Name: Renz Lyle H.

Laguitao PhB III

Subject: Environmental Philosophy
Professor: Ryan Urbano Ph.D.
ARE ALL SPECIES EQUAL?
David Schmidtz
Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1998
The article is a summary of critical responses to Paul Taylor’s argument for species
egalitarianism, then the author explains why would other species command our respect but also
why they do not command equal respect. The intuition that we should have respect for nature is
part of what motivates people to embrace species egalitarianism, but one need not to be a species
egalitarian to have respect for nature. It tackles that species egalitarianism is the view that all
species have equal moral standing. That in order to gain moral standing is to command respect,
to be something more than a mere thing. Thus, the article inquires whether species egalitarianism
is even compatible with respect for nature.
In the first section of the article, it tackles the ‘respect for nature.’ That species
egalitarianism is the view that all species have equal moral standing. That in order to gain moral
standing as said earlier is to command respect, to be something more than a mere thing.
Schmidtz thought that the intuition that we should have respect for nature is part of what
motivates people to embrace species egalitarianism, but one need not be a species egalitarian to
have respect for nature. In this way, one need not to be a species egalitarian in order to respect
nature but rather there are some alternative ways for us to respect what is nature. The respect for
nature in this regards is to respect the private spaces of every living nonhuman species, and
perhaps like humans they also have the interest not to experience pain and suffering.
The second section of the article tackles the ‘grounding of species egalitarianism.’ It
shows Paul Taylor’s idea about what anthropocentrism is. Taylor thought that anthropocentrism
gives either exclusive or primary consideration to human interests above the good of other
species. He urged that it should have an alternative to it, and that is biocentrism which covers all
living species, both humans and nonhumans. Taylor indeed was concern to all living things. His
view on the grounds of species egalitarianism is stated below:
(a) The belief that humans are members of Earth’s community of life in the same
sense and on the same terms in which other living things are members of that
community; (b) The belief that the human species, along with all other species,
are integral elements in a system of interdependence; (c) The belief that all
organisms are teleological centers of life in the sense that each is a unique
individual pursuing its own good in its own way; (d) The belief that humans are
not inherently superior to other living beings.
In this regards, Taylor would simply suggest all living beings including humans and nonhumans
species to respect for its nature. Thus, rejecting the notion of human superiority entails its
positive counterpart: the doctrine of species impartiality.
In its third section it inquires the question ‘Is species egalitarianism hypocritical?’ In this
part, William French argued that it is not possible for Taylor and Naess to have both ways in
advocating biocentrism and yet they allow that human needs override the needs of nonhumans.
French is in contrast between the egalitarian principles that Taylor and Naess officially endorse
and the unofficial principles they offer as the real principles by which we should live. It is
hypocritical in this sense because while advocating for the welfare of all organism in a biosphere,
and yet Taylor and Naess would still allow that human needs overriding the needs of nonhumans.
Perhaps, it would be an injustice in the part of the nonhuman species because human needs are
satisfied in the expenses of their liberation or more explicitly, their lives. For Schmidtz, species
egalitarianism requires us to avoid mortal combat whenever we can, not just with other humans
but with all things in general. He added that what seems far more problematic for species
egalitarianism is that it seems to suggest that makes no difference what we kill.
On the fourth part it asks the question ‘Is species egalitarianism arbitrary?’ Taylor’s
ground he says, a being has intrinsic worth if and only if it has a good of its own. But James
Anderson did not agree to it, and he points out that if we accept Taylor’s idea of a thing having a
good of its own, then that licenses us to notice differences among the various kinds of good of its
own. Anderson’s view is that so long as we do not assume away this possibility, valuing
cognitive capacity is not anthropocentric. The question is what would make any species superior
to another. As Schmidtz mentioned, Taylor defines anthropocentrism as giving exclusive or
primary consideration to human interests above the good of other species. He put it this way, if
biocentrism involves resolving to ignore the fact that cognitive capacity is something we value –
if biocentrism amounts to a resolution to value only those capacities that all living things share –
then biocentrism is at least as arbitrary and question-begging as anthropocentrism. The problem
with this is that, where there is one property that provides a basis for moral standing, there might
be others. Others properties might be possessed by some but not all species, and might provide
bases for different kinds or degrees of moral standing.
In the fifth part, it talks on ‘the multiple bases for moral standing.’ Taylor himself
assumes that human rationality is on a par with a cheetah’s foot-speed. It hardly seems
unreasonable to see the difference between the foot-speed of chimpanzees and cheetahs as a
difference of degree, while seeing the difference between sentience of a chimpanzee and the non-
sentience of a tree as a difference in kind. We may of course conclude that one of the grounds of
our moral standing is something we share with all living things. Beyond that, nothing about
equality even suggests itself.
In its sixth part, it gives emphasis on the ‘praises of speciesism.’ William French invites
us to see species rankings not as an assessment of some inherent superiority, but rather as a
considered moral recognition of the fact that greater ranges of vulnerability are generated by
broader ranges of complexity and capacities. One species outranks another not because it is a
superior form of life but rather because it is a more vulnerable form of life. But Schmidtz sees
this interpretation as problematic. Perhaps, this interpretation is forced upon French.
Vulnerability, on any interpretation, is essentially of derivative importance; any role it could play
in ranking species must already be played by the capacities themselves.
Moreover, on its seventh part, it has dealt with ‘equality and transcendence.’ We can
have reasons to treat nonhuman species with respect, regardless of whether we consider them to
be on a moral par with Homo sapiens. One reason to care is that gratuitous destruction is a
failure of self-respect. It is a repudiation of the kind of self-awareness and self-respect that we
can achieve by repudiating wantonness. In this respect, the main concern here is to impose
equality to each living beings, regardless its limitations and imperfectness. Perhaps, its concern is
to revere life to its fullest.
On its eighth section, it dealt on the ‘respect for everything.’ A broad respect for living or
beautiful or well-functioning things need not translate into equal respect. It need not translate
into universal respect, either. Its main project was to respect every single living being in the
biosphere.
On the last part of the article, it dealt about the ‘the history of the debate.’ Schmidtz
showed the three distinct projects that are odd project in the history of philosophy, it goes: (1)
determining our essence; (2) specifying how we are different from all other species; and (3)
specifying what makes us morally important. What makes us morally important is that we are
capable of suffering. There is no room to wonder whether species egalitarianism is even
compatible with respect for nature. This last part would somehow remind us that amidst
distinctions of different species, there are still always solutions to the tensions in respecting ones
nature and being.
Indeed, the article by David Schmidtz was good enough to somehow enlighten us why
other species command our respect and why others do not command equal respect. In my own
assessment, Schmidtz tries to reconcile species egalitarianism in a way that even one is not an
egalitarian, there is still an echo of respecting the nature of all living beings.