Indiana University Press Transactions of The Charles S. Peirce Society

Vagueness and the Unity of C.S.
Peirce's Realism
Author(s): Claudine Engel-Tiercelin
Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter, 1992), pp. 51-
82
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320354
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Claudine Etyjel-Tiercelin
Vagueness and the Unity

of C.S. Peirce's Realism
Recent discussions on realism tend to show that there are vari-

ous and not necessarily related forms of realism: scientific realism
versus instrumentalism, semantic realism, realism about properties
or universals versus nominalism. Nevertheless, and while pointing
out that to be a realist in some subject-matter (for example in
mathematics), does not imply your being a realist in another (for
example in morals, or in the philosophy of mind),1 Michael Dum-
mett has tried to find some unity among those different kinds of
realism by showing that they were based on a certain semantic
thesis, characterized at times as the endorsement of the logical
principle of Bivalence, at times as the commitment to a vericondi-
tional theory of meaning.
But many critics have pointed out that Dummett's principle of
unification could not capture the whole range of theses involved
in the realism issue. For instance, realism or anti-realism in seman-
tics does not imply realism or instrumentalism in the philosophy
of science,2 and the problem of the reality of an external world is
unaffected by Dummett's characterization.3
A second problem that recent debates on realism have contrib-
uted to emphasize, is related to the question of vagueness: in
"Wang's Paradox," following a Fregean line of thought, Dum-
mett wrote that "the notion that things might actually be vague,
as well as being vaguely described, is not properly intelligible."4
But, here again, as Crispin Wright has stressed, to suggest that bi-
valence "is or should be the hallmark of realism everywhere is ac-
cordingly to be committed to claiming that there is no such thing
as realism about vague discourse, or that the vagueness of a state-
ment, whatever exactly it is held to consist in, is a feature consis-
tent with its possession of a determinate truth value. Neither sug-
52 Claudinc Engcl-Ticrcclin
gestión is remotely plausible. "s

Now, as it is well known, C.S. Peirce claimed to be a realist,
and although he wrote that "No realist is so foolish as to main-
tain that no universal is a fiction" (N.E.M.IV. p. 343), he also
specified his own position as that of "a scholastic realist of a
somewhat extreme stripe" (5.470), who was only adapting the
virtues involved in Duns Scotus1 theory to the requirements of
modern science.
In what follows, I shall try to show that Peirce's particular
treatment of the realism issue is precisely an attempt to provide
a link between various forms of realism such as those that have
been mentioned above. And although it would of course ex-
ceed the scope of this talk to show precisely how this is
achieved in fields such as his philosophy of mind, his views
about science, mathematics, logic and metaphysics,6 it is none-
theless possible to trace the unity of Peirce's realism back to
the principle that animates his views about realism, namely the
principle of vagueness.
In that respect, I shall attempt to analyze what is really in-
volved in Peirce's scholastic realism, and what he means when he
claims both the reality of vagueness and the vagueness of the real.
In so doing, I hope to show that Peirce's idiosyncratic treatment
of the problem of universals, not only provides us with some
clues about the paradoxical alliance between pragmatism and real-
ism,7 but may also be seen as relevant to some contemporary
puzzles about realism.
1. Scholastic Realism as a Therapy to the Pseudo-Problem of Uni-

versáis
When it comes to the classification of the various forms in-
volved in realism, it is claimed that one of them is constituted by
issues about universals. But it is striking to see how often the
problem of universals is presented in a very schematic and Mani-
chean way: it would broadly consist in an opposition between
metaphysical realism (mostly conceived under its platonistic ver-
Vagueness and the Unity ofC.S. Peirce's Realism 53
sion) and nominalism.

Now, it is well known that, before it was to become a doctrine,
especially through James, Dewey and Schiller, pragmaticism was
conceived by its founder as a method, more precisely as a philo-
sophical method, the aim of which it was to elucidate the mean-
ing of our concepts and of our grammatical or real distinctions so
as to clarify and in some cases to eliminate the pseudo-problems
by which metaphysics is encumbered.8 From the start, Peirce is
convinced, as Bertrand Russell pointed out, that the problem of
universals is a decisive problem to be answered and that it is "as
pressing today as ever it was" (4.1) in so far as "though the ques-
tion of realism and nominalism has its roots in the technicalities
of logic, its branches reach about our life" (8.38). So Peirce is at
the same time convinced of the necessity to give a fàr-reaching so-
lution to the problem of universals and aware of the fact that "the
current explanations of the realist-nominalist controversy are
equally false and unintelligible " (8.12).
The most deep-rooted and crude misunderstanding lies in be-
lieving that the problem of universals has anything to do with
"Platonic ideas" (8.17). In fact,
it must not be imagined that any notable realist of the

thirteenth or fourteenth century took the ground that
any "universal" was what we in English should call a
"thing," as it seems, that at an earlier age, some realists
and some nominalists too, had done [. . .] their very defi-
nition of a "universal," admits that it is of the same ge-
neric nature as a word, namely, is: "Quod natum optum
est praedicari de pluribus." Neither was it their doctrine
that any "universal" itself is real. They might indeed,
some of them, think so; but their realism did not consist
in that opinion, but in holding that what the word signi-
fies^ in contradistinction to what it can be truly said of, is
real. Anybody may happen to opine that "the" is a real
English word; but that will not constitute him a realist.
But if he thinks that, whether the word "hard" itself be
54 Claudinc Engel-Tiercelin
real or not, the property, the character, the predicate,

hardness, is not invented by men, as the word is, but is
really and truly in the hard things and is one in them all,
as a description of habit, disposition, or behavior, then,
he is a realist. (1.27nl)
So, contrary to what is still often asserted today, when it

comes to the realism-anti-realism issue about universals, Peirce
clearly sees that the problem is not that of wondering whether
there exist universals apart from our ideas or words. The alterna-
tive between esse in anima and esse extra animam is wrong. Uni-
versals are undoubtedly words or concepts: the real question is:
are they only that?
The nominalists say it is a mere name. Strike out the

"mere" and this opinion is approximately true. (3.460)
The real opposition between realists and nominalists lies thus in

the question of the "fiindamentum universalitatis" (6.377). Any
other conception is but "a caricature" of scholastic thought
(6.361). We can now formulate the problem correctly in the fol-
lowing manner:
The real is that which is not whatever we may happen

to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of
it. The question therefore, is whether many horse, and
other names of natural classes, correspond with anything
which all men, or all horses, really have in common, in-
dependent of our thought, or whether these classes are
constituted simply by a likeness in the way in which our
minds are affected by individual objects which have in
themselves no resemblance or relationship whatsoever.
(8.12; 1871)
This is why it is most often incorrect to oppose metaphysical
realism (or Platonism) and nominalism. Indeed, most nominal-
ists are mere Platonists. Why is that so? Because, used as they
Vagueness and the Unity of C.S. Pcirce's Realism 55
arc to admit as reals, singular cxistants only (8.10; 5.470;

