02 Lopez - v. - Senate - of - The - Philippines PDF

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 163556. June 8, 2004.]
CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. SENATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES [represented by Franklin Drilon, President of
the Senate], HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
Gentlemen :
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc June
8, 2004.
G.R. No. 163556 — CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ v. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES [represented by Franklin Drilon, President of the Senate],
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.
Before the Court is a Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify
Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress, dated
May 28, 2004, creating a Joint Committee which shall preliminarily canvass the
votes of the candidates for President and Vice-President during the May 10, 2004
elections.
At the outset, the Court stresses that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this controversy, because the herein Petition contains sufficient allegations
claiming violations of the Constitution. Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the initiatory pleading, like the complaint or
petition.
However, after careful deliberation on the merits of the Petition and the
Comments filed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, Speaker Jose C. De
Venecia and the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
the Petition on the ground that it failed to show that Congress gravely abused its
discretion in creating such Joint Committee.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress "to
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates." In Arroyo v. De
Venecia (277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997), the Court ruled that it had no power
to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of
the Constitution. Likewise, Santiago v. Guingona, (298 SCRA 756, November 18,
1998) held that the Court — under the doctrine of separation of powers — has
"no authority to interfere" in the "exclusive realm" of a co-equal branch, absent a
showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has no authority to restrict or
limit the exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the Constitution.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot
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be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their
congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the
decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval
of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately (See Sections
19, 23, 24 and 27 of the Rules).
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(As above-worded, the foregoing Resolution was approved unanimously, 14 to 0,
by the Court. In addition, individual opinions, copies of which are attached
hereto, were written by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.; Justice Reynato S.
Puno, joined by Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
who concurs in a Separate Opinion, and Adolfo S. Azcuna; Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing; Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales; Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and
Justice Dante O. Tinga.) DHATcE
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In his petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on 2 June 2004, Ruy Elias C.
Lopez, Representative representing the 3rd Legislative District of the City of
Davao, asks this Court to declare unconstitutional the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections (hereafter, Canvassing
Rules), which the Senate and the House of Representatives, in joint session,
approved, after much debate, on 28 May 2004.
Petitioner alleges that the Canvassing Rules was adopted by both Houses of
Congress with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other
than this petition. He requests the Court to issue a temporary restraining order
directing Respondents to cease and desist from implementing, executing, and/or
enforcing the Canvassing Rules.
In the resolution of 4 June 2004, the Court, by a unanimous vote, denied the
application for a temporary restraining order, and by a vote of 9-4 required
Respondents and the Solicitor General to comment on the petition by 12 noon on
Monday, 7 June 2004. The Senate, the House of Representatives and the Office
of the Solicitor General seasonably filed their separate comments.
The prefatory statement of petitioner summarizes the main arguments found
throughout his petition:
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three (3) independent branches of government. The
very important and delicate power and authority to open all certificates of
canvass of votes for Presidential and Vice-Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Candidates are solely and exclusively vested by the
Constitution in the President of the Senate, just as the very important and
delicate power and authority to determine the authenticity and due
executions (sic) of all certificates of canvass and to canvass the votes
cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely and
exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Congress as one whole
body." Any attempt to delegate these powers or a portion thereof to any
other person or entity — whether within or without the Congress — is
unconstitutional on the principle that potestas delegata non potest
delegari. 1
Petitioner thus contends that the Canvassing Rules are unconstitutional because:
1) It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of
Congress; 2) It constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; 3) It deprives him of his rights and prerogatives as a Member of
Congress; and 4) By the passage of the Canvassing Rules, Congress has
neglected to perform an act which the Constitution specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office.
The arguments of respondents, the Solicitor General, the Senate, and the House
of Representatives, are similar in that they agree that the adoption of the
Canvassing Rules are internal matters of Congress which is beyond this Court's
scope of judicial inquiry. They are likewise unanimous in their argument that
there has been no invalid delegation to the Joint Committee of the Constitutional
duties of Congress.
This Court's jurisdiction over the issue raised in this case is founded on Section 1
of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that judicial power includes the
duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government". This duty does not do away with the
"political question" doctrine. It only clarifies it by limiting it to its definition laid
down in Tañada v. Cuenco. 2 That case defines political questions as those "which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government." The clarification became
necessary because prior to the 1987 Constitution, as long as an act or measure
was invoked as involving a political question, the courts affirmed such invocation
rather than risk the separation of powers. The result, then, was that the legality
of an act or measure was likewise left to the political branch in question. 3
Thus, now plainly stated in the 1987 Constitution, the mere invocation of a
political question does not warrant an immediate or summary dismissal of a
case. It falls, as it always has, within judicial power to determine for itself
whether the legality and the limits of the exercise of a power have been
observed and respected.
The contested provisions of the Canvassing Rules pertain to the functions of the
Joint Committee, as follows:
SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)
members from the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate
and eleven (11) members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of Each House panel shall elect
from among themselves their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two division of
eleven (11) members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members
from the Senate and five (5) members from the House of
Representatives: Provided, That a member of Congress who is a
candidate for President or Vice-President shall not be eligible for
appointment to the Joint Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a
Chairman of the Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes
of candidates for the offices of the President and Vice-President.
The Representatives of the province or city whose certificate of canvass

is being canvassed shall be an ex officio member of the Joint Committee,
without voting rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certificate of canvass.
It is petitioner's position that the formation of a Joint Committee, which

determines the authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass of
the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates and thereafter canvasses the
votes, is a transfer or surrender to an entity of a duty imposed by the
Constitution exclusively upon Congress as a whole body — that is, "in joint public
session assembled." 4 Accordingly, petitioner claims that such transfer violates
the principle that a delegated power cannot again be delegated, 5 potestas
delegata non delegari potest.
The source of the duty of Congress to act as the National Board of Canvassers for
the office of the President and Vice-President is in paragraph 4, Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes. caTESD
It is true that where the Constitution has vested powers in a branch of

government there can be no further delegation of such authority by that branch
to any other body. Originating from the law on agency, the principle has evolved
in Constitutional law as a natural corollary to the separation of governmental
powers. 6 Thus, the foundation of the principle of potestas delegata non delegari
potest in Constitutional law lies in the sovereignty that resides in the people
from which all governmental authority emanates. 7 It is invoked as a prohibition
against the three major branches of government — the executive, legislative, or
the judiciary — from transferring the powers and duties conferred by the people
upon it to another branch; neither does it allow any branch to invest in itself or
its members the powers and duties belonging to another. 8
Moreover, there is no distinction as to what kind of power is delegated by the
Constitution. Although the three branches of government each have its general
functions in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, the system of
checks and balances imposes upon each branch — or its members — powers
outside of its usual functions. 9 Thus, even when the legislature is performing a
non-legislative act as a National Board of Canvassers, its inability to delegate
such function to another branch of government remains intact.
In this context, the principle does not apply in this case insofar as no other
branch of government has been tasked with the duties of Congress as a National
Board of Canvassers.
As to whether there has been are invalid delegation of power "within" Congress,
such argument, and the basis of petitioner's discussion, is an imprudent one.
From a cursory reading of the Canvassing Rules, it can readily be seen that there
has been no delegation or abdication of any Constitutional authority, even within
Congress itself. Key provisions throughout the Canvassing Rules reveal the
nature of the Joint Committee and its relation to the duties of Congress, whether
referring to the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass or the canvassing of the votes itself. Some of these
provisions, however, are conveniently omitted by petitioner in his arguments.
For one, Section 19 thereof provides: SCEDaT
Sec. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall decide
any question involving the Certificate of Canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall be
subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and House of
Representatives voting separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the
decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation with the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shall prevail." [Emphasis supplied]
As to the canvassing of votes, paragraph 2, of Sec. 13, provides that "[t]he

Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of
candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President." And again, in Sec.
23, the final report of the Joint Committee "shall be submitted by the Joint
Committee en banc to the joint public session for its approval, each House
voting separately."
Further, in Section 27, we find that:
Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the Joint Committee
report and the accompanying resolution by majority of all the Members
of both. Houses voting separately in the joint public session, Congress
through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall forthwith proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-
President-elect. [Emphasis supplied]
Since the Canvassing Rules subjects the acts of the Joint Committee to the
affirmation of Congress, the Committee's report is preliminary and
recommendatory in nature.
The Canvassing Rules leaves to both Houses of Congress, as an entire body, the
The Canvassing Rules leaves to both Houses of Congress, as an entire body, the
final act of determining the authenticity in the manner provided by law, and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, and the proclamation of the President-
elect and Vice-President-elect.
Anent to his argument that the Canvassing Rules is an unlawful delegation of
power, petitioner claims that the creation of the Joint Committee deprives him of
his rights and prerogatives as a member of Congress to be present during the
canvassing of genuine certificates of canvass, and to participate in its
deliberations. He argues that by excluding him from the proceedings, the
Canvassing Rules likewise deprives his constituents — the sovereign people — of
representation and a voice in the affairs of government.
Unfortunately, petitioner once again relies on his misreading of the Canvassing
Rules. The fact that the findings of the Joint Committee are subject to a final act
of Congress, then, by casting his vote and declaring his approval or disapproval of
the final report, petitioner exercises his prerogatives as a Member of Congress.
By claiming a sovereign duty to be present in all stages of the proceedings,
petitioner confuses his rights as a Member of the Congress with the powers
given to Congress itself.
Under the Constitution, it is Congress that, in accordance with the law and its
rules, canvasses the certificates of canvass certified by the Boards of Canvassers
of provinces and cities after determining their authenticity and due execution in
the manner provided by law. Being a member of Congress, his participation is
likewise determined by the internal rules of congressional proceedings, and, in
general, is determined by his vote. The quality of his participation is determined
by such means as Congress deems fit to ensure the use of discretion when his
vote is cast.
As for the Canvassing Rules itself, petitioner's third argument is that Congress
amends the Constitution by investing itself with powers beyond what was
granted therein. He cites the three constitutional functions of Congress as a
National Board of Canvassers: 1) the opening by the President of the Senate of
all the certificates of canvass in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives in joint public session; 2) the determination of the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass; and 3) the canvassing of votes
based on said certificates. It is his observation that with the enumeration of
these three duties, the Constitutional mandate is specific, thereby foreclosing the
need for implementing or procedural rules. The argument is bereft of merit. DCcHIS
The authority of Congress to adopt its own rules of procedure under par. (3), Sec.
16, Art. VI 10 is a right that has been recognized to apply regardless of whether
Congress is exercising its legislative power or its other duties, such as in this case
when it acts as the National Board of Canvassers. 11
Here, apart from the general authority of Congress to promulgate its internal
rules, the Constitution itself specifically leaves it to Congress to determine the
conditions and procedures of fulfilling its duty as a National Board of Canvassers.
The sixth paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, plainly and
clearly states: "The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing
of certificates."
The reason for the insertion of this provision, and its relation to the
determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass, was likewise explained during the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission.
MR. DAVIDE:
On page 2, between lines 22 and 23, I propose to insert a new

paragraph to read as follows: CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS
RULES FOR THE CANVASSING OF THE CERTIFICATES.
MR. SUMULONG:
Will Commissioner Davide repeat the proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE:
CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE CANVASS OF THE

CERTIFICATES.
THE PRESIDENT:
Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO:
For the benefit of the other Commissioners, will Commissioner Davide

explain this proposal?
MR. DAVIDE:
This is necessary in order that Congress will have the authority now to
promulgate the necessary rules for the canvassing of the
certificates of canvass for the Offices of the President and the Vice-
President.
MR. REGALADO:
How will that tie up with line 16 regarding the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass in the
manner provided by law?
MR. DAVIDE:
That is entirely a different matter, Madam President, because it would

relate to the rules concerning the determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof, whereas the other one would be the
rules of procedure. 12 [Emphasis supplied]
As regards the determination of authenticity and due execution of the

certificates of canvass, the scope of the duty of Congress is to be defined by a
law to be enacted by it. This was made clear during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explaining the inclusion of this provision in the 1987
Constitution, thus:
MR. MAAMBONG. . . . The Committee had to insert the phrase "in the
manner provided by law" so that the legislature itself will find out and will
make it very specific as to what flaws or deficiencies in the certificates of
canvass can be taken cognizance of by the canvassing board of tellers,
because as of now the guiding regulations that govern the National
Assembly, as I mentioned in the Committee, are: the rules and regulations
of the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election Code, the jurisprudence from the
decisions of the Supreme Court. All these things taken together, the
legislature is given a notice by using the phrase "in the manner provided
by law," so that it will make a determination now of what are the points
which the board of tellers can take cognizance of, because it is not very
clear right now under the laws and regulations, and as a matter of fact,
that was one of the controversies which arose during the canvassing of
the votes of President Aquino and former President Marcos in the last
Batasan. 13 [Emphasis supplied]
The law referred to is R.A. No. 7166, 14 which was enacted on 26 November
1991. Section 30 thereof provides the flaws over which Congress would take
cognizance, as well as the manner by which it would do so, thus:
Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the
Election of President and Vice-President: Determination of
Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. —
Congress shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificate of canvass for President and Vice-President as accomplished
and transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing
that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and
thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers
and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2)
each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for
President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and
in figures; and (3) there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies
of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate
in words and figures in the certificate. TcaAID
When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of

canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete,
the Senate President shall require the board of canvassers concerned to
transmit by personal delivery, the election returns from polling places that
were not included in the certificate of canvass and supporting
statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery
within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement

of votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt
as to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect
the result of the election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-
Presidential candidate concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole
purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and
Vice-President, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the
election returns submitted to it.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, therefore, whether Congress deems it fit to

require its entire membership to examine each certificate of canvass, raise their
comments and objections thereto, or engage in parliamentary debate before
reaching its conclusions, or else leave preliminary matters to be discussed and
argued according to different rules, must be left to the wisdom of Congress. So
long as the ultimate power to canvass remains lodged in the body tasked to
perform it, congressional rules adopted to address matters of expediency or the
orderly conduct of proceedings is precisely the purpose of such rules. 15
Congress remains the body exercising its canvassing duties, and delegating
preliminary determinations to expedite proceedings. Where the rules of
Congress have thus been passed within the limits of constitutional and legal
boundaries, everything else remains internal and procedural, and to which
petitioner is bound. As procedural rules, "[t]hey may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body.' Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. 16
In claiming that the creation of a Joint Committee is an unlawful delegation of
authority, petitioner asserts that the determination of the authenticity and due
execution of certificates is a function that requires the exercise of discretion on
the part of the individual members of Congress. He implies that a ministerial
function can be delegated whereas the determination of the authenticity and
due execution, being more than ministerial, cannot. The distinction is facetious
since petitioner argues throughout his petition that none of the duties of
Congress under par. 4, Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution can be delegated
"whether within or without" Congress.
On the contrary, respondents argue extensively that the nature of canvassing, as
well as determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass, are ministerial functions, which can be delegated in any case.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary function was amply cited
in the Comment of Respondent Senate:
Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law of acting officially, under certain
circumstances, according to the dictates of their judgments and
consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of others. A
purely ministerial act of duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon
a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." 17
Referring, once again, to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: SHEIDC
MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of the

authenticity and due execution thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2,
referring to the certificates of canvass of the President and Vice-
President. Am I right if I say that because of the use of these
words, the duty of the legislature to canvass is no longer
ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:

Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been interpreted by
the Supreme Court as applicable to the canvass made by the
National Assembly, and the reason why we did not put the word
"ministerial" in the Article is, it has been understood in the case of
Lopez v. Roxas and in other cases. When we used the words
"authenticity" and "genuineness," the question refers to the
problem of whether or not the ministerial function is already
nonministerial. The answer is, it is still ministerial but when we say
"authenticity and "due execution," what it really means is that the
National Assembly will look at the certificates of canvass and find
out from the face of the document whether there are flaws in the
execution and authenticity of the document. That is what it means.
MR. NOLLEDO:
Madam President, in the event that the legislature finds out that there are
serious defects in the certificates of canvass — as when the seals
are broken, there are a lot of erasures and then many of them are
unsigned and, therefore, authenticity appears to be questionable —
what will happen?
MR. REGALADO:
The answer to that is in the phrase "in the manner provided by law. . . ."
18 [Emphasis supplied] TIcAaH
Indeed, the inclusion in the 1987 Constitution of the duty of Congress to be the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of the President and the Vice
President meant that Congress was to have expanded powers. These expanded
powers did not necessarily mean that the nature of the power changed from a
ministerial to a discretionary one. However, nor can the power of Congress to
determine authenticity and due execution of the canvass of votes be deemed
purely ministerial, as whether there has been tampering or not, or, as according
to Sec. 30 of R.A. No. 7166, or determining when there is 'doubt' requires some
degree of discretion.
The distinction made in Lopez v. Roxas 19 was a distinction made between the
duties of Congress and that of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the latter
charged with judging all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, under Section
1, R.A. No. 1793:
Needless to say, the power of congress to declare who, among the
candidates for President and/or Vice-President, has obtained the largest
number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent
with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by
Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely acts as a national board of
canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said
declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial
and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said
duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered
with, or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by
each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto,
pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall
be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has
power to do." 20
Thus, while petitioner correctly maintains that the 1987 Constitution sought to
expand the power of Congress by requiring it to determine the genuineness of
the certificates of canvass, the act of discretion was done upon determining the
rules of authenticity and due execution. That accomplished, the National Board
of Canvassers could only act within the parameters and according to the criteria
specifically provided by the law.
Nevertheless, even if, for purposes of argument, the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass were more than a
ministerial function, the Canvassing Rules, as discussed earlier, does not delegate
nor abdicate such determination to the Joint Committee, nor for that matter any
of the other duties Congress prescribed under Sec. 4, Art. VII. Therefore,
discussion on the accusation against Congress regarding its neglect of duty
because of the adoption of its Canvassing Rules would now be superfluous.
What remains for petitioner, as a member of Congress and a representative of
his constituents, is in the opportunities to make the informed judgments
provided by the Canvassing Rules itself. The Canvassing Rules provides
safeguards, which would enable petitioner to responsibly perform his individual
duty as a Member of Congress and properly represent the interests of his
constituents. A declaration of yea and nay or the raising of hand to express
protest or approval is a diminished prerogative only when it is not exercised with
the full weight of the trust of the people and the powers of reason and
conscience. aTcIAS
Finally, the challenged Canvassing Rules is similar, for the most part, to the
Canvassing Rules for the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election of 1998. 21
That canvassing Rules was unanimously approved by the Senate and the House
of Representatives at its joint session. In attendance at that session were
Senators, same of whom are now incumbent Senators Edgardo Angara, Gregorio
Honasan, Sergio Osmeña III and Vicente Sotto III, 22 and opposition
Representatives Bellaflor Angara-Castillo, Didagen Dilangalen and Rolando
Zamora, among others. 23 Indeed, I cannot understand why an almost the same
Rules is now assailed on constitutional grounds. I cannot likewise understand
why Congress should promulgate separate Canvassing Rules for every
Presidential elections. It should have promulgated one set of Canvassing Rules
for all such elections, thereby ensuring stability and avoiding delays and
confusion in future Presidential elections.
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition for its utter failure to show that the
Rules of the Joint Public Session on Congress on Canvassing the Votes for
Presidential and Vice Presidential abuse of discretion by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint session.
PUNO, J.:
The facts are sparse but sufficient. We held our national election last May 10,
2004. The candidates for President were President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, actor
Fernando Poe, Jr., Senator Panfilo Lacson, former Secretary of Education Raul
Roco, and religious leader Bishop Eddie Villanueva. The candidates for Vice-
President were Senator Noli de Castro, Senator Loren Legarda, former
Congressman Herminio Aquino and Mr. Rodolfo Pajo.
Congress thereafter convened itself in joint session to canvass the results of the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. It approved the Rules of the Joint
Public Session of Congress on Canvassing Votes for the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections. ETAICc
On May 2, 2004, petitioner, a member of the House of Representatives

representing the 3rd Legislative District of the City of Davao, filed the instant
petition for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of a status quo
ante order, temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. He
assailed said Rules as constitutionally infirmed allegedly because they: (1)
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a Joint
Committee of Congress; (2) constitute an unconstitutional amendment of Article
VII, Section 4 of the Constitution; (3) constitute an unconstitutional deprivation
and derogation of his rights and prerogatives as a member of the House of
Representatives; and (4) by the passage of the Rules, Congress has unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the Constitution specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from office.
In their respective Comments, public respondents defended the validity of their
act. The Senate, represented by the President of the Senate, Honorable Franklin
M. Drilon, submits that the Legislature's formulation and implementation of its
own rules affecting its internal operation are beyond the ambit of judicial
scrutiny. And, contrary to petitioner's contention, the Rules are in complete
accord with the Constitution as they do not remove from Congress the power to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
to canvass the votes of the candidates for President and Vice-President, which
power is still reposed in Congress as a whole, nor do they curtail the rights and
prerogatives of any member of Congress to participate in the canvassing. Neither
does the creation of the Joint Committee constitute an undue delegation of a
legislative function since the canvassing of votes is not an exercise of the
legislative function of Congress. In fine, the Senate President believes that the
instant petition is a mere disguised attempt to change the rules and delay the
canvassing of votes. CaTcSA
Respondent House of Representatives, through the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, Honorable Jose C. De Venecia, maintains that the constitutional
grant of the power to canvass the votes for the President and the Vice-President
and the corresponding mandate to formulate its own rules of procedure authorize
Congress which has the sole discretion to create a Joint Committee to
preliminarily canvass the votes to expedite the proceedings. Similarly, the
Speaker is of the view that the creation of the Joint Committee is not violative of
the well-known maxim delegata potestas non delegari 1 which finds application
only when what is delegated is legislative power, and not an electoral function
such as canvassing of votes.
The Solicitor General argues that the constitutionality of the act of Congress in
assigning the preliminary canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President is
a political question. It is Congress, and not the Judiciary, which gets to decide
what procedures are proper in this circumstance. And, while the Constitution
assigns to Congress the power to canvass the votes, it does not mean that the
whole Congress, as a body, should actually canvass the votes. Congress has the
discretion to follow its previous practice of using a joint committee to canvass the
certificates of canvass and does not abdicate its power because the Joint
Committee, apart from being a part thereof, will just come out with a final report
which will be submitted to the whole Congress, in joint public session, for
approval. Finally, there is no delegation of legislative power since delegation of
legislative power applies only when there is transfer of power from one
department of government to the other departments. In this case, Congress did
not delegate its power to the Executive or Judicial department.
In short, the petition poses two hinge issues: (1) whether it hoists a political
question over which the Court has no jurisdiction; and (2) assuming the issue
raised is justiciable, whether the Rules violate Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution.
Let us keep a full eye on the Rules. The pertinent parts provide:
RULE VIII
JOINT COMMITTEE

appointed by the Speaker. The Members of each House panel shall elect
from among themselves their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two divisions
of eleven (11) members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members
from the Senate and five (5) members from the House of
Representatives: Provided, That a Member of Congress who is a
candidate for President or Vice-President shall not be eligible for
appointment to the Joint Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a
Chairman of the Joint Committee.
of candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President.
The Representative of the province or city whose certificate of canvass is

being canvassed shall be an ex officio member of the Joint Committee,
SEC. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb
marked by the Chairman and Members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned; that it contains the names of all the
candidates for President and Vice-President and their corresponding
votes in words and in figures; and there exists no discrepancy in other
authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes
of any candidate in words and figures in the same certificate. TIcAaH
SEC. 15. When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the Board of
Canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete,
the Senate President shall require the Board of Canvassers concerned to
documents. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery
within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
SEC. 16. In case of omission in the certificate of canvass of the name of
any candidate and/or the votes obtained by any candidate, the President
of the Senate shall summon, in the most expeditious manner, the
provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers concerned to supply the
missing data in the certificate of canvass and to authenticate the same by
affixing their signatures thereon.
SEC. 17. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting
statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may
cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and
may affect the result of the election, upon request of the Presidential or
Vice-Presidential candidate concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the
sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for President
and Vice-President, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the
election returns submitted to it.
SEC. 18. In case the copy of the certificate of canvass for Congress is
delayed, the President of the Senate shall obtain said delayed certificate of
canvass from the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers
concerned within a period of two days. In case the certificate of canvass
has been lost, destroyed or is otherwise unavailable, the Joint Committee
shall immediately request the Commission on Elections for its authentic
copy of said certificate of canvass.
SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall
decide any question involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote
of its Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision
shall be subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and House of
Representatives voting separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the
decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation within the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, shall prevail.
SEC. 20. The Joint Committee en banc or in divisions, may, by a majority
vote of its Members each House panel voting separately, punish for
contempt any person who commits disorderly behavior during its
session. Any member of the provincial, city or district Board of
Canvassers who refuses without reasonable cause to obey any order
issued by the President of the Senate as provided in Sections 15, 16, 18
and 21 hereof, may likewise be punished for contempt by the joint public
session upon recommendation of the Senate President.
SEC. 21. The chairmen of the Joint Committee shall request from the
Commission on Elections technical assistance for purposes of the
canvassing of votes. A list of the names, specimen signatures and thumb
marks of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city and district
Boards of Canvassers shall be obtained from the Commission on
Elections for the determination of the authenticity and due execution of
certificates of canvass. When there is any doubt regarding the
authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass, the Joint
Committee, en banc or any of its divisions, may require the personal
appearance of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city of
district Board of Canvassers concerned.
SEC. 22. The Joint Committee en banc shall tabulate the votes and, for
this purpose, may avail of the services of an independent
accounting/auditing firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.
After the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes have been
tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in writing for copies
thereof from the Secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or
final report to the joint session.TSaEcH
SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall meet eight (8)
hours a day from Monday to Friday until all the certificates of canvass
referred to it by the joint public session shall have been canvassed. The
final report shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to the joint
public session for its approval, each House voting separately.
RULE IX
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all certificates of canvass have
been received, the Joint Committee may submit to the joint public session
its final report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass if the
total number of registered voters corresponding to the province, city or
district covered by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would
no longer affect the result of the election. Congress in joint public session,
voting separately, shall immediately act on the final report.
The Joint Committee may, in its discretion, submit interim report to the
joint public session whenever there is a need for guidance or direction
from Congress. Provided, That objections raised and rulings made therein
shall no longer be included in the final report.
SEC. 25. At least a majority of the Members from each House panel shall
sign the final report of the Joint Committee. Every Member shall be
provided with a copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-four
(24) hours within which to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion.
SEC. 26. During the joint public session, the Member designated by the
Joint Committee shall speak for not more than one hour on the report
and the accompanying resolution approving the report of the Joint
Committee, declaring the results of the canvass and proclaiming the
President-elect and Vice-President-elect. The Member designated by
those against the report shall also speak for not more than one hour.
Subsequent speakers for or against the resolution shall be allowed to
speak for not more than three hours; Provided, That one (1) speaker for
each candidate shall be given the opportunity to speak for not more than
twenty minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION
SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the Joint
Committee report and the accompanying resolution by majority of all the
Members of both Houses voting separately in the joint public session,
Congress through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall forthwith proclaim the President-elect and
Vice-President-elect.
I respectfully make the following submissions:
I
The petition poses a justiciable issue
over which this Court has jurisdiction.
The first issue is whether the petition involves a political question, hence, this
Court is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of it. This is not the first time,
and it will not be last, when the Court will wrestle with the political question
defense. As early as 1957, in the landmark case of Tañada v. Cuenco, 2 this
Court has held that political question connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, a question of policy. It refers to "those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom not legality of a particular measure." For this reason ". . . courts will
not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the
case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the
Constitution." 3 We have a continuous river of rulings that the political question
doctrine cannot be invoked when the issue is whether an executive act or a law
violates the Constitution. 4 Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy, 5 we emphatically explained that "the principle of separation of powers
mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved in
our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be debated in
the halls of Congress." IaDcTC
When the Constitution is violated, even an act of a co-equal and coordinate

