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VOL. 235, AUGUST 12, 1994 283

Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco

A.M. RTJ-93-1097. August 12, 1994.*

REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR FRANCISCO Q.

AURILLO, JR., complainant, vs. Judges GETULIO M.
FRANCISCO, Branch 6, and PEDRO S. ESPINA, Branch
7, both of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City,
respondents.

Judges; Bail; Capital Offenses; Due Process; A hearing is

absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine
whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong, for purposes
of deciding whether bail is to be granted or not to one charged with
a capital offense.—It is indeed regrettable how respondent Judge
Francisco ignored the clear import in People vs. Dacudao where
we clearly stated that “a hearing is absolutely indispensable
before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s
evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial of the prosecution’s
request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process,
a right to which it is equally entitled as the defense. A hearing is
required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence
of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec. 6.” In the Dacudao
case, the respondent judge therein concluded that the evidence of
the prosecution against the accused who was charged with
murder was weak. The determination was made by simply
reviewing the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses who were
allegedly not eyewitness to the crime. In the same vein,
respondent Judge Francisco peremptorily concluded from his
reading of the affidavits of the witnesses that the evidence against
the accused in the said criminal cases was weak because it
appeared to him that the evidence was merely circumstantial in
character.

_______________

* EN BANC.

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Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco

Same; Same; Same; It was patent error for the judge to base
his order granting bail merely on the supporting affidavits
attached to the information since those were merely intended to
establish probable cause as basis for the issuance of an arrest
warrant and not to control his discretion to deny or grant bail in
all situations.—Verily, it was patent error for him to base his
order granting bail merely on the supporting affidavits attached
to the information since those were merely intended to establish
probable cause as basis for the issuance of an arrest warrant, and
not to control his discretion to deny or grant bail in all situations
—i.e., with or without a motion from the accused and even
without conducting a hearing on the matter. Such error cannot be
characterized as mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and
judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known rules and,
therefore, constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
Same; It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast
with the law and changes therein; Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one—not even judges.—It is
a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law
and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the
Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory
acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of
the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one—not
even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE
TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

Grave and serious misconduct.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

PADILLA, J.:

On 6 July 1993, the office of the Court Administrator

received a sworn complaint of herein complainant, Regional
State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr. of Region VIII in
Tacloban City, charging respondent Judges Getulio M.
Francisco and Pedro S. Espina (RTC judges in Branches VI
and VII respectively of the 8th Judicial Region based in
Tacloban City) with grave and serious misconduct and
impropriety as well as for grave abuse of authority and
discretion in granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case
No. 93-01-38 entitled People vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al., for
Murder, and in Criminal Case No. 93-01-39 entitled People

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vs. Jane C. Go, for Parricide, without even conducting an

evidentiary
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Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco

hearing as required by the Rules of Court and despite the

prosecution’s opposition thereto. Complainant maintains
that there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of the
accused in both criminal cases.
In a communication dated 15 July 1993, complainant
also accused respondent Judge Espina of openly
fraternizing with the practitioners of a law firm based in
Tacloban City, which has created a negative perception in
the locality as to his capacity to dispense justice with
honesty and impartiality.
Complainant further made mention of Criminal Case
No. 93-04-197 entitled People vs. Salvador Padernal, a case
for violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425,
pending before the sala of respondent Judge Espina, in
which the latter allegedly favored the accused by allowing
him to post bail without even allowing the prosecution an
opportunity to oppose such bail application.
The records show that Criminal Case No. 93-01-38 and
Criminal Case No. 93-01-39 were initially assigned to the
sala of respondent Judge Getulio M. Francisco until they
were re-raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Espina.
On 17 February 1993, Judge Francisco issued two (2)
separate warrants of arrest against the accused in said
criminal cases but fixed the amount of bail at P100,000.00
for each accused. The prosecution had earlier recommended
no bail, since the accused were charged with a capital
offense.
Complainant, as early as 22 February 1993, wrote Judge
Francisco questioning the amount of bail fixed in the
aforestated warrants of arrest, claiming that the
prosecution was not notified of any motion to fix bail nor of
any order granting the same. He argued that it was a
violation of procedural due process to grant bail without
any hearing on the motion for bail. Such hearing is
necessary for the prosecution to voice its opposition to the
grant of bail.
Subsequently, the prosecution filed a motion asking
Judge Francisco to inhibit himself from the said cases. A
re-raffle was then ordered and the cases were raffled to
Branch 7 of the Tacloban RTC, despite the objection of
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complainant to the inclusion of Branch 7 in the re-raffled,

on the basis of alleged bias on the part of Judge Pedro
Espina, its presiding judge, who allegedly had earlier
prohibited complainant from conducting the prelimi-