5.503), they come to figure that all that is real must have the
same mode of reality as any other thing (1.21; 2.115) and that
"reality is something independent of the representative relation1*
(5.315). Now, when a scholastic realist claims that universals
are real, he does not mean that they exist and that they arc to
be discovered like crabs under rocks. One must distinguish be-
tween reality and existence.9 It is the only way to avoid meta-
physical figments.
[. . .] In fact, a realist is simply one who knows no more

recondite reality than that which is represented in a true
representation. Since, therefore, the word "man" is true
of something, that which "man" means is real. The no-
minalist must admit that man is truly applicable to some-
thing; but he believes that there is beneath this a thing in
itself, an incognizable reality. His is the metaphysical fig-
ment. Modern nominalists are mostly superficial men,
who do not know, as the more thorough Roscellinus and
Occam did, that a reality which has no representation is
one which has no relation and quality. (8.13)
So there is indeed a "nominalistic Platonism" (8.10) which

consists in conceiving the existence of things "independent of all
relation to the mind's conception of it" (8.13). On the contrary
scholastic realism refuses to introduce universal or singular entities
that would be utterly independent of thought and signification:
"the real is that which signifies something real" (5.320):
The gist of all the nominalist's arguments will be found

to relate to a res extra animam, while the realist defends
his position only by assuming that the immediate object
of thought in a true judgment is real. (8.17)
Conceptualista, nominalists and Platonists are thus put on the

same footing: either they merely hold "truisms about thinking"
(the conceptualista) (1.27) or they admit things that are "abso-
lutely inexplicable1* (5.318), since they figure that it is possible, at

a given time during the inquiry, to get out from language and
representation; in both cases they yield to the "Protean metaphys-
ical urge to transcend language " as David Pears would have
said,10 as if one could come to simple, ultimate, inanalyzable ele-
ments. As early as 1868, Peirce has violently criticized any appeal
to intuition, sense-data, or foundationalisms of all kinds. To criti-
cize nominalism will be to refuse any such form of reductionism.
On the contrary, the adoption of realism means on the one hand
that universals are real, namely that they cannot be reduced to
what can be thought about them, for if "the general is essentially
predicative, hence of the nature of a represen tamenw (5.120), it is
first and foremost for the realist what remains unchanged, whatev-
er the thought about it may be. This is what, in particular, distin-
guishes dreams or figments (which only depend on the mind that
conceives them (6.453)) from reality; but on the other hand the
adoption of realism means that vagueness must be considered as
real: for it is on that latter ground that realists and nominalists are
mostly opposed (5.453). To be a realist, one shall have to
get rid [. . .] of the Ockhamistic prejudice of political

partizenship that in thought, in being, and in develop-
ment, the indefinite is due to a degeneration from a pri-
mary state of perfect definiteness. The truth is rather on
the side of the scholastic realists that the unsettled is the
primal state, and that definiteness and determinateness,
the two poles of settledness, are, in the large, approxima-
tions, developmental^, epistemologically, and metaphysi-
cally. (6.348) One may entertain the theory that all
vagueness is due to a defect of cogitation or cognition. It
is a natural kind of nominalism [. . .] (4.344)
2 . Peirce 's Scotistic Realism

To try and understand what is at the heart of such cryptic state-
ments, and to clarify the principles that lie at the heart of Peirce 's
Vagueness ani the Unity of C.S. Peirce's Realism 57
scholastic realism, I am afraid we are going to have to go into

some scholastic niceties and abstractions, and especially into some
Scotistic subtleties.
For to get a grasp of Peirce's realism, one has to consider very
carefully the influence Duns Scotus exerted on him11 and the rea-
sons why while calling himself a Scotistic realist,12 he also re-
nounced to follow the Subtile Doctor on certain points on which
he found him too moderate or too little scientific. So I shall have
to remind you very briefly of the broad lines of Scotus1 solution
to the problem of universals.
As you know, Duns Scotus distinguishes three kinds of univer-
sals: the metaphysical universal, the logical universal and the phys-
ical universal.13 The metaphysical universal is the Common Na-
ture or Essence; it is the remote subject of first intention; it is a
common nature existing in many individuals of the same species,
not as it actually exists in concrete things but rather as it exists in-
dependently of being concretized in a state of positive indetermi-
nation or indifferentiation. The Common Nature is neither a sin-
gular (supposit) endowed with numerical unity nor a universal
that would have no other unity than that of logical predicability,
but a kind of "in-between11 as Gilson called it, 14 which could nei-
ther be confused with nor reduced to any of them. Indeed, the
physical universal is the result of the contraction of Common Na-
ture in its original state of indeterminacy to the mode of individu-
ality, by the addition of the principle of individuation namely the
haecceitas (from which it is formally distinct) to the Common Na-
ture. The logical or second intention confers logical or intellectual
universality to the metaphysical universal but no real or metaphys-
ical commonness.
For Peirce then, to follow Duns Scotus is to admit certain meta-
physical realities or formalities which are not reduced to either
physical parts or to conventional names, since their real unity, if it
is indeed discovered by the intellect, is not produced by it.15 Log-
ical generality and real community have to be distinguished:
Accordingly any such nature is to be regarded as some-

thing which is of itself neither universal nor singular,
but is universal in the mind, singular in things out of
the mind [. . .] If therefore it is asked whether the uni-
versal is in things, the answer is, that the nature which
in the mind is universal, and is not in itself singular, ex-
ists in things. It is the very same nature which in the
mind is universal, and in re is singular; for if it were
not, in knowing anything of a universal we should be
knowing nothing of things, but only of our own
thoughts, and our opinion would not be converted from
true to false by a change in things. This nature is actu-
ally indeterminate only so far as it is in the mind. But
to say that an object is in the mind is only a metaphori-
cal way of saying that it stands to the intellect in the re-
lation of known to knower. The truth is, therefore, that
that real nature which exists in re, apart from all action
of the intellect, though in itself, apart from its relations,
it be singular, yet is actually universal as it exists in rela-
tion to the mind. But this universal only differs from
the singular in the manner of its being conceived (far-
malittr), but not in the manner of its existence (reali-
ter). (8.18)
It is such indeterminacy of the ens rente (which in fact Duns

Scotus had himself retained from Avicenna's reading) that retains
Peirce's attention and which he takes as one of the most impor-
tant aspects of the Scotistic assessment of the reality of universals:
The great argument for nominalism is that there is no

man unless there is some particular man. That, however,
does not affect the realism of Scotus; for although there
is no man of whom all further determination can be de-
nied, yet there is a man, abstraction being made of all
further determination. There is a real difference between
man irrespective of what the other determinations may
Vagueness and the Unity of C.S. Peirce's Realism 59
be, and man with this or that particular series of determi-

nations [. . .] (5.312)
The second thing which is kept in mind by Peirce is the fact

that the quod quid est which is previous to its ways of being
(equinitas est equinitas tantum) and which is the proper subject
for the metaphysician is yet in potency of determination, "mid-
way from the physicist who considers it in its concrete determi-
nations and from the logician who considers it as determined to
universality."16
Such are the characteristics of real universality which Peirce sees
operating in knowledge ( "Since no cognition of ours is absolutely
determinate, generals must have a real existence" (5.312)), in
thought in general which expresses itself through signs, and in sci-
entific process.
Let us forget scholasticism for a while, and take a homely ex-
ample. Suppose a cook wishes to make an apple-pie (1.341). She
will start by following a series of general rules taken from the reci-
pe-book. An apple-pie is desired. But she does not desire a single
individual thing. What she really wants is "something which shall
produce a certain pleasure of a certain kind. " Of course she wants
"a good apple-pie, made of fresh apples, with a crust moderately
light, and somewhat short, neither too sweet nor too sour, etc."
But she has not in mind any "particular apple-pie she particularly
prefers to serve; but she does desire and intend to serve an apple-
pie to a particular person." It is the same with the various ges-
tures she has to accomplish in making her pie. Even if she must
use particular apples, the indifference towards this or that apple in
particular (unless she be some kind of maniac) shows that what
she wants is an apple and not that particular apple (except that
species (Ingrid-Marie, Boskoop, Golden) or that quality (not rot-
ten, etc.) of apples.
The attitude of the scientist is similar to that of the cook. What
he is interested in in an experiment, is not this or that piece of
gold or of acid; it is not the particular sample that the chemist is
investigating; it is the molecular structure (4.530), namely a cer-

tain nature which is in itself neither particular nor universal, nei-
ther particular, because the singular case is but a contraction of
that nature, nor universal because universality is not actual but
potential, under the form of a predicable habit, disposition, or
tendency:
When an experimentalist speaks of a phenomenon, such as

''Hall's phenomenon" [. . .] he does not mean any par-
ticular event that did happen to somebody in the dead
past, but what surely will happen to everybody in the liv-
ing future who shall fulfill certain conditions. (5.425)
Now it is also easier to understand why Peircc considers Duns

Scotus as being finally too moderate and too close to the nomin-
alists; for Peirce, real universality must not only be indeterminate
in respect to the mind; it must be so in re:
Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that

universals are contracted to the mode of individuality in
singulars, meaning, as he does, by singulars ordinary ex-
isting things. The pragmatist cannot admit that. (8.208;
c.1905)
Why is that so? Because, in spite of the modifications introduced
by Peirce in his logic, particularly from 1885 on, with the intro-
duction of indices and the first attempts in the direction of quan-
tification theory,17 in spite also of the ever growing importance of
the second category, namely the category of existence or reaction,
at the phenomenological level, Peirce will continue to say that an
absolutely determinate logical individual is impossible:
The absolute individual can not only not be realized in

sense or thought, but cannot exist, properly speaking. For
whatever lasts for any time, however short, is capable of
logical division, because in that time, it will undergo
some change in its relations. But what does not exist for
any time, however short, does not exist at all. All, there-
fore, that we perceive or think, or that exists, is general.

So far there is truth in the doctrine of scholastic realism.
But all that exists is infinitely determinate, and the infi-
nitely determinate is the absolutely individual. This seems
paradoxical, but the contradiction is easily resolved. That
which exists is the object of a true conception. This con-
ception may be made more determinate than any assigna-
ble conception; and therefore it is never so determinate
that it is capable of no further determination. (3.93nl)
Peirce's denial of the Scotistic contraction goes together with

the claim for the reality of law, mediation or generality. The uni-
versal in re is not a singular having anything in common with all
the singulars of its species, but law. The real question then is no
longer "are universals real?" but "whether laws, or general types
are figments of the mind or are real?" (1.16).
But how is one to demonstrate that laws or "general princi-
ples" "are really operative in nature" (5.101)? For one must be
careful not to commit another mistake of Scotus, who concluded
too quickly from logic to physics. Weren't the Scotists so utterly
uncritical that they accepted classes as natural, and seemed to
think that ordinary language was a sufficient guarantee in the
matter (6.362)? No doubt rightly,18 Peirce estimates that Duns
Scotus too rapidly assumed, on the basis of the existence of the
appropriate general term, a corresponding real common nature.
Now, reality does not follow, ipso facto, from the existence of the
adequate term. The discoveries of science only afford the means
of showing that things that have the same name are really similar,
and that there are real laws and not mere accidental uniformities.
The Scotists were wrong then to elaborate their "idle logical dis-
tinctions as precluding all physical inquiry" (6.361).
It will be the task of pragmatism to hold to the Scotistic inheri-
tance while adapting it to the requirements of modern science, for
his reading of F.H. Abbot's Scientific Theism has confirmed Peirce
in his impression that "science has always been at heart realistic
and always must be so" (1.20). But it also becomes clearer why
"pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that was not al-
ready convinced that there are real generals11 (5.503).
3. The Logical Affinities between Pragmatism and Realism

Scotus was wrong to strike logical classifications on reality with-
out taking into account the lessons to be drawn from experience.
Pragmatism yields the acceptable connexion:
The question of realism and nominalism [. . .] means the

question how for real facts are analogous to logical rela-
tions, and why . . . (4.68)
How is this going to be performed? Peirce confesses that he be-

longs to that part of the philosophical world "whose unlucky con-
victions force them to base metaphysics upon formal logic"
(NEM.IV. p. 167). So, in order to show that the logical princi-
ples are not only "regulatively valid" but may be taken "as truths
of being" (1.487; cf. 7.480; 8.113), one has to start from logic:
it is the only way to defeat nominalism (4.1). But it also, accord-
ing to Peirce, is decisive {ibid.). Peirce thinks he can do it thanks
to his work on the logic of relatives (4.1).
Indeed, such a logic has a double effect: first it reveals the too
narrow frame of the classical theory of the proposition in showing
that relations are as fundamental as qualities, and might very well
constitute the essence of the object. Now the scholastic form is too
static to reveal such a relational structure.19 Instead of looking for
some qualitative essence from which the behavior of the thing
could be derived, Peirce now identifies the essence of the thing
with the sum of habits it involves. The second effect of the logic of
relatives is to stress, parallel to the mathematical discoveries made
by Peirce at the same time,20 the central importance of continuity:
[. . .] Thus the continuum is that which the logic of rela-

tives shows the true universal to be. I say the true univer-
sal; for no realist is so foolish as to maintain that no uni-
versal is a fiction. (NEM.IV. p. 343)
Vagueness and die Unity ofC.S. Peirce's Realism 63
How is one to adapt such discoveries to science?

The pragmatist maxim, formulated in 1878, gives the grounds
of the method to be followed in science in order to determine
the truth of a given proposition: the meaning of a concept or of a
proposition is itself given in another proposition which is but a
general description of all the experimental phenomena which the
statement of the initial proposition virtually predicts.21 For exam-
ple, the meaning of the term "hard" or of the proposition "this is
hard" can be expressed in the following way: "not scratchable by
many other substances" or "this will not be scratched by many
other substances. " But thanks to the possible identification of any
categorical proposition with a hypothetical one or consequence,22
one may also translate the proposition into a set of conditionals
whose antecedent prescribes the operations to be performed and
whose consequent specifies what the observable results that will
ensue will be if such operations are performed, and if the proposi-
tion is true. It is important for understanding Peirce's realism to
note that he soon abandons the indicative (and material or philo-
nian) interpretation of the conditional to interpret it as a subjunc-
tive conditional:
I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when

I said that it was a mere question of the convenience of
speech whether we say that a diamond is hard when it is
not pressed upon, or whether we say that it is soft until it
is pressed upon. I now say that experiment will prove that
the diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a real
fact that it would resist pressure, which amounts to ex-
treme scholastic realism. (8.208) (cf. 5.453)
The statement of the conditionals then becomes synonymous

with the expression of a law (or habit) which rules experience and
which constitutes the ultimate (though irreducible and endless)
meaning of the proposition (5.491). So to say that a body is
hard, or red, or heavy, or of a given weight, or that it has any
other property, is to say that it is governed by law and that it is a
statement referring to the future.

In that sense, the scholastic realist "will consider a law of na-
ture as real and as having a kind of esse infuturo" (5.48), and he
will bring into prominence the kind of universals to which mod-
ern science pays most attention (4.1). It is the reality of that
third category or thirdness that Peirce attempts to prove in the
course of the famous Harvard experiment, by asking his audience
whether they are ready to doubt that the stone which he is going
to release will not fall down. If the "prooP is not utterly con-
vincing from a theoretical point of view, it is part of the argu-
ment to insist on the predictive character of the law (which can-
not be due to chance), another one being that it is not in our
power not to believe that the stone will not fall. And that is
enough, Peirce concludes, to show that law cannot be a mere
figment of the mind (5.93-101).
I hope you understand better now in what sense pragmatism,
according to Peirce, cannot be allied to nominalism. There are
three reasons for this. The first one is that if "the conception
of the practical effect" expressed by the pragmatist maxim is
conveyed under the form of a conditional, it cannot be re-
duced to any statement in terms of singular or discrete events
(which incidentally forbids any verificationistic reading of the
maxim), for the open, indeterminate aspect of the conditional
is here fundamental:
Do not overlook the fact that pragmaticist maxim says

nothing of single experiments or of single experimental
phenomena (for what is conditionally true in futuro can
hardly be singular), but only speaks of general kinds of
experimental phenomena. (5.426; cf. 6.327; 8.216-217)
The second reason why pragmatism is not allied to nominalism is

that if one refuses to reduce the meaning of a proposition to ac-
tual individual events and if one reduces it instead to relations be-
tween events, one must admit that the possible is real.23 The
third reason is that, if one insists on the legislative character of
Vagueness and the Unity ofCS, Peirce's Realism 65
regularities - what Peirce calls the H would-be" or the habit,24 one

is led to recognize that universals are not mere mental creations,
but active principles of nature.
Extreme scholastic realism asserts therefore not only the reality
and irreducibility of the third category, but also the reality and ir-
reducibility of the first category as well:
If a substance of a certain kind should be exposed to an

agency of a certain kind, a certain sensible result would
ensue, according to our experience hitherto. As for the
pragmaticist, it is precisely his position that nothing else
than this can be so much as meant by saying that an ob-
ject possesses a character. He is therefore obliged to sub-
scribe to the doctrine of a real Modality, including real
Necessity and real Possibility. (5.457)
This is why it seems to me that the original element in Peircian

scholastic realism lies in such a stress put on the presence of an
irreducible indeterminacy at both ends, so to say, of the process
of knowledge. For not only our tendency to generalize and to
take habits is real - and this tendency will be called by Peirce
"synechism" - but vagueness also is itself real.25 Vagueness is for
Peirce this element of possibility, of spontaneity or of random-
ness which lies at the bottom of habit, and which we cannot rei-
fy. It can be found also in what Peirce calls "tychism" and in his
fallibilist cpistemology.26
Vagueness and generality are, therefore, the two forms of real
indeterminacy which are the core of Peirce's realism. In what
follows, I shall try to illustrate how such principles work, by a
brief presentation of what Peirce himself calls his "logic of
vagueness."
4. The "Logic of Vagueness": the Reality of Vagueness and The

Reality of Generality
It is well known, especially since Max Black's famous paper,27
that Peirce was one of the first philosophers interested in the idea
of a logic of vagueness and that he even claims to have elaborated

"with something like completeness" such a logic (5.506). This ex-
pression, however, can be misleading, in spite of his attempts at for-
mulating a multiple-valued logic.28 What Peirce has in mind when
he talks about a "logic of vagueness" is, in a broader sense, the for-
mal study of signs, namely what he calls "signifies."29 This disci-
pline consists, first, in a formal discussion of all the varieties of de-
terminacy and of indeterminacy which affect either the "breadth"
(i.e. the reference, denotation, or extension of a term), or the
"depth" (i.e. the meaning, connotation or intension of a term).
Signifies is also an epistemological reflexion upon the limits, in de-
terminacy or in indeterminacy, that must be set upon a term.30
A subject is determinate in respect to any character which

inheres in it or is (universally and affirmatively) predicated
of it, as well as in respect to the negative of such charac-
ter, these being the very same respect. In all other re-
spects it is indeterminate. (5.447)
From this, Peirce concludes that a term or sign cannot be com-

pletely determined; if it were the case, it should designate a prop-
erty shared by all things, and we would have to spell out its inde-
terminacy for all possible predicates, which is impossible.31 A
term, however, cannot be completely determined, because it is al-
ways susceptible of being logically divided, and because it is illu-
sory to hope that one can always reach a simple, ultimate, unana-
lyzable element.32 Therefore, every sign or term is partially
determined (1.434). This partial indeterminacy can take two
forms, vagueness and generality:
A sign (under which designation I place every kind of

thought, and not alone external signs), that is in any re-
spect objectively indeterminate (i.e. whose object is unde-
termined by the sign itself) is objectively ¿entrai in so far
as it extends to the interpreter the privilege of carrying its
determination further. Example: "Man is mortal." To the
question, What man? the reply is that the proposition ex-
plicitly leaves it to you to apply its assertion to what man

or men you will. A sign that is objectively indeterminate
in any respect is objectively vague in so far as it reserves
further determination to be made in some other conceiv-
able signs, or at least does not appoint the interpreter as
its deputy in this office. Example: "A man whom I could
mention seems to be a little conceited/ The suggestion
here is that the man in view is the person addressed, but
the utterer does not authorize such an interpretation or
any other application of what she says. She can still say, if
she likes, that she does not mean the person addressed.
Every utterance naturally leaves the right of further expo-
sition in the utterer; and therefore, in so far as a sign is
indeterminate, it is vague, unless it is expressly or by a
well understood convention, rendered general. (5.447)
Vagueness and generality are two opposite forms of indetermi-

nacy. Is vague, "everything to which the principle of contradiction
does not apply," and general, "everything to which the principle
of the excluded middle does not apply"? In the first case, although
it is false that "A proposition whose identity I have determined is
both true and false," yet, "until it is determinate, it may be true
that a proposition is true and a proposition is false" (5.448). In
the second case, from the fact that any proposition the identity of
which has been determined is either true or false, it docs not fol-
low that a proposition the identity of which remains indeterminate
is true or false (5.448). For instance, a demonstration is neither
blue nor not blue; a sound is neither visible nor invisible.
Can vagueness and generality be eliminated? Concerning gener-
ality, the answer is clear: it is impossible, because one would have
to survey all the possible classes and systems of objects to which
determination could be applied. Generality is, therefore, the indef-
inite series of interpretants (1.339). Indeed, because it concerns
potentiality and quality - that is the first category - generality is of
a "negative kind" (1.427), but because it concerns conditional ne-
68 Claudinc Engd-Tiercdin
cessity and law - that is the third category - generality belongs to

the "positive kind" along with the ideas of "infinity, continuity,
diffusion, growth and intelligence" (1.340) to which philosophers
of science should utterly pay attention. For generalization, the
most important operation of the mind in mathematics and else-
where (1.82) is, first and foremost, an operation of specification,
and as such it is the manifestation of intelligence, since it is less
an extension of previous information than "an increase of breadth
and a decrease of depth, without change of information"
(2.422).33 To believe that generality can be eliminated is to be-
lieve that the meaning or intelligence which belongs to the things
themselves can be reduced, and this is an illusion.
Concerning vagueness, the question of its elimination is more
complex: in a first sense, vague means "indefinite" (as in the case
of the individuum vagum, but does not mean "ambiguous"; a
sign is indefinite if its interpretation remains doubtful, but not if
there is the choice between two possible interpretations (which is
ambiguity) (MS 283).
Vagueness is not, therefore, a semantic notion which would
correspond to the fact that a sign has no reference, since vague-
ness affects not the object of the sign, but its interpretant:
Another advantage of this definition is that it saves us

from the blunder of thinking that a sign is indeterminate
simply because there is much to which it makes no refer-
ence; that, for example, to say, "C.S. Peirce wrote this ar-
ticle," is indeterminate because it does not say what the
color of the ink used was, who made the ink, how old
the father of the ink-maker was when his son was born,
nor what the aspect of the planets was when that father
was born. By making the definition turn upon the inter-
pretation, all that is cut off. (5.448nl; cf. 3.93)
Thus understood, vagueness is a notion which can be called prag-

matic, a context dependent, communication dependent feature,
relative to the rules of ordinary talk. In this sense, it is illusory to
Vagueness ani the Unity of C.S. Peirce's Realism 69
attempt to eliminate it. It may be possible, as Peirce says, if the

discussion bears on the theory of numbers (5.447), but the far-
ther one goes from such abstract subjects, the less such a preci-
sion of discourse can be envisaged. Should one deplore this fact?
No, because most of the time, the context allows us to bring the
precisions which are needed to understand the needed determina-
tions, and because the speakers, except when they want to joke,
are always looking for a lesser "latitude of interpretation11 (5.447).
No general description can identify an object. But the

common sense of the interpreter of the sign will assure
him that the object must be one of a limited collection of
objects. Suppose for example, two Englishmen to meet in
a continental railway carriage. The total number of sub-
jects of which there is any appreciable probability that
one will speak to the other perhaps does not exceed a
million, and each will have perhaps half that million not
far below the surface of consciousness, so that each unit
of it is ready to suggest itself. If one mentions Charles
the Second, the other need not consider what possible
Charles the Second is meant. It is no doubt the English
Charles the Second. Charles the Second of England was
quite a different man on different days; and it might be
said that without further specification the subject is not
identified. But the two Englishmen have no purpose of
splitting hairs in their talk; and the latitude of interpreta-
tion which constitutes the indeterminacy of a sign must
be understood as a latitude which might affect the
achievement of a purpose. For two signs whose meaning
are for all possible purposes equivalent are absolutely
equivalent. This, to be sure, is rank pragmaticism; for a
purpose is an affection of action. (5.448, note)
But vagueness can also be due to the essential indeterminacy

found at different levels in reality. It is for instance the vague-
ness surrounding our habits and our beliefs. (Peirce gives the ex-
ample of the question whether a certain found skeleton is the

skeleton of a man or of a anthropoid ape, which may have no
yes-or-no answer.)34
In this sense, vagueness is irreducible, because it is a feature of
the very beliefs that we entertain about the world. These are
common sense, instinctive beliefs, which are, for this reason, in-
dubitable.
There is, however, another important sense (maybe the most
important) in which one must talk about the reality and the ir-
reducibility of vagueness. It concerns Peirce's ontology of the
continuum:
Suppose that the chat of our pair of Englishmen had fal-

len upon the color of Charles II 's hair. Now that colors
are seen quite differently by different retinas is known.
That the chromatic sense is much more varied than it is
positively known to be is quite likely. It is very unlikely
that either of the travelers is trained to observe colors or
is a master of their nomenclature. But if one says that
Charles II had dark auburn hair, the other will under-
stand him quite precisely enough for all their possible
purposes; and it will be a determinate predication.
(5.448, note)
Vagueness is due here to the fact that reality presents itself un-
der the form of a continuum and that we have most of the time
to deal with boundary cases.35 In this case, as in others, we must
admit that vagueness is a universal real principle, and not a defi-
ciency of our knowledge or of our thought (4.344).
i
5. The Unity of Peirce's Realism of Vaguenes

As we said in the beginning, most of our contemporaries claim
that it is useles to try and find a unified version of realism. Or
when they try to do so, the principle of unity which they propose
seems to have serious flaws in it.
Now can we see Peirce's own form of realism as an answer to
such difficulties?
First it might be said that to qualify Peirce's position as a form
of realism is futile, not only because the very concept of realism
is itself fuzzy, but also because Peirce develops a position which
is evidently original, and even baroque.36 But Peirce's own ethics
of terminology and the insistence with which he calls himself a
realist invite us to think more about the meaning and scope of
his position.
In fact Peirce's position has many affinities with idealism, and
he himself considers that his philosophy is a form of objective
idealism. He even sometimes says that it looks somewhat "Hege-
lian" (1.42). In that respect, one could say that he would not ac-
cept a current opposition made between realism and idealism. But
again, there arc many ways of being an idealist, and Peirce is care-
ful to distinguish his "objective idealism" from idealisms such as
are embodied in Plato, Berkeley or Hegel. "Idealism," however, is
as fuzzy as "realism," and this is why Peirce's own interpretation
of medieval philosophers is much more helpful to get a more ac-
curate picture of the meaning he attaches to realism; Peirce ap-
proves of the scholastics' insistence on the impossibility of a rela-
tion of correspondence between words and things.37 One must
not confound first and secondary intentions, the properties of
signs and the properties of things signified. By identifying being
with intelligibility and predicability Peirce means above all that
naive realism, according to which reality is totally independent of
mind, is absurd. The same can be said of the reduction of reality
to existence or hard facts. In that sense it seems to me that, al-
though Peirce does not defend any theory about semantic realism
as such, by stressing that "the real is that what signifies something
real," (my emphasis) he follows a line of argument very close to
Putnam, when he writes: "I do not think that there can be any
object totally independent of mind or of a theory," or to Dum-
mett when he says: "There can be no complete description of the
world in terms of hard facts. " 38
Although Peirce refuses to reduce reality to facts, he does not
72 Claudinc Engd-Tiercelin
intend to leave them out. Things must be here qualified. Many

commentators have characterized Peirce's thought as an evolution
from a form of phenomenalism (more Kantian than Humean) to-
wards an epistemological realism. It is true for instance that the
second category (the category of facts, and of the reaction to the
environment), which Peirce compares - wrongly or rightly - to the
Scotistic haecceity, is less important in his first writings than in his
later writings. But he departs from Hegel precisely in this: Hegel
has put too much emphasis on the third category, and forgot the
second, and this is enough for Peirce to reject his views. A blow
will be enough to knock down all idealist arguments.39 "When I
feel the sheriffs hand on my shoulder, I shall begin to have a
sense of actuality" (1.24). Facticity therefore is a genuine element
of reality. Although it is true that the originality of Peirce's real-
ism lies in the importance for him of the first and third catego-
ries, his realism lies also in the emphasis on the second category.
In that respect Peirce's realism also extends to a realism of the ex-
ternal world.
It is part and parcel of Peirce's scholastic realism that the three
elements which compose reality should be taken as irreducible;
such is the lesson taught by Duns Scotus. But it does not follow
that they can be taken for one another nor put on the same level.
This distinction between various orders of reality appears clearly in
a letter to Cantor where Peirce gives a definition of the criteria
for a true proposition and of the various levels of reality:
By a true proposition (if there is any such thing) I mean

a proposition which at some time, past or future, emerges
into thought, and has the following three characters:
First, no direct effort of yours, mine, or anybody's, can

reverse it permanently, or even permanently prevent its
asserting itself;
Second, no reasoning or discussion can permanently pre-
vent its asserting itself;
Third, any prediction based on the proposition, as to
Vagueness and lije Unity of C.S. Peirce's Realism 73
what ought to present itself in experience under certain

conditions, will be fulfilled when those conditions are
satisfied.
By a reality, I mean anything represented in a true
proposition.
By a positive reality or truth, I mean one to which the
first two criteria can be applied imperfectly, since we can
never carry them out to the end.
By an ideal reality or truth, I mean one to which the first
two criteria can be applied imperfectly, but the third not
at all, since the proposition does not imply that any par-
ticular state of things will ever appear in experience. Such
is a truth of pure mathematics.
By an ultimate reality or truth, I mean one to which the
first criterion can be in some measure applied, but which
can never be overthrown or rendered clearer by any rea-
soning, and upon which alone no predictions can be
based. Thus if you are kicked by a horse, the fact of the
pain is beyond all discussion, and far less can it be shaken
or established by any experimentation.40
One must therefore take into account the various elements of be-
ing, but also try to locate them within their respective order. In
other terms, even if realism extends to all kinds of fields, it does
not imply that it should be monolithic. The principle of unity
does not work as a principle of uniformization. This has very im-
portant consequences for Peirce's realistic position according to
the subject-matter to which it is applied. For example, although
realism should be extended to mathematics, not only should it be
distinguished from Platonism, but it should also be able to cope
with some constructivistic or intuitionistic elements that must be
taken into account, without again falling into a straightforward
nominalistic formalism. Another consequence of such a position is
not only that mathematical realism does not obey the same crite-
ria as ultimate realism or cpistemological realism, but also that
74 Claudinc Engd-Tiercdin
within this last form of realism, one must not mistake for ontolog-
ical differences the differences which concern only epistcmic activ-
ities. This attitude is particularly evident in Pcircc's subtle analysis
of perception, where, leaving out a spectator view, he shows that
the pragmatist analysis implies that we decompose perception into
various elements - the percept, the percipuum, and the perceptive
judgment - and that we consider the perceptive universe accord-
ing to experimental methodology or as an interactive unity be-
tween man and the unanalyzable factiáty of experience.41
These considerations can help us to deal with what appear pri-
ma facie as contradictions within Peirce's definition of reality; re-
ality is sometimes defined as the object of knowledge, the result
of the final opinion which the scientific community would reach,
and sometimes as what is entirely independent of our thought
(and not only of what such and such an individual can think).42
In that sense, as Haack has observed, "reality is intersubjective,
but can lack objectivity.1143 Of course, this is not only a difficulty
for Peirce's own realistic view, but for realism in general. For the
first definition implies that the meaning of "true" consists in the
criteria of its application or verification, which is, in Dummett's
sense, an H anti-realist " thesis. But by identifying truth with the
criteria of truth, Peirce is not guilty of mistaking the one for the
others, and of reducing truth to something subjective. As Haack
points out, the identification is a consequence of his "criteriolog-
ical theory of signification1* {ibid.). If scientific method is sup-
posed to lead to a consensus, it is because it is constrained by re-
ality (5.384). Peirce's declarations here in favor of scientific
realism look more often like a realistic profession of faith than as
a genuine argument for realism. He nevertheless gives us argu-
ments. These are based first on the thesis that what cannot really
be doubted cannot really be believed either, at least until experi-
ence has not brought to us contrary evidence. Another important
Peircean argument is that science is, first and foremost, in the
business of explaining things. A nominalist can reject disposition-
al realism and consider laws only as conventional regularities; but
Vagueness and ihe Unity of C.S. Peirce's Realism 75
then how can he predict anything?44 Hence, one should insist on

Peirce's treatment of abduction or hypothetical inference and on
its importance for the understanding of Peirce's scientific realism.
For example, one should analyze carefully the links between ab-
duction and Peirce's views about reality. Very often, reality is for
Peirce, as it is for Putnam, a plausible empirical hypothesis:
What is reality? Perhaps there isn't any such thing at all.

As I have repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroductdon, a
working hypothesis which we try, our one desperate for-
lorn hope of knowing anything. Again it may be, and it
would seem very bold to hope for anything better, that
the hypothesis of reality though it answers pretty well,
does not perfectly correspond to what is. But if there is
any reality, then, so far as there is any reality, what that
reality consists in is this: that there is in the being of
things something which corresponds to the process of
reasoning, that the world lives, and moves, and has its be-
ing, in a logic of events. We all think of nature as syllo-
gizing. Even the mechanical philosopher, who is as no-
minalistic as a scientific man can be, does that. (NEM
IV. pp. 343-344)
This may first explain why fellibilism is not, contrary to what has
often been said, inconsistent with Peircean realism, but insepara-
ble from it, and second, help to sec why the wide scope which is
attributed by Peirce to realism has nothing dogmatic:
If we think that some questions are never going to get

settled, we ought to admit that our conception of nature
as absolutely real is only partially correct. Still, we shall
have to be governed by it practically, because there is
nothing to distinguish the unanswerable questions from
the answerable ones, so that investigation will have to
proceed as if all were answerable. (8.43)
It is here of course that vagueness comes more clearly into the
realistic picture. But to acknowledge that there is an indeterminacy

in our knowledge and in the world is not an invitation to laziness.
If our language is irreducibly vague, and although there is no rea-
son to complain about it and to try to replace it by an ideal lan-
guage, we must not renounce looking after accuracy in our terms,
even by using, when necessary, the most esoteric terminology. Sim-
ilarly, the fact that most of our beliefs are indubitable does not im-
ply that we should abandon them as soon as their falsity is revealed
to us by experience. Finally, the fact that reality presents itself as a
continuum where the objects have boundaries which are necessarily
fuzzy does not imply that we should embrace scepticism and with-
draw any attempt at explaining phenomena scientifically.
On this last point indeed Peirce's realism is an ontological real-
ism the form of which is to be a realism of vagueness and of inde-
terminacy:
Now it is certainly conceivable that this world which we

call the real world is not perfectly real but that there are
things similarly indeterminate. We cannot be sure that it
is not so. (4.61)
Now, one might of course consider that Peirce's realism is indeed

in that sense "untypical/ and much closer to what Dummett calls
an "anti-realism. "4S Again, it is not sure that Peirce's metaphysical
treatment of the continuum and evolution and of the synechistic
and tychistic consequences he draws from it allow him or us to
say that some sense can be made out of such assertions as "vague-
ness is real" or even more "real is vague." But if one admits that
the hypothesis of a vague reality and of a realism of vagueness is
not completely unjustified, were it only for its heuristic value, one
may wonder whether the adoption of some typical form of real-
ism would not, on the contrary, constitute in itself the negation
of realism.
University of Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne)
NOTES
All our references are to Collected Papers ofC.S. Peirce, Hartshome, Weiss
& Burks, eds., Harvard 1933-1958, 8 volumes; ex: 5.470 and The New
Elements of Mathematics, (NEM), C. Eisele ed., Mouton The Hague,
1976, 4 vols.
1. M. Dummett, "The Reality of the Past," in Truth and

Other Enigmas, Duckworth, London 1978.
2. See N. Tennant, Anti-Realism and Lojic, Oxford, Cla-
rendon Press, ch. 2.
3. See J. Foster, The Case for Idealism, London, Routledge
1982.
4. M. Dummett, "Wang's Paradox," in Truth and Other

Enigmas, p. 260.
5. C. Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth, Blackwell, Ox-
ford, 1987, p. 4.
6. I have developed this in my Doctorat d'Etat: Le problèmi
des universaux chez C.S. Peirce, Université de Paris I, 1990, 1300 pp.
7. Indeed, such an alliance may sound very surprising at first
sight. Everyone remembers the famous pragmatist maxim of the article
"How to Make Our Ideas Clear": "Consider what effects that might con-
ceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception
to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our concep-
tion of the object" (5.402). If you understand such a maxim in the sche-
matic "materialistic, philistine" way against which Peirce kept fighting (n2
and 3 and 5.467), according to which the meaning of a concept would
seem to depend on the whole of its practical effects, then some kind of
nominalistic doctrine would appear to be the natural one to adopt. Wil-
liam James was convinced that such was the case: "Pragmatism," he
wrote, "agrees with nominalism, in always appealing to particulars" (quot-
ed by S. Haack, in "Pragmatism and Ontology: Peirce and James," Revue
Internationale de Philosophic, 1977, pp. 377-400, p. 378). Peirce not only
stresses that " pragma ticism could hardly have entered a head that was not
already convinced that there are real generals" (5.503; c.1905), but as his
78 Claudinc Engel-Tiercdin
realism developed, he disavowed the undesirably nominalistic elements

that had crept in in some early formulations of his pragmatism, and took
the reasons for realism to be pretty compelling: "Everybody ought to be
a nominalist at first [because it is simpler than realism and it is true that
the economy of research prescribes to try the simpler one first] and to
continue in that opinion until he is driven out of it by the force majeure
of irreconcilable facts" (4.1; 1898). So it would seem that there is a logi-
cal affinity (2.58; 1904) between pragmatism and realism.
8. 5.2 Cf. W.B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism, New York,
1966, pp. 11-21.
9. In spite of some ambiguous texts (e.g. 1.558), Peirce al-
ways distinguishes the two, and even contrasts them: existence is reaction
to environment (5.503, 5.430) and belongs to the second category (sec-
ondness); reality belongs to the third category (thirdness). Existence is
the mode of being of individuals, reality the mode of being of universals.
This distinction is crucial to understand Peirce 's view of individuality. If
the individual is more and more important, it is always on the pheno-
menological or psychological side, not on the logical, metaphysical, or
moral side. This distinction is strictly Scotistic, since in Scotus, existence
is that from which metaphysics, as a real or abstractive science, abstracts
itself. This is linked with the criticism of intuitive knowledge. See the pa-
pers in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1868).
10. D. Pears, n Universals" in Logic and Language, ed. Flew,
Oxford 1955. See also Rorty, "Pragmatism, Categories and Language,"
Philosophical Review, 1961, pp. 197-223.
11. Peirce had firsthand knowledge of medieval writings, as
it can be seen from the catalogue of his library. On Duns Scotus1 influ-
ence on Peirce, see J. Boler, C.S. Peirce and Scotistic Realism: a Study of
Peirce's Relation to Duns Scotus, Seattle 1963. R. McKeon, "Pcirce's Sco-
tistic Realism," in Studies in the Philosophy of Peirce, Wiener and Young,
Harvard 1952, pp. 238-250 and K Almeder, "Pragmatism and Scotistic
Realism," reprinted in The Philosophy of C.S. Peirce, Blackwell, Oxford,
1980, pp. 160-182.
12. 1.560; 4.50; 1.6; 1.560. On the genius of Duns Scotus,
sec, 2.166; 8.18; 5.40, etc.
13. Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum

Aristotelis, VII, q. 18.6, in Opera Omnia, Paris, Vivès, 1891-1895. It
must be noticed that almost all the texts referred to by Peirce belong to
those that have been since authenticated. Cf. McKeon, op. cit., p. 240.
14. E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, Paris, 1952, pp. 110 ff.,
Opus Oxoniense II, d.3. q.l. n.7.
15. Op. Ox., II.d.3. q.l. n.7.
16. See Gilson, op cit., p. 113.
17. See P. Thibaud, La kyique de C.S. Peirce, de l'algebre
auxgraphes, Université de Provence, 1975, p. 84 ff; R. Martin, "Individ-
uality and Quantification" in Peirce's Logic of Relations and Other Studies,
Dordrecht, Reidel, 1900, pp. 11-24.
18. It is not certain that Duns Scotus is always able to dis-
tinguish the logical order and the metaphysical order (see Gilson, pp.
107-108) and it is also true that the doctrine of formalities is often dark-
ened by the fact that Duns Scotus thinks as a logician, and tries only lat-
er to find an objective base to his concepts (cf. Wolter, A.B. The Tran-
scendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, St.
Bonaventure, New York, 1946, p. 28, and R. Godwin, "C.S. Peirce: A
Modern Scotist?," The New Scholasticism, 1961, p. 478-509, p. 487).
19. Even if the scholastic philosophers acknowledge the im-
portance of habits and dispositions (8.18) R. Gallie talks here of a "rela-
tional realism" about Peirce's realism (op. cit. p. 153).
20. See here C. Eisele, "The Problem of Mathematical
Continuity," in Studies in the Scientific and Mathematical Philosophy of
C.S. Peirce, Mouton, The Hague, 1979, pp. 208-215, where she re-
minds us of the discussion between Peirce and Cantor.
21. (5.427), (55.412), Ms 618 (Robin catalogue), see R.
Almeder, op. cit., pp. 14 f.
22. Peirce's treatment of the classical proposition as a conse-
quentia simplex de inesse, once again on the Scotistic model, is one of the
logical implications which occur very early in his work (1864-1865). See
C. Engel-Tiercelin, "Logique, psychologie ct métaphysique: les fonde-
ments du Pragmatisme selon Peirce," Zeitschrift fur Aligemeine Wissens-
chaftstheorie, 1985, p. 229-250.
23. 5.457; 5.45; 4.580; 4.546; 5.532, etc.

24. This tendency to act "in a way describable in general
terms upon every occasion (or upon a considerable proportion of the oc-
casions) that may present itself as of a generally describably character" is
what Peirce calls habit (5.538). It is not limited to human activity (see
the "would-be n of the dice (2.664)). This is of considerable importance
for Peirce's frequentist-dispositional theory of probabilities.
25. Synechism or "relational generality" (6.190) is "the doc-
trine that all that exists is continuous" (1.172).
26. It is the thesis according to which chance is a factor of
the universe (6.201) - the thesis that our certainty can never be absolute-
ly and definitively established (1.13-14).
27. M. Black, "Vagueness, An Exercise in Logical Analysis,"
in Philosophy of Science, VI, 1937, pp. 1274SS.
28. See Thibaud, op. cit., p. 46; C. Eisele, op. cit. p. 214,
and Fisch and Turquette, "Peirce's Triadic Logic," Transactions of the
C.S. Peirce Society, II, 1966, and C. Engel-Tiercelin, "Peirce et le projet
d'une logique du vague," Archives de Philosophic, oct-déc 1989, tome 52,
cahier 4, pp. 553-580.
29. (5.446) See J. Brock, "Principal Themes in Peirce's Log-
ic of Vagueness," Peirce Studies, Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism,
Lubbock, TX, 1979, pp. 41-49, and M. Nadin, "The Logic of Vagueness
and the Category of Synechism," TheMonist, 1980, p. 351-363.
30. The three texts of 1867 are here essential: "Upon Logi-
cal Comprehension and Extension" (pp. 70-86), "On the Natural Classi-
fication of Arguments" (pp. 23-48) and "On a New list of Categories"
(pp. 49-49). Reference is given to the new Peirce edition, M. Fisch,
Writings of C.S. Peirce, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, vol. 1.
(1857-1866), 1982, vol. 2 (1867-1871), 1984. See Engel-Tiercelin, In-
tuition et Inference: la critique peircienne de la métaphysique, (1867-1868),
these de doctorat de troisième cycle, Université de Paris-1, 1981, 598
pp., eh. 1.
31. See J. Brock, art. cit. p. 43. See the conditional inter-
pretation of the pragmatist maxim, the indefinite series of interpret ants,
and the properties of the mediadic relatives allowing the formation of su-
perior relatives inside collections which are not discrete but inside contin-
ual systems. See 1.548.
32. On the illusion of simplicity in sensation, see C. Engel-
Tiercelin, "Que signifíe "voir rouge"? La sensation et la couleur selon
C.S. Peirce," Archives dc Philosophic, 1984, 409-429.
33. Peirce calls this also formal hypothesis, e.g.; "1 received
today a number of English books printed by Hindoos in Culcutta. The
manufacture is rude, yet peculiarly pleasant. Remembering other Indian
manufactures I have seen, I now get a more definite conception of the
characteristic of Indian taste. This, since it is an idea derived from the
comparison of a number of objects, is called gcncr*Hztition. Yet it is not
an extension of an idea already had, but on the contrary, an increase of
definiteness of the conception I apply to known things" (2.422nl.).
34. See Peirce's definition of vagueness in Baldwin's diction-
ary: "Vague (in logic) [. . .] Indeterminate in intention, a proposition is
vague when there are possible states of things concerning which it is in-
trinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker,
he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition.
By intrinsically uncertain, we mean not uncertain in consequence of any
ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker's habits of language
were indeterminate; so that one day he would regard the proposition as
excluding, another as admitting, those states of things. Yet this must be
understood to have reference to what might be deduced from a perfect
knowledge of this state of mind; for it is precisely because these ques-
tions never did, or did not frequently present themselves, that this habit
remained indeterminate" (p. 966, vol. 2, 748).
35. This covers the traditional sorites arguments (the heap,
the bald) as well as the problems in contemporary literature on "border-
line-cases," fuzzy-sets, etc. Cf. Nadin, pp. 356, and Engel-Tiercelin,
1989, p. 569.
36. This is e.g. Boler's point of view, of. cit.^ p. 8.
37. This thesis pervades medieval writings (Anselm, Abelard,
Duns Scotus, Ockham, Aquinas). See Boler, "Peirce, Ockham and Scho-
lastic Realism," The Monist 63y 1980, pp. 209-304.
38. Putnam, "Vagueness and Alternative Logic," Erkenntnis,
19, 1983, pp. 297-314; p. 301. Dummett, "Comments on Putnam's

"Reference and Understanding," in Margalit, A. ed., Meaning and Use,
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979, pp. 218-225.
39. 6.340; 8.45, 2.173, 5.160, 1.24, 1.358, 1.380, 1.419,
1.427-35, 2.84., etc.
40. Letter to Cantor, December 23rd 1900, N.E.M. Ill, 2
pp. 772-79, p. 773.
41. We take up here S. RosenthaTs conclusions in "On the
Epistemological Significance of What Peircc is Not," Transactions of the
Peirce Society 1979, XV, 1. See also R. Bernstein, "Peircc's Theory of
Perception," in Studies in the Philosophy of Peirce. Moore & Robin, eds.,
Amherst, 1964, pp. 165-189.
42. On reality as a result of final opinion, see 2.29, 5.311,
5.409, 7.344, etc. and on the "declaration of independence," see for in-
stance 5.257, 5.430 etc.
43. S. Haack, "Two Fallibilists in Search of Truth: Peirce
and Popper," in Journal of Philosophy, 1977 ', pp. 63-83.
44. Peirce is known to have violently defended his own po-
sition against such conventionalists as Poincaré, Mach or Pearson. D.
Meli or has recently defended very similar views "In Defense of Disposi-
tions," Philosophical Review, 1974, XXXIII and The Matter of Chance,
Cambridge, 1972.
45. Cf. Dummett, The Interpretation of Fre¿fe's Philosophy,
Duckworth, London, 1981, p. 441; "Realism about vague properties has
more affinities with various forms of idealism than it does with the corre-
sponding forms of realism, in that it allows that reality may in certain re-
spects be indeterminate; it is for this reason a signally untypical case."

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Vagueness and the Unity of C.S.

Vagueness and the Unity

Recent discussions on realism tend to show that there are vari-

gestión is remotely plausible. "s

1. Scholastic Realism as a Therapy to the Pseudo-Problem of Uni-

sion) and nominalism.

it must not be imagined that any notable realist of the

real or not, the property, the character, the predicate,

So, contrary to what is still often asserted today, when it

The nominalists say it is a mere name. Strike out the

The real opposition between realists and nominalists lies thus in

The real is that which is not whatever we may happen

arc to admit as reals, singular cxistants only (8.10; 5.470;

[. . .] In fact, a realist is simply one who knows no more

So there is indeed a "nominalistic Platonism" (8.10) which

The gist of all the nominalist's arguments will be found

Conceptualista, nominalists and Platonists are thus put on the

lutely inexplicable1* (5.318), since they figure that it is possible, at

get rid [. . .] of the Ockhamistic prejudice of political

2 . Peirce 's Scotistic Realism

scholastic realism, I am afraid we are going to have to go into

Accordingly any such nature is to be regarded as some-

It is such indeterminacy of the ens rente (which in fact Duns

The great argument for nominalism is that there is no

be, and man with this or that particular series of determi-

The second thing which is kept in mind by Peirce is the fact

investigating; it is the molecular structure (4.530), namely a cer-

When an experimentalist speaks of a phenomenon, such as

Now it is also easier to understand why Peircc considers Duns

Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that

The absolute individual can not only not be realized in

fore, that we perceive or think, or that exists, is general.

Peirce's denial of the Scotistic contraction goes together with

3. The Logical Affinities between Pragmatism and Realism

The question of realism and nominalism [. . .] means the

How is this going to be performed? Peirce confesses that he be-

[. . .] Thus the continuum is that which the logic of rela-

How is one to adapt such discoveries to science?

I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when

The statement of the conditionals then becomes synonymous

statement referring to the future.

Do not overlook the fact that pragmaticist maxim says

The second reason why pragmatism is not allied to nominalism is

regularities - what Peirce calls the H would-be" or the habit,24 one

If a substance of a certain kind should be exposed to an

This is why it seems to me that the original element in Peircian

4. The "Logic of Vagueness": the Reality of Vagueness and The

of a logic of vagueness and that he even claims to have elaborated

A subject is determinate in respect to any character which

From this, Peirce concludes that a term or sign cannot be com-

A sign (under which designation I place every kind of

plicitly leaves it to you to apply its assertion to what man

Vagueness and generality are two opposite forms of indetermi-

cessity and law - that is the third category - generality belongs to

Another advantage of this definition is that it saves us

Thus understood, vagueness is a notion which can be called prag-

attempt to eliminate it. It may be possible, as Peirce says, if the

No general description can identify an object. But the