OMAR P. ALI  vs. ATTY. MOSIB A.

BUBONG

Facts: It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent.  In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli
Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against
Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.  It appears from the records that the
Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.

Issue: did atty. Bubong violate Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held: yes , he did.

In the case at bar, respondent’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer.  By taking advantage of his office as
the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the
benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a
civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar.  Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
explicit on this matter.  It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent’s conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public office he used to occupy and
cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession.  The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the
law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant’s daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of
this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be “interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same.” As we have previously explained in the case ofIrene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty.
Orlando A. Rayos

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. 
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven.  This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings.  A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
the respondent lawyer is a defendant.  Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress
for private grievance.  They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.  They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.  The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.  The complainant or the person
who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.
Public Attorney’s Office vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R.
Nos. 154297-300. February 15, 2008]
24SEP
Ponente: AZCUNA, J.
FACTS:
Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and Ex-Parte Motion to be Relieved as Court-Appointed Counsel
with the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, praying that she be relieved of her duties and
responsibilities as counsel de oficio for the said accused on the ground that she had a swelling workload
consisting of administrative matters and that the accused are not indigent persons; hence, they are not
qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO. Respondent Court found the reasons of the Chief
Public Attorney to be plausible and relieved the Chief Public Attorney as counsel de oficio of former
President Joseph Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada. The remaining eight PAO lawyers filed an Ex-
Parte Motion To Be Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels with respondent Court on the ground that the
accused are not indigents; therefore, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of
PAO. Respondent Court issued a Resolution denying the motion, but retaining two of the eight PAO
lawyers, namely, the   petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Andres.
Later, PAO filed a Manifestation and Compliance which informed the Court that petitioners Atty. Usita and
Atty. Andres were appointed as Assistant City Prosecutors of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office
sometime in August 2002, and that PAO is left as the lone petitioner in this case. PAO asserts that while
its lawyers are also aware of their duties under Rule 14.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, PAO lawyers are limited by their mandate as government

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the subject Resolutions retaining two PAO lawyers to act as counsels de oficio for
the accused who are not indigent persons.
HELD:
NO. Petition dismissed for being moot.

RATIO:
The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the subject Resolutions as
the issuance is not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness.  At the time of PAO’s appointment, the
accused did not want to avail themselves of any counsel; hence, respondent exercised a judgment call to
protect the constitutional right of the accused to be heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of
the cases.
Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represent the accused, in view
of the engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained two of the eight PAO lawyers obviously to meet
such possible exigency as the accused again relieving some or all of their private counsels.
In any event, since these cases of the accused in the Sandiganbayan have been finally resolved, this
petition seeking that PAO, the only remaining petitioner, be relieved as counsel de oficio therein has
become moot.

Metro lloilo Water District v. CA. et al.. G.R. No. 122855. March 31.2005

Facts: Metro Iloilo Water District (MIWD) is a water district organized under the provisions of PD 198.
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) granted MIWD Conditional Certificate of Conformance
No. 71. MIWD's seryice areas encompass the entire territorial areas of Iloilo City and the Municipalities
of Ma-asin, Cabatuan, Santa Barbara and Pavia. MIWD filed nine (9) individual yet identical petitions for
injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders against Nava, et al.
for unauthorized extraction or withdrawal of ground water without the necessary permit and
constitutes interference with or deterioration of water quality or the natural flow of surface or ground
water supply. Lower Court's Ruling: The RTC dismissed the petitions and ruled that the controversy is
within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resource Council (NWRC) under PD 1067 involving, as it
did, the appropriation, exploitation andutilization of water, and factual issues which were within the
NWRC's competence. In addition, the RTC held that MIWD failed to exhaust administrative remedies
under the doctrine of "primary administrative jurisdiction." Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA denied the
petition, holding that the RTC did not err in dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction as it was the
NWRC which had jurisdiction over the case. The CA stated that the case actually involves also a dispute
over the appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of
waters because Nava, et al. have allegedly engaged in the extraction or withdrawal of ground water
without a permit from the NWRC within the territorial jurisdiction of the MIWD.

