Lee VS Ca

9/26/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 367
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lee vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001.
MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE,

PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE,
EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON.
JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch
47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO
LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-
VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK
SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE,
VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and
THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.
Special Proceedings; Civil Register; It is precisely the province of a

special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
—It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one
outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private
respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’ records of birth
were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was
impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the
petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners’
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are
illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former
are not the latter’s children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood
relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
Same; Same; The ruling in Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 168 SCRA 294
(1988), does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register, the
only requisite being that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate
adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding.
—Far from petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016d6e1937abaeffe1ef003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/31
Republic does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil
______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 111
register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an
appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary
proceeding. Thus: “If the purpose of the petition (for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court
may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a
mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial
in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may
be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted, x x x.” (Italics supplied.)
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; It is true that in special
proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy granted upon mere application or motion, but this is not always the
case, as when the statute expressly provides; Rule 108, when all the
procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in
entries of the civil register.—It is true that in special proceedings formal
pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted
upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when
the statute expressly provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always
summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108
to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se.
Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also requires
inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be
affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and
any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court
may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same
(Sec. 7). Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder
are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
112
Same; Same; Judgments; It is high time that the Court puts an end to
the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each
other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases
raising the same substantial issue; The pronouncements in Ty Kong Tin v.
Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), and Chua Wee v. Republic, 38 SCRA 409
(1971), proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article
412 of the New Civil Code pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or
innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its
implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status,
filiation and the like.—It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the
confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other,
and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the
same substantial issue. x x x x x x x x x We venture to say now that the
above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the
interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless
or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of
its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status,
filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately,
Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that
the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot,
therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have
merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on
the matter. The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412
contemplates a summary procedure.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In its ordinary sense, to correct
means “to make or set right,” “to remove the faults or errors from” while to
change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as a substitute.”—Secondly, it is important to
note that Article 412 uses both the terms “corrected” and “changed .” In its
ordinary sense, to correct means “to make or set right”, “to remove the
faults or errors from” while to change means “to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.” The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be

changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that
the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all
entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412.
What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than
Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
Same; Same; Judgments; The Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article
412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or
citizenship is erroneous.—It is beyond doubt that the specific matters
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VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 113
covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also
nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does
not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or
citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating
Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New
Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a
statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular
meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the
context and the nature of the subject treated.
Same; Same; Statutes, Republic Act (R.A.) 9048; The obvious effect of
R.A. 9048 providing that clerical or typographical errors in entries of the
civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial
order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general is to
remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors
in entries of the civil register, leaving for the scope of operation of Rule 108
substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.—Thirdly,
Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001
substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.” The above law speaks clearly. Clerical
or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected
and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the
ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the
civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are
substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is

precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had
said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court admits that though it has
constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, it has failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. R.A. 9048 now embodies that
summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary
proceeding.—It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is
Congress’ response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to
what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or correc-
114
tions of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that

appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial
kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an
appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just
what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary
procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that
as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No.
9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the
preceding treatise.
Same; Same; Actions; Prescription; Inasmuch as no law or rule
specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under
Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is Article 1149
of the New Civil Code which applies, in that the action must be brought
within five years from the time the right of action accrues.—As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically
prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in
relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision
of the New Civil Code that applies: “Art. 1149. All other actions whose
periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within
five years from the time the right of action accrues.” The right of action
accrues when there exist a cause of action, which consists of three (3)
elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the
defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last
element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action
has arisen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In petitions for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the records of birth arising from the falsification of
the entries, the petitioners’ right tiff action or right to sue accrued only
upon their discovery that they in fact had a cause of action.—It is
indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element
of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries
in petitioners’ birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago.
Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents’ right
of action or right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the
fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discovered
that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to
use said falsified birth records. Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if
we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the truth
about a fact, in this case, petitioners’ true mother, and
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VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 115
their real status, simply because they had discovered the dishonesty
perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date. This is
especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father’s
legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would
commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to
inherit from their mother’s (Keh Shiok Cheng’s) estate. It was only
sometime in 1989 that private respondents’ suspicions were aroused and
confirmed. From that that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years
had lapsed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Unlike a title to a parcel of
land, a person’s parentage cannot be acquired by prescription—one is either
born of a particular mother or not.—It is true that the books making up the
Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Petitioners liken
their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the
whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold
water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person’s parentage cannot be
acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. It
is that simple.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Forum Shopping; Words and
Phrases; Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.—
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. Even a
cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their
various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is
no identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for. The present
case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of
which is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners’ birth records.
Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the
relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal
complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of
action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the
action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng’s naturalization certificate
which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an
immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter,
the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng’s estate which has for its cause
of action the private respondents’ right under the New Civil Code to inherit
from their mother’s estate.
116

