OH CHO V.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS


G.R. NO. 48321. AUGUST 31, 1946
PADILLA, J:
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in
the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas, in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and
on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to the filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. (Carino v.
Insular Government) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicant is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under the
provisions of the Public Land Act (C. A. No. 141).
HELD:
No. Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain (Sections 48, 49, C. A. No. 141).
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had
they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his
immediate predecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have
been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
predecessors in interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they
could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The
condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in
possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in
interest failed to do.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without
costs.

 CARIÑO V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

212 U.S. 449. FEBRUARY 23, 1909
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES:
FACTS:
The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land
lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the
findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had
lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according to the
custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His
father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for
pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had
inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom. No document
of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and again in
1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems
to have come of it. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the
mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only
a possessory title, it is said.
The proceeding for registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in
principle. It is a proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens Act.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not that even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because
the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among
others from its operation.
2. Whether or not the plaintiff owns the land.
HELD:
1. No. Act No. 926 deals with the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase,
etc., and the perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he
now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission's Act No.
496, of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout the
Philippine Archipelago," and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons
claiming to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the applicant does. He is entitled to
registration if his claim of ownership can be maintained.
2. Yes. The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in his
argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it
does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere
trespasser when the present government seized his land.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United
States. Our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the
natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all
the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered "for the
benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
When, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly, in a case like
this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt.
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof
that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty
clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the
Philippines into trespassers, or even into tenants at will.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal
lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with the
usual theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by
competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects,
those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. It does not
appear that this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. The applicant's possession
was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was
made.
The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of
adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought, should not
be construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the
applicant never was disturbed.
We are of opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he
seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom
he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of
Spain.

 ALANGILAN REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. NO. 180471. MARCH 26, 2010
NACHURA, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Barangays Alangilan and Patay
in Batangas City (Alangilan landholding). On August 7, 1996, petitioner filed an Application
and/or Petition for Exclusion/Exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) Coverage of the Alangilan landholding with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). It averred that, in 1982, the subject
landholding was classified as reserved for residential.
The DAR Secretary noted that, as of February 15, 1993, the Alangilan landholding remained
agricultural, reserved for residential. It was classified as residential-1 only on December 12,
1994. The qualifying phrase reserved for residential means that the property is still classified
as agricultural, and is covered by the CARP.
The previous zoning ordinance, i.e. the Batangas City Zoning Ordinance approved under HSRC
Resolution No. R-92, series of 1982, dated 6 October 1982, classified the said landholding as
"Agricultural, Reserved for Residential." It was Ordinance No. 3, series of 1994 that explicitly
classified the area as "Residential- 1."
On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision of the DAR Secretary. On
August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA noted the report of MARO, Provincial
Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), and Regional Agrarian Reform Office (RARO) that the Alangilan
landholding was devoted to agricultural activities prior to the effectivity of the CARP on June
15, 1988 and even thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner's Alangilan landholding is subject to the coverage of the
comprehensive agrarian reform law, notwithstanding that the property has been converted to
non-agricultural uses by the zoning ordinance of the city of Batangas prior to the law.
HELD:
Yes. Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL.
These include lands previously converted into non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of
the CARL on June 15, 1988.
It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for
residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. In this case, petitioner failed
to establish that the subject landholding had already been converted into residential use prior
to June 15, 1988. We also note that the subject landholding was still being utilized for
agricultural activities at the time of the filing of the application for exemption.
Not having been converted into, or classified as, residential before June 15, 1988, the
Alangilan landholding is, therefore, covered by the CARP. The subsequent reclassification of
the landholding as residential-1 in 1994 cannot place the property outside the ambit of the
CARP, because there is no showing that the DAR Secretary approved the reclassification.

 JOSE LUIS ROS V. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. NO. 132477. AUGUST 31, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J:
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban,
Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal Council of Balamban,
Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. As part of their preparation for the
development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary
permits and appropriate government certifications. DAR was disallowing the conversion of the
subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and desist from further
developments on the land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the Municipality
of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or
the Local Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has the effect of taking such lands out of the
coverage of the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR.
HELD:
No. After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of
conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already
reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion.
As held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, the subject landholding was merely reclassified.
Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use
of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands
shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use
conversion.
Municipal Ordinance No. 101 of Balamban, Cebu, which reclassified the subject lands, was
passed on 25 March 1992, and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu,
which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April 1995, long after Rep. Act
No. 6657 has taken effect.
We reiterate the view that with respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A.
No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversions may be
exercised from the date of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988 (Advincula-Velasquez v.
Court of Appeals).
The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act No.
6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government
Code. The Code explicitly provides that "nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.