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1 - Hernan V.SB

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OPHELIA HERNAN v.

SANDIGANBAYAN
| G.R. No. 217874. December 5, 2017 | Peralta, J.
Penalties in General; Retroactivity of Penal Laws

DOCTRINE: Reopening a case must be before finality of judgment, however, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage
of an amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court can direct reopening of a final and
immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

FACTS
 Petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of Transportation and Communication as an accounting
clerk. She was then promoted as a supervising fiscal clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier,
disbursement and collection officer.
 Hernan received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic
transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The collections were deposited in the bank account of DOTC
at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
 Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor from COA conducted a cash examination of the accounts handled by
Hernan. She found out that two of the deposit slips, dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996,
respectively, did not bear the stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated
 Lopez, together with her superior, Sherlyn Narag, verified all the reports and documents given to them by
Hernan.
 After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with the teller's blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident
auditor of LBP, found that no deposits were made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on September 19,
1996 and November 29, 1996
 LBP’s officer-in-charge, Rebecca Sanchez, instructed the bank’s teller, Ngaosi, to conduct their own inquiry.
 Hernan was then informed that the two aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank. The
auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the P81,348.20 remittance but not for the
P11,300.00.
 COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against Hernan with the Office of the Ombudsman
 RTC found Hernan guilty and sentenced her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer
imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years,
6 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion temporal maximum period, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P11,300.00. Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification
 CA affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its
decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the Sandiganbayan
which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27.
 SB affirmed RTC decision but modified the penalty with the modifications that the indeterminate penalty
to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years,
6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties under Article
42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of P11,300.00
to be restored by the accused.
 On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner’s MR became final and executory.
 On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer
to Stay the Execution. Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed the execution of the judgment of
conviction.
 Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in
lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the motion to reopen the case

HELD: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened ONLY to modify the penalty imposed in view of the
enactment of an amendatory law favorable to the accused. Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24, Rule
119 of Rules of Court)
1. The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction;
2. The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
3. The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;
4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and
5. The presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the
issuance of the order

Absent the first requisite, the Court held that it is still necessary to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner
prays for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed by said court.

In order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising
therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26,
2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the
amount involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the new penalty that should be
imposed is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.

On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such other officers of the law are
hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity,
called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable
penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious
mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in
consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing
circumstances attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, RA 10951 shall find application
regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even
if service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits
of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his
previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case,
moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action
before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing
penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final
and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable
penalties to be imposed.

ISSUE: WON Hernan is guilty of Malversation

HELD: YES. The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1)
that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable;
and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to
have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it
shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal uses. As duly found by the trial court,
and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso,
went to the LBP and handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to
where the money went failed to overcome the presumption of law.

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