branch of government has to be struck down. Our government operates both
under the principle of separation of powers and the principle of checks and
balances. In less esoteric terms, this means that our three branches of
government, vis-à-vis each other, follow the rule of trust the two but trust
no one absolutely. Thus, in Arroyo v. de Venecia, 6 this Court, citing U.S. v.
Ballin, Joseph & Co., 7 and speaking thru Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, held
that "[t]he Constitution empowers each house to determine its proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained."
In the recent case of Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, et al.,
8 promulgated on November 10, 2003, it was also pointed out, viz.:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes

more feeble in light of the new Constitution which expanded the
definition of judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." As well observed by retired Justice Isagani Cruz, this
expanded definition of judicial power considerably constricted the scope
of political question. He opined that the language luminously suggests
that this duty (and power) is available even against the executive and
legislative departments including the President and the Congress, in the
exercise of their discretionary powers.
We shall not be breaking grounds in striking down an act of a co-equal

branch of government or an act of an independent agency of
government done in grave abuse of discretion. Article VI, Section 17 of
the 1987 Constitution provides, inter alia, that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House. In Bondoc v. Pineda, et al. this Court declared
null and void the Resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election of Congressman Camasura as
a member of the HRET. His expulsion from the HRET by the House of
Representatives was held not to be for a lawful and valid cause, but to
unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the HRET's decision in his favor. This
Court found that the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of
discretion in removing Congressman Camasura. Its action was adjudged
to be violative of the constitutional mandate which created the HRET to be
the "sole judge" of the election contest between Bondoc and Pineda. We
held that a showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government is not an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident
exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy.
Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not unusually unrestricted,
limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the
courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered
to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political."
We further explained that the power and duty of courts to nullify, in
appropriate cases the actions of the executive and legislative branches
does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the
Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the
irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of
legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought
before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by
such action. It is "a plain exercise of judicial power, the power vested in
courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. . . . It is
simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a
case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of
which must be brought the test and measure of the law."
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we also ruled that the Electoral

Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of authority, but this
Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Similarly, in Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(HRET) and Augusto Syjuco, we nullified the HRET's decision declaring
private respondent Syjuco as the duly elected Congressman of Makati for
having been rendered in persistent and deliberate violation of the
Tribunal's own governing rules and the rules of evidence.
To be sure, this Court has reviewed not just acts of the HRET but also of
the House of Representatives itself. We passed upon the issue of whether
the procedure for passing a law provided by the Constitution was
followed by the House of Representatives and the Senate in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, et al. involving R.A. No. 7716 or the VAT law. We
ruled that the VAT law satisfied the constitutional provision requiring that
all appropriation, revenue and tariff bills originate from the House of
Representatives under Article VI, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution. We
also interpreted the constitutional provision requiring the reading of a bill
on three separate days "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." and held that this requirement
was satisfied when the bill which became R.A. No. 7716 underwent three
readings on the same day as the President certified the bill as urgent.
Finally, we interpreted the Rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and held that there was nothing irregular about the
conference committee including in its report an entirely new provision not
found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill as this was in
accordance with the said Rules. TADCSE
The recent case of Macalintal v. COMELEC on absentee voting affirmed

the jurisdiction of this Court to review the acts of the legislature. In said
case, the Court settled the question of propriety of the petition which
appeared to be visited by the vice of prematurity as there were no
ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a government
official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as required
by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court considered the importance of
the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner, and quoted Tañada v.
Angara stating that "where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute." (citations
omitted) HSaIET
This line of thought enjoys the unanimous view of the Court. It is therefore
futile to contend that this Court has no jurisdiction over the petition at bar on
the ground that it poses a political question. The petition assails the creation
by Congress of a Joint Committee for the purpose of determining the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass appertaining to
the positions of President and Vice-President in our last May 10, 2004
elections. Petitioner contends that the creation violates Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution under which it is alleged that only Congress, in joint public
session, can exercise the said power. Petitioner also argues that the creation of
the Joint Committee deprives him of his constitutional right to participate in
the canvass of the results of the last Presidential and Vice-Presidential
elections. The issue raised by petitioner calls for the proper
interpretation of Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution vis-à-vis the
Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress or Canvassing the Votes Cast for
the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004
Elections. Since time immemorial, the jurisdiction of this Court to interpret
the Constitution has never been successfully flayed. Indeed, this authority has
been broadened by the expanded definition of judicial power in the 1987
Constitution. In expanding the judicial power of this Court, we said that "[t]o a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this Court
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government." 9 We even held
that the Constitution "did not just grant the Court the power of doing
nothing." 10 Stubborn thoughts that still insist this Court has no jurisdiction on
issues that involve the interpretation of the Constitution should now be
consigned to the museum of memories.
II
Creation of Canvassing Committee constitutes
no grave abuse of discretion.
The next issue is whether the creation of a Joint Committee on Canvassing
constitutes grave abuse of discretion for being violative of Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution which relevantly states:
xxx xxx xxx
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed

elected, but in case of two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner also contends that the Rules deprived him of his rights and
prerogatives as a member of Congress. STcHDC
The nature of the work of the Joint Committee deserves minute examination.
The purpose of the Joint Committee is spelled out in no uncertain terms in Rule
VIII, Section 13, viz.: "The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily
canvass the votes of candidates for the offices of the President and Vice-
President." The key word is "preliminarily" which means its work is
preparatory, 11 a mere prelude. The preliminary work is performed by the Joint
Committee by satisfying itself — (1) that each certificate of canvass was duly
executed, signed and thumb marked by the Chairman and Members of the
provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers concerned; (2) that it contains the
names of all the candidates for President and Vice-President and their
corresponding votes in words and figures; and (3) that there exists no
discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy
in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the same certificate. 12
Provisions were then crafted to deal with certain concrete problems. Rule VIII,
Section 15, deals with the situation when the certificate of canvass, duly certified
by the Board of Canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be
incomplete. In this case, the Senate President shall require the Board of
Canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery, the election returns from
polling places that were not included in the certificate of canvass and supporting
documents. Rule VIII, Section 16, applies when there is an omission in the
certificate of canvass of the name of any candidate and/or the votes obtained by
any candidate. In this case, the President of the Senate is mandated by the
rule to summon, in the most expeditious manner, the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned to supply the missing data in the certificate of
canvass and to authenticate the same by affixing their signatures thereon. Rule
VIII, Section 17, is apt when it appears that any certificate of canvass or
supporting statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which
may cast doubt as to the veracity or authenticity of the number of votes stated
therein and may affect the result of the election. Upon request of the
Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate concerned or his party, the rule
requires Congress itself, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of
votes cast for President and Vice-President, to count the votes as they appear in
the copies of the election returns submitted to it. Rule VIII, Section 18, deals with
the situation when the transmittal of the copy of the certificate of canvass is
delayed. The rule directs the Senate President to obtain said delayed
certificate of canvass from the provincial, city or district Board of canvassers
concerned. The same Section 18 likewise addresses the situation when the
certificate of canvass has been lost, destroyed or is otherwise unavailable.
The rule requires the Joint Committee to immediately request the COMELEC for
its authentic copy of said certificate of canvass.
The Rules give the Joint Committee the necessary powers to discharge its
duty. Rule VIII, Section 20, grants it the power of contempt. It can punish for
contempt any person who commits disorderly behavior during its session. Rule
VIII, Section 21, accords to it the right to request from the COMELEC technical
assistance for purposes of the canvassing of votes. When there is any doubt
regarding the authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass, the
Joint Committee, may require the personal appearance of the chairmen and
members of the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers. Rule VIII, Section
22, empowers the Committee to avail of the services of an independent
The Rules then provide for the Report to be submitted by the Joint Committee.
Two kinds of reports can be submitted by the Committee to the joint public
session: One is the interim report which the Committee, in its discretion, may
submit whenever there is a need for guidance or direction from
Congress. Second is the final report containing the objections raised on certain
certificates of canvass and the rulings of the Committee. Rule IX, Section 25,
requires that every member of the Committee shall be provided a copy of the
final report and shall be given twenty-four (24) hours within which to submit his
concurring or dissenting opinion. At least a majority of the members from each
House shall sign the final report. The final report shall then be submitted to the
joint public session for its approval.
aDATHC
Rule IX, Section 26, then provides the manner on how the final report shall be
debated by the joint public session. Various speakers are allowed to speak
for or against the final report during the joint public session. First, the
member designated by the Joint Committee shall speak in favor of the final
report for not more than one (1) hour. Second, the member designated by those
against shall be given the same time. Third, subsequent speakers for or
against the report shall be allowed to speak for not more than three (3) hours.
Fourth, one (1) speaker for each candidate shall be given the opportunity to
speak for not more than twenty (20) minutes. After the debates, the Joint
Committee report and the accompanying resolution have to be approved by
majority of all the members of both Houses voting separately in the
joint public session. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall then
be proclaimed through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
The Constitution, the Rules, as well as jurisprudence, inform us of the nature of
the work of Congress as the national canvassing board of the votes cast
for the highest elective positions in the land and how it should be discharged.
They establish the following indubitable postulates, viz.:
First. When Congress convenes in joint public session as a national canvassing
board, it is not meeting as a lawmaking body. Its function as a canvassing
board is not to make laws but to count the votes cast by the electorate for the
Presidency and the Vice-Presidency. As we succinctly held in Cordero v. Judge
of First Instance of Rizal, 13 while the Board of Canvassers is made up of
legislators, it does not act in its capacity as a maker of laws but as an entirely
different and distinct entity organized for a specific purpose. The Board of
Canvassers exists for a specific function, that is, to canvass the result of the
election as shown in the election returns and to proclaim the winning candidates.
14 The exercise of the power of canvassing of votes is more akin to the discharge
of an administrative power.
Second. As canvassers of votes for the positions of President and Vice-President,
our lawmakers are to discharge their duties with fairness and impartiality.
Canvassing is an important part of the process of determining the choice of our
sovereign people on who ought to be our President and Vice-President, the two
highest elective posts in our country. Thus, in making the canvass, our
lawmakers should act more as representatives of the people and less
as partisans of political parties. For this reason, Article VII, Section 4 of
the 1987 Constitution did not give any significance to the political
affiliation of the lawmakers when they are discharging their duty as
canvassers. In cadence, Rule VIII, Section 13, bars a member of Congress who is
a candidate for President or Vice-President from sitting in the Joint Committee.
Stated otherwise, lawmakers when canvassing votes, should keep their
eyes open but should shut them off to any political light. The members of
city, provincial and district boards of canvassers canvass the votes appertaining
to our lesser elective officials yet they are enjoined to be non partisan in the
discharge of their duties. No less can be expected from members of Congress
acting as the national board of canvassers. In fine, when our legislators
acting as canvassers add 1 + 1, the sum should be 2, regardless of their
political affiliation.
Third. Congress can only proclaim as President-elect and Vice-President-elect
they who, on the basis of the election documents required by law, such as the
certificates of canvass, election returns and statements of votes, have
established, at the very least, a prima facie title to said offices. No candidate
who has failed to establish a colorable legal title to the positions of President and
Vice-President can be proclaimed and be endowed with the awesome mandate to
govern our people. Democracy disdains the rule and reign of the unelected.
Fourth. In canvassing the votes, our lawmakers are to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass in the manner
provided by law. Republic Act No. 7166, Section 30, prescribes the
manner by which certificates of canvass are deemed authentic and duly
executed. Read as a whole, Section 30 states that Congress must examine each
certificate of canvass not only on its face, but also vis-à-vis the statement of
votes and election returns when necessary. This law is binding on Congress
acting as a canvassing body. Rightly, the relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7166
were incorporated in the Rules.
As a canvassing body, Congress has no lawmaking power and hence cannot
amend or repeal R.A. No. 7166. It has therefore no discretion to disregard R.A. No.
7166. The Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes
Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004
Elections have to be read, interpreted and enforced in consonance with R.A. No.
7166.
Fifth. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates
of canvass cannot be done in a robotic manner. R.A. No. 7166 and the Rules
look upon our lawmakers not as unthinking slot machines when conducting the
canvass. For this reason, the law and the rules require that due consideration
be given not only to the certificates of canvass but also to the election returns
and the statement of votes. In other words, the search for the truth about
the true will of the electorate should not be confined to the four corners
of the certificates of canvass. The truth, if blocked by the opaque face of the
certificates of canvass, must be extracted from the election returns and
statements of votes. It is self-evident that discovering and distilling the truth of
who were really elected by our people for the positions of President and Vice-
President deserve more than a mechanical effort.
Sixth. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass calls for the exercise of discretion. It is self-evident that
reconciling discrepancies in the certificates of canvass vis-à-vis, among
others, the election returns and statements of votes involves intelligent
judgment. It is for this reason that in the discharge of its functions, the Joint
Committee was clothed with certain powers. It can request technical assistance
from the COMELEC. It can require the personal appearance of the chairmen and
members of the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers. It can avail of the
services of an independent accounting or auditing firm. It has the awesome
power to punish for contempt any person who commits disorderly behavior
during its session. More importantly, the Rules require that our lawmakers decide
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass only after a full
debate by members of Congress. In fine, determining the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass cannot be done by adding machines. cHSIAC
Seventh. The primary consideration in determining the authenticity and due

