G.R. No. 63786-87. April 7, 1993.

UNITED PARACALE MINING COMPANY, INC., AND COCO GROVE, INC., petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, in his capacity as the former Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, Branch 2, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. 70423. April 7, 1993.

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,

as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and PHILZEA MINING & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 73931. April 7, 1993.

JOSEPH V. LOPEZ and MIGUEL C. ANDRADE, petitioners, 

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT MARSMAN & COMPANY, INC. and UNITED
PARACALE MINING COMPANY, INC., respondents.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez and Gatmaitan for United Paracale and Coco Grove, Inc.

Pedro A. Venida for respondents in G.R. 63786-87 and petitioners in G.R. 73931.

J.V. Natividad & Associates for Zambales Chromite.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE; PROPER ONLY WHEN

THERE IS DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE; CASE AT BAR. — The view of the
petitioner that by virtue of the registration of the mining claims under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 624, the mining claims became private property and thereby brought outside the control and
supervision of the Director of Mines is without legal basis. The abovecited law does not distinguish
between private property and lands of the public domain. The provision of law involved is clear and
is not susceptible to interpretation. A condition sine qua non before the court may construe or
interpret a statute is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. Section 7 of P.D. 1281 quoted
above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Mines is clear. Time and
again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. [Cebu
Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 35 SCRA 708 (1968)] Where the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice
but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. [Chartered Bank Employees Association vs. Ople, 138
SCRA 273 (1985)].

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDICIAL RELIEF; NOT A VESTED RIGHT; A MERE
STATUTORY PRIVILEGE, NOT A PROPERTY RIGHT. — There can be no vested right in a judicial
relief for this is a mere statutory privilege and not a property right. The distinction between statutory
privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in statutory
privileges. The state may change or take away rights which were created by the law of the state,
although it may not take away property which was vested by virtue of such rights.(16A Am. Jur. 2d,
pp. 652-653) Besides, the right to judicial relief is not a right which may constitute vested right
because to be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future
enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand or legal exemption from
a demand made by another. (National Carloading Corporation v. Phoenix-E1 Paso Express, Inc.,
cited in 16A Am, Jur. 2d, p. 651) Definitely, the judicial relief herein referred to by the petitioner does
not fall under any of these.

3. CIVIL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1214; A VALID EXERCISE OF THE SOVEREIGN

POWER OF THE STATE AS OWNER OF LAND OF PUBLIC DOMAIN; SUSTAINED IN CASE AT
BAR. — The heart of these twin petitions is the question of constitutionality of P.D. 1214. Unless
P.D. 1214 is successfully assailed, the petitioners will be but mere applicants for the lease of the
mining claims involved and would thus have no causes of action against private respondents. This
question has been resolved by this Court in Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. [156
SCRA 1 (1987), which ruling was reiterated in Zambales Chromite Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido,
Jr., 176 SCRA 602 (1989)] thus: "(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not
unconstitutional.' It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of
the public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the
nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection,
that the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those
claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still
avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral
Development Resources Decree of 1974. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the
affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the public
domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves
the minerals found therein. To rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire
and maintain rights over a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is
contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply
with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim. This, we
cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator
should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in
the located mining claim. Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973
Constitution. The same Constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J p:

The cases herein were consolidated upon the representations of petitioners that they involve the
same issues or questions of law or at the very least, revolve around the same set of facts. A perusal
of the records, however, reveals the contrary. Only two petitions are properly consolidated. Thus, it
behooves Us to discuss the cases separately.

In blatant violation of Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which in part, provides:

"Sec. 2. Contents of the petition — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters
involved, the assignment of errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the
allowance of the petition, . . . (Emphasis Ours.).

"Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth . . ."

this petition devotes nine (9) pages under the subtitle "Summary statement of the matters involved"
to a discussion of matters off tangent from the real issues in the case. Definitely, the question of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing an order suspending hearing pending the resolution of their motion to
dismiss, does not involve the Philippine Bill of 1902, Executive Order No. 141, much less P.D. 1214.
The counsel for petitioners even discussed pending cases in this Court (G.R. No. 63786 - 87 and
69203) which have completely nothing to do with the instant petition except for the fact that the
parties therein are being represented by the same counsel as in this petition. In several pleadings
subsequent to their petition, petitioners insisted that the proceedings in the court below must be
restrained until this Court resolves the pending cases abovecited. For this reason this case was
consolidated thereto.

A summary of the real matters involved in this petition is found in the respondent Court's decision, to
wit:

"This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Regional Trial Court, Branch XL, in
Camarines Norte from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5148 and to disqualify
the respondent judge from acting in that case. The case was brought by the respondents Marsman
and Co., Inc. and United Paracale Mining, Inc., to enjoin the petitioners, Joseph V. Lopez and Miguel
Andrade, from entering and conducting mining operations within the "McDonald" and "San Antonio"
Tunnels in Paracale, Camarines Norte, in which the private respondents have mining claims
("Tulisan," "Santa Marta," "California," and "Rocky Mountain Fraction"). On December 11, 1984 the
RTC issued a restraining order against the petitioners.

On December 12 the petitioners filed their answer alleging that, in accordance with PD 1214, the
private respondents had forfeited their right to the mining claims. They likewise argued that in view of
PD 605, the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. On the same day the petitioners moved
for the disqualification of the respondent judge of the RTC, claiming (sic) that in issuing the
restraining order of December 11, 1984, he showed his "bias, prejudice and personal hatred of and
hostility to the [petitioners'] counsel [Atty. Pedro A. Venida]."

On December 24, 1984 the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on their defense that
the RTC lacked jurisdiction under PD 605 to issue a temporary restraining order or injunction in
cases involving or growing out of the action of administrative officials on the applications for permits
for the disposition, exploitation, utilization, or exploration or development of the natural resources.
Accordingly the RTC, in its order of September 5, 1985, suspended the hearing of the case until the
resolution of the petitioners' motion to dismiss. It is at this point that the present petition was filed." 1

The respondent Court denied this petition on grounds that: (1) the questions being raised are not
proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but rather defenses which should be raised in the
action itself; (2) the question of jurisdiction which has yet to be resolved by the trial court pending
resolution of the motion to dismiss is prematurely raised; and (3) there was no basis for determining
whether or not the judge must be disqualified. 2

The review of this decision is what is on appeal before.

We refuse to be persuaded by the petitioners that the RTC must be enjoined from exercising its
jurisdiction in settling the case presented before it for the reason that the constitutionality of the law
involved in the said case is being questioned before this Court. This case should have been
disposed of independently of the other petitions herein.

The respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. Neither did it commit grave abuse
of discretion as what petitioners want this Court to believe. The petitioners fail to point out any
assigned error which the respondent Court had supposedly committed but simply narrate the action
taken by it. Much less have they stated the reasons relied upon for the allowance of the instant
petition. For being insufficient in substance and in form, the instant petition lacks merit and must be
dismissed.

G.R. No. 70423

This is a petition involving the question of jurisdiction of regular courts in cases which had been
placed under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines under P.D. 1281.

This petition seeks to reverse the order of then Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Hon. Alfredo L. Benipayo, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner herein on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, citing Section 7 of P.D. 1281 and the doctrine enunciated in Twin Peaks Mining
Association, et al. vs. Navarro, 3 that an action for the enforcement of mining contracts, in this case
cancellation of a mining contract, is outside the competence of regular courts in view of the law cited.
4

The complaint filed with the then CFI of Manila, Branch XVI, was one for the rescission of its mining
contract with herein private respondent on grounds of violations of the terms and conditions thereof,
with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The trial
court, however, upon motion of the defendant therein, dismissed the case.

Petitioner wants Us to construe Section 7 of P.D. 1281 as applicable only to mineral lands forming
part of the public domain and not to mining claims located and registered under Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 624 as is its case.

Section 7 of P.D. 1281 reads as follows:

Sec. 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnerships or
persons engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder thereof with
several mining operators;

(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an operating agreement has not
been placed into actual operations within the period stipulated therein; and

(c) cancellation and/or reinforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to aside by the terms and conditions thereof.

All actions and decisions of the Director of Mines on the above cases are subject to review, motu
proprio or upon appeal by any person aggrieved thereby, by the Secretary of Natural Resources
whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with the applicable
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 309 and Letter of Instructions Nos. 119 and 135.

The view of the petitioner that by virtue of the registration of the mining claims under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 624, the mining claims became private property and thereby brought outside
the control and supervision of the Director of Mines is without legal basis. The abovecited law does
not distinguish between private property and lands of the public domain. The provision of law
involved is clear and is not susceptible to interpretation. A condition sine qua non before the court
may construe or interpret a statute is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. 5 Section 7 of
P.D. 1281 quoted above defining the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Mines is
clear. Time and again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application. 6 Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it
says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. 7

This Court in Benguet Corporation vs. Leviste, 8 made these pronouncements:

"We grant the petition. Presidential Decree No. 1281 which took effect on January 16, 1978 vests
the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or
applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof, including
mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned. To
effectively discharge its task as the Government's arm in the administration and disposition of
mineral resources, Section 7 of P.D. 1281 confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Analyzing the objective of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section 7 thereof, the Court in Twin Peaks
Mining Association, the case relied upon by petitioner, noted that the trend is to make the
adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. This observation was reiterated in the
more recent case of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."

The petitioner further argues that to hold that P.D. 1281 retroactively applies to its mining claims
which according to it is private property would constitute impairment of vested rights since by shifting
the forum of the petitioner's case from the courts to the Bureau of Mines, as urged by private
respondent, the substantive rights to full protection of its property rights shall be greatly impaired and
prejudiced. The judicial relief available for the redress of private property rights violated, now being
enjoyed by petitioner shall be lost altogether.

This argument does not merit Our approval. There can be no vested right in a judicial relief for this is
a mere statutory privilege and not a property right. The distinction between statutory privileges and
vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The
state may change or take away rights which were created by the law of the state, although it may not
take away property which was vested by virtue of such rights. 9 Besides, the right to judicial relief is
not a right which may constitute vested right because to be vested, a right must have become a title,
legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future
enforcement of a demand or legal exemption from a demand made by another. 10 Definitely, the
judicial relief herein referred to by the petitioner does not fall under any of these.

The case at bar falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, hence, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. Nos. 63786-87

In these petitions filed by petitioners United Paracale Mining Company, Inc. and Coco Grove, Inc.,
petitioners seek to set aside the Order of dismissal of the case they filed with the trial court for the
ejectment of their respective defendants from the mining claims which were allegedly privately
owned by them having been located and perfected under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 624.
The heart of these twin petitions is the question of constitutionality of P.D. 1214. Unless P.D. 1214 is
successfully assailed, the petitioners will be but mere applicants for the lease of the mining claims
involved and would thus have no causes of action against private respondents.

This question has been resolved by this Court in Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. 11
thus:

"(W)e hold that Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. ** It is a valid exercise of the
sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's mining
claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a
valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining
claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had failed
to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25)
lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.

Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be
locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To rule
otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a located
mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the intention of the
lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual
work and improvements in the located mining claim.

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution which states:

'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands
of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploration, development, and exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant.'

The same Constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
declares:

'All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State . . .'"

Notwithstanding Our ruling , in favor of the constitutionality of P.D. 1214, petitioners contend that
having filed mining lease applications on the mining claims they have previously located and
registered under then existing laws, pursuant to the requirements of this Presidential Decree, and
despite the waiver of their rights to the issuance of mining patents therefor (emphasis theirs), they
cannot be placed in equal footing with those who forfeit all rights by virtue of non-filing of an
application within the prescribed period such that they (petitioners) have no causes of action against
private respondents.
We are not persuaded by this contention.

Although We may agree that those who filed their mining lease applications have better rights than
those who forfeited all their right by not filing at all, this, however, does not amount to any vested
right which could be the basis for their cause of action against herein private respondents. What is
precisely waived is their right to the issuance of a mining patent upon application. This in effect
grants the government the power, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to award the patent to the
applicant most qualified to explore, develop and exploit the mineral resources of the country in line
with the objectives of P.D. 463, and not necessarily to the original locator of the mining claim. To
sustain their contention that they can question the award of mining patents to applicants other than
them would put to naught the objectives of P.D. 1214 as enunciated in its WHEREAS clauses.

We agree with the trial court that with the waiver of their right to the issuance of a mining patent
upon their application for a mining lease, their status is reduced to a mere applicant, their only
advantage over the others is the fact that they have already conducted explorations at the site and
this exploration may he ongoing. But still, this credential, so to speak, is not intended to tie the hands
of the government so as to prevent it from awarding the mining patent to some other applicants,
which in its belief may he more qualified than them.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 73931 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; the Order of
dismissal assailed in G.R. No. 70423 is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby likewise DISMISSED;
the Order of dismissal assailed in G.R. Nos. 63786-87 is AFFIRMED and these petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs.