murder was committed despite absence of proof of its
essential elements;
II. In holding the appellant guilty despite lack of evidence against him;
III. In appreciating the aggravating circumstance of band;
IV. In holding that the appellant and his co-accused had escaped and such escape
indicated an admission of guilt;
V. In not making a finding as to what part of the testimony of the witnesses it considered
believable.
The dispositive portion reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals, of the crime of Murder, defined under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code
and penalized therein by re-clusion temporal in its maximum period, to death, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and with the ordinary aggravating circumstance of
the crime having been committed by a band and advantage having been taken of
superior strength. Considering that there are two ordinary aggravating circumstances
and no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty that accused must suffer should be
the maximum period of the penalty provided by law. Considering, however, the abolition
of the death penalty under the Constitution of 1987, the hands of the Court are tied in
imposing the supreme penalty of death.
Consequently, all the accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
Accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the legal heirs of the victim
Isagani Mazon the amount of P50,000.00 by way of actual and compensatory damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
1. W/N the court complied with the req set foth by sec 14, art 8 consti?
Yes. The challenged decision substantially complied with the requirements of both
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
The pertinent disquisitions therein, as well as its dispositive portion, readily show such
compliance. It sets out the facts which it believed were proved and the law upon which
the judgment was based, and states the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by
the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the
penalty imposed, and the civil liability.
774. People v. Co
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 93-118519 finding appellant Anthony Ong
Co guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No.
6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000.00, with costs.
The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution’s evidence for being so “positive,
convincing, and satisfactory” that the appellant’s “denial and explanation cannot prevail
and overwhelm” such evidence.
127 | P a g e
Yes. SC not convinced by the appellant’s claim that the impugned decision is void
for being violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. Although the said
decision consists only of four pages of legal-size bond paper, SC found it to have fully
complied with the constitutional requirement. It clearly and distinctly expresses the facts
and the law upon which the judgment is based. It contains a faithful summary of the
evidence for the prosecution and of the testimony of the appellant; states the law
applicable, which is Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended; and after ruling that the
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) sold by the appellant to the poseur-buyer
belongs to the amphetamine group of regulated drugs, sentences him accordingly.
775. People v. Macoy
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC, Cebu City convicting accused-
appellant Lyndon Macoy of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Paul Ocampo. Accused-appellant
contends that the trial court’s decision has no basis in law or in fact.
This is not true. The decision states the facts found by the court. The fact that the
case law supporting it is not cited does not make the decision any less valid since it is
implicit in the discussion of the evidence that discussion is made in the context of the
law. Elucidation of the grounds of the decision would have been helpful in
understanding it, but the want of this attribute does not militate against its validity.
In sum, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors
against it. In the case at bar, the fact that accused-appellant is able to assign errors
against the decision of the trial court is proof that the trial court’s decision contains
findings and conclusions of law on which it is based.
776. ABD v. NLRC
In an illegal dismissal case the NLRC issued its order stating
“After a careful perusal of the records of the case, We agree with the POEA
Administrator findings and conclusion th(a)t the transferee agency, ABD must assume
full and complete responsibility to the contractual obligation of the principal, M.S. Al
Babtain Recruitment Office to the complainant who was recruited by MARS.
Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA Rules and Regulation provides:[7] x x x
It is clear from the aforementioned provision of the POEA Rules and Regulation that the
transferee agency shall assume full and complete responsibility to all contractual
obligations of the principals to its workers originally recruited and processed by its
former agency.
In the case at bar, respondent ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation(,) being the
transferee agency(,) must assume (the) full liability of the principal, M.S. Al Babtain(,) to
the complainant originally recruited and process(ed) by its former agency(,) Mars
International Manpower Inc.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the POEA Administrator.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion for Reconsideration

is dismissed for lack of merit.
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SO ORDERED.”
1. W/N the order sufficient?
RULING: Section 13, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides as
follows:
“SEC. 13. Form of Decision/Resolution/Order. – The Decision/ Resolution shall state
clearly and distinctly the findings of facts, issues and conclusions of law on which it is
based and the relief granted, if any. If the decision or resolution involves monetary
awards, the same shall contain the specific amount awarded as of the date the decision
is rendered.” This provision of the Rules is obviously in consonance with Section 14,
In this case, the NLRC left petitioner “in the dark” by its failure to discuss why the facts it
pointed out in its memorandum on appeal would not affect the unqualified application of
Section 6, Rule I, Book III of the POEA Rules. It is possible that the NLRC fully believed
that said rule should be applied literally. This should not, however, have given premium
to brevity in its resolution to the point that the very underpinnings for a party’s appeal to
it would be completely disregarded and left unresolved.
As this Court declared, “brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and
cannot be substituted for substance.” The need for a clear dissertation on the issues
raised on appeal was underscored in Francisco v. Permskul. In said case, although the
Court upheld the validity of Section 40 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 120, allowing the
rendition of memorandum decisions, especially in appealed cases, it nevertheless still
desirable that the appellate judge exert some effort in restating in his own words the
findings of fact of the lower court and presenting his own interpretation of the law
instead of merely parroting the language of the court a quo as if he cannot do any
better. There must be less intellectual indolence and more pride of authorship in the
writing of a decision, especially if it comes from an appellate court.
777. People v. Gastador
Appellant Antonio Gastador seeks the reversal of the Decision of the RTC of
Quezon City , which convicted him of rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
The defense argues that the assailed Decision is not valid because it was based on the
prosecution's memorandum, not on the trial court's own determination of the facts.
The appeal is without merit. The assailed Decision sufficiently complies with
Section 14 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and Section 2, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court. Both of these provisions require that decisions clearly state how the
court reached its conclusion in light of the applicable law and the facts established.
True, the trial court quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum, but it
did make its own findings. After assessing the evidence presented, it agreed with the
prosecution's evaluation of the case. This is sufficient compliance with the Constitution
and the Rules of Court. In any event, the conclusions of the trial court are supported by
the evidence on record.
778. People v. Ordonez

Please help, cannot find this case online, must be wrong title??
What the GR directs me is the GR of People vs Orbita
779. People v. Orbita
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Accused-appellant Federico Orbita was charged with the crime of Rape of
Marijoy Sumapang. He argues that the decision of the court a quo because it violates
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution
The SC held the assailed decision substantially compliant with the constitutional
mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. The decision contains a summary
of the evidence for both the prosecution and the defense, findings of facts as well as an
application of case law. The decision states, thus:
“Upon a careful study of the entire records and evidence, this Court finds that there is
no dispute that Marijoy Sumagpang, a mental retardate, was raped. At the time she was
sexually ravaged, Marijoy was twenty years of age albeit her mental state is that of a
nine year and three month old child. The real issue then is whether or not accused
Federico Orbita raped her.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the evidence convinces the Court with moral certainty that Marijoy
Sumagpang was sexually ravaged by the accused. The victim Marijoy Sumagpang was
unequivocal in stating that while she was at the residence of the accused on April 14,
1995, the latter kissed her on the lips, embraced her, removed her clothes and her
panty, and thereafter inserted his penis on (sic) her vagina. The ravishment of the victim
is confirmed by the report of Dr. Poblete that there was evidence of vaginal penetration;
that there was a slight bleeding (droplet) coming from the vaginal os and that there was
a hymenal laceration at 6:00 o'clock and also at the right parihymenal, that is, on the
sidings of the hymen.
It is a rule that (sic) in rape cases that sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived
of reason constitutes rape (People vs. Estrebella, 124 SCRA 114). This is because
while, as in this case, the woman may be twenty years of age, her mental capacity is
that of a nine year and three month old child. Hence, she is incapable of giving consent
to the sexual intercourse. (People vs. Sunga, 137 SCRA 131). The necessity of proof
beyond reasonable doubt of force or intimidation having been applied is absent.”
(emphasis supplied)
780. Lorbes vs CA HAHAHA no invovlment of sec 14, art 8. Plss help
It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale conveying the mortgaged
property in favor of private respondent Cruz in which petitioners claimed that the deed
was merely a formality to meet the requirements of the bank for the housing loan, and
that the real intention of the parties in securing the loan was to apply the proceeds
thereof for the payment of the mortgage obligation. They alleged that the deed of sale
did not reflect the true intention of the parties.
1. whether respondent court erred in ruling that the trial court’s decision violates
the constitutional requirement that it should clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based.
No. SC holds the Court of Appeals clearly complied with

the constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it was based.
781. People vs Mendoza
Facts:
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Zaldy Mendoza was convicted for the crime of robbery with homicide and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Mendoza filed an MR with the SC stating that the decision was defective for 1.) being
decided beyond the 90 day period granted by law, 2.) that the Trial Court motu proprio
amended its decision, and 3.) that the one paragraph decision did not conform to the
requirements of a decision under law.
(in case judge asks for the details, changes are in bold. First decision: WHEREFORE,
the accused Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide and is hereby punished with imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua to Death, to pay the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 as actual
damages and to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00.
Second decision:
WHEREFORE, the accused Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, is punished with
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to pay the heirs of the victim Seventy-Five
Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and to pay civil indemnity of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.17 )
Issues: Whether or not the assailed decision is defective? NO.
Ruling:
1.) The failure to decide cases within the ninety-day period required by law merely
constitutes a ground for administrative liability against the defaulting judge which
may take the form of dismissal, forfeiture of benefits and privileges, or fine, but it does
not make a judgment a nullity.
2.) Neither did the court motu proprio modify its ruling. Mendoza filed a motion for
reconsideration resulting in the modification of the penalty. The court has the residual
jurisdiction to correct the error in imposing the penalty.
3.) As to the amended decision being a nullity, a perusal of the decision shows that the
court substantially met with the requirements of a valid decision being a.) that it states
the crime committed by the accused along with accompanying circumstances, b.)
participation of accused as principal, accomplice or accessory, c.) the penalty,
and d.) the civil liabilities of the accused. While the decision complies with the
above, the dispositive portion was defective as it did not mention the law the accused
was convicted for, and the penalties. However, the court properly amended it upon the
motion for reconsideration filed by the accused appelant. Thus, a supplementory
order may be attached to an original order to properly meet the requirements of
law with regard to decisions of the court.
782. Asia Traders vs CA
Facts:
Cabever Realty Corporation filed an ejectment case against Eduardo Cua before the
MTC. It ruled against Cua ordering him to vacate the property. He appealed to the RTC
and posted a bond. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC and ordered Cua to
release the bond, but he failed to do so.
Thus a writ of execution was filed against the bond. Asia Traders Insurance, (one who
issued the bond for cua) applied all the way up to the SC, but the decision in question in
131 | P a g e
this case is the MR which was denied by the CA. Instead of the usual paragraphed
disposition, the CA decided in bullet points in the following manner: (just say it was
bulleted in 4)
“As to substance, the material allegations and arguments in the petition are not
substantiated.
First. The bond filed in Court is in a printed form of petitioner. While petitioner submitted
a sample copy of another bond, Bond No. 6 (16) -1442, it remains clear that both bonds
are printed forms of petitioner.
Second. The alleged genuine bond of petitioner does not have the signature of General
Manager Susana Fong, hence, no comparison can be made with the subject bond,
which bears the signature of Ms. Fong. More importantly, there is no affidavit executed
by Ms. Fong that her signature appearing on Bond No. 0062 is falsified.
Third. It is not denied that there is a Supreme Court clearance attached to Bond No.
0062 which lends credence to the presumption that the ordinary course of business has
been followed. There is no evidence that such clearance or certification is spurious.
Fourth. Petitioner's bare allegation that the series number in Bond No. 0062 is not the
series used by them is unsupported by any proof. A sworn statement by the Bond
Manager or responsible officer could have been more credible.
In short, We fail to see any grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent judge in
ruling against petitioner re the subject bond.
For certiorari to lie there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both
civil law and common law traditions. “
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the CA in the MR is valid? Yes.
Ruling
The court is unable to see how the assailed decision failed to state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law of the case. The court recited point by point its findings of fact,
followed by the applicable legal conclusion. Asia traders itself was able to point out and
discuss in its petition each of the four findings of the CA. Thus, a point by point
discussion followed by a legal conclusion is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of law
for a decision of a court.
783. Tichangco vs Enriquez
Facts:
Peittioner appealed a decision of the CA claiming that there were no grounds to initiate
proceedings to nullify titles 820 and 7477 including their subsequent titles.
Issues: Whether or not the VA complied with the requirements of a decision? Yes
Ruling:
There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when the CA states
that the questions raised are factual, or have already been passed upon, or cites some
oher legal basis. The CA decision contains the necessary necessary antecedents to
warrant its conclusions. The CA cannot be said to have withheld any specific finding of
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facts. What the law insists on is a decision that states the “essential ultimate facts.”
784. Ceferina Lopez Tan vs Antazo
Facts:
Spouses Antazo are owners of a land. A case for accion reinvidicatoria was docketed by
the Antazos against Tan for encroaching on their properties. The RTC ruled in favor of
the Antazos. The dispositive portion read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
A. That the defendant encroached on the property of the plaintiffs by 114 square
meters.
B. The defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the 114 square meters of the plaintiffs'
property illegally occupied by the defendant and to turn over its full possession
and ownership in favor of the plaintiffs. To remove the fence constructed on the
encroached area.
C. The plaintiffs are awarded attorney's fees in the amount of 50,000 pesos.[2]
Issue: Issues: Whether or not the VA complied with the requirements of a decision? Yes
Ruling:
After perusing the trial court's decision, we find that the assailed decision substantially
complied with the constitutional mandate. While the decision is admittedly brief, it
however contains all factual bases to support its conclusion. The first two (2)
paragraphs of the decision established the ownership of respondents through
certificates of title. The fact of encroachment was proven by the relocation survey
conducted by the geodetic engineer, which the trial court found to be credible. The trial
court held that these evidence are more than sufficient to prove two matters--ownership
by respondents and encroachment by petitioner.
Petitioner herself disproved the absence of the required statements. She questioned
the trial court's appreciation of her arguments and defenses; the sufficiency of evidence
to prove encroachment; and the existence of a clear title to the alleged encroached
properties in Errors (I), (II), and (III). Errors (IV), (V), and (VI) pertain to legal questions
such as whether there was violation of forum-shopping; whether the award of attorney's
fees is proper; and the validity of the counterclaims
785. Donnina Haley vs Printwell
Facts:
The petitioner was an incorporator and original director of Business Media Philippines,
Inc. (BMPI). Printwell engaged in commercial and industrial printing. BMPI
commissioned Printwell for the printing of the magazine Philippines, Inc. (together with
wrappers and subscription cards) that BMPI published and sold. For that purpose,
Printwell extended 30-day credit... accommodations to BMPI. BMPI paid only
P25,000.00, Printwell sued BMPI on January 26, 1990 for the collection of the unpaid
balance of P291,342.76 in the RTC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Printwell,
rejecting the allegation of payment in full of the subscriptions in view of an irregularity in
the issuance of the ORs and observing that the defendants had used BMPI's corporate
133 | P a g e
personality to evade payment and create injustice
Petitioner now comes to the SC claiming that the RTC merely copied the memorandum
of Printwell in writing its decision, and did not analyze the records on its own, thereby
manifesting a bias in favor of Printwell, is unfounded.
Issues:
Whether or not the VA complied with the requirements of a decision? Yes
Ruling:
Haley's petition for review merely generally alleges the decision of the RTC "copied
verbatim the allegations of herein Respondents in its Memorandum before the said
court," as if "the Memorandum was the draft of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig," but fails to specify either the portions allegedly lifted verbatim from the
memorandum, or why she regards the decision as copied. The omission renders the
petition for review insufficient to support her contention, considering that the mere
similarity in language or thought between Print well's memorandum and the trial
court's decision did not necessarily justify the conclusion that the RTC simply
lifted verbatim or copied from the memorandum.
It is to be observed in this connection that a trial or appellate judge may

occasionally view a party's memorandum or brief as worthy of due consideration
either entirely or partly. When he does so, the judge may adopt and incorporate in
his adjudication the memorandum or the parts of it he deems suitable, and yet
not be guilty of the accusation of lifting or copying from the memorandum. This is
because of the avowed objective of the memorandum to contribute in the proper
illumination and correct determination of the controversy. Nor is there anything
untoward in the congruence of ideas and views about the legal issues between
himself and the party drafting the memorandum. The frequency of similarities in
argumentation, phraseology, expression, and citation of authorities between the
decisions of the courts and the memoranda of the parties, which may be great or
small, can be fairly attributable to the adherence by our courts of law and the
legal profession to widely know nor universally accepted precedents set in earlier
judicial actions with identical factual milieus or posing related judicial dilemmas.
786. Flores vs Montemayor
Facts:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated August 25, 2010
setting aside the October 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the
Decision dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581,
which found the respondent administratively liable for failure to declare in his 2001 and
2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive cars registered in
his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8
(A) of R.A. No. 6713. The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal from service on respondent, with all accessory penalties.
One of the grounds assailed by the petitioner is as follows:
Respondent's constitutional right to due process was violated due to non conformance
to section 14 of article 8 of the constitution.
Issue:
134 | P a g e
Whether or not the VA complied with the requirements of a decision? Yes
The relevant consideration is not the brevity of the above disquisition adopting fully the
findings and recommendation of the PAGC as the investigating authority. It is rather the
fact that the OP is not a court but an administrative body determining the liability of
respondent who was administratively charged, in the exercise of its disciplinary authority
over presidential appointees.
In the case of Solid Homes, the court ruled:
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to
decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a[t] bar. Said section
applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled
"Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the
judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that
decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige[d] to meet the
requirements under Section 14, Article VIII. ]]
the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;" and that the decision be
rendered "in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered." Note that there is no
requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is
grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the
parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process
requirement is satisfied.
787. Reiting Solid Homes v Laserna
Facts:
Evelina Laserna entered into a contract to sell with Solid Homes. Upon paying 90% of
the purchase price they demanded the delivery of the deed of sale with the TCT. Solid
Homes failed to comply with the demands.
Laserna filed a complaint with the HLURB. They lost. On appeal the HLURB
commissioner granted the petition and ordered solid homes to execute the deed of sale
with TCT. Solid homes appeals and the Office of the President affirms the ruling. Solid
Homes appeals to the CA.
Solid homes now questions that the decision of the Office of the President
alleging that it merely adopted by reference the decision of the HLURB without a
recitation of the facts and law on which it was based.
Issue: W/N Decision by OP violated Section 14 Article VII? No.
Ruling:
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to
decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section
applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled
"Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the
135 | P a g e
judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that
decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet the
requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.
The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the
constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied.34 In the landmark case
of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative
proceedings, as follows:
1.) Right to a hearing, 2.) Evidence must be considered 3.) Decision must have
something to support itself, 4.) Evidence must be substantial 5.) Decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing 6.) Tribunal, body or its judges must
act on their own independent consideration of the law 7.) The board or body should
render its decisio ni na manner that the parties can know the issues involved and the
reason for the decision rendered.
788. People vs Escober
Facts:
Escober along with other persons were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide. The Trial Court found them guilty. He filed an appeal questioning the
constitutionality of the decision of the judge claiming that it fails to meet the
requirements of a decision under the constitution
Issue:W/N Decision violated Section 14 Article VII? Yes.
Ruling:
The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize
and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information
were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported this
conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was
allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions
consist of or what "vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He
also found the crime to have been attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty,
nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others," but did not particularly
state the factual bases for such findings.
789. Nicos vs CA
FACTS:A petition was filed against the CA for its decision against the petitioner for not
clearlystating the facts anddistinctively referencing the law to which it based was based.
The assailed decision is as follows:
ORDER
Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino
P. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other
defendants did not file their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very
evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the Sheriff's Auction Sale conducted on July 11,
1983 was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under which
the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it appearing from the
allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's pleading and likewise from plaintiff Carlos
Coquinco's own testimony that his cause is actually-against the other officers and
136 | P a g e
stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial Corporation ". . . for the purpose of
protecting the corporation and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests
in the corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and devices of
the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon them by
the stockholders . . ." a subject matter not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court,
the court finds the same to be impressed with merit.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The Defendants' respective
counterclaims are likewise dismissed.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is dissolved and set aside.4
(Note: The decision does not clearly substantiate its findings and merely states
observations)
Ruling:
The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter
and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor
of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its
action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision
that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to
the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a
higher tribunal.
790. People v Viernas

FACTS:An appeal for the crime of murder was filed Viernas and others. That there were
errors inthe findings of the lower court with regards to theory of conspiracy among the
accused.
ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court followed the constitutional requirements in coming
up with itsdecision.
RULING:No. The court concluded that its decision did not contain any findings of fact
which areessential in decision-making.
MAIN POINT:No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
137 | P a g e
791. People vs Bugarin
FACTS: An appeal was place against the decision made by the Quezon City RTC in
indicting Bugarinof four counts of consummated rape and one count of attempted rape.
On the basis that the TrialCourt was not able to state the facts and law upon which its
decision was based.

Ruling:
The decision of the trial court falls short of this requirement in at least three respects.
First, it does not contain an evaluation of the evidence of the parties and a
discussion of the legal questions involved. It does not explain why the trial court
considered the complainant's testimony credible despite the fact that, as accused-
appellant points out, complainant could not remember the time of the day when she was
allegedly raped. It does not explain why accused-appellant's licking of complainant's
genital constituted attempted rape and not another crime.
Second, the complainant testified that she had been raped five times, to wit, in
November 1989, on December 24, 1989, in June 1990, on March 14, 1991, and on
December 23, 1991, and that once, on January 17, 1992, she was molested by her
father who licked her private part, for which reason six informations were filed against
him, but the decision found the accused-appellant guilty of only four counts of rape
(which the trial court erroneously said three counts) and one count of attempted rape,
without explaining whether accused-appellant was being acquitted of one charge of
rape.
Third, the decision is so carelessly prepared that it finds the accused-appellant
guilty of three counts of consummated rape but sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua "for each of the four counts of . . . rape."
792. People vs Nadera
FACTS:
Theaccused-appellant was convicted by the trial court of raping his daughters.
Suchdecision was decided solely on his guilty plea before the court, without attempting
or justifying theguilty plea.
Issue:
Whether or not it is sufficient to render judgment solely on the guilty plea of the
accused without explanation for such.
Ruling:
No. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is
thesole basis of the judgment. In arriving with a decision, the judge shall clearly and
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distinctly provide a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the
law upon which the judgment is based.
793. Madrid vs CA
FACTS: Madrid and his co-accused was charged with homicide for the killing of Angel
Sunido onMay of 1992. This judgment was made by the CA in Cagayan. Now, a petition
for review is placedagainst the said decision because it did not satisfy the constitutional
standard of clear and distinct articulation of the facts and law.
ISSUE: W/N Decision violated Section 14 Article VII? Yes.
RULING:
First. The trial court's decision, for all its length - 23 pages - contains no analysis of the
evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusion. It
contains nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both
parties. The only discussion of the evidence can be found in 3 paragraphs
The decision does not indicate what the trial court found in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses to consider the same "straightforward" when, as will presently be
shown, they are in fact contradictory and confused. Nor does the decision contain any
justification for the appreciation of aggravating circumstances against the accused,
much less some basis for finding conspiracy among them.
Second. The Court of Appeals sustained petitioner's conviction on the strength of the
testimonies given by Remedios and Merdelyn Sunido. No independent evidence,
however, incriminating petitioner on the death of Arsenio Sunido has been presented by
the prosecution. Although they claimed that petitioner held the victim's right hand while
Arsenio stabbed him, their testimony should have been given the strictest scrutiny in
view of the fact that Remedios and Merdelyn Sunido are the wife and daughter,
respectively, of the victim.[31]
794. Yao vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner, Yao, and Roxas were charged of conspiracy for selling fluorescent
lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making
them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters. They were convicted and
appealed their decision. They state as their grounds the invalidity of the memorandum
decision issued by the court as it was in violation of Section 14 Article VII
ISSUE: W/N Decision violated Section 14 Article VII? Yes.
Ruling:
The RTC issued a memorandum decision however it failed to meet the requirements
provided by law:
xxx In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40

of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision.
It is an additional condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be
resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both
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parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal
complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws
involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations
only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously
groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell
short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly
hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing
and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be
done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.
We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision
because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco v.
Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision
or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for
resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.[33]
795. People vs Dumaging
FACTS: Accused-appellant, Dumaguing, was charged with the crime of qualified rape
against his daughter. As the crime committed is punished by death, it was brought to the
Supreme Court by automatic review. The court then reviewed the decision made by the
lower court
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court complied with theconstitutional requirements
prescribed inSection 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: No. This Court is disturbed by the fact that the decision of the trial court now
subject of automatic review failed to include a statement of facts or at least a summary
of the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The Information upon which the accused was arraigned is not cited
nor quoted in the trial court's decision, which failed to state distinctly the acts allegedly
committed by the accused constituting the crime. The trial court simply stated that the
accused is guilty of rape of his own daughter and that the evidence for the prosecution
is not controverted by the accused without mentioning the evidence the prosecution
presented in court.
It is an element of due process that the litigants are accurately informed of the evidence
considered by the court and the evidentiary weight accorded thereto in reaching the
legal conclusions that define the outcome of the case.[17] Every judgment of conviction
must be based on the findings of facts by the trial court according to its appreciation of
the evidence on record.[18] The trial judge is hereby admonished for her failure to
comply with the Rules regarding the form and contents of judgments.
796. Ong Chiu Kwan v. CA
FACTS: An information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court(MTC) of Bacolod City,
charging petitioner, Ong Chiu Kwan with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires,
water pipes and telephone lines of Crazy Feet,
TheMTC found petitioner guilty of unjust vexation, and sentenced him to imprisonment
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court(RTC)Bacolod City, simplistically adopted the
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decision of the lower court in toto, without stating the reasons for doing so.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court complied with the constitutional requirements
prescribed in Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: No. The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the
Court of Appeals affirmed peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial
Court merely quoted the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added two
paragraphs.
Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it

cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court.
The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own.[16]
797. Spouses Yu Eng Cho vs CA
Facts: A complaint for damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents Pan
American World Airways, Inc.(Pan Am), Tourist World Services, Inc. (TWSI), Julieta
Canilao (Canilao),and Claudia Tagunicar (Tagunicar) for expenses incurred such as
costs of tickets and hotel accommodations where petitioners were compelled to stay in
HongKong and then in Tokyo by reason of the non-confirmation of their booking with
PanAm.The RTC (of Manila)held the defendants liable. Only respondents Pan Amand
Tagunicar appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Trial court's finding of facts appeared to be a summary of testimonies of the witness
and the documentary evidence of the parties.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the RTC complied with the constitutional
requirement prescribed in Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution?
Ruling:
No The trial court’s finding of facts is but a summary of the testimonies of thewitnesses
and the documentary evidence by the parties. It did not distinctly and clearly setforth,
nor substantiate, the factual and legal basisfor holding respondents TWSI, Pan Am
andTagunicar jointly and severally liable. As was set inDel Mundo v. CA, xxxIn the case
at bar, thedecision of the trial court leaves much to be desired in both form and
substance. Even while saiddecision infringes the Constitution, we will not belabor this
infirmity and rather examine thesufficiency of the evidence submittedby the
petitioners.For failing to explain clearly and well thefactual and legal bases of its award
of moral damages,[the court]set it aside in said case.
798. Kao vs CA
FACTS: Pilipinas Kao, Inc.is a corporation engaged in multiple areas of registered

activity, or has a number of projects registered with the Board of Investments (BOI).
Batas Pambansa 391(Investment Policy Act of 1983), providing, among others, for tax
incentives for new and expanding export producer. Petitioners availed of these tax
incentives through registration of its expanded production capacity, which BOIapproved
andissued a resolution grantingtheapplication for tax credit but only in the reduced
amounts, as well as applications for the succeeding year of tax credit. Notified of the
BOI’s decision, petitioner requested for a reconsideration but was continuously
denied.Petitionert hen filed with the Honorable Supreme Court a motion for extension of
time to filepetition pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code.However, the
Supreme Court issued a resolution referring the instant petition torespondent Court of
Appeal; which dismissed the petition for review "on technical and substantive
grounds.”The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the BOI and sustained the
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reduction of credits on net value earned and net local contentapplied for by the
company in 1988 and 1989. Consequently,petitionersfiled petition to set asidedecision
of the Court of Appeals with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not BOI rendered a decision within the meaning of itsown rules
which requiresthat the decision in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state
clearlyand distinctly the factsand the law on which itis based?
RULING:No. Respondent BOI did not render a decision in the manner prescribed by its
own rulesand the law .Lacking the essential attribute of a decision, the acts in question
were at bestinterlocutory orders that did not attain finality nor acquire the effects of a
final judgment despite thelapse of the statutory period of appeal.Indeed, a judicious and
well-reasoned resolution of thequestions peculiar in their fields of expertise, carries a
strong persuasive effect and will go a longwayineasing the courts burden.In the context
of what the law and its own rules prescribe, aswell as our applicable
pronouncements,the BOI Resolution, as well as its Letters did notqualify as decision,
absent a clear and distinct statement of the facts and the law to supportthe action.
799. People vs Pastor
FACTS:Accused-appellant, Pastor, was charged with the crime of Incestuous Rape to

his13-year old daughter at the time of the incident;that she had a premature delivery
and her baby died five days after birth. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty but later
changed his statement to guilty. The trial court ordered that the previous plea of not
guilty be set aside and that accused-appellant be arraigned a new. The court a quo
rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of incestuous rape. It nevertheless recommended the commutation oft he
sentence from death to reclusion perpetua by reason of the remorseful attitude
exhibited by accused-appellant. Accused-appellant avers that the trial court gravely
erred in not applying the guidelines fora plea of guilty to a capital offense. Specifically, it
is contended that the trial court failed to conduct as earching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused-appellant's
plea, pursuant to the ruling laid down in the cases of People vs. Bello and Peoplevs.
Dayot.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of trial court complies with the constitutional
requirement prescribed in 1987 Constitution?
RULING: No.A perusal of the decision of the trial court will reveal that thej udge failed to
state the factual and legal reasons on which he based accused-appellant's
conviction.The judge merely stated that the complainant xxxher father (the accused in
this case), without her consent, forcibly obtained carnal knowledge with her, which
resulted in her being pregnant." He then concluded that the lone testimony of the victim,
if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction, and made a bare recital of Article 266Bof
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353. There is no discussion of the facts
of the case and the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information,in utter disregard
of the constitutional injunction that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
800. People vs Lizada
FACTS: On automatic review is the trial Court's decision finding the appellant guilty of
four countsof qualified rape and meting on him the death penalty for each count. In
rendering judgment against the appellant, the trial court merely summarized the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and the defense, made referral to the
documentary evidence of the parties, then concluded that it rendered judgment based
on the evidence of the prosecution. On appeal, appellant claimed that the trial court's
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decision is null and void as the court a quo made no findings of fact in its decision.
Appellant also averred that medical findings showing that private complainant's hymen
was intact belied her claim of having been deflowered by appellant on four different
occasions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the trial court is null and void as it failed to
comply with the requirements of Section 14, ArticleVIII of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: Yes.The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to comply with the
requirements under the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure "to set out
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." It merely summarized
the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accused-appellant on direct
and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of the
parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, accused-
appellant is guilty of four (4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based
on their evidence, the issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and
legal issues, as well as the legal and factual bases for convicting accused-appellant of
each of the crimes charged. The Court[SC]decided to resolve the cases on their merits
considering that all the records as well as the evidence adduced during the trial had
been elevated to the Court.
801. Consing vs. CA
FACTS:Petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Soledad Consing, were sugar-farm

Landowners who mortgaged their properties to the Philippine National Bank(PNB)
Victorias Branch. Petitioners also had an annual agricultural crop loan with PNB. A
portion of this loan was for a fertilizer line. Private respondent Sugar Producers
Cooperative Marketing Association (SPCMA) is a cooperative engaged in assisting
planters-members procure fertilizer and other farm needs. Petitioners purchased on
credit various grades of fertilizer through SPCMA with promissory notes. When SPCMA
presented the promissory note, PNB refused to honor the note as petitioners no longer
had a fertilizer line with PNB. SPCMA filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
against petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental(RTC) Bacolod
City. The trial court ruled in favor of SPCMA. It was render that petitioners are solely
liable for payment and damages; PNB is deemed not to be a guarantor of the
petitioners. Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, petitioners appealed to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held
that PNB was not the guarantor or surety of petitioners. The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the RTC failed to state the legal basis of its
ruling?
RULING:Yes. While RTC Judge mentioned his factual findings, the legal basis of his
ruling is not set out in the decision. RTC Judge failed to meet faithfully the requirement
demanded by the Constitution from the courts in rendering their decisions. The court
must inform the parties to a case of the legal basis for the courts decision so that if a
party appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the points of law to which it
disagrees. Though, there is no ground to overturn the factual finding of the trial court
and Court of Appeals. The records support the trial and appellate courts finding that
petitioner purchased on credit the fertilizers through SPCMA. The judgment by the
Court of Appeals was affirmed with modifications.
MAIN POINT: Every judge should know the constitutional mandate and the rationale
behind it. Judge Querubin should have known the exacting standard imposed on courts
by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and should not have sacrificed the
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constitutional standard for brevity’s sake. The failure of the trial court decision to
measure up to the standard set by the Constitution is too gross to ignore as it is in stark
contrast to the Court of Appeals decision.
802. Velarde v SJS
FACTS:The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory

Relieffiled before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS)
against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde. The Petition prayed for the resolution
of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein
respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or
requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the
letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x. Alleging that the questioned Decision
did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a
Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court..In response,
the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:x x x[T]his Court cannot
reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional
provision and to declare whether acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a
dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required only in coercive reliefs,
where are dress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party wronged
should get.The step that these movants have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45of
the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the
Supreme Court
ISSUE:Whether or not RTC’s Decision conform to the form and substance required by
the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court
RULING: No. In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision
contains no statement of facts--much less an assessment or analysis thereof--or of the
courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement
of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief
explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to
achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.
The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has
reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with
the clause SO ORDERED.
MAIN POINT: The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court
803. Report on the Judicial Audit
FACTS:This administrative case is an offshoot of the judicial audit conducted in March

2004 in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tambulig and the 11thMunicipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Mahayag-Dumingag-Josefina, both in Zamboanga del Sur, in
anticipation of the compulsory retirement of the Acting Presiding Judge thereof, herein
respondent Judge Ricardo L. Salvanera. During the audit, the audit team has
discovered that there were cases that were not even brought to action, and that audit
claims that there are cases that he failed to render the right and just decision. Inan
instance Judge Salvanera rendered a one-page decision dated 25 March 2004without
stating the facts and the law on which it was based in violation of. For his part, retired
Judge Salvanera submitted a written explanation dated 26 July 2004,informing the
Court that his failure to decide cases and resolve motions could be attributed to heavy
workload, lack of material time, and health reasons. He had to attend to the sessions of
all the three courts of which he was the presiding or acting.
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ISSUE:Whether or not the failed to render a complete judgement due to failure to state
the facts andbasis of the law
RULING: Yes. Judge Salvanera rendered a one-page decision dated 25 March 2004
without stating the facts and the law on which it was based in violation of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides: No decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
All told, the Court finds respondent Judge Salvanera guilty of gross inefficiency, gross
ignorance of the law, and violations of pertinent administrative circulars of the Court,
which merit disciplinary sanction.
MAIN POINT: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and
distinctly thefacts and the law on which it is based.
804. Laucrom v Tienzo
FACTS: For resolution is an administrative complaint charging Judge Juanita C. Tienzo

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is an appealed case of Unlawful Detainer from the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC).The complainant alleges that respondent judge
rendered a Decision in violation of the constitutional mandate to state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, and Section 1, Rule36 of the Rules
of Court echoing the same requisite.
ISSUE: Whether or not complainant alleges that respondent judge rendered adecisionin
violationof the constitutional mandate to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based
RULING: Yes. It is obvious that the decision rendered by respondent judge failed to
conform to this requirement. The cryptic decision simply referenced the appealed
decision of the (Municipal Trial Court in Cities) MTCC and forthwith found the same as
compliant with procedural due process under the Rules of Summary Procedure.
Nowhere in the decision does respondent judge make a statement of the facts which led
to the filing of the appeal. More importantly, the decision does not contain respondent
judges factual findings, albeit affirming those of the MTCC, from which she based her
conclusions of law. Ineluctably, respondent judge transgressed the constitutional
directive.
MAIN POINT: All memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set
forth as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any
deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
805. Salazar v Marigomen
FACTS: Doroteo M. Salazar (Salazar) charged Judge Antonio D. Marigomen (Judge

Marigomen) with gross ignorance of the law, bias,conduct prejudicial to the interest of
the service and rendering ad ecision violative of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the Constitution inc onnection with Election Case
he presided. In said election case, Judge Salazar isaccused of admitting in evidence
uncertified photocopies of the contestedballotscontrary to Section7, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. After reviewing or re-appreciating the ballots of the contested precincts,
the Court invalidated 90votes of the protestant and has not validated stray votes in her
favor as she has not formally offeredthe claimed stray votes or ballots.The court shall
only consider ballots which are presented andformally offered.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Judge is guilty of violating the constitution, specifically Article
VIISection 14
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RULING:Yes. Respondent also indeed failed to state in his decision why he invalidated
90 ballots infavor of the protestant and to specify the ballots being set aside, thereby
violating the Constitution.
MAIN POINT: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
806. De la Pena v CA
FACTS:On October 20, 1983, respondent Rural Bank of Bolinao, Inc. (respondent)
extended a loanof ₱81,000.00 to petitioners. The loan was evidenced by a promissory
note,and was payable on or before October 14, 1984. Petitioners failed to pay their
obligation in full when it became due.Demands for payment4were made by respondent,
but these were not heeded. Consequently,respondent filed a collection case against the
petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bolinao, Pangasinan, docketed as
Civil Case No. 838. At the pre-trial conference set on October 17,1995, petitioners did
not appear. Consequently, upon motion by respondent, petitioners weredeclared as in
default, and respondent was allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
ISSUE: Whether or Not MTC decision is null and void for it does not conform to the
requirement ofSection 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and of the Rules of Court.
RULING:Yes. Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which:

contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions;contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of
the witnesses of both parties;convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal
authorityor principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous;
consisted merely of one (1) paragraph withmostly sweeping generalizations and failed
to support its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five(5) pages, three (3) pages of
which were quotations from the labor arbiter’s decision including the dispositive portion
and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of itsown
discussion or reasoning; was merely based on the findings of another courts transcript
of stenographic notes; or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of
moral damages
MAIN POINT: Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is
likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a
litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court
807. Office of the President and Anti-Graft Commission v Cataquiz
FACTS: Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz was appointed as General Manager of the

Laguna Lake Development Authority(LLDA).A majority of the members of the
Management Committee and therank-and-file employees of the LLDA submitted to then
Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR)Secretary Elisea G.
Gozuntheir Petition for the Ouster of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager on the
grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior and management incompetence. He
was dismissed from his duties.Cataquiz filed his Motion for Reconsideration and/or for
New Trial and elevated his case on the CAby petition for review. CA a then finds merit
on his petition.
ISSUE:Whether the CA made an incorrect determination of the facts of the case

warranting reviewof its factual findings by the Court.
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RULING: Yes. It is evident that the CA failed to comply with these requirements. PAGC,
in its Resolution dated December 5, 2003, discussing each of the twelve allegations
against Cataquiz,determined that he should be dismissed from the government service
and that he could be held liable. Complained of is grossly insufficient to overturn the
determination by PAGC that he should be punished for acts prejudicial to the LLDA
committed during his service as General Manager of the said agency.It should be
emphasized that findings of fact of administrative agencies will not be interfered with
and shall be considered binding and conclusive upon this Court provided that there is
substantial evidence to support such findings. Substantial evidence has been defined as
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs.
MAIN POINT: Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based. Decisions of courts must be able to address the
issues raised by the parties through the presentation of a comprehensive analysis or
account of factual and legal findings of the court.
808. Republic of the Philippines v Legaspi
FACTS: Respondent Rosalina Libo-on sold her 40,133-square meter property situated
at Miag-ao,Iloilo Forthwith, a Deed of Definite Sale was executed by the parties
whereby Rosalina, UP Visayas immediately took possession of the property and, in line
with its educational development plan, started building thereon road networks,
infrastructure and school facilities. Rosalina informed UPV that she wanted to rescind
the sale of the property on the ground that she was no longer the owner of the property
at the time she sold it to UPV. Prior to the elecution of deed of sale in favor of UP, she
had already conveyed it by barter in favor of Legaspi, et al. The subject lot was
subdivided into 10lots and separately registered under the name of Legaspi, et al.UPV,
filed against respondents the complaint for eminent domain docketed before the RTC.
Finding that the exclusion of the aforesaid lots would not defeat UPV’s plan for its
campus, the RTC issued the order dated 31 May 2004,the decretal portion of which
states as follows: WHEREFORE,finding the [petitioner’s] Motion for Reconsideration
dated December 19, 2003 without merit, the same is denied. The Manifestation and
Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated December 19, 2003of respondent being
meritorious is, thus, granted and the Order dated November 17, 2003 of this Court is
partially reconsidered and judgment is hereby entered denying the expropriation of
subject Lots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred on a question of law indenying the petition for
CERTIORARIand AFFIRMING the ORDER DATED MAY 31, 2004 OF BRANCH 38 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTOF ILOILO CITY WHICH DID NOT STATE THE FACTS
AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED.
RULING:Yes. Since it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be

informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that
led to the conclusions of the court,the rule is settled that a decision that does not
conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and
deemed legally in existent. directing the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38 to
resolve the case in compliance with Section 14,Article VIII of the Constitution and in
accordance with the evidence on record.
MAIN POINT:The parties to litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with
anexplanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.
809. Borromeo v CA
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FACTS: In the present case for-damages filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Mr.
Borromeo charges that Attys. Carreon et al usurped judicial functions by issuing a
"supposed" resolution of the Third Division of the Court in G.R. No. 82273. The
resolution of the Supreme Court through its Third Division which disposed of
Borromeo's petition is a four-page resolution which more than adequately complies with
the constitutional requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to
petitions for review and claimed that he had been a victim of unjustice due to the
violation or Art VII Sec 14.His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed
of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the
deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise
complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they
did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by
the Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."
ISSUE:Whether or not the petition should be considered with merit considering that the
petitioner is claiming to victim if injustice, due to violation of Art.VII Sec. 14 made by the
courts employees.
RULING:No. was noted without action as the Court found that the motion merely
reiterated the same arguments earlier rose in the petition and already passed upon by
the Court and was,therefore without merit. When the Court, after deliberating on a
petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations,comments, or motions decides
to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis
stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.
MAIN POINT:The Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based asreferring only to
decisions.Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitutional provision which
states that, "No petition for review ... shall be refused due course ...without stating the
legal basis therefor" (Section 14, ArticleVIII, Constitution).
810. JRB Realty v. CA
FACTS:Petitioner assailed the proposal of Revised Deed Restrictions by ALI to MACEA

on the ground that the proposal would have an unfair effect on the members of MACEA
who have already built structures on their lot, which was later on approved by 403
members out of 476. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition which was denied by the
Hearing Officer of SEC and was denied a petition for for review for failure to show prima
facie evidence that SEC had committed errors of factor law that would warrant a
reversal or modification of the assailed decision. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the CA.
ISSUE: WON the respondent court violated Art. VIII Sec. 14 of the constitution when it
refused togive due course to the petition for review and subsequently denied the motion
for reconsideration.
RULING:No. Respondent court actually stated, “A perusal of the petition for review
Review filed before us based on the facts narrated and issues assigned vis-à-vis the
assailed decision the petition has failed to show prima facie evidence that SEC had
committed errors of fact or law that would warrant a reversal or modification of the
assailed decision.” In effect respondent court adopted the factual findings of the SEC as
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its own as well as the evidence which supported the conclusion.
MAIN POINT:It is clear that the subject resolution did not comply with the said provision
because contrary to the petitioner’s protestation, respondent court actually stated the
legal basis for the refusal.Note:MACEA-Makati Commercial Estate Association
Inc.MCBD-Makati Central Business DistrictALI-Ayala Land Inc.
811. KOMATSU VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 127682, APRIL 24, 1998
Short background (not necessary, but if you want to understand the case then read this)
National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) granted Komatsu
Industries, Inc. (KIPI) a direct loan of P8 million and a P2 million guarantee to secure
PNB. As a security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by KIPI in
favor of NIDC covering a parcel of land with all its improvements covered by a Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT). KIPI then executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed covering
the same parcel of land regarding letters of credit by PNB in favor of KIPI with foreign
suppliers worth US$1.56 million.
Upon full payment of KIPI’s account with NIDC and the P2 million credit line with
PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage. By virtue of this
release, NIDC returned the owner’s copy of the TCT to KIPI and registered the Deed of
Release with the Registry of Deed. However, PNB requested the return of the TCT due
to unsettled accounts based on the subsequent amendment of the mortgage. The return
was made but after a year, PNB filed for extrajudicial foreclosure of the property. KIPI
contests the foreclosure saying that the release by NIDC had the effect of releasing the
real estate mortgage.
Relevant facts
KIPI filed a petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals. However, it was denied by this Court for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment (see above). Hence, in its second motion for reconsideration,
petitioner tried a different approach by assailing that the minute resolutions are in
violation of the Constitution.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution. YES.
Resolutions, are not decisions within the above constitutional requirement; they
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained, and the petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but a sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision. That the Supreme
Court was fully justified in handling down its minute resolution because it agrees with or
adopts the finding of the Court of Appeals to be reviewed and set aside is correct.
If the Supreme Court after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings,
decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are
factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
812. MARTINEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. 123547, MAY 21, 2001
Martinez found out that the lot he was occupying was sold to the spouses
Veneracion in a letter that claimed ownership. However they were acknowledged as the
rightful possesors by the Municipal Trial Court, that was appealed in the Regional Trial
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Court where the court held the Venaracions to be the true owners of the lot in dispute by
virtue of their prior registration with the Register of Deeds.
The petitioner filed a petition to review that was denied by the Court of Appeals
and affirmed the Veneracions to be the owners in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil
Code. Hence this petition for review where the petitioners assailed that the Court of
Appeals erred in not giving due course to the petition for review.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the resolution of the CA denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
is contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of a motion must state
the legal reasons on which it based. NO.
The respondent court stated in its resolution that it “found no reason to change its
ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new.” The points and arguments
raised by the movants have been considered and passed upon in the decision sought to
be considered. Evidently the motion poses nothing new.
The requirement was fully complied with when the CA in denying reconsideration
of its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling
because petitioner had not raised anything new.
813. PROTACIO VS. LAYA

582 SCRA 417 (2009)
This is a petition for review on certiorari on the Court of Appeals’ decision to
further reduce the monetary award granted by the NLRC to respondent Zayber who
filed before NLRC a complaint against LAYA for non-issuance of his W-2 tax form and
the non-payment of his benefits.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether CA’s summary denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration violates
the constitutional requirement that court decisions must state the legal and
factual basis. NO.
The assailed Resolution complied with the requirement therein. The court
sufficiently explained that after reading the pleadings filed by the parties, the appellate
court did not find any cogent reason to reverse itself.
814. NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC. VS. VALDERAMA

G.R. NO. 186614, FEBRUARY 23, 2011
Petitioner appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the
December 9, 2008 Decision of CA, and the February 24, 2009 Resolution denying its
reconsideration.
Respondent was hired by petitioner as security guard and was assigned at the
Philippine Heart Center QC until his relief. Respondent was not given any assignment
thereafter. Thus, he filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and nonpayment of 13th
month pay, with prayer for damages against petitioner. Petitioner presented a different
version. It alleged that respondent was not constructively or illegally dismissed, but had
voluntarily resigned.
After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision. This office is of the
view that [respondent] was constructively dismissed. [Petitioners] defense that
[respondent] voluntarily resigned is unsubstantiated. What appears on record is the pro-
forma resignation dated long before this complaint was filed. The general rule is that the
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether this case sufficiently complied with the requirements under Art. VIII,
Sec. 14 of the Constitution. YES.
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The purpose of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 is to inform the person reading the decision of
how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and
examination of the applicable laws. The decision in this case has been expressed
clearly and distinctly.
Additional Notes (Reiterating Philippine Health care Providers, Inc. v. CIR.): The
distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional requirement
under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and
the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies
only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the
clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the
certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not
published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII
speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of
law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the
Court and certified by the Chief Justice.
815. RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGR. OSCAR L. ONGJOCO

A.M. OCA IPI NO. 11-184-CA-J, JANUARY 31, 2012
The Court received a letter from Engr. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board and CEO
of the FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative.
In the complaint, Ongjoco maintained that respondent members of the CAs Sixth
Division violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically
stating the facts and the law on which the denial of the petition for review was based;
that they summarily denied the petition for review without setting forth the basis for
denying the FH-GYMNs petition for review raised.
Complaint stemmed from alleged baseless decision in FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose
and Transport Service Cooperative v. Allan Ray A. Baluyut, et al - on its requested
amendment of Kautusang Bayan Blg. 37-02-97 of the City of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan through the Committee on Transportation and Communications of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod in order to include the authorization of FH-GYMNs Chairman
to issue motorized tricycle operators permit to its members. Sanggunian denied the
request. Case was brought to Ombudsman charging public officers of Sanggunian with
violation of the Cooperative Code and Anti Graft and Corruption Practices Act. Omb
denied. Petition for review was filed in CA. CA dismissed. Hence the complaint.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether decision promulgated by the CA’s Sixth Division had no legal foundation
and did not even address the five issues presented in the petition for review; and
that the respondents as members of the CA’s Sixth Division thereby violated
Section 14, Article VIII. NO.
The administrative complaint against respondent Justices of the CA is baseless

and utterly devoid of legal and factual merit, and outrightly dismiss it.
The definitive pronouncement of the CAs Sixth Division that the Deputy
Ombudsman found no substantial evidence to prove that there was interference in the
internal affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a violation of the law by the respondents met
the constitutional demand for a clear and distinct statement of the facts and the law on
which the decision was based. The CAs Sixth Division did not have to point out and
discuss the flaws of FH-GYMNs petition considering that the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman sufficiently detailed the factual and legal bases for the denial of the
petition.
MAIN POINT: The essential purpose of the constitutional provision is to require
that a judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under the law as applied to
the facts as proved; the provision nowhere demands that a point-by-point consideration
and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary.
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816. AGOY VS. ARANETA
G.R. NO. 196358, MARCH 21, 2012
Court denied petitioner Agoys petition for review through a minute resolution.
Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of the minute resolution that he received
through counsel since he promptly filed a motion to rescind the same and to have his
case resolved on its merits via a regular resolution or decision signed by the Justices
who took part in the deliberation.
Court denied Agoys motion to rescind the subject minute resolution and
confirmed the authenticity of the copy of the June 15, 2011 resolution. It also treated his
motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration and denied the same with finality.
Upon receipt of the Courts September 21, 2011 resolution, Agoy filed a motion to
rescind the same or have his case resolved by the Court En Banc pursuant to Section
13 in relation to Sec. 4(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Agoy reiterated his view
that the Court cannot decide his petition by a minute resolution. He thus prayed that it
rescind its June 15 and September 21, 2011 resolutions, determine whether it was
proper for the Court to resolve his petition through a minute resolution, and submit the
case to the Court en banc for proper disposition through a signed resolution or decision.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether it was proper for the Court to deny his petition through a minute
resolution. YES.
While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and
distinctly the fact and the law on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in
denying due course to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis for such
denial.
With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined the
instances when cases are to be adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned
resolution or minute resolution. Among those instances when a minute resolution shall
issue is when the Court denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of Court],
citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in the challenged
decision, resolution, or order of the court below. The minute resolutions in this case
complied with this requirement.
When the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and
denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it
already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.
Additional Notes: (Reiterating Borromeo v CA) No law or rule requires its members to
sign minute resolutions that deny due course to actions filed before it or the Chief
Justice to enter his certification on the same. The notices quote the Courts actual
resolutions denying due course to the subject actions and these already state the
required legal basis for such denial. To require the Justices to sign all its resolutions
respecting its action on new cases would be unreasonable and unnecessary.
817. DIZON VS. JUDGE LOPEZ

278 SCRA 483 (1997)
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez, with violation of the
Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in connection with a
criminal case she decided. Respondent Judge rendered a judgement, convicting
complainant of falsification of private document. The promulgation of the judgment
consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to
imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him. The accused and his
counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy of the decision, but although
petitioner and his father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of the decision they
were not able to do so. Complainant filed a partial motion for reconsideration on May 5,
1993, expressly reserving his right to submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the
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decision. The hearing of the motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May 12,
1993, but the case was not called as complainant's counsel was told that the decision
had not yet been finished. Complainant filed an "Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation
of Sentence and to Dismiss" the case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for hearing
the motion, complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April 22, 1993. Judge
Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated with the
reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared, although to
prevent leakage in the process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until
the day of its promulgation. Respondent only succeeds claims that the judgment
promulgated on April 22, 1993 was a "sin perjuicio" judgment which was incomplete and
needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment was based.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the negligence of the respondent to read a final decision until such time
the petitioner filed a petition against her violates Section 15, Art. VIII. YES.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the
accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts
and the law on which such judgment is based. Since this was done only on December
16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision was served on complainant, it is
obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision within three months as
required by Art. VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution. if indeed all that had to be done
after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to
incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is difficult to
see why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was able
to do so.
MAIN POINT: The Constitutional requirement under Section 15, Article VIII must
be strictly complied with, and if external factors, or factors not within control of the judge
should arise, the Judge can apply for extension of time to decide the case and put off
the promulgation of judgment until finished.
818. MOSQUERA VS. LEGASPI

AM RTJ-99-1511, JULY 10, 2000
On April 19, 1997, Wilfredo Mosquera filed a verified complaint charging
respondent Judge Emilio Legaspi, then Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, San Jose,
Antique, Branch 10, with dereliction of duty for his failure to resolve/decide Civil Case
No. 2530 within the period required by law.
In his comment, respondent Judge claimed that he had already rendered a
decision on the aforesaid case on December 2, 1997; that the delay was due to the
request of the parties that the case be held in abeyance for the reason that being
townmates and relatives, they were negotiating for an amicable settlement; that the
motion for early decision was filed after the parties failed to settle their case amicably;
that as Acting Executive Judge, he was saddled with so many cases involving detention
prisoners which have been substantially tried by the former presiding judge, to which
cases he gave his preferential attention; and that he was a pairing Judge of Branches
11, 12 and 13.
In the resolution of November 15, 1999, we required the parties to manifest if
they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records
already filed. Having failed to submit any manifestation despite notice of the said
Resolution, the parties are deemed to have waived the submission of such
manifestation.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the respondent judge violated the Sec. 15, Article VIII of the
Constitution. YES.
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Respondent is administratively liable for his failure to render the decision in Civil
Case No. 2530 within the prescribed period of ninety days from the time the case was
submitted for decision.
A judge’s failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the reglementary
period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases.—Sec. 15, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all
cases filed before the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three (3) months
from the date of submission (Lopez vs. Judge Reynaldo Alon, 254 SCRA 166). Non-
observance of this mandate constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the
defaulting judge. (Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA
819. OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. SALVA

AM RTJ-98-1412, JULY 19, 2000
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit of the cases
submitted for decision or resolution in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
Puerto Princesa City in 1997. The audit team discovered that there were seventy-five
(75) cases submitted for decision or resolution which Judge Dilig inherited from her
predecessors. Sixty-four (64) of the 75 cases were left undecided or unresolved by
Judges Sta. Maria and Salva, while the remaining eleven (11) cases were submitted for
decision or resolution when Judge Gomez was acting presiding judge of the MTCC.
Based on the foregoing, the Court Administrator recommended that Judges Salva and
Gomez be fined for their failure to decide or resolve the cases submitted to them for
decision within the reglementary period; that Clerk of Court Eriberto R. Sabas be
directed to explain why he should not be held administratively liable for failure to
produce the case records requested by the audit team and reprimanded for not
reflecting all the cases pending before the MTCC in the Monthly Report of cases for
March and April 1997; and that Sheriff Simpliciano be directed to explain why he should
not be held administratively liable for failing to make the returns of the writs of execution
dated November 20, 1995 in two separate civil cases within the prescribed period. The
respondents submitted their respective explanations. Court found explanations
insufficient.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether respondents’ failure to decide a case within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions on the defaulting judge. YES.
No less than the Constitution mandates that lower courts decide or resolve cases
or matters submitted for decision within three months upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court concerned. This
policy is reiterated in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states
that "[a] judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods."
The Constitution provides that the 90-day reglementary period for deciding or
resolving cases submitted for such purposes is reckoned from the date when the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself is
submitted, and not from the time when the transcript of stenographic notes of a case is
completed by the stenographer.
820. DELA CRUZ VS. BERSAMIRA

AM RTJ-00-1567, JULY 24, 2000
In a verified complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge
Bersamira of RTC Pasig was charged with violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The case stemmed from 3 criminal cases assigned to him.
It was alleged by the complainant that respondent abused his discretion by
issuing unreasonable orders for postponement which unjustly delay the administration
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of justice and allowing the two accused (in the criminal case) to submit a drug test
thereby postponing the trial of the cases indefinitely.
Associate Appellate Court Justice Vidallon-Magtolis was assigned to conduct an
investigation, report and recommendation on charges against the respondent. The
complainant did not appear at the hearing. Despite that, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis,
proceeded with the investigation by examining the records of the criminal cases
involved which respondent had brought along, also giving the respondent an opportunity
to clear his name. Justice Vidallon-Magtolis found that Judge Bersamira has fallen short
of the requirements of probity and independence. Justice Vidallon-Magtolis
recommended that respondent be fined with a stern warning that a repetition of the acts
complained of will be dealt with more severely.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether Judge Bersamira’s conduct was hardly exemplary thus subject to
administrative saction. YES.
The Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondents conduct was
hardly exemplary in this case. The Court in a litany of cases has reminded members of
the bench that the unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a
violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative
sanction against the defaulting magistrate. Indeed, the Court has consistently
impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the
principle that justice delayed is justice denied.
The fact that Barsamira tarried too long in acting on the pending incidents in the
Criminal Cases hardly becomes open to question. If at all, respondent judges foot-
dragging in acting on the incidents in the said cases, which stopped only when
administrative complaints were filed against him with the Ombudsman and the OCA, is
a strong indicia of his lack of diligence in the performance of his official duties and
responsibilities.
821. HEIRS OF SUCALDITO VS. CRUZ

A.M. RTJ-991456, JULY 27, 2000
Administrative matter at bar was commenced by a letter with affidavit of
complaint of the petitioners, charging Judge Magno Cruz with malicious delay in the
administration of Justice for his failure to rule on a motion for inhibition within 90-days
from its submission in Special Proc. Case No. 113-07-RTC-20. They further complained
that the respondent judge falsely stated in his Certificates of Service that there was no
case or incident pending decision or resolution in his Sala for more than 90 days. Going
over the records of the case, the motion for inhibition was filed and submitted for
resolution on July 3, 1997 and was granted on Jan. 2, 1998. However a motion for
reconsideration and a corresponding opposition was filed hence the incident is still
pending resolution by the court.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether Judge Cruz is guilty for violation of Art. VIII Sec. 15. YES.
The Judge neither refuted nor commented on the allegation of delay leveled
against him and therefore has admitted the same. Also during all perid that the said
motions were enacted upon, respondent judge falsely stated in his CoS that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three months from the date of
submission. Such grave misrepresentation by him must be duly punished.
For the speedy disposition of cases, a judge is called upon by law to resolve
cases and incident pending before him within the prescribe period of time. Failure to
comply constitutes gross inefficiency, which is punishable administratively.
822. SULLA VS. RAMOS

A.M.-MTJ-00-1319, SEPTEMBER 27, 2000
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For resolution is a letter-complaint of Dr. Sulla charging respondent Ramos for
unreasonable delay or refusal to render a decision in Criminal Case No. 8121, a case
for acts of lasciviousness against Talacay. Despite constant requests for its early
resolution, the respondent has not rendered a decision in the said case. Ramos
however explained that due to heavy pressure of work, his indefinite designation as
acting presiding judge and poor health was the reason he was unable to render a
decision within the period.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the factors cited may attribute to the delay of the respondent judge to
render a decision. NO.
OCA observed that while it may be true that the delay may be attributed in part to
the factors cited, such factors couldn’t exculpate him from administrative liability. Such
inaction for more than (2) years obviously caused distress and disappointment to the
complainant, further more if the reasons cited really prevented him from deciding the
case, he should have asked the SC for a reasonable extension which he failed to do.
The Court agrees with these findings of OCA.
This requirement is designed to prevent delay in the administration of Justice
because Justice delayed, is Justice denied; and delay in the disposition erodes the faith
and confidence of our people, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
823. SEARES VS. SALAZAR

A.M. MTJ-98-1160, NOVEMBER 22, 2000
Dr. Seares in a sworn letter complaint charged Judge Rosita Salzar with
ignorance of the law for failure to decide Criminal cases for violation of BP No.22.
Complainant alleges that these said cases were submitted Feb. 14, 1996 and since
then no decision has been rendered yet. In her comment, respondent vigorously denied
the charges. She averred that the cases were originally assigned to a diff. judge but
upon the latter inhibitions she was designated to try it by the then Executive Judge, that
both parties were known to her personally that’s why she was adamant to accept the
cases but nevertheless prevailed.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the judge presented any sufficient explanation for the non-compliance
considering that in certain meritorious cases a longer period to decide had been
allowed. NO.
The respondent offered no satisfactory and acceptable explanation for her failure
to comply with the fixed period; neither did she file an application for an additional time.
Also the pendency of an amicable settlement is not a valid excuse because it is settled
that a criminal case once filed in court cannot be amicably settled.
The 90-day period is to prevent delay in the administration of justice, and non-
compliance thereof constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of parties to
speedy disposition of their cases. Delay of justice, erodes the faith and confidence of
the people in the judiciary, lowers its standard and brings it into disrepute.
824. GIL VS. JONOLO

A.M. RTJ-00-1602, DECEMBER 5, 2000
This is a complaint filed against Judge Janolo for failure to decide Civil Case No.
65628, which was filed on Aug. 30, 1995. On March 17, 1999, over five months later,
Angel Gil one of the defendants filed the complaint alleging that it took Judge Janolo
more than four months to act on defendants Formal Offer of Evidence. It was also
evident from these orders that more than three months have elapsed, and the above-
mentioned case has remained undecided up to now. Respondent acknowledges the
delay, which he claims is the result of technical problems with the office computers.
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Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the Judge’s excuse is acceptable. NO.
The court agreed with the findings of the OCA that respondent judge’s delay,
while not deliberate, is in part mitigated by problems with his computers, although this
fact does not exonerate him from his liability. When Judge Janolo allegedly started
having technical difficulties with his computers, he should have immediately asked for
an extension of time.
The court is well aware of the fact that some cases involve complex questions of
facts and/or law and that the three months allotted for deciding cases may be well
inadequate considering the increase in litigation. This is precisely why the court almost
invariably grant, upon proper application and on meritorious grounds, additional time to
decide cases beyond the 90-day period.
825. ASLARONA VS. ECHAVEZ

A.M. RTJ-03-1803, OCTOBER 2, 2003
This is an administrative case against respondent Judge Echavez for delay of
more than (20) months in resolving three motions filed in Civil Case No. CEB-23577.
Complainant alleged that such undue procrastination was a manifest and clear act of
gross inefficiency on respondent’s part. The judge admitted his delay in resolving the
aforementioned cases, however denied that there it was due to deliberate intent or
refusal to perform a duty on his part but was due simply to his heavy workload which in
fact had already caused him to suffer from a heart ailment.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the judge is exempted from liability considering his lengthy and
untainted service and the fact that it was his first offense. NO.
He could have filed a motion for extension of time as soon as it became clear to
him that he could not possibly resolve the motions on time. Although the delay
according to the court is within a reasonable period of time, there were no hints of fraud,
dishonesty, corruption and malice on his part, therefore it is settled that not every
erroneous order or decision of a judge subjects him to disciplinary action.
For violations of the Constitutional mandate, the court invariably impose penalties
ranging from fine to suspension depending on the circumstances of each case as the
number of motions or cases unresolved, the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health
and age of the judge, etc.
826. UNITRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. CAOIBES

A.M. RTJ-03-1745, AUGUST 20, 2003
Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent judge for violation of Article III
of the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct that the respondents are guilty of
delay in the resolution of its motion to dismiss filed in a Civil Case (Olivia Garrido vs.
UDB) pending before the same court. UDB alleged that it was only after the lapse of
more than eight (8) months, that the respondent judge set the petition for initial hearing
in violation of the 90-day rule under Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Respondent judge retorted that the delay was occasioned by his court’s OIC and legal
researcher’s inefficiency and her having misplaced the records of the case.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the respondent is free from liability, even considering that the
responsibility of safekeeping the record is primarily vested upon the Branch Clerk
of Court or the Officer-In-Charge? NO.
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It is a judges’ duty to take note of the cases submitted for his decision or
resolution and see to it that they are decided within the prescribed period. He cannot
hide behind the inefficiency or irresponsibility of his court personnel because the latter
are not the guardians of his responsibilities. Indeed, Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires respondent judge to organize and supervise the court personnel for
prompt and efficient dispatch of business. The fact that Ms. Buenaventura misplaced
the records and was inefficient only goes to prove that the respondent judge failed in his
duty to properly supervise court personnel.
827. RE: REQUEST OF JUDGE ROBERTO S. JAVELLANA

A.M. 01-6-314-RTC, JUNE 19, 2003
Judge Javellana wrote a letter to OCA requesting for an extension of time to

decide 2 civil cases and claimed that his inability to decide the said cases earlier within
the required period was because he presides over 2 courts and he has to attend
administrative case filed against him in Manila. His request was granted and he was
ordered to submit to the OCA copies of his decisions in the aforesaid cases within 10
days from date of its promulgation. He was furthermore required to explain, within 10
days from notice, why his request for an extension of time was made after the expiration
of the 90-day period to decide the cases.
Despite the consideration given unto him, Judge Javellana still failed to meet the
requirements. OCA later held that Judge Javellana failed to render a decision in his 2
civil cases within the extended period granted by the Court.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether or not Judge Javellana is guilty of gross inefficiency and negligence for
his undue delay in resolving the two civil cases within the extended 90-day
period. YES.
A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the
resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. It
is gross misconduct and even outright disrespect for the Court for respondent to exhibit
indifference to the resolutions requiring him to comment on the accusations contained in
the complaint against him.
828. SALUD VS. ALUMBRES

A.M. RTJ-00-1594, JUNE 20, 2003
Petitioners had a prior case about a dispute in a house and lot sale where in Las
Pias METC ruled in favour against the same. Petitioners’ appeal, raffled to Branch 255
of the RTC of Las Pias City,was presided over by herein respondent Judge Alumbres.
Notwithstanding the pendency of said appeal, respondent issued an Alias Writ of
Execution, stating that judgment now final and executory. Petitioners filed a complaint
with OCA against the respondent for a delay in judgment. Petitioners claimed that the
RTC had the period from May 1997 to August 1997 to decide the case, but had not
resolved the matter. Respondent blame the complainant for the delay. Accordingly
complainant herein filed numerous pleadings not only before the RTC but also with the
CA which harasses him and caused the delay.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether or not the respondent is liable given that his inability was due to the
petitioners’ numerous pleadings? YES.
The Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within 90 days
from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to
administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the courts
business promptly within the period prescribed by the law and the rules. Failure to
comply with the mandate of the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes
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serious misconduct, which is detrimental to the honour and integrity of a judicial
office. Inability to decide a case despite the ample time prescribed is inexcusable, constitutes
gross inefficiency, and warrants administrative sanction of the defaulting judge.
829. SAMSON VS. MEJIA

A.M. RTJ-02-1710, JUNE 17, 2003
In a civil case for annulment of contracts, pending before respondent Judge
Mejia’s court where the respondent had not rendered his decision, the complainant,
dismayed by respondent’s inaction, went to his office and pleaded for the early
disposition of the case. However, respondent ignored her plea and even suggested that
she settle the case amicably with the plaintiffs. This convinced complainant that
respondent purposely withheld his decision in the subject case to pressure her to enter
into a compromise agreement with the plaintiffs. OCA found merit on the case.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether respondent Judge is liable for gross inefficiency? YES.
Article VIII, Section 15 (2) of the Constitution requires judges of lower courts to
decide cases or resolve matters within three months from the date they are submitted
for decision or resolution. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to
dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required
periods. Failure to do so violate a litigant’s right to speedy disposition of his
case. Moreover, delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and
confidence in the judiciary.
Judges are mandated by the law to dispose of the courts business promptly and
to decide cases within the required periods.
830. SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN VS. JAVELLANA

A.M. NO. RTJ-00-1601, NOVEMBER 13, 2001
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent, acting presiding judge of ("RTC")
of San Carlos City, Branch 57, for grave misconduct in the performance of official
duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. He averred that there was an undue delay
in the rendition of judgment, which was pending for10 months, which acquitted the
accused having been rendered after the case was submitted for decision and that
Respondent was indecent because he’s often seen with the accused’s counsel.
OCA recommended conducting an investigation. The Court adopted the OCA's
recommendation and assigned the case to AJ Abesamis of the CA. The investigation
found that respondent indeed failed to decide the case in the prescribed period. Also
the Investigating Justice held respondent judge accountable for impropriety for his close
association with the accused’s counsel.
Issue/ruling:
1. Whether the respondent is liable for failing to render judgment within the period
prescribed by law and in engaging in activities having the appearance of
impropriety which unduly raise suspicion and distrust among the people in the
administration of justice. YES.
The Constitution provides that lower courts have 3 months within which to decide
cases or matters pending before them from the date of submission of such cases or
matters for decision or resolution. Respondent judge has taken a period clearly beyond
the 90-day reglementary period to finally decide. A judge has the duty to not only render
a just and impartial decision, but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's integrity.
Main point: "while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality."
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CASES MISSING:

Article VIII: Judicial Department

Section 1. Judicial Power

506. Santiago v. Bautista – 32 SCRA 188 [1970]

507. Radiowealth v. Agregado – 86 Phil. 429 [1950]

508. In re Laureta – 148 SCRA 382 [1987]

509. In re Borromeo – 241 SCRA 405 [1995]

510. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice – GR 132601, January 19, 1999

ART 8 SEC 1: Judicial Power Definition And Scope

Facts: 37 of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law’s

FACTS: This is a petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the

Art. VIII Sec. 1: Limits

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and

Art. VIII Sec. 1: Grave Abuse of Discretion

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion is

Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Grave Abuse of Discretion

Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Grave Abuse of Discretion

FACTS: The CA sustained the Ombudsman dismissal of administrative

MAIN POINT: It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the

Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Advisory Opinion

As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a

Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Advisory Opinion

ISSUE: Whether or not judicial function be exercised in this case.

RULING: No. Judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers.

MAIN POINT: An award of honors to a student by a board of teachers may not

Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Advisory Opinion

MAIN POINT: Not to be confused with advisory opinions is what is known as a

Section 1, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court defines an action for

Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Advisory Opinion

ISSUES: Can the CA make recommendations?

Art VIII Sec 1: Judicial Power, Justiciable Controversy

FACTS: The Petitioner was proclaimed as member-elect of the National

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Art VIII Sec 1: Justiciable Controversy

FACTS: The special prosecutor of the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the

FACTS: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting

FACTS: Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) formed by a group of

FACTS: Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a

Art VIII Sec 1: Justiciable Controversy

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of petitioner is an actual controversy

RULING: No. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent

MAIN POINT: They cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of

Art VIII Sec 1: Justiciable Controversy

FACTS: COMELEC issued Resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide free

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers.

FACTS: In line with RA 7227(BCDA), the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,

Art VIII Sec 1: Justiciable Controversy

FACTS: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal

FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of certain provisions of the

FACTS: Petitioner requested NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body

542. TATAD V. DOE – 281 SCRA 330 [1997]

543. TELECOM V. COMELEC - 289 SCRA 337 [1998]

544. MIRANDA V. AGUIRRE – GR 133064, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999

545. CUTARAN V. DENR – 350 SCRA 697 [2001]

1. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy in this case.

No, there was no justiciable controversy as there was no actual or imminent

546. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO – GR 146740-15, MARCH 2, 2001 AND MR APRIL 3,

1. Whether or not the petitions present a justifiable controversy.