Article 1763- LIABILITY ON ACCOUNT OF ACT OF PASSENGERS/STRANGER

A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father
of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

1. JOSE PILAPIL, VS. CA and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC

FACTS:

Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded Alatco Transportation Company, Inc’sbus at San Nicolas, Iriga City. Upon
reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a
bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above his left eye.

RULING:

As a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of their passengers,
it would seem that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined when intervening acts of strangers is to be
determined directly cause the injury, while the contract of carriage Article 1763 governs:

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the
latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent
omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and
prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful
acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its
passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

He has charged the common carrier of negligence on the ground that the injury complained of could have been prevented
by the common carrier if something like mesh-work grills had covered the windows of its bus.

Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury complained of, the rule of ordinary care and prudence
is not so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against
unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent
any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type, in general use by others engaged in the
same occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with
negligence in this respect.

2. FORTUNE EXPRESS VS. CA

FACTS:

A bus of Fortune Express figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, LanaodelNorte, resulting in the death of
several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. CrisantoGeneralao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary
Regional Security Unit No. X, conducted an investigation of the accident. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao
residing in Delabayan, LanaodelNorte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some
of its buses. Generalao rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of the Philippine Constabulary Regional
Headquarters at Cagayan de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt.Bastasa, he went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of
petitioner, its main office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives
and property would be taken.

At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of
petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The
leader of the Maranaos, identified as one BashierMananggolo, ordered the driver, GodofredoCabatuan, to stop the bus on the side
of the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the steering wheel. The one of the
companions of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the passenger at bay with a handgun.
Mananggolo then ordered the passenger to get off the bus. The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and
went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway.

However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. At that time, one of the armed
men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong
pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The
armed men were, however, adamant as they repeated the warning that they were going to burn the bus along with its driver.
During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of the bus and crawled
to the canal on the opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw
that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the
burning bus and rush him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing operation.

ISSUE:

RULING:

Article 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of it’s
employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.

Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were Planning to take revenge on
Fortune Express by burning some of its buses and the assurance of it’s to take revenge on Fortune Express by burning some of its
buses and the assurance of it’s operation manager, Diosadado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, the common
carrier did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.

Had the common carrier and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a
large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers,
such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggage’s, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger’s constitutional rights. As this court intimated
in Gacal v. PAL, 183 SCRA 189, a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking pasengers and
inspecting their baggages.

It is evident that it’s employees failed to prevent the attacjk on one of it’s buses because they did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, the common carrier should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.
3. GACAL VS. PAL
4. MRR VS. BALLESTEROS
5, GGV FLORIDA TRANSPORT INC. VS. HEIRS OF ROMEO BATTUNG

FACTS:

Romeo L. Battung, Jr. (Battung) boarded GV Florida Transport’s bus in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound for Manila.
Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride. When the bus reached the Philippine CarabaoCenter
in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires. At this point, a man who was
seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion. The bus conductor,
Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead on
arrival.

RULING:

On the other hand, since Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of the
Civil Code, which states that "a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser
degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common
carrier's part.

Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes reasonable care consistent with that
which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether
negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence."

In ruling on this case, the CA cited Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals27 (Fortune) in ascribing negligence on the
part of petitioner, ratiocinating that it failed to implement measures to detect if its passengers were carrying firearms or deadly
weapons which would pose a danger to the other passengers.

However, the CA's reliance was plainly misplaced in view of Fortune's factual variance with the case at bar.

In Fortune, the common carrier had already received intelligence reports from law enforcement agents that certain
lawless elements were planning to hijack and burn some of its buses; and yet, it failed to implement the necessary precautions to
ensure the safety of its buses and its passengers. A few days later, one of the company's buses was indeed hijacked and burned by
the lawless elements pretending as mere passengers, resulting in the death of one of the bus passengers. Accordingly, the Court
held that the common carrier's failure to take precautionary measures to protect the safety of its passengers despite warnings from
law enforcement agents showed that it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the attack against
one of its buses; thus, the common carrier was rightfully held liable for the death of the aforementioned passenger.
 In contrast, no similar danger was shown to exist in this case so as to impel petitioner or its employees to
implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of its passengers. There was also no showing that during the
course of the trip, Battung's killer made suspicious actions which would have forewarned petitioner's employees of the
need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the passengers. Relevantly, the Court, in Nocumv. Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company, has held that common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the passengers they take in
will not bring anything that would prove dangerous to himself, as well as his co-passengers, unless there is something that
will indicate that a more stringent inspection should be made.

In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4) men ride petitioner's bus (two [2] of
which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the bus driver, Duplio, saw them get on the bus and even took note of what they were
wearing. Moreover, Duplio made the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these men and have them pay the corresponding fare,
which Daraoay did. During the foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing which would rouse their suspicion that the
men were armed or were to carry out an unlawful activity. With no such indication, there was no need for them to conduct a more
stringent search (i.e., bodily search) on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be concluded that petitioner or any
of its employees failed to employ the diligence of a good father of a family in relation to its responsibility under Article 1763 of
the Civil Code.

As such, petitioner cannot altogether be held civilly liable.