Issue: Whether the trial courts have jurisdiction over subject matter of the petitions Supreme Court's

Ruling: The petitions filed before the trial court were for the issuance of an injunction order for Nava, et
al. to cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from MIWD's well and from selling the
same within its service areas. In essence, the petitions focus on the violations incurred by Nava, et al. by
virtue of their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water within MIWD's service
area, vis-dvis MIWD's vested rights as a water district. At issue is whether Nava, et al.'s extraction and
sale of ground water within MIWD's service area violated MIWD's rights as a water district. It is at once
obvious that the petitions raise a judicial question. While initially it may appear that there is a dimension
to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council, i.e., the appropriation of water which
the Water Code defines as "the acquisition of rights over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of
waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by law," in reality the matter is
at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the petitions. The petitions having raised a judicial
question, it follows that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the basis of which the
petitions were dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, does not even come to play
Notably too, private respondents themselves do not dispute petitioner's rights as a water district. The
cases of Abe-Abe v. Manta and Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton invoked by Nava, et al. are thus
inapplicable. In Abe-Abe v. Manta, both petitioners and respondent had no established right emanating
from any grant by any govemmental agency to the use, appropriation and exploitation of water, while in
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton, petitioner Tanjay sought to enjoin the Municipality of Pamplona and
its officials from interfering in the management of the Tanjay Waterworks System. On the other hand, in
an analogous case of Amistoso v. Ong, petitioner had an approved Water Rights Grant from the
Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. The trial court was not asked to
grant petitioner the right to use but to compel private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, the
Court declared that the trial court's jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the
settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was
already granted. In like manner, the present petition calls for the issuance of an injunction order to
prevent Nava, et al. from extracting and selling ground water within MIWD's service area in violation of
the MIWD's water permit. There is no dispute regarding MIWD's right to ground water within its service
area.It is MIWD's enjoyment of its rights as a water district which it seeks to assert against Nava, et al.

STEMMERIK V. MAS

FACTS: Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its beauty. He consulted
Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that he could legally buy such properties.
Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property that he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of
this, Stemmerik entrusted all of the necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as
he went 7 | Block C 2012 Justice Hofilena LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS back to Denmark. After some
time, Atty Mas informed Stemmerik that he found the owner of the big piece of property and stated the
price of the property is P3.8M. Stemmerik agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly
drawing up the necessary paperwork. When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property
registered in his name, Atty Mas can’t be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed another
lawyer, and to his horror, was informed that aliens couldn’t own Philippine Lands and that the property
was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT case against Atty MAS in the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD ruled that Atty Mas abused the trust and confidence of
Stemmerik and recommended that he be disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted such
recommendations.

ISSUE/S: W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred

HELD: YES! Disbarred. RATIO: Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition Section 7, Article XII
of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying Philippine Lands. Respondent, in giving advice that
directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and
gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and
illegal. Deceitful Conduct By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real
estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent
deliberately deceived his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him
by complainant. Illegal Conduct By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by
complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal
in nature.

FRANCISCO LORENZANA vs. ATTY. CESAR G. FAJARDO A.C. No. 5712. June 29, 2005 FACTS: Francisco
Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo with violation of the Civil Service
Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the practice
of the law profession. Complainant alleged that respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the
Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until his retirement, was a member of the Peoples Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB). He was also a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa. However, respondent should still be
held liable for violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations since he failed to show that he was
permitted by his Office to appear as counsel for his clients. Complainant also alleged that respondent
was engaged in the private practice of law. He lives in a house and lot owned by complainants family
without paying any rental and refuses to leave the place despite the latters demands. 1ST SEMESTER SY.
2015-2016 ATTY. VICTORIA LOANZON 54 PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN LEGAL ETHICS REVIEW ACOSTA,
BARTOLOME, CASQUEJO, DE GRACIA, PINERA ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the civil
service law and be administratively liable. HELD: For accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of
Quezon City while concurrently employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in
violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn contravene his Attorneys Oath and Code of
Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. We now determine whether
respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed as Legal Officer V in the Manila Urban
Settlement Office. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action a succession of acts of the same kind. The
practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has
been interpreted as customarily habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. The prohibition against government officials and employees,
whether elected or appointed, from concurrently holding any other office or position in the government
is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In the case at bar, respondents appearance as counsel is
not merely isolated. Evidence presented by complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law.
While employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained a law
office. The pleadings he signed as counsel for his clients filed with the courts indicate his office address
as Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, Quezon City. Following is the letter head
appearing on the letters and envelopes[9] sent to his clients It is clear that this provision pertains only to
the compensation of PLEB members. It cannot be construed as an exception to the Constitutional and
statutory prohibition against dual or multiple appointments of appointive public employees. Respondent
cannot justify his practice of law by claiming that his office (the Manila Urban Resettlement) is not really
strict when it comes to appearing in some private cases as they (employees) were sometimes called to
render service even on holidays without additional compensation. At most, he should have asked
written permission from his chief as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
that (n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department. Respondent also failed to establish that his primary
functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB
member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes. Indeed,
respondent, in accepting such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code
of 1987, and the Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Attorneys Oath.

Sanchez v Somoso
AC No. 6061, October , 2003
Case No. 6
FACTS: Dr. Sanchez was the attending physician of Atty Somoso during his admission in the
hospital. When the respondent Atty. Somoso was discharged, he persuaded complainant D.
Sanchez to accept check for payment, since it was a public holiday and banks were closed that
day for business. Thus, complainant accepted the checks on the plea of respondent that he was a
lawyer, who can be trusted as such.
However, the checks were dishonored. Ultimately, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa
against Somoso, but respondent was able to evade the arrest IBP ordered to submit his answer,
but failed to file his answers to the complaint; thus declared him to be in default.
In its findings the IBP-CBD found sufficient evidence on record to substantiate the charges made
by complainant against respondent and recommended that the latter be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the IBP.  Clearly, respondent’s action of
issuing his personal checks in payment for his medical bills, knowing fully well that his account
with the drawee bank has by then already been closed, constitutes a gross violation of the basic
norm of integrity required of all members of the legal profession.
ISSUE: WON Somoso violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of canon 7 of Code of
Professional Responsibility?
HELD: The canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not
only in the practice of the legal profession but also in his personal dealings as well.  A lawyer
must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach
anywhere and at all times.
When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had already
been closed, the person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in refusing to settle his
due obligation despite demand, respondent exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment
to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image
of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem.  His conduct deserve nothing less than
a severe disciplinary sanction.
 The law profession is a noble calling, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent and fit to exercise it.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso GUILTY of misconduct, and
he is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from
receipt of this decision, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most
severely.

Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court- Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon- On The
Prohibition From Engaging In the Private Practice of Law

FACTS: Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the RTC, Branch 81 of Romblon, she resigned
from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter, she engaged in the private practice of law by
appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC Branch 81 of Romblon within 1 year after the
effectivty of her resignation. RA 6713, “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees”, Section 7(b)(2) places a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency
and those already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation,
in engaging in the private practice of their profession.

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public

officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by

the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; or

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case
of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Buffe is guilty of professional misconduct.

HELD: YES. She was fined in the amount of P10,000 and a stern warning that a repetition of the same
violation and other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

The letter-query “Why an incumbent can engage in private practice assuming not in conflict with his
official duties but a non-incumbent may not as is apparently prohibited under last par. of Sec 7” filed by
Atty. Buffe and the petition for declaratory relief cannot cover her acts and did not serve as a mitigating
circumstance for violating the abovementioned provision. It should be noted that she had already
appeared before Branch 81 in at least 3 cases at the time she filed the letter-query. The terms of Section
7 (b)(2) of RA 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot
excuse any resulting violation she committed.

Section 7 of RA 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the practice of his
or her profession under the following conditions:

1. The private practice is authorized b the Constitution or by the law;

2. The practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.

“The prohibition under Section 7 continues to apply for a period of 1 Year after the public official or
employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, EXCEPT for the private practice of
profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the 1 YEAR
PROHIBTION PERIOD. As an exception to this exception, the 1 year prohibited period applies with
respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with”.

Futhermore, no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as they are in fact
expressly prohibited by Sec.5 Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so. Under
both the general rule and the exceptions, Atty. Buffe cannot escape penalty. Said prohibitions are based
on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety which may occur
in government transactions.

Additional info:

Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the
following requirements:

(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or
conducts business with the Judiciary;

(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible
with the performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;

(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court
personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or
continuing education centers or similar institutions;

(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential
information acquired while performing officials duties;

(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless
specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.

Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment
reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside
employment.

DIANA RAMOS vs ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG

A. C. No. 6788, 23 August 2007

FACTS

In 1992, Diana Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal
actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave him P8,500 as attorney's fees but
the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only. The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her
cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always
told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had
been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent
charged her P350.
 
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally
inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was
shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact
employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the
very start as they have met when he was assigned as PAO counsel for the complainant's daughter.
 
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses. Since he knew that complainant was not an indigent, he advised the complainant to consult
a private lawyer, Atty. Ungson. Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was
unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. Despite Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant
insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on hand, the complainant asked
respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of
her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for
safekeeping. Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.
 
RULING

Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices

The private practice of profession is prohibited under Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the
complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance
of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. Respondent's admission that he
accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the
complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on
private practice of profession. 

PAO lawyers are prohibited from accepting legal fees other than his salary

PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants under
Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code. As a PAO lawyer,
respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with
the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his
salary.

Lawyers are bound to uphold the Constitution and all laws of the land

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES. Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the
observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as
the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's
fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint
against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that
the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never
took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.

DISPOSITION

Atty. Jose R. Imbang was DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name was ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000
with interest at the legal rate.
 SAA vs. IBP

G.R. No. 132826

FACTS:

Atty. Freddie Venida, herein private respondent, filed criminal and administrative
cases against petitioner Saa containing the same facts and allegations – violation of Sec 3,
RA 3019. Saa filed a disbarment complaint against Venida in the Supreme Court on Dec 27,
1991 stating that Venida’s act of filing two cases against him was oppressive and constituted
unethical practice.

In a Resolution dated February 17, 1992, Venida was required to comment on the complaint
within 10 days. However, Venida did not comply and just submitted a partial comment
January 26, 1993. Supreme Court issued another Resolution on June 14, 1995 requiring
Venida to show costs why he should not be dealt with or held in contempt for failure to
comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution. It was not until September 4, 1995, almost 3
years late, when Venida filed his full comment which is just a reiteration of his partial
comment.

Supreme Court referred the matter to the IBP. In a report dated August 17, 1997 which the
IBP Board adopted, Commisioner Briones the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit
since it found no evidence of unethical practice and that it was not oppressive. Saa filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Venida guilty of violation the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:

Supreme Court upholds the decision of the IBP that there was no grave abuse of
discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth of evidence showing oppressive or
unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida
was motivated by a desire to file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand.

However, the Supreme Court strongly disapproves Atty. Venida’s refusal to comply with the
directives of the court. As a lawyer, he has the responsibility to follow all legal orders and
processes. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three
years after due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a
 clear violation of Canon 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full comments. But
tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and had a
heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to blame a strong
typhoon for the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full comment). His
excuses tax the imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies notwithstanding, we find his
conduct utterly unacceptable for a member of the legal profession. He must not be allowed
to evade accountability for his omissions.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

Petition is granted in part. The charge of oppressive or unethical behavior against

respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the lawyer’s oath, Atty. Freddie
A. Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective
immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is further STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

1 GRANDE v DA SILVA

FACTS:
   Emilio Grande is the private offended party (of estafa and BP 22) against a certain Sergio Natividad, the client of Atty. De Silva
   De Silva tendered a check to Grande as settlement of the civil aspect of the case.
   The check was returned with the notation that the ACCT CLOSED
   Grande filed a suit against De Silva for violation of BP 22 and Estafa (sha naman ang nakasuhan tuloy hehe)
   De Silva refused to comment on notices of complaints sent to her.
   IBP recommended that de Silva be suspended for two years.

ISSUE: WoN de Silva should be suspended?

HELD: YES

RATIO:
1.        The nature of the office of an atty requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Gross misconduct which puts
the lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined
for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her
suspension or disbarment.
2.        Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-pro, justifies disciplinary
action. For a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.
Her deliberate refusal to accept the notices served on her stains the nobility of the profession. How else would a lawyer endeavor to
serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives. Also, Canon 1 says that a lawyer shall uphold
the consti, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the legal processes.
EDGARDO AREOLA, vs. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA

FACTS: Edgardo D. Areola a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy filed an administrative

complaint against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, from the Public Attorney’s Office for
violation of her attorney’s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan
Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He
alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the
Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the RTC, Branch
73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola
claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay
maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang
makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay
o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay
Judge Martin at Fiscal Banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no
bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain
na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is giving improper advice to her clients in
violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza
made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our
legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s
careless remark is uncalled for.
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two months
as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should
be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made
the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot
ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark
was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and
reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s
length of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and
feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable
considerations, respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying
significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty. The Court takes
note of Atty. Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO
lawyer as her main source of livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola
is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was
due to Atty. Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to
modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper
advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND,
with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

GG 95 Case Title: Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla vs Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua

(the case did not mention any violation under Canon 18 only under Canon 1)

G.R. Number & Date: A.C. No. 6655

Nature of the Case: Before the Court is the verified affidavit-complaint 1 of Pacita Caalim-
Verzonilla seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua for allegedly
falsifying a public document and evading the payment of correct taxes through the use
of falsified documents.

Facts:
o Complainant alleges that on September 15, 2001, respondent prepared and notarized
two Deeds of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with
Sale.
o Complainant alleges that both deeds are spurious because all the heirs’ signatures were
falsified. She contends that her sister Marivinia does not know how to sign her name and
was confined at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center as she was diagnosed of Substance
Induced Psychosis and Schizophrenia since May 3, 1999. This fact was supported by a
certificate dated February 6, 2004 signed by Dr. Alice Anghad.
o Complainant further alleges that the two deeds were not presented to any of them and
they came to know of their existence only recently.
 o She further claims that the Community Tax Certificates (CTCs) in her name and in the
names of her mother and her sister Marivinia were procured only by the vendee Shirley
and not by them.

Petitioner’s Arguments: Check facts

Respondent’s Arguments:
o Respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed Deeds of Extra
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Sale (subject deeds) but denies any irregularity in
their execution.
o In the morning of September 15, 2001, complainant, Caridad, Virginia and Shirley
Mipanga went to his house and requested him to prepare a deed of sale of a residential
lot located in Claveria, Cagayan. The agreed purchase price was at Php 1,000,000.00
o Upon the presence of witnesses, the instrument was ratified by the involved parties and
he then notarized the document (Php 1,000,000.00).
o When Shirley found out that she had to pay all the unpaid land taxes, including capital
tax gains, documentary stamp taxes and estate taxes to the BIR which would all result to
an enormous amount (because of the 1M consideration of the sale), she offered to pay
one half of whatever amount the BIR will assess, but Caridad insisted that another
document be prepared stating a reduced selling price of only Php 250,000.00 so
that they need not contribute to the payment of taxes since Shirley was anyway already
willing to pay one half of the taxes based on the selling price stated in the first deed.
o A second deed was later executed with the consideration of only Php 250,000.00. It
must be noted that respondent used the same document number, page number and
book number in the notarial portion as the first deed because according to him, the
second deed was intended by the parties to supplant the first.
o Respondent denies complainant’s assertions that the two deeds are simulated and
falsified, averring that as stated above, all the parties acknowledged the same before
him.
o As to the allegation that Marivinia did not appear before him as she was allegedly under
confinement at the Cagayan Valley Medical Center on September 15, 2001, respondent
cites a medical certificate stating that Marivinia was confined in said hospital from May 3,
1999 to August 10, 1999. He also points out that Marivinia is one of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 2836-S pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, for the
annulment of the subject deeds, and nothing in the complaint states that she is mentally
or physically incapacitated. Otherwise, her co-plaintiffs would have asked the
appointment of a guardian for her.

IBP’s Report and Recommendation:

o IBP found respondent administratively liable on account of his indispensable
participation in an act designed to defraud the government. He recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months and that his notarial
commission, if still existing, be revoked and that he be prohibited from being
commissioned as a notary public for two years.
 o IBP board of governor’s adopted the report of the commissioner but imposed a higher
penalty which is a suspension of two years from the practice of law and suspension of
his notarial commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pascua is administratively liable for participating in an act designed
to defraud the government?

FALLO: WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In addition, his
present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any
similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

HELD: YES.

Respondent did not deny preparing and notarizing the subject deeds. He avers that the true
consideration for the transaction is P1,000,000 as allegedly agreed upon by the parties when
they appeared before him for the preparation of the first document as well as the notarization
thereof. He then claimed to have been "moved by his humane and compassionate disposition"
when he acceded to the parties’ plea that he prepare and notarize the second deed with a lower
consideration of P250,000 in order to reduce the corresponding tax liability. However, as noted
by Commissioner Fernando, the two deeds were used by respondent and his client as evidence
in a judicial proceeding (Civil Case No. 2671-S), which only meant that both documents still
subsist and hence contrary to respondent’s contention that the second deed reflecting a lower
consideration was intended to supersede the first deed.