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Morales, Sayson & Mercado for petitioners.
Macarius S. Galutera; Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar and
Kapunan, Imperial, Panaguiton, Bongolan for private respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ 1
of Preliminary
Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court 2
of
Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31786. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the 3
Orders issued
by respondents
4
Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion and Hon. Jaime
T. Hamoy taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by
private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the
same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the
private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and
______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin and concurred in by Associate

Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.; Rollo, pp. 22-36.
2 Entitled “MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO

LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE and TIU
CHUAN versus HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in
their capacities as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 47, and RTC-Kalookan
City, Branch 130, respectively, and RITA K LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, in
their personal capacities and ROSA K/LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-
CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE,
MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL and
THOMAS K. LEE represented by RITA K. LEE. “
3 Presiding Judge of Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila.
4 Presiding Judge of Branch 130 of the RTC of Kalookan.
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VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 117

his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners
herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine,
Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek,
Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee,
Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-
Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private
respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee,
Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K.
Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as
petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all
petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the
Regional Trial5 Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC.
No. 92-63692 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by
respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a
similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before 6
the RTC of
Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. No. C-1674 and assigned to
the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and
erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by
deleting and/or canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as
their mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu
Chuan,” who is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial
courts that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng
and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime
in 1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China,
private respondents herein were all born and raised in the
Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival

in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She
was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new
housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan
_____________
5 CA Rollo, Annex A of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

6 CA Rollo, Annex A-1 of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.
118

immediately became Lee Tek Sheng’s mistress. As a result of their

illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every
time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common
father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of
petitioners by making it appear that petitioners’ mother was Keh
Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave
maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They all lived in the
same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were
residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondents’
discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father,
Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng’s demise on May 9,
1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children,
including those of petitioners’, be included in the obituary notice of
Keh Shiok Cheng’s death that was to be published in the
newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational
7
act that piqued private
respondents’ curiosity, if not suspicion.
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation
into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent
records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others,
the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners, specifically the
following:
1. As per Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1),

their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that he is the
12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon
investigation, it was found out that her Hospital Records,
the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given
birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of the attending
physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was “GRAVIDA I, PARA I”
which means “first pregnancy, first live birth delivery”

(refer to: MASTER PATIENT’S RECORDS SUMMARY
—Annex I). Also, the age of the mother when she gave
birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years
old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK CHENG’s age
was then already 38 years old. The address used by
____________
7 Rollo, pp. 171-172.
119
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 119

their father in the Master Patient record was also the same
as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal
Avenue, Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was
recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it
was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third child
which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of
KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG
(Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per
Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years old, but the
only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is
only 2 years.
3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it
was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5th child,
but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENG’S 5th child is
LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per Hospital
Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years
old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was
then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was
made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th child of
KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true,
considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have
stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per
Hospital Record, the age of the mother was omitted in the
records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK
CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic) given birth
to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is
impossible to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the
recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old.
Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the

difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO
LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it
will only mean that she have (sic) given birth at that
impossible age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it
was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH SHIOK
CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE
(Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH SHIOK
CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is
only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENG’s true age at
that time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per
complainant’s allegation, she was born at their house, and
was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it
was made to appear that he is the 14th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG
a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped
120

from 28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August

1957 to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on 22
April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last
son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is 48
years old. However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs.
LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years old.
Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO’s birth
on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK CHENG’s age is 38 years
old and at the time of EUSEBIO’s birth, she is already 48
years old, it is already impossible that she could have given
birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age. As
per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO’s
birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN
SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients

Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is
certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman,
most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and
analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in

fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with
his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate
children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd family and
secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would
not have been necessary had not the father and his 2nd family
kept on insisting that the
8
8 children are the legitimate children of
KEH SHIOK CHENG.
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the

petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners’
records of birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions—SP.
PROC. No. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. No. C-1674—on the grounds
that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective
is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition,
which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed 9
prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.
_____________
8 Rollo, pp. 348-349.