execution of the certificates of canvass is accuracy — accuracy in determining
the sovereign will of the people. The need to fast track the determination of the
will of the people pales in comparison with this consideration. It is a travesty of
democracy for the people to be governed by people without a mandate. The
nation can endure a slow but trustworthy tally. It may not survive an
indefensible count, however speedy it may be.
Eight. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass is governed by a distinct process to insure that when it
reaches its end, the ones who will be proclaimed President-elect and Vice-
President-elect can, at the very least, have a colorable claim to said offices. This
colorable claim can only be established after full debate on the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass in light of other
election documents such as election returns and statements of votes and the
testimonies of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city, or district board
of canvassers, in appropriate cases. The debate contemplated is one that will
elicit the truth as to the choice of the people, hence, the Rules provide the
following, viz.: (a) each candidate is allowed two (2) watchers who shall have
access to an unimpeded view of the entire proceedings; (b) each candidate is
likewise allowed lawyers who may argue and question any certificate of canvass;
(c) upon the opening of the certificates of canvass, observations and objections of
any member of Congress with reference to the condition of their envelope, seal
and serial number shall already be entered into the records and shall be
considered during the proceedings of the Joint Committee; (d) the Joint
Committee is composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be
appointed by the President of the Senate and eleven (11) members from House
of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker. To insulate it from partisan
politics, a member of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-President
is barred from appointment to the Joint Committee; (e) the Representative of the
province or city whose certificate of canvass is being canvassed is made ex-officio
member of the Joint Committee, without voting rights, for the duration of the
canvassing of the aforesaid certificate of canvass; (f) remedies are provided for in
cases where a certificate of canvass is incomplete or with omissions or where it
is lost destroyed or otherwise unavailable; (g) the Joint Committee is given the
authority to avail of the technical assistance of the COMELEC and of the services
of an independent accounting or auditing firm for the proper discharge of its task;
(h) after the Certificate of Canvass and statement of votes have been tabulated
by the Committee, any member of Congress may request in writing for copies
thereof from the secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or final
report to the joint public session; (i) the interim and final report shall contain the
objections raised and the rulings thereon by the Joint Committee; (j) every
member of the Joint Committee is given twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of
the final report within which to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion; (k)
the final report is then forwarded to the joint public session for debate. A member
of the Joint Committee is given one (1) hour to speak in favor of the final report;
another member of the Committee is given also one (1) hour to speak against
the report; other speakers for or against the report are further allowed to speak
for not more than three (3) hours; and one (1) speaker for each candidate is
given the opportunity to speak for not more than twenty 20 minutes; (1) after
full debate, the final report is submitted to a vote by the joint public session, each
House voting separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the decision of the
President of the Senate, in consultation with the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, will prevail. AEIcTD
The process may be long and laborious but it has a purpose. It is designed to
give our lawmakers all the facts and all the arguments necessary for an
informed and intelligent judgment in determining the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of a canvass. It demands that the evidence, the
arguments of the parties, and the applicable law should be meticulously weighed
by the lawmakers before they pass judgment on whether to canvass the votes in
the certificates of canvass. The objections to their authenticity and due execution
should be given their appropriate consideration. An unreasoned or
unreasonable judgment by Congress runs the risk of rejection in the
parliament of the street of the people. And the danger is that we may
not just face a mute multitude.
Ninth. The laws and the rules give clear rights to the candidates. Candidates
to the position of the President and Vice-President cannot be denied due
process. Thus, they are allowed watchers. They are entitled to lawyers who can
question any certificate of canvass before the Joint Committee. When the final
report is up for voting by the joint public session of Congress, they can have
speakers to defend their interest. Candidates are also entitled to the equal
protection of the law. They cannot be subjected to discriminatory treatment.
All these and their other constitutional rights are not suspended during the
canvass.
Tenth. The law and the rules likewise impose duties on Congress as a
canvassing board. Congress must be an outpost of openness. The canvassing
must be transparent. Lawmakers must conduct the canvassing without a taint
of arbitrariness. The worse type of arbitrariness is arbitrariness that runs
roughshod over the sovereign will of the people.
Prescinding from these predicates, I find no difficulty in voting to dismiss
the petition at bar. The Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the
May 10, 2004 Elections do not violate Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution. To begin with, the Constitution grants Congress the power to
promulgate its own rules for the canvassing of election certificates. The Rules
enjoy the presumption of legality and the petitioner has miserably failed to
overcome this presumption.
The argument that the creation of the Joint Committee constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power is an egregious error. As a canvassing
board, Congress exercises no legislative power and therefore did not
delegate any.
In creating the Joint Committee, Congress did not abdicate its constitutional
duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 election. Even a side-glance at
the powers and prerogatives of the Joint Committee will subvert petitioner's
submission. The function of the Joint Committee is laid down in Rule VIII, Section
14. To stress again, it shall satisfy itself that (1) each certificate of canvass was
duly executed, signed and thumb marked by the Chairman and members of the
provincial, city or district board of canvassers concerned; (2) it contains the
names of all the candidates for President and Vice-President and their
corresponding votes in words and figures; and (3) there exists no discrepancy in
other authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of
any candidate in word and figures in the same certificate. In the performance of
this function, the Joint Committee has to prepare a Report which will contain the
objections raised by the parties on the admission of the certificates of canvas
concerned and its rulings thereon. Rule VIII, Section 13, emphasizes that the
canvass of the Joint Committee is a mere preliminary canvass. The rulings of
the Joint Committee reflected in its Report are merely recommendatory in
nature. Its Report is yet to be submitted to the joint public session of Congress
for approval, each House voting separately. The constitutional canvassing
duty of Congress is therefore preserved and remains undiminished. cAHDES
Nor is the right of petitioner as lawmaker — canvasser unduly prejudiced by

the creation of the Joint Committee. The proceedings of the Joint Committee are
open and transparent. Under Rule VIII, Section 22, after the certificates of
canvass and the statement of votes have been tabulated by the Joint
Committee, petitioner, like any other member of Congress, may request in
writing for their copies prior to the consideration of any report by the Committee
to the joint public session. Under Rule IX, Section 26, petitioner may speak for or
against the final report of the Joint Committee whose findings and rulings are
non-binding to the joint public session of Congress. His right to vote for or
against the final report of the Joint Committee therefore stands
undiluted. In truth, the creation of a Joint Committee to preliminarily canvass
the results of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential election is compelled by the
need to hasten the canvass considering that our laws have set a deadline for
proclamation. History is studded with insights. The practice of creating a Joint
Committee was resorted to by Congress in the 1961, 1965, 1992 and 1998
elections. Its effectiveness has been proven.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to dismiss the petition.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition before us for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction and duty of the
Supreme Court pursuant to the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2, "to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." SIaHDA
Yet, basing on his arguments, we can say that the pith of petitioner's plea goes
deeper than the averment of personal exclusion from the select panel tasked as
"a joint committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for Presidential and
Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 national elections." He assails
the Rules * that Congress passed on May 28, 2004 because, in his view, the Rules
"effectively amends and abrogates" certain provisions of the Constitution,
particularly Section 4, Article VII, which give Congress the power and authority to
promulgate rules for said committee as the Board of National Canvassers.
Further, he charges the Congress of unlawful neglect in the performance of duty
enjoined by the Constitution because, by its passage of said Rules, Congress as a
whole delegated unlawfully its tasks as canvasser at the highest level to a mere
joint committee of eleven Senators and eleven Congressmen. *
Noteworthy, he raises expressly before us only one issue:
"Whether or not the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections are Valid, Legal, and
Constitutional."
He marshals his arguments abovecited to advance the thesis that said Rules are
invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional. But by prefacing his plea to us on the
principle of the tripartite separation of powers of government and the principle of
potestas delegata non potest delegari, he also triggers implicitly a second issue:
whether the court possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter he brings.
In the Resolution dated 4 June 2004, we denied petitioner's prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order. Without giving due course to the petition, we
required respondents herein and the Solicitor General to comment. On June 7,
2004, before noontime, we received the Comment of respondent Senate of the
Philippines, the Comment/Opposition by respondent House of Representatives,
and the Comment by the Office of the Solicitor General. * After a thorough
dissection of the issue raised by petitioner, we find that the respondents rightly
prayed for dismissal of the petition outright, "for lack of constitutional and legal
basis" ** and "for lack of merit". *** ADECcI
In denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order, we were not unmindful

of the prevailing air of anxiety and popular perception that the canvass of votes
for the two highest positions of government is overdue. Announcement of the
election results cannot be delayed for weeks by mere technicalities. At the same
time, a majority of nine members of the Court were of the considered opinion
that the views of the opposition parties need to be fairly and fully ventilated in a
neutral forum that could render the appropriate relief. Despite prevailing doubts
on the possible pre-emption of the functions reserved by the Constitution, Article
VII, Sec. 4, to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, we could not let the petitioner
go away empty handed simply because he failed to attach his affidavit of service
to the petition. Majority of the Court members believe it is in the public interest
that comments on the petition be required from herein respondents as well as
the people's tribune, the Solicitor General. Thereafter, the Court could promptly
rule on the merits of the petition, provided the members are satisfied that the
vital requirements of constitutional litigation, including the existence of a case
and controversy, lis mota, ripeness, locus standi and justiciability, are clearly
met.
As a member of the House of Representatives, believing that he was prejudiced
gravely by that chamber's action, petitioner has in his favor the requisite
personality (locus standi) to bring this suit before us. This we need not belabor.
But it still behooves us to determine, at the very inception of our discourse,
whether the issue raised by petitioner is one that is justiciable rather than a
political question. By itself, the threshold requirement of justiciability, which is to
say the appropriateness of a subject matter for judicial consideration, is trumped
by the assertion of the political question doctrine, perhaps rendering certain
government conduct immune from judicial review. * ECcaDT
In Tañada v. Cuenco, (103 Phil. 1051) the Court defined political questions as
those "which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government (Id. at p.
1065). ** This formulation evolving from the separation of powers doctrine has
been sharpened by saying that challenges on the constitutionality of a law
should be resolved by the Court while doubts on the wisdom of law should be
debated in the halls of Congress. (Tatad v. Secretary, 281 SCRA 347). More
recently, Francisco, Jr. v. HR, (G.R. No. 160261, decided Nov. 10, 2003), gave us
the opportunity for further distinction. Per Madame Justice Carpio-Morales, "the
determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
the government properly acted within such limits." To that extent, we consider
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, cited by the OSG, inappropriate. Instead we
find instructive the ruling in U.S. v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, which held
that while each House of Congress is empowered by the Constitution to
determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights.
Procedurally, it must be stressed that the petitioner in an action for mandamus
has the burden to show a clear, certain, and well-defined right to the relief
sought. (Sales v. Mathay, G.R. No. L-39537, 31 May 1984, 129 SCRA 180, 183.)
Mandamus cannot compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Further, an
action for prohibition, as a rule, lies only against judicial or ministerial functions,
but not legislative functions. (Ruperto v. Torres, G.R. No. L-8785, 25 Feb. 1957.)
Be that as it may, considering the crucial importance of the matter at hand, not
just for the moment but also for the future of a nation beset by crises after crises,
it is our view that a prompt consideration of the instant petition is called for. As
well said in Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, "a showing that plenary power is
granted [to another branch of the government] is not an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy."
Nevertheless, with due respect to a co-equal branch, interference with the
adoption and implementation of internal rules of Congress is furthest from our
mind. Indubitably, per the Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4, it is Congress and not any
other organ of the State which shall promulgate the rules for the canvassing of
the certificates of votes for the President and the Vice-President. Indeed we
recognize the plenary power of Congress to enact its own internal rules on the
matter. (Osmeña v. Pendatum, 109 Phil. 863. See also Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277
SCRA 268). What prompts us today to look into the present petition is the duty
to say what the law is, as a matter of constitutional prerogative by way of
judicial review. * To abdicate that duty is to invite lawlessness and disorder.
If only for edification, let us now focus on petitioner's complaint.
He alleges that "the questioned Rules of Congress call for the creation of a Joint
Committee under Section 13, Rule VIII thereof, which provides that the Joint
Committee shall: (a) be composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to
be appointed by the Senate President and eleven (11) members from the House
of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker; (b) sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in two (2) divisions of eleven members each; (c) determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass; and (d)
preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for the offices of President and
Vice-President." * HECTaA
Petitioner concludes that the Rules thus "(a) removed from the Congress as one
whole body and transferred to the Joint Committee of Congress the duty and
function of determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass, and (b) removed from the Congress as one whole body and transferred
to the Joint Committee of Congress the duty and function of canvassing the
votes cast for presidential and vice-presidential candidates." *
"Such removal and transfer of canvassing tasks from the constitutionally
mandated entity to the Joint Committee is directly contrary to the Constitution
itself," according to petitioner. "There is absolutely nothing in the Constitution
which allows expressly or by inference such removal and transfer of canvassing
tasks from Congress as one whole body to another entity," he adds. "Neither is
there anything in the constitution which allows any substitution of the Congress
as one whole body in the performance of the constitutionally mandated
canvassing tasks. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution cannot be any clearer
on the matter."
With the alleged delegation and transfer to a Joint Committee of the task of
canvassing the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, he
contends, "the canvassing of the votes will be done by and only before the Joint
Committee . . . composed of only 11 members from the Senate and 11 members
of the House of Representatives. Petitioner and all other members of both
Houses of Congress who are not members of the Joint Committee of Congress
have thus been unduly deprived of their rights and prerogatives as incumbent
members of Congress to be present at, observe and participate in the canvassing
of votes. . ." *
Respondent House of Representatives, thru its Speaker Jose de Venecia, traverses
petitioner's allegations. Joint Committees, according to De Venecia, are
constituted primarily to facilitate the work of the two houses of Congress. The
use of the joint committee system, he adds, is a well recognized and established
practice. Such was the mode, he says, in canvassing the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential votes during elections held on 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1992, and
1998. ** Even assuming that the principle of delegata potestas non potest
delegari applies, nevertheless he submits that such delegation by the Congress is
a valid delegation of powers beyond cavil, for Congress retains its control over
the canvassing process, and the ultimate decision on the matter is lodged in
Congress itself. On this score, we are in agreement. Equally important, we also
agree with the Speaker that when acting as the National Board of Canvassers,
Congress is not engaged in legislation, hence no issue of undue delegation of
legislative power need arise.
In any event, we are assured by respondent Senate, through its President
Franklin M. Drilon, that contrary to the assertion of the petitioner, he is not
deprived of any right or prerogative by the Joint Committee under its Rules that
he now assails. Petitioner's participation in the canvassing remains guaranteed
under the Rules of the Joint Public Session, thus:
"SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall
shall be subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and
House of Representatives voting separately. In case the two
Houses disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in
consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or divisions, shall meet eight (8)
final report shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc
to the joint public session for its approval, each House voting
separately. ScHADI
xxx xxx xxx
no longer affect the results of the election. Congress in joint public
session, voting separately, shall immediately act on the final
report.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the

Joint Committee report and the accompanying resolution by
majority of all the Members of both Houses voting separately in
the joint public session, Congress through the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
forthwith proclaim the President-elect and Vice-President
elect."

By its very nature, either chamber of Congress must act through committees.
They make the business of legislation feasible and practicable. Without working
committees, the tasks of the Senate or the House would be unmanageable. The
same is true of both chambers acting as the National Board of Canvassers. To
deprive the Board of the committee system is tantamount to obstructing its
work and consigning it to delay and failure.
Whether the Joint Committee or Congress as a whole is clothe with ministerial
or discretionary powers in the canvass of votes, including the "determination of
the authenticity and due execution" relative to the canvass of certificates need
not, in my view, preoccupy us now. Nor should the question of fraud and other
matters more appropriate for an election protest, if any. What is important now
is that the canvass be conducted "in the manner provided by law." *
The OSG calls attention, however, to one factor in this controversy: "the
avoidance of undue delay in the canvass of certificates to ensure the
proclamation of the winning candidates before June 30, 2004 Constitutional
deadline" ** Respondent House thru its Speaker bewails "an obvious attempt to
stop or delay the current canvassing of votes for both the Presidency and the
Vice-Presidency," whereby petitioner, in effect "would cast a cloud of doubt on
the elections for the two highest posts of land," including most if not all previous
elections. To respondent, such doubt would have staggering implications. ***
As the Solicitor General keenly observed:
"In the judgment of the Congress, to require the whole Congress to
canvass the certificates would unduly delay the canvassing of votes. This
delay may prove detrimental to the national interest. Far from
undermining the Constitution, the creation of the joint canvassing
committee will ensure that the elected President and Vice-President shall
assume office at noon of June 30, 2004, in accordance with the
Constitution. The national interest would be best served by deferring to
this policy decision made by the Congress." *
WHEREFORE, finding no clear and adequate basis to declare that there is a

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents, I vote that the instant
petition be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
CARPIO-MORALES, J., concurring:
I join in the Resolution dismissing the instant petition, and in addition, I would
like to make the following observations.
By his Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus (Petition), petitioner Ruy Elias C.
Lopez, incumbent Representative of the 3rd Legislative District of Davao City,
seeks: HICEca
(1) a judgment declaring null and void the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10,
2004 Elections (Rules on Canvassing) adopted by both Houses
of Congress on May 28, 2004;
(2) the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing all of respondents
to cease and desist from implementing the Rules on
Canvassing; and
(3) the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing both Houses of
Congress "to immediately open the certificates of canvass in
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress to determine the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law and canvass the votes as expressly
commanded under Section 4 (paragraph 4), Article VII of the
Constitution . . . ." 1
Petitioner advances the following arguments in support of his Petition:
ARGUMENTS
The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an

Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power to a Joint Committee of
Congress.

Unconstitutional Amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

Unconstitutional Deprivation and Derogation of the Rights and
Prerogatives of Petitioners [sic] as Members [sic] of Congress.
By the Passage of the Aforementioned Rules Dated May 28, 2004,

Congress has Unlawfully Neglected the Performance of an Act which the
Constitution Specifically Enjoins as a Duty Resulting from Office. 2
In fine, the Petition raises two issues for resolution. First, whether the Rules on
Canvassing constitute an unconstitutional delegation of a non-ministerial power
vested exclusively by the Constitution in the Congress as a whole. Second,
whether the Rules on Canvassing deprives petitioner of his alleged rights and
prerogatives to be present, observe and participate in the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the Certificates of Canvass for President and
Vice-President.
As always, in exercising its power of judicial review, 3 this Court does not assert
any superiority over a co-equal branch of the government, but merely acts
pursuant to its mandated duty to determine whether an organ of government
has acted within the restrictions and limitations imposed by the Constitution. 4
Where an act of Congress is shown to have outstripped the boundaries set by the
Constitution, this Court has not hesitated to declare the same null and void. 5
But, at the same time, where constitutional infirmity has not been proven, this
Court is duty bound to uphold and respect the actions of the Legislature. 6
Matters of procedure and jurisdiction aside, for the reasons discussed hereunder, I
find that the issues raised in the Petition must be decided in the negative.
The national canvass of votes for President and Vice-President by Congress is
provided for in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, as follows: cSEAHa
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct

vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not
be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President
and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular elections for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,

duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives
in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be

proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately .
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner maintains that the foregoing solely and exclusively vested three tasks
on Congress, in its capacity as the National Board of Canvassers, to wit:
a) the President of the Senate shall open all the certificates of canvass in
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in joint
public session,
b) Congress shall determine the authenticity and due execution of all

certificates of canvass in the manner provided by law, and
c) Congress shall canvass the votes for presidential and vice-presidential

candidates. 7
Petitioner then argues that the following portions of the Rules on Canvassing:
Sec. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)
among themselves their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The
Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two (2) divisions
of eleven members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members from
the Senate and five (5) from the House of Representatives: Provided, That
a Member of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-President
shall not be eligible for appointment to the Joint Committee. Each division
shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Committee.
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the
votes of candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President.
The Representative of the province or city whose certificate of canvass is

being canvassed shall be an ex-officio member of the Joint Committee,
Sec. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and
thumbmarked by the Chairman and Members of the provincial, city or
district Board of Canvassers concerned; that it contains the names of all
the candidates for President and Vice-President and their corresponding
of any candidate in words and figures in the same certificate. . . .
Sec. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall decide
any question involving the Certificate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. . . . (Rule VIII). 8 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
removed from Congress and transferred to the Joint Committee the functions
of (a) determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass and (b) canvassing the votes for President and Vice-President, in
contravention of the Constitution.
This argument fails.
First, contrary to petitioner's assertions, the functions of determining the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and the actual
canvassing of votes are both ministerial functions. Thus, in Lopez v. Roxas, 9 this
Court, noting that the function of Congress as the National Board of Canvassers
was essentially just like that of any municipal, city or provincial board of
canvassers, held: CSHcDT
Needless to say, the power of Congress to declare who, among

the candidates for President and/or Vice-President, has
obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in
nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793.
Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers,
charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said
declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified
provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether
or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or
tampered with, or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas
covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally
thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the
same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which
Congress has power to do. 10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
italics in the original)
Petitioner, however, contends that the foregoing no longer holds since, unlike the
1935 or 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution vested Congress, as the
National Board of Canvassers, with "more than merely ministerial functions." In
particular, petitioner contends that the determination of the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass necessarily "requires the exercise of
sound discretion based upon informed judgement through the use of the faculty
of the intellect." 11
Petitioner is mistaken.
A ministerial duty is one which is clear and specific leaving no room for the
exercise of discretion in its performance. Upon the other hand, a discretionary
duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment. 12
In general, the duty of a board of canvassers has been held to be purely
ministerial in function, its task being limited to mathematically computing the
results of the elections on the basis of the documents submitted to it. Thus, in
Demafiles v. Commission on Elections, 13 this Court held:
First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function —
that of compiling and adding the results as they appear in the
returns transmitted to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista
Party v. Commission on Elections: "the canvassers are to be
satisfied of the genuineness of the returns — namely, that the
papers presented to them are not forged and spurious, that
they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper
officers. When so satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns
because of informalities in them or because of illegal and
fraudulent practices in the elections." Thus, they cannot pass upon
the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass
on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came
are illegal.
But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the
ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the
statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188
voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that only 182
voters had registered on October 30, 1967. Lagumbay v. Commission on
Elections is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns
were palpably false as it was indeed statistically improbable that
"all the eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes,
each of them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all
the eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing."
In other words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not needed, as
"the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa
loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to
loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to
accept it and gives it prima facie value." LLpr
On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its
face from which the canvassers might conclude that it does not
speak the truth. It is only when it is compared with the certificate of
the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to the number of
registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously
manufactured" so as to justify its exclusion.
This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than
registered voters were allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true,
although the petitioner claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more
voters were allowed to register (making a total of 190 voters), and on the
day of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were
allowed to vote in precinct 7 because that was where they were really
assigned. The point is simply that this question should be
threshed out in an election contest. 14 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The foregoing decisions also clearly illustrate that the duty of a board of
canvassers to authenticate the documents submitted to it, before tabulating the
results is not something new. Indeed, authentication is necessarily included in
the task of canvassing since only genuine documents which are in due form may
be canvassed. This, however, does not imply that a board of canvassers also
exercises adjudicatory powers to assume jurisdiction over allegations of electoral
fraud or irregularity. Such allegations may only be threshed out through an
election contest before the proper adjudicatory body. Thus, in Dizon v. Tizon, 15
this Court held:
We are of the opinion that the dismissal of the petition below is correct,
and that the remedy now sought against such dismissal should be
denied.
1. The election return for precinct No. 18 of Dinalupihan is not "obviously

manufactured" within the meaning of our decision in Lagumbay vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25444, January 21, 1966. The said
return, as found by the lower court, is regular and complete on its face.
In fact, when it was canvassed by the provincial board of canvassers on
December 7, 1967, the petitioner did not raise any objection to it or point
to any defect or infirmity in its contents. The discrepancy on which
the petition was based is not one which appears on the face of
the return, but between the statement therein that 279 ballots
had been cast and an entirely different document, namely the
certification of the election registrar that only 80 voters actually
voted. This certification, as correctly explained by the trial
court, was not material insofar as the board of canvassers was
concerned, since its ministerial duty was to read and canvass
the results of the election on the basis of the returns, once
satisfied that the same were genuine. aADSIc
xxx xxx xxx
If there was any fraud or irregularity committed in the election in said

precinct; if, for example, some ballots were filled and cast by persons
other than the registered voters themselves, the election return could
not, for that reason, be considered as obviously manufactured. It would
still reflect the actual number of ballots found and counted, and the
remedy to correct the anomaly would be an election contest, not a
petition to exclude the return in question from the canvass and thus
virtually annul the election in that precinct. 16 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
And in Abella v. Commission on Elections, 17 this Court stated:

. . . The issue is the refusal of the COMELEC to consider
objections to 24 election returns on which the board of
canvassers had not made a written ruling. But it would seem
that, strictly speaking, no ruling was necessary, or even proper.
By the petitioners' own contention "in all those 24 returns, the Christian
name, nickname or maternal surname of private respondent's husband
was used with her Christian name or nickname which, as we will show at
length infra, did not constitute a valid vote for private respondent. If so,
the total 1,912 votes in these returns credited for private respondent
should be discounted." This matter was obviously beyond the
competence of the board of canvassers to resolve. Neither was it
cognizable in a pre-proclamation controversy before the COMELEC as
defined in Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. —

The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material

defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies
in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion,
or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places

were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of
the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
The inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of certain election
returns where votes allegedly cast for Emeterio Larrazabal were
counted for his wife is an issue appropriate in an election
contest and not in a pre-proclamation controversy. And it is also
immaterial that, as also contended, the inclusion of such votes would
affect the over-all results of the election and swing it in his favor. The
accepted rule is that as long as the returns appear to be authentic
and duly accomplished, the board of canvassers cannot look
beyond them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting
or the counting of the votes. These issues cannot be resolved by the
board of canvassers. A long line of decisions has established the
doctrine that the board of canvassers has only the ministerial
task of tallying the votes as reported in the election returns
and cannot exercise the judicial power of deciding an election
contest. 18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) ACIDTE
It does not appear from the text of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that
the phrase "upon determination of authenticity and due execution [of the
certificates of canvass] in the manner provided by law" was intended to confer
anything more than a ministerial duty on Congress and the National Board of
Canvassers. In fact, when this very point was raised during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Maambong, the author of the
amendment expressly clarified that the duty of the National Board of Canvassers
was ministerial in nature, to wit:
MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of
the authenticity and the execution thereof" on lines 7 and
8, page 2, referring to the certificates of canvass of the
President and Vice- (page 391) President. Am I right if I
say that because of the use of these words, the duty of
the legislature to canvass is no longer ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been

interpreted by the Supreme Court as applicable to the
canvass made by the national Assembly, and the reason
why we did not put the word "ministerial" in the Article is,
it has been understood in the case of Roxas v. Lopez and
in other cases. When we used the words "authenticity" and
"genuineness," the question refers to the problem of whether or
not the ministerial function is already nonministerial. The answer
is, it is still ministerial, but when we say "authenticity and
due execution," what it really means is that the national
Assembly will look at the certificates of canvass and find
out from the face of the document whether there are
flaws in the execution and authenticity of the document.
That is what it means.
MR. NOLLEDO:
what will happen?
MR. MAAMBONG:
The answer to that is the phrase "in the manner provided by law." The
Committee had to insert the phrase "in the manner
provided by law" so that the legislature itself will find out
and will make it very specific as to what flaws or
deficiencies in the certificates of canvass can be taken
cognizance of by the canvassing board of tellers, because
as of now the guiding regulations that govern the National
Assembly, as I mentioned in the Committee, are: the rules and
regulations of the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election Code, the
jurisprudence from the decisions of the Supreme Court. All these
things taken together, the legislature is given a notice by
using the phrase "in the manner provided by law," so that
it will make a determination now of what are the points
which the board of tellers can take cognizance of, because
it is not very clear right now under the laws and regulations, and as
a matter of fact, that was one of the controversies which arose
during the canvassing of the votes of President Aquino and former
President Marcos in the last Batasan. 19 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed a contrary interpretation is not possible because the last paragraph of the
very same constitutional provision vests the power to adjudicate electoral
controversies concerning the positions of President and Vice-President exclusively
with the Supreme Court, viz.: EcTCAD
xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose
An examination of Section 30 of Republic Act 7166, the implementing law

referred to in the above-cited constitutional provision, removes all doubt as to
the ministerial character of the duties and functions of the Congress as the
National Board of Canvassers:
Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of
President and Vice-President: Determination of Authenticity and Due
Execution of Certificates of Canvass. — Congress shall determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for
President and Vice-President as accomplished and transmitted
to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1)
each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and
thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of
canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to
Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains the
names of all of the candidates for President and Vice-President
and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; and (3)
there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the
certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any
candidate in words and figures in the certificate.
When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of

canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete,
the Senate President shall require the board of canvassers concerned to
statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery
within two (2) days from receipt of notice. AISHcD
When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement

of votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt
as to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect
the result of the election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-
Presidential candidate concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole
Vice-President, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the
election returns submitted to it. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing clearly limits the authentication of the certificates of canvass to

(1) a physical examination of the certificates themselves to determine whether:
(a) each certificate was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and
members of the board of canvassers and transmitted to Congress by them, (b)
each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for
President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and in
figures, and (c) there is a discrepancy between the words and figures in the votes
of any of the candidates; and (2) a physical comparison to determine any
discrepancies between the certificates transmitted to the Congress and the other
authentic copies of the certificate of canvass.
These tasks are purely mechanical and therefore clearly ministerial in nature and
do not require "the exercise of sound discretion based upon informed judgment
through the use of the faculty of the intellect."
Second, a reading of the questioned Rules on Canvassing shows that there has
been no delegation by Congress of its duties as the National Board of Canvassers
to an entity separate and distinct from Congress itself. To delegate means to
transfer authority from one person to another; to empower one to perform a task
in behalf of another; 20 to transfer authority by one branch of government in
which such authority is vested to some other branch or administrative agency. 21
By promulgating the questioned Rules on Canvassing, all Congress has done is
refer to the Joint Committee the mechanical and ministerial tasks of (1)
physically examining the certificates of canvass for irregularities or discrepancies,
as provided for in Section 30 of Republic Act 7166, and (2) tabulating the votes of
the respective candidates:
SEC. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb
marked by the Chairman and Members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned; that it contains the names of all the
candidates for President and Vice-President and their corresponding
or any candidate in words and figures in the same certificate.
xxx xxx xxx
After the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes have been
tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in writing for copies
thereof from the Secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or
final report to the joint session.
However, the same Rules on Canvassing clearly provides that Congress, as a

whole, retains control over the canvassing process. Thus, any
determination made by the Joint Committee as well as the preliminary canvass
itself is subject to the final approval of both House of Congress, voting
separately, thus: IHCSTE

the House of Representatives voting separately. In case the two
prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
separately.
report.
from Congress: Provided, That objections raised and rulings made
thereon shall no longer be included in the final report.
provided with a copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-four
(24) hours within which to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion.
those against the report shall also speak for not more than one hour.
Subsequent speakers for or against the resolution shall be allowed to
speak for not more than three hours: Provided, That one (1) speaker for
each candidate shall be given the opportunity to speak for not more than
twenty minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION

forthwith proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-
elect. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provisions also make it abundantly clear that it is Congress, as a

whole and meeting in joint session, and not the Joint Committee, which has the
ultimate authority to proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President.
Petitioner nonetheless insists that even such a referral by Congress to its own
Joint Committee is proscribed since the Constitution allegedly requires that the
functions of the National Board of Canvassers should be performed by all the
members of both Houses of Congress acting together. Thus, so he argues, there
is nothing in the Constitution which allows Congress to refer the physical
inspection and comparison of the certificates of canvass and the mechanical
tabulation of the votes cast for each candidate to the Joint Committee. 22 TCacIA
Petitioner's argument stands a basic principle of Constitutional law on its head. It

is axiomatic that the presumption is in favor of constitutionality. 23 To strike down
a law or rule as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing
that what the fundamental law prohibits, the law or rule permits. 24
While there is nothing to prevent Congress from undertaking the authentication
and canvassing of the certificates through a committee of the whole, if it so
chooses, there is also nothing in the text of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that prohibits Congress from referring the authentication and
tabulation of the certificates of canvass to a bicameral committee. Indeed, the
only task expressly required by the Constitution to be done in the presence of
the all the Senators and representatives is the opening by the Senate President
of all the certificates of canvass at the start of the joint session of Congress.
Petitioner's attempt to draw parallels between the canvassing procedure
provided for in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and the impeachment
procedures provided for in Sections 1 to 3 of Article XI 25 does not persuade. A
reading of the provisions of Article XI readily demonstrates the detailed manner
by which the Constitution sets forth the procedures for impeachment, even to
the extent of specifying the number of session days between each phase of the
impeachment process. In contrast, aside from specifying the manner by which
the certificates of canvass are transmitted to Congress, the date for the opening
of the certificates by the Senate President, and that the person with the highest
number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, 26 Section 4 of Article VII gives wide
latitude to Congress to determine the manner by which to undertake the canvass
of votes. HcACTE
To be sure, there is nothing irregular or sinister in the referral by Congress of the

authentication and tabulation functions to the Joint Committee. As a matter of
convenience and expediency, both Houses of Congress regularly refer matters to
their respective Committees for study and recommendation. In Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, 27 where the validity of amendments introduced by a
bicameral conference committee of both Houses of Congress in a tax bill was put
into question, this Court, speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, held:
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to
insert new provisions as long as these are germane to the subject of the
conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,
227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the
jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving
differences between the Senate and the House. It may propose an
entirely new provision. What is important is that its report is
subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress.
This Court ruled that it would not entertain allegations that, because new
provisions had been added by the conference committee, there was
thereby a violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the

petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2), of the Constitution. We are
bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy. (Id., at 710. [Emphasis added]) CSDAIa
It is interesting to note the following description of conference

committees in the Philippines in a 1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed.

These committees may be given instructions by their parent bodies
or they may be left without instructions. Normally the conference
committees are without instructions, and this is why they are often
critically referred to as "the little legislatures." Once bills have been
sent to them, the conferees have almost unlimited authority to
change the clauses of the bills and in fact sometimes introduce new
measures that were not in the original legislation. No minutes are
kept, and members' activities on conference committees are
difficult to determine. One congressman known for his idealism put
it this way: "I killed a bill on export incentives for my interest group
[copra] in the conference committee but I could not have done so
anywhere else." The conference committee submits a report to
both houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is not
accepted, then the committee is discharged and new members are
appointed. (R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in
COMMITTEES AND LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163
(J.D. LEES AND M. SHAW, eds.))
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference

committees. We cite it only to say that conference committees here are
no different from their counterparts in the United States whose vast
powers we noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all
events, under Art. VI, §16(3) each house has the power "to determine the
rules of its proceedings," including those of its committees. Any
meaningful change in the method and procedures of Congress or its
committees must therefore be sought in that body itself. 28 DSETcC
If parts of the legislative process, which are unquestionably both sovereign and
discretionary in character, may be referred to a bicameral committee in the
interest of efficiency and expediency, there is no reason why the ministerial
tasks of authentication and tabulation of certificates of canvass cannot similarly
be referred to the Joint Committee created by the Rules on Canvassing.
As a second line of argument, petitioner claims that the Rules on Canvassing
unduly deprives him of his rights and prerogatives to be present at, observe and
participate in the determination of the authenticity and due execution of all
certificates of canvass. 29
Petitioner's claim is without constitutional basis. The rights he asserts are not to
be found within the four corners of the Constitution. In fact the only individual
member of Congress on whom the Constitution imposes specific duties with
regard to the canvass is the Senate President, who is responsible for the
reception and opening of the certificates of canvass.
More importantly, and contrary to petitioner's assertions, the Rules on
Canvassing adequately provides each member of Congress with an opportunity
to observe the canvassing and to make known his views on the Report of Joint
Committee:
Sec. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)
among themselves their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The
Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two (2) divisions
of eleven members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members from
the Senate and five (5) from the House of Representatives: Provided, That
a Member of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-President
shall not be eligible for appointment to the Joint Committee. Each division
shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Committee.
of candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President.
The Representative of the province or city whose certificate of
canvass is being canvassed shall be an ex-officio member of the
Joint Committee, without voting rights, for the duration of the
canvassing of the aforesaid certificate of canvass.

the House of Representatives voting separately. In case the two
prevail.

xxx xxx xxx
After the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes

have been tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in
writing for copies thereof from the Secretariat prior to the
consideration of any interim or final report to the joint session.
separately. CAacTH
report.
from Congress: Provided, That objections raised and rulings made
thereon shall no longer be included in the final report.
provided with a copy of the final report and shall be given
twenty-four (24) hours within which to submit his concurring or
dissenting opinion.
those against the report shall also speak for not more than one
hour. Subsequent speakers for or against the resolution shall be
allowed to speak for not more than three hours: Provided, That
one (1) speaker for each candidate shall be given the
opportunity to speak for not more than twenty minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION
forthwith proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-
elect. (Emphasis supplied) IacHAE
The Rules on Canvassing likewise provides for mechanisms by which the

candidates, through their representatives, may participate in the canvassing
process:
Section 8. Each candidate shall be entitled to two watchers from
a team of five watchers who shall have access to an unimpeded
view of the entire canvassing proceedings. They shall register their
attendance before the Joint Committee and shall keep vigilant watch over
the ballot boxes from the time the same are received in the House of
Representatives until the canvassing proceedings are terminated.
Each candidate shall likewise be entitled to attorneys who shall

serve during the entire canvassing proceedings. The attorneys
shall register their appearances before the Joint Committee: Provided,
That only one attorney for every candidate may argue and
question any certificate of canvassconsidered by the Joint
Committee for not more than five (5) minutes which may be extended
for a similar period by the chairman when the need arises without
prejudice to the right to submit a written memorandum not
later than twenty-four (24) hours from the time the objection
was raised. No extension of the period to submit shall be allowed, and if
no memorandum is submitted with the said period, the right shall be
considered waived. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
as well as remedies in case patent irregularities and discrepancies are

discovered in the certificates of canvass: AaDSEC
Section 17. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or

supporting statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or
alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the
number of votes stated therein and may affect the result of the
election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential
candidate concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole
Vice-President, count the votes as they appear in the copies of
the election returns submitted to it. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
The procedure adopted by Congress is not without rational basis. The procedure
embodied in the questioned Rules on Canvassing is evidently intended to
accomplish both a speedy and accurate canvass. On the other hand, while there
appears to be little to be gained in the way of accuracy if the authentication and
canvass of the certificates were undertaken by both Houses of Congress as a
whole, much time may be lost by such a procedure.
It may not be amiss to point out that the timeliness of the canvassing and the
proclamation of the President-elect and Vice-President-elect is also of concern. It
is a general policy of our elections laws that controversies arising before the
proclamation of winning candidates should be dealt with in a summary manner
so that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. Hence,
questions involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of the election
campaign and the voting itself, which require more deliberate and necessarily
longer consideration, are properly the subject matter of election protests before
the appropriate adjudicatory body. 30 In the recent case of Sandoval v.
Commission on Elections, 31 this Court had occasion to state:
On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the
petitions filed by private respondent. As a general rule, candidates and
registered political parties involved in an election are allowed to file pre-
proclamation cases before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to
any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered
political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly
with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235
and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction
over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to
the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits
candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and
congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It
states: AacSTE
"SECTION 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for

President, Vice-President, senator, and Members of the House of
Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass,
as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority
of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it."
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the
winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in
these sensitive posts. . . . 32 (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the will of the people is no less frustrated by undue delays in the canvass
and proclamation of the winning candidates as by other forms of electoral fraud.
Finally, it may be observed that, because there can only be one winner, elections
naturally provoke intense competition among the candidates vying for elective
office. And in a close race for the highest executive position, fierce partisan
political activity is but to be expected. But once the electoral process has moved
beyond election day itself and all that is left to be done is to ascertain the will of
the people as expressed through the ballot, it is to be hoped that the members of
both Houses of Congress, politicians though they may be, will remember the
words of Manuel Luis Quezon, first President of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and realize that loyalty to their party ends where loyalty to their
country begins.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
CALLEJO, SR., J., concurring:
I concur with the encompassing separate opinion of my esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno.
I am convinced that Congress, when it acts as the National Board of Canvassers
in the presidential and vice-presidential elections conformably with Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution, does not merely perform a ministerial function,
but exercises quasi-judicial powers when it determines the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass. In fact, this is one of the substantial
changes introduced in the 1987 Constitution. In his sponsorship speech,
Commissioner Lorenzo M. Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee of the 1986
Constitutional Commission which drafted the Article on the Executive
Department, explained:
The first constitutional change that I will mention is the canvassing of
votes for President and Vice-President. In the 1973 Constitution, the
provision on canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President is as
follows:
The returns of every election for President, duly certified by the

board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted
to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa, who shall, not later than
thirty days after the day of the election, and in the presence of the
Batasang Pambansa, open all the certificates, and the votes shall
then be counted.
It will be remembered that many of the certificates of canvass received

from each province and city by the Batasang Pambasa were objected to
by the supporters of Aquino and Laurel. But based on this provision of
the 1973 Constitution, after the certificates of canvass had been opened,
the Speaker immediately announced the results of the canvass and
proclaimed President Marcos and Mr. Tolentino as elected President and
Vice-President, respectively. aSADIC
In the Article on the Executive that is submitted for consideration, it is

now provided that after the certificates of canvass had been opened, the
counting and canvassing of votes for the President and Vice-President
shall not immediately be made because, first, there should be a
determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass before the votes may be canvassed. That appears in Section 4
of the Article. . . . 1
The discussion between Messrs. Regalado E. Maambong and Jose N. Nolledo, both
members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, on this point is, likewise,
particularly instructive:
MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of the

authenticity and due execution thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2,
referring to the certificates of canvass of the President and Vice-
President. Am I right if I say that because of the use of these
words, the duty of the legislature to canvass is no longer
ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been interpreted by
the Supreme Court as applicable to the canvass made by the
National Assembly, and the reason why we did not put the word
"ministerial" in the Article is, it has been understood in Roxas v.
Lopez and in other cases. When we used the words "authenticity"
and "genuineness," the question refers to the problem of whether
or not the ministerial function is already non-ministerial. The answer
is, it is still ministerial but when we say "authenticity and due
execution," what it really means is that the National Assembly will
look at the certificates of canvass and find out from the face of the
document whether there are flaws in the execution and authenticity
of the document. That is what it means. HDTSCc
MR. NOLLEDO:
what will happen?
MR. MAAMBONG:
The answer to that is in the phrase "in the manner provided by law." The
Committee had to insert the phrase "in the manner provided by
law" so that the legislature itself will find out and will make it very
specific as to what flaws or deficiencies in the certificates of
canvass can be taken cognizance of by the canvassing board of
tellers, because as of now, the guiding regulations that govern the
National Assembly, as I mentioned in the Committee, are: the rules
and regulations of the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election Code, the
jurisprudence from the decisions of the Supreme Court. All these
things taken together, the legislature is given a notice by using the
phrase "in the manner provided by law," so that it will make a
determination now of what are the points which the board of tellers
can take cognizance of, because it is not very clear right now
under the laws and regulations, and as a matter of fact, that was
one of the controversies which arose during the canvassing of the
votes of President Aquino and former President Marcos in the last
Batasan. 2
A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in

a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the
propriety of the act done. 3 As my esteemed colleague, Justice Jose C. Vitug, in
his separate opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 4
succinctly put it, "a ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which,
being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion." Congress, as the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the
President and Vice-President, is mandated to make a "determination of the
authenticity and due execution" of the certificates of canvass before it proceeds
to canvass the same. As such, it cannot be said to perform a purely ministerial
function but it exercises a quasi-judicial function as well. It has been said that
where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of function of a judge, or is conferred
upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. 5
In this sense, the function of Congress, as the National Board of Canvassers in
the presidential and vice-presidential elections, is akin to that of the municipal,
provincial or city boards of canvassers. These boards of canvassers are said to
exercise quasi-judicial powers as they are tasked to determine the due execution
and authenticity of the certificates of canvass or the election returns as the case
may be before them:
. . . We do not discern in the law a purpose to throw the burden on
courts where it is patent — as in the case here — that tampering of the
returns occurred after they have left the hands of the election
inspectors, just to pave the way for the proclamation of a candidate in
whose favor falsification was resorted to. To tie up the hands of the board
of canvassers in the situation here presented is to wink at a brazen form
of wrong-doing to subvert the people's will, and in mockery crown the
loser with victory. Correctly then, canvassers are given quasi-judicial
powers to determine whether the return is genuine and to disregard one
which is obviously a forgery. Along parallel lines, this Court, in Nacionalista
Party v. Commission on Elections . . ., declared that the canvassing board
could accept as correct those returns transmitted to it "which are in due
form;" that they must "be satisfied of the genuineness of the returns —
namely, that the papers presented to them are not forged and spurious;"
and that "where the returns are obviously manufactured, . . . the board
will not be compelled to canvass them. 6
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

TINGA, J.:
The tradition of judicial review is as old as the essences of the democratic system
of government we practice today. 1 This Court has consistently affirmed the
doctrine, dating as far back as the Commonwealth era. 2 Judicial review arises
from the inherent judicial power, and has traditionally relied on no statutory
grant other than the source law that created the judicial system. 3 DTaAHS
At the same time, the notion of separation of powers is a linchpin of our

constitutional order. Coordinate political departments are accorded their
respective spheres over which they exercise discretion to manage. It is a rule that
promotes efficient governance, and, perhaps more importantly, institutionalizes
the system of checks and balances within the government.
These two doctrines are hardly antithetical. Judicial review ensures that the
other branches of government obey the Constitution. 4 It also shields one branch
from undue interference by another. On the other hand, the Court should restrain
itself from unduly interfering in the affairs of co-equal branches of government.
Indeed, the unwarranted exercise of the judicial power would be judicial activism
at its most egregious.
Cognizant that unwarranted judicial review may breach both the traditional
deference accorded by the judiciary to the coordinate political departments and
the presumption of validity accorded to their actions, jurisprudence has fostered
the evolution of the "political question" doctrine as a form of autolimitation of
the judicial power. The traditional stance of the Court has been to desist from
deciding issues that may properly be classified as political questions. A political
question refers to a question of policy or to issues which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. 5
In our country, the "political question" doctrine has undergone some rethinking,
particularly in light of the misuse of the doctrine during the martial law era. The
incorporation of Article VIII, Section 1 6 in the 1987 Constitution has especially
affected this Court's thinking on the political question doctrine. 7
Yet while nobody pretends that Section 1, Article VIII invented judicial review in
the Philippines, I likewise submit that the same article did not render the
"political question" inconsequential. Section 1, Article VIII has crystallized into a
constitutional command decades of jurisprudence affirming this Court's exercise
of judicial review, as balanced by the political question doctrine. Neither have the
contours of judicial review been altered by the new provision. Its effect is simply
this: with judicial duty cast not only as a power but also as a duty, no longer can
this Court refuse to correct a coordinate branch's act of grave abuse of discretion
simply on the premise that it constitutes a political question, as it had done in
the past. 8
The petition is unable to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Congress in promulgating the canvassing rules. Shorn of this essential element,
the Court is left with nothing to review but an act of a coordinate branch of
government which is textually committed to Congress by Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution. 9 This is a political question, and the Court should not extend
due course to the petition.
This leads to an important point which the Court should not overlook. The mere
incantation by a petitioner of "grave abuse of discretion" is not a passport to this
Court's jurisdiction. If upon initial review, it appears that no grave abuse of
discretion attends the questioned political act, the Court should say so, and say
nothing more.
Moreover, an express rejection of jurisdiction over political questions bereft of
grave abuse of discretion serves not only as an act of courtesy to the co-equal
branch, but also as an act of deference to the Constitution. While the Court
should not hesitate to compel an errant branch into obeying the Constitution, it
should also acknowledge when the other branches are obeying the Constitution,
and that the Court itself is observing its own constitutional mandate by reusing
to interfere. HcTSDa
The present petition serves as a perfect opportunity to desist and reject.

The basic issue proposed by petitioner is whether the rules of canvass ("Rules")
promulgated relative to the 10 May 2004 elections are constitutional. 10 In
support of his thesis that the Rules are unconstitutional, petitioner makes four
arguments; that the Rules are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
to a joint committee of Congress; that the Rules amend Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution; that the Rules deprive petitioner of his rights and prerogatives
as a member of congress; and by enforcement of the Rules, Congress neglects
performing its constitutionally enjoined duty. 11
On the arguments raised by the petitioner, the result is clear-cut. The petition is
palpably without merit.
First, the Rules does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. The power to canvass votes is not inherently legislative, as it does not
pertain to the enactment of legislation. 12 By traditional concept, the non-
delegation rule means that
Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another
branch of government. 13
At the same time, pursuing this point is ultimately needless, as despite
petitioner's claim, there really is no delegation made by Congress. A clear
examination of the Rules reveals that therein, Congress retains the right to open
the certificates of canvass and canvass the votes. cACDaH
Second, the Rules does not amend Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution by
providing for an unconstitutional method for canvassing the votes.
Congress is expressly granted the power to promulgate rules for the canvassing
of the certificates. 14 By virtue of this express right, the Rules were promulgated
by Congress. The Joint Committee does not have any authority or power except
that granted to it under the questioned Rules. Even then, its power is limited
only to functioning as a preparatory or preliminary body to speed up and make
more efficient the canvassing of the votes. 15 The Joint Committee's acts and
determinations do not have any force and effect unless approved by the whole of
Congress. 16
The canvassing of the votes under the questioned Rules is still the act of
Congress as one whole body. The findings of the Joint Committee do not bind
Congress unless approved in a joint public session. 17 Accordingly, Congress may
choose to overrule the findings and determinations made by the Joint
Committee.
The assailed Rules, and the procedure laid therein, are but an offshoot of
legislative practice. 18 Congress, as a matter of legislative practice, functions by
way of delegation towards committees. The formation of congressional
committees arises from plenary power possessed by the legislative body for all
purposes of civil government. 19 The entire House or Senate is too large to
conduct basic functions, such as to conduct investigations in aid of legislation,
and thus must always use a committee. 20 A bill that is filed in Congress is
always referred for preliminary consideration to the particular congressional
committee which would have specialized competence to examine the merits of
the proposed law. Yet, while the final report of the congressional committee as to
the proposed bill may have persuasive effect on the body as a whole, it is by no
means binding. In fact, Congress as a whole has the power to revive a bill that
has been tabled due to unfavorable action by the congressional committee. 21 HDCTAc
The assailed Rules is premised on realistic considerations that also govern the
daily legislative grind: that owing to the sheer volume of work and the number
of legislators, it would be counter-productive to have every and any preliminary
matter to be voted upon by every member of the House or Senate.
The procedure outlined in the questioned Rules does not in any way contravene
Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution. In fact, it strictly adheres to the provision.
Under the Rules, the Senate President opens the certificates of canvass in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session.
22 Upon approval by Congress in joint public session of the Joint Committee
report, Congress as one whole body is deemed to have determined the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates and canvassed the certificate of
votes.
Third, the questionedRules does not emasculate the representatives who are not
members of the Joint Committee since the Rules specifically provides avenues
for each member of Congress to voice out any dissent to the opinions and
conclusions of the Joint Committee. Petitioner will be entitled to avail of all his
legislative privileges and exert his persuasive powers during that time certain
when the Congress as a whole would deliberate on and approve the Joint
Committee's resolution of any question involving a certificate of canvass, 23 the
final report of the Joint Committee, 24 and the resolution proclaiming the
President and Vice-President-elect. 25
In light of my earlier discussion, petitioner's fourth argument hardly bears
discussion. Contrary to his claim, Congress did not abdicate from its
constitutional duties to canvass the presidential and vice-presidential elections.
The Joint Committee canvass is merely a preliminary canvass, with the final
canvass results subject to approval by the entire Congress.
These are the only issues for resolution before the Court, and they can be
concisely dispensed with. Given the scope and limitations of these issues
presented before us, it would be improvident of this Court to discuss
issues which are not raised, or to engage in a "preemptive strike"
based on speculative musings that in its wisdom, Congress will be
misguided by erroneous principles in the future conduct of its canvass.
By doing so, this Court will act in excess of its jurisdiction, by ruling upon
matters which have not been duly raised before us. The Court does not issue
advisory opinions. 26 This holds true, especially in the face of temptation to
dictate to a co-equal branch how it should act, despite the absence of any
justiciable question that would warrant such intrusion.
In fine, it is not the business of the Court to dictate on Congress as to how it
should perform its task as the national canvassing board, as its mandate was
derived from no less than the fundamental law. Should it fail to fulfill its
mandate, it is accountable not to this Court, but to the sovereign people.
Of course, there are laws which governs the conduct of the national canvass.
Republic Act No. 7166, passed in 1991, is one such law. Section 15 thereof
provides:
Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives.
— For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases
shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of
canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the
authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon
written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. SIaHDA
It is clear that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 prohibits pre-proclamation

cases in elections for President and Vice-President. This would extend to
questions pertaining to the appreciation of election returns or certificates of
canvass. The only exception would be to correct manifest errors in the certificate
of canvass. The Court in Chavez v. COMELEC 27 defined "manifest errors" as
those that must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election
returns sought to be corrected, and an objection thereto must have been made
before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings. For the purpose of the presidential/vice-presidential
canvass, the Court's definition in Chavez must be qualified, since Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution mandates that Congress inspect only the
certificates of canvass. Verily, I submit that such manifest errors which may be
corrected only pertain to the certificates of canvass in the case of presidential
and vice-presidential elections.
The Court, through Justice Puno, explained the reason for Section 15 in Sandoval
v. COMELEC:
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the
winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in
these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to
the exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of
petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and
members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that
the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of
canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the
election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of
the COMELEC under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an, election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections. 28 (emphasis supplied)
The limitations imposed on the national board of canvassers are thus clear. The
question which must be resolved by the canvassers is whether there is
prima facie basis for the proclamation of the president and the vice-
president. Matters which may be inquired into through a pre-proclamation
protest, as laid down in Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not
justiciable by Congress acting as the Board of Canvassers. 29
Populist arguments aside, there are fundamental policy considerations why
Congress is proscribed by law from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies,
or inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the certificates of canvass. First, there is
the abhorrence of vacuum in the "sensitive posts" 30 of President and Vice-
President. The Constitution provides that the term of office of the president shall
begin on the thirtieth day of June. 31 While the Constitution provides for
contingencies should no president be proclaimed before that date, all efforts
should be exerted to avoid these "emergency provisions" from coming into play,
as they would necessarily affect political stability. In fact, the June 30th
"deadline" should be appreciated by Congress as an imperative that should guide
the body in the formulation of the rules for canvassing.
There is also the fact that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President. 32 As the eminent constitutionalist Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza has explained:
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of
the House of Representatives. The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the
other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and
Vice President, as the case may be. (citations omitted) 33
IcESaA
It is clear that such questions in the province of the Supreme Court to decide in
its capacity as the sole judge of election contests for the presidency and vice-
presidency are distinct from those within the mandate of Congress as the
canvassing body. They include the appreciation of election returns and questions
pertaining to the intrinsic validity of the certificates of canvass. The power to be
the "judge of contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of any
public officer is essentially judicial, and as such, under the principle of separation
of powers, it belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar
as the Constitution provides otherwise. 34
I VOTE to DISMISS the petition.
Footnotes
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
1. Petition, p. 2 [emphasis supplied].
2. 103 Phil. 1051, 1068 [1957].
3. Javellana v. Executive Secretary, L-35154, 31 March 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 84, citing In
re McConaughy, 119, N.W. 408, 417.
4. Petition, p. 12, citing 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission 419 [hereinafter

RECORDS].
5. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979.

6. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 112-113 [1937].
7. Sec. 1., Article II, 1987 Constitution.
8. U.S. v. Hampton, 276 US 394 [1928]. See also Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice ,
G.R. No. 13260, 12 October 1998, 297 SCRA 754; People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.
328 [1939].
9. Throughout the Constitution are examples of such encroachment, such as in the

House of Representatives, Senate, or Presidential Electoral Tribunals, with
members from their respective Houses as well as from the Supreme Court, or
else when the President exercises the veto power regarding legislation.
10. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings , punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed shall not
exceed sixty days. [Emphasis supplied]
11. Discussing the authority of Congress to provide its rules of proceedings, Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza in Arroyo v. De Venecia, (G.R. No. 127255, 14 August 1997,
277 SCRA 268), cites Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968
[1912], where it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the
rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation
of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative
matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by
a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination
of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it
proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in
the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution." [Emphasis
supplied]. See also United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5,
9-10 [1906]: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. . . .The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal."
12. RECORDS at 433.
13. 2 RECORDS at 391.
14. Republic Act No. 7166, An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and
Other Purposes, 26 November 1991.
15. See Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1995, 235
SCRA, 666-672 where it was held that amendments to bills proposed by
conference committees held in executive session that were not found in the
original bills approved by the House of Representatives or the Senate, were
deemed valid because they were "[o]ften the only way to reach agreement an
conflicting provisions. . . with only the conferees present.
Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made." Regardless, such amendments were

deemed valid as they could only be passed with the approval of Congress.
16. Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871, citing 67 Corpus Juris Secundum 870.
17. Citing Sanson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198.
18. 2 RECORDS at 433.
19. 124 Phil. 168.
20. Id. at p. 182.
21. Record and Journal of the Joint Session of Congress as National Board of
Canvassers, Tenth Congress of the Philippines.
22. Id., 1.
23. Id., 1 & 2.
PUNO, J.:
1. A delegated power cannot be delegated.
2. 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
3. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 80 (2000).

4. Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7 (1967).
5. 281 SCRA 330, 348 (1997).
6. 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
7. 144 U.S. 5, 36 L ed., 324-325.
8. G.R. No. 160261. See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, J. Puno.
9. Ibid.
10. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.
11. The New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, 1995 International Edition,
p. 790.
12. Section 14.
13. 40 Phil. 246, 251 (1919).
14. Aquino v. COMELEC, 22 SCRA 288, 293 (1968).
QUISUMBING, J.:
* Annex "A" to the petition.
* Arguments, p. 10 of petition.
* A member of the Joint Committee, Hon. Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin, also filed a
motion for leave to file attached Comment, which we granted and noted on 8
June 2004.
** Comment, House of Representatives, p. 12.
*** Comment, Senate of the Philippines, p. 40.
* See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186.

** See also Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452.
* See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and Gore v. Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
* Petition, p. 13.
* Note from the Publisher: Missing footnote text.
* Petition, p. 22.
** Citing Congressional Records for these years.
* See Records, Constitutional Com., pp. 391, 401.
** Comment of the OSG, p. 15.

*** Comment, House of Representatives, p. 10.
* Comment of OSG, p. 15.
CARPIO MORALES, J., concurring:
1. Petition at 2-3.
2. Id. at 10.
3. CONST. art. VIII, sec. 1.
4. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156-159 (1936).
5. Vide: In re Prautch, 1 Phil. 132 (1902); U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922);
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991).
6. Vide: Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997), Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298
SCRA 756 (1998).
7. Petition at 18.
8. Id. at 7-9.
9. 17 SCRA 756 (1966).
10. Id. at 769.
11. Petition at 15-16.
12. Mateo v. Court of Appeals , 196 SCRA 280, 284 (1991) citing Symaco v. Aquino,
106 Phil. 1130 (1960).
13. 21 SCRA 1462, 1466 (1967).
14. Id. at 1466-1467.
15. 22 SCRA 1317 (1968).

16. Id. at 1318-1320.
17. 180 SCRA 509 (1989).
18. Id. at 514-515.
19. II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND

DEBATES 390-391 (1986).
20. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. at 426.
21. Ibid.
22. Petition at 14-15.
23. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 (1970); Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968);
Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30 (1978).
24. David v. Commission on Elections, 271 SCRA 90 (1997); vide: Arroyo v. De

Venecia, supra; Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., supra.
25.
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.
26. Unless two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes. In which
case, one of them shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.
27. 249 SCRA 628 (1995).

28. Id. at 649-650.
29. Petition at 21.
30. Abella v. Larrazabal, supra.
31. 323 SCRA 403 (2000).
32. Id. at 417-418.
CALLEJO, SR., J., concurring:

1. II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 385.
2. Id. at 390-391.
3. Mateo v. Court of Appeals , 196 SCRA 280 (1991).
4. 248 SCRA 300 (1995).
5. Sandoval v. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 403 (2000).
6. Espino v. Zaldivar, 21 SCRA 1204 (1967); Salvacion v. Commission on Elections, 170

SCRA 513 (1989). (Underscoring supplied.)
TINGA, J.:
1. See e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 L. ed [1803].
2. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
3. "The United States Constitution. . . does not explicitly grant the judicial review
power asserted in Marbury." K. Sullivan & G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 13,
14th ed. (2001). See also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 207, 3rd ed.
(2000). "Although the Constitution is silent as to whether federal courts have
[the authority for judicial review], the power has existed ever since Marbury". E.
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 39, 2nd ed.; (2002).
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Byron White has been on record in opining that it
was the U.S. Constitution, and not Marbury v. Madison that created judicial
review in the United States.
4. "When [judicial] supremacy is invoked, it compels the errant branches of

government to obey not the Supreme Court, but the Constitution." Francisco v.
House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 160261, etc., 10 November 2003, J. Tinga,
concurring.
5. Generally, political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil.
101 [1957], as cited in Tatad v. Secretary of Finance, 346 Phil. 321.
The formulation made in Baker v. Carr by the late American Supreme Court Justice
William Brennan as to what constitutes a political question has long gained a
foothold both in the United States and in the Philippines. "Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision' already made; or potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217. (1962)
6. "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."
See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution, in relation to Baker v. Carr, supra note
5.
7. See, e.g., Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989, 177 SCRA
668.
8. See e.g., Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 151-A Phil. 35 (1973).
9. "The returns of every election for President and Vice-President . . . . shall be

transmitted to the Congress . . . and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes." See Section 4, Article VII, Constitution.
10. Petition, p. 9.
11. Id. at 10.

12. The essential of the legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy
and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.
Occeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-2265, 28 January 1980, citing Yakus v. United
States 321 US 414, 88 L. ed. 834.
13. See K. Sullivan and G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 351, 14th ed. (2001) "The non-
delegation doctrine forces a politically accountable Congress to make the policy
choices, rather than leave this to unelected administrative officials." E.
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 2nd ed 319 (2002).
14. "The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates."
Par. 6, Sec. 4, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
15. In fact, the 2nd paragraph of Section 13 of the Rules quite baldly states: "The Joint
Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution of
the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for
the offices of President and Vice-President.
16. See Secs. 19, 23 and 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
17. See Section 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
18. Congress has the constitutional power to adopt rules for its proceedings, and by
legislative practice it is conceded the power to promulgate such orders as may
be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve its dignity. See Vera v.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212. (1946)
19. See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three Departments of
the Philippine Government 205 (1985).
20. See E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 2nd ed 303 (2002).
21. See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three Departments of
the Philippine Government 205 (1985).

24. See Section 23 and 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
26. Guingona v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 125532, 10 July 1998, 292 SCRA 402,
413; Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235
SCRA 630, 686; De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, 12 March 1982, 112
SCRA 294, 385, Plana, J., concurring and dissenting.
27. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105323, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 315, 322.
28. 380 Phil. 375, 389-390 (2000).
29. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code states:
243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. The following shall
be proper issues that may be raised in a preproclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear
to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or
in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and
236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were
canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates.
30. Sandoval v. COMELEC, supra note 28.
31. Article VII, Section 1, par. 1, Constitution.
32. See Section 4, Article VII, Constitution.
33. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300, 397; J.
Mendoza, concurring.
34. Lopez v. Roxas, 124 Phil. 168, 177 (1965).

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 163556. June 8, 2004.]

CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. SENATE OF THE

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

The Representatives of the province or city whose certiﬁcate of canvass

It is petitioner's position that the formation of a Joint Committee, which

It is true that where the Constitution has vested powers in a branch of

As to the canvassing of votes, paragraph 2, of Sec. 13, provides that "[t]he

On page 2, between lines 22 and 23, I propose to insert a new

Will Commissioner Davide repeat the proposed amendment?

CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE CANVASS OF THE

Is this accepted by the Committee?

For the beneﬁt of the other Commissioners, will Commissioner Davide

That is entirely a diﬀerent matter, Madam President, because it would

As regards the determination of authenticity and due execution of the

When the certiﬁcate of canvass, duly certiﬁed by the board of

When it appears that any certiﬁcate of canvass or supporting statement

Contrary to petitioner's argument, therefore, whether Congress deems it ﬁt to

Referring, once again, to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: SHEIDC

I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of the

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On May 2, 2004, petitioner, a member of the House of Representatives

Respondent House of Representatives, through the Speaker of the House of

SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)

The Representative of the province or city whose certiﬁcate of canvass is

When the Constitution is violated, even an act of a co-equal and coordinate

To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes

We shall not be breaking grounds in striking down an act of a co-equal

In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we also ruled that the Electoral

Similarly, in Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

The recent case of Macalintal v. COMELEC on absentee voting aﬃrmed

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed

Seventh. The primary consideration in determining the authenticity and due

Nor is the right of petitioner as lawmaker — canvasser unduly prejudiced by

In denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order, we were not unmindful

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the

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WHEREFORE, ﬁnding no clear and adequate basis to declare that there is a

The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an

The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an

The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an

By the Passage of the Aforementioned Rules Dated May 28, 2004,

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,

The person having the highest number of votes shall be

b) Congress shall determine the authenticity and due execution of all

c) Congress shall canvass the votes for presidential and vice-presidential

The Representative of the province or city whose certiﬁcate of canvass is

Needless to say, the power of Congress to declare who, among

1. The election return for precinct No. 18 of Dinalupihan is not "obviously

xxx xxx xxx

If there was any fraud or irregularity committed in the election in said

And in Abella v. Commission on Elections, 17 this Court stated:

This provision reads as follows:

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. —