With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true
consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on the
transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a
public document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount
much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in
depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act clearly
violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Xxxx
 Rule 1.02. – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity aimed at defiance of the law,
he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an
Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he is entitling it full faith
and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its nature and purpose.

As to the charge of falsification of documents, the Court finds that the documents annexed to
the present complaint are insufficient to render a judgment.

With regard to the respondent’s notarial act, he proceeded to notarize the second deed despite
knowledge of its illegal purpose. His purported desire to accommodate the request of his client
will not absolve respondent, who as member of the legal profession, should have stood his
ground and not yielded to the importunings of his clients. Respondent should have been more
prudent and remained steadfast in his solemn oath not to commit falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any.

Case # Dimagiba v. Montalvo

001.
Ref./Date/ Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991 PER CURIAM: (Jen)
Pn.
Law/ Canon 1, Rule 1.03- A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any
Subject: suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause/ ETHICS
Case Aid: Lawyer filed several cases, similar facts, parties and cause = Malpractice

Facts:
This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice, for stretching
to almost
a half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes which
instituted
Ismaela Dimagiba as the sole heir of all the properties.

In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los Reyes as
found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of action:

1. On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the CFI Bulacan, regarding the same
property subject of the annulment of sale. Luckily, the said case was terminated on June 20, 1958,
probating the said will.
2. The oppositors (The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa
Reyes, Mariano
Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes) appealed this case to the SC on October 12, 1967, affirming the
decision of the Lower Court;

3. G.R. Nos. L23638 and L23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the Supreme Court, upheld the
decision CA G.R. No. 31221R, in effect, affirming the due execution the Will and the capacity of the
Testator as well as the institution of the complainant.

4. Oppositors thru counsel, Atty. Montalvo filed in the CFIof Bulacan on June 4, 1968, a petition for the
nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.

5. A complaint again was filed dated November 3, 1970 and was again dismissed.

6. Civil Case No. 4151M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the property left by the
deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the Will, was again dismissed for failure
to prosecute.

7. Civil Case No. 4188M. Filed on May 25, 1972, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the
descendants of the collateral relatives of the deceased De Los Reyes against herein complainant
Dimagiba. This case was dismissed.

8. Civil Case No. 4458M. Civil Case No. 4188M was appealed. But without waiting for the outcome, Atty.
Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458M on April 5, 1974 which was a complaint for the cancellation of
the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of
title in the name of the late Benedicta de los Reyes.

Dimagiba was constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said lawyer who is
a member of the
Philippine Bar attending to cases of non-suit, which cause harassment on her part.

The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No. 831 of the CFI,
Bulacan. They cannot be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that the case filed by Atty.
Montalvo is still pending in Court.

Atty. Montalvo’s Answer: (1) He has always been of the honest and sincere belief that its filing is for the
interest of justice — certainly never for harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not
be ejected from their land as stated by complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of PD 27
which emancipated the farmers from their bondage and declared them as owners of the rice and corn
land they tilled upon the passage of the decree coupled with the very acts of the complainant herself;
and that (3) the complainant by filing this instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate
the undersigned in order to withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her
erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta
de Los Reyes and could not accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the
deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned.

Issue/s: WON Atty. Montalvo is guilty of malpractice.

Held: YES. WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain
the high traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the
practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Ratio:
Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms involving the
same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to rest by final judgment.

This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's pronouncements is
in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of Court.9

Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire history of
a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty. Montalvo does not deny
the fact that the probate of the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes has been an overextended and
contentious litigation between the heirs.

A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly endless channels left dangling by our legal
system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie could get
away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela Dimagiba When
court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our judicial system may not be
entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had taken their privilege so lightly, and
in such mindless fashion.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.03 —

On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his oath not
to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession, and has
proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We have not
countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the
severest punishment of DISBARMENT.

Fernando Collantes v. Viente Renomeron

200 SCRA 584

Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty. 
Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty.
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter’s irregular actuations with
regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.

Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the registration
of the documents with certain “special conditions” between them, which was that V&G should
provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket
money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City house and lot by V&G
or GSIS representatives.

Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated
the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator
then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite the resolution of the
Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the
parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted in his previous
denial.

Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his
malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of Professional Responsibility applies
to government service in the discharge of official tasks.

Held: (1) Yes, a lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money
or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge
of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any
man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).