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Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco

nary investigation of the said cases as well as in another

case pending in the same sala.
In an en banc resolution of the Court dated 27 January
1994, respondents were required to file their comment on
the complaint. Judge Francisco filed his comment on 18
February 1994 with a supplemental comment filed on 22
February 1994. The arguments contained therein are
reiterations of his earlier comment filed with the OCA on 9
April 1993. Judge Espina filed his comment with the OCA
on 17 July 1993 which states in effect that he just took over
as presiding judge of the subject criminal cases, thru a
raffle, after the questioned bails had been approved by
Judge Francisco. With respect to the Padernal case (Crim.
Case No. 93-04-197), Judge Espina did not file any
comment.
On 17 March 1994, the Court resolved to refer the case
to the office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
Quoted hereunder are the findings of the OCA dated 27
October 1993 as contained in a memorandum dated 11 May
1994:

“On the other hand, respondent Judge Francisco, in his comment

dated April 9, 1993 (p. 12, rollo), explains that on January 18,
1993, the complainant filed the two (2) aforementioned Criminal
Cases Numbers 93-01-38 against Cristeta Reyes, et al. and 93-01-
39 against Jane C. Go, for Murder and Parricide, respectively
without bail, but upon his personal examination of the records of
the cases although he found probable causes warranting the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, ‘he honestly believes that the
evidence of the prosecution is merely circum-stantial and
therefore not strong’ (p. 11, rollo)—ergo, he fixed bails. He claims
that it is his discretion to do so and admitted having fixed bails of
P100,000.00 each for all the accused in the very warrants of
arrests he issued.
“He then boldly asserted that the Dacudao case cited by the
complainant does not apply to his case because in the former case,
the court there did not fix any bail in its warrant of arrest while

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in the warrants of arrests he issued, he already fixed the amounts

of bail. He continues—that ‘of course, when a motion for bail was
filed, the prosecution must be heard.’ (p. 9, rollo), reasoning out
that since there was no application for bail by any of the accused
in his case it follows that the Prosecutor (herein-complainant)
need not be notified anymore. Then he harps lengthily on his
judicial discretion and authority to find probable cause.

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Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco

“After a thorough study of this case, the following observations

are unmistakably clear.
“The explanation of respondent Judge Francisco (who is also
the Executive Judge) is very novel indeed and amusing, to say the
least. Irrespective of his opinion about the strength or weakness
of the evidence of the guilt of the accused, our laws and settled
jurisprudence demand that a hearing should first be conducted
before bail could be fixed, if such bail could be justified after the
hearing. The law in point, Sections 5 and 15, Rule 114, Rules of
Court state:

‘Section 5. Burden of proof in bail application.—At the hearing of an

application for admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody for
the commission of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or death,
the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party,
the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the
witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.’
‘Sec. 15. Notice of application to fiscal.—In the application for bail
under the preceding section, the court must give reasonable notice of the
hearing to the fiscal or require him to submit his recommendation.’
(Italics supplied)

“The act of respondent Judge Francisco of disregarding an

established rule of law which resulted in the deprivation of the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused
was strong amounts to serious misconduct, grave abuse of
authority and most of all gross ignorance of the law which is
subject to disciplinary action. In Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA
48, the Supreme Court pronounced that a judge owes it to the
public and to the administration of justice to know the law and he
is then (sic) expected to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance
with the statutes and procedural rules.

