Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz 328 SCRA 505, March 17, 2000

5/26/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 328
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 505

Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz
*
G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000.
JOSELITO V. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. FLOR MARIE

STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Judges are compelled to conduct

hearings in bail applications in which the accused stands charged
with a capital offense.—Jurisprudence is replete with decisions
compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail
applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital
offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a
basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right
to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account
of familiarity with the case. “Said reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion
to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial
discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.”
Same; Same; A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge
can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the
evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.—The grant of bail
is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when
the matter is left to the sound discretion of the court. That
discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a hearing
should be held but in the appreciation and evaluation of the
prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused. x x x A
hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said
to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
prosecution is weak or strong.”
________________
* THIRD DIVISION.
506
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001724c92e9c76c8e3d64003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Duties of the trial judge in a petition for bait in

a capital case.—Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several cases that
emphasized the mandatory character of a hearing in a petition for
bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of the
trial judge in such petition: “(1) Notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended); “(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Sections 7 and 8, supra); “(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra); “(4) If the guilt of the
accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
denied.”
Same; Same; Same; Court’s grant or refusal of bail must
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution; Its absence
will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.—
The court’s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be
formulated the judge’s own conclusion on whether such evidence
is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The
summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.
Same; Actions; Parties; The offended parties in criminal cases
have sufficient interest and personality as “persons aggrieved” to
file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari.—“In
Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that
the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and
personality as “person(s) aggrieved” to file the special civil action
of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in
line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the
Rules of Court in order to promote their object.
Same; Same; Same; A party cannot be left without recourse to
address a substantive issue in law.—To rule otherwise would
leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the
public injustice brought about by the trial court’s Order, leaving
her with
507
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 507
only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of

the law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be
left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
Same; Same; Same; Accused who is charged with parricide
cannot be regarded as an offended party.—Corollary to the
question of standing, petitioner submits that even if the exception
were made to apply, private respondent is not an “offended party”
who is granted the right to challenge the assailed RTC Order. He
maintains that only the compulsory heirs of the deceased, who are
the accused himself and his minor child, may file the instant
action. We disagree. It should be remembered that the crime
charged against the private respondent is parricide; hence, the
accused cannot be regarded as an offended party. That would be a
contradiction in terms and an absurdity in fact. Nor can one
expect the minor child to think and to act for himself. Hence, we
rule that in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
sister of the deceased is a proper party-litigant who is akin to the
“offended party,” she being a close relative of the deceased. There
is no closer kin who may be expected to take up the cudgels of
justice for the deceased.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Antonio Navarrete for petitioner.
Rene Sarmiento and Rolando M. Delfin for private
respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted
by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused.
Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In
parricide, the accused cannot be considered an offended
party just because he was married to the deceased. In the
interest of justice and in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case, the sister of
508

the victim may be deemed to be an “offended party”; hence,

she has the legal personality to challenge the void order of
the trial court.
The Case
We invoke the foregoing principles in rejecting the Petition

for Review on Certiorari
1
before us, assailing the February
26, 1998 Decision and the
2
June 29, 1998 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed and set aside the
Order of Executive Judge Pedro T. Santiago of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-24179 entitled “People of the Philippines v.
Joselito V. Narciso.”
The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby3 GRANTED

and the order granting bail is annulled and set aside.”
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied

petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The full text of the August 3, 1992 RTC Order, which
the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside, reads as
follows:
“Accused who is present filed thru counsel a Motien to Allow

Accused Joselito V. Narciso to Post Bail.
“Considering that the Presiding Judge of Branch 83 who is
hearing this case is on leave and the Pairing Judge Honorable
Salvador Ceguerra is no longer within the premises, there being
no objection by the City Prosecutor Candido Rivera to the accused
posting a cashbond of P150,000.00, the undersigned 4
in his
capacity as Executive Judge hereby approves the same.”
___________________
1 Penned by J. Ricardo P. Galvez, now solicitor general, Division

chairman; with the concurrence of JJ. Hilarion L. Aquino and Marina L.
Buzon, members.
2 Special Fifteenth Division.
3 Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 13.
4 Rollo, p. 42.
509
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 509

The Facts of the Case
The undisputed antecedents of the case were summarized

by the Court of Appeals as follows:
“1) After conducting a preliminary investigation on the

death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of
Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and
thereafter filed, the information for parricide
against Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991,
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179.
“2) Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the
prosecutor’s resolution [before] the Department of
Justice (DOJ) which was however denied. Joselito
Narciso moved for reconsideration, which was still
denied by the DOJ.
“3) Failing before DOJ, the accused on February 6,
1992, filed in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 an
“Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift
the Warrant of Arrest.” The Motion was granted
and the case was set for reinvestigation by another
prosecutor.
“4) Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom
the case was assigned for reinvestigation, found no
reason to disturb the findings of the previous
prosecutor and recommended the remand of the
case to the court for arraignment and trial.
“5) On August 3, 1992, accused filed an ‘Urgent Ex-
Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused
Joselito Narciso to Post Bail’. The Public Prosecutor
registered no objection and said motion was granted
on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at
P150,000.00.
x x x x x x x x x
“6) On August 14, 1992, the private prosecutor
representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta.
Romana-Cruz, a sister of accused’s deceased wife,
filed an “Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing
Accused To Post Bail.’
“7) Accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion by
filing a ‘Motion to Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance
of the Private Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent Motion

to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail.”
“8) Arraignment was conducted on September 14, 1992
and the case was set for hearing on November 9, 16,
23, December 2, 9, 1992, January 6, 13, 20, 27,
1993, February 3, 7, 10 and 24, 1993.
510

“9) On October 15, 1992, private complainant through

counsel filed her opposition to the motion to
expunge [filed by] accused.
“10) On November 3, 1992 private complainant moved
for the postponement of the trials set on November
9, 16 and 23 and the subsequent hearings thereon
pending the resolution of their ‘Urgent Motion to
Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail.’
“11) On November 9, 1992, the court issued the first
assailed order stating therein to wit:
‘ORDER
‘Counsel for the accused, upon being informed of the motion for
postponement dated November 3, 1992 filed by the private
complainant, through counsel, offered no objection to the
cancellation of today’s trial but not the trial set on November 16,
23 and December 2 and 9, 1992 for the reason that the trial can
proceed independently of the pending ‘Urgent Motion to Lift
Order Allowing the Accused to Post Bail.’
WHEREFORE, the trial set for today is hereby cancelled and
re-set on November 16, 1992 at 10:30 o’clock in the morning, as
previously scheduled.
‘SO ORDERED.’
“12) On November 16, 1992, the court cancelled the

hearing upon motion of the public prosecutor
because no prosecution witness was available.
“13) [I]n the hearing of November 23, 1992, the private
prosecutor again moved for postponement because
of the pendency of his ‘Motion to Lift Order
Allowing Accused to Post Bail.’ On the same date,
the court issued the second assailed order which
reads:
‘ORDER
‘On motion of the Asst. City Prosecutor, for the reason that there
is no showing in the record that the private complainant was duly
notified, hence there is no available witness this morning, the
trial set for today is hereby cancelled and reset on December 2
and 9, 1992 both at 10:30 o’clock in the morning, as previously
scheduled.
‘Let a subpoena be issued to complainant Corazon [sic] Sta.
Romana-Narciso, the same to be served personally by the Deputy
Sheriff/Process server of this Court.
‘The accused is notified of this Order in open court.
511
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 511

‘SO ORDERED.’
“Not obtaining any resolution on her ‘Motion To Lift Order
Allowing Accused to Post Bail,’ private complainant filed this
petition [before the CA].”
As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private

respondent’s Petition for Certiorari. 5Hence, this recourse to
us via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
Petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals this alleged

error:
“The Respondent Court of Appeals has erroneously decided

questions of substance, in a manner not in accord with law, the
Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence, as exemplified in the
decisions of this Honorable Court, when it reversed and set aside
the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering
the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more
especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of
the proceedings and after assessment of6 the evidence, have
themselves recommended the grant of bail.”
7
Respondent, on the other hand, poses the following issues:
_________________
5 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on October 6, 1999,

upon receipt by this Court of the solicitor general’s Memorandum, signed
by Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez and Solicitor Edwin

C. Yan. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Antonio F. Navarrete,
was filed on July 14, 1999; while that of private respondent, signed by
Attys. Rene V. Sarmiento and Rolando M. Delfin, was posted on June 28,
1999.
6 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 4-5.
7 Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 9; Rollo, p. 165.
512

