People vs. Serzo, Jr.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 274 11/18/19, 7:43 AM
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 553

People vs. Serzo, Jr.
*
G.R. No. 118435. June 20, 1997.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MARIO SERZO, JR., accused-appellant.
Constitutional Law; The right of an accused to counsel is

guaranteed by the Constitution.·The right of an accused to counsel
is guaranteed by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land.
This right is granted to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome
prosecutory machinery of the state. In the words of Justice Black,
this is a „recognition xxx that an average (accused) does not have
the professional skill to protect himself xxx before a tribunal with
power to take his life or liberty, wherein the (prosecutor) is xxx an
experienced and learned counsel.‰
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; The right covers the period beginning from custodial

investigation, well into the rendition of judgment, and even on
appeal.·The right covers the period beginning from custodial
investigation, well into the rendition of judgment, and even on
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e788686277c8576f1003600fb002c009e/p/AQQ916/?username=Guest Page 1 of 22
appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right to an

accused not only during trial but even before an information is filed.
Same; Republic Act No. 7438 was enacted providing, inter alia,
that any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall at all times be assisted by counsel.·Recently, Republic Act No.
7438 was enacted providing, inter alia, that any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
Same; While the right to be represented by counsel is

immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel de parte,
however, is not absolute.·Accordingly, an accused may exercise his
right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-
appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be
represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the
services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The court is
obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against
the stateÊs and the offended partyÊs equally important right to
speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the
accusedÊs option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on
an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member
of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a
valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.
Same; Right to counsel de parte is waivable.·Also, the right to

counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so long as
(1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly
and intelligently made.
Same; The right to be heard and to reopen the case could not be
allowed if doing so would sanction a plainly dilatory tactic and a
reprehensible trifling with the orderly administration of justice.·In
Sayson vs. People, this Court held that the duty of the court to
appoint a counsel de oficio is not mandatory where the accused has
proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his
choice but, when the time for the presentation of the evidence for
the
555
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 555
defense was due, he appears by himself alone because of the

inexcusable absence of his counsel. In another case, this Court held
that the right to be heard and to reopen the case (and send it to
trial anew) could not be allowed if doing so would sanction a plainly
dila-tory tactic and a reprehensible trifling with the orderly
administration of justice.
Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; In a case of murder or

homicide, it is enough that the death of the victim and the
responsibility of the person who caused such death are proven
beyond reasonable doubt.·We, however, find no cogent reason to
reverse the conviction of appellant. In a case of murder or homicide,
it is enough that the death of the victim and the responsibility of
the person who caused such death are proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Both elements were duly established by the prosecution
witnesses. Dr. Gajardo testified to the fact of death while Widow
Adelaida Alcantara positively identified the appellant as the
assailant.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Two

conditions must concur to constitute treachery.·Based on the facts
established by the prosecution which remain uncontested, the Court
affirms the trial courtÊs appreciation of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1)
the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (2)
deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The
manner of the attack itself is proof enough of alevosia.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Antipolo, Rizal, Br. 72.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Carmelo L. Arcilla for accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our

Constitution, our laws and our Rules of Court. During
custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on
appeal, the accused is given the option to be represented by
a counsel of
556

his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this

option during arraignment and trial, the court shall
appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by
counsel is absolute, the accusedÊs option to hire one of his
own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to
sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the
Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights of the
state and the offended party to speedy and adequate
justice.
This will be amplified in this appeal seeking the reversal
of the August 23, 1994 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 90-
5997 convicting Appellant Mario Serzo, Jr. of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant was charged with murder in an Information
dated September 4, 1990 filed by Rizal Assistant Provincial
2
Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata, worded as follows:
„That on or about the 22nd day of August, 1990, in the Municipality

of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
armed with bladed weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Alfredo Alcantara y Casabal at the back, thereby
inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused his death.‰
Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to

trial on the merits. After arraignment and trial,3 appellant
was found guilty as charged and sentenced thus:
„WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds
accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of having

committed the crime of MURDER and as prescribed under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences accused to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victimÊs wife
in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as actual
_______________
1 Presided by Executive Judge Rogelio L. Angeles.

