Persons and Family Relations Law

Dean’s Circle
2016
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
PERSONS
AND
FAMILY
RELATIONS
LAW
First Sem Cases
https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

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Table of Contents
Preliminaries 2
Human Relations 14
Prejudicial Question 29
Civil Personality 33
Citizenship 34
Marriage 35
Void Marriages 46
Psychological Incapacity 53
Voidable Marriages 76
Legal Separation 78
Rights and Obligations between Husband & Wife 81
Property Relations 85
The Family as an Institution 103
Family Home 106
Paternity and Filiation 108
Adoption 125
Support 130
Parental Authority 131
Preliminaries
LORENZO M. TANADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985, ESCOLIN, J.
The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of
its effectivity cannot be dispensed with.

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Facts:

Tanada seeks for the issuance of writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish or cause
to be published in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders because it involves
public interest. Tuvera dismissed the case outright beacause Tanada has no legal personality to file petition
for mandamus since he is not an aggrieved party which what the law requires that only a person who is
personally and directly affected by non-publication of laws would have the personality to file such. Tuvera
further contends that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates and since the presidential issuances
in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
Issue:
Whether or not the requirement of publication can be dispensed with.

Ruling:
No. The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity cannot be dispensed with.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1.There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders
and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to
be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon public officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such
listing, to our mind, leaves public officials with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions
so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

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LORENZO M. TANADA ET AL v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, CRUZ, J.
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" under Article 2 of the Civil Code refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Facts:

Tanada requested for publication of presidential decrees for public purposes. The government
argued that while publication is necessary as a ruled, it is not so when it is "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
Issue:
Whether or not the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself
Ruling:

Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code states that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision, SC have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under the disputed
clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the
lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with
but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
SC holds therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION v. THE HON.

SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and
CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the

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personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties
Facts:
Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment. It recruited private respondents for employment in Saudi
and made to pay placement fees. However when the private reached the Saudi they were made to sign
contracts resulting to some reduction of their benefits but they refused to do sp. Due to their refusal they,
were terminated and repatriated back in the Philippines. Thereafter, the filed a complaint of illegal exaction
against Philsa which the Secretary of Labor found it guilty of such for collecting fees beyond the prescribed
by law. Philsa insists however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from
applicants, is void for lack of publication.
Issue:

Whether or not Philsa is guilty of illegal exaction despite the fact that the POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 11, Series of 1983 was not published.
Ruling:
No. In Tañada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows: that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations
and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions
issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties."
Applying this doctrine, SC ruled that the abovementioned Memorandum shall be ineffective since
it lacks publication which makes Philsa not liable for illegal exaction.
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993, NOCON, J.
It is a settled rule that when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Facts:

Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes were students of Unciano Paramedical College Inc. After their
first term, they were no longer allowed to enroll due to allegedly being members of National Union of
Students of the Philippines and League of Filipinos Officers which they organized despite the prohibition to
organize such. Unciano cited the ruling in Alcuaz which was promulgated on 1988 that when a college
student registered in a school, it is understood that he is only enrolling for the entire semester. Thus it also
refuted the argument of Villegas and Magallanes that since in a more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs.
Hon. Sancho Dames promulgated in 1990 (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled
its decision in Alcuaz since it was promulgated later when the contract has already been terminated. Thus,
it cannot apply retroactively.

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Issue:

Whether or not the ruling in the case of Ariel Non et al vs. Hon Dames may be applied
retroactively.
Ruling:

No. Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Under Article 4 of the New Civil Code, Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. Furthermore, Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decision applying or
interpreting the laws or constitution shall form a part of the legal system. Thus, since judicial decisions are
laws it shall not have retroactive effect unless otherwise provided.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly
situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case.
EMETERIO CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961, CONCEPCION, J.
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as
to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent
with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights.
Facts:

Cui was a student of Arellano University from prelaw up to fourth year first semester in the
College of law. By that time he was a scholar of such university and his tuition fees were reimbursed after
each semester. The scholarship agreement however stipulates that in consideration of the scholarship
granted to him by the University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded
to the University the equivalent of his scholarship cash. But after in his fourth year last semester, he
transferred to College of Law Abad Santos University thus he graduated therein. The conflict arose when
he needed his law school records for taking up the bar exam but Arellano University contended that it will
only release such upon payment of reimbursed tuition fees. Thus, Director of private schools issued a
Memorandum which states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships
should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer
to another institution for it is against public policy. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is
understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. Scholarships should not be offered merely to
attract and keep students in a school.
Issue:

Whether or not the Contract of Scholarship entered into by the Cui and Arellano waiving the
formers right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University the equivalent of his
scholarship cash is void for it is against public policy.
Ruling:

Yes, Under Article 6 of the New Civil Code states that Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.

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In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent
with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. It has
been consistently held that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the
law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or
tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty.
Thus, if Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships it should have not
entered into a contract of waiver with Cui, which is a direct violation of the Memorandum and an open
challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound
morality and civic honesty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN

G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974, ANTONIO, J.
Decisions of the Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean.
Facts:

Jose Jabinal was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition without the required
license permit on 1964. However, he contended that he was a Secret agent from the Provincial Governor of
Batangas for prevention of crimes as well as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander for
prevention of smuggling. Thus the said appointments carried with them the authority to possess and carry
the firearm. His argument was relied on the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang (1959)
and People vs. Lucero (1958). However, the RTC convicted the accused on the basis that such decisions
were already overturned by latest decision promulgated by the SC in People vs. Mapa on 1967 thereby
Secret Agents were no longer exempted from license permit. Thus such ruling shall apply retroactively
convicting the accused of such crime.
Issue:

Whether or not People vs. Mapa shall be applied retroactively, thus convicting Jabinal for illegal
possession of firearms.
Ruling:
No, Under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system”. Decisions of this Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the
law, of the land, at the time Jabinal was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary
that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that Jabinal conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm
in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, He may not
be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

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ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
While it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Facts:

Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines was married to Richard Upton a US citizen. They
were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines. However due to
conflicts, they obtained a divorce in Nevada US and later on Alice Van Dorn remarried to Theodore Van
Dorn. Conflict arose when, Upton claimed in the RTC through a petition that Alice Vandorns shop in
Ermita is a conjugal property which he orders the latter to render an accounting and that he be declared to
manage the property. Van Dorn then filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in divorce proceedings before Nevada Court which was acknowledge by Upton that
they had no community property. However, it was denied by the RTC on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Hence this
petition. Upton averred that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Divorce decree is binding as between the parties.

Ruling:
Yes, it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of Van Dorn. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as Vandorn's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as Upton does, that, under our laws, Vandorn has to be considered still married to
him and still subject to a wife's obligations cannot be just. Vandorn should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Upton. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
FE D. QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND BLANDINA DANDAN

G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, BELLOSILLO, J.

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Citizenship at the time the divorce decree was obtained is necessary for the purpose of recognition
of such in the Philippine Courts.
Facts:

Fe. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan both Filipinos were married in the Philippines. However, they
obtained a divorce decree in San Francisco California USA. Later on, she remarried twice. When Padlan
died, she claimed for the estate of such and invoking that the divorce decree was not valid in the
Philippines since at the time they obtained divorce, they were both Filipino citizens and thus, she is entitled
to the estate of Padlan. Meanwhile, Dandan the second wife of Padlan claimed that she is the lawful wife
and that Quita was already an American Citizen at the time of the divorce which makes Padlan entitled
validly remarry. RTC invoking Tenchavez v. Escao which held that a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code was not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction, thereby disregarded the divorce between Qiuta and Padlan. However the trial court
did not bother to resolve the issue of citizenship of Quita at the time the divorce decree was obtained.
Issue:

Whether or not citizenship at the time of the divorce is necessary for the divorce decree to be
recognized in the Philippine Courts.
Ruling:

Yes, If Quita was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo, this should
have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is
to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao. Thus
Quitas citizenship of was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Thus, since RTC has failed to resolve the issue of citizenship of Quita at the time of the divorce,
then the case must be remanded to such for trial.
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO CATALAN AND

MEROPE BRAGANZA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action.
Facts:
Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the
United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof and later on allegedly divorced.
Orlando remarried to Braganza though the later had prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol.
Felicitas then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Orlando and Merope. RTC
granted such petition but on Appeal it was reversed by the CA ruling that Felicitas does not have the legal
capacity to file the petition since they already obtained divorce thus severing her ties with Orlando.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicitas has the legal capacity to file the petition assuming arguendo that they

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obtained divorce decree after they were naturalized as American citizens.
Ruling:
No, If there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage. Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no
longer has any interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other
might subsequently contract.
Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent
marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the
divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. Significantly,
Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented.
Facts:

Felicisimo San Luis had three marriages. His first marriage was dissolve because his first wife
died. His second marriage was with Merry Lee an America citizen though they obtained divorce. His third
marriage was with Felicidad San Luis. Felicisimo died, which prompted Felicidad in filing for petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. It was then opposed by the children of Felicisimo in
his first marriage contending that the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was bigamous due to the
fact that the divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines since Felicisimo is a Filipino and the
Philippine Laws does not grant divorce. Felicidad then presented the divorce decree but it was opposed by
the children of Felicisimo from his first wife.
Issue:

Whether or not the presentation solely of divorce decree is sufficient to prove its authenticity and
due execution.
Ruling:

No, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s
surviving spouse.
In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign
law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in

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which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT
G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Facts:
Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot (Rebecca) and Vicente Madrigal Bayot (Vicente) were married
on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca to be an
American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix.
From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter initiated
divorce proceedings in the CFI of Dominican Republic which ordered the dissolution of the couple's
marriage but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix.
Rebecca filed a petition before the Muntinlupa City RTC for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support
pendente lite for her and Alix. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting
her Filipino citizenship, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
The RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss and granted Rebecca's application for support
pendente lite. The CA dismissed the petition of Rebecca and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in
relation to the case.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the
Dominican Republic.
2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in
this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and
may still be, a holder of an American passport.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and
represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican
Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment in which she stated being an
American citizen. The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet
recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
2. Yes. The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the
alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a

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copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata
effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between
Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. Consequent to the dissolution
of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the code
ADOLFO C. AZNAR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963, LABRADOR, J.
Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with a conflict of law
and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private international law rules.
Facts:

Edward E. Christensen executed a will bequeathing a part of his property located in the
Philippines to Maria Helen Christensen his acknowledge daughter. He was a citizen of US and State of
California but domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death. Lucy his other child alleged that under
the State of California Law acknowledge children shall not inherit. Furthermore, Article 16 of the Civil
Code states that in case of testamentary succession with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the deceased. Thus, Helen shall not inherit. Helen Christen on the other hand alleged
that since there is no single American law to such issue for the disposition of property located in the
domicile of the deceased what shall govern is the State of California Law that under Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, if there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile. Moreover in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is
the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case.

Ruling:

Yes, Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with a conflict of
law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private international law rules. This can apply
when considering foreign issues arising in succession planning and in administering estates.
Thus, Article 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code provides that intestate and testamentary successions with
respect to order of succession and amount of successional right is regulated by the national law of the
deceased. While California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form
and manner he desires. Furthermore, Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law on the
contrary, the place where the personal property is situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and
is governed by the law of his domicile
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of
validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedent’s domicile – the
Philippines. The conflicts of law rule in California Law Probate and Art. 946 authorize the return of
question of law to the testator’s domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in
the conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred back and
forth between 2 states.

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SC finds that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code
of California, not by the internal law of California.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS v. EDWARD A. BELLIS ET AL.
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967, BENGZON, J.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
Facts:

Amos G. Bellis born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He
therefore executed a will in the Philippines in favor of his children and his first wife then later on died.
Thereafter, when the will is probated, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis were claiming to be
the illegitimate children of Amog and contended that they were deprived of legitimes. However, the
Probate court denied the claim on the ground that the national law of Amos G. Bellis does not grant
legitimes to illegitimate children relying on Article 16 of the Civil Code. They argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code that prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country prevails as the
exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code which renders applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount
of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Issue:

Whether or not Article 17 last paragraph of the civil code is an exception for the application of
national law of decedent in Article 16 of the Civil Code
Ruling:

No. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a
specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication
of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
PAULA T. LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEAL, AND ALICIA F. LLORENTE

G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, PARDO, J.

Page 13 of 126
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Facts:

Lorenzo N. Llorente (Lorenzo) was married to his first wife Paula llorento (Paula). However they
obtained a divorce because of Paula’s infidelity to Lorenzo’s brother. The divorce was obtained long after
Lorenzo was naturalized as American Citizen. He then married his second wife Alice and begot three
children. He executed a will in the Philippines and bequeathing his properties situated therein to his second
wife and three children the later on died. Paula then claimed that she was the surviving spouse of Lorenzo
and that the divorce was not valid in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce was recognizable in the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. In long line of cases decided by the SC it ruled that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the
same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Once proven that Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from Paula, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and Paula could very well lose her right to
inherit from him. Thus the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Human Relations
ALFREDO M. VELAYO v. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD.

G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956, FELIX, J.
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be
compensated by damages.
Facts:

Shell supplies fuel needs of CALI. However, due to financial crisis it failed to pay Shell and its
other creditors. Thus, they entered into an agreement that they would present suits against the corporation
but to strive for a pro-rata division of the assets, and only in the case of non-agreement would the creditors
file insolvency proceedings. However, when Shell PH assigned the credit to Shell oil its American Sister
Corporation, the latter filed a case against CALI for the collection of assigned Credit attaching the C-54
plane of CALI which the creditors opposed and filed damages against Shell for breach of their agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages.

Ruling:
Yes, Under Article 21 of the Civil Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to

Page 14 of 126
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage. This is the legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
Another rule is expressed in Article 23 which compels the return of a thing acquired ‘without just
or legal grounds’. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. Now, if
Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: “Even if an act or event causing damage to
another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the Shell, the latter shall be liable for indemnity
if through the act or event he was benefited” with mere much more reason the Shell should be liable for
indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence.
Shell taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by
CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent
asset among them, and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was
really the case — schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where
CALI’s plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent’s
property depriving the latter, of the opportunity to recover said plane –to the detriment of the other
creditors.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989, CORTES, J.
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the NCC are known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, which sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
Facts:

Restituto M. Tobias (Tobias) herein private respondent was an employee of Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp (GMCRC) herein petitioner. Herbert Hendry (Hendry) herein petitioner, was the Executive
Vice-President and General Manager of GMCRC. Sometime in 1972, GMCRC discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. Thereafter, Hendry
ordered Tobias to take a force leave so as to have Tobias investigated. Hendry declared that Tobias was
their number one suspect in the anomaly. Thus, criminal complaints for estafa were filed against Tobias.
These charges were however dismissed for lack of probable cause. Subsequently, Hendry dismissed Tobias
from employment. Claiming that he was illegally dismissed, Tobias filed a complaint for damages against
GMCRC and Hendry with the RTC.

The RTC decided in favor of Tobias. On appeal, the CA affirmed. Now, GMCRC and Hendry
assail the decision of the CA. It asseverates that the dismissal of Tobias was in lawful exercise of its right.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not GMCRC and Hendry exercised lawfully their right to dismiss Tobias.
Ruling:

No. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be
justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go
on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But
the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. The imputation of

Page 15 of 126
guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the
right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable
for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to
exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages
under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
BARONS MARKETING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998, KAPUNAN, J.
There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or
injuring another.
Facts:

Sometime in 1973, Barons Marketing Corp (Barons) herein petitioner, appointed Phelps Dodge
Phils Inc (Phelps) herein private respondent, as its dealer for the sale of electrical wires and cables. Phelps
was given by Barons credit for the former’s purchases of the latter’s electric products. Thereafter, Phelps,
purchased on credit from Barons various electric wires and cables. These wires and cables in turn, were
sold by Phelps to MERALCO. Subsequently, Barons demanded payment from Phelps the amount covering
the wires and cables. However, Phelps was unable to pay the same. This prompted Barons to file a
complaint for collection against Phelps.
The RTC held in favor of Barons and ordered Phelps to pay Barons. On appeal with the CA, the
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Now Phelps assails the decision of the CA. It avers that Barons abused
its right as credit to the prejudice of Phelps. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Barons abused its right to the prejudice of Phelps.

Ruling:

No. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of
proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad
faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioners allegation that private respondent was motivated by a
desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal directly
with Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such supposition is merely speculative.
Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for rejecting
petitioners offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private
respondent, the corporation had its own cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations.
This is not such a lame and poor rationalization as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent
were to be required to accept petitioners offer, there would be no reason for the latter to reject similar offers
from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any enterprise, especially a profit-
oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights,
not an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances, we do not deem private respondent to have acted in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to violate the provisions of Article 21 of the
Civil Code.
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM v. ACT THEATER, INC.

G.R. No. 147076, June 17, 2004, CALLEJO SR., J.

Page 16 of 126
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards the norms provided by Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the NCC resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held
accountable.
Facts:

This case stems from a criminal complaint filed by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) herein petitioner, against the employees of Act Theater (AT) herein respondent.
Thereafter, MWSS disconnected the water services provided to AT. This prompted AT to file a complaint
for damages against MWSS for having allegedly abused its right to the prejudice of AT.

The RTC ruled in favor of AT. The CA affirmed. This prompted MWSS to elevate the case,
assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not MWSS abused its right in cutting the water supply services to the prejudice of AT.
Ruling:

Yes, it has abused its right. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the
respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent’s water service
connection. As correctly found by the appellate court:
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to
the disconnection of the latters water services, this was done only a few hours before the
actual disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter, Act
sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he was treated
badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act. Acts water services
were cut at midnight of the day following the apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the
plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it was deprived of the water services. As
a consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to provide water for a number
of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum of
P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services.
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a quo and the
appellate court that the petitioners act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the respondent, justifying
the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
SOLEDAD CARPIO v. LEONORA A. VALMONTE

G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004, TINGA, J.
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or damage without
wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.
Facts:

Leonora Valmonte (Valmonte) herein respondent, is a wedding coordinator who was engaged by
one Michelle del Rosario (Michelle) and Jon Sierra (Jon) for their wedding. On the day at the wedding and
within the Manila Hotel where the Michelle and Jon were billeted, Valmonte was overseeing the

Page 17 of 126
preparations for the wedding. Upon entering the suite where the bride, bride’s maids, parents, relatives,
make-up artist, assistants, photographers and fashion designers were located, Soledad Carpio (Carpio)
herein petitioner exclaimed, “Ikaw ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta?
Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.” Thereafter, Carpio ordered one of the ladies at the
suite to search the body of Valmonte. Apparently, the million dollar pieces of jewellery owned by Carpio
were missing and Carpio was speculating the Valmonte had it. Throughout the event, Valmonte was being
accused by Carpio of taking the pieces of jewellery owned by Carpio. Thereafter, Valmonte filed a
complaint for damages against Carpio alleging that her ordeal has caused her humiliation, and has
besmirched her reputation.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of Valmonte. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. It held Carpio liable for damages in favor of Valmonte. Now, Carpio comes before the
Supreme Court assailing decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Carpio’s imputations has prejudiced Valmonte.

Ruling:

Yes. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewellery
inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos which
were not merely inquisitive but out-rightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person
who went out of the room before the loss of the jewellery in the presence of all the guests therein, and
ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True,
petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota
of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewellery is an act which, by any standard or principle
of law is impermissible. Petitioner had wilfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary
to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewellery cannot justify her acts
toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in
mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation
to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
ELEAZAR S. PADILLO v. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC. and MARK S. OROPEZA

G.R. No. 199338, January 21, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Damages may be recoverable due to an abuse of right under Article 21 in conjunction with Article
19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following elements must, however, obtain: ( 1) there is a legal
right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Facts:

Eleazar Padillo (Padillo) herein petitioner, deceased and represented by his heirs, was an employed
by Rural Bank of Nabunturan Inc. (RBNI) herein respondent, as its Bookkeeper. Thereafter, on 2007,
Padillo suffered a mild stroke due to hypertension which consequently impaired his ability to effectively
pursue his work. On September 10 2007 he wrote a letter addressed to Mark Oropeza (Oropeza) President
of RBNI expressing his intention to avail of an early retirement package. However despite several follow-
ups, Padillo’s request remained unheeded. Thus, on October 3, 2007, Padillo was separated from
employment due to his poor and failing health. Not having received his claimed retirement benefits, Padillo
filed a complaint for recovery of unpaid retirement benefits.

The LA dismissed the complaint of Padillo. On appeal with the NLRC, the NLRC reversed and set
aside the decision of the LA. Subsequently, the CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC and affirmed the
decision of the LA. Among others, Padillo avers that the act of RBNI and Oropeza in ignoring his request

Page 18 of 126
for the early retirement package constitutes bad faith and thus susceptible for the damages. Hence this
petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the act of ignoring the request of Padillo is a violation of the NCC on Human
Relations
Ruling:

No, it is not. The Court finds no bad faith in any of respondents’ actuations as they were within
their right, absent any proof of its abuse, to ignore Padillo’s misplaced claim for retirement benefits.
Respondents’ obstinate refusal to accede to Padillo’s request is precisely justified by the fact that there lies
no basis under any applicable agreement or law which accords the latter the right to demand any retirement
benefits from the Bank. While the Court mindfully notes that damages may be recoverable due to an abuse
of right under Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following
elements must, however, obtain: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Records reveal that none of these elements exists in the case
at bar and thus, no damages on account of abuse of right may he recovered.
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO v. RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR
G.R. No. 168512, March 20, 2007, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article 20, NCC provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the Code
Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal
provision.
Facts:

Ranida Salvador (Ranida) herein respondent underwent a HBs Ag test for the purpose of
determining whether Ranida had Hepatitis B. The test was conducted by Bu Castro (Castro) of the
Community Diagnostic Center (CDC) represented by Orlando Garcia (Garcia) herein petitioners.
Subsequently, it was determined that Ranida was positive of Hepatitis B. As a result, Ranida was
terminated from her employment. Because of Ranida’s alleged positive identification for Hepatitis B which
resulted to her termination, Ramon Salvador (Ramon) herein respondent and father of Ranida, suffered a
heart attack and was forced to be admitted to the hospital for medication. Thereafter, Ranida sought further
tests from other medical practitioners and it was later found out that Ranida was in truth and in fact, not
suffering from Hepatitis B. Verily, CDC conducted a second test on Ranida the test yielded a negative
result. Thus Ranida was reinstated in her employment. Thereafter, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for
damages. They anchored their claim on the fact that Ranida lost her job, suffered serious mental anxiety,
trauma and sleepless night. In the same vein, Ramon avers that he was hospitalized and had therefore lost
business opportunities because of the erroneous test results of CDC.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and held
CDC and Castro liable. Now, CDC and Castro comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of
the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not CDC and Castro are liable for damages in favor of Ranida and Ramon.
Ruling:

Page 19 of 126

Yes. The failure of petitioners to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the
protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would observe. Thus, their act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply with the
mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the physical
examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more tests.
All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in conducting the
clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O. CHAVES, and
JUAN O. CHAVES
G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988, YAP, J.
The act of MERALCO in disconnecting the electricity of the Chavez' without prior notice
constitutes a violation of Article 21, NCC and hence, therefore a ground for award of damages.
Facts:

Sometime in 1965 Pedro Yambao (Yambao) representing Manila Electric Company (MERALCO)
herein petitioners, sent two (2) overdue bills representing the unpaid electricity of Isaac Chavez Sr. et al
(Chavez et al). Thereafter, Chavez et al caused the payment of one (1) of the electric bills. Subsequently,
MERALCO disconnected its power services without prior notice to the prejudice of Chavez et al. The day
after, Chavez et al caused the payment of the other overdue bill. Later on, Chavez et al sued MERALCO
for damages on the ground that they have suffered embarrassment, humiliation, wounded feelings, and hurt
pride because of the undue disconnection.

The RTC ruled in favor of Chavez et al and held MERALCO liable. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not Meralco’s act of disconnecting the electricity of Chavez et al without prior notice
is a ground for damages
Ruling:

Yes it is a ground. We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from. One cannot deny the
vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in
Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity
has become a necessity to most people in these areas justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory
power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is
engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the
Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as
MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written
notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the service. Failure to give such prior notice
amounts to a tort, as held by us in a similar case, where we said:
Petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior

notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity
of the action is indicative of intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to
private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which

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provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code. Moreover, the
award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that wilful injury
to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find
that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996, REGALADO, J.
In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be
applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
Facts:

This case stems from a civil case filed by Pacifico Mabasa (Mabasa) against Spouses Custodio
(Sps.Custodio) and Spouses Santos (Sps. Santos) herein petitioner for easement or right of way in favor of
Mabasa. The RTC decided in favor of Mabasa and ordered Sps. Custodio and Santos to give Mabasa his
right of way. In the same case however, the RTC denied the claim of damages filed by Mabasa. Thus, the
Heirs of Mabasa (Heirs) appealed to the CA only as regards the claim for damages. The CA held in favor of
the Heirs and ordered the Spouses Custodio and Santos to pay the Heir damages for unrealized rentals
resulting from the easement or right of way. Now, Sps. Custodio and Santos come before the Supreme
Court, assailing, among others the award of damages. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Sps. Custodio and Santos are liable for damages.
Ruling:

No. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as
owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the
right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides
that every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitude. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private
respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial
court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that
decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the
compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of
fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and
exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.

Page 21 of 126
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993, DAVIDE JR. J.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Facts:

Gashem Shookat Baksh (Baksh) herein petitioner is an Iranian citizen who is studying here in the
Philippines. On the other hand Marilou Gonzales (Gonzales) herein private respondent is a Filipino citizen.
Sometime in 1987 Baksh courted and proposed to Gonzales for the purpose of marrying the latter.
Thereafter, Baksh and Gonzales went to the latter’s parent so as to obtain their consent. Thus, Baksh and
Gonzales started to live together under one roof. Subsequently, a week before their marriage, their
relationship turned sour. Baksh started to abuse, maltreat and threatened to kill Gonzales. This ordeal
culminated to a confrontation before the barangay whereby Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement,
asked Gonzales to leave and disclosed that he was already married to another woman. Aggrieved, Gonzales
filed a complaint for damages against Baksh with the RTC.

The RTC held in favor of Gonzales and awarded damages in her favor. On appeal with the CA, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Now, Baksh comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision
of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Baksh can be held liable for damages for his breach of promise to marry Gonzales.
Ruling:

Yes. The Court is of the opinion that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause
of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it
and the wilful injury to her honour and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress
not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience
about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all,
she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a
similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in
delicto.
VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband Roberto Ortega v. GONZALO

Page 22 of 126
PELLOSIS, INESITA MOSTE, and DANILO RADAM
G.R. No. 138964, August 9, 2001, VITUG, J.
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act
with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which
the actor can be held accountable.
Facts:

Gonzalo Pellosis, Inesita Moste, and Danilo Radam (Pellosis et al) herein respondents, were lessee
on the land of one Marta Reyes. During their lease, they erected houses upon the land owned by Reyes.
Thereafter, Reyes died. Without the knowledge of Pellosis et al, Vicente Rellosa (Rellosa) and his daughter
Cynthia Ortega (Ortega) herein petitioners, bought the leased land where the houses of Pellosis et al were
located. Thus, titles covering the aforementioned land were issued in favor of Ortega. Subsequently, Ortega
filed a petition for condemnation with the Office of the Building Official (OBO) praying for the demolition
of the houses and evacuation of its occupants, namely Pellosis et al. The OBO issued a resolution ordering
the demolition of the houses. Copies of the resolution were served upon Pellosis et al on December 7, 1989.
The following day, Ortega hired workers to commence the demolition of the houses of Pellosis et al.
Pellosis et al were able to timely intervene averring that the resolution for demolition was not yet final and
executory hence appealable. On December 11, 1989, Pellosis et al filed their appeal to the OBO. However,
on December 12, 1989 Ortega once again hired workers and proceeded with the demolition of the houses of
Pellosis et al. This prompted, Pellosis et al to file a complaint for damages for untimely demolition of the
houses against Ortega.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pellosis et al. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. It held Ortega liable for damages in favor of Pellosis et al. Now, Ortega comes before
the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the act of Ortega of demolishing prematurely the houses of Pellosis et al is a
ground for damages.
Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of these rights is not without limitations.
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice,
to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner
which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor
can be held accountable. In this instance, the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity
of the order of demolition as the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and
not in disregard of, the standard set by Article 19 of the Civil Code.
At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after respondents
received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day
appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but
by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of
the period to appeal), the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that the order of
demolition was later affirmed by the Department of Public Works and Highways was of no moment. The
action of petitioners up to the point where they were able to secure an order of demolition was not
condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a
different matter and could only be held utterly indefensible.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.

Page 23 of 126
G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Where a person merely uses a right pertaining to him, without bad faith or intent to injure, the fact
that damages are thereby suffered by another will not make him liable.
Facts:

Sometime in 1987 the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) herein petitioner issued
invitations to bid for the supply of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in
Batangas. One of the bidders was the Philipp Brother Oceanic Inc (PHIBRO) herein respondent. After
public bidding, PHIBRO’s bid was accepted. Thereafter a contract was entered into between NAPOCOR
and PHIBRO whereby it stipulates that within thirty (30) days from the transmission of the Letter of Credit
(LC) by NAPOCOR, PHIBRO would ship the coal. However, PHIBRO failed to undertake such obligation.
PHIBRO imputed such failure on the fact that there was an on-going strike somewhere in Australia
involving workers who carry out the exportation and transfer of the coal. PHIBRO was able to transmit the
coal only after ninety (90) days after the LC was sent. Subsequently, NAPOCOR advertised once more for
the delivery of coal. PHIBRO again submitted an application to bid. However NAPOCOR disapproved
PHIBRO’s application because of PHIBRO’s purported failure to ship the coal on time as per their contract.
This prompted PHIBRO to file a complaint for damages against NAPOCOR.

The RTC and CA held in favor of PHIBRO and ordered NAPOCOR to pay PHIBRO damages for
proscribing PHIBRO to bid. Now, NAPOCOR comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of
the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NAPOCOR exercised its right legally when it disapproved PHIBRO’s application
to bid.
Ruling:

Yes, it exercised its right legally. Accordingly, a bidder has no ground of action to compel the
Government to award the contract in his favor, nor to compel it to accept his bid. Verily, a reservation of the
government of its right to reject any bid, generally vests in the authorities a wide discretion as to who is the
best and most advantageous bidder. The exercise of such discretion involves inquiry, investigation,
comparison, deliberation and decision, which are quasi-judicial functions, and when honestly exercised,
may not be reviewed by the court. The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is vested in
the Government agencies entrusted with that function. The discretion given to the authorities on this matter
is of such wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is used as a
shield to a fraudulent award.
Owing to the discretionary character of the right involved in this case, the propriety of
NAPOCORs act should therefore be judged on the basis of the general principles regulating human
relations, the forefront provision of which is Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith. Accordingly, a person will be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts
with negligence or abuse. We went over the record of the case with painstaking solicitude and we are
convinced that NAPOCORs act of disapproving PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification to bid was
without any intent to injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage. Apparently, NAPOCOR acted on
the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a seriously-impaired track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted
from believing so.
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL v. EDERLINA P. CATITO

G.R. No. 143958, July 11 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J.

Page 24 of 126
Article 22, NCC is expressed in the maxim “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO
PROTEST" (No persons should enrich himself at the expense of another). However, this article does not
apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.
Facts:

Alfred Fritz Frenzel (Frenzel) a German national met Ederlina Catito (Catito) a Filipino citizen.
Frenzel and Catito were married respectively to other persons. However, despite such marriage of each,
Frenzel and Catito decided to have an amorous or common law relationship without the benefit of
marriage. Thereafter, Frenzel bought real properties in the Philippines but had it named to Frenzel.
Sometime after, their relationship turned sour resulting to their separation. Now, Frenzel seeks the return of
the real properties he allegedly bought and named in favor of Catito contending that it was his money
which was used in the acquisition of such real properties.

The RTC and CA found scant merit in the position of Frenzel. They opine that Frenzel is not
qualified to own real properties in the Philippines since it is proscribed by the Constitution. Now, Frenzel
comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Frenzel has a legal right to cause the return of the real properties in his favor.
Ruling:

No. The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen. Thus, the petitioner
and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. The evidence on record shows that the petitioner in
fact knew of the respondent's marriage to another man, but nonetheless purchased the subject properties
under the name of the respondent and paid the purchase prices therefor. Even if it is assumed gratia
arguendi that the respondent and the petitioner were capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still disqualified
to own the properties in tandem with the respondent.
The reliance of petitioner on Art. 22 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. The said provision does
not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the
subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield
stated in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not
for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy,
which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."
DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella) v. JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG KENG and
HARRISON LUMBER, INC.
G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003, CARPIO, J.
The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied in
Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to procedural
remedies.
Facts:

David Reyes (Reyes) herein petitioner, was the owner of a parcel of land somewhere in Pasay
City. Chuy Cheng Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber Inc (HLI) herein respondents, are lessee in the

Page 25 of 126
aforementioned parcel of land owned by Reyes. Sometime in 1994, Reyes entered into a Contract to Sell
with Jose Lim (Lim) herein respondent for the sale of the parcel of land owned by Reyes. In the Contract to
Sell, it was stipulated that in case of failure by Reyes to have Keng and HLI vacate the premises, Reyes
would pay Lim a percentage of the contract price agreed into between Reyes and Lim. The agreed contract
price was P28M. P10M was paid when the Contract to Sell was entered into. Thereafter the remaining
P18M would be paid after the Deed of Absolute Sale has been entered into and the lessee namely Keng and
HLI, be vacated from the land. However, Keng and HLI did not vacate the aforementioned land. This
prompted Reyes to sue for annulment of contract against Lim, Keng and HLI. Reyes imputed that Lim,
Keng and HLI were in connivance in making sure that Keng and HLI would not vacate the premises.
During the proceedings with the RTC, Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the
P10M down payment with the cashier of the RTC. The RTC granted said motion. Thereafter, Reyes filed a
motion to set aside the aforementioned ordered on the ground that it is not one of the remedies provided for
by the Rules of Court in civil proceedings.

The RTC denied the motion. On appeal with the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the deposit of P10M ordered by the trial court is valid.
Ruling:

Yes, it is valid. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another
is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to
procedural remedies. One condition for invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party has no other
action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. Courts can
extend this condition to the hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved party, during the pendency of
the case, has no other recourse based on the provisional remedies of the Rules of Court.
Thus, a court may not permit a seller to retain, pendente lite, money paid by a buyer if the seller
himself seeks rescission of the sale because he has subsequently sold the same property to another buyer.
By seeking rescission, a seller necessarily offers to return what he has received from the buyer. Such a
seller may not take back his offer if the court deems it equitable, to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure
restitution, to put the money in judicial deposit.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when
a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10
million down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 148332, September 30, 2003, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo Cum Alterius Detrimento
Locupletari Potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others.
Facts:

The National Development Company (NDC) herein petitioner, wholly owns the subsidiary
National Corporation (NSCP) which offers shipping services for containerized cargo between the Far East
ports and the US West Coast. Subsequently, the NDC Board of Directors sent out invitations to bid for
stock ownership of the NSCP as well as its three (3) ocean-going vessels. Thereafter, a Notice of Award
was issued to Madrigal Wan Hai Lines Corporation (MWHLC) since it won the bidding process. Thus,
NDC and MWHLC entered into a Contract of Sale whereby MWHLC acquired NSCP, its assets, personnel,

Page 26 of 126
records and its three (3) vessels. Later on, MWHLC was flabbergasted when the US Internal Revenue
Service sent MWHLC a Notice of Final Assessment against NSCP for deficiency taxes on gross
transportation income derived from US sources for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992 when NSCP was still
owned by NDC. Thus MWHLC was constrained to pay. Subsequently, MWHLC sought reimbursement
from the NDC for the expenses it incurred for the payment of NSCP’s taxes. However, MWHLC’s demand
fell on stony ground. This prompted MWHLC to sue NDC.

The RTC and CA found MWHLC’s position meritorious. Now, NDC comes before the Supreme
Court assailing the decision of the CA holding it liable for reimbursement of taxes paid by MWHLC.
Issue:
Whether or not NDC is liable for reimbursing MWHLC.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no dispute that petitioner was aware of its US tax liabilities considering its numerous
communications with the agents of the United States Internal Revenue Service, just prior to the sale of
NSCP and the marine vessels to respondent. The NSCP itself made an ambiguous contingent provision in
its Unaudited Financial Statements for the year ending December 1993, thereby indicating its awareness of
a possible US tax assessment. It bears stressing that petitioner did not convey such information to
respondent despite its inquiries. Obviously, such concealment constitutes bad faith on its part.
The case at bar calls to mind the principle of unjust enrichment Nemo cum alterius detrimento
locupletari potest. No person shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of others. This
principle of equity has been enshrined in our Civil Code, Article 22 of which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act or performance by another or by any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Justice and equity thus oblige that petitioner be held liable for NSCPs tax liabilities and reimburse
respondent for the amounts it paid. It would be unjust enrichment on the part of petitioner to be relieved of
that obligation.
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA
v.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984, GUTIERREZ JR., J.
What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant
has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for
the same criminal act or omission.
Facts:

Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Ismael Gonzalgo, and Jose Farley (Padilla et al) herein
petitioners, were charged with the crime of Grave Coercion by one Antonio Vergara (Vergara) for allegedly
preventing the latter from closing his stall at the public market and by subsequently forcibly opening the
door of the said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying the same.

Page 27 of 126

The RTC found Padilla et al guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal with the CA, acquitted
Padilla et al on the ground of reasonable doubt but were ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P9,600.00 as damages. To this, Padilla et al appealed as regards the civil aspect of the case. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Padilla et al may be held civilly liable for damages despite their acquittal
Ruling:

Yes, they may still be held civilly liable. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in
the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The
two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not,
however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability
might arise did not exist.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the
legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to
recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint
would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of
course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays
suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this
case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
Prejudicial Question
LEONILO C. DONATO v. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO,
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988, GANCAYCO, J.
The civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and is thus not a prejudicial question in the crime of bigamy. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts; otherwise, the presumption is that the first marriage exists.
Facts:
Paz B. Abayan and Leonilo C. Donato lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
wedlock for at least five (5) years. In 1978, Paz married Leonilo, without knowing that the latter had a
subsisting marriage with another woman. Upon discovering the truth, Paz left Leonilo and filed a criminal
complaint for bigamy. Before Leonilo was arraigned, Paz filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Leonilo. Taking advantage of the situation, Leonilo moved to suspend the criminal
proceedings on the ground that civil case for nullity of marriage filed by private respondent raises a
prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question to

Page 28 of 126
the criminal case.
Ruling:
No. A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a prejudicial
question to suspend the criminal action, it must appear that (1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, and that (2) the resolution of the
issue/s raised in the civil case would necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. The civil case does not
determine Leonilo’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts; otherwise, the presumption is that the first marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
RICARDO QUIAMBAO v. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA

BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, AND FELIPE GAZA
G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988, FERNAN, J.
Even if the cases involved are civil and administrative in nature, a prejudicial question exists so
long as the following requisites are present: (a) the (administrative) case involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue in the (civil) case; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the (civil) action may proceed.
Facts:
Ricardo Quiambao filed an administrative case against Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, et al. before the
Office of the Land Authority. Ricardo questioned Zenaida, et al.’s right of possession over a parcel of land
in Malabon, Rizal. During the pendency of the case, Ricardo went to the subject property, fenced it, and
began construction of a house thereon. Zenaida, et al. thereafter filed a civil case against Ricardo for
forcible entry. Ricardo argued that the pending administrative case poses a prejudicial question which bars
the civil case.
Issue:
Whether or not the administrative case questioning Zenaida, et al.’s right of possession over the
property poses a prejudicial question to the civil case for forcible entry.
Ruling:
Yes. The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in
character. This means that technically speaking, prejudicial question does not exist. Equally apparent,
however, is the intimate correlation of the issues between the said cases. The right of Zenaida, et al. in the
civil case to eject petitioner over the subject property is intertwined on their right of possession over the
said parcel of land, which is the subject of the administrative case. Likewise, the resolution of the
administrative case necessarily determines whether or not the civil case may proceed. Hence, the
administrative case posed a prejudicial question as against the civil case.
ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA AND LEONILO JACALAN v. HON. RUMOLDO R.

FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, AND SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. AND ROSITA
TAGHOY TIGOL
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995, MENDOZA, J.

Page 29 of 126
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
Facts:
A case for declaration of nullity of Rosita’s title over a parcel of land in Lapu Lapu City was filed
in 1990. Three (3) years later, Rosita and her husband filed a criminal complaint against Isabelo Apa, et al.
for violation of the Anti-Squatting law, alleging therein that Rosita’s ownership over the subject lot was
violated by Isabelo, et al.’s occupation of a portion of Rosita’s said real property. Isabelo, et al. moved for
the suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for declaration of nullity of Rosita’s title
posed a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case questioning Rosita’s title over the property poses a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting law.
Ruling:
Yes. A prejudicial question exists if: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. The issue of Rosita’s ownership in the prior civil case is intimately
related to the criminal case, which alleges violation of Rosita’s right of ownership. Likewise, resolving
Rosita’s right of ownership in the civil case will determine if the criminal action for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law, which hinges on Rosita’s claim of ownership, will proceed.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND HON. JUDGE

FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., BEING THE JUDGE OF THE RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI
CITY
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.
A prejudicial question exists if the resolution of the common issue of the civil and criminal cases
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Facts:
Meynardo L. Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were married in 1973. Years later, Meynardo
abandoned the conjugal home and cohabited with another woman. In 1997, Meynardo filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Charmaine responded with a criminal complaint for concubinage against Meynardo. To forestall his arrest,
Meynardo moved to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground that the civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question the criminal case for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for declaration of nullity of Meynardo’s marriage poses a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for concubinage.
Ruling:
No. A prejudicial question exists if the resolution of the common issue of the civil and criminal
cases determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Since Article 40 of the Family Code
provides that “the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of marriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void”, Meynardo does not need the final
judgment in the civil case to prove the nullity of his marriage for purposes of his acquittal in the criminal

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case.
In any case, a subsequent declaration of nullity of his marriage in the civil case is not a valid
defense in a criminal complaint for concubinage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG AND LOLITA T. PAHANG v. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL,

PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 56, MANDAUE CITY,
DEPUTY SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 56 AND
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004, CALLEJO, SR., J.
A prejudicial question exists if the issues involved in the first case are similar or intimately related
to the issues raised in the second case.
Facts:
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage which secured Sps. Antonio and Lolita Pahang’s loan upon the latter’s default. The property was
sold to Metrobank at public auction and a certificate of sale was issued. Metrobank informed Sps. Pahang
about the looming deadline of the redemption period. But instead of redeeming the property, Sps. Pahang
filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale on the ground that their obligations were bloated by
Metrobank.
After expiration of the redemption period, Metrobank consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed property and filed a Petition for Writ of Possession. Sps. Pahang opposed the Petition on the
ground that their complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale constituted a prejudicial question to
Metrobank’s petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for annulment of extrajudicial sale poses a prejudicial question to the
land registration case for the issuance of writ of possession.
Ruling:
No. In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a
civil action and the respondents petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1 is
but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of the two actions.
The focal issue in the civil case filed by Sps. Pahang was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage executed by Sps. Pahang in favor of Metrobank and the sale of their property at
public auction are null and void. The issue in the land registration case was whether Metrobank was
entitled to the possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption had lapsed and title was
issued.
Civil Personality
ANTONIO GELUZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR LAZO

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961, REYES, JBL, J.

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Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, a conceived child only has a provisional personality
(conceptus pro nato habetur), or a personality burdened with a condition or an express limitation that the
child be subsequently born alive.
Facts:
Nita Villanueva became pregnant for a third time with her husband Antonio Geluz’s child.
Unknown to Antonio, Nita had two (2) previous abortions and is planning another one through the aid of
Dr. Oscar Lazo. Nita succeeded again in aborting her two-month old fetus; but this time, Antonio
discovered the latest abortion. Thereafter, Antonio, for and in behalf of the dead foetus, filed an action for
damages against Dr. Oscar.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages may be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on account of
the injuries it received.
Ruling:
No. An action for damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured. The action presupposes that the one injured has juridical personality. Under Article 40 of the Civil
Code, a conceived child only has a provisional personality (conceptus pro nato habetur), or a personality
burdened with a condition or an express limitation that the child be subsequently born alive.
Here, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb. Since
the conceived child’s personality was extinguished by its pre-natal death, no cause of action for such
damages accrued in behalf of the said unborn child. Likewise, since no action for damages could be
instituted on account of the injuries the unborn child received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs.
Citizenship
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHULE Y. LIM

G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Since the requirement applies only to legitimate
children, an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother automatically becomes a Filipino upon birth.
Facts:
Chule Y. Lim was born as an illegitimate child of her Chinese father and Filipino mother in 1954.
Her birth records show that she is a Chinese citizen. Nearly four (4) decades later, Chule filed a petition for
correction of entries of her birth records, alleging among others that she is a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not Chule’s citizenship as shown in her birth records should be changed from Chinese
to Filipino.
Ruling:

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Yes. Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, provides that the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, states that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply
only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of Chule who was concededly an illegitimate
child. As such, Chule was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to
become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, Chule automatically became
a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013, SERENO, J.
By using a passport, a person positively declares that he is a citizen of the country which issued
the passport. In the same vein, a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person
named therein as its national.
Facts:
Rommel Arnando was a natural-born Filipino. Thereafter, he acquired American citizenship by

naturalization. By virtue of Republic Act No. 9225, Rommel reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Rommel likewise renounced his American
citizenship as a prerequisite for running as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 2010
elections. Nevertheless, Rommel continued using his American passport at least six (6) times after his
renunciation, even if he already holds a Philippine passport. His qualifications were soon challenged
before the COMELEC on the ground that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
Issue:
Whether or not Rommel is a dual citizen disqualified to run for local elective positions on the
ground that his renunciation was rendered nugatory by his subsequent use of his American passport.
Ruling:
Yes. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement
that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath
of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to.
Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so
is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial
formality. After all, by using a passport, a person positively declares that he is a citizen of the country
which issued the passport. In the same vein, a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes
the person named therein as its national.
Here, since Rommel continued to use his American issued passport long after his renunciation, he
is still deemed to be both a Filipino and an American citizen for purposes of applying the dual citizenship
disqualification found in Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

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Marriage
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014, PEREZ, J.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate.
Facts:
Tecla Hoybia Avenido and Eustaquio Avenido were married in 1942 in Talibon, Bohol, but the
records of the Local Civil Registrar therein, including their marriage certificate, were lost due to World War
II. Their union bore four (4) children. Eustaquio soon abandoned his family in 1952, and married Peregrina
Hoybia Avenido in 1979.
After Eustaquio’s death, Tecla filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of
Peregrina and Eustaquio on the ground that Tecla is Eustaquio’s legal wife. Tecla presented as evidence the
certifications of loss of her marriage certificate, the birth certificates of her children, as well as the
testimonies of witnesses who attended Tecla and Eustaquio’s marriage ceremony.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented during trial proves the existence of Tecla’s marriage to
Eustaquio.
Ruling:
Yes. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate, the testimony of the witnesses to the marriage, and even
the testimony of the solemnizing officer may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
the parties. Likewise, since the due execution and loss of the marriage certificate were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence—testamentary and documentary—may be admitted to prove the
fact of marriage.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007, CORONA, J.
The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant by examining the
genitals of the infant. Without a law recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex at
the time of birth is immutable, if not attended by error.
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a Filipino, was born male per his birth certificate. Feeling
trapped inside a man’s body, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand and transformed
himself into a “woman”. Since then, Rommel lived as a female and is in fact engaged to his American
fiancé. To allow him to marry his fiancé under Philippine law, Rommel filed a petition to change his name
from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”, and his sex from “male” to “female”.
Issue:

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Whether or not Rommel can change his sex from “male” to “female” by law or equity.
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certificate, which includes a declaration of a
person’s sex, is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person
is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Since there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
The change cannot also be granted even on the grounds of equity, since the changes would have
serious and wide-ranging consequences. Marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. Changing Rommel’s sex in his birth
certificate will substantially alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008, Quisumbing, J.
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the intersexed person, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex.
Facts:
Jennifer B. Cagandahan was born and registered as a female in her birth certificate. She was later
diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition wherein a person is genetically female
but secretes male hormones. Because of Jennifer’s very rare condition, she has both male and female sex
organs, did not develop breasts or ovaries, and never had her monthly period. Feeling that she has become a
male person in mind and body, she filed a Petition to change her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”, and her
sex from “female” to “male”.
Issue:
Whether or not Jennifer can change her sex from “female” to “male”.
Ruling:
Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like Jennifer (now Jeff), having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. Since the gender of intersexed persons is fixed only at maturity, the
original entries in the birth certificate are thus correctible under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, intersexed Jeff lets nature take its course without taking unnatural steps to interfere
with such development. Nature made him male over time and Jeff simply chose what nature has given him.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, MENDOZA, J.
For consent to be valid, it must be “freely given”, i.e. real in the sense that it is not vitiated, and
conscious or intelligent, in the sense that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the

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nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act of marriage.
Facts:
Liberty D. Albios, a Filipina, paid Daniel Lee Fringer, an American, $2,000.00 for the latter to
marry Liberty for purposes of immigration. In 2004, Liberty and Daniel were married out of jest.
Immediately after the marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife. However, Liberty’s
immigration application was denied. In 2006, Liberty filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Daniel on the ground that they never really had any intention of entering into a married state
or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Issue:
Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship and
in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
Ruling:
No. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given. A "freely given" consent must be real in the
sense that it is not vitiated by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, and
must also be conscious or intelligent, in the sense that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Here, Liberty and Daniel’s freely given consent is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal
tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In any case, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it
is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid, notwithstanding the
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.
A certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The certification likewise enjoys the
presumption of regularity.
Facts:
Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, decided to stay in the Philippines two (2) years after meeting
Gloria Goo Abbas, a Filipina. While Syed was staying at the house of Gloria’s mother in Manila, Gloria’s
mother arrived with two (2) men. Syed underwent a “ceremony” as a requirement for his stay in the
Philippines. They signed a document, which Syed learned later on was a “marriage certificate”. Upon
investigation, Syed discovered that the marriage license was procured in Carmona, Cavite, where neither
Syed nor Gloria resided. Likewise, the marriage license was issued under a different name, and that no
marriage license was ever issued for Syed and Gloria per certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Syed and Gloria should be declared void ab initio based on

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the lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
Yes. A certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The certification likewise enjoys the
presumption of regularity, and such presumption may only be rebutted upon proof of the claimant that no
diligent search was made or that the certification did not categorically state that no such marriage license
was made or found.
In this case, not only did Gloria fail to explain why she procured a marriage license in Carmona,
Cavite, where neither party resides. There is also proof that diligent search was made by the Municipal
Civil Registrar to find Syed and Gloria’s marriage license since they were able to trace the marriage license
written at the marriage certificate, albeit registered in another couple’s names.
Since a marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license, then the
marriage between Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage license should be declared null and void.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN v. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061, July 03, 2013, CARPIO, J.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning."
Facts:
On September 1973, Benjamin married Azucena. In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic

relationship with Sally. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease
her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would
not be registered.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada. She then filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin to Sally was valid and existing.
Ruling:
No. The Court sees no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be
void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the
month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
In relation to the above ruling, the marriage of petitioner and respondent was not bigamous. For
bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except
for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and

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Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
RENE RONULO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014, BRION, J.
While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the
law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code
Facts:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest refused to solemnize
the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was
then dressed in barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors
and guests, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to
perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no
marriage certificate.
Now, Fr. Ronulo, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.
Issues:
Whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential
and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was
illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, AZCUNA, J.
The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly
squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same
controversy all over again. Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein.
Facts:
In 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion (Oscar) filed a petition before the San Pablo City RTC (Civil
Case 4341-95) seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent alleging his wife’s
psychological incapacity. The case was dismissed upon the finding that petitioner failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.

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In 1999, Oscar filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that
his marriage with respondent Edith Alcantara (Edith) was null and void due to the fact that it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity bars a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
lack of marriage license.
Ruling:
Yes. Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case. Petitioner forgets that he
is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. In both petitions, petitioner has the same
cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the
cause of action is predicated.
Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial
relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and
relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be
needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the
same controversy all over again. Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds
that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is
barred by the decision in Civil Case No. 4341-95.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996, ROMERO, J.
While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons.
Facts:
Municipal Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed a complaint on two specific acts
committed by MCTC Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. First, that respondent Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Tagadan and
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife without institution of
summary proceeding for the declaration of wife’s presumptive death; and second, that the judge performed
a marriage ceremony between Sumaylo and del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction upon the written
request of del Rosario only. Judge Domagtory holds office and has jurisdiction in the MCTC of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 km away from the municipality of Dapa.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the marriage between Tagadan and Borga is valid.
(2) Whether or not the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario is valid.
Ruling:

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(1) No. Article 41 of the Family code provides that for the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to his first wife.
(2) Yes. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Hence, while it was only the latter
who made the written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family
Code, their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held
administratively liable.
ZENAIDA S. BESO v. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan,

Samar
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Facts:
Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan, Samar, solemnized the

marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito Yman, on August 28, 1987, at the Judge’s residence in
Calbayog City, Samar. Respondent alleged that was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage
of Beso and Yman because complainant was "an overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more
than ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further averred that in
solemnizing the marriage in question, "he believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side
of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.”
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Beso and Yman conducted outside the judge’s jurisdiction is
valid.
Ruling:
Yes. A marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only (1) at the point of
death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or (3) upon the request of both parties in writing
in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these instances was present in this case. Considering that
respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only,
he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.
Facts:

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In 1997, Respondent Crasus L. Iyoy, married to Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy, sought the nullity of their
marriage held on the year 1961 on the basis of Article 36, FC, alleging that Fely was hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant. He averred also that in 1984, Fely left the Philippines for USA and obtained a
divorce. She married another man in 1985. In Fely’s Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988.
RTC and CA declared their marriage null and void finding merit on Fely’s psychological
incapacity and the applicability of Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code. Consequently, OSG filed this
petition for review alleging that abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se
constitute psychological incapacity and that Article 26, paragraph 2 is inapplicable to the case at bar.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RTC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity of Fely.
(2) Whether or not paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code applies in the case.
Ruling:
(1) No. The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the root cause for such
was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither
could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable.
(2) No. Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage
was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to
the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, QUISUMBING, J.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
Facts:
On May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido (Cipriano) married Villanueva. Their marriage was blessed with
a son and a daughter. In 1986, Villanueva, the wife left for the US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, Cirpriano learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same.

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The OSG now contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC is not applicable because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.
Hence, Orbecido cannot remarry.
Issue:
Whether or not Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC applies in the case at bar.
Ruling:
Yes. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Thus
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010, BRION, J.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction.
Facts:
Petitioner Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Sto. Tomas but
subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the
Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce which was eventually granted.
Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went
to the civil registry to register the divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However,
despite the registration, an official of NSO informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under
the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent
judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
dissolution of marriage with the RTC. RTC denied the same and concluded that Corpuz was not the proper
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Corpuz has no legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree.

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Ruling:
No. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. While the alien spouse can claim no right under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse, such unavailability does not necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Corpuz, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry.
This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto.
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife David Manzano, having been married to him in
1966. In 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.
On the other hand, respondent Judge averred that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. However, in his later
Manifestation, he maintained that the affidavits of both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years, and that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Hence, on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question
in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the solemnization of a marriage between Manzano and Payao who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is valid.
Ruling:
No. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a
long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties
to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge Sanchez take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of Manzano and Payao
stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve
as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.
Void Marriages
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY v. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S.

SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan

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G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.
Facts:
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were
married were the parents of Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed
Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay filed a
criminal case against her husband. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the CFI a complaint for
legal separation. TC declared in its dispositive portion the marriage null and void and of no effect as
between the parties. The body of the decision however stated that the legal basis for setting aside the
marriage is paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code.
In 1995, Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the RTC a petition for issuance in her
favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay
in representation of her father, Emilio. Petitioner moved to dismiss the same and argued that since CFI
declared the marriage of the respondent Isabel’s parents null and void, the latter is an illegitimate child, and
has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Emilio and Isabel is null and void as stated in the dispositive
part of the decision making the respondent an illegitimate child.
Ruling:
No. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while
Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. The fundamental distinction
between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.
Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights
and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89. On the other hand, a voidable marriage,
is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent
court in an action for annulment. Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment
shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the
decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the
intention, purpose and judgment of the court. A reading of the pertinent portion of the decision of the CFI
shows that the marriage is voidable.
ENGRACE NINAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NINAL,
INGRID NINAL, ARCHIE NINAL & PEPITO NINAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.
Facts:
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones in 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her in 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito
and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years

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and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. In 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the second marriage is null and void ab initio
(2) Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person can file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage after his death
Ruling:
(1) Yes. At the time Pepito and Norma’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife.”
(2) Yes. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action
or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.
LOLITA D. ENRICO v. HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-

MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on 15 March 2003 thereof makes it the
sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
Facts:
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in 1962. They begot seven children, herein respondents. On 1
May 2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married the petitioner. Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away. Thereafter, respondents filed with the RTC an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico since the same was entered into without
the requisite marriage license. Article 34 FC, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was not
applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the circumstances
required by said provision.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife
under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a
marriage license. She sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties

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while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Eulogio can seek the declaration of the nullity of his marriage after his
death.
Ruling:
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on 15 March 2003 applies in this case.
Section 2(a) thereof makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage.
While it is true that in Ninal case, no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father,
we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Ninal recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage
sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned
from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
OFELIA P. TY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES

G.R. No. 127406, November 27, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.
When the second marriage of private respondent was entered into, the prevailing rule was found
in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is
necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Therefore, we conclude that private
respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Facts:
Private respondent married Villanueva in a civil ceremony in 1977. Then they had a church
wedding on the same year. However, in 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared
their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of license and consent. However, even before the decree was
issued nullifying his marriage to Villanueva, private respondent wed Ty, herein petitioner, in 1979. In 1991,
private respondent sought the nullity of his marriage to Ty alleging that at the time he married petitioner, he
was still married to Villanueva and the decree of nullity of his marriage had not been issued. The decree of
nullity of his marriage was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took
place on April 4, 1979.
The RTC declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio. CA affirmed. It ruled
that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
could be validly contracted.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage
can be entered into validly.
Ruling:
No. We must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and
1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The lower court and the CA cannot
apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by private respondent were solemnized prior to the

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FC. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains
no express provision to that effect. Therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to
petitioner is valid. The provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case,
for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
DOROTHY B. TERRE v. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992, PER CURIAM
The prevailing case law of this Court holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void
ab initio is essential.
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Dorothy against her husband for gross immorality. She
posited that the respondent made her believe that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab
initio being incestuous (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), that she was still
legally single and free to marry him. She also alleged that the respondent contracted a second marriage and
lived with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.
In his answer, he sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his
prior marriage with complainant Dorothy was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial
declaration of nullity was necessary.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary for purposes of remarriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument
ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his
second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO,

AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, J.
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted;
or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article
35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Facts:
Yasuo Iwasawa and Felisa Gangan were married on November 28, 2002. It was only in 2009 when
Yasuo learned about his wife's previous marriage to Raymond Arambulo upon Felisa's confession when she
learned of Raymond's death. This prompted Yasuo to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to
Felisa as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in
relation to Article 41 of the FC. The RTC ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove Felisa's prior
existing valid marriage to another man. It was only Yasuo who testified about said marriage who has no

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personal knowledge of Felisa's prior marriage nor of Raymond's death. It also held that Yasuo's testimony
about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Yasuo and Felisa is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from
the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. In this case, Raymond
died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that Felisa’s marriage with Raymond was deemed to
have been dissolved. The second marriage of Felisa to Yasuo is bigamous, hence null and void, since the
first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by Yasuo are all public documents.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner
did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due
execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are
said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013, CARPIO, J.
When Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage.
Facts:
Maria Paz Galela Marinay was first married to Minoru Fujiki on January 24, 2004. Without her
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay married Shinichi Maekara on May 15, 2008. Marinay left Makeara
when she allegedly suffered physical abuse from him. She then started to contact Fujiki. In 2010, Marinay's
marriage with Makeara was declared void on the ground of bigamy by a family court in Japan. In 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign judgment. The RTC dismissed the
petition citing Secs. 2 and 4 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). It took the view that only "the husband or the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.
Issue:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.
Ruling:
Yes. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, the Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or

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annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." (See Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, 646 SCRA 637, March 30, 2011)
When Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife"—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014, PERALTA, J.
In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Facts:
When Merlinda Olaybar requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR), she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, in 2002. She then
filed a petition for cancellation of entries in the marriage contract especially the entries in the wife portion
thereof. She impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to
the case. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. The RTC granted her petition. Petitioner then contends that there was no
clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Also, it was asserted that the grant of the cancellation of all
the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab
initio.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of "all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract" is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Ruling:
No. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence
of marriage. Rather, Olaybar showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that
she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established
that the only “evidence” of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While the Court
maintains that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, the Court cannot nullify
the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already
been admitted and examined. Olaybar indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling
the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
Psychological Incapacity
DIANA M. BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON

G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003, Carpio, J.
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the

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petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Diana. It was alleged that during
their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. She withdrew to herself and
eventually refused to speak to her husband when she suffered several miscarriages. She even requested him
to leave the conjugal dwelling. The petition further alleged that Diana was psychologically incapacitated at
the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such
incapacity subsists up to the present time. Diana filed a motion to dismiss the said petition on the ground
that it failed to state a cause of action. The petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity, that it existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is
permanent or incurable. Further, it is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring
about the disability of Diana to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, it did not even state the
marital obligations which Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition states a cause of action.
Ruling:
Yes. The petition states the legal right of Tadeo, the correlative obligation of Diana, and the act or
omission of Diana in violation of the legal right.
Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriage provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.
The petition states the ultimate facts on which Tadeo bases his claim in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need
not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine
the root cause of psychological incapacity.
CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, TORRES, JR., J.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Facts:
On May 22, 1988, Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao-Tsoi. However, since their marriage until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Gina then filed a complaint for
the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Chi Ming Tsoi on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Page 50 of 126
Gina claims that Chi Ming Tsoi is impotent and a closet homosexual. According to Chi Ming Tsoi, the fault
lies with his wife since everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his her, she always avoided him
and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The RTC rendered a decision
declaring the nullity of their marriage. The CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not refusal to have sexual intercourse constitutes psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Yes. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "to procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As stated by the CA, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
DAVID B. DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL

a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.
Facts:
David and Sharon Dedel were married in 1966. However, during the marriage, Sharon turned out
to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men.
Petitioner alleged that despite confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment, Sharon did not stop her
illicit relationship with Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. David
then filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The RTC declared the civil and church marriages between David and Sharon null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the Sharon to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. The CA reversed the said decision dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not aberrant sexual behavior fall within the term "psychological incapacity."
Ruling:
No. The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very
complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s
sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not
have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage.
Sharon's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional

Page 51 of 126
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS v. BRIX FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time
with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Facts:
Armida Perez-Ferraris was married to Brix Ferraris. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage with Brix on the ground of his psychological incapacity. The RTC denied her petition
holding that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity and the evidence on
record were insufficient to prove infidelity. The CA affirmed the said judgment where it held that the
evidence on record did not convincingly establish that Brix was suffering from psychological incapacity or
that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Brix Ferraris is psychologically incapacitated to comply with marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the FC, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. The Court finds that the alleged mixed
personality disorder of Brix, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
BRENDA B. MARCOS v. WILSON G. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
Facts:
The marriage between Wilson and Brenda Marcos was declared null and void in a petition filed by
Brenda pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC. Wilson was declared psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards Brenda and their children. However, the said decision was reversed by the CA ratiocinating that
Wilson was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them
was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or
as would make him or her unable to assume them.
Issues:

Page 52 of 126
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that Wilson failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Equally important, there is no
evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO

MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

constitutes psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Roridel alleged that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as
a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance; and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. She asserted that Reynaldo
had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual. Their marriage was declared void ab initio
by the RTC which decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not "opposing and conflicting personalities" is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. It appears to the Court to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. It must be proven
to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. It must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Page 53 of 126
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, CORONA, J.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
Facts:
In 1988, Lolita Quintero-Hamano was married to Toshio Hamano. Eight years later, Lolita filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the FC. As alleged, Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest
only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to Lolita for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991,
she learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child. Their marriage was declared null and void by the RTC. The CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. In Molina, the guidelines provided the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. In this case, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented fell
short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. His
act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some
kind of psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence
was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there
was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an
expert witness. This Lolita did not do.
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his
family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (See
Republic vs. CA, 268 SCRA 198, 1997)
LEOUEL SANTOS v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, VITUG, J.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
Facts:

Page 54 of 126
The marriage between Leouel and Julia took place on September 20, 1986. In 1988, Julia went to
the US to work as a nurse. Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed a complaint to
have his marriage with Julia declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Leouel argues that
Julia's failure to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. Leouel
asserts that "a wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated." The RTC and the CA both dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. The factual settings in the this case, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. It should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. MANUEL SIAYNGCO

G.R. NO. 158896, October 27, 2004, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
Facts:
Manuel Siayngco filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juanita
Siayngco on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. Manuel alleged, among others, that his wife
exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him, she incessantly complained about almost
everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not
of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial
matters, she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors and she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement. In her answer, Juanita contended that it was respondent Manuel who was
remiss in his marital and family obligations and that she supported Manuel in all his endeavors despite his
philandering. The RTC dismissed Manuel's petition. The CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:

Page 55 of 126
Whether or not Juanita/Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to comply with marital
obligations.
Ruling:
No. What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of
the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which Manuel was not able to
fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that Manuel’s
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child
of his own flesh and blood.
As to the allegation of psychological incapacity on the part of Juanita, Manuel failed to prove that
his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her
controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents
are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. The record clearly shows that the root cause of Juanita’s behavior is
traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during
the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her
husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive.
JAIME F. VILLALON v. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON

G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Facts:
Jaime Villalon filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Corazon Villalon
pursuant to Article 36 of the FC. He cited as one of the manifestations of his psychological incapacity his
desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation. He admitted that on certain
occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even
when he became engaged to and, later on, married Corazon. Dr. Dayan was presented to testify on his
alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. A
person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings
and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova Complex exhibits habitual
adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another. When asked about the womanizing ways of
her husband, Corazon averred that she did not know whether her husband's acts could be deemed
womanizing since there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. The RTC
declared their marriage null and void. The said decision was reversed by the CA dismissing the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Jaime is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Jaime failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder.
While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder
as self-centered, characterized by grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to others, and one with
Casanova Complex as a serial adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these
symptoms.

Page 56 of 126
The Court is not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer, as he wants the court to
believe. As stated by Corazon, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years
apart could be deemed womanizing, especially considering that these instances involved the same woman.
This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from Casanova Complex who, according to
Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient
proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, TINGA, J.
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as

opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.
Facts:

Petitioner Leonilo Antonio filed a petition to declare his marriage with respondent Marie Ivonne
Reyes be declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Antonio claimed that Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. Reyes allegedly concealed the fact that she
previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, which she represented to Antonio as adopted child of the
family. She fabricated stories, misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist, claimed to be a singer or a free-
lance voice talent and even invented imaginary friends.
The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the
parties, which was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. Thereafter, the trial court declared the
marriage of the parties null and void. Despite the rulings of the Catholic tribunals, the CA reversed the
RTC’s judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of the parties should be declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage,
as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The evidence to establish psychological incapacity
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereto.
Respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality.
Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world
of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent
has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her
singing abilities, her income, etc. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by
the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. Respondent’s psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.

Page 57 of 126
JORDAN CHAN PAZ v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ
G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, CARPIO, J.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is
downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Facts:
Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Jordan allegedly had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts. He was alleged to be a
Mama’s boy as he depended on his mother for support and supplies of milk and diapers for their son.
Jeanice also alleged that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than help her
take care of their son. Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that Jordan was afflicted with Borderline
Personality Disorder.
The trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage null and void. The trial court
declared that Jordan’s psychological incapacity, which was specifically identified as Borderline Personality
Disorder, deprived him of the capacity to fully understand his responsibilities under the marital bond. The
CA dismissed Jordan’s appeal and motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Ruling:

No. The Court has declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder. In
this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s psychological incapacity were
based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic notes of Jeanice’s
testimony before the trial court. Consequently, Gates’ report and testimony were hearsay evidence since
she had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates’ testimony should have
thus been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.
Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordan’s alleged psychological incapacity was
not shown to be so grave and so permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological
incapacity.
JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010, BRION, J.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
Facts:

Page 58 of 126

Jocelyn Suazo and Angelito Suazo got married when they were 16 years old. They lived with
Angelito’s parents as they have no means to support themselves. They stopped schooling and Jocelyn was
forced to work. Angelito allegedly refused to work and became an alcoholic and heavy gambler. Jocelyn
alleged that Angelito beat her, thus prompting Jocelyn to leave Angelito. Ten years after their separation,
Jocelyn filed a petition to declare their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
psychologist diagnosed Angelito with Anti-Social Personality Disorder. The trial court granted the petition
and declared the marriage null and void. However, the CA reversed.
Issue:

Whether or not the marriage between Jocelyn and Angelito should be declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:

No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the
root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition. The psychologist, using
meager information coming from Jocelyn, a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s
psychological condition.
Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek

employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do
not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere
refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be
constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, BUENA, J.
The import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage against his wife Charmaine Felix on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Charmaine subsequently sued
Meynardo and his paramour for concubinage. Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He contended that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code posed a prejudicial question to
the determination of the criminal case. The said motion was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the RTC questioning the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case. Said
petition was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the Meynardo Beltran could be convicted of the crime of concubinage despite the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Ruling:

Page 59 of 126
Yes. The Court has held that the import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. In the case at bar, it must be held that parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
ROBERTO DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by

her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA
G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, ROMERO, J.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense.
Facts:
Private respondent Delia Soledad Domingo and petitioner Roberto Domingo got married while the
marriage of Roberto with one Emerlina dela Paz was still subsisting. Hence, Emerlina sued Roberto for
bigamy. Thereafter, Delia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Roberto and
separation of property. Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is unnecessary. The trial court denied the motion.
Roberto then filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the CA.
Roberto contended that the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage can be maintained only if it
is for the purpose of remarriage.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary for the recovery
and the separation of properties.
Ruling:
Yes. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other
instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other
than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common
children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage
which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required
by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a

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final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN

G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy.
Facts:
Vincent Mercado married Consuelo Tan while his marriage with Ma. Thelma Oliva was still
subsisting. Hence, Tan filed a complaint for bigamy against Mercado. Subsequently, Mercado filed a
petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Oliva. The petition was granted and the marriage
between Mercado and Oliva was declared null and void. Nevertheless, the RTC convicted Mercado of the
crime of bigamy.
Mercado contended that since his previous marriage had been declared null and void, he cannot be
convicted of the crime of bigamy as there was no first marriage to speak of.
Issue:
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void. It
is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy
charge. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity
of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then.
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004, QUISUMBING, J.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute
an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married in the Philippines. When Barrete returned to Canada
to work, she filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against Morigo which
was granted by the court. Consequently, Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in the Philippines.
Morigo subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Barrete on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Thereafter, Morigo was charged with the crime of

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bigamy, and later convicted by the RTC. Pending appeal to the CA, the trial court declared the marriage
between Morigo and Barrete null and void. The CA eventually affirmed the conviction of Morigo.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete is valid, thereby warranting
the conviction of Morigo of the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
No. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there
is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to
Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act
of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration
of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
ANTONIA ARMAS y CALISTERIO v. MARIETTA CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, VITUG, J.
Under Article 83 of the New Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. For the
subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse
present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith.
Facts:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate and was survived by his wife, respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William
Bounds. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years after James had disappeared, without Marietta
having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Petitioner Antonia Armas, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of the estate of Teodorico with
the RTC. She claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico, and that the marriage between the
Teodorico and Marietta is bigamous and thereby null and void. Marietta, who opposed the petition, stated
that her first marriage with James had been dissolved due to the latter's absence for more than eleven years
before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. The RTC ruled in favor of Antonia. Marietta
went to the CA contending that the trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code despite
the fact that the controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law in force. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and declared the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marietta is valid, despite the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of Marietta’s first husband, James.
Ruling:

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Yes. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on
08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only
on 03 August 1988. Under Article 83 of the New Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage
referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the
absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong – it partakes of the nature of
fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not find these
circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the
explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It
follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of
death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the
old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present
can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and
in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in
Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.
Before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the
effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
Facts:

Eduardo Manuel married Tina Gandalera while his marriage with Rubylus Gaa was still
subsisting. Thus, Gandalera sued Manuel for bigamy. Gandalera alleged that she married Manuel based on
the latter’s representation that he was single when in fact he was not. Manuel, on the other hand, allegedly
declared he was single in his marriage contract with Gandalera because he believed in good faith that his
first marriage was invalid. He stated that he was merely forced to marry Gaa and that after Gaa was
imprisoned for estafa, he had not heard from her for more than 20 years. He thought that there was no more
need to nullify his first marriage before marrying Gandalera. The RTC convicted Manuel of the crime of
bigamy, which the CA affirmed.
Issue:

Whether or not Eduardo Manuel should be convicted of bigamy considering the absence of
judicial declaration of presumptive death of Rubylus Gaa under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of
marriage established by law. The phrase “or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” was incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of

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presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy. It was the burden of the
petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-
grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive
death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the
Family Code.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
A decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is not a
prejudicial question.
Facts:
Respondent Isagani Bobis got married three times. The first was with one Maria Dulce B. Javier,
the second was with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis, and the third was with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. An Information for bigamy was filed against Isagani. Subsequently, Isagani filed a civil action
for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for bigamy, Isagani filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case, which the lower court granted. Imelda moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling:
No. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry.
The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a
matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage
was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been
valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage.
Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

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SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Facts:
The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first was
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Cariño. SPO4 Cariño
passed away under the care of respondent, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner
and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Respondent filed a case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00 “death benefits”
which petitioner received from various government agencies. Respondent admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed to be in good faith since she had
no knowledge of the previous marriage. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, which the
CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between SPO4 Santiago Cariño and petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño
is valid, thereby entitling her to the entire subject death benefits.
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and
the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. The records reveal
that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from
the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant
case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between
petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 of the Family Code is therefore in order. The
disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it
could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased
alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family

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Code governs. Even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government
employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are
presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005, GARCIA, J.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of
Section 247 of the Family Code, are immediately final and executory.
Facts:
Nine years after she left her husband due to the latter’s violent character, Gloria filed a verified
petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his absent spouse with the RTC under the rules
on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code. The RTC granted
the petition and declared Francisco presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Despite
the judgment being immediately final and executory under Article 247 of the Family Code, the OSG filed a
Notice of Appeal. The RTC elevated the records to the CA. The CA, treating the case as an ordinary
appealed case, denied the appeal and affirmed the appealed RTC decision. Without filing any motion for
reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed a petition for review for certiorari under Rule 45, maintaining that
the petition raises a pure question of law that does not require prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment declaring Francisco presumptively dead is final and executory, and
therefore, not appealable.
Ruling:
Yes. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision
of Section 247, Family Code, are immediately final and executory. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part
of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of

law, is immediately final and executory. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due
process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code,
all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are immediately final and
executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines,
as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no
right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible
error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction
because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not appealable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH

DIVISION) and ALAN B. ALEGRO
G.R. No. 159614, December 9, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.

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The spouse present is burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage.
Facts:
Alan Alegro filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea)
Julaton. Alan stated when he arrived home from work one day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan
thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house but when he went there, Lea was not there. He sought
the help of his friends, Lea’s friends, and the barangay captain, to locate his wife but to no avail. He even
went to Manila to look for her, but he also failed. Alan then decided to report Lea’s disappearance to the
local police station and to the NBI. The RTC granted the petition and declared Lea presumptively dead.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The OSG contended that Alan failed to prove that he had a well-
founded belief that Lea was already dead since Alan did not exert reasonable and diligent efforts to locate
his wife.
Issue:

Whether or not Alan had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead and thus, Lea should be
declared presumptively dead.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the spouse present is burdened to
prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The belief of the present spouse must
be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse
present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat.
The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom
he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent
admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law, his father-in-law told him that Lea had
just been there but that she left without notice. The respondent declared that Lea left their abode after he
chided her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it would be
better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single person. Lea, thus, left their
conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she communicate with the respondent after leaving the
conjugal abode because of her resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after
their marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-
law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the
credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts
considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio DYMS. The respondent did report and seek the help
of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only
after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR

G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013, BRION, J.
Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Facts:

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Jerry Cantor, the husband of respondent Maria Fe Cantor, left their conjugal home after having a
violent quarrel about respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" and Jerry’s expression of animosity
toward the respondent’s father. More than four years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent
filed before the RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code. She stated that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She allegedly
exerted efforts to look for her husband by inquiring from her in-laws, neighbors and friends of Jerry’s
whereabouts, but to no avail. She further alleged that she checks the patients’ directory whenever she went
to a hospital hoping to find Jerry. The RTC granted the petition and declared Jerry presumptively dead.
The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
Ruling:

No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the
Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. To be able
to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent
and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry. These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence. The respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not
report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. She did not
present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to
locate Jerry. There was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she
conducted a diligent search.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where
she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a
diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband
was already dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, FELICIANO, J.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Facts:
Respondent Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England during one
of his ship's port calls. The two became sweethearts and eventually got married in the Philippines.
Nolasco obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left Parker with his parents. After Parker
gave birth to their son, she left the Philippines. Nolasco allegedly exerted efforts to look for her in
England, but to no avail. He, however, admitted that he did not report Parker’s disappearance to the
Philippine government authorities. Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition, which the CA affirmed.
Issue:

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Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
No. When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it
superseded, the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration
of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes
a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no
news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family
Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable
or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of
Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look
for her there. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information
as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife
which respondent claims were all returned to him. Neither can this Court give much credence to
respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that
respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he
had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the
issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
Voidable Marriages
AURORA A. ANAYA v. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970, JBL Reyes, J.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the
last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall
give ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Facts:

Palaroan filed for an action for annulment of his marriage with Anaya on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The CFI of Manila dismissed his complaint
upholding their marriage. Anaya also filed for annulment of marriage on the ground that Palaroan had
divulged to Anaya that months prior to their marriage, he had a pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his which Anaya considered a fact that wrecked their marriage thus she averres that there was
fraud in the contracting of their marriage. The court considered Anaya’s allegation of fraud as insufficient
thus they dismissed her claim.
Issue:

Page 69 of 126
Whether or not non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Ruling:

No. Non-disclosure of pre-marital relationships is not a ground for annulment. Non-disclosure of a
husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that
would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article,
providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having
been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her
grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which
society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give
effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
FERNANDO AQUINO v. CONCHITA DELIZO

G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960, GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of
the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the
lower part of the abdomen.
Facts:

Delizo, at the date of her marriage to Aquino, concealed the fact that shewas pregnant by another
man that four months after their marriage, she gave birth to a child which she claims that the child was
conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and Aquino. The trial court dismissed the complaint for
Aquino did not show any birth certificate to show the child was born within 180 days after the marriage
between the parties. Later on Aquino presented evidence to show proof tho the child’s birth but still his
petition was denied. The CA denied Aquino’s appeal on the theory that it was not impossible for the parties
to have sex during their engagement so that the child could be their own and finding it absurd for Aquino
not to notice or suspect that Delizo was pregnant when he married her. In a motion for reconsideration filed
by Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not file an answer thus the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of Aquino’s complaint is correct.

Ruling:

No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact
that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of marriage. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy
was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to
medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still
below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen.
It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height
above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.

Furthermore, The Court of Appeals should not have denied the motion praying for new trial
simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as
evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government

Page 70 of 126
precisely to prevent such collusion.
JOEL JIMENEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960, PADILLA, J.
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear as under the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Facts:

Jimenez is praying for a decree to annul his marriage with Canizares on the ground that the office
of her vagina was to small to allow the penetration of the penis for copulation which he states existed at the
time of marriage and continues to exist. Canizares did not file an answer when she was summoned.
Canizares did not respond as well to subsequent calls to her by the court thus the MTC entered a decree
annulling the marriage between Jimenez and Canizares.
Issue:
Whether or not amarriage may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the
husband.
Ruling:

No. It is not enough proof. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved
to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending
or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to
be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this
country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in
this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a
witness against herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption
is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
Legal Separation
JOSE DE OCAMPO v. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960, BENGZON, J.
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife for one
of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a
matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to
obtain a divorce.
Facts:

After years of marriage, Ocampo discovered on several occasions that his wife was maintaining
illicit affairs with a Jose Arcalas when Ocampo sent her to study beauty culture in Manila. When she

Page 71 of 126
finished her course, she left Ocampo and that he even caught her with an affair with another man by the
name of Nelson Orzame. Ocampo filed for legal separation. She did not made any answer to the RTC and
admits having such sexual relation so when the case was appealed to the CA, the CA construed such
confession a confession of judgment thus they did not decree the legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not there was collusion between Ocampo and Floreniano.

Ruling:

No. In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a
legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.

Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant
could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the
moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a
personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the
guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove
it. And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG v. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956, FELIX, J.
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation.
Facts:

Bugayong is married to Ginez. They lived together with their sisters in Manila. After some time,
Ginez left the dwelling and informed her husbnad that she will be staying with her mother in Pangasinan
from which she moved to Dagupan to study in a local college there. Bugayong began receiving letters from
his sister in law and from other unknown writers stating that Ginez was performing acts of infidelity.
Bugayong went to Pangasinan to meet with his wife and when they met, they stayed in the house of
Bugayong’s cousin for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and day. Bugayong tried to verify the truth of Ginez’
alleged infidelity to which Ginez responded by merely packing her bags and leaving to which he took as a
confirmation for the acts. He could not find Ginez anymore. Bugayong filed with the CFI of Pangasinan a
complaint for legal separation to which Ginez answered denying the averments of the complaint. She set up
the posive defense that her acts were condoned by Bugayong.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in the part of Bugayong.

Ruling:
Yes. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially those portions

Page 72 of 126
quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts
of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument
that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected
between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact
that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and
together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the
second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no
other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that
there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he
came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.

It has been held that condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other
infidelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with reason and justice that if the
wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent
should operate as a pardon of his wrong.
ELISEA LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962, BARRERA, J.
The wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the
separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.
Facts:

Elisea was legally separated from his former husband Enrique. She desired to use her maiden
name Elisea Laperal on the ground that she had long been separated from Enrique so she filed an action
with the court to which at first was denied with respect to Article 372 of the Civil Code but later granted by
the court treating the action as a change of name which the City Attorney of Baguio opposed to.
Issue:
Whether or not Elisea is allowed to use her maiden name since she is legally separated from her
husband.
Ruling:

No. According to Article 372 of the Civil Code, the wife, even after the legal separation has been
decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so
because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It
seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged
status for the benefit of all concerned.

There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure prescribed
in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the petition quoted in
full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that
petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It
is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over
the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married women legally
separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation
alone — which is the only basis for the petition at bar — is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify
a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention
of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

Page 73 of 126
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG v. LUCITA G. ONG
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
Facts:

After 3 years of marriage Williamn and Lucita would almost quarrel every day to where William
began to physically assault Lucita in different ways for petty reasons. William also committed physical
violence to his children. He also said offensive and insulting language to her. William denied the
allegations. The RTC ruled in favor of Lucita finding the acts of William detrimental to their marriage. The
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision finding the testimonies of Dr. Elinzano, the doctor who treated Lucita’s
wounds and Linda, Lucita’s sister to be proven true.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA is correct in decreeing a legal separation.

Ruling:

Yes. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label
him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such
a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts,
but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which
provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The
abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one
year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. The Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of
state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same. With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been
accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity
and those for legal separation. As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal
separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the
relief she is entitled to under the law.
Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife
MARIANO B. ARROYO v. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO

G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921, STREET, J.
Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention
and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount
to legal cruelty

Page 74 of 126
Facts:

Mariano and Dolores lived together as husband and wife in Iloilo with a few short intervals of
separation. There came a time when Dolores went away to be separated from Mariano on the ground that
she was cruelly treated by Mariano. Mariano opted for her to return home to resume their married life but
Dolores wanted to be legally separated from him. The trial court ruled in favor Dolores ruling that it was
Mariano’s ill treatment that caused Dolores to leave.
Issue:
Whether or not the Dolores may choose not to cohabit with respect to Mariano’s cruelty towards
Dolores.
Ruling:

No. Dolores must cohabit. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of
jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a
doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. The tales of cruelty on the part of the
husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly
colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to
become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife.

Cruelty has been defined as what merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted
where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper,
petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional
sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral
offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that
cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on
the one side as well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an
injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be
done, both must suffer in silence. .

Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that
she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him.
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA v. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916, TRENT, J.
The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and
protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his
domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country.
Facts:

Eloisa and Jose were married and after a month, Eloisa left to return to her parents. It was alleged
in Eloisa’s complaint that Jose had her do unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals and other obscene
demands to which Eloisa did not agree to thus Jose treated him harshly. Jose even did not comply with the
marital duties of a husband. Eloisa thus filed for an action of support against her husband.
Issue:

Page 75 of 126
Whether or not Eloisa can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
Ruling:

Yes. She may claim for support. The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is
created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the
wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home
at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to
evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home
because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of
the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for
separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and
protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his
domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to
support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her
in his own home.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO,

JOHN DOE and JANE DOE
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO
v. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO
G.R. No. 139789 and G.R. No. 139808 May 12, 2000, PARDO, J.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne
process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
Facts:

Erlinda and Potenciano were once married but were separated for undisclosed reasons. When
Potenciano returned from the US, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo where their children claimed that
Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of his antidepressant drug which caused Potenciano’s health to
deteriorate. Erlinda filed with the RTC for guardianship over Potenciano due to his failing health. After a
meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and lived in Makati thus Erlinda filed for a
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. She alleged that the other respondents refused
her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibit Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
Issue:

Whether or not spouses can furnish a writ of habeas corpus to compel one another to live with
each other.
Ruling:

No. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the
petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

Page 76 of 126

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the
individual to discern his actions.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne
process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
ARTURO PELAYO v. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909, TORRES, J.
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something and spouses are mutually
bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness
should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the
necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored.
Facts:

Pelayo filed a complaint against Lauron and Abella when they refused to pay him for services he
rendered in the birth of their daughter-in-law’s child. They claimed in their answer the she died after the
childbirth and that she lived with her husband independently of them and that they are not bound to pay for
their daughter-in-law’s expenses. The trial court ruled in favor of Lauron and Abella.
Issue:
Whether or not Lauron and Abella should be liable for the expenses of the operation.
Ruling:

No. If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something and spouses are mutually
bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness
should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the
necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all
expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services.

In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees
due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants
during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants
herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife
is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to
which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently
needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician at
such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance therewith is
unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his
action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such
an emergency.

Page 77 of 126
Property Relations
MOISES JOCSON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO

VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989, MEDILEA, J.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Facts:

The petitioner and respondent are the surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. Poblete died before emilio without her estate being settled. Emilio died shortly. Emilio
executed three documents in his lifetime which conveyed by sale to Agustina, one of the respondents,
majority of his property including 1/3 share in the estate of Agustina. The petitoner, Moises, assailed the
documents and prayed for their nullity. and the properties be partioned between him and Agustina. The
RTC ruled in favor of Moises in which the CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is part of Emilio and Alejandra’s conjugal property.
Ruling:

No. The property is not part of their conjugal property. It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson
may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed
properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of
title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were
acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It
is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs.
Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still
a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was
described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties
were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. There being no showing also that the camarin and
the two ricemills, which are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson
and Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson,
the burden of proof being on petitioner.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996, VITUG, J.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal.
Facts:

Page 78 of 126

Antonio Valez filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition directing them to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply with
Articles 50, 51 and 52. Consuelo asserted that the Family Code contains no provisions on the procedure for
the liquidation of property in unions without marriage. The RTC clarified that suich provision applies.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the case at bar.
Ruling:

Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party
who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
already heretofore expressed.
BENIGNO TODA, JR v. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA

ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA v. BENIGNO TODA, JR.
G.R. Nos. 78583-4 and G.R. Nos.78696-7 March 26,1990, REGALADO, J.
The separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of
the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon
judicial approval, without which it is void.
Facts:

Benigno and Rose Marie Toda were married until the alleged infidelity of Benigno which promted
Romse Marie to file for the termination of their marriage for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of
conjugal funds against Bengigno. The parties agreed to file a joint petition for judicial approval of conjugal
partnership on April 1, 1981. This petition was signed by the both of them on March 30, 1981 embodied
with a compromise agreement in the separation of their properties. Such agreement was approved in June 9,
1981.
Issue:

Page 79 of 126

Whether or not the CA is correct in stating that the compromise agreement is effective only on
June 9, 1981.
Ruling:

Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the compromise agreement became effective only on June 9,
1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by
the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the
contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore,
becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said
Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of
separation of property.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be considered
dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their joint petition for voluntary dissolution of
their conjugal partnership. Conformably thereto, the cash dividends declared on July 1, 1981 and July
25,1981 in the amount of P2,191.62 and P40,196.12, respectively, should pertain to Rose Marie; and that
declared on April 2,5, 1981 in the amount of P37,126.30 ought to be paid to Benigno, pursuant to
Paragraph 4 (c) of the compromise agreement which awards to Benigno the conjugal assets not otherwise
specifically assigned to Rose Marie.
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS,
EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and
ROMARICO HENSON
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991, FERNAN, C.J.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
Facts:

Romarico and Katrina Henson were married spouses and had 3 children. Even during their
marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. Romarico bought a parcel of land from
his father using money he borrowed from an officemate. Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan
where the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry. Katrina failed to return the same thus Anita
demanded for payment of the value jewelry thus Katrina issued a check but was dishonored. Anita Chan
and Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The
trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs where a writ of execution was issued attaching 4 lots in Angeles City
in the name of Romarico married to Katrina. Such lots were sold to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Josn.
Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision which was meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties are exclusively owned by Romancio.

Ruling:

No. The properties are not owned exclusively by Romarico. The presumption of the conjugal
nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof
that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where

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he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the
conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in
the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the controlling factor is
the source of the money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for
with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the
conjugal partnership. In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such
indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988),
a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the
family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the
family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the
conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY v. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ

GR NO. 116668, July 28, 1997, ROMERO, J.
The property acquired by one spouse while living in an illicit relationship with another still
belongs to the conjugal partnership or community property of his/her valid and legal spouse.
Facts:
Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. Their marriage was described by the
frequent absence and separation of Miguel and Carlina due to Miguel’s leaving abroad. In 1972, Miguel
returned to the Philippines for good but did not choose to leave with his wife and daughter Herminia. In
July 1973, then 63 years old Miguel contracted his second marriage with 19 years old Erlinda Agapay. In
May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan.
Upon the death of Miguel in 1981. Carlina and Herminia filed a case to recover the ownership and
possession of the Agricultural land in Pangasinan. To counter, Erlinda defended claiming that it was her
sole property, having bought the same with her own money with facts however providing that she only has
a sari-sari store as her source if income.
Issue:
Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void marriage
(Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid marriage (Carlina and Miguel)
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household,
are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of
buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy
the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was

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only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S.
Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the
operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their
adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was
purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was
bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution
would still be essential.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in
Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
SPOUSES ONESIFORO AND ROSARIO ALINAS v. SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS,
GR NO. 158040, APRIL 14, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes, the husband's sale of conjugal property without the consent of the wife
was annulled but the spouses were ordered to refund the purchase price to the buyers.
Facts:

Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas owns a land property in which Onesiforo sold to
respondent spouses Victor and Elena Alinas without Rosario’s consent. Onesiforo's signature appears in an
Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989, selling Lot 896-B-9-B to respondent spouses. The records
show a notarized document and captioned Agreement whereby petitioner Onesiforo acknowledged that his
brother Victor used his own money to redeem Lot 896-B-9-B from the SSS and, thus, Victor became the
owner of said lot. In the same Agreeement, petitioner Onesiforo waived whatever rights, claims, and
interests he or his heirs, successors and assigns have or may have over the subject property. On March 15,
1993, by virtue of said documents, TCT No. 17394 covering Lot 896-B-9-B was issued in the name of
respondent spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid notwithstanding the absence of Rosario’s (wife) consent.
Ruling:
No. Although petitioners were married before the enactment of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, the sale in question occurred in 1989. Thus, their property relations are governed by Chapter IV on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code. Hence, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and
jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners' conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its
entirety.
However, in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, the
Court agrees with the CA that petitioners spouses should reimburse respondent spouses the redemption
price paid for Lot 896-B-9-B in the amount of P111,110.09 with legal interest from the time of filing of the
complaint.
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO v.

COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING
G.R. NO. 118305, February 12, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.

Page 82 of 126
When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity agreement by the husband redounded
to the benefit of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an obligation personal to him.
Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300, 000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM,
respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan.
Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching. As a
result the conjugal property of spouses Ching was sought to answer.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property is liable for the husband’s obligation as a surety of PBM.
Ruling:
No. The evidence of Ayala Investment indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed
as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Ayala should have adduced evidence to prove
that Alfredo Chings acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we underscored the
requirement that: there must be the requisite showing of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses or benefits to his family or that such obligations are productive of some benefit to
the family. Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate
existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM
was saved by the loan and its shares of stock appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the
holdings of the Ching family.
Ayala Investment (AIDC) insist that the corporate debt in question falls under the exception laid
down in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan procured from AIDC was for the sole
advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of Ching. Appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits from Philippine Blooming Mills (the
debtor corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and benefits,
are not the benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The benefits contemplated
by the exception in Article 122 (Family Code) is that benefit derived directly from the use of the loan. In
the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-
appellee-husband Ching or his family. The alleged benefit, if any, continuously harped by respondents-
appellants, are not only incidental but also speculative.
WILLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES

G.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
A foreigner husband cannot claim reimbursement from the amount he contributed from the
purchase of a private land they acquired during the marriage upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership for it violates the constitution.
Facts:

Willem Beumer a Dutch national and Avelina Amores a Filipina were married in 1980. During
their marriage they acquired properties. This Includes several house and lot in which instruments and deeds
were named before her wife acknowledging the incapacity of Willem to acquire private lands. When their
marriage was dissolved on the ground of psychological incapacity of Willem Beumer, in a similar vein, the
latter upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership claims for the reimbursement of the amount of

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money he contributed for the acquisition of the land. The RTC and CA denied Willem’s claim on the
ground of the constitutional prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not Willem may claim reimbursement?
Ruling:
No. In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
petitioner Beumer given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces
no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, Beumer cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement
for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the
action is proscribed by the Constitution.
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.
Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning
Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1
and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state,
the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimoni6 and it is this policy which the Court is
duty-bound to protect.
HONORIO L. CARLOS v. MANUEL T. ABELARDO

G.R. No. 146504, April 9, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.
The conjugal property is liable for the debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited
Facts:

Manuel Abelardo and Maria Abelardo were husband and wife. To start their journey as spouses
they contracted loan from Honorario Carlos for the payment of the house and lot that would serve as their
conjugal dwelling. Notably, Manuel’s wife Maria executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but
which respondent Manuel did not sign. When they failed to pay for their obligation the spouses were sued
by herein petitioner Carlos.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property of the spouses Abelardo is liable?
Ruling:
Yes. Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants spouses Abelardo never denied that the check

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of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as
their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made
by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the
family. Hence, defendant-husband Manuel Abelardo and defendant-wife Maria Abelardo are jointly and
severally liable in the payment of the loan.
While respondent Manuel Abelardo did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and
signed by his wife Maria Abelardo, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it
was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family.
Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent Manuel, under Art. 121 of the Family
Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife Maria.
SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA v. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. CELSO
ATAYAN, HEIRS OF GARCIA, ET.AL.
G.R. No. 111547, Januiary 27, 1997, FRANCISCO, J.
For the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership to apply proof of its
acquisition during marriage must first be established.
Facts:

Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Garcia were husband and wife. Santiago has five children with his
first wife Consuelo and four others from another for a total of nine children. The subject property in
controversy in this case was inherited by Santiago prior to his marriage with Consuelo. However it was
named and registered only during their marriage in which provides”Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo
Gaza”. After the death of Santiago a writ of attachment was issued in favor of petitioner Estonina against
Consuelo Garcia. 55% of the subject property was included in the attachment which means the ½ share plus
1/10 share of Consuelo claiming that the subject property is presumed conjugal property since it was issued
during their marriage that would entitle Consuelo to ½ share of the property.

On the other hand, respondent Atayan claiming interest from the other heirs claimed that it is not a
Conjugal property. Hence, Consuelo only has 1/10 interest to the property which consequently would give
only 1/10 right of attachment for petitioner Estonina. The RTC ruled in favor of Estonina. The CA on
appeal reversed the RTC and held that it is not a conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the title to land ”Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza” give rise to
presumption of conjugality.
Ruling:
No. The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter lead us to concur
with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive
property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presumption
under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership
applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated,
proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case at bench, the petitioners have been unable to present any proof
that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo.
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question that
formed part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death. And
as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in
Civil Case No. 88430 was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel
of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad
Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null and void, belonging as it

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does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan.
JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER v. SPS. MANUEL M. FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER

and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER and FLORA FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
While we could concede to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family
Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse
upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of
the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
Facts:

Alfredo and Josefa Ferrer were husband and wife. Alfredo owns a lot which he acquired prior to
his marriage to Josefa. Upon their marriage improvements were introduced by Josefa. However, before the
death of Alfredo and at the time when Alfredo was allegedly was already bedridden the respondents Ferrer
were able to acquire the subject lot including its improvements through a deed of sale contracted with
Alfredo. Josefa then questioned the validity of sale. However, in a decision of the Supreme Court it was
finally held that it was a separate property in which Alfredo can rightfully sell without his wife’s consent.

Hence, as a final attempt to recover Josefa now claims that since she introduced some
improvements and since the subject land was the only property of his deceased husband Alfredo she now
has the right of reimbursement from the buyer spouses Ferrer pursuant to Article 120 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Josefa Ferrer may claim reimbursement from the buyer spouses pursuant to
Art.120 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
No. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements
that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts
or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of
the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property
of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership
by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject
property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the
Family Code.
However, in this case what is incontrovertible is that the respondents Ferrer, despite the allegations
contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner Josefa’s
spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse Josefa for
her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse Manuel Ferrer who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated,
respondents Ferrer do not have the obligation to respect petitioner Josefa Ferrer’s right to be reimbursed.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK v. MIGUELA C. DAILO

A real estate mortgage without the consent or authority of the wife is void.
Facts:

Page 86 of 126

Marcelino Dailo Jr. and Miguela Dailo were husband and wife married in 1967. During their
marriage they acquired house and lot. In 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City.
Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner Homeowners
Bank. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the
subject property in favor of Homeowners Bank. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution
of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of Miguela.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Mortgage executed by Marcelino Dailo Jr. without the consent of his wife
Miguela valid as to his undivided share.
2. Whether or not the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family.
Ruling:
1. No.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge
and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in
the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of
the conjugal property shall be void.
2. No.
For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, it was not
sufficiently provided. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to
the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to
show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER v.

HELMUT MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
An alien spouse cannot claim reimbursement from the money used to purchase a land property due
to the constitutional prohibition.
Facts:

Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller were husband and wife married in Germany in
1989. During the subsistence of their marriage the spouses acquired a land in Antipolo from the money of
Helmut but was named after Elena due to their acknowledgement of the constitutional prohibition.
However, Due to incompatibilities and Helmut’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated. Consequently, Helmut now claims reimbursement of the money used for the
acquisition of the land property in Antipolo.
Issue:
Whether or not Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of
the Antipolo property.

Page 87 of 126
RULING:
No. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of Elena Muller’s
marriage to Helmut Muller. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, Helmut
Muller’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its
express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.To hold otherwise
would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Thus, in the instant case, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. Further, the
distinction made between transfers of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on
Helmut Muller’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit Helmut to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. v. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO

G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000, MENDOZA, J.
Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in
union are incapacitated to marry each other.
Facts:

Eustaquio Mallilin,Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo, both married and with children, but separated from
their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective
marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation,
with Eustaquio as president and chairman of the board of directors, and Ma. Elvira as vice-president and
treasurer. The business flourished and Eustaquio and Ma. Elvira acquired real and personal properties
which were registered solely in Ma. Elvira’s name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple
separated. Eustaquio demanded from Ma.Elvira his share in the subject properties, but Elvira refused
alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. In her defense, Elvira claimed that it
was her sole property and that there cannot be a co-ownership between them because of an illicit
relationship.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership can occur in an illicit/adulterous relationship.
Ruling:
Yes. It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated
to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living together, they could not have
owned properties in common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists
between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
There is thus co-ownership even though the couple are not capacitated to marry each other.
THELMA A. JADER-MANALO v. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO

CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002, KAPUNAN, J.

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The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.
Facts:

An advertisement was posted by the spouses Camaisa with regard to the property they are selling.
After seeing the Ad petitioner Jader-Manalo became interested and offered to buy the property to the
spouses Camaisa. An initial negotiation took place in which the spouses Camaisa and Jader-Manalo was
present. In their second meeting Manalo paid a down payment to Edilberto Camaisa (husband) who
received it, based on the latter’s promised of the follow up consent of her wife Norma Camaisa. When
Norma was later on informed of the payment she did not consent and did not sign the contract.
Consequently, the initial down payment was returned then to Manalo. However, Manalo now claims that
the sale was already perfected and valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property without the wife’s written consent is valid.
Ruling:
No. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to
sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Respondent Norma Camaisa
admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma Camaisa
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma
refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the
sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
Finally, Manalo argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the
contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted. The argument is
bereft of merit. Manalo is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse
cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority
if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under
Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this
case, Manalo failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought
IMELDA RELUCIO v. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ

G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002, PARDO, J.
Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses. Stated otherwise, the administration of the
property of the marriage is entirely between husband and wife, to the exclusion of all other persons
Facts:

Angeline Lopez filed for judicial appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property, accounting and forfeiture arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. In
addition to his husband, Imelda Relusion was also impleaded by Angeline on the alleged illicit relationship
thereof to his husband which resulted to the abandonment and the abuse of their conjugal property’s
administration to the detriment of Angeline and four children. Nonetheless, Imelda defended by claiming
lack of cause of action against her that should warrant the dismissal of the case against her.
Issue:
Whether or not the inclusion of Imelda as a party defendant in special proceeding for judicial
appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property, accounting and

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forfeiture between spouses Lopez should prosper.
Ruling:
No. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion
of all other persons. Angeline alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of
action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between Imelda and Angeline that can
possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.
The second cause of action is for an accounting by Angeline’s husband. The accounting of
conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Imelda has nothing to do with the marriage
between Angeline and Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against Imelda on this ground.
Further, Angeline’s asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez share alone. Failure of
Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in Angeline’s favor, results in a
breach of an obligation to Angeline and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however,
pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not Imelda.
ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA v. HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA,

RUFINO M. GARADO, and CASIANO HOMBRIA
G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.
The husband alone in a suit involving the conjugal property may sign the certificate against forum
shopping pursuant to the right granted by law to administer it.
Facts:

A case in which the conjugal property of the spouses Docena was involved is filed. Pursuant to
this case, however, rather than both spouses signing the certification against forum shopping it is only
Antonio the husband in behalf of the conjugal property signed the certification against forum shopping. The
private respondent Casiano Hombria assails this claiming that the certification is invalid.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification against forum shopping signed by the husband alone involving
conjugal property is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In
fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this endeavor.
The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife.
Corollary, the husband alone may execute the necessary certificate of non-forum shopping to accompany
the pleading. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal property could have filed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition alone, without the concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an
interest in the conjugal properties may be filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the petition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband and wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of
the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It is believed that even under
the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of
Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping

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only by the husband is not a fatal defect.
Therefore, in view of the circumstances of this case, namely, the property involved is a conjugal
property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery
brought against the spouses, and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and the wife,
as pointed out in the Motion for Reconsideration in respondent court, was in the province of Guian, Samar,
whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that
would not authorize a husbands signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh and is
clearly uncalled for.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA

CORPUZ
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.
Without authority or consent of the spouse any disposition or encumbrance by the other spouse is
null and void.
Facts:
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz where spouses. In January of 1990 when Gilda was away looking
for work Judie Corpuz sold their house to spouses Guiang. Upon her return, she was informed that his
husband Judie already left with his new wife and that their house was already sold to the spouses Guiang.
When Gilda stayed in the house and refused to accede with spouses Guiang’s order to leave the house, the
latter filed a case for trespassing against Gilda Corpuz and children.

At the barangay level, Gilda Corpuz was forced to sign an amicable settlement in relation to the
trespassing case filed against her. Nonetheless, she stayed and claimed that she was forced by the barangay
captain to sign it. Spouses Guiang now claims that the sale is valid and if ever it is voidable on account of
Gilda’s lack of consent it was nonetheless ratified by the amicable settlement subsequently rendered.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the house without the wife’s consent is valid.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner spouses Guiang insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly
executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private
respondent Gilda’s consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code.
However we cannot agree for ART. 124 of the Family Code is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is
void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The provision in the civil code giving the wife ten (10) years during the marriage to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal
partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were
perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged
during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion.
In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband Judie
Corpuz and the petitioners-spouses Guiang for doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified.
The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wife’s consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of Gilda’s consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2)
object, and (3) consent. Here, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

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GUILLERMA TUMLOS v. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property
acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition.
Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
Facts:

Spouses Mario and Lourdez Fernandez filed an ejectment suit against Guillarma Tumlos. Spouses
Fernandez claimed that the apartment building where Guillerma stays is owned by them and that they
allowed Guillerma’s possession by mere tolerance. In her defense, Guillerma said that she had a
relationship with Mario that would entitle her to the possession of the property being the co-owner thereof.
Guillerma alleged that they bought the property as their love nest; that they lived together in the property
with their 2 children and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals, until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Guillerma is entitled to the possession of the property.
Ruling:
No. In this case, Guillerma failed to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution
to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation
with Respondent Mario Fernandez. Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the
cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in
Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in
its acquisition. Clearly, there is no basis for Guillerma’s claim of co-ownership. The property in question
belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondent spouses Fernandez.
LUPO ATIENZA v. YOLANDA DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, GARCIA, J.
There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, De Castro sufficiently established that she
derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a
businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail.
Facts:
Despite Lupo Atienza being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in
consortium. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted
ways. Consequently, Lupo filed in the RTC a complaint against Yolanda De Castro for the judicial partition
between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City wherein
he alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband
and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them. Moreover, he averred that the property in question was
acquired by De Castro sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred
by the seller in De Castro’s name without his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any objection
thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving. He further argued that pursuant to Article 144 of
the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject
property because with or without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof,
adding that under Article 484 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either or both of
them during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and

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governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is commonly owned by the parties.

Ruling:

No. Atienza’s claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did
he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. True,
the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is
either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the
purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to Atienza’s dismal failure to prove his cause, De
Castro was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-
ownership when, as here, De Castro sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the
property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes
evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
property.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR v. BRUNO FEHR

G.R. No. 152716, October 23, 2003, PUNO, J.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This
provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.
Facts:
The RTC declared the marriage between Bruno and Elna Fehr void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. Petitioner however
questioned the order of the RTC with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the
support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time
when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the
Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is a common property of the parties and their property regime
should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
Ruling:
Yes. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown
that Elna and Bruno suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in
marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of
respondent’s psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed

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property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time
when they were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of the parties.
JACINTO SAGUID v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship requires proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met
Jacinto Saguid. However, after 9 years of cohabitation, the couple decided to separate. Rey filed a
complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against Saguid wherein she
alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and
fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects,
with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their
house, be reimbursed to her.
Issue:

Whether or not Saguid was able to prove her actual contribution as provided under Art.148 of the
Famiy Code.
Ruling:
No. It is not disputed that Rey and Saguid were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property
regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual
contribution is required.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Rey
alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However,
nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are
receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23,
1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00. On the other hand, while there is no question that both parties
contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their
respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of
the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal
properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the
petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Family as an Institution
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON
G.R. No. 125465. June 29, 1999, MENDOZA, J.

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Whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving family members, the requisite showing of
earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory.
Facts:
Spouses Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents before the RTC.
Later, the spouses filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful. In due time, private
respondents filed an answer in which they denied that earnest efforts had been made to reach a compromise
but the parties were unsuccessful. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not
verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had
been made to arrive at a compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not the Art. 151 of the Family Code is applicable herein.
Ruling:
NO. Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively
among family members. The inclusion of Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the
case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same
family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and
sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal
effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondent Hontiveros, and Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto
Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR. v. JUANA GONZALES, ET. AL

G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, PEREZ, J.
If the respondents as parties–defendants could not, and did not, after filing their answer to
petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a
compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis to motu propio order
the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
Facts:
Claiming that the donation made prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis’ children with Capitolina
filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of property
before the RTC. The latter nullified the said deed. On appeal, the CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of
the complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure
to allege therein that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.
Ruling:
NO. A failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members
of the same family is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of
action. The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss

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or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court. In the case at hand, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a
condition precedent was filed in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that
respondent brought before the CA. Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non–jurisdictional defense
or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties–defendants could not, and did
not, after filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required
allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority
or basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI,

JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO
G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994, BELLOSILLO, J.
"Sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil
Code as members of the same family.
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Pedro Hernando. However the same was dismissed by the RTC on
the ground that the parties being brother-in-law, the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were
first exerted towards a compromise. Gaudencio Guerrero argued however that since brothers by affinity are
not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise.
Issue:
Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217,
par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court
requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and
maintained.
Ruling:
No. The Court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as
members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice
Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of
the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially
the same enumeration of "members of the family", the Court find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence
on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of
Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. v. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA, in his capacity as
Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no
longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action
can prosper.
Facts:
Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his
wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for
cancellation of mortgage. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Moreno failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. The RTC however
denied the motion and agreed with Moreno that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required before
the filing of the instant case considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are strangers to

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the family. Also, as it is Remedios who stands to be benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code, being a
member of the same family as that of Alberto, only she may invoke said Art. 151.
Issue:
Whether or not earnest efforts towards a compromise is required in the case herein.
Ruling:
NO. In Magbaleta, the Court ruled that once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving
members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made
towards a compromise before the action can prosper. Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when
the suit is exclusively between or among family members. Petitioner makes much of the fact that the
present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between brothers. However, the
Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta
inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151
of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits
involving "members of the same family" as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code. Since the
Court has ruled that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which
are exclusively between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be
invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
Family Home
FLORANTE F. MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.

G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997, PANGANIBAN, J.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop.
Facts:
Jose Manacop and his wife purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with a bungalow. E & L
Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the
RTC to collect indebtedness. Instead of filing an answer, Manacop and his company entered into a
compromise agreement which was approved by the court. A motion for execution was filed which the
lower court granted. Manacop and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to
stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them.
Issue:
Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before
the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the
said Code.
Ruling:
Yes. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property
became his family home under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said
Code. However, Modequillo ruling explicitly enunciated that said provision of the Family Code does not
have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code
had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the
subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the laws
protective mantle cannot be availed of by Manacop. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the
assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, Manacop cannot be shielded by the
benevolent provisions of the Family Code.

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JOSE MODEQUILLO v. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, ET. AL
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990, GANCAYCO, J.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
have a retroactive effect.
Facts:
A judgment against Jose Modequillo was rendered by the CA. The said judgment having become
final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land owned
by Modequillo. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose
Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to
the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the
judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated
under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the final judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of
execution of the subject residential property.
Ruling:
Yes. In the present case, the residential house and lot of Modequillo was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home
upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in
the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Thus, the family home of Modequillo is
not exempt from execution of the money judgment. The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the Family Code.
PERLA G. PATRICIO v. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino
Lorenzo Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not
fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support.
Facts:
Perla Patricio and her two sons inherited from her husband several properties including a parcel of
land with a residential house. Marcelino Marc, one of her sons, instituted an action for partition before the
RTC which was granted. Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by Dario III on appeal, the CA dismissed

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the complaint for partition filed by Patricio and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family
home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary
thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of
spouses Marcelino Dario and Perla Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
Issue:
Whether or not partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede
to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Ruling:
Yes. The rule is that if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will
continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case
the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV is dependent
on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home
and his being a descendant of Marcelino Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent
on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must
now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Paternity and Filiation
MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEÑAS
v. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG
G.R. No. L-2474, May 30, 1951, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
As a rule, a child presumed to be legitimate if he was born within three hundred (300) days
following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was
physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300
next preceding the birth of the child.
Facts:
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother,
Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became
worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from
his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the
house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse
and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without the presence of his
wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was
given the name of Mariano Andal.
Issue:

Whether or not Mariano can be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that
boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three
hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120
days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.

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There was no evidence presented that Emiliano was absent during the initial period of conception,
specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included
in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano. On the contrary, there is enough
evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano and his wife were still living under the marital
roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit
intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. The Court
admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he
could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows
that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can
do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. There
is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable,
nor was there evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in
favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome.
TEOFISTA BABIERA v. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.
The present action involves the cancellation of Babiera's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn her
legitimacy. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented during trial,
sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.
Facts:
Presentacion Catotal questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera. She
asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of
informant forged, and contained false entries. Catotal ask the court to declare Babiera's certificate of birth
void and ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary
rights of Catotal who inherited the estate. Babiera countered that she and Catotal are full-blooded sisters, as
showed therein her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Catotal has legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171.
(2) Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute of limitation.
(3) Whether or not the public record of Babiera's birth is superior to the oral testimony of Catotal.
Ruling:
(1) No. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it
applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that the
alleged mother, Hermogena, did not give birth to Babiera. The present action does not impugn Babiera's
filiation to Eugenio and Hermogena, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. The reason
why Catotal took interest on Babiera's status is to protect the former's successional rights.
(2) No. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for
action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Babiera's Birth
Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe
because it was allegedly declared void ab initio.
(3) No. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented during
trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate. First, the birth
certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the mother's signature was different from other
signatures. Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of Hermogena's

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pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age. Third, the disposition of
Hermogena which states that she did not give birth to Teofista and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL

G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994, PUNO, J.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at bar because
said provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a
certain couple.
Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They both died intestate.
The special proceedings for administration of the properties were filed with the trial court. Vicente’s sister,
Victoria Lirio, filed for issuance of letters of administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa Badua opposed
the petition, saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Marissa and that she is capable of administering his
estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the spouses treated her as their
own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed
to beget a child during their marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological
child of the spouses who were unable to physically procreate. The RTC relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the
Family Code and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court decision and
declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of the late spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Marissa is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the late spouses.
Ruling:
NO. Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. The
above provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a
certain couple. In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been his child; and (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this
case, it is not where the heirs of the late Benitez are contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by
Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was
repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that
he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of the estate.
ARTEMIO G. ILANO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO,

represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994, NOCON, J.
The possession of illegitimate status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly
and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity.
Facts:
While Leoncia De Los Santos and Artemio Ilano were living together, Merceditas Ilano was born.
Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and
Artemio Geluz Ilano. During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he
showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial
School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. Those signatures
were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their presence
and of Elynia. Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized
as her Daddy. He treated her as a father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and

Page 101 of 126
anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.
Issue:
Whether or not Merceditas is a duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
Ruling:
Yes. Since Artemio had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she
is a spurious child. The possession of illegitimate status means that the father has treated the child as his
own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity.
There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own,
by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
The mere denial by Artemio of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth
that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not
appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment. It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long
beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total
stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures
and handwriting. The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship
between Leoncia and Artemio, their living together as circumstances of Merceditas birth, the acts of
Artemio in recognizing and supporting Merceditas, find ample support from the testimonial and
documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed
by his belated denials.
JANICE MARIE JAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO
G.R. No. L-49162, July 28, 1987, PADILLA, J.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to
non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity.
Facts:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico Jao.
Perico denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by
the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico and
Arlene. Upon Salgado's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared the
child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood grouping test could have been
conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no showing of irregularity or
mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Perico's contention and reversed the trial court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity.
Ruling:
Yes. As held by the Court in the case of Co Tao v. CA, the NBI expert’s report of the blood tests
stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From
this statement the defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court
noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the
child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other
facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is the father
of the child."
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity,
rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood
typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now
almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although

Page 102 of 126
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the
mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the
blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged
father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. Thus, the Court holds
that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the
non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented showing any
defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of
the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE

PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005, CORONA, J.

DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage.
Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. In their complaint,
respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate relationship and
impregnated Fe. Arnel, however, denied having sired Martin. Fe and Martin, as a result moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing.
Issues:
Whether or not DNA testing is a valid means to prove paternity.

Ruling:

Yes. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed
equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. The Court has long believed in the merits of DNA
testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA
testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. The Court
therefore reiterated that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.

The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some
instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence
County, New York pointed out that a determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial
process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements
set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.

In Rafferty v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing
paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a
marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test eliminating
Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that
no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94% probability of
paternity concluded by the DNA testing.

Page 103 of 126
JOEY D. BRIONES v. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P.
MIGUEL, G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004, PANGANIBAN, J.

An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent
any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
Facts:

Petitioner Joey D. Briones alleged that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel and that he wanted to obtain custody of his minor child. Respondent Miguel,
however, prayed that the custody of her minor child be given to her by reason of the minor’s illegitimacy.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his
own child.
Ruling:

Yes. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. Under Article 176 of the
Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, without any distinction
between natural and spurious. The concept of natural child is important only for purposes of legitimation.
Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an illegitimate child.

Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in
the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his
birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176,
parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s
recognition of him.
CAMELO CABATANIA v. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents. [G.R.

No. 124814. October 21, 2004, CORONA, J.

A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
Facts:

Page 104 of 126

Florencia Regodos filed a petition in behalf of her minor son for recognition and support from
petitioner Camelo Cabatania. Cabatania, however, denied the alleged paternity and insisted that Florencia
was already pregnant when they had sex. The RTC gave more probative weight to the testimony of
Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was
alive.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner should be compelled to acknowledge private respondent Camelo
Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter.
Ruling:

No. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may
be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.

The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code. Private
respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was without
the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. In the same vein, the Court ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the
date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity. Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them
gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of
legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, G.R.
No. 123450, August 31, 2005, CORONA, J.

The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Facts:

Gerardo Concepcion filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa Almonte annulled on the
ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario
Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The RTC annulled Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Gerardo for
being bigamous and as a result declared Jose Gerardo as an illegitimate child. The custody of the child was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma. Theresa argued that there was
nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She
further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname. When brought to
the appellate court, it held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage.

Page 105 of 126
Issue:

Whether or not Jose Gerardo was the son of Mario during Ma. Theresa’s first marriage.
Ruling:

Yes. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage
of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy,
Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect
the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right
to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother
Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A persons surname or
family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence,
Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in
any way.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, represented by their mother,

CAROLINA A. DE JESUS v. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON,
ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN
DIZON and FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES
CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001, VITUG, J.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
Facts:

Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married and it was during this marriage that
Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie Christie de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, a
certain Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children
by Carolina Aves de Jesus. When Juan G. Dizon died intestate, petitioners filed a complaint for Partition
with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the RTC. Respondents sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint would call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of
Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
Issue:

Page 106 of 126
Whether or not Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus is Juan G. Dizon’s own illegitimate children.
Ruling:

No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is
perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption
indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between
the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due
to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious
illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration
of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took
effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that
the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, v. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS
G.R. No. 105619, December 12, 1995, ROMERO, J.

Although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights
of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by
legal fiction can likewise be legitimized.
Facts:

Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein
petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, Antonio fell in love and married Conchita Talag de
Santos, herein private respondent in another country. This union produced eleven children. Less than a
month later, after the death of Sophia, Antonio and private respondent contracted another marriage
celebrated under Philippine laws.

After the death of Antonio, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. After six years,
petitioner Santos decided to intervene. She argued that private respondent's children were illegitimate. The
RTC declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them,
along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, she filed the instant petition contending that since only natural
children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction can be legitimized.

Ruling:

Page 107 of 126
No. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined
thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born out of
illicit relations from the purview of the law.

Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural
children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out,
much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the
petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in
the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is
rightfully entitled to only half of her share.

Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of
the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and
illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S.

FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 108366, February 16, 1994 PUNO, J.

While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Facts:

Petitioners filed an action for recognition and support against private respondent Carlito. Violeta,
the mother of the two petitioners pointed Carlito as the father of her two sons. She averred they were
married in civil rites and discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious. To bolster
their case, petitioners presented the following documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth,
identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states
that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro;
and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. Respondent Carlito,
however, denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the two petitioners. Based on the evidence adduced by
the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA found that the "proof relied upon
by the RTC is inadequate to prove the private respondent's paternity and filiation of petitioners."
Issue:

Whether or not proof relied upon by the RTC is inadequate to prove the private respondent's
paternity and filiation of petitioners.
Ruling:

Yes. Firstly, petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism
as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.

Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent showering
affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity.

Page 108 of 126

Thirdly, the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his father has
scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we ruled that while baptismal certificates may
be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on
the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with
respect to the child's paternity.

Fourth, the certificates of live of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are
not also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private
respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates.
GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law
the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Facts:

Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in
the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. Respondent soon filed a petition for judicial
approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental
Physical Custody, and Correction/Change of Surname of Minors before the RTC. Petitioner on the other
hand, speculated that Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, may not
be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of
their mother.
Issue:

Whether or not the father has a right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation.
Ruling:

No. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code. It is clear that the
general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided
by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument
is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the
right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent)
or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one
must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged

Page 109 of 126
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF

ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN
WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG,
JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG v.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang
who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married, they executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang.

Petitioner, however sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang because he may be discriminated against in Singapore. The
RTC ruled that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from
petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian
reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle
name.
Issue:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his registered name.
Ruling:
No. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the
use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the
middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.

Page 110 of 126
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. v. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN,
TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO
G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002, DE LEON, JR., J.

It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Facts:

William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for compulsory recognition
as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents before the RTC.
Petitioner Liyao, jr. insisted that his mother, Corazon, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically
impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born.

Respondents, on the other hand, stated that their parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-
Liyao, were legally married and that Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo and was not legally
separated from her husband.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
his supposed father, William Liyao.
Ruling:

No. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of
the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as
the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and
subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could
impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose
his own filiation.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE

G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007, CORONA, J.

Illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his
mother’ surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such.
Facts:

Page 111 of 126

Respondent Trinidad Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N.
Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Respondent Capote claimed that Giovanni Gallamaso is the illegitimate
natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso and was born prior to the effectivity of the
New Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of
marriage between them. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni was born and up to the
present, failed to take up his responsibilities to him on matters of financial, physical, emotional and
spiritual concerns. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his
surname changed to that of his mother’s surname.
Issue:

Whether or not the minor Giovanni is entitled to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s
surname.
Ruling:

Yes. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name
and his mother’ surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate
child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged child.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever
recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to
have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son.
NARCISO SALAS v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.
Facts:

Respondent Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against petitioner
Narciso Salas. Respondent Matusalem claimed that petitioner is the father of her son. Petitioner Salas,
however, denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo. Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of
Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently

Page 112 of 126
proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Ruling:

Yes. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be
taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the
alleged father.

As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we
have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive
evidence to prove paternity. As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission
by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify
under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS

SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND
DORIBEL SAYSON
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, CRUZ, J.

Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of
recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
Facts:

When spouses Teodoro and Isabel Bautista died, their properties were left in the possession of
Private respondents Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claimed to be their children.
Petitioners, however, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. The petitioners, in addition, argued that Doribel is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the
child that she was her natural mother. The action was resisted by private respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not Doribel is the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel.

Ruling:

Yes. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means
of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted
by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Page 113 of 126

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly
suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in
the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered
in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN
G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992, REGALADO, J.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father
or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.
Facts:

Private respondent Emilie Cuyugan, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad
D. Cuyugan filed a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner, the
administrator of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner submitted that Article 175 of the
Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative
father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent,
however, insisted that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during
the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of
majority of the minor child.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 285 of the Civil Code applies in this case.
Ruling:

Yes. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that the action for the recognition of natural children
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the
father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority.

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it
will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she
represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is
therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Adoption
HERBERT CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and

Page 114 of 126
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998, ROMERO, J.
In cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination.
Facts:
Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony are the natural children of Herbert Cang and Anna Marie
Clavano. Later due to the extramarital affairs of Herbert, Anna filed a petition for legal separation which
was granted. The decree of legal separation conferred Anna the custody of the children. Meanwhile,
Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Marie, filed a petition for adoption the three children before the Branch 14 of RTC Cebu City. This petition
was accompanied by an affidavit of consent executed by Anna. The affidavit further alleged that Herbert
had long forfeited his parental rights over their children.
Herbert, upon knowing the institution of such petition for adoption, went home to the Philippines
and interposed his opposition to the adoption claiming that the petition was defective since it lacks his
consent. He also moved for the reacquisition of his custody over his children and the same was later
granted by Branch 19 of RTC Cebu City. Later, the RTC Branch 14, issued a decree granting the petition
for adoption and in doing so, the RTC ruled that Herbert has abandoned his children and such abandonment
is a ground for dispensing with his consent to the adoption. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decree of
adoption. Motion for reconsideration filed by Herbert was likewise denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:

Whether or not the petition for adoption was defective for lack of Herbert’s consent.
Ruling:

Yes. Based on Article 188 of the Family Code, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption is a requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed
with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not
sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The
issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first
confront. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR

ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON
CERVANTES v. GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO
G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989, PADILLA, J. (Resolution)
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child.
Facts:
Angelie Anne Fajardo, the child of Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon out of their common law
marriage, was offered for adoption to Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes. Affidavit of

Page 115 of 126
Consent to the adoption of the child was also executed by Gina Carreon. Later, Spouses Cervantes filed a
petition for adoption before the RTC of Rizal which granted the petition making Angelie Anne Cervantes
the child of the spouses Cervantes.
Later, the spouses Cervantes received a letter from the biological parents of Angelie demanding a
sum of money to which they never heeded. The biological parents threatened to get back the child in case
of non-payment. True to their word, Gina Carreon took the child and brought her to her residence. Demand
to return the child were also unheeded. This prompted spouses Cervantes to file a petition for a writ
of Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court.
Issue:

Whether or not Gina Carreon is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
No. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents.
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina
Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open
cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where
she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the
adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority
and responsibility over him.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed
to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
Facts:
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is the biological child of Honorato B. Catindig and Gemma
Astorga Garcia out of wed-lock. Due to the demise of Gemma, Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child and prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial court granted the
petition and pronounced Stephanie as the child of Honorato and shall be known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig. Later, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. The trial court, however,
denied the same holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname
of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:

Page 116 of 126
Yes. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s
continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.
Furthermore, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Furthermore, it is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM v. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.

LAHOM")
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, VITUG, J.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action.
Facts:
In an order granting the petition for adoption filed by spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
Lahom, Jose Melvin Sibulo became the child of spouses Lahom. Later, however, Mrs. Lahom, filed a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the RTC on the grounds of strained relationship and utter
disregard of Jose Melvin Sibulo of the needs and feelings of Mrs. Lahom who was then sick. However
before the institution of the case, RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act) took effect and such law deleted the
right of the adopter to rescind a decree of adoption. The RTC dismissed the petition holding that by virtue
of RA 8552, petitions lack of cause of action. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, may still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552.
Ruling:
No. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed
the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. The
Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
MACARIO TAMARGO et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS et al.

G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992, FELICIANO, J.
Retroactive effect may not be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child.
Facts:
Due to a shooting incident that led to the death of Jennifer Tamargo, a civil case for damages was

Page 117 of 126
filed by Macario Tamargo and spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, the adopting parent and natural parents
of Jennifer Tamargo, respectively, against spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, natural parents of Adelberto
Bundoc, a minor. Prior to the incident, there is pending petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc filed by spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura before the RTC of Ilocos Sur. The said petition was granted after Adelberto had
shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer, the spouses Bundoc contended that due to the approval of the
petition for adoption, parental authority over Adelberto has already shifted to the spouses Rapisura, hence
they the indispensable party to the case. The RTC dismissed the petition holding that Spouses Bundoc is
not the indispensable party. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied due to failure to file it within
the reglementary period and failure to observe the 3-day notice rule. The Tamargos then elevated the case
to the CA via petition for mandamus and certiorari however the same was also dismissed. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against
their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
Ruling:
No. The shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was
still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to
the suit for damages. The Court does not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been
retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. Retroactive effect may not be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody
over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In
the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which
they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody
over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses,
could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES

G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992, REGALADO, J.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration.
Facts:

Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat before the RTC. Petitioner
contended that the petition for adoption should be dismissed for it was filed solely by private respondent
without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption
by the spouses. It argued that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition
for adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for adoption should be dismissed.

Page 118 of 126
Ruling:
No. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in
force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in
accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it
until it fully disposes of the case.

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the
best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The representative of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition
for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons,
especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition
was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate,
needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted,
as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally
a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Support
EDWARD V. LACSON v. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON,

represented by their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006, GARCIA, J.
Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less
a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
Facts:
Edward V. Lacson and Lea Daban Lacson are the parents of Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa
Daban Lacson. For unknown reason, Edward left their conjugal home thereby leaving Leah to fend for their
children. For a period of 18 years, Leah and her children transferred from one dwelling place to another not
their own. Records reveal that in a note dated December 10, 1975, Edward promise to give support to his
daughters however, aside from occasional giving of some amount, Edward failed to fulfill his promise.
In 1995, Leah instituted an action for support in behalf of her daughter before the RTC of Iloilo
City demanding the amount of the support her daughters should have received. The RTC ruled in favor of
the plaintiff sisters and ordered Edward to pay them the amount equivalent to 216-month worth of support
in arrears. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Edward was likewise dismissed. Hence this appeal. Before the SC, Edward contended that the demand
required by law was never complied with by Leah thus the award of support in arrears is not proper.
Issue:

Whether or not the mother of the petitioner failed to make a demand for support as required by
law.
Ruling:
No. The requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that

Page 119 of 126
Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious
tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand
was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency
of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
Edward’s insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of
his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own
handwriting. Said note stating that he will "sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa" also stated "as
requested by their mother" thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by
mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that Edward’s obligation to pay support in arrears should
commence from 1976.
Parental Authority
NERISSA Z. PEREZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ,
G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996, ROMERO, J.
The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Facts:
Ray Perez II (Ray Junior or RJ) is the only child of Spouses Ray and Nerissa Perez and was born
after successive miscarriage suffered by Nerissa. Nerissa is a resident alien of United States while Ray only
had tourist visa. The spouses and the child later went home to the Philippines for a vacation however after
the lapse of such period, Ray decided to stay together with RJ to take care of his sick mother but has
promised to follow Nerissa. However, this never happened. Later the relationship of the spouses went sour.
Despite church mediation, reconciliation has failed. Subsequently, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas
corpus asking Ray to surrender the custody of their son to her.
The RTC ruled in favor of Nerissa holding that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother. However on appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision holding that granting
custody to the boy's father would be for the child's best interest and welfare. Nerissa filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to Nerissa.

Ruling:
Yes. When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable
law. The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of
the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. The
general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison
d'être in the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall
justify the court's awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority.
DAISIE T. DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR

G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995, MENDOZA, J.
While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in
cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other, it

Page 120 of 126
does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation.
Facts:
Ramon R. Villar, a married man, had three children with Daisie T. David out of their amorous
relationship namely; Christopher J, Christine and Cathy Mae. Such relationship became known to the legal
wife and family of Villar. Later, the legal family of Villar accepted the children. During one of Villar’s
family vacation, they invited Christopher J., then six years of age, with Daisie’s permission. However after
such vacation, Villar refused to give back the child. This prompted Daisie to file a petition for habeas
corpus.
The RTC ruled in favor of Daisie and ruled that she has the rightful custody over Christopher J.
However on appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the petition for habeas
corpus is not proper and that the question of custody and the question of custody should be brought in a
case singularly filed for the purpose. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper to recover the custody of a child.
Ruling:

Yes. Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in
cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other, it
does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an
illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, Ramon R. Villar, was married to another
woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is
under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law,
is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG v. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA

MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995, MELO, J.
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to
be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over
seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests.
Facts:

While Teresita Masauding was still in a subsisting marriage, she maintained a common law
relationship with Reynaldo Espiritu which begot two children, Rosalind and Reginald. Later the Espiritu
and Masauding got married. The marriage went sour and Teresita left their conjugal home and went to
California. Due to his assignment abroad, Reynaldo has to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma
Layug.
Later, Teresita went back to the Philippines and filed a petition for habeas corpus against
Reynaldo and Guillerma to gain custody over the children. The petition was, however, dismissed thus

Page 121 of 126
conferring upon Reynaldo the sole parental authority over the children subject to the visitation rights
granted to Teresita. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and gave Teresita the custody of the
children. The CA relied on the presumption that the custody of a child below seven years of age will be
lodged to the mother. Hence this appeal.
Issue:

Whether or not custody of the children should be given to Reynaldo.
Ruling:
Yes. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial
function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under
or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. In ascertaining the
welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother
is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice.
In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even
to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They
understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best
interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree
of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under
Article 213 of the Family Code. Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the
father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances,
personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind.
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG
G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992, REGALADO, J.
Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages.
Facts:
Due to an incident that led to the death of Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, a case for damages
was filed by Spouses Felipe and Shirley Gotiong, parents of Julie Ann, against Spouses Cresencio Libi and
Amelia Yap Libi, parents of Wendell. Prior to the incident, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts however eventually their relationship went sour. Attempt of Wendell for reconciliation likewise
failed which led to threats against Julie Ann. Both Julie Ann and Wendell died due to gunshots. The gun
recovered in the crime scene was licensed under the name of Cresencio Libi, the father of Wendell.

Spouses Gotiong contends that it was Wendell who shot their daughter and thereafter committed suicide.
As such, Spouses Gotiong wanted to claim damages against Spouses Libi arising from the latter’s
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
On appeal, the IAC reversed the RTC decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Libi are liable for vicarious laiability.

Page 122 of 126
Ruling:
Yes. Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15
years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary
liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a
quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for
damages arising therefrom. Spouses Libi failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias
to prevent such damages.
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. v. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA
BEDIA
G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995, ROMERO, J.
Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Facts:
Leouel Santos, Jr. is the only child of spouses Leouel Santos, Sr., and Julia Bedia. After his birth,
he had been under the care and custody of Spouses Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia, his maternal grandparents.
Since then, spouses Bedia are the ones providing for the support for the child. Before Julia went abroad to
work, she entrusted the custody of her son to her parents. Later, Spouses Bedia alleged that Santos, Sr
abducted the child which prompted the former to file a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor
Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the RTC of Iloilo City,
After an ex-parte hearing, the RTC granted the petition and awarded the custody of the child to
spouses Bedia. On appeal, the CA affirmed such decision. The motion for reconsideration filed by Leouel
Santos, Sr was likewise denied. Before the SC, Leouel Sr. contended that since Spouses Bedia failed to
show that he is unfit and unsuitable father, the grant of substitute parental authority to them is
inappropriate.
Issue:

Whether or not custody of the child should be given to Spouses Bedia.
Ruling:
No. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound
and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. The law vests on the father and mother joint
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent,
the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The consideration where the decision of CA is couched upon is insufficient to defeat petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly
since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY v. WILLIAM CARPITANOS et al.

G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002, PARDO, J.

Page 123 of 126
To be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
Facts
During an enrollment drive conducted by St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City, the vehicle used
by its student turned turtle and caused the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Records showed that the vehicle
used was then driven recklessly by James Daniel II, a minor. Later, Spouses William and Lucia Carpitanos,
parents of Sherwin Carpitanos, filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before
the RTC of Dipolog City.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Capistrano. St. Marys Academy was ordered to pay damages
and in case of its insolvency, James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel, parents of James Daniel II, shall be
subsidiary liable. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision but reduced the amount of actual damages.
Motion for reconsideration to this decision was likewise denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
No. For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the
authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which St. Marys Academy had no control, and
which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting
from such accident.
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL v. HELEN G. BELMES

G.R. No. 13222, June 19, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of
petitioner to be Vincent’s guardian.
Facts:
Reeder C. Vancil and Helen G. Belmes are common law husband and wife and they had two
children out of such relationship namely Valerie and Vincent. Due to the death of Reeder, a US-based Navy
serviceman, Bonifacia Vancil, the mother of Reeder, filed a guardianship proceeding over the persons and
properties of minors Valerie and Vincent before the RTC of Cebu City.
Later, the RTC appointed Bonifacia as the legal and judicial guardian of the persons and estate of
Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr. Subsequently, Helen Belmes filed an opposition to such proceeding

Page 124 of 126
contending that she initiated a similar proceeding. Belmes also filed a motion for the Removal of Guardian
and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the subject minors
The RTC denied the motion of Belmes and directed Bonifacia to perform her duties. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and ruled that under the law, parents are ipso facto the
guardian ad litem of their minor child. During the pendency of the petition, Valerie attained the age of
majority thus making the guardianship proceeding, in so far as she is concern, moot and academic.
Issue:

Whether or not Helen Belmes should be the guardian of Vincent Vancil.
Ruling:
Yes. Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of
petitioner to be Vincent’s guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code. Petitioner,
as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian,
respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times.
But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify
as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian.
Courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they
will find it difficult to protect the wards.

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Digested by: DC 2016 Members

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FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ORLANDO CATALAN AND

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

ADOLFO C. AZNAR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA

​Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case.

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

PAULA T. LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEAL, AND ALICIA F. LLORENTE

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

​Whether or not the divorce was recognizable in the Philippines.

ALFREDO M. VELAYO v. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD.

​Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages.

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY v.

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

​Whether or not Barons abused its right to the prejudice of Phelps.

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM v. ACT THEATER, INC.

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

SOLEDAD CARPIO v. LEONORA A. VALMONTE

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

​Whether or not Carpio’s imputations has prejudiced Valmonte.

ELEAZAR S. PADILLO v. RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC. and MARK S. OROPEZA

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

Petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

VICENTE RELLOSA, CYNTHIA ORTEGA assisted by husband Roberto Ortega v. GONZALO

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL v. EDERLINA P. CATITO

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v. MADRIGAL WAN HAI LINES CORPORATION

https://z-1-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-21/13576229_1020895…h=d2bca2bca11f97ced30cde62b7c76148&oe=57C5E140&dl=1 29/08/2016, 12:06 PM

​Whether or not NDC is liable for reimbursing MWHLC.

Whether or not the requirement of publication can be dispensed with.

Whether or not the Divorce decree is binding as between the parties.

Whether or not the Doctrine of Renvoi shall apply in this case.

Whether or not the divorce was recognizable in the Philippines.

Whether or not Shell shall be liable for damages.

Whether or not Barons abused its right to the prejudice of Phelps.

Whether or not Carpio’s imputations has prejudiced Valmonte.

Whether or not NDC is liable for reimbursing MWHLC.