“A
Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled

that the Order of the Regional Trial Court which granted bail to
the petitioner is substantially and procedurally infirm
notwithstanding the absence of any opposition from the public
prosecutor.
“B
Whether or not the private respondent has the legal

personality to intervene in the present criminal case.”
To resolve this case, the Court believes that two issues

must be taken up; namely, (1) the validity of the grant of
bail and (2) private respondent’s standing to file the
Petition before the CA.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Validity of the Grant of Bail
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution, provides: “All

persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.” Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114
of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: “No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail

regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is
punishable with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the
CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his
guilt
513
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 513

was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor’s

conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a
finding that the prosecution evidence against him was not
strong.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no
basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted
on the application for bail—summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed
between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the
Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be
deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate
any evidence. We agree with the CA. 8
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the
duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong,
the Court held:
“When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the

burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. ‘This discretion by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal.’
x x x x x x x x x
“Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged
with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
‘A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of

receiving
__________________
8 269 SCRA 220, March 5, 1997, per Romero, J.; Ramos v. Ramos, 45
Phil. 362, October 30, 1923; Ocampo v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55, August 20,
1946; Siazon v. Presiding Judge, et al., 42 SCRA 184, October 29, 1971.
514

and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and

consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-
examination.’ If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard,
there would be a violation of procedural due process.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges

to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in
which the accused stands charged with a capital offense.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a
basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has
no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is
doing on account of familiarity with the case. “Said
reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the
duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether
the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the
domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to
exercise discretion
9
has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.” 10
Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to
conduct a hearing despite the prosecution’s refusal to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail. We quote below the pertinent portion of the
Decision therein:
“The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few

cases wherein the Court ruled that even if the prosecution re-
_________________
9 Basco v. Rapatalo, supra.

10 243 SCRA 284, April 6, 1995, per Regalado, J.; Borinaga v. Tamin, 226 SCRA
206, September 10, 1993; Aguirre v. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778, October 27, 1994;
Tucay v. Dumagas, 242 SCRA 110, March 2, 1995.
515
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 515

fuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the

motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the
strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the
accused.”
11
In Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., the Court also held:
“The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving

capital offenses when the matter is left to the sound discretion of
the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination whether
or not a hearing should be held but in the appreciation and
evaluation of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the
accused. x x x A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge
can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the
evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.”
12
And in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, the Court ruled:
“It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to

the sound discretion of the court. However, such discretion may
only be exercised after the hearing called to ascertain the degree
of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining whether or
not he should be granted liberty.”
13 14
Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several cases that
emphasized the mandatory character of a hearing in a
petition
__________________
11 250 SCRA 376, November 29, 1995, per Vitug, J. See also Aurillo, Jr.
v. Francisco, 235 SCRA 283, August 12, 1994.
12 241 SCRA 84, February 6, 1995, per curiam.
13 Supra.
14 People v. Sola, 103 SCRA 393, March 17, 1981; People v. Dacudao,
170 SCRA 489, February 21, 1989; People v. Calo, 186 SCRA 620, June 18,
1990; Libarios v. Dabalo, 199 SCRA 48, July 11, 1991; People v. Nano, 205
SCRA 155, January 13, 1992; Pico v. Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421,
November 6, 1992; Borinaga v. Tamin, 226 SCRA 216, September 10,
1993; Aurillo v. Francisco, 235 SCRA 283, August 12, 1994; Estoya v.
Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1, September 26, 1994; Aguirre v. Belmonte,
237 SCRA 778, October 27, 1994; Lardizabal v. Reyes, 238 SCRA 640,
December 5, 1994; Guillermo v. Reyes, 240 SCRA 154, January 18, 1995;
Santos v.
516

for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties

of the trial judge in such petition:
“(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the

application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court as amended);
“(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7
and 8, supra);
“(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
“(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bailbond.
(Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
denied.”
The Court added: “The above-enumerated procedure should

now leave, no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial
judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with
the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount
to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.”
Additionally, the court’s grant or refusal of bail must
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on
the basis of which should be formulated the judge’s own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to

indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is
considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the
prosecution Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56, June 16, 1995; Sule v.
Biteng, 243 SCRA 524, April 18, 1995; Buzon, Jr. v.
Velasco, 253 SCRA 601, February 13, 1996.
517
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 517

and the defense; its absence will 15invalidate the grant or the
denial of the application for bail.
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago
was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of
Appeals was correct in reversing him.
Second Issue: Respondent’s Standing to File the

Petition
Petitioner attacks respondent’s legal standing to file the

Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court,
maintaining that only the public prosecutor or the solicitor
general may challenge
16
the assailed Order. He invokes
People v. Dacudao, which ruled:
“x x x A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to

act for the People of the Philippines before this Court. It is the
Government’s counsel, the Solicitor General who appears in
criminal cases or incidents before the Supreme Court. At the very
least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the conformity of the
Solicitor General, should have raised the issue (of whether or not
the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process on
account of the grant of bail to the accused without any hearing on
the motion for bail) before us, instead of the private prosecutor
with the conformity of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu.”
17
He also cites Republic v. Partisala which held as follows:
“We make it known that only the Solicitor General can bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
Henceforth actions filed in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines if not initiated by the Solicitor General will be
summarily dismissed.”
_____________________
15 People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522, December 24, 1968; Carpio v.

Maglalang, 196 SCRA 41, April 19, 1991; People v. Nano, supra;
Guillermo v. Reyes, supra; Santos v. Ofilada, supra.
16 170 SCRA 489, February 21, 1989, per Gutierrez, J.
17 118 SCRA 370, November 15, 1982, per Abad Santos, J.
518

18
Citing the “ends of substantial justice,” People v. Calo,
however, provided an exception to the above doctrines in
this manner:
“While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the
Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State
in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of
Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends
of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in
this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an
offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient
personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao’s order
granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner’s)
father.
“In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled
that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest
and personality as “person(s) aggrieved” to file the special civil
action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of
the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, thus:
‘Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before

petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that respondents have sufficient
interest and personality as ‘person(s) aggrieved’ by petitioner judge’s
ruling on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under
sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Recently, in line with the underlying spirit of
a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their
object, as against the literal interpretation of Rule 110, section 2, we
held, overruling the implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses
the right as an offended party to file a criminal complaint for the murder
of her deceased husband.’ ” (Id., p. 699)
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the

affirmation of the appellate court’s ruling on this point.
Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

A void order is no
_________________
18 186 SCRA 620, June 18, 1990, per Bidin, J.
519
VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 519

19
order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the source of
any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is
likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent
without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought
about by the trial court’s Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the
law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot
be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in
law.
Moreover, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that “it is too late in the day for the petitioner to
challenge the legal personality of private respondent
considering that it was never disputed by [him] during the
preliminary investigation of the case, in his appeal to the
Department
20
of Justice and during the reinvestigation of the
case.”
Corollary to the question of standing, petitioner submits
that even if the exception were made to apply, private
respondent is not an “offended party” who is granted the
right to challenge the assailed RTC Order. He maintains
that only the compulsory heirs of the deceased, who are the
accused himself and his minor child, may file the instant
action. We disagree.
It should be remembered that the crime charged against
the private respondent is parricide; hence, the accused
cannot be regarded as an offended party. That would be a
contradiction in terms and an absurdity in fact. Nor can
one expect the minor child to think and to act for himself.
Hence, we rule that in view of the peculiar circumstances of
this case, the sister of the deceased is a proper party-
litigant who is akin to the “offended party,” she being a
close relative of the deceased. There is no closer kin who
may be expected to take up the cudgels of justice for the
deceased.
_________________
19 Leonor v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 69, April 2, 1996.

20 Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 13.
520

Campo Assets Corporation vs. Club X.O. Company
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed

Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-

Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion

reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the
prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his
recommendation. (Cortes vs. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 [1997])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz 328 SCRA 505, March 17, 2000

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz 328 SCRA 505, March 17, 2000

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz 328 SCRA 505, March 17, 2000

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

5/26/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 328

VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 505

JOSELITO V. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. FLOR MARIE

Criminal Procedure; Bail; Judges are compelled to conduct

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz

Same; Same; Duties of the trial judge in a petition for bait in

VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 507

Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz

only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion

508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz

the victim may be deemed to be an “offended party”; hence,

We invoke the foregoing principles in rejecting the Petition

“WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby3 GRANTED

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied

“Accused who is present filed thru counsel a Motien to Allow

1 Penned by J. Ricardo P. Galvez, now solicitor general, Division

VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 509

The Facts of the Case

The undisputed antecedents of the case were summarized

“1) After conducting a preliminary investigation on the

of the Private Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent Motion

510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“9) On October 15, 1992, private complainant through

“12) On November 16, 1992, the court cancelled the

VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 511

As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private

Petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals this alleged

“The Respondent Court of Appeals has erroneously decided

5 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on October 6, 1999,

by Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez and Solicitor Edwin

512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled

Whether or not the private respondent has the legal

To resolve this case, the Court believes that two issues

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue: Validity of the Grant of Bail

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution, provides: “All

when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail

VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 513

was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor’s

“When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the

‘A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of

514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges

“The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few

9 Basco v. Rapatalo, supra.

VOL. 328, MARCH 17, 2000 515

fuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the

“The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving

“It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to

516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties