1. The case involved an election protest filed by Maximino Argana against deceased Francisco De Mesa, who had previously won the mayoralty election in Muntinlupa, Rizal in 1963.
2. While the election protest case was pending, Mayor De Mesa was assassinated. The court later proceeded ex parte and ruled in favor of Argana without appointing a legal representative for the deceased De Mesa.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should have strictly followed Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which requires appointing a legal representative for a deceased party. Without doing so, the proceedings taken in the absence of the representative are null and void.
1. The case involved an election protest filed by Maximino Argana against deceased Francisco De Mesa, who had previously won the mayoralty election in Muntinlupa, Rizal in 1963.
2. While the election protest case was pending, Mayor De Mesa was assassinated. The court later proceeded ex parte and ruled in favor of Argana without appointing a legal representative for the deceased De Mesa.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should have strictly followed Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which requires appointing a legal representative for a deceased party. Without doing so, the proceedings taken in the absence of the representative are null and void.
1. The case involved an election protest filed by Maximino Argana against deceased Francisco De Mesa, who had previously won the mayoralty election in Muntinlupa, Rizal in 1963.
2. While the election protest case was pending, Mayor De Mesa was assassinated. The court later proceeded ex parte and ruled in favor of Argana without appointing a legal representative for the deceased De Mesa.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should have strictly followed Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which requires appointing a legal representative for a deceased party. Without doing so, the proceedings taken in the absence of the representative are null and void.
1. The case involved an election protest filed by Maximino Argana against deceased Francisco De Mesa, who had previously won the mayoralty election in Muntinlupa, Rizal in 1963.
2. While the election protest case was pending, Mayor De Mesa was assassinated. The court later proceeded ex parte and ruled in favor of Argana without appointing a legal representative for the deceased De Mesa.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should have strictly followed Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which requires appointing a legal representative for a deceased party. Without doing so, the proceedings taken in the absence of the representative are null and void.
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TITLE: MAGDALENA SIBULO VDA.
DE MESA, Widow of the late Francisco De Mesa, JUAN
GILBUENA, DR. PEDRO MOLERA, DEMETRIO PRESNEDI and LUCIO VICTA, as Officers and in representation of the Local Chapter of the Liberal Party in Muntinlupa, Rizal, and DEMETRIO R. LORESCA, petitioners, vs. HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS and/or Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, MAXIMINO A. ARGANA, the CHIEF OF POLICE, and the MUNICIPAL TREASURER, both of Muntinlupa, Rizal, respondents. G.R. NO. L-24583 DATE: October 29, 1966 PONENTE: J. Castro NATURE: Statutes prescribing procedural requirements FACTS: Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana were opponents for the mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections. De Mesa won the election and thereafter proclaimed and assumed office. Meanwhile, the defeated candidate Argana, filed an election protest against De Mesa charging him of the perpetration of frauds, terrorism and other irregularities in certain precincts. De Mesa, on the other hand filed a counter-protest and sought to shift responsibility for irregularities to the protestant and his followers. However, while the case is pending Mayor De Mesa was assassinated. Protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision of ballots. Accordingly, the court a quo required the protestee's widow and children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be substituted for said protestee, if they so desired. They did not, however, comply. Proceeding ex parte, on June 11, 1964, the protestant Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots, And so, without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative — as indeed none had thus far been named — the trial court granted the motion aforesaid. With the constitution of the committee on revision of ballots in which, incidentally, Ramon Antilon Jr. was motu proprio named and then served as commissioner for the deceased protestee, the trial court, in its decision of August 10, 1964 adjudged the protestant Maximino Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, in the 1963 elections. De Mesa’s widow and local chapter of the LP which deceased was member filed a petition which include among others for the reconsideration of the August 10, 1964 decision upon the ground that, for failure to order the protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased protestee after his widow and children had failed to appear, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court, it was legally improper for the trial court to have proceeded ex parte with the election case The trial court denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee, and order stricken from the record their motion for reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of appeal. The movants elevated the case to CA on a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction. ISSUE/S: WON Sec 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court connotes a directory or mandatory compliance. DOCTRINES | HELD: It is no argument against this conclusion to contend that the requirement for the procurement of a legal representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory word "shall". While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be resorted to as guides in the ascertainment of the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions, they are in no wise absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction. Thus, Black is authority for the rule that " Where the statute 1 provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where it invests a public body, municipality or public officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty"(Black, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 540-543). The matter here involved not only concerns public interest but also goes into the jurisdiction of the trial court and is of the essence of the proceedings taken thereon. On this point, there is authority to the fact that in statutes relating to procedure, as is the one now under consideration, every act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected, is mandatory. RULING: Yes. The death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him, it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee. With the death of De Mesa, however, contingency not expressly provided for by the Revised Election Code was ushered in. It is our considered view that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies to election contests to the same extent and with the same force and effect as it does in ordinary civil actions. And we declare that unless and until the procedure therein detailed is strictly adhered to, proceedings taken by a court in the absence of a duly appointed legal representative of the deceased protestee must be stricken down as null and void. NOTES: SEC. 17. Death of party.— After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to produce the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. . . .