COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROJECT ON

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VETO POWER EXERCISED BY

PRESIDENT IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

PROJECT SUBMITTED BY:-

ANKIT NANDE

1783015

B.A.LL.B.(A)

PROJECT GUIDED BY:-

MR. YOGESH MISHRA

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR

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INTRODUCTION:-

A presidential veto is a constitutional rule that enables a president (or elected head of state who
might, in some cases, go by another title) to refuse assent to a bill that has been passed by the
legislature, and thereby to stop the bill from becoming law. The grounds on which the veto
power may be exercised and the difficulty of overturning the veto vary between jurisdictions.
When a bill is introduced in the Parliament, Parliament can pass the bill and before the bill
becomes an act, it has to be presented to the Indian President for his approval. It is on President
of India to either reject the bill, return the bill or withhold his assent to the bill. 1 The choice of
the President over the bill is called his veto power. Veto powers in simple terms refer to the
powers granted to the president by the constitution either to pass any bill or to keep it with
himself or resend it with some considerations back to the parliament for amendment, in order to
ensure the public welfare.

Strong presidential veto powers are typically found in presidential democracies that are based on
the classical 18th and 19th century model of the separation of the powers. Weaker presidential
veto powers are found mainly in semi presidential democracies and in recent presidential
systems where the president’s legislative leadership role is recognized.

WHY VETO?

Historically, the veto power was intended mainly as a passive instrument to protect the
constitutional separation of powers and the rights of citizens as part of a system of checks and
balances. It retains this function in many cases but has also emerged as an instrument of inter-
institutional policy bargaining in democracies characterized by presidential leadership.2

1
Art 111, The Constitution of India, 1950.
2
Cameron, Charles M., ‘The Presidential Veto’ in William Howell and George Edwards (eds) The Oxford
Handbook of the American Presidency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)

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 WHY NOT?

 The veto power puts great power and responsibility in the hands of one person: why should one
person’s decision outweigh the decision of a whole legislative assembly?
 Excessive presidential veto powers may unbalance the working relationship between the
executive and legislative branches, resulting in a combination of autocracy and deadlock.

ON WHAT GROUNDS VETO MAY BE EXERCISED?

Veto on constitutional or procedural grounds: Constitutions may restrict the veto to matters of
constitutional or procedural propriety. The Constitution of Austria, for example, specifies that,
‘The adoption of federal laws in accordance with the constitution is authenticated by the
signature of the Federal President’ with the countersignature of the Federal Chancellor [Prime
Minister] (art. 47). This implies that the president is obliged to promulgate laws and may only
refuse to do so only in extreme circumstances, if the law is clearly not, procedurally or
substantively, passed ‘in accordance with the Constitution’ (Koker 2014).

A presidential veto on constitutional grounds usually takes the form of referring legislation to the
Supreme Court or Constitutional Court for a ruling on its constitutionality. This power is found,
for example, in the Constitutions of Bulgaria (art. 150) and Ireland (art. 26). This is a form of
abstract or a priori judicial review. While the president acts as a gatekeeper, the final decision
making power with respect to the constitutionality of laws rests with the courts.3

Veto on policy grounds: Conversely, in democracies where the president is expected to take a
more active role in leadership and policymaking, it is usual to allow the president a broad
discretionary veto power that may be exercised on any grounds the president sees fit. The
president may therefore veto legislation because of substantive policy objections without any
need to demonstrate procedural or constitutional irregularities.

3
Slezak, Nicole L., The Presidential Veto: A Strategic Asset (Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2007)

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Prohibition of veto for certain types of legislation: Certain types of legislation may be immune
to a presidential veto, such as laws that are not treated in the same way as ordinary legislative
acts. For example, presidents that otherwise possess a veto power over all ordinary legislation
may be denied the right to veto constitutional amendments (which may have a different process
of final approval, such as being endorsed by the people in a referendum). Alternatively, a
president may have a veto only over specified types of controversial or fundamental legislation.
In Singapore, for example, the president has veto powers only in relation to a fairly narrow range
of bills, which includes certain budgetary matters.

VETO POWER OF PRESIDENT OF INDIA:-

In India, the president has three veto powers i.e. absolute, suspension & pocket. The president
can send the bill back to parliament for changes, which constitutes a limited veto that can be
overridden by a simple majority. But the Bill reconsidered by the parliament becomes a law with
or without the assents of President after 14 days.
The president can also take no action indefinitely on a bill, sometimes referred to as a pocket
veto. The president can refuse to assent, which constitutes an absolute veto.
The President of India does not have it within his/her power to veto a bill passed by the
Government, headed by the Prime Minister.4

POCKET VETO:-
There is no time frame within which the President must give his assent to a bill, when it is sent to
him for the first time. Therefore, by delaying his decision, the President can effectively exercise
a Pocket Veto, which will also scupper any further discussion on the bill, since it has not been
actually sent back for discussion.

However, this is an extreme case, and is generally not advised to the President. Indeed, it has
been done only once in the history of the Republic. The President cannot exercise a pocket veto
on a financial or a constitutional amendment bill.

4
Sharma, B.K. (2007). Introduction to the Constitution of India. New Delhi (Prentice-Hall of India Learning Pvt.
Ltd.) p. 145.

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A pocket veto is a legislative maneuver that allows a president or other official with veto power
to exercise that power over a bill by taking no action (instead of affirmatively vetoing it).

In this case, the President can send the bill back to the Parliament with recommended
amendments, but the Parliament is under no obligation to accept these, and may send the bill
back to the President for his approval with or without the suggested amendments.

In case the bill is sent back to the President for a second time, the President is bound to give his
assent to the bill within a fixed time period. Again, in this case, the President cannot send a
financial or a constitutional amendment bill back to the parliament for re-consideration.

In India, Article 111 of the Indian constitution stipulates that the President shall give assent to a
bill passed by both houses of the parliament or return the bill as soon as possible for
reconsideration with his recommendation.

The Indian Constitution does not give a specific time limit for presidential action on a bill sent
by the Parliament. Thus, by indefinitely postponing action on a bill, the president effectively
vetoes it. However, if a president receives a bill he or she had previously vetoed and sent back to
Parliament, where such a veto has been overruled by another Parliamentary vote, then such a bill
becomes an act within fourteen days of the President’s receiving it regardless of his or her
subsequent action or inaction.

Zail Singh, President of India from 1982 until 1987, exercised a pocket veto to prevent the Indian
Post Office (Amendment) Bill from becoming law. However, the Indian Supreme Court has not
upheld the right of presidents to veto bills in this manner.

ABSOLUTE VETO:-
Absolute veto is when the head of the government (Crown/Viceroy/President) refuses assent to
any bill passed by the legislature. It cannot become law.

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In India there is no conception like absolute veto however a veto can be absolute, as for instance
in the United Nations Security Council, whose permanent members can block any resolution. Or
it can be limited, as in the legislative process of the United States, where a two-thirds vote in
both the House and Senate may override a Presidential veto of legislation.

A veto gives power only to stop changes, not to adopt them (except for the rare “amendatory
veto”). Thus a veto allows its holder to protect the status quo.

SUSPENSIVE VETO:-
Generally, a suspensive veto is the ability of an executive to return a bill to the legislature
without the bill becoming law. In the United States, the President can veto a bill the Congress
has passed.

The veto is suspensive because the Congress can override the veto, given a large enough
majority. The opposite of a suspensive veto is an absolute veto, a power the President does not
have. However, if a vetoed bill is not re-passed by Congress, the bill dies, and the suspensive
veto, at that point, could be considered absolute.

VETO OVER STATE LEGISLATION:-

If governor reserved a bill for consideration of President then President can use any of above
veto power. But in case of suspensive Veto, if the State legislature is again passed bill with
simple majority then President is not bound to give assent to bill as in case of Union legislation.

The exception to this is, the President can’t exercise any veto on Constitutional Amendment
bill i.e. bound to give assent and in case of money bill, he can’t exercise Suspensive veto either
ratified or rejected.5

Article 201 of the Constitution says that when a Bill is reserved by a Governor for the
consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that
he withholds asset, provided that, where the Bill is not a Money Bill, the President may direct the

5
Gupta, V. P. (26 August 2002). "The President's role". Times of India.

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Governor to return the Bill to the House or, as the case may be, the Houses of the Legislature of
the State together with such a message as it mentioned in the first proviso to Article 200 and,
when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of
six months from the date of receipt of such message and, if it is again passed by the House or
Houses with or without amendment, it shall be presented again to the President for his
consideration Procedure in Financial Matters.

COMPARISON BETWEEN INDIA AND USA:-

Indian parliamentary democracy and USA is presidential democracy the important difference lies
between both is in India president is head of state only but in USA president is both head of state
and government so there is no post of prime minister. Indian president have to work with aid and
advice of ministers but in USA President can act as per his opinion and advice of cabinet is not
binding on him. The veto power is given to president to act as checks and balances for the bill
passed by the legislature so the laws will be rectified and constitutionally right. Indian President
has comparatively lesser veto power than the President of US. The President of US can veto a
bill passed by the Congress. He needs to sign the bill if it is once again passed by two-thirds
majority of both the houses. The Indian President on the other hand can send the bill for
reconsideration only once. If the bill is passed again even by a simple majority in the Parliament
he is obliged to sign the bill.6

Both the President of the United States and U.S. state governors usually issue a veto statement or
veto message that provides their reasons for vetoing a measure when returning it to Congress or
the state legislature, as required by the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, or by custom. Those
statements do not have precedential value, although their reasoning may be respected within the
Executive Branch, and can contribute to the American constitutional tradition. However, unlike
a presidential signing statement, a veto statement does not carry much direct weight in the
American legal system, because of its function: if Congress fails to override the veto, the bill and

6
The Pugmark, Comparison between vetoes of president of USA and India, available at insights on India.

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veto become legally irrelevant, but if the override succeeds, the veto message is not considered
during subsequent executive implementation or judicial interpretation of the law.7
The President or the state governor may sign the veto statement at a signing ceremony, often
with media present, particularly for measures that they wish to disapprove of in a very public
fashion.

POCKET VETO:-
US President can exercise his pocket veto power by not signing the bill for 10 days if he knows
the session of the congress will end within 10 days. In such cases the bill dies. Indian President
can keep the bill for indefinite period as there is no constitutionally prescribed time limit to give
his assent. The President can use his pocket veto if the fall of the government appears imminent.
However, he has to act as per the advice of the new government and cannot take his own
decision if the current government falls. Pocket veto was first exercised by the President Giani
Zail Singh with respect to the Indian Postal Bill which was passed by the Rajiv Gandhi
government. Subsequently, the new government withdrew the bill in 1989.

STATE BILLS:-
Certain state bills need the previous consent of the president and he posses absolute veto power
with respect to some types of state bills. The US President does not have such powers as USA is
having truly federal structure.
So though both President have veto power more or less they have to use it with responsibility to
upheld the constitutional provisions.8

UNITED KINGDOM:-

In the United Kingdom, the British monarch has two methods of vetoing a law. Any bill passed
by the House of Commons and the House of Lords becomes law only when formally approved
by the monarch (or his official representative), in a procedure known as royal consent. Legally,
the monarch can deny that consent by vetoing the account. This power was last exercised in 1708

 Ackerman, Bruce (2011). The Decline and Fall of the American Republic. Harvard University Press. p. 222.
7

8
Manual of the Legislature of New Jersey. 210. 2003. p. 358, 359.

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by Queen Anne to block the Scottish militia bill of 1708. The method is now generally
considered obsolete and royal consent is a formality.9

The monarch has additional veto powers over bills that affect the monarch's royal prerogative or
personal affairs (such as royal income or hereditary property). These projects require the queen's
consent before they are even debated by Parliament, as well as royal consent if they are
approved. The queen's consent is not obsolete and is occasionally withheld, though now only on
the advice of the cabinet. An example was the Military Action Project Against Iraq
(Parliamentary Approval) in 1999, which received a first reading under the Ten Minute Rule, but
the Queen's consent for a second reading was denied.

The House of Lords used to have an effective veto power, refusing to agree with the bills
adopted by the House of Commons. However, reform first by a liberal government and then by a
Labor government limited its powers. Parliament's laws of 1911 and 1949 reduced their powers:
now they can only change and postpone the legislation. They can postpone legislation for up to a
year. According to the 1911 Act, money bills (those relating to finance) cannot be postponed
and, according to the Salisbury Convention, Lords, by convention, cannot postpone any law
established in the ruling party's manifesto.10

AUSTRALIA:-

According to the Australian Constitution (sec. 59), the Queen may veto a bill that has been given
royal assent by the Governor-General within one year of the legislation being assented to. This
power has never been used. The Australian Governor-General himself or herself has, in theory,
power to veto, or more technically, withhold assent to, a bill passed by both houses of
the Australian Parliament, and contrary to the advice of the prime minister. This may be done
without consulting the sovereign as per Section 58 of the constitution:

9
Royal Assent Act,1967.
 Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice (19th ed.), p. 562
10

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When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the Parliament is presented to the Governor-
General for the Queen's assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to this
Constitution, that he assents in the Queen's name, or that he withholds assent, or that he reserves
the law for the Queen's pleasure. The Governor-General may return to the house in which it
originated any proposed law so presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments
which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal with the recommendation.

This reserve power is however, constitutionally arguable, and it is difficult to foresee an occasion

when such a power would need to be exercised. It is possible that a Governor-general might so
act if a bill passed by the Parliament was in violation of the Constitution. One might argue,
however, that a government would be hardly likely to present a bill which is so open to rejection.
Many of the viceregal reserve powers are untested, because of the brief constitutional history of
the Commonwealth of Australia, and the observance of the convention that the head of state acts
upon the advice of his or her chief minister. The power may also be used in a situation where the
parliament, usually a hung parliament, passes a bill without the blessing of the executive. The
governor general on the advice of the executive could withhold consent from the bill thereby
preventing its passage into law.

With regard to the six governors of the states which are federated under the Australian
Commonwealth, a somewhat different situation exists. Until the Australia Act 1986, each state
was constitutionally dependent upon the British Crown directly. Since 1986, however, they are
fully independent entities, although the Queen still appoints governors on the advice of the state
head of government, the premier. So the Crown may not veto (nor the UK Parliament overturn)
any act of a state governor or state legislature. Paradoxically, the states are more independent of
the Crown than the federal government and legislature. State constitutions determine what role a
governor plays. In general the governor exercises the powers the sovereign would have,
including the power to withhold the Royal Assent.11

 Hamer, David (2002) [1994, University of Canberra]. "Curiously ill-defined – the role of the head of state". Can
11

Responsible Government Survive in Australia?.

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SPAIN:-

In Spain, Section 91 of the Constitution provides that the King shall give his assent to laws
passed by the General Courts within 15 days after their final passing by them. The absence of the
royal assent, although not constitutionally provided, would mean the bill did not become a part
of the law. Section 90 of the Constitution states that "Within two months after receiving the text,
the Senate may, by a message stating the reasons for it, adopt a veto or approve amendments
thereto. The veto must be adopted by overall majority."12

EUROPEAN REPUBLICAN SYSTEMS:-

Many European republics allow some form of presidential veto on legislation, which may vary,
according to their constitutional form or by convention. These include France, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine.

The President of Estonia may effectively veto a law adopted by Estonian parliament by

refusing to proclaim it and demanding a new debate and decision. The parliament, in its turn,
may override this veto by passing the law unamended for the second time (a simple majority is
enough). In this case the President is obliged to proclaim the law or to request the Supreme Court
of Estonia to declare the law unconstitutional. If the Supreme Court rules that the law does not
violate the Constitution, the President may not object any more and is obliged to finally proclaim
the law.

The President of France has only a very limited form of suspensive veto: when presented with
a law, he or she can request another reading of it by the Assembly, but only once per law. Aside
from it, the President can only refer bills to the Constitutional Council.

The President of Hungary has two options to veto a bill: submit it to the Constitutional Court if

he suspects that it violates the constitution or send it back to the Parliament and ask for a second

12
Sec 91, The Constitution of Spain.

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debate and vote on the bill. If the Court rules that the bill is constitutional or it is passed by the
Parliament again, respectively, the President must sign it.

The President of Iceland may refuse to sign a bill, which is then put to referendum. This right
was not exercised until 2004, by President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who has since refused to
sign two other bills. The first bill was withdrawn, but the latter two resulted in referenda.

The President of Ireland may refuse to grant assent to a bill that he or she considers to be

unconstitutional, after consulting the Council of State; in this case, the bill is referred to
the Supreme Court, which finally determines the matter. This is the most widely used reserve
power. The President may also, on request of a majority of Seanad Éireann (the upper house of
parliament) and a third of Dáil Éireann (the lower house of parliament), after consulting the
Council of State, decline to sign a bill "of such national importance that the will of the people
thereon ought to be ascertained" in an ordinary referendum or a new Dáil reassembling after a
general election held within eighteen months. This latter power has never been used because the
government of the day almost always commands a majority of the Seanad, preventing the third
of the Dáil that usually makes up the opposition from combining with it.13

The President of Italy may request a second deliberation of a bill passed by Parliament before it

is promulgated. This is a very weak form of veto as the Parliament can override the veto by an
ordinary majority. The same provision exists in France and Latvia. While such a limited veto
cannot thwart the will of a determined parliamentary majority, it may have a delaying effect and
may cause the parliamentary majority to reconsider the matter. The President of Republic can
also call a new election for parliament.

The President of Latvia may suspend a bill for a period of two months, during which it may be
referred to the people in a referendum if a certain number of signatures are gathered. This is
potentially a much stronger form of veto, as it enables the President to appeal to the people
against the wishes of the Parliament and Government.

McCarty, Nolan, ‘Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral
13

Reform?’ The Journal of Politics, 71/2 (April 2009), p. 369

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The President of Poland may submit a bill to the Constitutional Tribunal if he suspects that bill
is unconstitutional or send it back to the Sejm for a second voting. If the Tribunal says that the
bill is constitutional or if Sejm passes it by at least three-fifths of the votes, the President must
sign the bill.

The President of Portugal may refuse to sign a bill or refer it, or parts of it, to

the Constitutional Court. If the President refuses to sign bill without it being declared
unconstitutional, the Assembly of the Republic (parliament) may pass it again, in which case it
becomes law.

The President of Ukraine may refuse to sign a bill and return it to Parliament with his
proposals. If the parliament agrees on his proposals, the President must sign the bill. Parliament
may overturn a veto by a two-thirds majority. If Parliament overturns his veto, the President
must sign the bill within 10 days.14

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS:-

There are few alternatives to the presidential veto power. Most constitutions that provide for a
directly elected president with more than a ceremonial function allow the president to exercise
some form of veto if only in the form of a constitutional or procedural veto, a policy veto that
can be easily overridden or the right to refer legislation to the people in a referendum. If it is
decided not to allow any presidential veto power, while retaining a system of government in
which the president has more than a figurehead or ceremonial function, then it would be
necessary to strengthen the presidency’s other powers, such as dissolution powers and decree-
making powers. In an ethnically, religiously or linguistically divided society, however, it might
be advisable to give veto powers to those who represent particular communities, although
successful examples of this are rare. The Constitution of Cyprus, as originally enacted, provided
for a president from the Greek community and a vice-president from the Turkish community,
each of whom had a veto over legislation in order to protect the vital interests of their respective
communities. In Kosovo, certain classes of legislation concerning the rights, identity and
14
Slezak, Nicole L., The Presidential Veto: A Strategic Asset (Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2007)

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interests of national minorities require approval by a double majority of the legislature,
essentially giving those minorities a veto power that they can use for self-preservation.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY:-

 https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/veto-power/
 https://www.gktoday.in/gk/difference-between-united-states-president-and-indian-president/
 https://www.mitrasias.com/veto-power-of-the-president-of-india/
 http://lawtimesjournal.in/veto-power/
 https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/01/22/robert-craig-could-the-government-advise-the-queen-
to-refuse-royal-assent-to-a-backbench-bill/
 https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/~/~/link.aspx?
_id=9495A9BDD2964D7DB682C13BFA5D4D1A&_z=z
 http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/presidential_veto_powers.pdf

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