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SURVEY OF RECENT CASES

IN REMEDIAL LAW
Bar Review 2019
JUSTICE MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON
CIVIL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Real action – jurisdiction depends on assessed value of property
Under BP 129, when the civil action involves title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein exceeds P20,000 or P50,000 if in Metro Manila, or is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction lies with the RTC. If it is a real action which does not
exceed such amount, the MTC has jurisdiction.
Capable of pecuniary estimation – jurisdiction depends on amount of claim
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim.
Incapable of pecuniary estimation - exclusive RTC jurisdiction
But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases incapable of
pecuniary estimation and are thus cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
In the present case, the course of action in the complaint is the enforcement of the
right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-patent
holder under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Such is a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Some civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are :

1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
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4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;

5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation
Bautista filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot
subject of free patent. It is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not
strictly such action, then it is analogous to one of specific performance. Thus, his action
for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the
RTC. Although the selling price is less than P20,000, the RTC still has jurisdiction
because the repurchase of the lots is only incidental to the exercise of the right to
redeem. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise
of such right and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought.
Moreover, the respondents are barred by estoppel, as they actually participated in

the proceedings before the RTC. By invoking the RTC’s authority by asking for
affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial
court. (Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014)
A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory obligation contained in

the penal clause is actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary
estimation.
The party who unilaterally terminated the exclusive distributorship contract without
any legal justification can be held liable for damages by reason of the breach committed
pursuant to Article 1170. True, breach of contract may give rise to a complaint for
specific performance or rescission of contract. In which case, the subject matter is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC.
However, breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a complaint for
damages. Thus, it is not correct to immediately conclude, as the CA erroneously did,
that since the cause of action is breach of contract, the case would only either be
specific performance or rescission of contract because it may happen, as in this case,
that the complaint is one for damages.
In an action for damages, the court which has jurisdiction is determined by

the total amount of damages claimed
Under Paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,

where the amount of the demand exceeds ₱400,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, exclusive jurisdiction is
lodged with the RTC. Otherwise, jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Trial Court.
Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-94, this Court declared that "where the claim
for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court." In other
words, where the complaint primarily seeks to recover damages, all claims for damages
should be considered in determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
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of the case regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several
causes of action.
Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the respondent in its Complaint
filed with the RTC on September 3, 2012 amounted only to ₱280,000.00, said court was
correct in refusing to take cognizance of the case. (Pajares vs. Remarkable Laundry
and Dry Cleaning, G.R. No. 212690, February 20, 2017)
The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court
has jurisdiction over the action.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is detennined by the allegations in the complaint,

which contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause of action.
In an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the property sought to be
recovered determines the court's jurisdiction.
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject
property must exceed ₱20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint
the assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as
petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the
assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial
court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
In an action to recover, the property must be identified. In this case, petitioners failed
to identify the property they seek to recover as they failed to describe the location, the
area, as well as the boundaries thereof. In fact, as aptly pointed out by the CA, no
survey plan was presented by petitioners to prove that respondent spouses actually
encroached upon the 70-square meter portion of petitioners' property. Failing to prove
their allegation, petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for in their Complaint.
(Heirs of Julao vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014)
An action to recover the deficiency on the extrajudicial foreclosure is a personal

action.
According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects
title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition
or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. On the
other hand, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Based on
the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the
deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a
personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or
any interest therein.
The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal
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plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one. Since the Bank’s
principal office is located in Makati, the venue is properly laid. Assuming arguendo that
the venue was improperly laid, in civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and it may be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer. Hence, assuming the venue was improperly laid,
Yujuico is deemed to have waived the improper venue when he failed to raise it in his
motion to dismiss (BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796, July
22, 2015).
MTC has jurisdiction over cancellation of title
From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the
cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The
determination of such issue merely follows after a court of competent jurisdiction shall
have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting parties is the lawful owner
of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its possession and enjoyment. The
action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the
subject lot, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of such lot.
The Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the
real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court
has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the
subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to
petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that
would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings,
respondents’ counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the
property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial
Assessor’s Office. However, they did not present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the
Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the
RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and
void. (Padlan vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013)
Which court has jurisdiction over a complaint for accion publiciana?
Jurisdiction over accion publiciana and other actions involving title to or possession of
real property depends on assessed value of the property. –
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions
involving title to or possession of real property is plenary.
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RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and
granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where
the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in
Metro Manila.
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. The
assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. (Supapo vs. Sps. de
Jesus, G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015)
Personal action and real action – venue
The case should not be dismissed. The case was a PERSONAL ACTION; hence,
venue was properly laid. The case, being for the declaration of the nullity of a contract of
loan and its accompanying continuing surety agreement, and the real estate and chattel
mortgages, was a personal action; hence, its filing in Cebu City, the place of business of
one of the plaintiffs (XM Corporation), was correct under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court.
BPI, however, contends that the case was a real action that should be commenced
and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, was situated; and that consequently the filing and docket
fees for the complaint should be based on the value of the property as stated in the
certificate of sale attached thereto.
According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects
title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is
also referred to as a local action.
In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such
actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery
of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a
personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which
reason the action is considered a transitory one. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.
Hontanosas, G.R. No. 15761325, January 25, 2014)
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Exclusive venue stipulation does not apply where the complaint assails the
validity of the written instrument
The general rule under Rule 4 of the Rules of Court is that the venue of real
actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the
court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election
of the plaintiff.
As an exception, under Section 4 of the said rule, the parties, through a written
instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such
instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving for

this purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the
exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be
deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.
In cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of
a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained
therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly
dismissed on the ground of improper venue. However, if the complaint was assailing
the validity of the written instrument itself, the parties should not be bound by the
exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with
the general rules on venue. It would be inherently inconsistent for a complaint of this
nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the
validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained. (Briones vs. CA, G.R.
No. 204444, January 14, 2015)
Unincorporated association has no capacity to sue
Under Rule 3, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term
"plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or
the third (fourth, etc.) -party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original
defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third
(fourth, etc.) -party defendant.
Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
In this case, petitioner was still in the process of incorporation as stated in their
petition and thus cannot be considered a juridical person or an entity authorized by law,
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which can be a party to a civil action. It is thus an unincorporated association not

endowed with a distinct personality of its own in the absence of an enabling law. If an
association, like petitioner Association of Flood Victims, has no juridical personality,
then all members of the association must be made parties in the civil action.
Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no legal capacity to sue, petitioner
Hernandez, who is filing this petition as a representative of the Association of Flood
Victims, is likewise devoid of legal personality to bring an action in court. (Association
of Flood Victims vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 2037755, August 5, 2014)
Compulsory counterclaim may prosper after dismissal of complaint for lack of

jurisdiction
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. But what
about when the complaint is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction? The same rule applies.
The jurisdiction over a complaint is not to be confused with jurisdiction over the
counterclaim. They are different. The counterclaim can be treated as a separate action,
where the counterclaimant is the plaintiff while the plaintiff in the original complaint
becomes the defendant.
A counterclaim bears the same integral characteristics of a complaint. It has its own
cause of action. If the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause of the
counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. But if the compulsory counterclaim
is by reason of an unfounded suit then it may prosper even with the main complaint
having been dismissed. The counterclaimant may indeed already have incurred
damages and litigation expenses by virtue of improper service of summons. Thus, the
cause of action of the counterclaimant is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of the
main complaint.
The RTC Pasig should have allowed Padilla’s counterclaim to proceed

notwithstanding dismissal of the Realty Corps’ complaint. Padilla had already incurred
expenses in defending herself, having been sued in her personal capacity by the Realty
Corps in a separate court (Pasig RTC), while the dispute between the Realty Corps and
PNB was still being litigated (Pasay RTC). (Padilla vs. Globe Asiatique, G.R. No.
207376, August 6, 2014)
When should compulsory counterclaim be filed?

At the time for filing of answer.
A claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-à-vis the amount due should be
interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed
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by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. It is elementary that a defending party’s

compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his Answer, and his
failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. Respondent’s belated assertion proved
fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their
Answer. Thus, their claim for the excess is barred. (MBTC vs. CPR Promotions and
Marketing, G.R. No. 200567, June 22, 2015).
Verfication and non forum shopping certification
Rule 7, Sec. 4 requires verification, while Rule 7, Sec. 5 requires a certificate of non-
forum shopping. The following guidelines apply:
• As to verification, non-compliance or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. It is a FORMAL, not a jurisdictional
requirement The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served
thereby.
• Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made
in good faith or are true and correct.
• As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against
forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are
unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on
behalf of the corporation.
• The certification against forum shopping must be signed by ALL the plaintiffs
or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only ONE of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
• The certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of
Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General
Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. In
Corazon’s affidavit, she stated that she is the "office manager and resident interpreter of
the Manila Bureau of Fuji Television Network, Inc." and that she has "held the position
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for the last twenty-three years." As the office manager for 23 years, Corazon can be
considered as having knowledge of all matters in Fuji’s Manila Bureau Office and is in a
position to verify "the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Petition."
’Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification
against forum shopping. (Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Arlene S. Espiritu, G.R. No.
204944-45, December 3, 2014)
ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT
Failure to specifically deny under oath the genuiness

and due execution of an actionable document results
in its admission
Petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution
of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that the genuineness and
due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted.,
"There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents
the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party." With
the consequent admission engendered by petitioners’ failure to properly deny the
Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication, identification
and offer by the respondent, not to mention petitioners’ admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6
of their Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court believes that
judgment may be had solely on the document, and there is no need to present receipts
and other documents to prove the claimed indebtedness. (Spouses Santos vs.
Alcazar, G.R. No. 183034, March 12, 2014)
Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a

written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling
than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus,
where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply
specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due
execution of the document will be deemed admitted. (Casent Realty Development
Corp. vs. Philbanking Corporation, G.R. No. 150731, September 14, 2007 )
DEFAULT
How may an order declaring a defendant in default be lifted or set aside?
Three (3) requisites that must be satisfied to warrant the setting aside of an order
of default for failure to file answer:
(1) verified motion by one that has knowledge of the facts;
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(2) affidavit of merit showing that the failure to file answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and
(3) affidavit of merit showing the existence of a meritorious defense
Rule 9, Section 3(b) gives an exclusive list of only four (4) grounds that allow for
relief from orders of default. These grounds — extrinsic fraud, accident,
mistake, and excusable negligence — relate to factors that are extraneous to a
defendant, that is, grounds that show that a defendant was prevented, by
reasons beyond his or her influence, from timely filing an answer.
The recognition that it is the defendant who is at fault and must suffer the
consequences of his or her own failure is analogous to the dismissal of an action
due to the fault of a plaintiff, as provided by Rule 17, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Rule 17, Section 3 is qualified by the phrase "for no justifiable cause." Thus,
in cases covered by Rule 17, Section 3, should the failure to comply with court
processes be the result of the plaintiff’s own fault, it is but logical that a plaintiff
must suffer the consequences of his own heedlessness, i.e., dismissal of the
complaint.
Rule 9, Section 3 — on default — applies the same logic to a culpable

defendant. In this case, the Spouses Manuel only have themselves to blame in
not properly receiving the summons and copy of the complaint served on them.
(Spouses Manuel vs. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014)
SUMMONS
Extraterritorial service of summons in in rem and quasi in rem cases
When the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over
the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter instance,
extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant, and such
extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair
play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the
action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or
in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and
he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand,
when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him because of the
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impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily

appears in court.
In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was

demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through
their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including
an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam.
They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules
of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action. (Macasaet vs.
Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013)
Re Rule 14, Sec. 11 (officers authorized to receive summons for the corporation),
the substituted service of summons on receptionist is valid
While Our pronouncement in Manotoc has been strictly applied to several

succeeding cases, We do not cling to such strictness in instances where the
circumstances justify substantial compliance with the requirements laid down therein. It
is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
In Sagana v. Francisco, the substituted service of summons was questioned for non-
compliance with the Rules, since the summons was not allegedly served at defendant's
residence or left with any person who was authorized to receive it on behalf of the
defendant. We upheld the validity of the substituted service of summons due to the
defendant's evident avoidance to receive the summons personally despite the process
server's diligent efforts to effect personal service upon him.
A perusal of the Officer's Return dated October 28, 2008 detailing the circumstances
surrounding the service of the second alias Summons dated September 9, 2008 shows
that the foregoing requirements for a valid substituted service of summons were
substantially complied with.
Indeed, the Return established the impossibility of personal service to Carson's

officers, as shown by the efforts made by Process Server Pajila to serve the September
8, 2008 alias Summons on Carson's President/General Manager. In particular, several
attempts to serve the summons on these officers were made on four separate
occasions: October 2, 2008, October 16, 2008, October 27, 2008, and October 28,
2008, but to no avail. On his fourth and final attempt, Process Server Pajila served
the summons on Fernandez, Carson's receptionist, due to the unavailability and
difficulty to locate the company's corporate officers.
Based on the facts, there was a deliberate plan of Carson's for its officers not to
receive the Summons. It is a legal maneuver that is in derogation of the rules on
Summons. We cannot tolerate that. The facts now show that the responsible officers
did not intend to receive the alias Summons through substituted service. The Summons
is considered validly served.
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Voluntary appearance amounts to waiver of defective service of summons
In any event, even if We concede the invalidity of the substituted service, Carson
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed, through Atty. Roxas, the
Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the
Summons dated April 11, 2007 and seeking additional time to file its responsive
pleading. As noted by the CA, Carson failed to indicate therein that the Appearance and
Motion was being filed by way of a conditional appearance to question the regularity of
the service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief of additional time to file
its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
RTC. (Carson Realty & Management Corporation vs. Red Robin Security Agency,
G.R. No. 225035, February 8, 2017)
MOTION TO DISMISS
Waiver of grounds for dismissal

(1) Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion
attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion
because it attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason, a motion to
dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available
at the time of the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from the provision, only the following
defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application: [a] lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior
judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the statute of limitations or
prescription.
In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective verification and
certification of forum shopping only when they filed their second motion to dismiss,
despite the fact that this ground was existent and available to them at the time of the
filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain this
fatal omission, the ground of defective verification and certification of forum
shopping was deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by the
petitioners in their second motion to dismiss.(De Guzman vs. Ochoa, G.R. No.
169292, April 13, 2011)
(2) It was only during the pre-trial stage that respondents verbally manifested and
invited the attention of the lower court on their grounds for dismissal. In order to justify
such late invocation, they heavily relied on Section 2(g) and (i), Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court that the nature and purpose of the pre-trial include, among others, the propriety of
dismissing the action should there be a valid ground therefor and matters which may aid
in the prompt disposition of the action.
The respondents are not correct. The rules are clear and require no interpretation.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss based on
the grounds invoked by the respondents may be waived if not raised in a motion
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to dismiss or alleged in their answer. On the other hand, “the pre-trial is primarily
intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are
properly raised. The purpose is to obviate the element of surprise, hence, the parties
are expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact which they
intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching matter.”
The issues submitted during the pre-trial are thus the issues that would govern the trial
proper. The dismissal of the case based on the grounds invoked by the
respondents are specifically covered by Rule 16 and Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
which set a period when they should be raised; otherwise, they are deemed
waived.
(Contreras vs. Rovilla Water Supply, Inc., G.R. No. 168979, December 2, 2013)
(3) In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy and related cases, the attack on the jurisdiction of the
respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by
laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent
posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause
voluntarily. Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the
trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the
principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles
relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein
Based on the Rule 9, Sec. 1 and Rule 15, Sec. 8, the "objection on jurisdictional
grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x subject, however, to the principle of
estoppel by laches."
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not
one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such
defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to
prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. (Boston Equity Resources, Inc.vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013)
Ground of non-compliance with condition precedent - deemed waived if not

raised in motion to dismiss or answer
The CA erred in dismissing the complaint. Although Art 151 of the Family Code
requiring earnest efforts of compromise may fall under Section 1 par (J) Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, (J) that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not
been complied with, such is only a ground to dismiss. Pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 9, there
are only four instances when the court may motu propio dismiss the claim, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia, (c) res judicata, (d)
prescription of action. The ground relied upon not being one of those above-mentioned,
14
it would fall under the general rule of Sec 1 Rule 9, which states that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
WAIVED. Since the heirs of the second wife did not raise the defense of non-
compliance with Art 151 Family Code as a ground to dismiss the complaint to annul the
Deed of Donation, such was deemed waived, and the CA erred in considering that
ground to dismiss the action. (Heirs of Favis v. Gonzales, January 15, 2014)
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action – hypothetical admission

of veracity of facts alleged
Counsel’s reliance on Palicte’s hypothetical admission of her agreement with

Marcelo Sotto is unjustified. The hypothetical admission is only for the purpose of
resolving the merits of the ground of insufficiency of the complaint. This is because the
test of the sufficiency of the statement of the cause of action is whether or not,
accepting the veracity of the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. The admission of the veracity
of the facts alleged in the complaint, being only hypothetical, does not extend beyond
the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Counsel cannot bind Palicte to her hypothetical
admission of the agreement between her and Marcelo Sotto. Thus, the complaint was
properly dismissed because of res judicata, and counsel is guilty of forum shopping.
(Heirs of Sotto vs. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, February 17, 2014)
Preliminary hearing on affirmative defense raised in answer not necessary when

affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action
The trial court may elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses as
raised in the answer under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court. Such a
hearing is not necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause
of action, and that it is, in fact, error for the court to hold a preliminary hearing to
determine the existence of external facts outside the complaint. The reception and the
consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, has been held to be improper and impermissible. Thus, in a preliminary hearing
on a motion to dismiss or on the affirmative defenses raised in an answer, the parties
are allowed to present evidence except when the motion is based on the ground
of insufficiency of the statement of the cause of action which must be determined
on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and no other. (Aquino vs.
Quiazon, G.R. No. 201248, March 11, 2015)
Prescription can be a ground for motion to dismiss if complaint on

its face shows that action has already prescribed
The affirmative defense of prescription does not automatically warrant the dismissal
of a complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An allegation of
15
prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on
its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. If the issue of
prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the
merits, it cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss. Those issues must be
resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.
The issue of prescription hinges on the determination of whether the sale was valid,
void or voidable. It would seem that there are several possible scenarios that may have
occurred given the limited set of facts. The statement transaction did not push through
since defendant did not have the financial wherewithal to purchase the subject property
creates confusion and allows for several different interpretations. The only way to prove
this is by going to trial. A summary or outright dismissal of an action is not proper where
there are factual matters in dispute, which require presentation and appreciation of
evidence (Sanchez vs. Sanchez, December 4, 2013)
Indispensable parties not impleaded – not ground for automatic dismissal of

complaint
Dismissal on ground of failure to state a cause of action should look at whether the
parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, not whether all
persons interested in such outcome are actually impleaded (this is only relevant in
looking at indispensable parties). The original spouses were not impleaded are
indispensable parties, as alleged owners of the original Rovila Water Supply. Non-
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal, but the court
should order an amendment and impleading of the indispensable parties. In
Galica v Vda de Mindo, the Court allowed the intervention of indispensable parties
instead of dismissing the complaint. Obviously the spouses cannot be impleaded
because they are dead, but upon death, property rights transmit to the heirs. The Court
then ordered the impleading of all the heirs, except those who already inititated the
case and Lagrimas who intervened. The operative act that would lead to the dismissal
of the case would be the refusal to comply with the directive of the court for the joinder
of an indispensable party to the case.
(Contreras vs. Rovila Water Supply, G.R. No. 168979, December 2, 2013)
N.B. Rule 3, Sec 7 mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit
as it is the party whose interest will be affected by the court’s action and without whom
no final determination of the case can be had. His legal presence is an absolute
necessity. Absence of the indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act.
Failure to implead any indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint.
16
The proper remedy is to implead them. In this case, Cacayuran failed to implead the
Municipality, a real party in interest and an indispensable party that stands to be directly
affected by any judicial resolution. As the contracting party and the owner of the public
plaza, it stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the case. Sec 7, Rule 3
mandates that all indispensable parties are to be joined in a suit as it is the party whose
interest will be affected by the court’s action and without whom no final determination of
the case can be had. His legal presence is an absolute necessity. Absence of the
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for lack of
authority to act.
The decision of the RTC, affirmed with modification by the CA, and finally affirmed
by the SC is not binding upon the Municipality as it was not impleaded in the case.
(Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, G.R. No. 191667, April 22, 2015)
N.B. A real party in interest is a party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the
judgment on the suit, while an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action (necessary and indispensable parties
are real parties in interest).(Rule 3, Secs.
Dismissal of action – failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is
a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Lack of cause of action
refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in
the pleading.
The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of cause of action (i.e.
insufficiency of evidence). In civil cases, courts must determine if the plaintiff was able
to prove his case by a preponderance of evidence which is defined as the probability of
the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton or
palpable discretion. It must be noted that this case is an action for small claims where
decisions are rendered final and unappealable, hence, a [d]ecision dismissing the same
is necessarily with prejudice. (Lourdes Suites vs. Binarao G.R. No. 2014729, August
6, 2014)
Rule 17, Section 2 – Prosecution of counterclaim after dismissal of action
: A filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. B filed her
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. A filed his Motion to Withdraw his petition. B
invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the ROC and prayed that her counterclaim be declared as
remaining for the court’s adjudication. A filed his Reply, averring that B’s counterclaim is
barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a
manifestation therefor within 15 days from Notice of Motion to Withdraw. RTC granted
17
A’s petition and declared B’s counterclaim “as remaining for independent adjudication”
and as such, gave A 15 days to file his answer thereto. CA affirmed RTC ruling. Is the
CA correct in upholding the RTC Order declaring B's counterclaim for
independent adjudication before the same trial court?
No. Under Section 2, Rule 17 of the ROC, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal
of the complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same
resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should
render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in
a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in
the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest
within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss, otherwise the
counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action. Since B failed to file a
manifestation within 15 days from the Notice of Motion to Withdraw, her
counterclaim may only be prosecuted in a separate action. (Blay v. Bana, G.R. No.
232189, March 7, 2018) - EPB
Intervention - when allowed even after decision has been rendered
Although Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is explicit on the period when a motion to
intervene may be filed. This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been
allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the
higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after
a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the
judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even
where the assailed order has already become final and executory. (Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184589, June 13, 2013)
CONSOLIDATION
Substantial identity of parties exists when there is a community of interest or

privity of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second, even if
the latter has not been impleaded in the first case. As to issues, what is required is mere
identity of issues where the parties, although not identical, present conflicting
claims. The justification for consolidation is to prevent a judge from deciding identical
issues presented in the case assigned to him in a manner that will prejudice another
judge from deciding a similar case before him.
In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is to make the consolidation of all
cases and proceedings resting on the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or
interests or parties mandatory. Such consolidation should be made regardless of
18
whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A mandatory policy eliminates
conflicting results concerning similar or like issues between the same parties or
interests even as it enhances the administration of justice (Re: Letter Complaint Of
Merlita B. Fabiana, A.M. No. CA-13-51-J, July 2, 2013)
JUDGMENT
Supreme Court can decide case on the merits even if main case already closed
and terminated for being moot and academic
Although the case of unlawful detainer decided by the SC had considered the main
case, or the issue of possession as moot and academic, the Court granted the petition
and reversed the CA. The SC adjudicated on Rockland’s right to possess the subject
property (it had no right to possession). The Court clearly stated that the said right was
already extinguished by virtue of the expiration of Rockland’s leasehold rights. The CA
thus erred in restoring Rockland to possession of the property.
While the main case has been declared closed and terminated for being moot and
academic, the Court can decide the case on the merits in view of the peculiar
circumstances. Not to reverse the decision would allow the CA disposition to remain
intact in the records and would prejudice Pasig Printing because it would allow
Rockland to claim possession despite the fact that the contract, on which it based its
right has long since expired. (Pasig Printing vs. Rockland Construction, G.R. No.
193592, February 5, 2014)
Exceptions to Immutability of judgment
Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of victory. But the
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted
several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision that render its execution unjust and inequitable. Despite the absence of
the preceding circumstances, the Court is not precluded from brushing aside procedural
norms if only to serve the higher interests of justice and equity. (University of the
Philippines vs. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012)
Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its finality, its
execution should follow as a matter of course. A supervening event is an exception
to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if
it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes
the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust,
impossible or inequitable. The supervening event cannot rest on unproved or
uncertain facts.
19
This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be

relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain
circumstances like:
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property;
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(c) the merits of the case;
(d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the doctrine;
(e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or
(f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.
In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the
quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the
judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. (Abrigo vs.
Flores, G.R. No. 160786, 2013)
When SC can review factual issues
1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Marina Port
Services. vs American Home Assurance Corporation, GR. No. 201822 , August 12,
2015)
Judgment on the pleadings
Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. The rule is
stated in Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules. Jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails
to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial
as set out in Rule 8, Sections 8 (actionable document) and 10 (how to make specific
denial), resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleadings. As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted
pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain
uncontroverted.
20
In this case, records disclose that in its Answer, GSIS admitted the material
allegations of PGAI’s complaint warranting the grant of the relief prayed for. On the
basis of these admissions, the Court finds that the CA did not err in affirming the
propriety of a judgment on the pleadings.
(GSIS v. Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc., November 20, 2013)
Judgment on the pleadings distinguished from summary judgment
What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is

the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to
tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or
admits said material allegations of the adverse party's pleadings by admitting the
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings
is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material
averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an
issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A
'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence,
as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not
constitute a genuine issue for trial."
In this case, we note that while petitioners' Answer to respondents' Complaint

practically admitted all the material allegations therein, it nevertheless asserts the
affirmative defenses that the action for revival of judgment is not the proper action and
that petitioners are not the proper parties. As issues obviously arise from these
affirmative defenses, a judgment on the pleadings is clearly improper in this case.
(Iloilo Jar Corporation vs.Comglasco Corporation/Aguila Glass, G.R. No. 219509,
January 18, 2017)
ATTACHMENT
A writ of preliminary attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a

compromise agreement among the parties
While the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment,
jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the
sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or
the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement
which had already been approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended
21
Decision, the obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the
payment of the total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the
foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have
continued to subsist.
The parties to the compromise agreement should not be deprived of the protection
provided by an attachment lien especially in an instance where one reneges on his
obligations under the agreement.
If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a

debtor can easily escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be faced with an
anomalous situation where a debtor, in order to buy time to dispose of his properties,
would enter into a compromise agreement he has no intention of honoring in the first
place. The purpose of the provisional remedy of attachment would thus be lost. It would
become, in analogy, a declawed and toothless tiger.
The lien or security obtained by an attachment even before judgment, is in the nature
of a vested interest which affords specific security for the satisfaction of the debt put in
suit. The lifting of the attachment lien would be tantamount to an abdication of Lim, Jr.’s
rights over Sps. Lazaro’s properties which the Court, absent any justifiable ground
therefor, cannot allow. (Lim, Jr. vs. Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, July 3, 2013)
INJUNCTION
Writ of injunction not proper to restrain foreclosure of mortgage
The RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and
unwarranted.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, respondents had admittedly constituted

the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of their loan obligation
to BPI, and, as such, they were fully aware of the consequences on their rights in the
properties given as collaterals should the loan secured be unpaid.
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued when (1) the right to be protected exists
prima facie; and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. The
applicant must have a sufficient interest or right to be protected, but it is enough
thatthe applicant has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint.”
It is also basic that the power to issue a writ of injunction is to be exercised only where
the reason and necessity therefor are clearly established, and only in cases reasonably
free from doubt.
Also, the applicant must prove that the violation sought to be prevented would cause
an irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it cannot be remedied under
22
any standard of compensation. But in this case, the respondents principally feared the
loss of the mortgaged properties, and faced the possibility of a criminal prosecution for
the post-dated checks they issued. Such fears did not constitute the requisite
irreparable injury, because ultimately the amount to which the mortgagee-bank shall be
entitled will be determined by the RTC’s disposition of the case. (Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. Hontanosas, G.R. No. 15761325, January 25, 2014)
Requisites for issuance of preliminary injunction
For a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present:
(1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that the very foundation of the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the
probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the
prevention of multiplicity of suits. Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction in a pending case, rests in the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that
end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination.
Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Cahambing vs.
Espinosa, G.R. No. 215807, January 25, 2017)
While Rule 58, Section 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing in
every application for temporary restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule
58, Section 5 requires a hearing only if an application for preliminary injunction is
granted. Thus, Section 5 states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined." Inversely stated,
an application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a
hearing separate from that of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order. (Evy Construction and Development Corporation
Vs.Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 207938, October 11 , 2017)
No basis to enjoin institution of criminal complaints for violation of BP 22
As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction – whether
preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. But there are
extreme cases in which exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, including:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional
23
rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question that
is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5)
when the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double
jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) when the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8)
when it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) when the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly
no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied.
However, the case does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the
issuance by the RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
instituting criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22 against the respondents was
unwarranted. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hontanosas, G.R. No. 15761325,
January 25, 2014)
Issuance of injunctions to be avoided to dispose of merits

The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. The RTC contravened the
foregoing guidelines and easily ignored the exhortation by granting JPV's application for
injunction in the initial stage of the case. Such granting of JPV's application already
amounted to the virtual acceptance of JPV's alleged entitlement to preventing petitioner
Iloilo City from considering and passing upon the applications of other parties like
Grahar to operate their own Private Emission Testing Center (PETC) in Iloilo City based
on JPV's still controversial capability to serve all the registered motor vehicles in Iloilo
City. The granting amounted to the prejudgment of the merits of the case, something
the RTC could not validly do. (City of Iloilo vs. Honrado, G.R. No. 160399, December
9, 2015)
Complaint for injunction within exclusive jurisdiction of RTC
The RTC can take cognizance of the injunction complaint which is “a suit which has
for its purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from
the commission or continuance of a specific act, or his compulsion to continuen
performance of a particular act.” Actions for injunction and damages lie within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
RA 7691. (Republic vs.Principalia Management, G.R.No. 198426, September 2,
2015)
APPEAL
Filing of notice of appeal via private courier – date of actual receipt is deemed
date of filing
24
Notice of Appeal should be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that pleadings
may be filed in court either personally where the date of filing is the date of receipt or by
registered mail where the date of mailing is the date of receipt. The counsel for
petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided
in the Rules.
Though not prohibited by the Rules, the date of delivery of pleadings to a private
letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court.
Instead, the date of actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing of that
pleading. Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was
received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period (Heirs
of Miranda vs. Miranda, July 3, 2013)
Filing by registered mail – date of mailing is considered the date of filing
Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is filed by

registered mail, the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It
does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading.
In this case, the records show that the Republic filed its Motion for Partial
Reconsideration before the RTC via registered mail on September 28, 2012. Although
the trial court received the Republic's motion only on October 5, 2012, it should have
considered the pleading to have been filed on September 28, 2012, the date of its
mailing, which is clearly within the reglementary period of 15 days to file said motion,
counted from September 13, 2012, or the date of the Republic's receipt of the assailed
Decision.(Republic vs. Sps Senando, G.R. No. 205428, June 7, 2017)
Proper modes of appeal
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not
reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to
the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.
Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of
law must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
An appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant
raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law.
25
There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to what law shall
be applied on a given set of facts. Questions of law do “not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented.” Its resolution rests solely on the
application of a law given the circumstances. There is a question of fact when the
court is required to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. A question of fact
“invites a review of the evidence.”
The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals
is whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in
accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question involves the
interpretation and application of the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals
to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of
the evidence. The issue raised before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question
purely of law. The proper mode of appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground.
(Republic v. Ortigas, G.R. No.171496, March 3, 2014)
Remedy from denial of motion to dismiss – appeal from decision
The Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent.
Well-settled is the rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy
to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court
denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is
finally decided on the merits. Therefore, "the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal
after a decision has been rendered. (Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013)
Remedy against order denying motion to dismiss - certiorari
While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable,

certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made
without or in excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Contreras vs. Rovila Water
Supply, G.R. No. 168979, December 2, 2013)
Appeal from order denying motion for reconsideration
Rule 41, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the Rules of Court, which provides that “[n]o
appeal may be taken from [a]n order denying a x x x motion for reconsideration,” is
based on the implied premise in the same section that the judgment or order does not
completely dispose of the case. The pertinent portion of Rule 41, Section 1 provides:
26
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final

order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
In other words, what Section 1 of Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an

interlocutory order. An interlocutory order or judgment, unlike a final order or judgment,
does “not completely dispose of the case [because it leaves to the court] something else
to be decided upon.” Appeals from interlocutory orders are generally prohibited to
prevent delay in the administration of justice and to prevent “undue burden upon the
courts.”
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A
motion for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if “it
puts an end to a particular matter,” leaving the court with nothing else to do but to
execute the decision.
“An appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of

dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.” It is an
appeal from a final decision or order.
The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for
reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its
property to the government was not an interlocutory order because it completely
disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the
administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of
Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the Republic used the wrong mode
of appeal. (Republic v. Ortigas, G.R. No.171496, March 3, 2014)
May an appeal be taken from the denial of a motion for reconsideration?

Yes, if the subject of the motion for reconsideration is a judgment or final order
An order denying the motion for reconsideration of a decision is the final resolution
of the issues a trial court earlier passed upon and decided. Thus, the notice of appeal
filed against the order of denial is deemed to refer to the decision subject of the
motion for reconsideration (Sps. Mendiola vs. CA, G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012)
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s
motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave
nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming
party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the
denial ( Alma Jose vs. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012)
27
Rule 40, Section 8
The Spouses Norberte were deemed to have been unlawfully deprived of the lawful
possession of the property by the Mejias upon the execution of the contract of
conditional sale on March 28, 1998. Unfortunately, they filed their complaint for
ejectment only on November 6, 2003, way beyond the prescribed period of one (1) year
within which the action should be commenced. However, the RTC should not have
dismissed the case. Rather, it should have tried it as one for accion publiciana, as
if it had originally been filed with it, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section 8,
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. (Norberte vs. Mejia, G.R. No. 182886, March 9, 2015)
The first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of

dismissal issued without trial of the case on the merits, while the second paragraph
deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits.
Both paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of
jurisdiction. The second paragraph refutes respondents' contention that Section 8, Rule
40 refers solely to cases where the MTC dismissed a case filed therein without a trial on
the merits and an appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of dismissal. Therefore,
the RTC correctly proceeded to decide the case on the merits despite the MTC's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(De Vera vs. Santiago, Jr., G.R. No. 179457, June 22, 2015)
Rule 40 – RTC’s appellate jurisdiction
The RTC’s appellate jurisdiction, as contrasted to its original jurisdiction, is provided in

Section 22 of B.P. Blg.129, as amended, thus:
SECTION 22. Appellate jurisdiction.–Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin or such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties.
The above-quoted provision vests upon the RTC the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the
amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction; all
cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the
amount involved. Hence, the CA grossly erred in nullifying the RTC Decision for lack of
jurisdiction, and in declaring as moot and academic the factual issues raised in the
respondents' petition for review when it should have proceeded to review on appeal the
factual findings of the RTC. This is because the RTC not only has exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitioners' action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with
28
damages, but also appellate jurisdiction over the MTC Decision itself. (De Vera vs.
Santiago, Jr., G.R. No. 179457, June 22, 2015)
Rule 42 not correct remedy from RTC order granting petition for certiorari
A filed an ejectment complaint against the Municipality of Iba, Zambales. The MTC
decided in A’s favor and ordered the Municipality to vacate the property. The
Municipality filed a notice of appeal but the MTC did not give due course thereto. Thus,
the Municipality filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC pursuant to Rule 41, Sec. 1.
Granting the Municipality’s petition, the RTC annulled and set aside the MTC order. A
filed a Rule 42 petition with the Court of Appeals. Is A
correct?
No. Since the Municipality filed a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC
instead of an appeal from the MTC’s order, A’s remedy should be an appeal under
Rule 41, not a petition for review under Rule 42, which is the correct remedy if the RTC
decided the case in its appellate jurisdiction. (Heirs of Arturo Garcia v. Municipality of
Iba, Zambales, G.R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015)
When court loses jurisdiction
Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, "[i]n appeals by notice of appeal, the
court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties."In fact, under
Section 13 of Rule 41, the trial court, prior to the transmittal of the original record or
record on appeal, may, motu propio or on motion, order the dismissal of the appeal on
the grounds specified therein. In other words, the mere filing of a notice of appeal
does not automatically divest the trial court of its jurisdiction, since the appeal is
deemed perfected as to the appellant only; it is not "deemed perfected," for
purposes of divesting the court of its jurisdiction, "before the expiration of the
period to appeal of the other parties." Thus, contrary to petitioner's position, the RTC
has yet to lose its jurisdiction over the case when it filed its Notice of Appeal as
respondents' period to appeal had not yet expired by then. (United Interior Manggahan
Homeowners Association vs. De Luna, G.R. No. 216788, November 11, 2017.)
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
Extrinsic fraud as ground for annulment of judgment
For purposes of the application of Rule 47, gross negligence cannot be equated to
the extrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for an annulment of judgment.
By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character, i.e., it
relates to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from
29
presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is
committed by the adverse party, not by one’s own lawyer. In the latter case, the
remedy of the client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re- litigate the case
where judgment had been rendered. Also, it was Pinasukan’s own fault for not being
updated with the proceedings of its case and merely relying on its lawyer (Pinausukan
Seafood House vs. FEBTC, G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014)
Can a judgment based on a compromise agreement be nullified because of

extrinsic fraud?
No. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal

concessions to avoid litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. It attains the
authority and effect of res judicata upon the parties upon its execution, and becomes
immediately final and executory, unless rescinded by grounds which vitiate consent.
Once the compromise agreement was approved by the RTC, it ceased to be a
mere contract of the parties and was transformed into a final judgment. Second, if
the ground of the respondent to assail the judgment based on the compromise
agreement was extrinsic fraud, his action should be brought under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court.
Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the original action for annulment may be based only on
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, but extrinsic fraud, to be valid ground, should
not have been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new
trial or petition for relief. If the ground relied upon is extrinsic fraud, the action must be
filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; if the ground is lack of
jurisdiction, the action must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel. This
remedy could only be availed if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are not available to the petitioner. In this instance,
respondent Y could have availed of Rule 38: Relief from Judgment. (Tung Hui Chung
and Tong Hong Chung vs. Shih Chi Huang, G.R. No. 170679, March 9, 2016)
EXECUTION
Requisites to stay immediate execution of judgment in plaintiff’s favor in an

ejectment suit under Sec. 19, Rule 70
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but
the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a
supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the
pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez
should file a motion for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order
for the immediate execution of the judgment, the Spouses Lopez are equally correct in
30
pointing out that they were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in view
of the Acbangs’ failure to comply with all of the three abovementioned requisites for
staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the
appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the
sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals. (Acbang vs.
Luczon, Jr., G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014)
Execution pending appeal in ejectment cases

The totality of all the provisions above (Section 21, Rule 70; Section 21 of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure; Section 4, Rule 39; and Section 8(b), Rule 42) shows the
following significant characteristics of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed
to it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant is immediately executory,
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by appeal therefrom, unless otherwise
ordered by the RTC or, in the appellate court’s discretion, suspended or modified.
The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately executory -- is

emphasized by the fact that no resolutory condition has been imposed that will prevent
or stay the execution of the RTC’s judgment.
The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is
ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus. Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes
that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the
RTC’s judgment and appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately
issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. The
rationale of immediate execution of judgment in an ejectment case is to avoid injustice
to a lawful possessor. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the appellate court may
stay the writ of execution should circumstances so require.
The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal
taken therefrom -- reinforces the first. The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is
enforceable upon its rendition and, upon motion, immediately executory
notwithstanding an appeal taken therefrom. The execution of the RTC’s judgment is not
discretionary execution under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Execution of the RTC’s judgment under Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary
execution but a ministerial duty of the RTC. It is not governed by Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court but by Section 4, Rule 39 on judgments not stayed by appeal. In
this connection, it is not covered by the general rule, that the judgment of the RTC is
stayed by appeal to the Court of Appeals under Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, but constitutes an exception to the said rule. In connection with the second
characteristic of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it, the
consequence of the above distinctions between discretionary execution and the
execution of the RTC’s judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals is that discretionary execution may be availed of in the RTC only before
the Court of Appeals gives due course to the appeal while the execution of the
RTC judgment in an ejectment case may be availed of in the RTC at any stage of
the appeal to the Court of Appeals. (Air Transportation Office vs. Court of
31
Appeals, G.R. NO, 173616, June 25, 2014)
Execution pending appeal
The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that
only a final judgment may be executed. In order to grant the same pursuant to Section
2, Rule 39 of the Rules, the following requisites must concur: (a) there must be a motion
by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason
for execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special
order.
Good reasons call for the attendance of compelling circumstances warranting

immediate execution for fear that favorable judgment may yield to an empty victory.
GSIS funds and assets may be subject to execution
Funds and assets of GSIS may – after the resolution of the appeal and barring any
provisional injunction thereto – be subject to execution, attachment, garnishment or levy
since the exemption under Section 39 of RA 8291 does not operate to deny private
entities from properly enforcing their contractual claims against GSIS.
Where proper, under Section 36, the GSIS may be held liable for the contracts it has
entered into in the course of its business investments. For GSIS cannot claim a special
immunity from liability in regard to its business ventures under said Section. Nor can it
deny contracting parties, in our view, the right of redress and the enforcement of a
claim, particularly as it arises from a purely contractual relationship of a private
character between an individual and the GSIS. (GSIS vs. Prudential Guarantee &
Assurance, Inc., November 20, 2013)
The execution of the RTC judgment does not automatically mean that the issues
on appeal have become moot and academic.
Even assuming that the writ of execution in the instant case were not void, the
execution of the RTC judgment cannot be considered as a supervening event that
would automatically moot the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana, which
is pending before the CA. Otherwise, there would be no use appealing a judgment,
once a writ of execution is issued and satisfied. That situation would be absurd. On the
contrary, the Rules of Court in fact provides for cases of reversal or annulment of an
executed judgment. Section 5 of Rule 39 provides that in those cases, there should be
restitution or reparation as warranted by justice and equity. Therefore, barring any
supervening event, there is still the possibility of the appellate court’s reversal of the
appealed decision - even if already executed - and, consequently, of a restitution or a
reparation. (Carpio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183102, February 27, 2013)
32
Execution of judgment by motion prescribes in 5 years; exception – when delay

caused by actions of judgment debtor
Two modes of enforcing the court’s judgment: a) by motion or b) by independent

action.
Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was

sought within five (5) years from the date of its entry. Execution by independent action is
mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already
elapsed. However, for execution by independent action to prosper – the Rules impose
another limitation – the action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of
limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment.
For execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor must ensure the
accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive period. These are: a) the
filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and b) the court’s actual
issuance of the writ.
In the instances when the Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of
five years, we only recognized one exception, i.e., when the delay is caused or
occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage. Petitioners, however, failed to show circumstances which would warrant the
exception.
Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered in it. Thus, a writ of
execution can only be issued against a party and not against one who did not have his
day in court.
In this case, Subic Water never participated in the proceedings. The compromise
agreement also did not carry the express conformity of Subic Water. (Olongapo City
vs. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc. G.R. No. 171626, August 6, 2014)
Action for revival of judgment may prosper despite the lapse of ten years from
entry of judgment, in the interest of justice
Although the Rules of Court in relation to Art 1144 of the Civil Code would provide
that an action upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues, that is from finality of judgment, to allow a strict application of the
rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners, considering (1) that
respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and
(2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners. Petitioners could not afford to engage
the services of a private counsel and so were represented by the PAO. SAC-PAO in
particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by
respondent of her appeal or of the entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they
could not be faulted for their subsequent actions. Due to the peculiarities of this case,
33
the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and decides to
allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. (Rubio vs. Alabata,
G.R. No. 203947, February 26, 2014)
Revival of judgment – jurisdiction with RTC
Where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable by the RTCs.
As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right to
have the final and executory judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced and
does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that jurisdiction over a petition
to revive judgment is properly with the RTCs. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that
it does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's action for revival of judgment.
(Anama vs. Citibank, N.A., G.R. No. 192048, December 13, 2017)
Appeal from decision in an action for revival of judgment

A party aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may
appeal the decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned.
The original sjudgment, which is already final and executory, may no longer be
reversed, altered, or modified. (Heirs of Miranda vs. Miranda, July 3, 2013)
THIRD PARTY CLAIM
What is the remedy of the third party claimant to prevent the inclusion of his
property in the execution sale?
1. Separate action under Rule 39, Sec. 16 to vindicate his claim of ownership
and/or possession over the property
• Money judgments are enforceable only against the property

incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property
belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another
man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through
any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. The claimant or third
person may vindicate his claim to the property in a separate action.
The third-party claimant is not obligated to file an action for

damages against the sheriff in case an indemnity bond was filed by
the judgment creditor. The third-party claimant may file a separate
34
and independent action to establish ownership to the property

levied upon by the sheriff. In that action, he may secure an
injunction to restrain the sale of the attached property. (Arabay,
Inc. vs. Salvador, G.R. No. L-31077 March 17, 1978).
2. Motion for summary hearing
Before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the
property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant
must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. A third
person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the
judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized
such execution. Upon due application by the third person and after SUMMARY
HEARING, the court may command that the property be released from the
mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can
do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has
acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment,
more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment
debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the
property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may
be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the
sheriff to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted by the
evidence. However, if the claimant's proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of
his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied. (Villasi vs. Garcia, G.R.
No. 190106, January 15, 2014)
Compare to Rule 57, Sec. 14 (attachment) and Rule 60, Sec. 7 (replevin)
where the third party claimant may vindicate his claim to the property in
the same or separate action.
The timing of the filing of the third party claim is important because
the timing determines the remedies that a third party is allowed to
file. A third party claimant under Section 16 of Rule 39 may vindicate his
claim to the property in a separate action, because intervention is no
longer allowed as judgment has already been rendered. A third party
claimant under Section 14 of Rule 57, on the other hand, may vindicate
his claim to the property by intervention because he has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation. (Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation vs.
Yllas Lending Corporation., G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008)
REPLEVIN
Only the owner of the property or one entitled to the possession thereof may file
an action for replevin.
35
Siy appointed Ong as his agent to sell the subject vehicle, surrendering to Ong all
documents of title. Ong was able to sell the vehicle to Chua, but failed to remit the
proceeds of the sale to Siy. His guarantee checks bounced as well.. Chua, in turn, sold
the vehicle to Tomlin, who registered it in his name. Siy filed a complaint for estafa and
carnapping against Ong, and also
a complaint for replevin against Ong, Chua and Tomlin. Will the replevin case prosper?
No. Rule 60 allows a plaintiff in an action for the recovery of possession of personal
property to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is the owner of the
property claimed or is entitled to the possession thereof. In this case, when Siy
authorized Ong to sell the vehicle and Ong subsequently sold the same, Siy ceased to
be the owner of the vehicle and also lost his right of possession over it. Hence, Siy may
no longer seek the return thereof through replevin.
(Siy vs. Tomlin, G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017)
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
CERTIORARI
Motion for reconsideration required before certiorari can be filed (Rule 65,
Section 4) Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case.
Exceptions:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner or
the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be

useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
36
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.
(j) where judicial intervention is urgent
(k) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage
(l) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on
the matter
(m) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot
(n) where special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action
(Novateknika Land Corporation vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 194104,
March 13, 2013; Republic vs. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013; Tan. Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, 242 SCRA 452; Marawi Marantao General Hospital vs. CA, 349
SCRA 321).
Molina was not strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
His failure to file the motion for reconsideration did not justify the immediate dismissal of
the petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain exceptional circumstances that
excused his non-filing of the motion for reconsideration. Considering that the matter
brought to the CA - whether the act complained against justified the filing of the formal
charge for grave misconduct and the imposition of preventive suspension pending
investigation - was a purely legal question due to the factual antecedents of the case
not being in dispute. Hence, Molina had no need to exhaust the available
administrative remedy of filing the motion for reconsideration. (Garcia v. Molina,
G.R. No. 165223, Jan. 11, 2016)
Motion for reconsideration still required even if prohibited by the agency’s

internal rules
Before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of,
the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to afford an
opportunity for the correction of the error or mistake complained of.
Considering that a decision of the Secretary of Labor is subject to judicial review only
through a special civil action of certiorari and, as a rule, cannot be resorted to without
the aggrieved party having exhausted administrative remedies through a motion for
reconsideration, the aggrieved party, must be allowed to move for a reconsideration of
the same so that he can bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari
37
inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible
representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself. Unless it is filed,
there could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari would be
unavailing. Simply put, regardless of the proscription against the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the same may be filed on the assumption that rectification of the
decision or order must be obtained, and before a petition for certiorari may be instituted.
(Philtranco Service Enterprises vs. Philtranco Service Union, G.R. No. 180962,
February 26, 2014)
Appeal and not certiorari is the proper remedy from order GRANTING a motion to
dismiss a complaint
X commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC. Y filed a
motion to dismiss, claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction since the land is a friar land.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. X filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
RTC denied the same. X assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA
dismissed the petition. Was certiorari the proper remedy?
No. The order granting Y’s motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an
interlocutory order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due course.
Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being
availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final
order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial
court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct
remedy. (Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta vs. Spouses Lorenzo Mores, G.R.
No. 159941, August 17, 2011)
An order DENYING a motion to dismiss, being merely interlocutory, cannot be the

basis of a petition for certiorari.
An interlocutory order is not the proper subject of a certiorari challenge by virtue of its
not terminating the proceedings in which it is issued. But a petition for certiorari may be
filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is issued without jurisdiction, or with excess
of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The exception does not apply to this case. X has not demonstrated how
the assailed orders could have been issued without jurisdiction, or with excess of
jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Nor has he convinced the courts that he had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, like filing his answer and going to pre-trial and trial. In the
end, should he still have the need to seek the review of the decision of the RTC, he
could also even appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. That, in reality, was his
proper remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Banez vs. Concepcion, GR No. 159508,
August 29, 2012)
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on
whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. The
assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the
38
inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration
were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was
not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course
of the administration proceedings. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject
of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion (Aranas vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014)
Does the CTA have jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing
an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case?
YES. The authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari
questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the
powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
It would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split
jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local
tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction
over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in
consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate
jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the
power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.
(City of Manila vs. Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014. En Banc)
The CA's original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution
in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily
transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282,and that such petition
shall be governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the
CTA, not the CA, which has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ
resolution of dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit against private respondents for
violation of the TCCP. (Bureau of Customs vs. Hon. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253,
September 8, 2015)
Certiorari proper remedy to question denial of notice of appeal

by the RTC.
PBCOM argues that the CA should have given due course to its Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus because it is the proper remedy to question the Order dated
June 2, 2011 of the RTC denying its Notice of Appeal and that a motion for
reconsideration is not required when the order assailed of is a patent nullity for having
been issued without jurisdiction.
39
In the assailed Decision, the CA appears to have confused the RTC Order
dismissing PBCOM's complaint with the RTC Order denying PBCOM' s notice of
appeal, and mistakenly ruled that the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
PBCOM was a wrong mode of appeal.
Records will bear that the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint for sum of money
was grounded on private respondents' [petitioner] failure to timely comply with the order
dated 29 September 2010 of the public respondent which is pursuant to Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court.
Notably, in its petition before the CA, PBCOM assailed the RTC Order denying due
course to its notice of appeal. A trial court's order disallowing a notice of appeal, which
is tantamount to a disallowance or dismissal of the appeal itself, is not a decision or final
order from which an appeal may be taken. The suitable remedy for the aggrieved party
is to elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, contrary to
the CA's finding, PBCOM availed itself of the correct remedy in questioning the
disallowance of its notice of appeal.
Moreover, while it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court,
there are well-defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction.
The power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances specified
in Rule 41, Sec. 13 - for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the
docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on an entirely
different ground - such as "that an appeal is not a proper remedy." The authority to
dismiss an appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA
under Rule 50, Section 1. (Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017)
The fresh period rule does not apply to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 as
it is not akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42; hence, the period to
file a Rule 64 petition should not be reckoned from the receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial. Pursuant to
Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for
reconsideration to file the petition. Therefore, since X received the decision denying its
motion on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19 to file the petition. (Fortune Life
Insurance Company, Inc. vs. COA Proper, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015)
WRIT OF POSSESSION
40
1. Ministerial, ex parte, summary, non-litigious
A proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in

nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without
notice by the court to an person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is
granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be
heard. The RTC thus did not err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in
granting Planters Bank’s motion without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it
to participate. The case LZK cited will also not help its cause. The statement was made
in contemplation of issuance of a writ of possession after the redemption period has
lapsed. But the rules also provide that a writ of possession may be issued before the
expiration of the redemption period provided that applicant posts a bond, which Planters
did in this case. (LZK Holdings vs. Planters Development Bank, January 20, 2014)
2. Exceptions to ministerial duty to issue writ of possession –
a. When redemption period had not yet lapsed
An exception to the ministerial duty of the courts to issue a writ of possession is

when the redemption period had not yet lapsed. The ratio for the ruling is to uphold the
public policy of allowing the redemptioner every chance to redeem his property. The
reason is that in case the mortgagor decides to exercise his right of redemption, Section
30 of Rule 39 provides that the redemption price should be equivalent to the amount of
the purchase price, plus one [percent] monthly interest up to the time of the redemption,
together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have
paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate.
The same cannot be said of this case, where Yeung had already allowed the
redemption period to lapse.
As to the surplus, Sec 4 Rule 68 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
surplus is to be paid to junior encumbrances, in the absence of whom, it shall pertain to
the mortgagor. In the absence of any evidence showing that the mortgage also covers
other obligations of the mortgagor, the proceeds from the sale should not be applied to
them. (PBCOM v. Yeung, December 4, 2013)
b. When a third person is in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed

property
Unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court where an action for foreclosure is filed before the RTC where the mortgaged
property or any part thereof is situated, any property brought within the ambit of Act
3135 is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but with the
office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. As such, a third
person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed property, who claims a right
41
superior to that of the original mortgagor, is given no opportunity to be heard on his

claim. It stands to reason, therefore, that such third person may not be
dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex parte possessory writ, since to do so
would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of
due process. (Villanueva vs. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation, G.R. No.
177881, October 13, 2010; Marquez vs. Alindog, G.R. No. 184045, January 2, 2014)
The phrase "a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor" contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property
by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The
co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own
right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of
possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property
should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
ADVERSELY to the judgment obligor. In this case, Y is merely a successor-in-interest
of Spouses X. (Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. vs Centeno, G.R. No. 200667
(Resolution), March 11, 2013)
Writ of possession - purchaser must first be placed in possession before a

judgment debtor may file a petition for cancellation of the writ of possession
pursuant to Section 8 of Act 3135, if the writ of possession was issued during the
redemption period
As the CA correctly pointed out, a debtor may avail of the remedy under Section 8
of Act No. 3135 only after the purchaser has obtained possession of the property. What
it missed, however, is that this rule is applicable only to a unique factual situation –
when the writ of possession sought to be cancelled was issued during the redemption
period. The provisions of Act No. 3135 applies until the period of redemption; once
redemption lapses and consolidation of the purchaser’s title ensues, Act No. 3135 finds
no application.
The writ of possession that the debtor may petition to set aside under Section 8 of
Act No. 3135 undoubtedly refers to one issued pursuant to Section 7 of the same law
"during the redemption period." (Home Appliances vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
206599, September 29, 2014)
Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
The registration of the sale is required only in extrajudicial foreclosure sale

because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of the
right of redemption. In contrast, the registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial
foreclosure because only the equity of redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except in
mortgages with banking institutions.
The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
42
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the
90-day period after the judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale but
prior to the confirmation of the sale. In this case, only equity of redemption was granted.
Hence, registration of sale is not required for the period to commence to run. (Robles
vs. Yapcinco, G.R. No. 169568, October 22, 2014).
D obtained a loan from E. As security, D mortgaged his property. Upon failure of D to

pay, E filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage in the RTC.
While the latter case was pending, F -- D’s son -- agreed to pay D’s obligation to E by
executing a promissory note in favor of E. However, when F learned of the foreclosure
proceedings, F stopped paying. E then filed a collection case against F. Can a
creditor-mortgagee file a complaint for foreclosure against the debtor-mortgagee,
then file a complaint for collection against another debtor who contracted himself
to pay the same loan?
No. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-
mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover
the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of
money OR the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each
remedy is complete by itself. While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the
promissory note executed by respondent who was not the original debtor, the same
does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would have given
rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. (Marilag vs. Martinez, G.R. No.
201892, July 22, 2015.) - EPB
RES JUDICATA
There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the
second case that is sought to be barred. There is conclusiveness of judgment,on the
other hand, where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action.
Tested against the foregoing, the Court rules that res judicata, in the concept of
bar by prior judgment, applies in this case. By resolving the substantive issue therein –
that is, the right of Gilbert to recover the de facto possession of the subject property
arising from Robert’s breach of the undated lease contract – the MCTC-Nabunturan-
Mawab’s Decision should be properly considered as a judgment on the merits.
The Court must, however, clarify that res judicata only applies in reference to the
cause of action raised by Gilbert in both ejectment complaints – that is, his entitlement
to the de facto possession of the subject property based on breach of contract (due to
43
non-payment of rent), which was resolved to be simulated and, hence, non-binding.

