Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116615 March 1, 1995

FERDINAND CUNANAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HERMIN E. ARCEO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga; HON. PEDRO M. SUNGA, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Branch 42 of San Fernando, Pampanga; and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 5 April 1991, an information for Murder was filed against petitioner Ferdinand Cunanan before
Branch 46 of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of San Fernando, Pampanga, presided over by Judge
Norberto C. Ponce, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5708.  The Information alleged that
1

petitioner was a member of the Philippine National Police; it contained no averment that he had
committed the offense charged in relation to his public office.  Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty
2

at arraignment and trial proceeded thereafter.  In an Order dated 4 November 1993, the parties
3

having presented their evidence, Judge Arceo required them to submit memoranda, after which the
case was deemed submitted for decision. 4

On 11 March 1994, the Supreme Court promulgated its En Banc Decision in Republic

v. Hon. Asuncion, et a1., 5 which laid down the rule that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction to take cognizance of offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six
(6) years or more or a fine of P6,000.00.

The Supreme Court further held that in the event an Information failed to allege that the accused-
public officer had committed the offense charged in relation to his office, the RTC hearing the
criminal case, pending at the time of the promulgation of the Asuncion rule, shall conduct a
preliminary hearing to determine the existence or absence of this material fact. If this material fact is
found to be present, the RTC shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan for
docketing, and the latter shall proceed to hear the case as if the same had been originally instituted
with it. If it be determined that that fact is absent, the RTC seized with the case shall proceed with
the trial and render judgment on the case. 6

Judge Arceo proceeded to apply these holdings in Criminal Case No. 5708 by conducting a hearing
solely to ascertain if petitioner had committed the offense charged in relation to his office.
7

In an Order dated 21 April 1994, Judge Arceo ruled that on the basis of the evidence adduced during
the trial, petitioner had committed the offense charged while in the performance of his official
functions. He then held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try this case and that, accordingly, any
decision it may render thereon would be null and void. Judge Arceo dismissed Criminal Case No.
5708 "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan," pursuant to the Asuncion ruling. 8

In a further Order dated 23 May 1994, Judge Arceo modified his earlier order and deleted the clause
dismissing the case:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, this case is hereby ordered forwarded to the
Sandiganbayan and the complete records of the same transmitted therewith as if it
was originally filed with the said Court. (Republic vs. Asuncion, G.R. 108208, March
11, 1994).  9

In an Order dated 24 May 1994, upon motion by the prosecution, Judge Arceo inhibited himself from
further hearing the case.   The case was then raffled to the sala of Branch 42, the RTC of San
10

Fernando, Pampanga, co-public respondent Judge Pedro M. Sunga Jr. presiding. 11

In an Order dated 14 July 1994, Judge Sunga denied, among other things, petitioner's Opposition to
the Order directing the transmittal of the records of his (petitioner's) case to the Sandiganbayan. 12

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Judge Sunga in an Order dated 18
August 1994,   he is now before the Supreme Court on certiorari, seeking annulment of the orders of
13

the public respondents calling for the transfer of Criminal Case No. 5708 and transmittal of records
to the Sandiganbayan as products of alleged grave abuse of discretion. 14

Petitioner contends that jurisdiction over the case was fixed in the RTC by the terms of the
Information for Murder dated 5 April 1991, which contained no averment that he had committed the
felony in relation to his office, and that such jurisdiction is not determined by the result of the
evidence presented at the trial. He also cites the Court's pronouncement in Sanchez
v. Hon. Demetriou, et a1.   that the use or abuse of public office does not inhere in the crime of
15

Murder as an element.  16

Petitioner further argues that the RTC judge in Asuncion who had decreed a transfer of the case to
the Sandiganbayan did so when the prevailing case law was Deloso v. Domingo,   which did not
17

require that an Information contain an averment that the accused public officer had committed the
offense charged in relation to his office, before the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance of the
case.   In contrast, the public respondents here had decreed a transfer of the case to
18

the Sandiganbayan when the new, prevailing case law   was already in force and which now
19

requires the presence of such material averment in an Information before a case can be taken
cognizance of by the Sandiganbayan.  20

Moreover, petitioner continues, the Asuncion ruling is inapplicable to the present case, since here
trial had already ended and the case was already submitted for decision when the Asuncion ruling
was promulgated. A transfer of his case to the Sandiganbayan at this late stage will, accordingly,
expose him (petitioner) to double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.   Indeed, petitioner
21

believes Judge Arceo's Order dated 21 April 1994 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged amounts to an acquittal of petitioner.  22

Deliberating upon the present Petition for certiorari, and the Solicitor General's Comment thereon,
the Court considers that petitioner has failed to show grave abuse of discretion, or any act in excess
of or without jurisdiction on the part of public respondent RTC judges, in rendering their assailed
Orders dated 23 May, 14 July and 18 August 1994.
The principal issue posed in this case is whether the public respondent RTC judges had correctly
applied the doctrine laid down in Asuncion to this case, considering that here the absence of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC became apparent to the RTC after completion of the trial and
submission of the case for decision.

Section 4 (a-2) of P.D. No. 1602 as amended by P.D. No. 1861 provides as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation

to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be
tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing provisions, whenever two (2) requisites concur, the offenses mentioned
thereunder fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: (a) the offense
must have been committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty
prescribed for the offense charged is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years or a fine of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00).  23

It is firmly settled that jurisdiction over the offense charged is a matter that is conferred by
law.   Whenever the above two (2) requisites are present, jurisdiction over the offense is vested in
24

the Sandiganbayan. This is true even though the information originally filed before the RTC did not
aver that the accused public officer had committed the offense charged in relation to his office. In
other words, the absence in the old information filed before the RTC of an allegation that petitioner
Cunanan had committed the offense charged in relation to his office, is immaterial insofar as
determination of the locus of jurisdiction is concerned. Indeed, it may be recalled that
the Asuncion ruling involved a situation where the information similarly did not contain an averment
that the accused public officer had committed the offense charged while carrying out his official
duties.   It was precisely to address this situation that the Supreme Court in Asuncion fashioned the
25

rule directing the conduct of a preliminary or separate hearing by a trial court to determine the
presence or absence of that jurisdictional element.

The RTC's initial assumption of jurisdiction over the offense charged in this case did not, therefore,
prevent it from subsequently declaring itself to be without jurisdiction, that lack of jurisdiction having
become apparent from subsequent proceedings in that case.
As noted earlier, here the RTC found after a hearing that petitioner had committed the offense
charged while he was in the performance of his duties as a policeman. Petitioner had shot and killed
the victim in the course of trying to restore local public order which had been breached by a fistfight
between the victim and two other individuals. The RTC said:

The evidence along that line is very clear as shown in the above Findings of Facts
Material to this Incident Only: the fact that the accused was on a mission on that day
at Candaba, Pampanga was not refuted by the prosecution; that he went out of the
Police Station after hearing the commotion and fired a warning shot was a clear
indication that his intention was to restore peace and order disturbed and broken by
the fight between the victim and Rogelio Agustin and later on between the deceased
and Pfc. Efren Bass. Maintenance of peace and order is one of the duties of a
policeman. And, that was what the accused was doing when the deceased was
killed. Thus, it is clear that the offense is intimately connected with the office of the
accused and perpetuated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
Whether or not the said performance is improper or irregular is a matter that could be
determinative of the guilt or innocence but the same at this moment, is
inconsequential for the purpose of determining jurisdiction.

In the light of the above, it is clear that this Court is bereft of any jurisdiction to try and
decide this case and any decision that may be rendered maybe validly assailed as
null and void for want of jurisdiction. 26

In Sanchez v. Demetriou,   the court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
27

committed in relation to [an accused's] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla
v. Hilario,   and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo.   The
28 29

principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation
to the accused's office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a
constituent element of the crime as . . . defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of
the Revised Penal Code." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said
that "although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a
particular case may show that

. . . the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds']

respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no
personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they
not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown
obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan
City.   (Emphases supplied)
30

In the instant case, public office is not, of course, an element of the crime of murder, since murder
may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a private citizen. In the present case,
however, the circumstances quoted above found by the RTC bring petitioner Cunanan's case
squarely within the meaning of an "offense committed in relation to the [accused's] public office" as
elaborated in the Montejo case. It follows that the offense with which petitioner Cunanan is charged
falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and that the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga had no jurisdiction over that offense.

It may be noted, once more, that the absence in the information filed on 5 April 1991 before Branch
46 of the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, of an allegation that petitioner had committed the
offense charged in relation to his office, is immaterial and easily remedied. Respondent RTC judges
had forwarded petitioner's case to the Sandiganbayan, and the complete records transmitted thereto
in accordance with the directions of this Court set out in the Asuncion case: ". . . As if it was
originally filed with [the Sandiganbayan]." That information maybe amended at any time before
arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, and indeed, by leave of court at any time before judgment is
rendered by the Sandiganbayan, considering that such an amendment would not affect the juridical
nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder), the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information,
or the defenses that petitioner may assert before the Sandiganbayan. In other words, the
amendment may be made before the Sandiganbayan without surprising the petitioner or prejudicing
his substantive rights. 31

Finally, the defense of double jeopardy does not become available to petitioner upon transfer of his
case to the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner had not been exposed at all to legal jeopardy by the commencement and trial of Criminal
Case No. 5708 because the RTC was not a court of competent jurisdiction to try the case in the first
place.   Consequently, upon the commencement of this case before the Sandiganbayan petitioner
32

will for the first time be placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense of murder. By the same
token, the dismissal of the Information by the RTC was not equivalent to, and did not operate as an
acquittal of petitioner of that offense. The "dismissal" (later deleted by the RTC) had simply reflected
the fact that the proceedings before the RTC were terminated, the RTC having ascertained that it
had no jurisdiction to try the case at all. 
33

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Orders of the
public respondent RTC Judges dated 23 May, 14 July and 18 August 1994 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 23. The case was apparently later transferred to Branch 43 of the same
RTC, public respondent Judge Hermin E. Arceo presiding.

2 Id.

3 Id., p. 25.

4 Id., p. 26.

5 231 SCRA 211 (1994).

6 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA at 235.

7 Petition, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 14-15.

8 Rollo, pp. 29-31.

9 Id., 32.
10 Id., p. 45.

11 Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 6-7.

12 Rollo, pp. 46-47.

13 Id., pp. 59-61.

14 Id., p. 2.

15 227 SCRA 627 (1993).

16 Petition, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 12-13.

17 191 SCRA 545 (1990).

18 Petition, p. 13; Rollo, p. 14.

19 E.g., Sanchez v. Hon. Demetriou, supra; Natividad v. Felix, 229 SCRA 680

(1994); Republic v. Asuncion, supra.

20 Id.

21 Petition, pp. 15-17; Rollo, pp. 16-18.

22 Id.

23 Aguinaldo v. Domagas, En Banc Resolution of 26 September 1991, p. 5; Sanchez

v. Hon. Demetriou, 227 SCRA at 644-645 (1993); Natividad v. Felix, 229 SCRA at
686-687 (1994).

24 See Andaya v. Abadia, 228 SCRA 705, 717 (1993); Buazon v. Court of Appeals,
220 SCRA 182, 187 (1993); Philippine International Trading Corporation v. M.V.
Zileena, 215 SCRA 309, 313 (1992); Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center-Aqua Culture Department v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206
SCRA 283, 288-289 (1992); People v. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750, 754-756 (1990) and
Calimlim v. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399, 406 (1982).

25 Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA at 34.

26 Order dated 21 April 1994, p. 4; Rollo, p. 30.

27 227 SCRA 627 (1993).

28 90 Phil. 49 (1951).

29 108 Phil. 613 (1960).

30 108 Phil. at 622.

31 See Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court; and People v. Mosende, 228 SCRA 341
(1993); see also People v. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537, 547-548 (1994) and People v.
Amor, 232 SCRA 683, 685 (1994).

32 Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court. See, e.g., Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234

SCRA 175 (1994); People v. Vergara, 221 SCRA 650, 566 (1993); Gorian v.
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, 213 SCRA 138, 144 and 148 (1992); Bogo-
Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Son, 209 SCRA 329 (1992); People v. Puno, 208 SCRA
550, 557-558 (1992).

33 People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722 (1949); Paulin v. Gimenez, 217 SCRA 386 (1993).