Control

Hijacking

Basic Control
Hijacking Attacks
Dan Boneh
 Control hijacking attacks
• Attacker’s goal:
– Take over target machine (e.g. web server)
• Execute arbitrary code on target by
hijacking application control flow

• Examples.
– Buffer overflow attacks
– Integer overflow attacks
– Format string vulnerabilities
Dan Boneh
 Example 1: buffer overflows
• Extremely common bug in C/C++ programs.
– First major exploit: 1988 Internet Worm. fingerd.

Source: web.nvd.nist.gov
Dan Boneh
 What is needed
• Understanding C functions, the stack, and the heap.
• Know how system calls are made
• The exec() system call

• Attacker needs to know which CPU and OS used on the target machine:
– Our examples are for x86 running Linux or Windows
– Details vary slightly between CPUs and OSs:
• Little endian vs. big endian (x86 vs. Motorola)
• Stack Frame structure (Unix vs. Windows)
Dan Boneh
 Linux process memory layout
0xC0000000
user stack
%esp

shared libraries
0x40000000
brk
run time heap
Loaded
from exec unused 0x08048000
0
Dan Boneh
 Stack Frame
high

arguments

return address
stack frame pointer
exception handlers

local variables Stack

callee saved registers Growth
SP low
Dan Boneh
 What are buffer overflows?
Suppose a web server contains a function: void func(char *str) {
char buf[128];
When func() is called stack looks like:
strcpy(buf, str);
do-something(buf);
argument: str }
return address
stack frame pointer

char buf[128]

SP Dan Boneh
 What are buffer overflows?
What if *str is 136 bytes long? void func(char *str) {
After strcpy: char buf[128];
strcpy(buf, str);
do-something(buf);
argument: str }
return address
stack frame pointer
*str Problem:
no length checking in strcpy()
char buf[128]

SP Dan Boneh
Basic stack exploit
high

Suppose *str is such that Program P

after strcpy stack looks like:

Program P: exec(“/bin/sh”)
(exact shell code by Aleph One)
return address

When func() exits, the user gets shell ! char buf[128]

Note: attack code P runs in stack.
low
Dan Boneh
 The NOP slide high
Program P
Problem: how does attacker
determine ret-address?
NOP Slide

Solution: NOP slide

return address
• Guess approximate stack state
when func() is called
• Insert many NOPs before program P:
char buf[128]
nop , xor eax,eax , inc ax
low
Dan Boneh
 Details and examples
• Some complications:
– Program P should not contain the ‘\0’ character.
– Overflow should not crash program before func()
exists.

• (in)Famous remote stack smashing overflows:

– Overflow in Windows animated cursors (ANI). LoadAniIcon()
– Past overflow in Symantec virus detection
test.GetPrivateProfileString "file", [long string]
Dan Boneh
 Many unsafe libc functions
strcpy (char *dest, const char *src)
strcat (char *dest, const char *src)
gets (char *s)
scanf ( const char *format, … ) and many more.

• “Safe” libc versions strncpy(), strncat() are misleading

– e.g. strncpy() may leave string unterminated.

• Windows C run time (CRT):

– strcpy_s (*dest, DestSize, *src): ensures proper termination
Dan Boneh
 Buffer overflow opportunities
• Exception handlers: (Windows SEH attacks)
– Overwrite the address of an exception handler in stack frame.

• Function pointers: (e.g. PHP 4.0.2, MS MediaPlayer Bitmaps)

Heap
buf[128] FuncPtr or
stack
– Overflowing buf will override function pointer.

• Longjmp buffers: longjmp(pos) (e.g. Perl 5.003)

– Overflowing buf next to pos overrides value of pos. Dan Boneh
 Corrupting method pointers
• Compiler generated function pointers (e.g. C++ code)

FP1 method #1
ptr FP2 method #2
FP3
method #3
data vtable

Object T NOP shell

slide code
• After overflow of buf :

data
buf[256] vtable

ptr
object T Dan Boneh
 Finding buffer overflows
• To find overflow:
– Run web server on local machine
– Issue malformed requests (ending with “$$$$$” )
• Many automated tools exist (called fuzzers – next week)
– If web server crashes,
search core dump for “$$$$$” to find overflow location

• Construct exploit (not easy given latest defenses)

