Republic v. Karbasi PDF

3/30/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 764
G.R. No. 210412. July 29, 2015.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. KAMRAN F. KARBASI, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Civil Law; Citizenship;

Citizenship is personal and, more or less a permanent
membership in a political community.—Citizenship is
personal and, more or less a permanent membership
in a political community. It denotes possession within
that particular political community of full civil and
political rights subject to special disqualifications.
Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the
political community. The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to
participate in government principally through the
right to vote, the right to hold public office and the
right to petition the government for redress of
grievance.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 353

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000169cf29be7ea9614ea7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/49
Republic vs. Karbasi
Same; Same; Naturalization; Republic Act (RA)

No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the
Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by
administrative proceeding by filing a petition for
citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view
of the facts before it, may approve the petition and
issue a certificate of naturalization.—No less than the
1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino
citizens. Among those listed are citizens by
naturalization. Naturalization refers to the legal act
of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
privilege of a native-born citizen. Under the present
laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or
administrative. Judicially, the Naturalization Law
provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship
and the receipt of evidence showing that the
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required by law, the competent court
may order the issuance of the proper naturalization
certificate and its registration in the proper civil
registry. On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9139 provides that aliens born and residing in the
Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by
administrative proceeding by filing a petition for
citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in
view of the facts before it, may approve the petition
and issue a certificate of naturalization. In both cases,
the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines as a sovereign nation.
Same; Same; Same; Naturalization is not a right,
but one (1) of privilege of the most discriminating, as
well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it
does, public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor.—It is a well-entrenched

rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be
given away. All those seeking to acquire it must
prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that they have
complied with all the requirements of the law. The
reason for this requirement is simple. Citizenship
involves political status; hence, every person must be
proud of his citizenship and should cherish it.
Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of
the most discriminating, as well as delicate and
exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of
the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only
under the precise conditions prescribed by law
therefor.

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354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Naturalization; An

applicant must comply with the jurisdictional
requirements; establish his or her possession of the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
enumerated under the law; and present at least two (2)
character witnesses to support his allegations.—
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization,
the application must show substantial and formal
compliance with the law. In other words, an applicant
must comply with the jurisdictional requirements;
establish his or her possession of the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications enumerated under
the law; and present at least two (2) character

witnesses to support his allegations. Section 2 of the
Naturalization Law clearly sets forth the
qualifications that must be possessed by any
applicant.
Same; Same; Same; Lucrative Income; A long line
of cases reveals that the Supreme Court (SC) did not
hesitate in reversing grants of citizenship upon a
showing that the applicant had no lucrative income
and would, most likely, become a public charge.—A
long line of cases reveals that the Court did not
hesitate in reversing grants of citizenship upon a
showing that the applicant had no lucrative income
and would, most likely, become a public charge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Had the law intended
for government data on livelihood and income research
to be used as a gauge for the “lucrative income”
requirement, it must have stated the same and
foreclosed the Court’s power to assess existing facts in
any given case.—As in any other business venture, the
risk of losses is a possibility for his repair shop but,
still, this risk was not clearly established to render his
livelihood as unstable and volatile. In fact, the OSG
does not belie the fact that Karbasi has been engaged
by reputable companies for his services. Conversely,
the findings of the RTC would indicate that Karbasi
had indeed exhibited industry and hard work in
putting up his repair shop business and that his wife
considered him as a good provider, not to mention a
vocational and college degree holder. Admittedly,
testimonies in favor of an applicant for naturalization
are expected to be self-serving. Nevertheless, the
Court finds it difficult to agree with the OSG’s meager
use of government data to prove that Karbasi would
become a burden to the Philippine society in the
future. Except for its own citation of government data,
nothing else was presented to establish that Karbasi

had indeed no lucrative income or trade to support
himself and his

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 355

family. To accept the OSG’s logic is a dangerous

precedent that would peg the compliance to this
requirement in the law to a comparison with the
results of research, the purpose of which is unclear.
This is not to say that the data produced by
government research are inappropriate, or much less
irrelevant in judicial proceedings. The plain reliance
on this research information, however, may not be
expected to produce the force of logic which the OSG
wants to attain in this case. Besides, had the law
intended for government data on livelihood and
income research to be used as a gauge for the
“lucrative income” requirement, it must have stated
the same and foreclosed the Court’s power to assess
existing facts in any given case. Here, the Court opts
to exercise this power and delve into a judicious
review of the findings of the RTC and the CA and, as
explained, to rule that Karbasi, possesses a lucrative
income and a lawful occupation, as required by the
Naturalization Law.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Reciprocity; The
Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or subjects of
a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos
the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects.—
Considering the above disquisitions, the Court does

not need to belabor the last issue on reciprocity
between Iranian and Philippine laws on
naturalization. True, the Naturalization Law
disqualifies citizens or subjects of a foreign country
whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of Karbasi’s
petition, both with the RTC and the CA, together with
his supplemental pleadings filed with the Court,
however, reveals that he has successfully established
his refugee status upon arrival in the Philippines. In
effect, the country’s obligations under its various
international commitments come into operation.
Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, must be considered in this case, to wit:
Article 6 of the 1951 Convention: For the purposes
of this Convention, the term “in the same
circumstances” implies that any requirements
(including requirements as to length and conditions of
sojourn or residence) which the particular individual
would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in
question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by
him, with the exception of requirements which by
their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Article 34 of the 1951 Convention: The
Contracting States shall as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees. They shall in particular make every
effort to

356
ANNOTATED
expedite naturalization proceedings and to

reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such
proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees; Article 7 of the said
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
expressly provides exemptions from reciprocity, while
Article 34 states the earnest obligation of contracting
parties to “as far as possible facilitate the assimilation
and naturalization of refugees.”—Article 7 of the said
Convention expressly provides exemptions from
reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest
obligation of contracting parties to “as far as possible
refugees.” As applied to this case, Karbasi’s status as
a refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino
citizenship, in consonance with Philippine statutory
requirements and international obligations. Indeed,
the Naturalization Law must be read in light of the
developments in international human rights law
specifically the granting of nationality to refugees and
stateless persons.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the

decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Angeles Law Office & Associates for
respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible

refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to
expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as
far as possible the charges and costs of such
proceedings.1
_______________
1 Article 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status

of Refugees.