2 Rollo, p. 1.
3 Rollo, p. 11.
557
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 557

damages and TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) as

moral damages and costs.‰
The Antecedents
Summarizing the testimonies of Adelaida Alcantara (the

victimÊs widow), Medico-Legal Officer Dario L. Gajardo and4
Epifania Andrade, the trial court found the following facts:
„Alfredo Alcantara Y Casabal never knew that death was just

around the corner inevitably meeting his way. That fateful night of
August 22, 1990, Alfredo together with his wife Adelaida Alcantara
were (sic) staying inside their house comfortably watching
television when at around 11:30 in the evening, Susana Serzo,
mother of the accused, and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking
at their doorsteps and pleading for help to bring out her
grandchildren who were being held inside their house by her son,
the accused in this case. Unhesitatingly, the couple heeded their call
and went with them at (sic) their house, located just across the
private complainantÊs residence. The spouses were able to rescue
the grandchildren and to bring them to a safer place. When
returning to their house, Alfredo Alcantara who was walking just
armslength ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused Mario Serzo
from behind. Accused stabbed Alfredo at his back forcing the latter
to scamper for his dear life. However, accused was able to

overpower him thereby causing his fall in the canal where he was
repeatedly stabbed by the accused. Adelaida Alcantara shouted for
help but was likewise attacked by the accused as she was only half-
meter away from her husband. However, Adelaida fortunately was
able to hold the hand of the knifewielder and persistently fought the
accused. (p. 05 TSN June 3, 1991) At that moment, the commotion
had already caught the attention of the residents within the vicinity
who responded to help her thereby causing the accused to flee. The
victim Alfredo Alcantara, who remained lying and motionless in the
canal, was rushed to the hospital where he was confirmed dead. (p.
06 TSN June 3, 1991) The Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Dario Gajardo,
testified in Court that the victim sustained three (3) stab wounds,
two at the back and one in his chest, which instantaneously caused
the victimÊs death. (p. 04 TSN May 13, 1991)‰
_______________
4 RTC Decision, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 9-10.
558

In view of appellantÊs allegation that he was denied his

right to counsel, a narration of the proceedings before the
trial court is now in order. Arraignment was set by the trial
court on January 8, 1991, during which appellant appeared
without counsel. Consequently, the trial court appointed
Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the
arraignment only. Appellant, however, moved that the
arraignment be reset and that he be given time to engage 5
a
counsel of his own choice, which the trial court granted.
On February 11, 1991, appellant appeared without a
counsel de parte. He was nonetheless arraigned with6 the
assistance of Counsel de oficio Wilfredo Lina-ac. He
pleaded „not guilty.‰ Pre-trial was waived and trial was set
on April 22, May 6 and 13, 1991 for the reception of the
prosecution evidence and June 3 and 17, 1991 for the
defense.
The hearings scheduled on April 22, 1991 and May 6,
1991 were7 cancelled on motion of Public Prosecutor Robert

H. Tobia. On both dates, appellant appeared with Atty.
Lina-ac. On May 13 and June 3, 1991, trial proceeded with
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. On behalf of
appellant, Atty. Lina-ac cross-examined the said witnesses.
On June 17, 1991, trial was8
again cancelled as appellant
appeared without counsel. 9
On August 13, 1991, the
prosecution rested its case.
On November 4 and 11, 1991, presentation of evidence
for the10 defense was reset as appellant was not ready to
testify and he manifested his 11
intention to secure the
services of a counsel de parte. On March 3, 1992, Atty.
Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de oficio in view of
appellantÊs manifestation
_______________
5 Minutes of the Proceedings and Order dated January 8, 1991,

Records, pp. 11-12.
6 Ibid., pp. 14 & 16.
7 Id., pp. 20-21 & 22-23.
8 Id., pp. 30 & 31.
9 Id., pp. 34 & 35.
10 Id., pp. 38 & 39.
11 Id., pp. 40 & 41.
559
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 559

12
and refusal to cooperate with said counsel. On April 6,
1992 appellant appeared without counsel, forcing the trial
court to appoint another counsel de oficio, Bella Antonano.
Counsels for both parties agreed to reset the trial, but 13
appellant refused to sign
14
the minutes of the proceedings.
On April 27, 1992, over vehement objection from the
prosecution, hearing was reset for the last time 15
as
appellant was still looking for a counsel de parte. On
August 25, 1992, appellant appeared without counsel; thus,
the trial court appointed Atty. Bonifacia Garcia of the
Public AttorneyÊs Office (PAO) as appellantÊs counsel de
16
oficio. Again, trial was postponed. On September 1 and
October17 19, 1992, trial was postponed on motion of Atty.
Garcia. Appellant again refused to sign the minutes of the
proceedings for both trial dates. On November 5, 1992,
appellant refused to cooperate with Atty. Garcia by
declining to take
18
the witness stand, forcing the defense to
rest its case. Both parties were ordered to submit their
respective memoranda in ten days, after which the case
would be submitted for decision. Atty. Garcia was further
ordered to manifest within the same period whether
appellant would change his mind and cooperate with her.
No memorandum or manifestation was ever filed by
appellant.
Appellant wrote Judge Angeles three times within the
period beginning December 16, 1992 until April 2, 1993,
seeking legal advice and the early resolution of the case.
Branch Clerk of Court Melchisedek A. Guan replied to him
twice, informing him that Judge Angeles was prohibited by
law from giving
_______________
12 Id., pp. 43 & 44.

13 Id., pp. 46-47.
14 This date appears to be incorrect as, in the RTCÊs Order of that day,
trial was reset on August 25 and September 1, 1992.
15 Order dated August 27, 1992, Records, p. 50; Minutes of the
Proceedings, Records, p. 49.
16 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
17 Id., pp. 54-55 & 57-58.
18 Id., pp. 60-61.
560

legal advice to litigants in cases pending in his court and

that a decision was forthcoming. On July 13, 1994,
appellant wrote Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo 19
L.
Suarez, asking for the early resolution of his case. The
latter referred said letter to Judge Angeles for appropriate

action.
Thereafter, the assailed Decision convicting appellant of
murder was promulgated on August 23, 1994.
Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision, the trial court noted that appellant simply

refused to secure the services of a counsel de parte and to
present evidence in his defense despite ample opportunity
accorded to him. Said the trial court:
„The defense particularly the accused assisted by counsel however

refused to present any evidence despite several opportunities
afforded by the Court. As early as the arraignment stage, accused
refused to be assisted by a counsel de oficio from the Public
AttorneyÊs Office (PAO) insisting that he be assisted by a counsel of
his own choice. For several settings, accused and her (sic) mother
were allowed to secure the services of a counsel de parte. However,
they failed to present one. Hence, the Court, to avoid further delay
in the proceedings of the case, was constrained to assign a counsel
de oficio from the PAO.
During the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused and
counsel could not present any witness as accused refused to
cooperate and to testify in Court. Hence, the defense waived its
right to present any evidence.
Considering that this case has been dragging for several years
already x x x the court x x x afforded the defense another
opportunity to present its case by submitting its memorandum
simultaneously with the Prosecution. Thereafter, the case was
20
submitted for decision.‰
Consequently, the trial court convicted appellant on the

basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Appellant
________________
19 Rollo, p. 78.
20 RTC Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 83.
561
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 561

was positively identified as the assailant by the widow,

Adelaida Alcantara, who survived his attack. In her
distinct and vivid narration of the sequence of events
leading to the murder, she showed that the attack was
treacherous as the victim was stabbed at the back and
without warning.
Not satisfied with the trial courtÊs 21Decision, appellant
through Counsel Carmelo L. Arcilla appealed to this
Court.
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief filed by Atty. Arcilla, appellant questions his

conviction for murder based 22on the following alleged errors
on the part of the trial court:
„I
The lower court erred in not giving the defendant-appellant time to

engage counsel of his own choice.
„II
The lower court erred in not affording the defendant-appellant

the chance to present evidence for his defense.
„III
The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant-appellant.‰
Mainly, appellant alleges that he had been denied effective

legal representation. His thesis is that the trial court did
not give him enough time to engage a counsel de parte,
effectively depriving him of the chance to present evidence
in his defense. In fact, the scant five-page AppellantÊs Brief
was dedicated entirely to this argument without contesting
the facts found by the trial court.
_______________
21 Atty. Arcilla, who was/is employed in the Provincial Legal Office of

the Province of Rizal, was „tasked by the Provincial Governor (of Rizal)
to render legal assistance to one of his impoverished constituents,
Accused Mario Serzo, Jr.‰ (ArcillaÊs „Explanation‰ dated April 11, 1996, p.
1; rollo, p. 37.)
22 Rollo, p. 48 b-c.
562

The CourtÊs Ruling
The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the

Constitution, the supreme law of the land. This right is
granted to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome
prosecutory
23
machinery of the state. In the words of Justice
Black, this is a „recognition xxx that an average (accused)
does not have the professional skill to protect himself xxx
before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty,
wherein the (prosecutor) is xxx an24experienced and learned
counsel.‰ In Powell vs. Alabama, Mr. Justice Sutherland
wrote at greater length on why an accused needs a
competent counsel:
„Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and

sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence,
or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.‰
The right covers the period beginning from custodial
25
investigation, well into the rendition of judgment, and
even on appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides this right to an accused not only during trial but
even before an information is filed. It provides:
________________
23 Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-3 (1938) which was cited in
Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 534, 533 (1949).
24 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). See also People vs. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752,
756-757 (1950).
25 People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450, 472-473, February 6, 1971.
563
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 563

„SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.‰
„SEC. 14 (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, x x x.‰
With these precepts as springboard, the Rules of Court

grants an accused the right to counsel under the following
provisions, viz.:
„RULE 112
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.·x x x
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper
officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 113
ARREST
SEC. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested.·

Any member of the bar shall, at the request of the person arrested
or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer
privately with such person, in the jail or any other place of custody
at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night. This right
shall also be exercised by any relative of the person arrested subject
to reasonable regulation.
564

Rule 115
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial.·In all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall be entitled:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings, from the arraignment to the promulgation
of the judgment. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x‰
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court makes it compulsory that

the trial court inform the accused of his right to counsel
prior to arraignment, thus:
„SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel.·

Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right
to counsel and shall ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the
accused is allowed to defend himself in person, or he has employed
counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to
defend him.
SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio.·The court, considering

the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that
may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of
the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and
ability may adequately defend the accused. But in localities where
such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint
any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity
and ability, to defend the accused.‰
Even on appeal, the accused

26
is still afforded the right to
counsel under Rule 122:
„SEC. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for accused on appeal.·

It shall be the duty of the clerk of the trial court upon the
presentation of a notice of appeal in a criminal case, to ascertain
from the appellant, if he be confined in prison, whether he desires
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to
________________
26 Rule 122, Section 13, Rules of Court.
565
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 565

defend him de oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a form to
be prepared by the clerk of the appellate court, a certificate of
compliance with this duty and of the response of the appellant to
his inquiry.‰
The foregoing is buttressed by another provision in Rule

124:
„SEC. 2. Appointment of counsel de oficio for the accused.·If it

appears from the record of the case as transmitted: (a) that the
accused is confined in prison, (b) without counsel de parte on
appeal, and (c) signed the notice of appeal himself, then the clerk of
the Court of Appeals shall designate a member of the bar to defend
him, such designation to be made by rotation, unless otherwise
directed by order of the court.
An accused-appellant not confined in prison shall not be entitled
to a counsel de oficio, unless the appointment of such counsel is

requested in the appellate court within ten (10) days from receipt of
the notice to file brief and the right thereto is established by
affidavit.‰
Recently, Republic Act No. 7438 was enacted providing,

inter alia, that any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.
A deprivation of the right to counsel divests the accused
of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a level
playing field, so to speak. In a previous case, this Court
held that an accused was deprived of his right to counsel
when he retained the services of 27 a person who
misrepresented
28
himself as a lawyer. In People vs.
Malunsing, retrial was ordered on the ground that
petitioner was denied his constitutional right to counsel.
Very old and unlettered, he was shown not to have
understood what was going on during the trial. In said
case, although the lawyer of his co-accused was appointed
as his counsel, petitioner was not properly apprised by said
court of
_______________
27 Telan vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 534, 542, October 4, 1991; and
Delgado vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 357, 360, November 10, 1986.
28 63 SCRA 493, 496, April 29, 1975.
566

his right to be assisted by counsel. No evidence was

presented for and on his behalf and the trial court did not
even bother to inquire why he did not take the witness
stand when all the other defendants were presented as
witnesses.
This is the legal backdrop against which appellantÊs
allegation of deprivation of his right to counsel shall be
measured.
Right to Counsel De Parte Is Not Absolute
Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel

by electing to be represented either by a court-appointed
lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be
represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure
the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute.
The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a
counsel of choice against the stateÊs and the offended
partyÊs equally important right to speedy and adequate
justice. Thus, the court may restrict the accusedÊs option to
retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an
attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a
member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the
accused
29
for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the
like.
Also, the right30 to counsel de parte is, like other personal
rights, waivable so long as (1) the waiver is not contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs;
or prejudicial
31
to a third person with a right recognized by
law and (2) the waiver32
is unequivocally, knowingly and
intelligently made.
________________
29 „Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United

States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994,‰ Georgetown
Law Journal, Vol. 83, No. 3, March-April 1995, pp. 1086-1087.
30 U.S. vs. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426, 427-479 (1912); U.S. vs. Kilayko, 31
Phil. 371, 372-373 (1915); People vs. Sim Ben, 98 Phil. 138, 139 (1955);
and People vs. Holgado, supra.
31 Article 6, Civil Code.
32 People vs. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289, 299, February 11, 1986; and
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 683, August 19, 1968.
567
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 567

33
In Sayson vs. People, this Court held that the duty of the
court to appoint a counsel de oficio is not mandatory where

the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the
trial with a counsel of his choice but, when the time for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense was due, he
appears by himself alone because of the inexcusable
absence of his counsel. In another case, this Court held that
the right to be heard and to reopen the case (and send it to
trial anew) could not be allowed if doing so would sanction
a plainly dilatory tactic and a reprehensible
34
trifling with
the orderly administration of justice.
In the present case, appellant claims that he was not
given sufficient time to engage a counsel de parte, thereby
preventing him from presenting evidence in his defense. In
his Brief he adds, but without giving particulars or proof,
that allegedly his counsels de oficio did35 not exert their
„utmost efforts‰ in representing him, thus:
„x x x (T)he lower court afforded the accused the assistance of

counsel de oficio as early as the arraignment stage but failed to
show that utmost efforts were exerted by said counsel to defend the
life and liberty of the accused. The duty of the court is not ended
with such appointment, however, as it should also see to it that the
counsel does his duty by the defendant. Counsel de oficio should not
merely make the motions of defending the accused but exert his
utmost efforts as if he were representing a paying client.‰
36
The Solicitor General, in his eleven-page Brief, rebuts
this, arguing that appellantÊs actions during the trial
showed instead a „lackadaisical stance on his own defense.‰
Appellant had been given ample time to secure the
services of a counsel de parte, but his subsequent
appearances in court without such counsel and his act of
allowing this situation to continue until the presentation of
his evidence betrays his
________________
33 166 SCRA 680, 690, 692, October 28, 1988.

34 People vs. Mendez, 28 SCRA 880, 887-889, July 29, 1969.
35 Rollo, p. 48-e.
36 AppelleeÊs Brief, Rollo, pp. 66-76.
568

lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was

merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on
purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial
court and the orderly administration of justice.
Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what
way the services of his counsels de oficio were
unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating
his claim that he was not effectively represented. In short,
he was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own
choice, but by his own neglect or mischief, he effectively
waived such
37
right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost
two years since appellant first invoked his right to be
represented by counsel de parte, he still could not find one
who would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he
cooperate with his court-named lawyers.
The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of
appellantÊs constitutional right to counsel because he was
adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers:
Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia. Courts are
not required to await indefinitely the pleasure and
convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to
promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Nor should they countenance such an obvious trifling with
the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the trial
continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was
adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to
be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent
him.
Crime and Punishment
In spite of appellantÊs failure, either through negligence or

unreasonable refusal, to impute errors to the assailed
Decision·other than the alleged violation of his right to
counsel·this Court nonetheless scoured the records of the
trial, perused the transcripts of the testimony of the
witnesses for the
________________
37 The trial court patiently waited for the appearance of appellantÊs

counsel de parte from January 8, 1991 until November 5, 1992.
569
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 569

prosecution, evaluated the evidence and examined the

applicable laws and jurisprudence to determine the
correctness of the trial courtÊs Decision. We, however, find
no cogent reason to reverse the conviction of appellant. In a
case of murder or homicide, it is enough that the death of
the victim and the responsibility
38
of the person who caused
such death are proven beyond reasonable doubt. Both
elements were duly established by the prosecution
witnesses. Dr. Gajardo testified to the fact of death while
Widow Adelaida Alcantara positively identified the
appellant as the assailant.
Based on the facts established by the prosecution which
remain uncontested, the Court affirms the trial courtÊs
appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To
constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate
and (2) deliberate
39
or conscious adoption of the means of
execution. The manner of the attack itself is proof enough
of alevosia.40 Widow Adelaida vividly described the stabbing
as follows:
„Q: And you said a certain Suzana Serzo together with

one Epifania Bentilacion came to your house and
asked for help from you, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that you responded for help Mrs. witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are together with your husband in helping
Suzana Serzo?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the help she was asking Mrs. witness?