Accordingly, any subsequent ejectment complaint raising a different cause of action –
say for instance, recovery of de facto possession grounded on tolerance, is not barred
by the Court’s current disposition. In effect, the dismissal of the second ejectment
complaint, by virtue of this Decision, is without prejudice to the filing of another
ejectment complaint grounded on a different cause of action, albeit involving the same
parties and subject matter. (De Leon vs. Dela Llana, G.R. No. 212277, February 11,
2015)
Former judgment must be on the merits
For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the
judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there
exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. A judgment is "on the
merits" when it amounts to a legal declaration of the respective rights and duties of the
parties, based upon the disclosed facts and upon which the right of recovery depends,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objectives or contentions. Thus, when a
dismissal was merely based on the finding of forum shopping, it cannot be said
that the dismissal was constitutive of a judgment "on the merits" of the case. (Dy
vs. Yu, G.R. No. 202632, July 8, 2015) - EPB
Same evidence rule – test whether res judicata applies
The Rules of Court defines cause of action as an act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. One of the tests to determine the identity of causes of action
so as to warrant application of res judicata is the "same evidence rule." In ascertaining
the identity of causes of action, the test is to look into whether or not the same
evidence fully supports and establishes both the present and the former causes
of action. If the answer is in the affirmative, the former judgment would be a bar;
otherwise, that prior judgment would not serve as such a bar to the subsequent action.
In an unlawful detainer case, the evidence needed to establish the cause of action
would be the lease contract and the violation of that lease. However, in this case where
a person occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, what must be· proven is that such possession is by mere
tolerance, and that there was a breach of implied promise to vacate the land upon
demand. (Diaz, Jr. vs. Valenciano, Jr., G.R. No. 209376, December 16, 2017)
When counterclaim for partition not barred by prior judgment.
44
In their answer to the counterclaim, petitioners countered that the action for
partition has already been barred by res judicata. There is res judicata when the
following requisites are present: (1) the formal judgment or order must be final; (2) it
must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration
of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action.
In this case, respondent siblings admit: 1) that they filed an action for partition,
which the RTC dismissed for the failure of the parties to attend the scheduled hearings;
2) that since they no longer appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Also, the
subject property in the former case and in the present controversy are the same, and
that in both cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. And there is identity
of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also between those in
privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest. With all the other
elements present, what is left to be determined now is whether or not the dismissal of
Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits that would complete the
requirements of res judicata.
Based on Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, the following are instances when
a complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the
date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if he fails to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with
the Rules or any order of the court. The general rule is that dismissal of a case for
failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with
prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of
dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice. In
this case, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language say that the
dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal be on the
merits is present.
Dismissal with prejudice amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata.
However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided
that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet (Article 494, Civil
Code). Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right
granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To
construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the
promulgation of procedural rules.
Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or
not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice. But, there can still be
res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter
once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a
45
competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for
co-ownership does not or no longer exists. Since, in this case, the co-ownership is still
subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario, then there is no legal bar
preventing respondents from praying for the partition of the property through
counterclaim. (Quintos vs. Nicolas, G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014)
Does res judicata apply to bar the Makati case from proceeding?
Yes. The Makati case was already barred by res judicata. Hence, its immediate
dismissal is warranted. Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final;
(b) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
(d) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter and cause of action.
The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the merits Shell’s complaint to
recover the deficiency, and its decision rendered on May 31, 1990 on the merits already
became final and executory. Hence, the first, second and third elements were present.
The fourth element is met as well. The test to determine whether the causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain the actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If
the same facts or evidence will sustain the actions, then they are considered identical,
and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. B’s Makati case and
A’s Manila case undeniably required the production of the same evidence. Also, both
cases arose from the same transaction (i.e., the foreclosure of the mortgage), such that
the success of B in invalidating the extrajudicial foreclosure would have necessarily
negated A’s right to recover the deficiency. (Sps. Mendiola v. CA, G.R. No. 159746,
July 18, 2012)
Extrinsic fraud as ground for annulment of judgment
For purposes of the application of Rule 47, gross negligence cannot be equated to
the extrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for an annulment of judgment.
By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character, i.e., it
relates to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case where the defeated party has been prevented from
presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is
committed by the adverse party, not by one’s own lawyer. In the latter case, the
remedy of the client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re- litigate the case
where judgment had been rendered. Also, it was Pinasukan’s own fault for not being
46
updated with the proceedings of its case and merely relying on its lawyer (Pinausukan
Seafood House vs. FEBTC, G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014)
Declaratory relief – not remedy for decisions of quasi-judicial agencies
In the same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition
for declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a
petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a
decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies
provided by the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper
subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP
Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions. (Monetary
Board v. Philippine Veteran’s Bank, G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015)
EJECTMENT
In an appeal from the judgment of the MTC in an unlawful detainer case, is there a
trial de novo in the RTC? NO.
• Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondents. However

the MTC dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioners to adduce clear and
convincing evidence showing that respondents had encroached on their
property.
• Petitioners appealed to the RTC, which ordered petitioners to conduct a

relocation survey to determine their allegation of encroachment. Afterwards, the
RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and set aside the MTC’s
decision, observing that respondents had encroached on petitioners’ property
based on the court-ordered relocation survey.
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
reinstated the MTC decision.
The RTC violated Rule 70, Sec. 18 by ordering the conduct of the relocation
and verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the
testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial
de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the
appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin.
N.B. Under Rule 70, Sec. 18, the RTC shall decide the appeal on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the MTC and such memoranda as may be
submitted by the parties.
47
The case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-summary action
like accion reivindicatoria. The CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be
resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary
dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property
claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute
cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings
under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry (Manalang vs.
Bacani, G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015)
A was the owner of a piece of land. After building a house in the land, A migrated to
Hawaii and asked B to become caretaker. B then claimed ownership over the land. A
filed a case for unlawful detainer against B. Does A have a cause of action for unlawful
detainer considering that he does not anymore live in his land?
Yes. It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the
property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of
real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of
the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in
such occupancy.(Piedad vs. Spouses Gurieza, G.R. No. 207525, June 18, 2018.) -
EPB
. Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring
an action for the ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed instituted for the benefit of all.
To reiterate, both X and Y are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a
commonality of interest and cause of action as against Z. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstance, as in this case where the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the rule requiring all
such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping may be
relaxed. (Fernandez vs. Villegas, G.R. 200191, August 20, 2014)
Recovery of physical possession of real property is a real action that is not

extinguished by the death of a party
The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to
the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to
the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is
questionable.” Thus, “an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one
who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property.”
Indeed, possession in ejectment cases “means nothing more than actual physical
possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.” In a forcible
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entry case, “prior physical possession is the primary consideration[.]” “A party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a
person with a better right lawfully ejects him.” “[T]he party in peaceable, quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.”
In this case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the
property and that the petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force,
strategy and stealth.
Wilfredo’s death did not render moot the forcible entry case. (Calingasan vs.
Rivera, G.R. No. 171555, April 17, 2013)
Indirect contempt – partakes of a criminal action

Contempt is not a criminal offense. However, a charge for contempt of court partakes
of the nature of a criminal action. Rules that govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply
to a prosecution for contempt.In fact, Section 11 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
provides that the appeal in indirect contempt proceedings may be taken as in criminal
cases. This Court has held that an alleged contemner should be accorded the same
rights as that of an accused. Thus, the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge against
respondent amounts to an acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution.
(Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. vs. Cantos, G.R. No. 180200,
November 25, 2013)
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Failure to file record on appeal – appeal not perfected
In a special proceeding to settle the estate of the decedent husband, the brother of the
husband’s wife intervened, seeking to exclude the paraphernal properties of said wife
from inclusion in the estate of the husband. The RTC dismissed brother’s complaint-in-
intervention. He thereafter filed a notice of appeal. The administrator of the husband’s
estate sought to dismiss the appeal for failure for file record on appeal. The brother
averred that the appeal was from the decision of the trial court to dismiss the brother's
complaint-in-intervention and not 'the final order or judgment rendered in the case',
obviously referring to the main case, that is, the intestate estate case. Since the
intervention was not an independent proceeding but only ancillary or supplemental to
the main case, the rule on multiple appeals allegedly does not apply and the filing of a
record on appeal is not a pre-requisite to the acceptance and consideration of the
appeal by the appellate court. Was the brother’s right to appeal lost by his failure to
49
file the record on appeal?

Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an
appeal "may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable."
In the context of the final judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the
appealable orders and judgments in special proceedings to the final order or
judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the remedy of appeal to other
orders or dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in the case.
The dismissal of the brother's intervention constituted "a final determination in
the lower court of the rights of the party appealing," as in Sec. 1 of Rule 109, that
is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister.
The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by

notice of appeal and record on appeal, pursuant to Sec. 2(a) of Rule 41. Considering
that the brother did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule
41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result,
the dismissal became final and immutable. The right to appeal, being statutory in
nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating the exercise of the right. As
such, his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was mandatory and
jurisdictional, and his failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time rendered
the judgment final and beyond review on appeal. (Chiongbian vs. Benitez-Lirio, G.R.
No. 162692, Aug. 26, 2015)
May an entry in the marriage contract be cancelled under Rule 108? YES.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that
her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into
or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled
that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she
was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in
the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as
parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth
in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified
of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in
the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence.
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With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. The court
thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as
she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
"evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given
the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed,
and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the CORRECTION of the record of such marriage to
reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was
no marriage to speak of. (Republic vs. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10,
2014)
Exception to rule requiring special proceedings in declaration of heirship
The declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an

independent civil action. Recourse to administration proceedings to determine who the
heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.
The Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as
(a) when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and (b) the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the
issues it defined during the pre-trial.
In this case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical to
dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of
petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, since respondents spouses Gualvez
admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole
heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with
rights over the subject land.
Affidavit of self-adjudication void – affiant not sole heir of decedent

Thus, it is only proper for the RTC to declare the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second
sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that self-
adjudication is only warranted when there is only one heir. As admitted by respondents,
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Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. The falsity of Avelina’s claim renders her act of
adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid.
The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents was correctly
nullified, since Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute
ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of
Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still
subject to partition. What she could have transferred to respondents was only the
ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the admissions of respondents
and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of
whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is
nothing more than a simulated contract. (Rebusquillo vs. Galvez, G.R. No. 204029,
June 4, 2014)
Writ of Amparo
Writ of Amparo not proper remedy for child custody and assertion of parental
authority
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
In this case, Christina claimed that the actions of the DSWD amounted to an
enforced disappearance. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD
officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. Christina obtained a memorandum
stating that the baby was in the custody of the Medina spouses.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her
child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is
not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him. Since what is involved is the issue of child custody
and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
properly applied. (Infant Julian Yusa vs. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014)
Writ of amparo improper remedy if there is no government participation
Spouses R and C were complaining before the Cebu Pacific complaint desk after
being informed that their baggage were offloaded and transferred to a different flight. In
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the course of the complaint, R noticed Z taking photos of C and this led to a brawl.. Z’s
brothers aired on their TV program comments and expletives against Spouses R and C,
threatening retaliation. The spouses hence filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
Amparo against. Z’s brothers and they, in turn, filed a Manifestation and motion to Deny
Issuance of Protection Order and/or Dismissal of the Petition Motu Proprio. This was
opposed by the spouses for being a prohibitive pleading. The RTC dismissed the
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo. Is RTC’s dismissal correct?
Yes. The writ of Amparo was intended to address and, thus, is presently
confined to cases involving extralegal killings an/or enforced disappearances, or
threats. “Extrajudicial killings,” according to case law, are generally characterised as
“killings committed without due process of law,” i.e. without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings,” while “enforced disappearances,” according to Sec. 3(g) of RA 9851
(Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other
Crimes Against Humanity,”) “means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or
with the authorisation, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organisation
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information
on that fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The Court previously held that the
petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation. The writ of
amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance out the
government's incredible power in order to curtail human rights abuses on its end.
In this case, the petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of Z’s
brothers’ purported violation of their right to life and security, carried out
by private individuals without any showing of direct or indirect government
participation. Thus, it is apparent that the amparo petition falls outside the
purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail. (Spouses Santiago vs.
Tulfo, G.R. No. 205039, October 21, 2015) - LPB
Order of priority on who can file petition for writ of amparo
While "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for
the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be
strictly followed. In this case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no
immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In fact, no allegation was made on
any of the familial relationship of Parker as only her whereabouts from 2011 were
alleged and discussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no legal
standing to file this petition.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in
the following order:
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(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of
the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known

member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. (Callo vs. Morente,
G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017)
Habeas Corpus
Service of summons not required in habeas corpus
Service of summons is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102
of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of
habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil
actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent. (Tujanmilitante vs. Deapera, G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014)
A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly

deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. (Rule
102, Sec. 4) The restraint then has become legal.Therefore, the remedy of habeas
corpus is rendered moot and academic.
If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper
remedy is to pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.This
ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest
based on one or more of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court: (Osorio vs. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018)
Writ of Habeas Data
Posting of photographs on Facebook – waiver of right to informational privacy
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such
were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy. [A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake
and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery,
54
Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise,
the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions
that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or
to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this
case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist
that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question.. (Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
Allegations in petition for habeas data must be supported by substantial evidence
The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule) was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as "the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself."
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as "a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party."
The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing

an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption –
he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to
life, liberty or security.
All that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony
which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas
Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded
to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life,
liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to
conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends
55
- say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan' s reputation.

Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the
criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the
insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence,
the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas
data petition. (Lee vs. Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014) - EPB
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction
X was charged with falsification of private document before the MCTC of Jagna,
Bohol by Corp A. It was alleged that X falsified a receipt by recording a reimbursable
meal expense of Php 1,810, instead of the actual amount of Php 810. X filed a Motion to
Quash in the MCTC but was denied. X filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
questioning the denial of the MR but the denial was affirmed. Consequently, X filed a
petition for review on certiorari with the SC. X contends that the allegations in the
complaint showing that the receipt was issued in Jagna, Bohol does not determine the
venue because the place of issuance of receipt is not an essential element – there was
no damage yet to speak of so none of the elements of falsification occurred in Jagna,
Bohol. Does MCTC Jagna, Bohol have jurisdiction over the criminal case?
Yes. The MCTC has jurisdiction. Secs. 15(a) and 10, Rule 110 of the Rules
categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal case not only in the court
where the offense was committed but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place. The sufficiency of the information as to the place of the commission of the
offense is adequately met if the information, through its allegations, provides for the
place where the any of the crime’s essential elements are committed, and that it is
within the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the allegations in the Information and the
complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case that such crime was committed in
Jagna, Bohol. (Navaja v. De Castro, G.R. 182926, June 22, 2015)
Jurisdiction over drugs cases – exclusive RTC

Issue: whether it is the Sandiganbayan or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.
The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated
the rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A
plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-
related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other.
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or
higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office.
The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government
officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and
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its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660, which amended Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1606. In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the
jurisdiction to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)."
This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the
general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon
of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law. De Lima vs.
Guerrero (G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017)
Control of prosecution
Matters within the control and supervision of the Prosecutor:

1. what case to file;
2. whom to prosecute;
3. manner of prosecution; and
4. right to withdraw information before arraignment even without notice and
hearing
Matters within the control of the Court after the case is filed:
1. suspension of arraignment;
2. reinvestigation;
3. prosecution by the fiscal;
4. dismissal of the case; and
5. downgrading of offense or dropping of accused even before plea
Limitations on control by the Court:

1. Prosecution is entitled to notice and hearing;
2. Prosecution's stand to maintain prosecution should be respected by the
court ; and
3. The court must make its own assessment of evidence in granting or
denying any motion to dismiss the case
Effect of filing of complaint or information in court
Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as

its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound
discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
which has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records
57
of the investigation. (Department of Justice vs. Alaon, G.R. No. 189596, April 23,
2014)
Valid information
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and
the actual acts or omissions constitutive thereof. It is not necessary to state therein the
precise date the offense was committed, except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. And as earlier mentioned, in rape cases, the date or time of commission of
the offense is not an essential ingredient of said crime. (People vs. Colentava,
G.R. No. 190348, February 9, 2015)
Formal amendments
Amendments sought by the prosecution pertain to (i) the alleged change in the date
in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase “doing
business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group;” (iii) the change and/or
addition of the branches of petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase “for
income earned.” These are mere formal amendments, as the nature of the crime or
the essence of the offense charged under the amended information remained
consistent, thus petitioner could not have been surprised at all. (Mendez vs.
People, G.R. No. 179962, June 11, 2014)
Substantial amendments
Test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense

under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other (DAEA)
Duplicity of the offense
As a rule, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in

the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation. The accused cannot be convicted of a crime,
even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will
constitute as one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate
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offenses. The complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is

committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money
or goods from another person. In other words, the falsification is a NECESSARY
MEANS of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to CONCEAL
the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are
committed.
In the instant case, the falsified or erroneous entries were used in order to conceal
the proceeds of the sale, thus, constitute two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification. Not being Estafa Through Falsification of Documents, there was no need to
allege falsification. Furthermore, since only estafa was charged (though also possibly
liable for falsification as a separate offense), petitioner is properly convicted thereof.
There is no necessity of alleging falsification as it is not an element of estafa. (Patula v.
People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012)
Single act constituting violation of two or more distinct provisions of law or by

special law and revised penal code
Since the information filed against petitioner were for separate and distinct offenses
as discussed above – the first against article 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code and the
second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938) – one cannot be pleaded
as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal
procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our
penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus where a SINGLE ACT is
directed against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by SPECIAL LAW and the REVISED PENAL
CODE, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the
prosecution of the other. (Consino vs. People, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015)
Separate civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action
As a result of a vehicular accident, a party involved therein filed a criminal case for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against the other party, who, in
turn, filed a civil suit against the party instituting the criminal action.
The party filing the separate civil action cannot be liable for forum shopping
because the law (Arts. 2176 & 2177 of the Civil Code), and the rules (Sec. 1, Rule 111)
expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently
of the criminal action. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a
separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that
state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
(Standard Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 200055, September 10, 2014)
Effect of death of accused pending appeal
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Accused A was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape
under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal
Code by the CA. However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued, the CA
received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing the CA that A has just died
as evidenced by the Certificate of Death attached thereto. What is the effect of A’s
death?
The accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action, which may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based..(People vs. Culas, G.R. No. 211166, June 5,
2017.)
Effect of acquittal on civil liability
X was charged with Reckless Imprudence when he ran over Y while she was crossing
the street. X filed an Urgent Motion to dismiss (demurrer) asserting that he was not
positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that
hit the victim. MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of
evidence. With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the
same, holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving
that X was the person responsible for Y’s demise. The RTC affirmed the MeTC’s
ruling, declaring that the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did
not exist at all. The CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered X to pay damages,
holding that the MeTC’s Order showed that X’s acquittal was based on the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, X was not
exonerated from civil liability. Is X civilly liable?
No. The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of
the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. The Rules of Court
requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." Thus, when the court order
acquitting the accused is based on the fact that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist in view of the failure of the prosecution to
sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him, his
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civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.

(Daluraya v. Oliva, G.R. No. 210148, December 8, 2014) - EPB
Prejudicial Question
The action for rescission is not a prejudicial question to the B.P. 22 criminal
proceedings. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must
first be determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. Two elements that must concur
in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question are expressly stated in
Section 7, Rule 111: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The issue in the criminal actions upon the violation of B.P. 22 is, therefore, whether or
not X issued the dishonored checks knowing them to be without funds upon
presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or
not the breach in the fulfilment of Y’s obligation warranted the rescission of the
conditional sale. (Reyes vs. Rossi, G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013)
61
Four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure where probable cause
is needed to be established:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to determine

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information
for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months
and one day without regard to the fine;
(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a warrant of
arrest or a commitment order, if the accused has already been arrested, shall be issued
and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice;
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private person making a
warrantless arrest when an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search warrant
shall be issued, and only upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is

based only on the likelihood, or probability, of guilt. (Estrada vs. Ombudsman,
G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015)
How to determine probable cause

S was charged with qualified theft before the Office of the City Prosecutor. The
prosecutor found probable cause, hence the information was filed before the RTC. S
filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Finding that there was
probable cause, the RTC denied the motion. CA reversed stating that certain elements
of the crime were absent. Can a judge determine the absence/presence of probable
cause?
A: Yes. Rule 112, Sec. 5 explicitly states that a judge, after personally evaluating
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence, may immediately
dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
However, the judge's dismissal of a case under the authority of the aforesaid provision
must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to
establish probable cause — that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and
thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the
62
crime charged. Otherwise, he/she should not dismiss. In doubtful cases, however, the
appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.
While probable cause should be determined summarily, it requires careful
examination of the evidence to prevent material damage to an accused's
constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect
the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and
holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. (People of the
Philippines v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 220685, November 29, 2017)
Preliminary investigation – respondent has no right to cross-examine

complainant’s witnesses and to be furnished copies of affidavits of his co-
respondents
The respondent in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the

witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a
counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant
and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine.
Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with
copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses.
Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent
with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents. The right of the respondent is
only "to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant," as expressly stated in
Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has
unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to
submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant
and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or
their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine." (Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January
21, 2015)
Are the constitutional due process requirements prescribed in Ang Tibay

applicable to preliminary investigation? NO.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court

of Industrial Relations, as amplified in GSIS v. CA, are not applicable to
preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere
statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul with
the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified
63
in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply, and were
never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary
investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while
administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so
adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a
decision against the respondent in the administrative case. In preliminary investigations,
only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to
establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine
the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such
rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the

hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and
hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer
may be the investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder,
investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same
public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now
declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and
essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present
preliminary investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This
will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts
throughout the country.(Estrada vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21,
2015)
BAIL
Where to file bail bond
Respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a),
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail
bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest. (Tormis vs. Judge
Paredes, A.M No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015)
Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail
The MTC cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for
denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination of probable cause, as the motion was
64
filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication
of reliefs other than an application for bail.
In Miranda v. Tuliao, which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court
discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person,
and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. This is in
the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of
the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: x x x (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest
. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke

the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the
court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived
of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.
Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is
not limited to, detention (David vs. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015)
When a matter of right; exceptions (Sec. 4, Rule 114)

•Bail is a matter of right, when:
a. before or after conviction by the MTC or
b. before conviction by RTC of all offenses punishable by a penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua
•Exceptions:
1. When the evidence of guilt is strong in capital offenses or offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Exception to the exception: when accused charged with a capital offense
is a minor, he is entitled to bail regardless of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong.
2. Bail in extradition proceedings
3. Right to bail is not available in the military.
4. After judgment has become final. (Sec. 24)
5. After the accused has commenced to serve his sentence
When a matter of discretion (Sec. 5, Rule 114)

Bail is discretionary, when:
a. Before conviction, in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.
b. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense NOT punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
65
Note: Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same
bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances: (Bail-Negating Circumstances) - REPFC
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; RECIDIVIST
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; ESCAPED
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon; PROBATION
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; FLIGHT RISK or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal. CRIME RISK
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case.
Application for bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation (Sec. 26, Rule 114)
An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging or assailing the:
a. validity of his arrest; or
b. legality of the warrant issued; or
c. regularity of the preliminary investigation; or
d. questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation
Note: Provided that he raises them before entering his plea.
Is the registered owner of a vehicle liable for the damage caused by the negligent
driving of his employee? YES
A dump truck driven by Pablo Manoco rammed a 45-foot wooden electricity post
owned by Meralco, damaging the post and its attachments. Thus, Meralco sued the
driver and Vicente Josefa, registered owner of the truck, for damages. Meralco alleged
that Manoco’s reckless driving resulted in damage to its properties. It also imputed
primary liability on Josefa for his alleged negligence in the selection and supervision of
Manoco. In defense, Josefa denied that Manoco was his employee when the accident
occurred. He also maintained that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of all his employees.
66
Bautista is presumed to be negligent in driving the truck under the doctrine of

res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and extraordinary for the truck to hit an electricity
post, an immovable and stationary object, unless Bautista, who had the exclusive
management and control of the truck, acted with fault or negligence. We cannot also
conclude that Meralco contributed to the injury since it safely and permanently installed
the electricity post beside the street.
Under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer is vicariously
liable for damages caused by his employees within the scope of their assigned
tasks. In the present case, Josefa avoids the application of this provision by denying
that Bautista was his employee at the time of the incident.
Josefa cannot evade his responsibility by mere denial of his employment relations
with Bautista in the absence of proof that his truck was used without authorization or
that it was stolen when the accident occurred. In quasi-delict cases, the registered
owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of law. The
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused while
the vehicle was being driven on highways or streets. The purpose of motor vehicle
registration is precisely to identify the owner so that if any injury is caused by the
vehicle, responsibility can be imputed to the registered owner. (Josefa vs. Manila
Electric Company, G.R. No. 182705, July 18, 2014)
Warrantless arrest – hot pursuit

N.B. Justice Brion traced the history of warrantless arrest (Rule 113, Sec. (b) in the
Philippines.
Elements of arrest in hot pursuit:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and

(2) the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness

of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate
against unreasonable arrests.
An offense has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of
IMMEDIACY between the time the offense was committed and the time of the
arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
N.B. The arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the
crime (mauling by the accused of Atty. Generoso).
The arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b),

Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal
67
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has

committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being
committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has recently committed the crime
N.B. Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his
mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same
neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting
officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
Probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable

ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged, or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on
actual facts.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon

the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically,
the (a) requirement of immediacy; the (b) police officer's personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances; and lastly, the (c) propriety of the determination of probable cause that
the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. (Pestilos vs. Generoso , G.R.
No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
Crime of importation of regulated drugs includes crime of illegal possession
While appellants cannot be held liable for the offense of illegal importation charged in
the information, their criminal liability for illegal possession, if proven beyond reasonable
doubt, may nevertheless be sustained. The crime of importation of regulated drugs is
committed by importing or bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being
authorized by law. Indeed, when one brings something or causes something to be
brought into the country, he necessarily has possession of the same. Necessarily,
therefore, importation can never be proven without first establishing possession,
affirming the fact that possession is a condition sine qua non for it would rather be
unjust to convict one of illegal importation of regulated drugs when he is not proven to
be in possession thereof.
68
Charging appellants with illegal possession when the information filed against them
charges the crime of importation does not violate their constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against them. The rule is that when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and
that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in that which is charged. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is
proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. (People vs. Chi Chan Liu,
G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015)
Valid warrantless arrest
Appellant’s contention that her warrantless arrest was unlawful does not deserve
credence. The facts on record do not substantiate her claim that she was apprehended
merely on suspicion of committing a crime. On the contrary, appellant was arrested after
committing a criminal offense that resulted from a successful buy-bust operation.
Having been apprehended in flagrante delicto, the police officers were not only
authorized but were even duty-bound to arrest her even without a warrant. (People v.
Nepomuceno, G.R No. 194999, February 9, 2015)
Buy-bust operation - lawful procedure for apprehending drug peddlers
A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law,

for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. Since accused-appellant was caught
by the buy-bust team in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made.
The accused was caught in the act and had to be apprehended on the spot.
Where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some
material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial
court's assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in
a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. (People v.
Usman, G.R No. 201100, February 4, 2015)
Evidence to prove illegal sale of dangerous drugs – proof of illegal sale and
presentation in court of corpus delicti
The lack of documentary proof of the surveillance conducted on Dela Peña,[36] the
failure of the PDEA-7 operatives to record in their blotter the serial numbers of the buy-
bust money, and the failure of the prosecution to present as evidence the pre-operation
report,failed to create a dent on the prosecution’s evidence. A surveillance, pre-
operation report, and buy-bust money are not elements of, and are not vital to the
prosecution for illegal sale of shabu. What is material to the prosecution of illegal
69
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the illegal sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
Anent Criminal Case Nos. CBU-83577 and CBU-83578, the cases for illegal
possession of shabu, both Dela Peña and Delima failed to overcome the presumption
that they have knowledge or animus possidendi of the shabu found in their respective
possession. Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. Except for their self-serving denial, the
accused could not present any viable defense. The defense of denial or frame-up has
been invariably viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common
defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of R.A. 9165. Chain of custody - from the
time the illegal drugs were seized from Dela Peña and Delima, up to their delivery to the
crime laboratory for chemical examination, until their presentation in evidence before
the RTC, the integrity of said items was preserved. No evidence was adduced by the
defense showing that they were tainted in any manner. The integrity of the evidence is
presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the
evidence has been tampered with. Dela Peña and Delima failed to discharge their
burden of proving that the evidence was tampered to overcome the presumption of
regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that the
public officers properly discharged their duties (People vs. Dela Pena, G.R No.
207635, February 18, 2015)
Legitimacy of entrapment procedure or decoy solicitation
In People v. Bartolome, we had the occasion to discuss the legitimacy of a “decoy

solicitation,” to wit:
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence
report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it
by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no
showing that the informant induced the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as
indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a
rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to
protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts.
Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant’s identity is protected in deference to his
invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is
considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need
to protect his security be disregarded. In the present case, as the buy-bust operation
was duly witnessed by the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit
(PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot (SPO4 Larot) and PO3 Juancho
Dizon, their testimonies can take the place of that of the confidential informant. (People
v. Rosauro, G.R No. 209588, February 18, 2015)
70
Dismissal based on denial of accused’s right to speedy trial amounts to acquittal

which is not appealable and bars further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense
A dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the
effect of acquittal that would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense
While the remedy of certiorari may be availed of in order to challenge the judgment
or order of acquittal, petitioner must prove that the trial court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction
In this case, no such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the RTC in
dismissing the case for denial of the respondents’ right to speedy trial. Aside from the
lapse of two (2) years and nine (9) months from the time the case was dismissed to
the time petitioner sought for a reconsideration of the same, it is also not disputed that it
was petitioner who caused the inordinate delay. (Bonsubre Jr. vs. Yerro, G.R No.
205952, February 11, 2015) - EPB
No violation of right to speedy disposition of cases
There was no violation of respondents’ right to a speedy disposition of cases. The

reckoning point to determine if there had been inordinate delay should start to
run from the filing of the formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, on December 8, 2014, up to the filing of the Information on November
23, 2016. It appears that after the filing of the formal complaint on December 8, 2014,
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint order dated January 7, 2015
directing respondents, among others, to submit their counter-affidavits, which they did
on March 3, 2015 after some extensions of time. Thereafter, a subpoena duces
tecum was issued to the COA and the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH). The other respondents filed a Supplement to Position Paper on October 16,
2015 and followed by a Motion to Admit Annexes of the Supplemental Counter-
Affidavits on October 23, 2015. On November 27, 2015, the Graft Investigation Officer
submitted to the Ombudsman a Resolution finding probable cause. The Resolution was
approved by the Ombudsman on April 29, 2016 and the Information was filed on
November 23, 2016.
The period from the filing of the formal complaint to the subsequent conduct of the
preliminary investigation was not attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays as would constitute a violation of respondents’ right to a speedy disposition of
cases. “We find the period of less than two years not to be unreasonable or
arbitrary.” Also respondents did not raise any issue as to the violation of their right to a
71
speedy disposition of cases until the issuance of the Ombudsman’s Resolution finding
probable cause.
As to the quashal of the subject Information, the Court noted that the petitioner did
not assail the Sandiganbayan’s findings of insufficiency of the allegations in the
Information
Since there was no violation of respondents’ right to a speedy disposition of cases,

the case should not be dismissed, and therefore gave the petitioner an opportunity to
amend the Information and correct its defect pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. (People v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 233063, February 11, 2019)
MOTION TO QUASH
Order sustaining motion to quash will not bar another prosecution for the same
offense - unless the criminal action or liability has been extinguished or double
jeopardy has already attached. - ED
The Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all the
material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.
The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a
prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial
ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to
a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must
include, inter alia, both “the designation of the offense given by the statute” and “the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.”
Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan should just
have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by
amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to
correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, the
Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no
defect in the Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was
sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in
ordering the quashal of the Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from
72
filing another information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order
sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course,
unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached. (People v. Bayabos, G.R
No. 171222, February 18, 2015)
Failure to move for quashal of information before arraignment – waiver of right to

question the regularity of his arrest
Jurisprudence is settled that “any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused

should be timely raised in a motion to quash the Information at any time before
arraignment, failing [in] which, he is deemed to have waived” his right to question
the regularity of his arrest. As the records show, except during the inquest
proceedings before the prosecutor’s office, appellant never objected to the regularity of
his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, he even actively participated in the trial of the
case. With these lapses, he is estopped from raising any question regarding the same.
(People vs. Cunanan, G.R. No. 198024, March 16, 2015)
Appellant failed to move for the quashal of the Information prior to the arraignment
due to the alleged illegality of her arrest or to object to the same during her arraignment.
She even actively participated in the trial and only questioned the validity of her arrest in
the CA. As a result of this omission, she is deemed to have waived any objection to the
defects that may have attended her arrest. (People vs. Nepomuceno, G.R. No.
194999, February 9, 2015)
Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before

the accused enters his plea on arraignment, and having failed to move for the
quashal of the Information before arraignment, accused-appellant is now estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest. Moreover, any irregularity was cured upon his
voluntary submission to the RTC’s jurisdiction. (People vs. Usman, G.R No. 201100,
February 4, 2015)
Court should no longer entertain the petitioner's challenge against the sufficiency of
the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior
to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground
that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not
charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge. - child
abuse, violation of Republic Act No. 7610. (Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988,
October 8, 2014)
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash

shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended
information. Generally, the fact that the allegations in the information do not
73
constitute an offense, or that the information does not conform substantially to

the prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary to this rule, the
court should give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.
The RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an
opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations; even granting that the information
in question is defective, it appearing that the defects thereof can be cured by
amendment, the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should have
ordered the Fiscal to amend the information. When there is any doubt about the
sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court should direct its
amendment or that a new information be filed, and save the necessity of
appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might easily be
amended. (People vs. Andrade, G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014)
No provisional dismissal under Rule 117, Sec. 8
Petitioner’s claim that there was no violation of the respondents’ right to speedy trial
as both parties mutually agreed to provisionally dismiss the case until full settlement of
the obligation under paragraph 5 of the Compromise Agreement likewise does not
persuade.
The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to

the reinstatement thereof, is governed by Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
Under this provision, a case is provisionally dismissed if the following requisites concur:
(a) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves
for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
(b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(c) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
(d) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal of
the case.
In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites were met. While it may appear
that the respondents consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the
Compromise Agreement, the prosecution neither presented the same for the court’s
approval nor filed the required motion to that effect such that no order was in fact issued
granting the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, petitioner’s assertion that the
respondents are estopped from invoking their right to speedy trial is without basis.
(Bonsubre Jr. vs. Yerro, G.R No. 205952, February 11, 2015)
.
When dismissal becomes permanent:
74
one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine of any amount, or both
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived of offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years
Prior notice to offended party of motion for provisional dismissal
In this case, no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing
thereon was served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing;
it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal “considering that, as
per records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint.”
Importance of a prior notice to the offended party of a motion for provisional
dismissal: Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the
victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public
prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of
the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court
during the hearing.
The proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory.
Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on
valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for
the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due
process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of
the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him
to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from
Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecution’s
physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on
the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property
or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property (Co
vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products , G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014)
Stipulation of facts during pre-trial
Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118 prescribes that all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused AND counsel, otherwise, they cannot be
used against the accused. In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial
agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the
same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to
its admission (People vs. Likiran, G.R. No. 201858, June 4, 2014)
75
Qualified rape
To convict an accused charged with qualified rape instead of rape in its simple form
not only condemns him to a more serious offense but also exposes him to an even
greater liability. As such, the state is mandated to sufficiently allege in the information
and to completely prove during trial the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship with the same certainty as the crime itself (People vs. Jaranilla, G.R. No.
184762, February 25, 2015)
Acts constituting violation of dangerous drugs law
The Court finds unpersuasive petitioner’s contention that it is highly improbable and
contrary to human experience that he would hold and examine the subject plastic
sachet with people around and in broad daylight. It has been observed in many cases
that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any prospective customer, be he a
stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even during daytime. Undeniably,
drug pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openly defiant
of the law. Hence, what matters is not the time or place where the violation was
committed but the acts constituting the violation of the dangerous drug law
With respect to the seized illegal substance, the presentation of the drug itself
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and its existence is indispensable to
a judgment of conviction. It behooves upon the prosecution to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the narcotic substance. It must be shown that the item
subject of the offense is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain of
custody requirements provided for in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 performs this
function as it ensures the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the item
so that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
The defense did not question the admissibility of the seized item as evidence during
trial. In no instance did he intimate before the trial court that there were lapses in the
handling and safekeeping of the item that might affect its admissibility, integrity and
evidentiary value. It was only during the appeal to the CA that he questioned the same.
Settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it had been
raised in the court below as enunciated in People v. Sta. Maria and reiterated in
subsequent cases. (Tionco vs. People, G.R. No. 192284, March 11, 2015)
76
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Demurrer to evidence – notice of hearing not required
While a demurrer to evidence is in the nature of a motion to dismiss, the rule on

motions under Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which requires a notice of
hearing, is inapplicable on the ground that in criminal cases, the processes or
procedures is governed by Sec 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Sec. 23, Rule 119 provides for the period within which to file opposition, i.e., 5 days
from receipt of the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and 10 days from
receipt of the demurrer to evidence. In the case at bar, petitioner was given an
opportunity to object to the motion by filing its opposition. It cannot be gainsaid (sic)
thus, that petitioner was deprived of its opportunity to be heard.(People vs. P/Supt.
Jonathan Calisto, G.R. No. 213551, January 12, 2015)
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer
The evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise
degree of participation therein by the accused.
Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the
prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
Grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court,
Its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of
such discretion. As to effect, the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an
ACQUITTAL and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in
double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When grave
abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
(People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014)
Does the grant of demurrer to evidence for lack of jurisdiction constitute

acquittal? NO.
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved
to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She
argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged
(Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which
she can be held criminally liable. : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
www.chanroblesbar.com
A di l th RTC di i d th f l k f j i di ti th ff
77
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of

the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence
may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.
The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
*** In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the
case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the
issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the
prosecution. This being the case, the RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as an
acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. (Asistio vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015)
Remedy from denial of demurrer to evidence - certiorari under Rule 65
Rule 119, Sec. 23 provides that ‘”The order denying the motion for leave of court to
file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by
certiorari before judgment.”
However, the Supreme Court granted the petitions for certiorari filed by former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno Aguas against the denial by the
Sandiganbayan of their respective demurrers to evidence.
The Sandiganbayan completely ignored the failure of the information to sufficiently

charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners; and ignored the lack of
evidence establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth in the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the
predicate crimes. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely abusing
its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment

which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari,
the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction.
(Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan,

G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016)
State Witness
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a
state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section
17 of Rule 119www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for
admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic
78
Appeal dismissed if accused jumps bail
J and K were charged with rape. The authorities were able to arrest only J while K
remained at large. Thus, J was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,
but before the prosecution could conclude the presentation of its evidence, he jumped
bail. Consequently, he was tried in absentia. Meanwhile, the cases against K were sent
to the archives pending his arrest. Later, the RTC revived the criminal case against K.
The RTC found both of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the penalty of
death imposed upon them, the case was elevated on automatic review. The Court En
Banc rendered a Decision vacating the judgment of conviction against Y finding that the
proceedings against him were abbreviated and irregular. Thus, the Court remanded the
case to the CA. Meanwhile, the automatic review of the cases against J was held in
abeyance. K was tried anew before the RTC and was convicted of rape. Only J
appealed to the Court En Banc. Is it proper for the Court to dismiss the appeal of J?
Yes. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees
to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or
submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief therefrom. Thus, even if the Court were to remand these cases to the CA
for intermediate review, the CA would only be constrained to dismiss appellant's appeal,
as he is considered a fugitive from justice. Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
provides that “...The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal” (People v. De los
Reyes, G.R. Nos. 130714 & 139634 , October 16, 2012) - EPB
VARIANCE DOCTRINE
Accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Under the variance

doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and affirmed by settled jurisprudence, even though the crime
charged against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be
convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional
rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.
The ruling of the CA finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of

lasciviousness is based on the testimonies of the two classmates of the victim, AAA,
who saw accused-appellant fondle the latter's vagina. (People vs. Edwin Dagsa, G.R.
No. 219889, January 29, 2018)
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When

there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information
and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or :iswww.chanroblesbar.com.ph

www.chanroblesbar.com included in another. – An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
l t i di t f th f ll d i th l i t i f ti
79
Examples: 1. murder charged, homicide proved (conviction: homicide) 2. robbery

charged, theft proved (conviction: theft) 3. homicide charged, murder proved
(conviction: homicide) 3. theft charged, robbery proved (conviction: theft) 4. rape
charged, acts of lasciviousness proved (conviction: acts of lasciviousness)
APPEAL
Remedy from DOJ decision on probable cause finding of the public prosecutor –
Rule 65
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not
make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the
decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies,
particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however,
the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In
reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable
cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to
determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed,
and whether there was 'probable cause to believe that the respondents were
guilty thereof.
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of
probable cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the
Secretary of Justice exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner,
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had
jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without authority.
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or
modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (De Lima vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January
11, 2016)
Issues of facts and arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
Canoy basically insists that he was deprived of his fundamental right to be heard
when the trial court convicted him without affording him the opportunity to present his
defense; and that the RTC did not consider the fact that the seized lumber were found
in the place owned by his mother who also operated a lumber business.
The CA was correct in disregarding the abovementioned arguments, for the reason
80
Appeal from RTC in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction – Rule 42
It did not matter that the appeal of the petitioner, as represented in her petition for
review on certiorari, seemingly involved only a question of law. The appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over appeals involving pure questions of law as
expressly set forth under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is restricted to
such questions arising in the first instance in the lower courts. In contrast, her appeal of
the ruling of the RTC in the exercise of the latter’s appellate jurisdiction should be
brought to the CA by petition for review, and could also focus on a question of
law only. Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court precisely states that the petition for
review shall set forth concisely therein a statement of the matters involved, the issues
raised, the specification of errors of fact or law or both, allegedly committed by the
RTC, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal. Her
advantage under that mode of appeal is to give her the benefit of an intermediate review
by the CA.
Under the circumstances, the petitioner’s appeal is denied because of her disregard
of the law and the Rules of Court. Considering that appeal is a mere statutory right, her
appeal of the affirmance of her convictions by the RTC should comply with the rules
prescribed by the law or rules of procedure establishing her right to appeal; otherwise,
the right is waived. (Deato vs. People, G.R. No. 175519, January 21, 2015)
Appeal from acquittal prohibited
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is
barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated.
Appeal by accused - waiver of rule against double jeopardy
When accused appeals from the decision of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law
and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant. (People
vs. CA, G.R No. 183652, February 25, 2015)
The rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. (Benabaye vs.
People, G.R No. 203466, February 25, 2015)
Remedy of People from judgment of acquittal – Rule 65
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However,
in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lackwww.chanroblesbar.com
of jurisdiction. Grave abuse: of discretion generally refers to capricious or
www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Th b f di ti tb t t d t tt i f
81
only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and
conclusions of the trial court.
There is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In fact, petitioner did not make
any allegation to that effect. What the records show is that during the trial, both parties
had more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The same
is true during the appeal before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not
deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case.
A review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, which is extra ordinem – beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. It is not for
this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses
or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo. (Villareal vs. Aliga, G.R. No
166995. January 13, 2014)
Two kinds of acquittal and their effects on the civil liability of the accused
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him
on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with
it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does
not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the
acts or omission imputed to him. (Daluraya vs. Marla Oliva, G.R. No. 210148,
December 8, 2014)
Factual findings of Court of Appeals binding on Supreme Court
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, the review on appeal of a
decision in a criminal case wherein the the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty other
than reclusion perpetua or llfe imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.
The errors imputed by petitioner upon the CA all pertain to “appreciation of evidence”
or factual errors which are not within the province of a Rule 45 petition.
Petitioner’s assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and re-examination
of the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature. The petition must therefore be
denied on this basis because “one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation
of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will
not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd,
speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings
reach by the court of origin,” which was not shown to be the case here. (Rogelio Roque
vs. People, G.R. No. 193169, April 6, 2015)
E ti t l th t f t l fi di f l t bi di th
82
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record. (Macayan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015)
Failure to file memorandum on appeal not ground for dismissal in criminal cases
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the
appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because
Rule 122, Section 9(c) imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis
of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been
filed,” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration
of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be
properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal. (Sanico vs.
People, G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015)
Failure to appear at promulgation
The accused and his wife were charged with estafa in RTC. On the date scheduled
for the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the
promulgation because the accused was then suffering from hypertension. Unconvinced
of the reason, the RTC proceeded to promulgate its decision and issued a warrant for
accused’s arrest. He was apprehended eight days after the promulgation of the
judgment finding him guilty. Did the accused lose his standing in court for his failure to
appear at the promulgation of his conviction?
Yes, the personal presence of the accused at the promulgation of the judgment was
mandatory because the offense of which he was found guilty was not a light felony. The
promulgation of the judgment of conviction may be done in absentia. The accused
who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses the remedies
available under the Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a
motion for new trial or for reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the
judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in order to
avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from the date of promulgation of the
judgment conditioned upon: (a) his surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave
of court to avail himself of the remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence.
Should the trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he should be
allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from notice of the order finding
his absence justified and allowing him the available remedies from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 120, Sec. 6). (Salvador vs. Chua, G.R. No. 212865, July 15, 2015)
83
Application for search warrant not a criminal action
An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the

public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to
question an order quashing search warrants.
What is the remedy from an order quashing a search warrant – certiorari or

appeal? Appeal.
An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the
filing of a criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the proper subject of
an appeal.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, the
quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to
be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused
therein."
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a

criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for
reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be
done thereafter. Thus, an appeal may be properly taken therefrom. (Worldwide Web
Corporation vs. People, G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014)
Does the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to quash search warrants?
YES. The omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash search warrants;
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing.
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise,
said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. (Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation, G.R. No.
189669, February 16, 2015)
EVIDENCE
Judicial admission
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact, as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial
admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy.
Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party makingwww.chanroblesbar.com
such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to
: www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed
by the party or not The allegations statements or admissions contained in a pleading
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Admissibility of evidence
Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The

ADMISSIBILITY of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the
WEIGHT of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on JUDICIAL EVALUATION within the guidelines
provided by the Rules of Court. (Dela Llana vs. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December 4,
2013)
.
Requisites for admissibility
Evidence, to be admissible, must comply with two qualifications: (a) relevance and (b)
competence. Evidence is relevant if it has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce a
belief in its existence or nonexistence. On the other hand, evidence is competent if it is
not excluded by the law or by the Rules of Court.
One of the grounds under the Rules of Court that determines the competence of
evidence is the best evidence rule. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
that the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the contents of the
document is under inquiry. Gumabon vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 202514,
July 25, 2016)
Authentication of evidence
While it is true that a copy of the decree of registration from the LRA is a public
document that need not be authenticated anymore, in this case the LRA admitted the
existence of the purported decree but admitted that it does not have a record thereof.
Thus the decree should be considered as a private document which should be
authenticated by anyone who saw the document executed or written or by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature of handwriting of the maker (Sec. 20, Rule 132). Since
respondent failed to authenticate the purported decree of registration, it cannot be the
basis of a reconstitution in accordance with RA 26 (Republic vs. Pasicolan, G.R. No.
198543, April 15, 2015)
Quantum of evidence (weight and sufficiency of evidence)

Weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its TENDENCY TO
CONVINCE AND PERSUADE.
Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not
determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses
testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the
party on the judge trying the case. : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
▪ In the hierarchy of evidentiary values,
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Clear and Convincing Evidence
This standard of proof is less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (for criminal
cases) but greater than preponderance of evidence (for civil cases). The degree of
believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case;
◦ Some instances when clear and convincing evidence is required:

▪ to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties accorded to police officers.
▪ the defenses of denial and frame-up must be substantiated with clear
and convincing evidence; otherwise, same cannot prevail over the
positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
▪ paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence
▪ to warrant an award or moral damages, bad faith must be proven
through clear and convincing evidence
▪ invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense
▪ a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence
▪ proving bias and prejudice in order to disqualify a Judge from
participating in a particular trial
Extrajudicial confession
The general rule is that an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the

confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused since it is
considered hearsay against them. However, as an exception to this rule, an
extrajudicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said co-accused in
the crime. In this case, the prosecution was able to show circumstantial evidence to
implicate Constancio in the crime. Constancio was positively identified as among those
who threw the body of AAA over the bridge. (People vs. Constancio, G.R. No.
206226, April 4, 2016)
Extra-judicial confession given by accused-appellant during the interview

conducted by the field reporter is admissible in evidence. Accused-appellant
asserts that the confession was involuntarily given and was made under extreme fear
because he was interviewed while he was inside the detention cell and while
surrounded by police officers. That the confession was given without the assistance
of counsel and was therefore involuntary is immaterial. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with relations between private individuals.The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents; thus, accused-appellant's confession to
field reporter Tacason is not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution.
Furthermore, accused-appellant would have this Court believe that the confession
was given under a tense and fearful :atmosphere,
www.chanroblesbar.com similar to that of a custodial
investigation. In a previous case-with similar circumstances, We observed that the
f th li ffi did t t d i fl th
86
that the repmier was instructed by the police to extract information from him. Moreover,
accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed. A
review of the taped interview would show that he answered the questions freely and
spontaneously (People vs. Quitola, G.R. No. 200537, July 13, 2016)
Best evidence rule
The said rule applies only when the contents of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or
exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply.
There are instances when the Court may allow the presentation of secondary
evidence in the absence of the original document. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court enumerates these exceptions:
(a) when the original has been lost, or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office. (Gumabon vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 202514, July 25,
2016)
Secondary evidence when original document is unavailable (Rule 130, Sec. 5)
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court;
and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
(EELC).(MCMP Construction vs. Monark Equipment Corp., G.R. No. 20100,
November 10, 2014)
Exception to parol evidence rule - to ascertain the true intent of the parties
The fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does
not accord it www.chanroblesbar.com
the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parol evidence
rule. The form of a contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act valid.
S f f
87
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to
express the true intent and agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue
in the present case. Again, respondents themselves admit in their Answer that the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were only executed to
facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the
exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain the true
intent of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document (Rebusquillo
vs. Galvez, G.R. No. 204029, June 4, 2014)
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
Define Chain of Custody.
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 explicitly describes as “the
duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction,” demands such record of movements and
custody of seized items to include the identities and signatures of the persons who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the dates and times when such transfers of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition. (People of the Philippines V. Alberto Gonzales y Santos, also known as
Takyo, G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013)
To secure conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the identity of the prohibited
drug seized from the accused must be proved with moral certainty. The prosecution
must establish with such measure of certitude that the substance bought or seized
during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered as evidence in court. Proof
of the chain of custody from the time of seizure to the time such evidence is
presented in court ensures the absence of doubt concerning the integrity of such
vital evidence. This requires as a minimum that the police mark the seized item (1) in
the presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation.The
Supreme Court has ruled that immediate marking could be made at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. (People vs. Palomares, G.R. No. 200915,
February 12, 2014)
Possession of dangerous drugs – prima

www.chanroblesbar.com facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi
88
possidendi, which the appellant in this case miserably failed to do. (People vs. Rom,
G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014)
Circumstantial evidence
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the

circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of
evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were probably
guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were
innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient, therefore, if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance,
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
We agree with the trial court that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to hold
[appellant] for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. As proven by the
prosecution, AAA was last seen in the company of [appellant] as the person chasing the
victim on a grassy area located at the outskirts of their barangay. Contrary to the
[appellant’s] supposition, We find that the distance of about 50-60 meters is enough for
one person to recognize another person’s face. This is especially true since it had been
established by one witness that [appellant] turned his face towards him x x x and that he
was able to see him before AAA ran towards the knee-high cogon grass. (People vs.
Solano, G.R. No. 199871, June 2, 2014)
Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable when there are no eyewitnesses to

a crime. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom
a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The courts are allowed to rule
on the bases of circumstantial evidence if the following requisites concur: (1) there is
more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.The corollary rule is that the circumstances
established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
(San Diego vs. CA, G.R. No. 176114, April 8, 2015)
Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct
evidence; Circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person; must exclude the possibility that some
other person has committed the crime. (Zabala vs. People, G.R. No. 210760, January
26, 2015)
D i l t il i t iti t ti
89
given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony
on affirmative matters. (People vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014)
Testimony must be compatible with human knowledge, observation and human

experience
The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its
compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common experience of man.
Thus, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation and
experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance. Indeed, it is
incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8) days in a house
where the abuser’s entire family, including the abuser’s minor nephews and nieces live.
For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and
anxiety among AAA’s family members, AAA’s father, instead of reporting the matter to
police authorities, went to appellant’s house to discuss AAA and appellant’s marital
plans on 7 December 1998. Clearly, this is contrary to human logic and experience, and
inconsistent with the prosecution’s claim. (People vs. Patentes, G.R. No. 190178,
February 12, 2014)
Expert Testimony
A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting

experts; the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of
authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny.
While we recognize that the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents calls for handwriting experts, resort to these expe1is is not mandatory or
indispensable, because a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on their
testimonies. Judges must also exercise independent judgnient in determining the
authenticity or genuineness of the signatures in question, and not rely merely on the
testimonies of handwriting experts.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who
alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or
evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it. In this case, the respondent was not able to prove the fact that his
signature was forged.
It is also worthy to note that the document being contested has been notarized and
thus, is considered a public document. It has the presumption of regularity in its favor
and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant. (Philippine Trust Company vs. Gabinete, G.R. No. 216120, March 29,
2017)
Disqualifications of witnesses
Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence (Rules of Admissibility) provide
ifi l f it di lifi ti
90
By reason of privileged communications (Sec. 24, Rule 130)

Types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication:
(a) communication between husband and wife;

(b) communication between attorney and client;
(c) communication between physician and patient;
(d) communication between priest and penitent; and
(e) public officers and public interest.
Other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Sec. 24, Rule 130:
(a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news;
(b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted;
(c) trade secrets;
(d) information contained in tax census returns;
(e) bank deposits;
(f) national security matters and intelligence information; and
(g) criminal matters
Hearsay evidence
Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the original
declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-
examination by the defense, except in a few instances as where the statement is
considered part of the res gestae.
Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value, and unless it is part of res gestae, the
appealed decision runs contrary to the well-settled rule against admitting hearsay
evidence, aptly described as “evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of
what he has heard from others.” The hearsay rule puts in issue the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence, since the statement testified to was not given under oath
or solemn affirmation, and more compellingly, the declarant was not subjected to cross
examination by the opposing party to test his perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness, on whose reliability the entire worth of the out-of-court statement
depends
The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations must
have been “voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as
to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and
were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of
design or deliberation.”
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “a witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.” Res gestae, one
of eleven (11) exceptions to the hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130, thus:
Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be: given
in evidence as part of the res gestae.
So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
91
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances.
The victim’s statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as part
of res gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an
appreciable time between the rape and the declarations which afforded her sufficient
opportunity for reflection.
When inculpatory facts are susceptible to two or more interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the
test of moral certainty required for conviction.
A forced application of the res gestae exception results if the Court says that the
victim’s incriminatory statements were spontaneous and thus part of a startling
occurrence. It produces an outright denial of the right of the accused-appellant to be
presumed innocent unless proven guilty, not to mention that he was also denied his
right to confront the complainant.
N.B. Accused acquitted. (People vs. Estibal, G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014)
Res gestae statement not newly-discovered evidence

P appealed his conviction for homicide, contending that L admitted to stabbing E
immediately after the incident, and such res gestae statement of L constitutes newly-
discovered evidence that created reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Is P correct?
No, the res gestae statement of L did not constitute newly-discovered evidence.
Requisites for newly-discovered evidence: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it
would probably change the judgment if admitted. The first two requisites were not met
by P's proposed evidence. (Ladines vs. People, G.R. No 167333, January 11, 2016)
Independently Relevant Statement

Statements or writings attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand and are
being offered not to prove the truth of the facts therein but only to prove that such
writings were executed or actually made.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth

or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay
rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact (People vs. Estibal,G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014)
Electronic evidence
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying: the
www.chanroblesbar.com Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal
actions.Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a
t t th h l k l d f th (P l E j GR
92
A notarial document enjoys the presumption of regularity and is a prima facie

evidence of the facts stated therein – which may only be overcome by evidence that
is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Without such evidence,
the presumption must be upheld. (Heirs of Spouses Angel Liwagon vs. Heirs of
Spouses Demetrio Liwagon, G.R. No. 193117, November 26, 2014)
Dying declaration
Requisites for admitting such declaration as evidence – an exception to the hearsay

rule – are four, which must concur:
(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.
(People vs. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013)
Testimonies of child victims
It is a well-entrenched principle that testimonies of child victims are given full weight
and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. (People vs. Suarez, G.R. No.
201151, January 14, 2015)
Parental and filial privilege
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is an adaptation from a similar
provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those
who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of
actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.
Here, Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of
petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies
only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common
ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Thus, Tiu can be
compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. (In Re: Petition for Cancellation
and Correction of Entries in the Record of Birth, Emma K. Lee vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010)
Self-serving evidence
Are the testimonies in court self-serving?
No. They are not self-serving as the adverse

www.chanroblesbar.com party is accorded the opportunity to test
the veracity of the declarations by cross-examinations and other methods. Self-serving
id f t t f t t t t th t f th d l t’ i t t It i
93
Formal offer of evidence, when not necessary
Since respondents' exhibits were presented and marked during the ex parte hearing
of August 7, 2008, the trial court judge committed no error when he admitted and
considered them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that no formal offer of
evidence was made. The pieces of evidence were (a) identified during the ex parte
hearing and marked as Exhibits "A" to "F" for respondents and were (b) incorporated
into the records of the case. As a matter of fact, the RTC Judge referred to them in his
October 21, 2008 Decision. If they were not included in the record, the RTC Judge
could not have referred to them in arriving at judgment.(Guyamin vs. Flores, G.R. No.
202189, April 25, 2017)
X filed a case against Y. Y then presented hearsay evidence in the trial court which
was erroneously admitted by the latter. The public prosecutor who represents X,
interposed no objection to the admission of the hearsay evidence. Can the hearsay
evidence presented in the lower court and not objected to be accorded probative
value?
No. The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of
objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one
should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with
probative value. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE EQUATED WITH
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be
given credence for it has no probative value, unless the proponent can show that
the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. (Republic vs.
Galeno, G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017.) - LPB
Preponderance of evidence
In civil cases, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence, which

connotes "that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that
which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the
testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the
probability of truth is on one side than on the other."
The CA is correct in concluding that there is no legal basis to hold Deyto solidarily
liable with Ang for what the latter may owe Manlar. The evidence does not support
Manlar’s view that both Deyto and Ang contracted with Manlar for the delivery of rice on
credit; quite the contrary, the preponderance of evidence indicates that it was Ang alone
who entered into the rice supply agreement with Manlar. Pua’s own direct testimony
indicated that whenever rice deliveries were made by Manlar, Deyto was not around;
that it was solely Ang who issued the subject checks and delivered them to Pua or
Manlar.(Manlar Rice Mill vs. Deyto, G.R. No. 191189, January 29, 2014)
Tender of excluded evidence
Even assuming that the trial court erroneously

www.chanroblesbar.com rejected the introduction as evidence of
the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have
il d f th d id d i S ti 40 R l 132 f th R l f C t hi h
94
for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony.
As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit
the CA’s Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in his
offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party
producing it should ask the court’s permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.
(Catacutan vs. People, G.R. No.175991, August 31. 2011)
While the RTC cannot consider the excluded evidence to resolve the issues, such
evidence may still be admitted on appeal provided there has been tender of the
excluded evidence under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. (Gumabon vs.
Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 202514, July 25, 2016)
95

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