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 357

This is a petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
January 29, 2013 Decision2 and the November
27, 20133 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01126-MIN, which
affirmed the January 17, 2007 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City
(RTC), in a naturalization case docketed as
Naturalization Case No. 2866. The RTC order
granted the petition for naturalization and, thus,
admitted Karman F. Karbasi as a citizen of the
Philippines.

The Facts

On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi

(Karbasi) filed a petition for naturalization with
the RTC, where he alleged the following:
1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;

2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by
the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a certification duly
issued by the UNHCR;
3. He is presently residing with his family at 341
Burgos Street, Dipolog City, since early part of June
2000 and more so has resided continuously in the
Philippines for not less than 11 years immediately
preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11
July 1990 and in Dipolog City for more than one (1)
year;
4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan
and his other places of residence, prior to his present
residence, were as follows (i) Panay Ave., Quezon
City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii) Capi-
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 24-37. Penned by Associate Justice Oscar V.

Badelles and concurred into by Associate Justices Edgardo
A. Camello and Renato C. Francisco of the Twenty-Second
Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
3 Id., at pp. 38-39.

358

ANNOTATED
tol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas,

Zamboanga del Norte;
5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran,
Iran, as shown in his identity card which also serves
as his birth certificate;
6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino
citizen, 22 years old and born on 10 August 1979 in
Cebu City, whom he married on 12 October 2000 in
Dipolog City, as shown in their certificate of marriage;
8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, 1 year old, was
born on 9 June 2001 in Dipolog City and presently
residing with him and his wife at 341 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City;
9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an
assumed name (Syed Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11
July 1990 specifically at the Manila International
Airport onboard Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731,
per UNHCR certification containing reference to his
Pakistani passport issued under said assumed name;
10. Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the
benefit of Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
which reduced to five years the ten year requirement
of continuous residence;
11. He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
12. His trade or occupation is as a repair technician
in which he has been engaged since 1998 and, as such,
he derives an average annual income of Php80,000.00
more or less;
13. He has all the qualifications required under
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under
Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act No. 473;
14. He has complied with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473)
regarding the filing with the Office of the Solicitor
General of his bona fide intention to become a citi-

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zen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration

of Intention duly filed on 25 May 2001;
15. It is his intention in good faith to become a
citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
particularly to Iran of which, at this time, he is a
citizen or subject; that he will reside continuously in
the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship;
16. Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age,
Filipino, married and residing at ABC Compound,
Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City and Alton C.
Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing
at 047 Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino
citizens, whose affidavits are attached to his petition,
will appear and testify as witnesses at the hearing
thereof.
[Emphasis supplied]

On July 2, 2002, after finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued
an order setting the petition for hearing on
October 21, 2002 and ordering the publication
thereof, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga
del Norte and in the cities of Dipolog and

Dapitan. In the same Order, persons concerned
were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the
petition should not be granted and oppose the
petition.
On July 22, 2002, the RTC amended its
previous order and, with notice to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), reset the hearing on
September 10, 2003 instead because the
National Printing Office could no longer
accommodate the publication requirement before
the first hearing date.
On December 2, 9 and 16, 2002, copies of the
amended order and Karbasi’s petition were
published in the Official Gazette. Subsequently,
the same were published in Press Free-

360

ANNOTATED
dom on January 27, February 3 and 10, 2003.

The said copies were likewise posted on the
bulletin boards of the RTC and the Municipal
Building of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte and
Capitol Building, Dipolog City.
On September 10, 2003, Karbasi and his
counsel appeared and presented proof of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
Nobody appeared to interpose an objection to the
petition.
During the hearing on May 18, 2006, Alton C.

Ratificar (Ratificar) and Dominador Natividad
Tagulo (Tagulo) testified as character witnesses.
Ratificar testified that in 1990, he was
introduced to Karbasi whose house was located
about 30 meters away from his; that he came to
know him since then; that when Karbasi got
married, he was invited to the wedding
ceremony where the then City Mayor of Dipolog
was one of the wedding sponsors; that he also
attended the celebration; that he used to see
Karbasi almost every day as he owned an
electronics repair shop near his house; that
Karbasi would also allow neighbors, who did not
own television sets at home, to watch shows at
his repair shop; that he never heard of any
complaint by the neighbors against Karbasi, who
went to church during Sundays and even on
weekdays; that on several occasions, he was
invited to Karbasi’s home, where he observed his
good relationship with his in-laws and his
treatment of his wife and child which was in
accordance with Filipino customs; and that
Karbasi talked to him in both Visayan and
English.
For his part, witness Tagulo testified that he
worked at the Andres Bonifacio College and had
known Karbasi since July 1990 when the latter
was then enrolled in a vocational course; that
Karbasi was very respectful to his instructors
and that he had good grades; that he treated his
schoolmates in accordance with Filipino
customs; that he never showed any inclination to
violence; that when Karbasi transferred to
Dumaguete City, he visited him there; and that
during this visits,


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Tagulo witnessed how Karbasi socially

interacted and mingled with the rest of the
community.
On August 10, 2006, the wife of Karbasi, Cliji
G. Lim (Cliji), also took the witness stand. She
testified that her father introduced her to
Karbasi during her graduation party; that a
courtship followed thereafter for five months,
during which Karbasi was well-behaved and
acted like any other Filipino; that when Karbasi
proposed marriage to her, he was accompanied
by his brother, Ali Karbasi; that Karbasi’s
baptism as a Catholic coincided with her
birthday; that after their marriage, they begot
two (2) children; that Karbasi continuously
stayed with his family and never returned to
Iran; that he was a good husband, father and
provider; that all his income from the repair
shop was turned over to her for the budgeting of
the family’s expenses; and that he was then
earning a daily income of P1,000.00.
She added that Karbasi and his family
regularly attended the Catholic mass and
received communion; that they were active
members of Couples for Christ since 2003; that
he actively participated in Catholic practices like
the novena and vigil for her deceased
grandfather; that Karbasi was not a polygamist
and that he did not flirt with other women; that
she never heard her husband speak of any

terrorist groups; and that he was never known to
have an immoral reputation.
On several hearing dates thereafter, Karbasi
himself took the witness stand. As summarized
by the RTC, the gist of his testimony is as
follows:
He is an Iranian national. He was born in Tehran,