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“The reason advanced by respondent Judge Francisco why the

Ducadao case is not applicable to him smacks of a lamentable
state of real ignorance of the procedural due notice very much
settled (sic) long time ago in our jurisprudence. His case is worse
because there is (sic) not even an application for bail and he
arrogated unto himself a fancied authority in granting bails. The
situation is aggravated by the fact that no bail at all was
recommended by the (C)omplainant-prosecutor. It is incredulous
that he was not able to see the legal point in the case cited by the
Complainant.
“To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt
the prosecution must also be consulted or heard. It is equally
entitled as

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Aurillo, Jr. vs. Francisco

the accused to due process. (People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489).
Further, the court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses
might (sic) be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, otherwise, it could be uncontrolled
and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court’s order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. (Resolution issued in A.M. No. 92-10-
884-RTC—Re: Report of Pasig RTC Judges about the case of
Judge Armie Elma, RTC, branch 153, Pasig, M.M.).
“As to the other respondent Judge Espina, it is true that as far
as his participation in the granting of bails is concerned, he is not
guilty. Although the rest of the accused who were granted bail in
his sala, by virtue of the earlier orders of respondent Judge
Francisco, must also be reissued (sic) warrants of arrest.
“As to the allegations of his fraternization with a law firm in
Tacloban City which appears to be unsubstantiated, the same
may be dismissed. However, he is expected to be more discreet
and aboveboard in dealing with people because 1
he is not an
ordinary person and must be above suspicion.”

It is indeed regrettable how respondent Judge Francisco

ignored the clear import in People vs. Dacudao where we
clearly stated that “a hearing is absolutely indispensable
before a judge can properly determine whether the
prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial of
the prosecution’s request to adduce evidence, deprives it of
procedural due process, a right to which it is equally
entitled as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the

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judge a basis for determining the2 existence of those factors

set forth under Rule 114, Sec. 6.”
In the Dacudao case, the respondent judge therein
concluded that the evidence of the prosecution against the
accused who was charged with murder was weak. The
determination was made by simply reviewing the affidavits
of the prosecution witnesses who were allegedly not
eyewitness to the crime. In the same vein,

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 1-5.

2 G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 489. See also People vs.
San Diego, G.R. L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522; People vs.
Raba, G.R. No. L-10724, April 21, 1958, 103 Phil. 384; People vs. Bocar,
G.R. No. 62710, March 1969, 27 SCRA 512.

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respondent Judge Francisco peremptorily concluded from

his reading of the affidavits of the witnesses that the
evidence against the accused in the said criminal cases was
weak because it appeared to him that the evidence was
merely circumstantial in character.
Verily, it was patent error for him to base his order
granting bail merely on the supporting affidavits attached
to the information since those were merely intended to
establish probable cause as basis for the issuance of an
arrest warrant, and not to control his discretion to deny or
grant bail in all situations—i.e., with or without a motion
from the accused and even without conducting a hearing on
the matter. Such error cannot be characterized as mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment, but a
patent disregard of well-known rules and, therefore,
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast
with the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest
decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in
a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and
procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is
bound to know, excuses no one—not even judges.
IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE
TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
imposes on Judge Getulio Francisco a fine of P20,000.00
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with STERN WARNING that the same or similar acts in

the future will be DEALT with more severely.
Judge Pedro S. Espina is hereby ordered to issue new
warrants of arrest for all the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39 who had taken undue
advantage of the questioned orders releasing them on bail
and to immediately conduct a hearing to determine the
propriety of granting bail.
With respect to the charges against respondent Judge
Espina, relative to his participation in the handling of
above-mentioned criminal cases and to his alleged
fraternization with a law firm in Tacloban City, the Court
resolves to dismiss the same for insuffi-ciency of evidence,
admonishing however said judge to be more circumspect
and prudent in his dealings with other people so that he
can at all times be regarded with respect and beyond
suspicion.

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Lacuata vs. Bautista

SO ORDERED.

     Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,

Jr., Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
     Cruz and Bellosillo, JJ., On leave.

Judge Getulio Francisco imposed a fine of P20,000.00

with stern warning. Judge Pedro Espina ordered to issue
new warrants of arrest and immediately conduct hearing on
bail application.

Notes.—The prosecution must be given an opportunity

to present within a reasonable time all the evidence before
the court should resolve the motion for bail. Denial of such
an opportunity would be a violation of procedural due
process. (People vs. Nano, 205 SCRA 155 [1992])
Right to bail has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. (Comendador vs. De
Villa, 200 SCRA 80 [1991])

———o0o———

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