Dan Boneh
Control Hijacking

More Control
Hijacking Attacks
Dan Boneh
 More Hijacking Opportunities
• Integer overflows: (e.g. MS DirectX MIDI Lib)
• Double free: double free space on heap
– Can cause memory mgr to write data to specific location
– Examples: CVS server
• Use after free: using memory after it is freed
• Format string vulnerabilities

Dan Boneh
 Integer Overflows (see Phrack 60)
Problem: what happens when int exceeds max value?

int m; (32 bits) short s; (16 bits) char c; (8 bits)

c = 0x80 + 0x80 = 128 + 128 ⇒ c = 0

s = 0xff80 + 0x80 ⇒ s = 0
m = 0xffffff80 + 0x80 ⇒ m = 0

Can this be exploited? Dan Boneh

 An example
void func( char *buf1, *buf2, unsigned int len1, len2) {
char temp[256];
if (len1 + len2 > 256) {return -1} // length check
memcpy(temp, buf1, len1); // cat buffers
memcpy(temp+len1, buf2, len2);
do-something(temp); // do stuff
}

What if len1 = 0x80, len2 = 0xffffff80 ?

⇒ len1+len2 = 0
Second memcpy() will overflow heap !! Dan Boneh
Integer overflow exploit stats
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0 Source: NVD/CVE
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Dan Boneh
Format string bugs

Dan Boneh
 Format string problem
int func(char *user) {
fprintf( stderr, user);
}

Problem: what if *user = “%s%s%s%s%s%s%s” ??

– Most likely program will crash: DoS.
– If not, program will print memory contents. Privacy?
– Full exploit using user = “%n”

Correct form: fprintf( stdout, “%s”, user);

Dan Boneh
 Vulnerable functions
Any function using a format string.

Printing:
printf, fprintf, sprintf, …
vprintf, vfprintf, vsprintf, …

Logging:
syslog, err, warn

Dan Boneh
 Exploit
• Dumping arbitrary memory:
– Walk up stack until desired pointer is found.
– printf( “%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x|%s|”)

• Writing to arbitrary memory:

– printf( “hello %n”, &temp) -- writes ‘6’ into temp.
– printf( “%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%n”)
Dan Boneh
Control Hijacking

Platform Defenses

Dan Boneh
 Preventing hijacking attacks
1. Fix bugs:
– Audit software
• Automated tools: Coverity, Prefast/Prefix.
– Rewrite software in a type safe languange (Java, ML)
• Difficult for existing (legacy) code …

2. Concede overflow, but prevent code execution

3. Add runtime code to detect overflows exploits

– Halt process when overflow exploit detected
– StackGuard, LibSafe, …
Dan Boneh
 Marking memory as non-execute (DEP)
Prevent attack code execution by marking stack and heap as non-executable

• NX-bit on AMD Athlon 64, XD-bit on Intel P4 Prescott

– NX bit in every Page Table Entry (PTE)
• Deployment:
– Linux (via PaX project); OpenBSD
– Windows: since XP SP2 (DEP)
• Visual Studio: /NXCompat[:NO]

• Limitations:
– Some apps need executable heap (e.g. JITs).
– Does not defend against `Return Oriented Programming’ exploits
Dan Boneh
Examples: DEP controls in Windows

DEP terminating a program

Dan Boneh
 Attack: Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
• Control hijacking without executing code
stack libc.so
args
ret-addr exec()
sfp printf()

local buf “/bin/sh”

Dan Boneh
 Response: randomization
• ASLR: (Address Space Layout Randomization)
– Map shared libraries to rand location in process memory
⇒ Attacker cannot jump directly to exec function
– Deployment: (/DynamicBase)
• Windows 7: 8 bits of randomness for DLLs
– aligned to 64K page in a 16MB region ⇒ 256 choices
• Windows 8: 24 bits of randomness on 64-bit processors
• Other randomization methods:
– Sys-call randomization: randomize sys-call id’s
– Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) Dan Boneh
 ASLR Example
Booting twice loads libraries into different locations:

Note: everything in process memory must be randomized

stack, heap, shared libs, base image
• Win 8 Force ASLR: ensures all loaded modules use ASLR Dan Boneh
 More attacks : JiT spraying
Idea: 1. Force Javascript JiT to fill heap with
executable shellcode
2. then point SFP anywhere in spray area

NOP slide shellcode

execute enabled execute enabled

heap
execute enabled execute enabled
vtable

Dan Boneh
Control Hijacking Defenses

Hardening the
executable
Dan Boneh
 Run time checking: StackGuard
• Many run-time checking techniques …
– we only discuss methods relevant to overflow protection

• Solution 1: StackGuard
– Run time tests for stack integrity.
– Embed “canaries” in stack frames and verify their integrity
prior to function return.
Frame 2 Frame 1
top
local canary sfp ret str local canary sfp ret str of
stack
Dan Boneh
 Canary Types
• Random canary:
– Random string chosen at program startup.
– Insert canary string into every stack frame.
– Verify canary before returning from function.
• Exit program if canary changed. Turns potential exploit into DoS.
– To corrupt, attacker must learn current random string.

• Terminator canary: Canary = {0, newline, linefeed, EOF}

– String functions will not copy beyond terminator.
– Attacker cannot use string functions to corrupt stack.
Dan Boneh
 StackGuard (Cont.)
• StackGuard implemented as a GCC patch
– Program must be recompiled

• Minimal performance effects: 8% for Apache

• Note: Canaries do not provide full protection
– Some stack smashing attacks leave canaries unchanged

• Heap protection: PointGuard

– Protects function pointers and setjmp buffers by encrypting them:
e.g. XOR with random cookie
– Less effective, more noticeable performance effects
Dan Boneh
StackGuard enhancements: ProPolice
• ProPolice (IBM) - gcc 3.4.1. (-fstack-protector)
– Rearrange stack layout to prevent ptr overflow.

String args
Growth ret addr Protects pointer args and local
SFP pointers from a buffer overflow

CANARY
Stack local string buffers
Growth local non-buffer variables pointers, but no arrays
copy of pointer args Dan Boneh
 MS Visual Studio /GS [since 2003]
Compiler /GS option:
– Combination of ProPolice and Random canary.
– If cookie mismatch, default behavior is to call _exit(3)
Function prolog: Function epilog:
sub esp, 8 // allocate 8 bytes for cookie mov ecx, DWORD PTR [esp+8]
mov eax, DWORD PTR ___security_cookie xor ecx, esp
xor eax, esp // xor cookie with current esp call @__security_check_cookie@4
mov DWORD PTR [esp+8], eax // save in stack add esp, 8

Enhanced /GS in Visual Studio 2010:

– /GS protection added to all functions, unless can be proven unnecessary
Dan Boneh
 /GS stack frame
args
String
ret addr
Growth Canary protects ret-addr and
SFP exception handler frame
exception handlers
CANARY
Stack local string buffers
Growth local non-buffer variables pointers, but no arrays
copy of pointer args
Dan Boneh
 Evading /GS with exception handlers
• When exception is thrown, dispatcher walks up exception list
until handler is found (else use default handler)

After overflow: handler points to attacker’s code

exception triggered ⇒ control hijack
Main point: exception is triggered before canary is checked
0xffffffff
SEH frame SEH frame

ptr to high
next handler buf next
next handler next handler mem
attack code
Dan Boneh
 Defenses: SAFESEH and SEHOP
• /SAFESEH: linker flag
– Linker produces a binary with a table of safe exception handlers
– System will not jump to exception handler not on list

• /SEHOP: platform defense (since win vista SP1)

– Observation: SEH attacks typically corrupt the “next” entry in SEH list.
– SEHOP: add a dummy record at top of SEH list
– When exception occurs, dispatcher walks up list and verifies dummy
record is there. If not, terminates process.

Dan Boneh
 Summary: Canaries are not full proof
• Canaries are an important defense tool, but do not prevent all
control hijacking attacks:
– Heap-based attacks still possible
– Integer overflow attacks still possible
– /GS by itself does not prevent Exception Handling attacks
(also need SAFESEH and SEHOP)

Dan Boneh
 What if can’t recompile: Libsafe
• Solution 2: Libsafe (Avaya Labs)
– Dynamically loaded library (no need to recompile app.)
– Intercepts calls to strcpy (dest, src)
• Validates sufficient space in current stack frame:
|frame-pointer – dest| > strlen(src)
• If so, does strcpy. Otherwise, terminates application

top
sfp ret-addr dest src buf sfp ret-addr of
stack

Libsafe strcpy main Dan Boneh

 How robust is Libsafe?
low high
memory sfp ret-addr dest src buf sfp ret-addr memory

Libsafe strcpy main

strcpy() can overwrite a pointer between buf and sfp.

Dan Boneh
 More methods …
Ø StackShield
§ At function prologue, copy return address RET and SFP to
“safe” location (beginning of data segment)
§ Upon return, check that RET and SFP is equal to copy.
§ Implemented as assembler file processor (GCC)

Ø Control Flow Integrity (CFI)

§ A combination of static and dynamic checking
§ Statically determine program control flow
§ Dynamically enforce control flow integrity
Dan Boneh
 Control Flow Guard (CFG) (Windows 10)
Poor man’s version of CFI:
• Protects indirect calls by checking against a bitmask of all valid
function entry points in executable

ensures target is
the entry point of a
function

Dan Boneh
 Control Flow Guard (CFG) (Windows 10)
Poor man’s version of CFI:
• Protects indirect calls by checking against a bitmask of all valid
function entry points in executable
• Does not prevent attacker from causing
a jump to a valid wrong function
ensures target is
the entry point of a
function

Dan Boneh
Control Hijacking

Advanced
Hijacking Attacks
Dan Boneh
 Heap Spray Attacks

A reliable method for exploiting heap overflows

Dan Boneh
 Heap-based control hijacking
• Compiler generated function pointers (e.g. C++ code)
FP1 method #1
ptr FP2 method #2
FP3
method #3
data vtable

Object T

• Suppose vtable is on the heap next to a string object:

data
buf[256] vtable

ptr
object T Dan Boneh
 Heap-based control hijacking
• Compiler generated function pointers (e.g. C++ code)
FP1 method #1
ptr FP2 method #2
FP3
method #3
data vtable

Object T shell
code
• After overflow of buf we have:

data
buf[256] vtable

ptr
object T Dan Boneh
 A reliable exploit?
<SCRIPT language="text/javascript">
shellcode = unescape("%u4343%u4343%...");
overflow-string = unescape(“%u2332%u4276%...”);
cause-overflow( overflow-string ); // overflow buf[ ]
</SCRIPT>

Problem: attacker does not know where browser

places shellcode on the heap
???

data
buf[256] vtable shellcode

ptr
Dan Boneh
 Heap Spraying [SkyLined 2004]
Idea: 1. use Javascript to spray heap
with shellcode (and NOP slides)
2. then point vtable ptr anywhere in spray area

NOP slide shellcode

heap
vtable

heap spray area

Dan Boneh
 Javascript heap spraying
var nop = unescape(“%u9090%u9090”)
while (nop.length < 0x100000) nop += nop

var shellcode = unescape("%u4343%u4343%...");

var x = new Array ()

for (i=0; i<1000; i++) {
x[i] = nop + shellcode;
}

• Pointing func-ptr almost anywhere in heap will

cause shellcode to execute.
Dan Boneh
 Vulnerable buffer placement
• Placing vulnerable buf[256] next to object O:
– By sequence of Javascript allocations and frees
make heap look as follows:
free blocks

heap

object O

– Allocate vuln. buffer in Javascript and cause overflow

– Successfully used against a Safari PCRE overflow [DHM’08]

Dan Boneh
 Many heap spray exploits
[RLZ’08]

• Improvements: Heap Feng Shui [S’07]

– Reliable heap exploits on IE without spraying
– Gives attacker full control of IE heap from Javascript Dan Boneh
 (partial) Defenses
• Protect heap function pointers (e.g. PointGuard)

• Better browser architecture:

– Store JavaScript strings in a separate heap from browser heap

• OpenBSD heap overflow protection:

prevents
cross-page
overflows
non-writable pages

• Nozzle [RLZ’08] : detect sprays by prevalence of code on heap

Dan Boneh
 References on heap spraying
[1] Heap Feng Shui in Javascript,
by A. Sotirov, Blackhat Europe 2007

[2] Engineering Heap Overflow Exploits with JavaScript

M. Daniel, J. Honoroff, and C. Miller, WooT 2008

[3] Nozzle: A Defense Against Heap-spraying Code Injection Attacks,

by P. Ratanaworabhan, B. Livshits, and B. Zorn

[4] Interpreter Exploitation: Pointer inference and JiT spraying,

by Dion Blazakis
Dan Boneh
End of Segment

Dan Boneh