Iran, and resided there since birth up to 1986. His
father is Abdolhossein Karbasi, a doctor in Iran, and
his mother is Narjes Froghnia Karbasi, a retired
teacher.
He has five brothers and two sisters. The eldest of
the brood, Hamid Reza Karbasi, is in the United
States of America and is now an American Citizen.
The second, Dr. Ali Reza Karbasi, admitted as
Filipino citizen in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
Dipolog City, is in the

362

ANNOTATED
Philippines. The third is Qite Karbasi, his sister.

The fourth, his brother, Dr. Abduoul Reza Karbasi,
graduated in India. The fifth, his sister, Kia Karbasi,
is a nurse. The sixth, his brother Qolam Reza Karbasi,
is an engineer who graduated in France. His last four
siblings are all in Iran.
He was a Shiite Muslim before he was converted as
Roman Catholic. His former religion believes in the
existence of a Supreme Being called God. It believes
in the existence of government and repudiates

violence. His said religion is not within an
organization of Al Qaeda, Jemayah Islamiya, or any
terrorist group. It also adheres to the principle of one
man-one woman marital relation.
He and his brother, Ali Reza Karbasi, left Iran in
1986 because of the war between Iran and Iraq at that
time. When the Shah of Iran, Pahlavi, was
overthrown by Ayatolah Khomini in 1979, some
Iranian nationals left Iran. He and Ali Reza, who also
condemns the act of overthrowing an existing
government by force and violence, were among those
who left. Since the government confiscated his
passport, they traveled by camel and passed by the
desert during nighttime to reach Pakistan. He stayed
there for almost three (3) years.
Being foreigners in Pakistan, they submitted
themselves to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. However, they were not granted the
status of refugee right away since Pakistan is
adjacent to Iran. They had to transfer to a third
country not at war with Iran. Since his brother Ali
Reza was already studying in the Philippines, they
decided to come here.
As it was difficult for him to get travel documents,
petitioner procured a Pakistani passport under the
assumed name of Syed Gul Agha.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July 11,
1990, he submitted himself to the United Nations in
Manila. After several interviews, he was admitted as
a refugee and, later on, as a person of concern. As a
refugee, he was granted by the United Nations
allowances, medical benefits and protection to some
extent.

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 363

After having been interviewed by the Solicitor

General regarding his intention to become a Filipino
citizen, he filed the corresponding Declaration of
Intention, dated March 28, 2001, on May 25, 2001.
Sometime in 2002, petitioner, having signified his
intention to become a Filipino citizen, was issued a
certification captioned “UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, Liaison Office for the Philippines,” dated 25
June 2002, certifying that he has been recognized as a
person of concern who arrived in the Philippines on 11
July 1990 onboard Philippine Airlines flight 731
under an assumed name (Syed Gul Agha).
At the time of the filing of the petition, he was
already married and residing at 341 Burgos Street,
Dipolog City. However, upon arrival in the
Philippines, he first resided at Panay Avenue, Quezon
City, where he stayed for almost six months. During
those times, the United Nations provided him a
monthly allowance of P2,800.00, being a refugee. He
then transferred to Burgos Street, Miputak, Dipolog
City, where he stayed at the house of the father-in-
law of his brother Ali Reza for a month.
He then moved to Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City, at
the house of his sister-in-law. It was during this time
that he enrolled at Andres Bonifacio College where he
studied from 1990 to 1992. He finished a two-year
vocational course in said school as evidenced by a
Diploma issued by the Andres Bonifacio College,
Dipolog City. In Iran, he finished Bachelor of Science
in Economics.
He then pursued a four-year course (Bachelor of

Science in Industrial Technology Major in Electronics)
at the Central Visayas Polytechnic College in
Dumaguete City. He resided in the Capitol Area of
said city. He was already receiving a monthly
allowance of P4,800.00 from the United Nations at
that time. He graduated from said institution as
evidenced by a Diploma issued by said school. He also
attended technical trainings conducted by Asian
Durables Manufacturing, Inc. as evidenced by a
Certificate of Attendance issued by said company.

364

ANNOTATED
In 1996, he returned to Dipolog City and resided at

Burgos Street where he opened his electronics repair
shop (KX3 Electronics Repair Shop).
On October 12, 2000, he got married. The couple
transferred to the house of his parents-in-law after
the marriage. When the grandfather of his wife got ill,
they were requested to take care of him. Thus, the
couple transferred their residence to Dohinob, Roxas.
However, they moved back to their house in Burgos
Street, Dipolog City, as it is nearer to a hospital.
When his grandfather-in-law died, he participated in
all the rites and ceremonies relative to his wake and
burial.
At present, his repair shop’s gross monthly income
hovers between P20,000.00 to P25,000.00.”4

Additionally, Karbasi claimed that he had
never been involved in any demonstration or
mass action protesting any issuances, policies or
acts of the Philippine Government and its
officials; that he had never made any rebellious
or seditious utterances; that he believed in the
principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution and he had even memorized the
preamble; and that he can also sing the
Philippine National Anthem and recite the
Filipino Patriotic Pledge, both of which he did in
open court.
The following documents were proffered in
Karbasi’s Formal Offer of Exhibits: 1] Identity
Card issued by Iran to prove his Iranian
citizenship; 2] Pakistani passport with visa
under the assumed name of Syed Gul Agha; 3]
Certifications and Identification Card issued by
the UNHCR to prove his status as a refugee and,
later, as a “person of concern”; 4] Alien
Certificate of Registration; 5] Certifications to
prove Filipino nationality of Karbasi’s wife, Cliji
G. Lim; 6] Certificate of Marriage between
Karbasi and Cliji; 7] Certificates of Live Birth of
his children Keenyji and Kerl Jasmen; 8]
Karbasi’s Certificate of Baptism; 9] Affidavits of
his character witnesses
_______________
4 RTC Decision, id., at pp. 46-47.