xxx xxx xxx
A: She was asking to help her children being held by
Mario Serzo by not letting them go out of the house.
_______________
38 People vs. Roluna, 231 SCRA 446, 453, March 24, 1994; People vs.
Sasota, 91 Phil. 111, 116 (1952).
39 People vs. Mallari, 212 SCRA 777, 784, August 21, 1992; and People
vs. Mabubay, 185 SCRA 675, 680, May 24, 1990; and People vs. Samonte,
64 SCRA 319, 325-326, June 11, 1975.
40 TSN, June 3, 1991, pp. 7-8.
570

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Were you able to help the grandchildren of Suzana
Serzo?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after you help (sic) them what happened next?
A: We brought them to where they could hide and then we
went home.
Q: You said you heard somebody approaching you at the
back through the sound of his footsteps is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened next after you hear (sic) those
footsteps at your back?
A: My husband was just beside me.
Q: And immediately your husband was stabbed by the
accused?
A: Yes, sir.‰
From this testimony, it appears that appellant waited for

the victim and his wife and pounced on them swiftly and
without warning. The victim and his wife were already on
their way home after transferring appellantÊs children to a
safe place. They were unarmed as they had absolutely no
idea that appellant would attack them right then and from
behind. The manner of the attack tended directly and
especially to insure the execution of the crime without risk
to appellant and 41
virtually no chance for the victim to
defend himself. Even AdelaidaÊs life would have been
mortally threatened were it not for the timely intervention
of her neighbors.
Damages and Indemnity
Actual and moral damages require the presentation of42

proof before they can be awarded by the trial court.
Accord-
_______________
41 People vs. Isleta, G.R. No. 114971, November 19, 1996, pp. 11-17;
People vs. Layno, G.R. No. 110833, November 21, 1996, pp. 19-20; and
People vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312, January 28, 1997, pp. 23-24.
42 People vs. Arguelles, 222 SCRA 166, 172, May 17, 1993; and People
vs. Rosario, 246 SCRA 658, 671, July 18, 1995.
571
VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 571

ing to Adelaida,43burial expenses in the amount of P2,000.00

were incurred. This is separate and distinct from civil
indemnity awarded under prevailing jurisprudence, which
is granted without further proof beyond the fact of death
and the accusedÊs responsibility therefor. Moral damages
were not discussed at all in AdelaidaÊs testimony. Hence,
without any factual basis, the award of moral damages is
not justified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, but the award of moral damages is

DELETED. Instead, appellant is ORDERED TO PAY the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and actual
damages of P2,000.00 as burial expenses.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Davide, Jr. and Melo,

JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., On leave.
Judgment affirmed, but moral damages deleted.
Note.·The Constitution requires that a person under

investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with counsel. (People vs. Lucero, 244 SCRA 425
[1995])
··o0o··
________________
43 TSN, June 3, 1991, p. 7.
572
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 274 11/18/19, 7:43 AM

VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 553

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Constitutional Law; The right of an accused to counsel is

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Serzo, Jr.

Same; The right covers the period beginning from custodial

appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right to an

Same; While the right to be represented by counsel is

Same; Right to counsel de parte is waivable.·Also, the right to

VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 555

People vs. Serzo, Jr.

defense was due, he appears by himself alone because of the

Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; In a case of murder or

Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Two

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this

„That on or about the 22nd day of August, 1990, in the Municipality

Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to

„WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds

accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of having

1 Presided by Executive Judge Rogelio L. Angeles.

VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 557

damages and TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) as

Summarizing the testimonies of Adelaida Alcantara (the

„Alfredo Alcantara Y Casabal never knew that death was just

to scamper for his dear life. However, accused was able to

4 RTC Decision, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 9-10.

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In view of appellantÊs allegation that he was denied his

1991 were7 cancelled on motion of Public Prosecutor Robert

5 Minutes of the Proceedings and Order dated January 8, 1991,

VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 559

12 Id., pp. 43 & 44.

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

legal advice to litigants in cases pending in his court and

latter referred said letter to Judge Angeles for appropriate

Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision, the trial court noted that appellant simply

„The defense particularly the accused assisted by counsel however

Consequently, the trial court convicted appellant on the

VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 561

was positively identified as the assailant by the widow,

In his Brief filed by Atty. Arcilla, appellant questions his

The lower court erred in not giving the defendant-appellant time to

The lower court erred in not affording the defendant-appellant

The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant-appellant.‰

Mainly, appellant alleges that he had been denied effective

21 Atty. Arcilla, who was/is employed in the Provincial Legal Office of

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The CourtÊs Ruling

The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the

„Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and

The right covers the period beginning from custodial

VOL. 274, JUNE 20, 1997 563

With these precepts as springboard, the Rules of Court