SY vs ESPONILLA

Attorney; Disobedience to court directives. Complainant Sy charged Respondent Esponilla, Legal

Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk of court and exofficio sheriff of RTC Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty. The complaint was in
connection with the irregular withdrawal of deposits for monthly rentals in a civil case based on a
purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. The Supreme
Court held that Atty. Bayhon violated the Lawyers Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for failing to explain, in good faith the circumstances surrounding the filing of
the Ex-Parte Motion which he himself filed, for proffering misleading claims in the course of the subject
administrative investigation, and for not having shown and proved that he exerted his best efforts to
secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion all in violation of the resolutions issued by the Court.
Atty. Bayhon was suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Elpidio Sy, President, Systems Realty
Development Corporation v. Edgar Esponilla, Legal Researcher and Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261,
December 11, 2013.
MALIGAYA VS DORONILLA
FACTS: Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel for several military officers. During ahearing, he said we had
an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him(Maligaya) he will also withdraw all the cases. Do
with that understanding, he evenretired and he is now receiving pension. Atty. Doronilla was then charge
of misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting in obstruction of justice.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Doronilla guilt of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of canon 10 of the code
of professional responsibility.
RULING: by stating untruthfully in open court, Att. Doronilla breached peremptorytenets of ethical conduct.
Not only violated the lawyers oath to do no falsehood,nor consent to the doing of an in court, but
also his acts infringed on everylawyers duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by
anartifice or false statement of fact or law. He was suspended from practice of law fortwo months.
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI v. ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNGA.C. 8920, 28 September 2011, SECOND
DIVISION (Brion, J.)
A lawyer who insulted a judge inside a courtroom completely disregardsthe latters role, stature and
position in our justice system.
On July 24, 2008, during a hearing on the motion for reconsideration of
acase, respondent Atty. Mechor A. Battung acted disrespectfully by shoutingwhile arguing his motion.
Petitioner, Judge Rene Baculi, had advised respondentto tone down his voice but the
respondent consistently
kept shouting, evenwhen he was warned that he would be cited for direct contempt. Aftereventually being
cited for direct contempt and was imposed a fine of P100.00,the respondent left. However, while other
cases were being heard, respondentre-entered the court and shouted Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! Iam not afraid of you! He was escorted out of the courtroom and was againcited for direct
contempt for the second time. Respondent also uttered the samelines when he saw petitioner at the hall of
the courthouse afterwards and evenchallenged the latter to a fight. He was then escorted out of the
building.Based on the tape of the incident and the transcript of stenographicnotes, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigative Commissioner Jose dela Rama, Jr. found that the respondent was the one
who shouted first at thecomplainant, despite the latters claim that he was provoked by the
petitioner. The Commissioner further stated that the respondent failed to observe Rule11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that alawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language orbehaviour before the courts.
The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolutionadopting and approving the Report and Recommendation
of the InvestigatingCommissioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Melchor A. Battung is guilty of violating Rule 11.03,Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for insulting a judge in hiscourtroom
HELD:
Petition
GRANTED.
The Supreme Court agrees with the finding of the IBP that the respondentdid violate Rule 11.03, Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Byshouting at the petitioner, Atty. Battung clearly disrespected
the former in the presence of litigants and their counsels and court personnel. Furthermore, the
respondent even threatened the judge that he will file a case of gross ignorance
of the law against the latter. The respondents actions are found not onlya gainst the person, the position
and the stature of petitioner but also against the court whose proceedings were disrupted.As an officer of
the court, it is the duty of Atty. Battung to uphold thedignity and authority of the
courts. A lawyer who insulted a judge inside acourtroom completely disregards the latters role, stature
and position in

our justice system. Respects for the courts guarantee the stability of the judicialinstitution and without suc
h, the courts would be resting on very shaky foundations and will thus, lose the confidence from the
people. By threateningto a file a case against the judge, Atty. Battung seems to erode publicconfidence in
the petitioners competence. However, incompetence is a
matterthat, even if true, should be handled with sensitivity in the manner that isprovided under the Rules
of Court, and not how the respondent handled
thesituation. The respondents actions, being scandalous and offensive to theintegrity of the judicial
system, clearly showed a violation of the Rule 11.03,Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Uy v. Depasucat, A.C. No. 5332, July 29,2003
After the parties had filed their respectivebriefs with the Court of Appeals and before thelatter's resolution
submitting the case fordecision was released, respondent lawyers, Atty.Depasucat, and others filed a
pleading"Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of theHon. Court of Appeals from a Self-ConfessedBriber
of Judges", which stated that plaintiff-appellant Uy had, in fact, confessed to
bribing judges. Consequently, Uy filed a verifiedcomplaint against respondent lawyers for gross
misconduct. Should the respondents bedisciplined for having authored and filed the
Manifestation of Usurpation of Authority of the
Hon. Court of Appeals from a Self-Confessed
Briber of Judges?
A:
Yes.
Respondents went overboard by stating inthe Manifestation that complainant "had in factconfessed to
bribery and telling one of the judges,after the judges allegedly refused to give in totheir demands, by using
illegally taped conversations-both actual and/or by telephone".It belied their good intention and exceeded
thebounds of propriety, hence not arguablyprotected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a
litigant; it offends the courtbefore which it is made. A lawyer shall abstainfrom scandalous, offensive or
menacing languageor behavior before the courts. It must beremembered that the language vehicle does
notrun short of expressions which are emphatic butrespectful, convincing but not derogatory,illuminating
but not offensive. It has been saidthat a lawyer's language should be dignified inkeeping with the dignity of
the legal profession. Itis the duty of Atty. Depasucat et.al. as membersof the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor orreputation of a party or witness,
unless requiredby the justice of the cause with which he ischarged.
Note:
The language of a lawyer, both oral andwritten, must be respectful and restrained inkeeping with the
dignity of the legal profession andwith his behavioral attitude toward his brethren inthe profession. The use
of abusive language bycounsel against the opposing counsel constitutes atthe same time disrespect to the
dignity of the court justice. Moreover, the use of impassioned languagein pleadings, more often than not,
creates more heatthan light.
(Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719,Sept. 21, 1993)
The duty to observe and maintain respect is not aone-way duty from a lawyer to a judge. A judgeshould
also be courteous to counsel, especially thosewho are young and inexperienced and to all thoseappearing
or concerned in the administration of justice.

RE: SMOKING AT THE FIRE EXIT AREA AT THE BACK OF THE PUBLIC INFORMATION
OFFICE, A.M. No. 2009-23-SC, 2010 February 26, En Banc
RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Resolution the administrative case involving Atty. Brandon C. Domingo, Atty. Leo Felix S.
Domingo, and Atty. Emiliana Helen R. Ubongen (respondents) for alleged violation of (1) Section 6,[1] in connection
with Section 1,[2] of Office Order No. 06-2009 entitled Reiterating the Ban on Smoking as Provided for in
Administrative Circular No. 09-99 and Reiterated and Clarified in Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A, and (2) Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009, entitled Smoking Prohibition Based on a
100% Smoke-Free Environment Policy.[3]

By 1st Indorsement dated October 29, 2009,[4] Eduardo V. Escala (Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Security
Division of this Court) forwarded to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria (Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer)
for her information and appropriate action, the Incident Report[5] dated October 29, 2009 of Gregorio Alvarez
(Alvarez), Security Officer II.

Alvarez related that on October 27, 2009 at about 2:50 p.m., Roel Suyo (Watchman II) instructed him to proceed to
the Public Information Office (PIO) because some staff members of that Office wanted to report violations of the
Courts smoking ban. At the PIO, Atty. Dominadoranne Lim reported to him that she found one female and two male
Supreme Court employees smoking in the fire exit at the back of the PIO. She further claimed that she recognized
them as court attorneys from the Office of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, but was prevented from
ascertaining their identities when one of the lawyers parried her hands as she tried to take a look at his Supreme
Court identification card.

In a Memorandum dated November 13, 2009, the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) requested Atty. Lim to
name and identify the employees she saw smoking inside the Court premises and to give additional details on the
incident, so that the Office may act accordingly on the report.[6] Atty. Lim responded with a letter dated November
18, 2009[7] where she narrated that:

On 28 October 2009, at around noon time, upon inhaling second hand smoke in the PIO coming from the fire exit,
my officemates and I discreetly went to the fire exit, and upon opening the door, were met with a strong smell of
cigarette smoke. I heard people conversing upstairs. I proceeded up a flight of stairs, and immediately saw outside
the 4th floor door, three (3) people smoking, who were identified later as Brandon Carlos Domingo, Leo Felix S.
Domingo, and Emiliana Belen R. Ubongen. Incidentally, they were in an area surrounded by stacks and piles of
paper documents.

I also called my office mate, Erika Dy, who immediately showed up at the flight of stairs and saw the smokers.
Moments after, office mates Dennis Balason and Jay Rempillo also arrived and also saw them.

Later in the day, the three smokers, accompanied by Atty. Josephine C. Yap, came to our office for a meeting
attended by, [sic] all three, Brandon Carlos Domingo, Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Emiliana Belen R. Ubongen, and
DCA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Atty. Yap and Erika Dy, and myself. During the meeting the three categorically
admitted that they were indeed all smoking in the fire exit that afternoon.

On November 19, 2009, the OAS individually directed the respondents to submit their respective
comments/explanations on why they should not be subjected to appropriate administrative disciplinary actions and
sanctions for violating the ban on smoking within the Court premises.[8] The respondents collectively filed their
Comment dated November 27, 2009.[9] They contended that Alvarezs report was not based on his personal
knowledge of the incident; he completely relied on the account given by Atty. Lim. They also claimed that Atty. Lim
uttered untruthful statements against them to retaliate for the administrative complaint lodged against her. They
pointed out that while Alvarez reported that the incident occurred on October 27, 2009, Atty. Lim inconsistently
maintained that it occurred on October 28, 2009.

The respondents further alleged that they were not informed of the particular memorandum or circular they were
supposed to have violated. Nevertheless, they questioned the validity of the existing regulations on smoking within
Court premises. They averred that the salient provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A,[10] particularly
the implementation of smoking cessation programs within the Court and the designation of smoking areas within the
premises, had not yet been implemented. Similarly, they noted that Republic Act No. 9211 (otherwise known as
The Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003) likewise requires that the appropriate places for cigarette smoking be
designated. Moreover, the respondents consider an absolute ban on smoking within the Court premises to be
unreasonable.[11]

In the Memorandum[12] dated December 21, 2009, Atty. Candelaria reviewed the respondents assertions regarding
the inaccuracies in the reports of Alvarez and Atty. Lim, but considered it more significant that the respondents did
not deny that they were the persons found smoking in the fire exit. She also clarified that the facts contained in the
reports consisted of violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, particularly Office Order No. 06-2009, and
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009. She likewise cited a Memorandum
dated October 6, 2009, issued by the OAS through Atty. Ma. Carina M. Cunanan, declaring that smoking is now
strictly prohibited inside the Supreme Courts premises.

Atty. Candelaria found that the respondents acts constituted a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
a light offense under Section 52(C)(3) of Rule IV on Penalties of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service,[13] for which the penalty is Reprimand.[14] Nevertheless, she recommended that a WARNING be
issued to the respondents, as well as a reminder that a repetition of the same or similar acts be dealt with more
strictly in the future. In merely admonishing the respondents instead of issuing a reprimand, Atty. Candelaria
considered that the respondents had never been charged with any offense prior to this incident.[15]

We agree with Atty. Candelarias recommendation that a WARNING issued to the respondents is sufficient. We
appreciate Atty. Candelarias submitted reason that this is the respondents first offense, and is in fact the first case
in this Court involving smoking. Separately from these reasons, we take into account compelling considerations that
dissuade us from imposing the full sanctions on the respondents.

The statute that actually penalizes smoking is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9211 or the Tobacco Regulation Act of
2003[16] which, in order to foster a healthful environment, absolutely prohibits smoking in specified public places[17]
and designates smoking and non-smoking areas in places where the absolute ban on smoking does not apply.[18]
Under this law, the Court is generally considered a place where smoking is restricted, rather than absolutely
banned. Exceptions to this characterization are the Courts elevators and stairwells; the Courts medical and dental
clinics; and the Courts cafeteria and other dining areas (including the Justices Lounge), together with their food
preparation areas, where an absolute ban applies. In the areas where smoking restriction applies, the law requires
that the Court designate smoking and non-smoking areas. Significantly, the law carries specific penalties for
violations, ranging from a low of a P500.00 fine for the first offense, to a high of not more than P10,000.00 fine for
the third offense.[19]

In the present case, the respondents were caught smoking (as Atty. Candelaria found and we have no reason to
dispute this finding) at the Courts stairwell an area subject to an absolute ban on smoking. Thus, technically, a
smoking violation under R.A. No. 9211 exists.

We note, however, that the respondents were never held to account for violation of R.A. No. 9211 and, in fact, had
raised the question of under which law or regulation they were being held accountable. In response, the OAS
pointed to Section 6, in connection with Section 1, of Office Order No. 06-2009; and Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 2009.[20] Thus, the respondents never defended themselves against
any charged violation of R.A. No. 9211 and cannot be held liable under this law pursuant to the present charge
against them.

Office Order No. 06-2009, under which the respondents are charged, covers absolute smoking prohibition areas
greater than those covered by R.A. 921, which include all interior areas of the buildings of the courts and the areas
immediately adjacent to these buildings. The Office Order still allows smoking within court premises (apparently
referring to exterior areas), but such smoking has to be done in designated places. Sections 2 and 3 of Office Order
No. 06-2009 provides for the designation of smoking areas:

Sec. 2. Smoking Areas.-Court personnel who choose to smoke shall do so in open locations at reasonable distance
(five or more meters) from any building, enclosed area, or vehicle where smoking is prohibited to ensure that
environmental tobacco smoke does not enter the building, enclosed area, or vehicle through entrances, windows,
ventilation or exhaust systems or any other means.

Sec. 3. Designation of smoking areas. (a) In the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of
Tax Appeals, their respective Chief Administrative Officers shall designate the smoking areas in their compounds.

Compliance with the Office Order is enforced under its Section 6 on Administrative Sanction.[21]

Implicit, to our mind, in these provisions is that appropriate smoking areas should be designated to give full effect to
the Office Order. The smokers within the courts must know not only where they cannot smoke, but also where they
can legitimately smoke.

Unfortunately, no designation of the smoking areas was immediately made. In fact, a clarificatory Memorandum
dated October 6, 2009 states that smoking is now strictly prohibited inside the Supreme Courts premises, since
there are no open areas that are five or more meters away from any building, enclosed area or vehicle where
smoking is absolutely prohibited.

After the smoking incident involving the respondents on October 27, 2009, the Court clarified the interpretation of the
issuances on smoking to reflect the interpretation the Court believes to be correct. On December 15, 2009, the
Court En Banc promulgated the Resolution directing the OAS to recommend smoking areas within the Court
pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A.[22] In compliance with this December 15,
2009 Resolution, the OAS addressed a Memorandum to the Chief Justice recommending two areas in the Court that
may be designated as smoking areas: (1) a portion of the Taft side parking area in the Old Compound; and (2) a
space between the DOJ building and the front exit gate in the New Compound. In effect, the Court invalidated the
October 6, 2009 Memorandum declaring a total smoking prohibition within court premises, but it was not until
February 9, 2010 that the matter was clarified when the Court En Banc approved the OAS Memorandum to the
Chief Justice on the designated smoking areas.

To be sure, the stairwell where the respondents smoked is considered a completely banned area under the Office
Order and does not need the issuance of any clarificatory smoking area designation. The lack of designation,
however, raises questions about the status of the Office Order and the issuances it seeks to implement (specifically,
Administrative Circular No. 09-99, Memorandum Circular No. 01-2008A, as well as the related Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009). One of the questions is whether there can be a valid partial
enforcement of the Office Order.

Effectively, partial enforcement upholds that part of the Office Order that prohibits smoking in certain areas, but
nullifies equally critical parts of the rule that clearly allow smoking in designated areas. Stated differently, partial
enforcement gives effect to the part of the Office Order absolutely prohibiting smoking in certain areas, without
implementing the parts that call for the designation of smoking areas. An arguable objection to this manner of
implementation is the badge of inequity that it carries, as it places a greater burden upon smokers than that which
the Office Order intended; without any designated smoking area, they are always at risk of running afoul of the Office
Order.

When the interpretation of a statute or a rule according to the exact and literal import of its words would contravene
the clear purposes of the law (in the case of the Office Order, to safeguard health and environmental concerns, while
respecting the rights of the individual), such interpretation should be disregarded in favor of a construction of the law
made according to its spirit and reason.[23] A laws raison detre must be ascertained from a consideration of the
rule as a whole, not of an isolated part of a particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in isolation from its
context might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended.[24]

Another point to consider is the reality that the Office Order imposes an administrative sanction on violating court
officials and employees. Thus, strictly speaking, the Office Order is a penal measure because of the punishment it
imposes. The penal provisions of a law or regulation are to be construed strictly a rule of construction that
emphatically forbids any attempt to hold that when the commission of an act on certain specific occasions is
penalized, it should be penalized on all other occasions.[25] It is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to increase the
restrictions provided by law.[26] When Section 6 of Office Order No. 06-2009 sets out to penalize only the act of
smoking outside the designated smoking areas, but ends up penalizing the act in all the areas within the Court
because no proper smoking area has been designated, the rule is thereby expanded beyond its intended
parameters.

The rule, being penal, must also be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the
respondents and at the same time preserve its obvious intention. If the language is plain, it will be construed as it is
read, with the words of the rule given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the
respondents than it would if the statute were remedial.[27] The strict construction of penal statutes against the state
and their liberal construction in favor of an accused, defendant, or respondent are not intended to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality, but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.[28]

It must likewise be considered, still with respect to the penal nature of the Office Order, that not only smoking
violators but even the Chief of our OAS may have technically been in violation of the Office Order when she failed to
comply with the duty to designate the smoking areas within Court premises.[29] As worded, Section 3 of the Office
Order imposes this duty on the Chief Administrative Officer. Thus, the Office Order casts a net wider than that which
caught the respondents. In the absence of any Court action for the omission under Section 3, so also should we not
act at this point on other violations of our rule.

An aspect obviously absent from this discussion is CSC Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 2009, that was also
allegedly violated. The absence is intentional to avoid repetition, as this Memorandum is no different in its terms and
effects from Office Order No. 06-2009; thus, what applies to the latter with due adjustments owing to
circumstances peculiar to the development of Office Order No. 06-2009 within the Court similarly applies to the
former.

Under the circumstances, in addition to those pointed out by Atty. Eden Candelaria and out of considerations of
fairness that the Court should exemplify, we believe and so hold that we should not impose on the respondents the
strict sanction the Office Order carries. The health and safety concerns that our smoking policy embodies, however,
should not be lost on the respondents and on everyone within the Court, smokers and non-smokers alike. Hence,
we have to give the respondents the firm warning that the chief enforcer of the Office Order the OAS, through Atty.
Eden Candelaria recommended, while at the same time also warning everyone that this initial lenient
consideration is not apt to be repeated in future violations now that our smoke-free policy is complete.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Brandon C. Domingo, Atty. Leo Felix S. Domingo, and Atty. Emiliana
Helen R. Ubongen are firmly WARNED and PUT ON NOTICE that a repetition of any prohibited smoking under the
law and against our internal Court policies shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.