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 365

Alton C. Ratificar and Dominador Tagulo; 10]

Police and NBI Clearances; 11] Certifications
and Diploma to prove his completion of
vocational technology, BS Industrial Technology,
and training seminars; 12] Alien Employment
Permit for Refugees; 13] Business Permit,
Clearances and DTI Certificates of Accreditation
to KX3 Repair Shop, Karbasi’s source of
livelihood; 14] Income Tax Returns for the years
2001 to 2005; and 15] Contract of Service with
Quality Circuits Services, Inc. and Kolins
Philippines Intl., Inc., including a Summary of
Accounts paid to KX3 Electronics Repair Shop.5
On January 17, 2007, the RTC found
Karbasi’s evidence sufficient to support his
petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

petition for naturalization filed by KAMRAN F.
KARBASI to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines
is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.6
Not in conformity, the Republic of the

Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA,
based mainly on the ground that the RTC erred
in granting Karbasi’s petition as he failed to
comply with the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 473 (Naturalization Law) on character,
income and reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG

pointed out that Karbasi failed to establish that:
1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of naturalization
to Filipino citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income
as required under the law; and 3] he is of good
moral character as shown by his disregard of
Philippine tax laws when he had underdeclared
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 29-30.

6 Id., at p. 50.

366

ANNOTATED
his income in his income tax returns (ITRs) and

overstated the same in his petition for
naturalization.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the
assailed decision affirming the grant of Filipino
citizenship to Karbasi. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

DENIED. The Decision dated 17 January 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10 in
Naturalization Case No. 2866 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled that the alleged under

declaration in Karbasi’s ITRs was prepared in
good faith because he was of the belief that he no
longer needed to include the income he received
as payment of his services to Daewoo Electronics
Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins
Philippines International, Inc. (Kolins), because
the same were already withheld at source. The
CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that
Karbasi, as a refugee, need not prove reciprocity
between Philippine and Iranian laws.
Hence, this petition.

Position of the OSG

The OSG asserts that the findings of the
courts a quo are not in accord with law and
jurisprudence because Karbasi failed to prove
that he had a lucrative income and an
irreproachable character. It insists that Karbasi
failed to establish his lucrative income
considering that at the time of the filing of his
petition for naturalization in 2002, his gross
income was P21,868.65. Per table of Annual
Income and Expenditure in Western Mindanao,
the average income for the year 2000 was
P86,135.00 and for 2003 was P93,000.00. This
_______________
7 Id., at p. 36.

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 367

shows that Karbasi’s declared gross income was

way below the average income and average
expenses in Western Mindanao, the region
where Dipolog City, his residence, is located. The
OSG argues that even if the subsequent years
were to be considered, Karbasi’s income was still
insufficient as compared to the average income
and expenditure in the area. Karbasi’s declared
income for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 were
P31,613.00, P41,200.00 and P39,020.00,
respectively. The same table presentation,
however, provides that the average expenditure
for the year 2000 was P69,452.00, and for the
year 2003 was P75,000.00. This shows that
Karbasi’s declared gross income was not enough
to support his family within the contemplation of
the law. Whether based on his testimony or on
his ITRs, Karbasi’s gross income was not
adequate, given the high cost of living prevailing
in the region. The OSG also mentions that
Karbasi’s child had started formal schooling
which would entail substantial income on the
part of Karbasi, so that he could meet his
family’s needs.
The OSG cites the discrepancy between his
petition for naturalization and his ITRs as
another reason to deny his application for
Filipino citizenship. An examination of the
petition discloses that Karbasi claimed an
annual income of P80,000.00. He had also
declared in his testimony that he was earning
P20,000.00 to P25,000.00, monthly, from his
electronic repair shop. His ITRs on the other
hand, show his gross income as P14,870.00 in
2001; P21,868.65 in 2002; P31,613.00 in 2003;

P41,200.00 in 2004; and P39,020.00 in 2005.
The OSG further argues that the
“underdeclaration” of Karbasi’s income in his
ITRs reflects his disregard of Philippine tax laws
and, worse, its overstatement in his petition
indicates his intent to make it appear that there
was compliance with the Naturalization Law,
when there was actually none. According to the
OSG, this negates irreproachable behavior
which required of every applicant for
naturalization because the failure to enter the
true income on the tax return is indicative of
dishonesty. The OSG cited the ruling in Re-

368

ANNOTATED
public v. Yao,8 where the Court ordered the

cancellation of the naturalization certificate
issued to the applicant therein upon the
discovery of his underdeclaration and
underpayment of income tax. In the OSG’s
words, “[u]nderdeclaration of income is a serious
matter that it is used as a ground to cancel the
certificate of naturalization. If the court can
reverse the decision in an application for
naturalization, with more reason can
underdeclaration be considered in denying an
application,” as in Karbasi’s case.9

Position of Karbasi

In the April 7, 2014 Resolution of the Court,
Karbasi was required to file a comment on the
petition in which he mainly argued that the
petition did not raise questions of law but
questions of facts which were too unsubstantial
to require consideration. He countered that
while, admittedly, the “lucrative
trade/occupation” requirement under the law
must be complied with, it has been emphasized
in jurisprudence that, the objective of this
economic requirement is to ensure that the
applicant should not become a public charge or
an economic burden upon the society.10 Karbasi
claims that he had more than satisfactorily
established his lucrative trade or occupation,
showing that he would become a citizen who
could contribute to national progress. This has
been clearly and unanimously appreciated by
the RTC and the CA.
Karbasi also avers that the analysis of the
OSG with respect to the data on Annual Income
and Expenditure in Western Mindanao is
misplaced. Firstly, the data presented were
merely statistical and not actual, and did not
reflect the circumstances relative to a specific
subject or person. Hence, these are greatly
unreliable with respect to a specific person in a
naturalization case. At best, it was only intended
for the
_______________
8 G.R. No. 35947, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 748.