9 CA Rollo, Amended Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.
121
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 121

On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the

motion to dismiss SP. PROC. No. 92-63692 for failure of the herein
petitioners (defendants
10
in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of
the said motion. Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion
issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is

hereby given due course. Let this petition be set for hearing on March 29,
1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor of the
City Hall of Manila.
Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition
should file on or before the date of hearing his opposition thereto with a
statement of the grounds therefor.
Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.
Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be
served upon the Office of the Solicitor General, and the respondents, and be
posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the
petitioners. 11
SO ORDERED.
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated

April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:
It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the p

etitioners that the Order of the Court setting the case for hearing was
published in “Media Update” once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks,
that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit
of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies
of the “Media Update” published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy
of the order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition
had been served upon the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan
City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the private respondents, the
Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional
requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case.
_____________
10 CA Rollo, Annex D of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

11 CA Rollo, Annex B of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.
122

x x x x x x x x12 x
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the

abovementioned orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge Hamoy
failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries in petitioners’ records of birth to prosper
in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners
raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for
impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents
judges are sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and
legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private
respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings
despite the fact that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4)
Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already

time-barred; and 13
(5) The petitions below are part of a forum-
shopping spree.
Finding no merit in petitioners’ arguments, the Court of Appeals14
dismissed their petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was
also denied15
by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December
19, 1994.
Hence, this petition.
I. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court is improper since private respondents seek to have the entry
for the name of petitioners’ mother changed from “Keh
_____________
12 CA Rollo, Annex E of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 92-63692.

13 CA Rollo, Amended Petition in CA-G.R. No. 92-63692.
14 Rollo, p. 22.
15 Rollo, p. 38.
123
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 123

Shiok Cheng” to “Tiu Chuan” who is a completely different person.

What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a correction in
name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek
Sheng’s legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of16his mistress, Tiu
Chuan, in effect a “bastardization of petitioners.” Petitioners thus
label private respondents’ suits before the lower courts as a
collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108
proceeding.
Debunking petitioners’ above contention, the Court of Appeals
observed:
xxx xxx xxx

As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment x x
x, the proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status
and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to
establish the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which
created or affected
17
the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said
persons of rights.
xxx xxx xxx
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one

outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of 18
Court to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed
by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’

records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth
records. Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions before
the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the
prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate
children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not
the latter’s children. There is nothing
____________
16 Rollo, p. 7.
17 Rollo, p. 33.
18 Sec. 3 (c). Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
124

to impugn as there is 19no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok

Cheng and petitioners.
Further sanctioning private respondents’ resort to Rule 108, the
Court of Appeals adverted
20
to our ruling in the leading case of
Republic vs. Valencia where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI
of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the
correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner’s minor
children as stated in their records of birth from “Chinese” to
“Filipino,” and “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” respectively. Although
recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are
not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, this
Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a
civil register may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the21
error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case, we also laid
down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in
nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary
proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are
complied with. Thus we held:
“Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or
proceeding is ‘appropriate.’
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
‘SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.’
‘SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the
______________
19 Babiera v. Catotal, 333 SCRA 487 (2000); Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA
468 (1994); Cabatbat-Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451 (1988).
20 141 SCRA 462 (1986).
21 Id., p. 468.
125
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 125

hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.’
‘SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.’
“Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning

the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are—(1) the
civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the
duty of the court to—(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition:—(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
“If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and / or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed
and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer
be described as “summary.” There can be no doubt that when an opposition
to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and for corrected
and the opposition is actively
22
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.” (Italics supplied.)
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both

petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records
of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary
proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of

birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-
Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order setting the case for
hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) con-
_____________
22 Id., pp. 473-474.
126

secutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In

the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the
case for hearing in “Media Update” once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks. In both cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the
Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the
petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil
Registrars and the other respondents in the case below to file their
oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed
by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio,
all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an
opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private
respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the
requisite parties, notices and publications
23
could very well be regarded as
that proper suit or appropriate action. (Italics supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings

adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the
ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections
contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil
24
Code or mere clerical
errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.
25
The petitioners point to
the case of Labayo-Rowe
26
vs. Republic, which is of a later date than
Republic vs. Valencia. 27where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid28
down in earlier cases, starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,
prohibiting the extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners
______________
23 Rollo, p. 32.
24 Rollo, p. 310.
25 168 SCRA 294 (1988).
26 Supra, see note 20.
27 Brown v. Republic, 99 Phil. 818 (1956); Black, et al. v. Republic, 104 Phil. 848
(1958); Bantoto Coo v. Republic, 2 SCRA 42 (1961); Beduya v. Republic, 11 SCRA
109 (1964); Reyes vs. Republic, 12 SCRA 377 (1964); Baybayan v. Republic, 16
SCRA 403 (1966); Tan, et al. v. Republic, 16 SCRA 692 (1966); Matias v. Republic,
28 SCRA 31 (1969); Uy v. Local Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu, 46 SCRA 1
(1972); Republic v. Medina, 119 SCRA 271 (1982); Rosales v. Castillo Resales, 132
SCRA 132 (1984); Tan v. Republic, 133 SCRA 591 (1984), to name a few.
28 94 Phil. 321 (1954).
127
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 127

29
contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar, allowing
substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule
unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or
modifying substantive rights.
At the outset, it should 30be pointed out that in the cited case of
Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, the reason we declared null and void
the portion of the lower court’s order directing the change of
Labayo-Rowe’s civil status and the filiation of one of her children as
appearing in the latter’s record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was
inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe’s
petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable
parties to the case.
We explained in this wise:
“x x x. An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable

parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
“In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was
notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the
Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken,
which is summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents.
They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well,
together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights
would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected
by the change should be notified or represented x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
“The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be
substantially impaired if her status would be changed from ‘legitimate’ to
‘illegitimate.’ Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and

embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she
will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was
published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promul-
_____________
29 39 SCRA 350, 361 (1971).

128

gated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under

Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such
rules ‘shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.’ If Rule 108
were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections
of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as
to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule
would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. 31
This situation is not contemplated
under Article 412 of the Civil Code.” (Italics supplied)
Far from32petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs.

Republic does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries
of the civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under
Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-
distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:
“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries
in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible
to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary
procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as
repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes
which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the
nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted
to prove
33
the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted,
x x x.” (Italics supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing

may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere
application or motion. But this is not always the case, as
____________
31 Id., pp. 301-302.

33 Id., p. 299.
129
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 129

34
Hence, a special proceeding is not always
when the statute expressly provides.
summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is
contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the
petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also
requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required
to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make
orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, 35we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs.
Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register.
It must
36
be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs.
there continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not
Valencia
substantial corrections in entries of the civil register will be effected by means of Rule 108 in
relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of
37 38 do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or
Appeals and Republic vs. Labrador
typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be
used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those
involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
130

“This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case,
Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking
the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia
Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising
from the “non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage.” In
debunking the trial court’s ruling granting such petition, the Court held as
follows:
‘On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry
regarding “marriages” in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a
verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally,
the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or
clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a
marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing
(Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement
of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).’
‘Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of
petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be
granted except only in an adversarial x x x.’
‘Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that
matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his
and Virginia’s civil status from married to single and of their three children from
legitimate to illegitimate, x x x’
“Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will

change the status of a person from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” as
39
in Sarah
Zita’s case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings.”
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown
by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and
perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising
the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule
108 to substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied
_____________
39 Id., p. 444.
131
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 131

40
in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic that first delineated
the extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected
pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court
ruled in this case that:
“x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was
contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in
nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the nationality or
citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely a
clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error or
mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects
the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a

proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. Such action
can be found at random in our substantive and remedial laws the
implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and
circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion
is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in Article 412
is summary
41
in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial
issues.”
This doctrine42 was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al.
vs. Republic where the Court said that:
“From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the
promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was
no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial
authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in
the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should
be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law
on the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the
other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of
the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court ‘shall not dimmish or
increase or modify substantive rights.’ If Rule 108 were to be extended
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations
______________

41 Id., pp. 323-324.
42 38 SCRA 409 (1971).
132

concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of

marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would
be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which 43
changes are not
authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.” (Italics supplied)
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from

a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains
only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively
excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule,
substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and
the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty

Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine
that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature
and cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues.
Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine
without, however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412
contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as
follows:
“No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial

order.”
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed

except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by
judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the
procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is
summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the
terms “corrected” and “changed.” In its ordinary sense, to correct44
means “to make or set right”; “to remove the faults or errors from”
while to change means “to replace something with something 45
else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.”
______________
43 Id., p. 415.
44 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, @ 1993.
45 Ibid.
133
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 133

The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed

or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the
correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that
all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under
Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not
go further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the
answer.
“Art. 407 Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.”
“Art. 408 The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural

children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)
civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.”
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding

provisions include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the
Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate
matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is
erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412
from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil
Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that
a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the
particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase46 is
ascertained from the context and the47 nature of the subject treated.
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by Congress
on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New
Civil Code, to wit:
____________
46 Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688, 694 (1922); Araneta v. Concepcion and Araneta, 99
Phil. 709, 713 (1956); National Tobacco Administration v. COA, 311 SCRA 755, 769
(1999); Paras v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49, 54 (1996).
47 AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL
134

“SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and

Change of First Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.”
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in

entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed
without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the
ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in
entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of
operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in
entries of the civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty
Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another
indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress’
response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to
what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or
corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from
that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of
a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have
constantly referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have
failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act
No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is
that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at
bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which
has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding
treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no
cause of action to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the
_______________
OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST

NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A
JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PUPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412
OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
135
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 135

Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an48 action to
impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his death.
Article 171 provides:
“The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
“(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed
for bringing this action;
“(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having
desisted therefrom; or
“(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.”
Petitioners’ contention is without merit. 49

In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal, we upheld the decision
of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of
Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto
as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of
Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births. We
ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, had the requisite
standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera, another alleged child of the same spouses because she is the
one who stands to be benefited or injured by the 50
judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
We likewise held therein that:
“x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case A
close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the
father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that
______________
48 Rollo, p. 13.
50 Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
136

petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena,

51
but to establish that the
former is not the latter’s child at all. x x x”
52
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals that:
“Petitioner’s insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and

171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
“A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not
be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a
child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn
the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) that it was physically impossible
for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons the child could not have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or notification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this guiding as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when
it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is
not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is
not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was
not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision in
apropos, viz.:
‘Petitioners’ recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the
Family Code] is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she
is not the decedent’s child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child
____________
51 Supra, see note 19, p. 495.

52 Ibid.
137
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 137

53
by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.’ ”
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents’ cause of action had

already prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between
the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and54
the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for
filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article
412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New
Civil Code that applies:
“Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in
other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of
action accrues.”
The right of action accrues when there exist a cause of action, which
consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such
right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element
occurs or takes
55
place that it can be said in law that a cause of action
has arisen.
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action.
The last element of their cause of action, that is, the act of their
father in falsifying the entries in petitioners’ birth records, occurred
more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this
occurrence that private respondents’ right of action or right to sue
accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was
only sometime in 1989 that private respondents discov-
_____________
53 Id., pp. 472-474.

54 Rollo, p. 14.
55 Español v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314, 318
(1985).
138

ered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who
continue to use said falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive
private respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact,
in this case, petitioners’ true mother, and their real status, simply
because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them
by their common father at a much later date. This is especially true
in the case of private respondents who, as their father’s legitimate
children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit
such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to
inherit from their mother’s (Keh Shiok Cheng’s) estate. It was only
sometime in 1989 that private respondents’ suspicions were aroused
and confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five
(5) years had lapsed.
Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive
period from the date of the registration of the last birth among the
petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private
respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners’ birth
records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth
records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for
the right of action available to the private respondents started to run
from the time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil
Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners’ thinking on that point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all
documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be prima
56
56
facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Petitioners liken their
birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to
the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does
not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person’s parentage
cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular
mother or not. It is that simple.
IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum
shopping. They enumerate the other actions filed by private re-
_____________
56 Article 410 of the New Civil Code.
139
VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 139

spondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions
in the lower courts, as follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth

certificates filed against their father as principal and against
defendants as alleged accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization
certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
57
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng’s estate.
According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions

abovementioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions, subject of the
case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the
natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend
that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to
resolve this issue58 in order to determine whether or not to grant the
relief prayed for.
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases
pending there 59is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and
reliefs sought. Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by
private respondents in their various cases against petitioners would
reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of
action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2)
petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct
and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners’ birth records. Suffice it to
state, the cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief
sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal
complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause
of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the
accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng’s

naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the
commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate
deportation for its object; or for that matter,
______________
57 Rollo, p. 15.
58 Rollo, p. 16.
59 International School, Inc. (Manila) v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 474, 480
(1999); Saura v. Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA 465, 475 (1999).
140

the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng’s estate which has for its
cause of action the private respondents’ right under the New
Civil Code to inherit from their mother’s estate. We therefore
concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum
shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and
contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena,

JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a

petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which
is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. The Supreme
Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. (Republic vs. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462
[1986])
If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by
filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. A petition for change of name is an

independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules—a fortiori, it cannot be granted by
means of any other proceeding. (Republic vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA
509 [1996])
141
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9/26/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 367

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE,

Special Proceedings; Civil Register; It is precisely the province of a

VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 111

Lee vs. Court of Appeals

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lee vs. Court of Appeals

substitute.” The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be

VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 113

Lee vs. Court of Appeals

substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lee vs. Court of Appeals

tions of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that

VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 115

Lee vs. Court of Appeals

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin and concurred in by Associate

2 Entitled “MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO

VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 117

Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival

5 CA Rollo, Annex A of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

immediately became Lee Tek Sheng’s mistress. As a result of their

1. As per Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1),

which means “first pregnancy, first live birth delivery”

7 Rollo, pp. 171-172.

VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 119

Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

from 28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August

In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:

10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients

analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the

8 Rollo, pp. 348-349.

VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 121

On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is

On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated

It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the p

10 CA Rollo, Annex D of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 31786.

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the

Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already

12 CA Rollo, Annex E of the Petition in CA-G.R. No. 92-63692.

VOL. 367, OCTOBER 11, 2001 123

Shiok Cheng” to “Tiu Chuan” who is a completely different person.

xxx xxx xxx

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one

by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’

124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

to impugn as there is 19no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok

The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:

‘SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is