9 Rollo, p. 20.
10 Id., at p. 71.

369
VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 369

purpose it was made — for planning and for

policy making of the government and not to
determine whether a certain trade, occupation or
income is lucrative or not.
Anent the allegation that the
underdeclaration of his income projects was a
flaw on his moral character, Karbasi point out
that he had sincerely explained that his failure
to declare his correct annual income was in good
faith not intended to commit fraud. He believed
that the other sources of his income apart from
his repair shop had already been withheld by the
companies for whom he had rendered services.
For Karbasi, the meaning of “irreproachable” as
required by the law does not mean “perfectly
faultless.”
On September 18, 2014, Karbasi moved for
leave of court to file a supplemental pleading, in
which he insisted that pursuant to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, to which the Philippines was a
signatory, the country was bound to safeguard
the rights and well-being of the refugees and to
ensure the facility of their local integration
including naturalization. Karbasi reasoned that
this was precisely why Department Circular 58,
Series of 2012 was issued by the Department of
Justice (DOJ). Under the said circular, the

Refugees and Stateless Persons Unit was
created not only to facilitate the identification
and determination of refugees but also for the
protection of these refugees.
Karbasi insisted that unlike any other alien
applying for naturalization, he had to leave Iran
out of fear of persecution without any mental
and financial preparation, and only with a view
of finding safe refuge in the Philippines.

Reply of OSG

In its Reply, the OSG contended that Karbasi
could not downplay the significance of the Data
on Annual Income and Expenditure in Western
Mindanao, as it was an accurate illustration of
the financial condition of a typical family in a

370

ANNOTATED
particular region. The said table was prepared

by the National Statistics Coordination Board
(NSCB), which strengthened the credibility of
the report. The OSG explained that whether the
data were statistical or actual, the numbers still
reflected the financial standing of Karbasi. It
followed then that Karbasi could not claim good
faith in failing to declare the income he gained
from his transactions with several companies.
He even failed to present a certificate of tax

withheld to show that these companies had
actually remitted the withholding taxes due to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Even assuming
that Karbasi’s declared income allegedly
excluded the amount withheld by these
companies, the OSG claimed that his income
would still be below the standard income and
expenditure per the table.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court is confronted with the issue of
whether or not the CA had correctly affirmed the
RTC decision granting Karbasi’s application for
naturalization despite the opposition posed by
the OSG.
Citizenship is personal and more or less a
permanent membership in a political
community. It denotes possession within that
particular political community of full civil and
political rights subject to special
disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes the
duty of allegiance to the political community.11
The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy
political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to
vote, the right to hold public office and the right
to petition the government for redress of
grievance.12
_______________
11 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of

the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 629, 2009
ed.
12 Id., at pp. 629-630.

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 371

No less than the 1987 Constitution

enumerates who are Filipino citizens.13 Among
those listed are citizens by naturalization.
Naturalization refers to the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a
native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the
process of naturalization can be judicial or
administrative. Judicially, the Naturalization
Law provides that after hearing the petition for
citizenship and the receipt of evidence showing
that the petitioner has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications required by law, the
competent court may order the issuance of the
proper naturalization certificate and its
registration in the proper civil registry. On the
other hand, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139
provides that aliens born and residing in the
Philippines may be granted Philippine
citizenship by administrative proceeding by
filing a petition for citizenship with the Special
Committee, which, in view of the facts before it,
may approve the petition and issue a certificate
of naturalization.14 In both cases, the petitioner
shall take an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines as a sovereign nation.
It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine
citizenship should not easily be given away.15 All
those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the

satisfaction of the Court, that they have
_______________
13 Section 1, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
14 Republic Act No. 9139 entitled “An Act Providing for
the Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship for Certain Aliens
by Administrative Naturalization and for Other purposes.”
15 Tochip v. Republic, 121 Phil. 248, 250; 13 SCRA 251,
254 (1965).

372

ANNOTATED
complied with all the requirements of the law.

The reason for this requirement is simple.
Citizenship involves political status; hence,
every person must be proud of his citizenship
and should cherish it. Naturalization is not a
right, but one of privilege of the most
discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting
nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of

the highest order, and which may be enjoyed
only under the precise conditions prescribed by
law therefor.16
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial
naturalization, the application must show
substantial and formal compliance with the law.
In other words, an applicant must comply with
the jurisdictional requirements; establish his or
her possession of the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications enumerated under the law;
and present at least two (2) character witnesses
to support his allegations.17 Section 2 of the
_______________
16 Cuaki Tan Si v. Republic, 116 Phil. 855, 857; 6 SCRA

545, 556 (1962).
17 Section 7. Petition for citizenship.—Any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the
competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two
photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and
surname; his present and former places of residence; his
occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or
married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace
and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the
approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the
name of the port of debarkation, and if he remembers it, the
name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has
the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same,
and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the
provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the
requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will
reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the
applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the
affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they

are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of
time required by this Act and a person of good repute and
morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 373

Naturalization Law clearly sets forth the

qualifications that must be possessed by any
applicant, viz.:
Section 2. Qualifications.—Subject to section four

of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines
for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and
believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English

or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages;
_______________
opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen

of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under
the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the
names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the
petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case.
The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention
must be made part of the petition.

374

ANNOTATED
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of

school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private Education
of the Philippines, where the Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as
part of the school curriculum, during the entire period
of the residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization
as Philippine citizen.
[Emphasis supplied]
The contention in this case revolves around

the following points:
1. the sufficiency of Karbasi’s income for
purposes of naturalization;
2. the effect of the alleged discrepancy in the

amounts of his gross income as declared in his
ITRs, on one hand, and in his petition for
naturalization on the other; and
3. the necessity of proving reciprocity between
Iranian and Philippine laws on naturalization.
The Court resolves these issues in seriatim.
First. A reading of the OSG’s pleadings
discloses that its position arose out of a
comparison made between Karbasi’s declared
income and the amounts reflected in the Data on
Annual Income and Expenditure in Western
Mindanao issued by the NSCB. The OSG also
invokes the past rulings of the Court where the
concept of “lucrative trade, trade, profession or
lawful occupation” was explained in this wise:
It means not only that the person having the

employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities
in life. It must be shown that the employment gives
one an income such that there is an appreciable
margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to
provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sick-

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VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 375

ness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s

becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His
income should permit him and the members of his
family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance
with the prevailing standard of living, and

consistently with the demands of human dignity, at
this stage of our civilization.18

A long line of cases reveals that the Court did
not hesitate in reversing grants of citizenship
upon a showing that the applicant had no
lucrative income and would, most likely, become
a public charge. A summary of some of these
notable cases is in order:
1. In the Matter of the Petition for Admission to

Philippine Citizenship of Engracio Chan also known
as Nicasio Lim.19 — The Court found that the
petitioner, who was a salesman at the Caniogan Sari-
Sari and Grocery Store, then located in Pasig, Rizal,
from which he received a monthly salary of P200.00,
with free board and lodging, had no lucrative income.
Even if the petitioner was then an unmarried man
without dependents, a monthly income of P200.00
with free board and lodging, was not considered
gainful employment. Further, there was no proof that
he was legally authorized to use an alias and his use
thereof, being in violation of the Anti-Alias Law, was
indicative of a reproachable conduct.
2. In the Matter of the Petition of Antonio Po to be
admitted a Citizen of the Philippines.20 — The Court
found Antonio Po, then single and employed as
collector of the Surigao Chamber of Commerce as
without lucrative income on the ground that his
_______________
18 Republic v. Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012, 673

SCRA 485, 499, citing Tan v. Republic, 121 Phil. 643, 647; 13
SCRA 663, 667 (1965) and In the Matter of the Petition of
Ban Uan, 154 Phil. 552, 554; 55 SCRA 594, 596 (1974).
19 17 Phil. 475; 17 SCRA 474 (1966).

20 122 Phil. 943; 15 SCRA 548 (1965).

376

ANNOTATED
employment had so long depended upon the

selection of the succeeding presidents of the chamber
and that he then got free board and lodging by living
with his widowed mother. Simply put, there was not
enough stability in his claimed salary. His additional
income gained from helping his mother to run a store
was also insufficient to satisfy the law, in the amount
and in its steadiness. His free board and lodging
pretense was also discerned as indicative of
dependence upon his mother for support.
3. In the Matter of the Petition of Tanpa Ong alias
Pedro Tan to be admitted a Citizen of the
Philippines.21 — The income of the applicant as
contemplated in the naturalization law was only
P3,000.00 a year. Considering that he had a wife and
seven children to support, this income was held as
insufficient to meet the high cost of living at that
time.
4. Keng Giok v. Republic.22 — The Court held that
an income of P9,074.50 per annum was not sufficient
for a married applicant with a wife and five children
to support.
5. Sy Ang Hoc v. Republic.23 — The Court held that
his income, derived from employment in a business
enterprise of the petitioner’s father, was not sufficient
to establish compliance with the statutory

requirement of lucrative occupation or calling.
6. In the Matter of the Petition to be admitted a
Citizen of the Philippines by Pantaleon Sia alias
Alfredo Sia.24 — The Court ruled that the
determination of lucrative income or occupation
should be reckoned as of the time of the filing of the
petition. The Court decided against the petitioner as
his regular salary was not ample enough to defray his
family’s ex-
_______________
21 No. L-20605, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 535.

22 112 Phil. 986; 2 SCRA 1090 (1961).
23 111 Phil. 489; 1 SCRA 886 (1961).
24 No. L-20290, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 1003.

377
VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 377

penses. The excess amounts representing his

bonuses and commissions should not be considered in
determining whether or not petitioner had a lucrative
income or occupation.

With the pronouncements in these cases in
mind, the comparison made by the OSG now
begets another question: can the possession of an
applicant’s lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation, for purposes of naturalization, be
fairly determined through a simplistic read-

through on government data?
The Court answers in the negative.
While it is true that a naturalization case is
not an ordinary judicial contest to be decided in
favor of the party whose claim is supported by
the preponderance of the evidence, this does not
accord infallibility on any and all of the OSG’s
assertions. If this were the case, the rules of
evidence might as well be brushed aside in order
to accord conclusiveness to every opposition by
the Republic. Needless to state, the Court still
has the final authority and duty to evaluate the
records of proceedings a quo and decide on the
issues with fair and sound judgment.
Here, it is clear that the circumstances
prevailing in the above cited cases are not at all
attendant in Karbasi’s situation. There was
neither a showing that Karbasi was dependent
on another person for support nor proof that his
family’s extraordinary expenses that would
render his income as inadequate. As in any other
business venture, the risk of losses is a
possibility for his repair shop but, still, this risk
was not clearly established to render his
livelihood as unstable and volatile. In fact, the
OSG does not belie the fact that Karbasi has
been engaged by reputable companies for his
services. Conversely, the findings of the RTC
would indicate that Karbasi had indeed
exhibited industry and hard work in putting up
his repair shop business and that his wife
considered him as a good provider, not to
mention a vocational and college degree holder.
Admittedly, testimonies in favor of an appli-

378

ANNOTATED
cant for naturalization are expected to be self-

serving. Nevertheless, the Court finds it difficult
to agree with the OSG’s meager use of
government data to prove that Karbasi would
become a burden to the Philippine society in the
future. Except for its own citation of government
data, nothing else was presented to establish
that Karbasi had indeed no lucrative income or
trade to support himself and his family.
To accept the OSG’s logic is a dangerous
precedent that would peg the compliance to this
requirement in the law to a comparison with the
results of research, the purpose of which is
unclear. This is not to say that the data
produced by government research are
inappropriate, or much less irrelevant in judicial
proceedings. The plain reliance on this research
information, however, may not be expected to
produce the force of logic which the OSG wants
to attain in this case. Besides, had the law
intended for government data on livelihood and
income research to be used as a gauge for the
“lucrative income” requirement, it must have
stated the same and foreclosed the Court’s power
to assess existing facts in any given case. Here,
the Court opts to exercise this power and delve
into a judicious review of the findings of the RTC
and the CA and, as explained, to rule that
Karbasi, possesses a lucrative income and a
lawful occupation, as required by the

Naturalization Law.
At this point, it is worthy to note the Court’s
ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Chua25 (Chua), where the Court assessed the
prevailing circumstances of an applicant for
naturalization who was a medical student at the
time of the filing of her petition. In Chua, the
Court rejected the Republic’s argument that the
applicant’s status as a subsequent passer of the
Board Examinations of 1985 for Doctors of
Medicine could not by itself be equated with
“gainful employment or tangible receipts.” The
Court held that this interpretation of the income
requirement in the law is “too literal and
_______________
25 249 Phil. 84; 167 SCRA 86 (1988).

379
VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 379

restrictive.” It then cited Uy v. Republic,26 where

the Court laid down the public policy underlying
the lucrative income requirement as follows:
[T]he Court must be satisfied that there is

reasonable assurance not only that the applicant will
not be a social burden or liability but that he is a
potential asset to the country he seeks to adopt for
himself and quite literally, for his children and his
children’s children.
The Court, in Chua, continued:
The economic qualification for naturalization may

be seen to embody the objective of ensuring that the
petitioner would not become a public charge or an
economic burden upon society. The requirement
relates, in other words, not simply to the time of
execution of the petition for naturalization but also to
the probable future of the applicant for naturalization.
In the case at bar, the Solicitor General does not
dispute that respondent applicant, then a student,
was earning P2,000.00 a month, with free board and
lodging, at the time she filed her Petition in August
1984. While this amount was not, even in 1984,
exactly a princely sum, she was not then a public
charge and the respondent applicant having passed
the qualifying medical board examinations, can
scarcely be regarded as likely to become a public
charge in the future should she be admitted as a
citizen of this Republic. Respondent is certainly in a
position to earn substantial income if allowed to
exercise her profession. Being a Doctor of Medicine,
she is also clearly a “potential asset to the country.”27

As in Chua’s case, it does not at all seem
likely that Karbasi, in his current
circumstances, will ever become a public charge.
It bears emphasis to note that from a refugee
who had
_______________
26 120 Phil.973, 975; 12 SCRA 182, 184 (1964).

27 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25 at pp. 88-
89; p. 92.


380

ANNOTATED
nothing when he came to the Philippines,

Karbasi had indeed refused to be the object of
charity by working hard to graduate from college
and to eventually engage in business to give his
family support and comfort. The CA could not
have explained this in better terms —
Thus, Karbasi went from being a refugee — who

was dependent on the UNCHR for support — to a self-
made entrepreneur who can ably support himself and
his family. As such, there is no showing that Karbasi
may turn out to be a public charge and a burden to
our country’s resources. The fact moreover that he
overcame this adversity through his education and
skills shows that he is a potential asset of the country.

Second. The OSG raised the issue of
Karbasi’s alleged underdeclaration of income in
his ITRs. It contended that even if Karbasi had,
indeed, a lucrative means of earning, his failure
to declare the income which he had earned from
service contracts and to present any proof of the
withholding of the taxes thereon, would reflect
adversely on his conduct, which under the
statute must be “proper and irreproachable.”
The OSG cited Lim Eng Yu v. Republic28 (Lim
Eng Yu), where the applicant later refuted the
amounts reflected in his ITRs in order to prove
that he had lucrative trade or occupation. The

Court rebuffed this “eleventh hour explanation”
and concluded that the applicant had to conceal
his true income for the purpose of evading
payment of lawful taxes. The Court found that
Lim Eng Yu, at that time, had a wife and two
children, so, at most, his total tax exemption
then, was P5,000.00. Had he stated the net
incomes he claimed in his ITRs, he would have
been required to pay income taxes, it appearing
that the same exceeded his exemption under the
law. Such conduct showed that Lim Eng Yu’s
moral character was not irreproachable, or as
good as it should be, thus, disqualifying him for
naturalization.
_______________
28 124 Phil. 478; 17 SCRA 1058 (1966).

381
VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 381

Like the CA, the Court is inclined not to apply

the rigidity of the ruling in Lim Eng Yu to the
present case. Unlike Lim Eng Yu, Karbasi did
not deny the charge of the OSG and instead
admitted a procedural lapse on his part. Here,
there is no showing that the income earned by
Karbasi was undeclared in order to benefit from
statutory tax exemptions. To clarify, this does
not intend to downplay the requirement of good
moral character in naturalization cases. It bears

stressing that the granting of applications for
naturalization still necessitates that only those
who are deserving may be admitted as Filipino
citizens. The character of the applicant remains
to be one of the significant measures to
determine entitlement to Filipino citizenship.
Nonetheless, the tenor of the ground used for the
denial of the application in Lim Eng Yu is not
akin to what happened in this case.
Clearly, in Lim Eng Yu, the petitioner
altogether intended to evade the payment of
taxes by abusing the benefits granted by tax
exemptions. In this case, Karbasi did not deny
that he gained income through his transactions
with Daewoo and Kolin. He even presented, as
evidence, the contracts of service he had entered
into with the companies including a Summary of
Accounts paid to his repair shop. He did not
disclaim that he had rendered services to these
companies and that he had earned a
considerable sum therefrom. Instead, he
explained the cause of his lapse and
acknowledged his mistaken belief that his
earnings from these transactions need not be
declared in his ITRs as these were withheld
already.
Again, it is not the objective of the Court to
justify irregularities in ITRs by reason of a
“mistaken belief.” The Court, however, finds it
difficult to equate Karbasi’s lapse with a moral
depravity that is fatal to his application for
Filipino citizenship. This mistaken
understanding of the proper way to declare
income is actually so common to individual
taxpayers, including lawyers and other
professionals. While this is not to be taken as an
excuse for every irregularity in ITRs, the Court

is not prepared to consider this as an outright
re-

382

ANNOTATED
flection of one’s immoral inclinations. With due

consideration to his character as established by
witnesses, and as observed by the RTC during
the hearings, Karbasi should be deemed to have
sufficiently explained his mistake.
In the case of Chua, the Court had even
disregarded the OSG’s argument that the
applicant’s failure to execute her ITR “reflects
adversely on her conduct.” Her explanation of
non-filing as an “honest mistake” was accepted
by the Court with due regard to the other
circumstances of her case. Like the CA, the
Court also finds the same degree of sincerity in
Karbasi’s case, for he was candid enough to elicit
this conclusion. Besides, there was no suggestion
in the records that Karbasi habitually excluded
particular income in his ITRs. Echoing the
findings in Chua, the Court does not believe that
this one lapse should be regarded as having so
blackened Karbasi’s character as to disqualify
him from naturalization as a Philippine citizen.
Third. Considering the above disquisitions,
the Court does not need to belabor the last issue
on reciprocity between Iranian and Philippine
laws on naturalization. True, the Naturalization

Law disqualifies citizens or subjects of a foreign
country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the
right to become naturalized citizens or subjects.
A perusal of Karbasi’s petition, both with the
RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental
pleadings filed with the Court, however, reveals
that he has successfully established his refugee
status upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect,
the country’s obligations under its various
international commitments come into operation.
Articles 6 and 34 of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in
this case, to wit:

Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:

For the purposes of this Convention, the term
“in the same circumstances” implies that any
requirements (including requirements as to
length and conditions of so-

383
VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 383

journ or residence) which the particular individual

would have to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in
question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by
him, with the exception of requirements which by
their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.

Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:

The Contracting States shall as far as possible
refugees. They shall in particular make every
effort to expedite naturalization proceedings
and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs
of such proceedings.

In the same vein, Article 729 of the said
Convention expressly provides exemptions from
reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest
obligation of contracting parties to “as far
_______________
29 Exemption from reciprocity.— 1. Except where

this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a
Contracting State shall accord to stateless persons the same
treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.
2. After a period of three years residence, all stateless
persons shall enjoy exemption from legislative reciprocity in
the territory of the Contracting States.
3. Each Contracting State shall continue to accord to
stateless persons the rights and benefits to which they were
already entitled, in the absence of reciprocity, at the date of
entry into force of this Convention for that State.
4. The Contracting States shall consider favourably the
possibility of according to stateless persons, in the absence of
reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond those to which they
are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3, and to
extending exemption from reciprocity to stateless persons
who do not fulfill the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2
and 3.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to

the rights and benefits referred to in Articles 13, 18, 19, 21
and 22 of this Convention and to rights and benefits for
which this Convention does not provide.

384

ANNOTATED
as possible facilitate the assimilation and

naturalization of refugees.” As applied to this
case, Karbasi’s status as a refugee has to end
with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in
consonance with Philippine statutory
requirements and international obligations.
Indeed, the Naturalization Law must be read in
light of the developments in international
human rights law specifically the granting of
nationality to refugees and stateless persons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perlas-

**
Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—It has been held that in determining

the existence of a lucrative income, the courts
should consider only the applicant’s income; his
or her spouse’s income should not be included in
the assessment. (Republic vs. Ong, 673 SCRA

485 [2012])
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire
Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
“Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A
third option, called derivative naturalization,
which is available to alien women married to
Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of
CA 473. (Republic vs. Batuigas, 706 SCRA 746
[2013])

——o0o——
_______________
** Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate Justice

Mariano C. Del Castillo, per Special Order No. 2115, dated
July 22, 2015.
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3/30/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 764

G.R. No. 210412. July 29, 2015.*

Constitutional Law; Civil Law; Citizenship;

VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 353

Republic vs. Karbasi

Same; Same; Naturalization; Republic Act (RA)

prescribed by law therefor.—It is a well-entrenched

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Same; Same; Same; Judicial Naturalization; An

the law; and present at least two (2) character

nothing else was presented to establish that Karbasi

VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 355

family. To accept the OSG’s logic is a dangerous

Considering the above disquisitions, the Court does

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

expedite naturalization proceedings and to

PETITION for review on certiorari of the

The Contracting States shall as far as possible

1 Article 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status

VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 357

This is a petition for review on certiorari

On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Karbasi

1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;

2 Rollo, pp. 24-37. Penned by Associate Justice Oscar V.

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

tol Area, Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas,

VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 359

zen of the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration

del Norte and in the cities of Dipolog and

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

dom on January 27, February 3 and 10, 2003.

During the hearing on May 18, 2006, Alton C.

VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 361

Tagulo witnessed how Karbasi socially

she never heard her husband speak of any

He is an Iranian national. He was born in Tehran,

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Philippines. The third is Qite Karbasi, his sister.

in the existence of government and repudiates

VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 363

After having been interviewed by the Solicitor

He then pursued a four-year course (Bachelor of

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

In 1996, he returned to Dipolog City and resided at

4 RTC Decision, id., at pp. 46-47.

VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 365

Alton C. Ratificar and Dominador Tagulo; 10]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

Not in conformity, the Republic of the

income and reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG

5 Id., at pp. 29-30.

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

his income in his income tax returns (ITRs) and

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

The CA ruled that the alleged under

VOL. 764, JULY 29, 2015 367

shows that Karbasi’s declared gross income was

2001; P21,868.65 in 2002; P31,613.00 in 2003;

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS