'PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY : PEIRCE AND JAMES'

Author(s): SUSAN HAACK

Source: Revue Internationale de Philosophie , 1977, Vol. 31, No. 121/122 (3/4), LA
PENSÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE AMÉRICAINE 1776-1976 (1977), pp. 377-400
Published by: Revue Internationale de Philosophie

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 'PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY:
PEIRCE AND JAMES'

by SUSAN HAACK

l. Introduction

A recurring theme in Peirce's philosophy is the crucial import

of the issue between nominalism and realism, still 'as pressing', P
comments, 'as ever it was' (4.1,1898). Peirce often, and emphatica
declares himself a realist, indeed, a scholastic realist 'of a somew
extreme stripe'. He misses no opportunity, moreover, to at
nominalism, which he regards as a 'philistine doctrine' (1.383,
whic^i blocks the road of inquiry' (1.170, c. 1897). Philosophers w
whom Peirce disagrees are almost inevitably accused of nominali
this charge is made against, among others, Hobbes, Bentham,
Hume, Bain, Leibniz, Hegel, Wundt, Fichte, Haeckel, Pearson, and
against Peirce's fellow-pragmatists James and Schiller. Even
Scotus, to whose realism Peirce refers with sympathy, as closely si
to his own, does not escape the criticism that 'he inclines too m
towards nominalism' (1.560,1905). Nor, furthermore, are the alle
bad influences of nominalism confined to philosophy ; nominalis
effects on science are also deplored, and Peirce even claims
nominalism has had bad consequences for the practice of med
(1.109, c. 1896) (').
But Peirce's realism is, in a way, surprising. It has seemed to m
that nominalism has more affinity than realism with the spirit
pragmatism, with its insistence that the meaning of a concept lies
empirical effects. The intuitive impression that there is such an affin
is given some support, furthermore, by James's insistence

(l) The danger, according to Peirce, is of confusing a disease with its sympt

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378 S. HAACK

'Pragmatism agrees with nominalism is always appeal

ticulars', ([1907], pp. 46-7).
Some commentators have observed that Peirce is apt, fr
time, to indulge in metaphysical speculations of a kind w
scarcely to satisfy the' standards of meaningfulness imposed
pragmatic maxim. Goudge, for example, in [1950], trea
really two philosophers, one, the pragmatist, a 'naturalist
the speculative metaphysician, the 'transcendentalist' ; and
and conquer' approach certainly proves, in many ways, high
And so one might be tempted to regard Peirce's realism
another instance of Peirce the transcendentalist forgetting
of Peirce the naturalist. Goudge doesn't quite do this ; but
gard 'Platonism' as a characteristically transcendentalist d
he takes Peirce's later, more extreme, realism, if not his earlier,
moderate realism, to be incongruent with his naturalism. Peirce,
though, constandy stresses that his realism and his pragmatism are in
timately connected : 'Pragmaticism' (2), he says, 'could hardly have en
tered a head that was not already convinced that there are real
generals' (5.503, c. 1905). And as his realism developed he was con
vinced — not at all that there was any inconsistency between
pragmatism and 'extreme scholastic realism' — but that his early
formulations of the pragmatic maxim had allowed undesirably
nomimâlist elements to creep in. Peirce is convinced that pragmatism
and realism have a logical affinity (2.58,1904). He could, of course, be
wrong about this ; but his conviction weighs in favour of an approach
which tries to avoid divorcing pragmatism and realism.
One can assume, furthermore, that Peirce takes the reasons for
realism to be pretty compelling. For although he strenuously opposes
nominalism he declares himself, nevertheless, to be altogether in
favour of Ockham's razor, for all that it was 'urged by an illustrious
nominalist' (6.274, c- J893)- Ockham's razor, according to Peirce, is
but the unexceptionable methodological principle that one should try
the simpler before the more complex hypothesis. Peirce denies that

(2) 'Pragmaticism', introduced in 1905, is meant to signify a doctrine more precisely

delineated than 'pragmatism'. Though the main stated object in introducing the new
term is to avoid misuses in the literary journals, there is also some hint that Peirce is
disassociating himself from the nominalistic pragmatism of James and Schiller.

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 379

Ockham's razor is, of itself, a nominalistic principle ; he a

however, that it throws the burden of proof on the realist. Bec
nominalism is a simpler theory than realism (3), without compe
reason :

Everybody ought to be a nominalist at first, and to co

opinion until he is driven out of it by force majeure of ir
(4.5, 1898).

One may take it, then, that Peirce believes that one is driven to
realism by 'irreconcilable facts'. (And cf, 8.250,1897).
Peirce always treats 'nominalism' as covering both the view that
universals are in no way real, and to the view that universals have only
a mental reality ; his realism is opposed both to (what would nawadays
be called), nominalism and conceptualism. The key thesis of on
tological realism is the affirmation of the reality of universals, or
generals, in contrast to the nominalist's claim that these have no, or
only a mental, reality :

The question... is whether man, horse and other names of natural classes,
correspond with anything which all men, or all horses, really have in com
mon, independent of our thoughts, or whether these classes are con
stituted simply by a likeness in the way in which our minds are affected by
individual objects which have in themselves no resemblance... (8.12,
1871).

Peirce distinguishes reality and existence : reality is independence of

thought, existence reaction with the environment. (At 5.503, 5.430,
both 1905, existence is treated as the mode of being of individuals,
reality as the mode of being of universals. At 6.439, 1902-3, however,
though existence and reality are still distinct, existence is treated as a
king of reality, so that everything that exists is real, though not
everything that is real exists. At 6.327-8, 1909, Peirce also distinguishes
between what is external and what is mental ; externality, like reality,
is independence of thought, but whereas reality applies to the
denotata of expressions, externality applies to their significata). Peirce

(3) Questions could be raised here about the sense in which nominalism is simpler ; for
it isn't obvious that a theory extravagant in ontology but economical in syntax, for
example, is more complex than a theory economical in ontology but extravagant in syn
tax. But I can't pursue these issues — promising as they are — at present. Cf. Sober
[1975] ch. 2.

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380 S. HAACK

holds that generals are real, though they don't exist. In claim
generals are real, Peirce is rejecting the nominalist/ conceptu
that horses, say, have nothing in common. In denying that
exist, Peirce is rejecting what he calls 'nominalistic platonism
1871), which treats generals as abstract individuals. The d
generals exist is, however, doubtfully consistent with anoth
which Peirce sometimes stresses : that generals are causally ef
If existence is reaction with the environment, what is ca
ficacious presumably exists. This creates tension between the
existence as reaction with the environment, and the view of e
as the mode of being of individuals, since individuals are
items which, in Peirce's view, may interact causally. This tens
the vagaries of usage of 'exists' and 'real', will prove signific

2. Exegetical interlude

On ontological as on other issues, Pierce presents, in diff

places, different and sometimes apparently incompatible view
cing the problem this presents, one has three options : (1) to
evidence at its face value, and conclude that Peirce held ambig
contradictory views ; (2) to reinterpret the evidence in such a w
reconstruct a unified and consistent view ; (3) to attribute
ferences to a change of mind over time. Of these alternatives,
that the first should — as a matter of exegetical charity — be
only after the second and third have been tried and have prov
plausible.
There are three relevant areas of ambiguity in Peirce's views : (i) his
commitment to ontological realism ; (ii) his view of individuals ; (iii) his
attitude to epistemological realism.
(i) According to Fisch ([1967]), Peirce's philosophy gradually
developed — just as, in his comments on Ockham's razor, Peirce
argued that a sensible philosophy should — from an original
nominalism to increasing extreme realism. As an illustration of
Peirce's early nominalism, Fisch points out that in 1868 (8. iff) Peirce
not only sympathises with Venn's frequency theory of probability, but
also — without any authority from The Logic of Chance —- labels that
theory 'nominalist'. Others, eg, Roberts in [1970], take Peirce's claims
in 1893 (6.605) that 'never, during the thirty years in which I have been

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 381

writing in philosophical questions, have I failed in my allegiance to

realistic opinions and to certain Scodsdc ideas' to be essentially
correct. Fisch is obliged to suggest that Peirce's 'thirty years' is an
exaggeration of five years or so.
Peirce's own testimony is inconclusive. At 1.20(1903), he declares
that he has 'never been able to think differently on that question of
nominalism and realism' ; yet elsewhere (eg, 6.103, 1892) he says that
he had, earlier, been 'a little blinded by nominalisdc preposessions'.
Whether one chooses to follow Fisch in characterising Peirce's position
as originally nominalist and later realist, or to follow Roberts in
characterising it as always realist, but with nominalist elements which
gradually became fewer, certain relevant developments should be
mentioned : the move from a nominalist' or at least epistemic, account
of possibility, as what is not known not to be the case, to a realist ac
count ; from a material to a subjunctive reading of the conditionals of
the pragmatic maxim ; and from a frequency to a propensity account
of probability. These certainly represent at least moves towards a
more complete realism.
In one respect, however, his position on the status of individuals,
Peirce may have moved in the other direction : from a more to a less
extreme realism.

(ii) Realism, Peirce sometimes says, is characterised by the impor

tance it gives to generals vis à vis individuals. There is some evidence
that Peirce's early realism was so extreeme as to involve not only the
claim that generals are real but also the denial that individuals exist.
Passcited are 3.93, 1870; 1.678, 1893; 5.317, 5.323, both 1868. Of
these passages, however, the last three deal not with the individual in
the logical or epistemological sense in which 'individual' is contrasted
with 'universal', but with the individual in the sense of 'individual per
son', and their main concern is to emphasise the importance of the
community and the relative unimportance of the person. It is true that
Peirce's ontological realism and his distaste for political or sociological
individualism are connected. Nevertheless, I think it reasonable to
concentrate on the first of the passages cited ; for there Peirce ex
plicitly denies the existence of the logical individual, whereas in the others he
only denigrates the importance of the social individual.
Elsewhere, however, Peirce clearly admits the existence of in
dividuals (eg, in the entry in Baldwin's dictionary 1901), as he

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382 S. HAACK

presumably needs to in view of the connection between i

existence and secondness, and his thesis of the irreducib
seconds. Some writers, consequently, eg, Weiss in [1965], Ber
[1964], Boler in [1963], find here an inconsistency in Peirce's t
Riley, however, in [1974], takes the second approach, arguing
interpretation can be supplied according to which Peirce's vi
dividuals is consistent. And Murphey', in [1961], takes the
proach, arguing that the apparent inconsistency is the result
poral development in Peirce's thought.
Now Peirce gives two different definitions of 'individual',
object necessarily determinate with respect to every char
(3.611) (b) something which reacts with the environment
It is the second of these definitions, of course, which conne
the claim that existence (= reaction with the environment) is the
special mode of being of individuals, and that secondness ( = reaction
with the environment) is the category of individual existence.
It is the first of these definitions, however, to which Peirce appeals
when he repudiates individuals. At 3.93 he argues that all terms are
general : 'a term, however determinate, may be made more deter
minate still, but not... absolutely determinate'. The idea seems to be
that terms can be progressively ('King', 'King of Macedon', Philip, King
of Macedon', The second Philip, King of Macedon') but will always be
susceptible of further narrowing ; cf. Peirce's comment that 'the
second Philip, King of Macedon' is 'still capable of logical division',
into Philip drunk and Philip sober, for example. No term, therefore,
can denote an absolutely determinate individual ; and furthermore, no
absolute individual can exist ; for whatever exists must exist for some
time, however short, and in any period of time it will undergo some
change in its relations, and thus fail of complete determinateness.
Peirce recommends the term 'singular' for an ersatz individual, 'that
which is one in number from a particular point of view', a point of
view which ignores or disregards certain of its relations, and hence its
real indeterminacy.
Riley's approach is to treat (a) rather than (b) as the key charac
teristic of individuals ; and he interprets (a) to mean that something is
individual if it is completely law governed, if, that is, it is a wholly con
sistent bundle of habits of action. (He points out that, on this in
terpretation, Peirce's conception of an individual has affinities with

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 383

Hegel's 'concrete universal'). Pierce's disposition to treat indi

an unattainable ideal thus becomes of a piece with his evo
theory that the universe tends from a primeval chaos to a go
fect order. This interpretation has, as will be apparent, many
it also, however, has some drawbacks. One is that, as Bernstei
in [1975], Peirce claims that definition (a) is preferable — wh
view of Peirce's criticisms of Hegel for his neglect of secondne
perhaps, very surprising another is that it glosses over an im
difficulty in Peirce's theory : that, while he plainly offers bo
(b) as alternative definitions of 'individual', there is a question
the two definitions are equivalent or even co-extensive. Contr
son [1975], it is not obvious that only what is perfectly determ
react with the environment ; indeed, as I have already noted
himself quite explicitly claims the causal efficacy of thirds, a
efficacy presumably calls for reaction with the environment (4). A
difficulty is that, while Riley's account throws considerable lig
place in his philosophy of Peirce's denial of the existenc
dividuals, it does not, so far as I can see, reconcile this denia
Peirce's claims that individuals do indeed exist. For this reason the

third, temporal approach looks promising.

Murphey's procedure, in borad outline, is to trace the development
of Peirce's philosophy by way of relating revisions in the theory of
categories to the logical innovations (the logic of relations in 1870,
quantification theory in 1885, the theory of multitudes in the late
1890's) which, he argues, prompted them. These logical innovations all
bear, also according to Murphey, on Peirce's realism; the theory of
relations supplies a logical argument for the reality of thirds, ie, triadic
relations or laws ; quantification theory modifies Peirce's view of
the existence of individuals ; the theory of multitudes supplies an
argument for Peirce's adoption of epistemological as well as on
tological realism. I shall turn to the last of these claims later, under
(iii) below ; for the present, it is the second which concerns me.
Murphey points out that in the logic of 1870 neither the individual

(4) It seems plausible to speculate that (a) stands to (b) as Peirce's logical to his
phenomenological argument for the categories, and that the gap that threatens to open
between them corresponds to the danger that the two kinds of argument, may not lead
to just the same categories.

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384 S. HAACK

variables, nor proper names, nor even indices, are terms

individuals ; they are general terms, capable of further s
Subsequendy, however, Peirce developed quantification
an account of the index as a term directly referring, by
causal connection, to an individual. Martin, in [1975], has
some detail and most instructively the slow process by w
arrived at the notions of quantification and individuality
points out that it is at about this time (c. 1885) that Peirc
use the scotistic term 'haeccity' ('thisness') for the individ
dividuals, and to admit the existence of genuine indiv
phey's approach, while it does not resolve the difficulties
concept of an individual, does account for his different v
whether or not individuals exist. It seems plausible, furthe
because his account of an individual involves tensions,
should have changed his mind about individuals' ontolo
With the admission of individuals, Peirce's realism m
resembles that of Scotus, to whom Peirce acknowledge a d
fluence of Scotus on Peirce, and the similarities between
Scotus' realism, have been discussed in detail by Boler,
Almeder). Sometimes, however, Peirce criticises Scotus fo
too much to nominalism; his 'halting realism' (6.176, 1906) is
'separated from nominalism only by a hair'. So it is worthwhile to in
dicate briefly some of the ways in which Peirce's realism differs from
Scotus'. One respect in which Peirce's realism is more extreme is in
denying the 'contraction' of the common nature in the individual :

Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that universals are
contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars (8.208, c. 1905).

It will prove significant, later, that Peirce goes on to observe that 'the
pragmaticist cannot admit' the doctrine of contraction, for this turns
out to relate to Peirce's shift from a more nominalistic to a more
realistic account of the pragmatic maxim of meaning. Of this, more
subsequently.
A second difference is that Peirce criticises Scotus for having
assumed, simply on the basis of the existence of the appropriate
general term, that there is a corresponding real common nature. The
reality of a common nature, Peirce argues, does not follow merely
from the existence of a suitable word ; it is a matter for scientific
discovery that things called by the same word really are similar. The

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 385

idea is, I think, that general terms might stand for either 'natural' or
'artificial' properties, there being, in the latter case, a real similarity
between the things to which the word is applied. (Cf. Boler, Qyinton).
In an analogous, and as we shall soon see, related way, Peirce would
distinguish between accidental uniformities and real laws.
A third, again connected, difference is that the 'generals' to which
Peirce ascribes reality are of a somewhat different character from
Scotus' universals (see Bastian, Moore [1953], Almeder [1973]). First,
Peirce is inclined to emphasise the real similarity between individuals
falling under a general term — his view of universals stresses relations
at least as much as properties. This is connected, no doubt, with his
work in the logic of relatives and his category of thirds. Second, the
pragmatic maxim explains general terms by means of conditionals ex
pressing dispositions : a diamond is hard if, if it were to be rubbed, it
would be scratched. The attribution of a disposition ('habit' or
'would-be' are Peirce's terms) to something requires, in turn, the
reality of laws concerning the behaviour of the thing, and laws require
appeal to possibilities, since to say that such and such is a law is to say
that it would happen in possible circumstances of the pertinent kind,
as well as that it does happen in actual circumstances of the pertinent
kind. Peirce's ontology of generals thus covers relations, dispositions,
laws and possibilities.
(iii) This realism which has been considered so far is ontological,
concerning the question, whether there really are 'generals'. But the
epistemological question also arises, whether these real generals are
perceptually accessible to us.
Murphey has argued that until relatively late Peirce maintained —
though not altogether unequivocally — a phenomenalism which in
volved denying epistemological, while accepting ontological, realism.
Eventually, however, according to Murphey, the strain which this com
bination of views placed on Peirce's conception of reality led him to
abandon phenomenalism and adopt epistemological realism. He con
nects this change with developments in Peirce's theory of multitudes.
O'Connor, in [1964], accepts Murphey's account of the change in
Peirce's view, but suggests that the most important factor leading to
Peirce's rejection of phenomenalism was due to the influence of F. E.
Abbot, whose influence on his own realism he frequently acknow
ledges.

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386 S. HAACK

Other writers have suggested that Peirce's writings can

terpreted in such a way that there is no need to attribute to
change of mind which Murphey diagnoses. Riley (in [196
Almeder (in [1968]) both think that Peirce can be interpreted a
holding a view which combines elements of empiricism and id
The issue here, however, turns out to be much less straig
ward than it seems. First, when Riley and Almeder suggest tha
never held a straightforwardly phenomenalist view, they are
phenomenalism to be the thesis that ordinary commonsense o
are not directly perceived but are constructed from phenome
put. But the thests which Murphey contrasts with epistem
realism is, rather, the thesis that thirds are not directly perce
are constructed out of firsts and seconds. Secondly, there is e
in a letter to Abbot dated 11th January 1886, that Peirce did
that time, regard the view that thirds are perceived as inconsistent
phenomenalism. My conjecture is that around 1890 Peirce did
as Murphey suggests, change his mind about epistemological r
but the change involved the recognition of an inconsistency b
phenomanalism and the perception of thirds as well as the eve
rejection of phenomenalism. As O'Connor suggests, Abbot's inf
was, I suspect, important ; but, I think, important as much in
ing Peirce of the incompatability of phenomenalism with
ception of thirds as in persuading him to abandon phenomena
This conjecture leaves the problem of how to explain Peirce's e
belief that phenomenalism and perception of thirds could b
ciled. This question is an extremely complex one, which it
require another paper to answer satisfactorily ; for the present
suffice to observe that there are crucial ambiguities in Peirce'
two key terms. (1) He uses 'reality' sometimes in contrast to ex
sometimes to include existence, and at least once (1.538, c
equivalently with existence. (2) He uses 'observe' and 'pe
sometimes literally of sense perception, sometimes metaphoric
rational insight, and sometimes for the simultaneous observat
icons of abstract entities and those entities themselves (s). It s
plausible to conjecture that the intersection of these ambiguitie
explain Peirce's early position.

(5) See Stearns [1968] for discussion of the first, and Freeman [1974] for disc
the second of these ambiguities.

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 pragmatism AND ONTOLOGY 387

3. Realism in Peirce's philosophy

Peirce sees connections between his realism and almost

major element in his philosophy. Since my main concern
relations between realism and pragmatism, I shall only sk
briefly, some of the other important connections.
Categories. Peirce often claims that realism is intimately
with the category of thirdness (see eg, 5.122, 1903). He a
categories by two routes : on the one hand, he uses argum
the logic of relatives to distinguish monads (firsts), dyads
triads (thirds) ; on the other, he uses phenomenological a
disdnguish qualities (firsts), facts (seconds), and laws (
logical and phenomenological routes are supposed to lead
destination ; qualities are monadic ; facts, brite reactions
laws, triadic. (But cf. i.452,c. 1896, and Freeman, [1937], for
discussion of the fit between the two appoaches). Since Peirce often
characterises realism as giving priority to laws rather than to the facts
under laws (eg., 4.1, 1898), it is clear why he should associate realism
with thirdness.

At one point (4.5,1898) Peirce offers to 'prove' nominalism false by

appeal to his logic of relatives. Acceptance of thirds, he believes,
requires realism, and the logical route to thirdness appeals to a result
in his logic of relatives to the effect that, whereas relations of four or
more places can be reduced to compounds of triads, triads cannot
themselves be reduced to compounds of monads and/ or dyâds. Con
sequendy, he argues, a separate category of thirds is ineliminable.
Synechism. Peirce associates the category of thirdness closely with
the doctrine of synechism. He insists on the reality of laws, and
recognises that laws can be thought of as universal propositions in
terprétable as referring to the temporal condnuum, and thus relates
realism and synechism. He also argues that nominalism is unable to
account for infinity (8.208, c. 1905).
Theory of inquiry. Connections between realism and the theory of
inquiry have already emerged in the course of the investigation of
Murphey's account of Peirce's conversion from phenomenalism,
Reality is a premiss of the theory of inquiry, and a vital element in the
definition of truth. Peirce also observes that realism is required for the
justification of induction.

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388 S. HAACK

Tychism. Since Peirce's realism commits him to the reality o

might be supposed that there is some tension with his tychis
trine that there is real chance, real indeterminacy, in the uni
there is no genuine conflict. Peirce holds that there are real
they are never absolutely precise or universal ; there is also, a
claims, real chance. (Peirce, of course, abhors appeal to
posedly inexplicable ; and since, he thinks, regularity rat
irregularity calls for explanation, the doctrine of tychism allo
offer an evolutionary account of the development of law
Pragmatism. Peirce, as I observed at the outset, regard
pragmatism and his realism as intimately connected. Sp
guments about the interpretation of the pragmatic maxim a
evidently felt there to be an affinity between pragmatism an
His conviction that nominalism is 'anti-scientific in essen
1902) is significant in veiw of the fact that he also stresses
pragmatism is an essentially scientific philosophy, form
training as an experimental scientist, which regularises philo
obliging it to conform to scientific standards of meaningfuln
scarcely surprising, in view of Abbot's insistence on the conn
tween science and realism, that Peirce offers him the title of
pragmatist'.
Peirce was already sympathetic to pragmatism when he first for
mulated the pragmatic maxim (probably in the early 1870's, though it
was published only in 1878), but as we have seen, his realism under
went some changes after this time. His formulation of the pragmatic
maxim also changed, the major change being from a version Peirce
came to regard as too nominalist to a later, more completely realist
version.

One must suspect that Peirce exaggerates when he claims that

pragmatism 'could scarcely have entered a head that was not already
convinced that there were real generals' ; for he acknowledges
Berkeley, for example, as an important precursor, who had used,
though not explicitly formulated, something like the pragmatic
method, and yet he regards Berkely as an arch-nominalist (see 8.206,
c. 1905). And, of course, James's and Schiller's versions of pragmatism
were, by Peirce's standards, nominalist.
So the question of the precise connections Peirce saw between
pragmatism and realism will require close attention. Pragmatism, ac

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 389

cording to Peirce, is not a doctrine but a method — a method bo

explaining the meaning of 'hard' or 'intellectual' concepts, an
showing the meaninglessness of certain metaphysical ideas. The K
nel of pragmatism thus lies in its account of meaning, as given by
maxim, stated in 'How to make our ideas clear' like this :

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we

consider the object of our conception to have, then, our conception of
those effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (5.402,1878.).

The meaning of a concept would thus — reading this account in

the light of the comments that immediately precede it, to the effect
that meaning is a matter of habit, and that habits are identified via
their when and their how (5.400) — consist of a series of conditionals
the antecedents of which describe initial conditions, the consequents
'sensible results' : as, if the diamond is rubbed, it will not be scratched.
Murphey describes this formulation, with its appeal to 'sensible
results', as 'decidedly phenomenalistic' ([1961], p. 157). Nor is it very
hard to see why James should have thought the maxim nominalistic,
for it apparently reduces the meaning of a concept to a set of con
ditionals referring to particular events.
Peirce, however, gradually develops a thoroughly realist in
terpretation. In the first place, even in this early formulation, the
maxim involves an element of prediction, it appeals essentially to future
events. (Cf. 8.194, c. 1904 ; early and late, Peirce stresses pragmatism's
appeal to the future). And Peirce often argues (eg., 8.151, 1903) that
the possibility of prediction requires the admission of real laws. In fact
he more than once offers to 'prove' nominalism false thus : holding a
stone, he persuades his audience to agree that if he drops it, it will fall ;
if they admit they can truly predict what will happen, he claims, they
are obliged to agree that there are real laws, for were there no law
over and above individual droppings and fallings there could be no
grounds for the prediction. (Cf. Thompson [1964].). If nominalism
cannot allow predictions, Peirce has a reply to Burks' objection that by
pragmatic standards there is no real difference between nominalism
and realism. (See Burks, [1951], and cf. Min, [1963]).
However, Peirce's interpretation of the conditionals, though always
future in reference, subsequently became more realist still. In early
writings (eg., 7.340, c. 1873, and in 'How to make our ideas clear',
1878) Peirce adopts a weak interpretation of the conditional which, ac

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390 S. HAACK

cording to the pragmatic maxim, gives the meaning, as in

is hard if, if it is rubbed, it is not scratched. He even says t
absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft t
as they are not brought to the test (5.403, 1878) (6). Later
Peirce came to the conclusions (5.457, 1905) that it had
barous misuse' to deny that a diamond which is never rub
theless really hard :

I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I

was a mere question of convenience of speech whether we sa
diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we s
soft until it is pressed upon. I now say that experiment will pr
diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a real fact th
resist pressure, which amounts to extreme scholastic realism.(8.208,
1905)

Thus, he came to insist that the meaning of 'hard' is given by the sub
junctive conditional : 'if x were to be rubbed, it would, not be scratched'.
That, if it were to be rubbed, it would not be scratched, is a disposi
tion, habit, or would-be of the diamond ; the actual behaviour of the
diamond does not exhaust its dispositions : '... the will be's, the actually
is's, and the have been's are not the sum of the reals. They only cover
actuality. There are besides would be's and can be's that are real' (8. 216,
c. 1910). The point of moving from the indicative to the subjunctive
formulation is to allow that a diamond is hard even if it is never rub
bed ; and in consequence Peirce also regards the subjunctive con
ditional as requiring appeal to all possible rubbings and not just all ac
tual rubbings. In its subjunctive form, therefore, the maxim involves
an implicit appeal to possible but non-actual events.
It is in the context of arguing for the subjunctive version of the
maxim that Pierce observes that he goes beyond Scotus in denying the
contraction of the universal in the individual (8.208, c. 1905) ; for he
now claims that there is more to the habits of a thing than can be en
compassed by any statement about its behaviour on any number of ac
tual occasions. It is also now clear how his conception of the 'common

(6) This interpretation strongly resembles Carnap's 'reduction sentence' view of

disposition statements ; recognising that it is unacceptable to interpret the conditional as
straightforwardly material, Carnap resorts to conditionals of the more complex form — I
use his example — (x is placed in water x is soluble x dissolves). "Soluble' is undefined for
untested x.

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 391

nature' of a thing differs from Scoutus' idea of the common nature as

an essence.

The apparently phenomenalist character of the

formulation, noted by Murphey, also disappears
tings — as, in view of his move away from phen
expect. At 8.186 (c. 1903) the point emerges
curiously oblique way. The paper is a review of S
has a Body, which Peirce criticises for having ta
pragmatist position. The book has, however,
thoroughgoing phenomenalism', which, Peirce c
should think, to denote pragmatism'. But he
thoroughgoing phenomenalism' must be 'a pheno
which will involve the doctrine of immediate per
1905, where the point is put less obliquely).

4. James's nominalistic pragmatism.

Whereas Peirce came to insist on a strongly rea

the pragmatic maxim, James took pragmatism
spirit. James believed that the pragmatic maxim
thy nominalism, in virtue of its insistence that the
be given entirely in term of particular, practic
Peirce, James praises Berkely for his anticipa
unlike Peirce, he also praises him for his nom
James, I think, was temperamentally disposed
ticular (see the relish with which he quotes (Prag
Maxwell's complaint, when faced with 'vague,
'Yes, but I want you to tell me the particular go of
James's social philosophy was individualistic, i
emphasis on the community. James was more of
concerned with the monism/pluralism dicho
nominalism/realism issue ; but it seems that one
nominalism, for James, was precisely its plural
ticulars rather than uni versais, on the many r

(7) This is by no means the only time Peirce uses a philoso

sense — despite his 'ethics of terminology' ; cf. his use of 'ind
doubted'.

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392 S. HAACK

It is notable that James, no less than Peirce, stresse that pr

is scientific in character. But James's view of science would
with Peirce's or Abbot's ; it bears more resemblance to the v
say, Mach or Ostwald, to both of whom James refers with sy
(See Perry, 1954, pp. 150-1, 236). James's agreement with M
Ostwald, however, does not extend to an endorsement o
menalism about material objects (8) ; James holds that ordin
monsense objects are themselves perceived. (Cf. Madden an
barti, [1976], for a detailed examination of James's doctrine
experience').
In spite of his nominalistic interpretation of the pragmatist maxim,
James does not believe that pragmatism is opposed to abstractions as
such :

pragmatism has no objection whatever to the realising of abstractions, so

long as you get about among particulars by their aid. (1907, p. 57).
Later he offers an interesting analogy : it is as if we were fishes, with
particulars analogous to the water, in which alone we can live, and ab
stractions analogous to the air above the water, which is essential to
our life, and yet incapable of sustaining us directly :

... Let the water represent the world of sensible facts, and let the air
above it represent the world of abstract ideas. Both worlds are real, of
course, and interact ; but they interact only at their boundary, and the
locus of everything that lives, and happens to us, so far as full experience
goes, is the water, (pp. 89-90).

It is not surprising, given that James expressly claims that

pragmatism is nominalistic, that Peirce criticises him for his
nominalism. However, Peirce's and James's ontological attitudes are
not so radically opposed as this perhaps suggests. Peirce denies that
generals exist, and strenuously opposes that nominalistic platonism'
which makes universal into abstract particulars. His realism consists
primarily in the claim that generals are real. Andjames does not deny
the reality of 'abstractions'. In fact, James not only admits the reality

(8) It is of some interest that Peirce comments on the difference between his
pragmatism and Comte's positivism that the letter is a sort of phenomenalistic
pragmatism (5.428, 1905 ; 8.13a fT., the review of Pearson's The Grammar of Science, 1901 ;
review of Levy-Bruhl, The Philosophy of Auguste Comte, 1904.

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 393

of abstractions ; he also frequently stresses their enormous us

(cf. his comment that arrangements of things into kinds ena
'travel through the univers as if with seven-league boots
p. 119). The difference between Peirce and James, where ont
concerned, is not the one accepts, while the other denies, the
universals ; it is, rather, that Peirce denies that real universa
reduced to particulars, whereas James seems to think that,
sense, they can. This difference emerges plainly from
discussion of possibility ; applying his pragmatic maxim, he
that :

...a concretely possible chicken means : (1) that the idea of chicken con
tains no essential self-contradiction ; (2) that no boys, skunks or other
enemies are about ; and (3) that at least an actual egg exists. Possible
chicken means actual egg plus actual sitting hen, or incubator, or what
not. (p. 184).
The ontological disagreement between Peirce and James strikingly
resembles some modern disputes. First, Peirce connects a group of
notions : of kind, law, disposition, possibility, which subsequent writers
have also seen as related. Consider, for example, attempts to explain
the difference between lawlike and accidental generalisations by ap
peal to the formers' capacity to support counterfactuals ; appeal to
counterfactuals in explication of disposition statements ; appeal to
possibility to explicate counterfactuals. A significant feature of this
area, however, is that the appeal sometimes goes in one direction, and
sometimes in the other. Consider, for example, attempts to explain the
truth of countrfactuals as the derivability of their consequents from
their antecedents with the help of laws, and appeals to counterfactuals
to explain possibility. (According to Kripke, counterfactuals explain
possibility, according to D. K. Lewis, possible worlds explain coun
terfactuals). There seems to be a considerable degree of agreement
that these notions are intimately connected, but equally considerable
disagreement about which is fundamental.
Second, though Peirce's attitude to this group of notions is realist,
and James's nominalist, this doesn't mean that while Peirce holds that
there are real natural kinds, laws, dispositions, and possibilities,James
denies this. The difference is, rather, that, while Peirce holds them to
be irreducible, James believes that the real kinds, laws, dispositions,
possibilities can be reduced to particular, actual items. The disagree

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394 S. HAACK.

ment, that is, is not so much whether laws etc. are real, but wha
of thing they are. (This, as I have argued elsewhere — Haack A
often the structure of ontological disputes : consider the di
about numbers which hinge on the (ir)reducibility of numbers to
or disputes about the reality of material objects which hinge on
(ir)reducibilty to sense-data). I shall offer, shortly, some sugges
for at least a partial reconciliation of this disagreement. First, th
I want to sketch some applications of ideas developed in Peir
tological work to current disputes.

5. Some morals.

I believe that a good deal can be learned from the contrast be

Peirce's realistic and James's nominalistic versions of pragmatis
this concluding section I should like to offer some commen
inevitably sketchy, but I hope suggestive — applying some of th
of the previous sections to Qpine's views on ontology. I shall
with two applications of Peirce's ideas to Qjiine, and end with a
plication of Qpine's work to Peirce and James.
First, an extremely brief account of some of the main elemen
Qliine's ontological work. This work can be seen as the result of
central theses : his criterion of ontological commitment ('to be i
the value of a variable'), which tells one what a theory says the
and his standard of ontological acceptability ('no entity without
tity'), which tells one what ontological commitments are, and wh
not, tolerable. (See Qpine [1947].) Briefly, and roughly, Qjiine be
there to be those things which the optimal overall theory says
are. Qpine aims for ontological economy, in the sense that he w
not approve the positing of more things than are required
language adequate for science. And the 'optimal overall theo
'language adequate for science' represents a compromise between
desire for a rich enough language and the fear of an overblo
tology ; sometimes, as in the case of sets, Qyine allows an ontol
increment because he sees no way to achieve an adequate lan
without it ; sometimes, as in the case of possible worlds, he fin
proposed increment intolerable, and argues that it is not ne
Early on, Qjiine sympathised with nominalism (see Qyine and
man, [1947] ; later, he has come increasingly to allow abstract o

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 395

so long as they are extensional, as he has come to regard them as in

dispensable. It could be suggested, indeed, that Qjiine's ontological
development follows the course which Peirce recommends, of begin
ning with nominalism and moving towards realism in the face of
'irreconcilable facts'. Qpine's conception of realism, however, differs
interestingly from Peirce's.
(i) 'Nominalistic platonism'
One valuable aspect of Peirce's work, I think, is that it gives one
cause to wonder what, exactly, is meant by realism. It seems to me
plausible to think that the nominalist sympathies of many recent
writers can be attributed to a dislike rather of what Peirce calls
'nominalistic platonism' than of what he calls 'realism'. In Qyine's
case, it can be shown why it is natural for him to think of nominalistic
platonism as the alternative to nominalism. For consider how hisc
criterion locates ontological commitment in bound variables ; this
criterion is supported by the 'objectual' reading of the existential
quantifier, as 'there is at least one object such that... ', which in turn is
supported by the appeal to sequences of objects in Tarski's definitions
of satisfaction and truth. Now given this location of ontological com
mitment, and this interpretation of the quantifier, the only way to
commit oneself to the reality of properties, say, would be to adopt a
theory with some such theorems as 'OF) (... F ...)', and this would
commit one to the existence of abstract objects. (Cf. Qyine, [1953]. ).
And the view which makes real universals into existent, abstract ob
jects is just what Peirce calls 'nominalistic platonism'.
What is, I think, essentially the same point can be seen in another
way. Qyine insists that 'there are ...' (or '... exists', or '... is real') be
treated univocally, being explicated in terms of the existential quan
tifier. Peirce, by contrast, distinguishes existence and reality, as
(usually) different modes of being. Correspondingly, Qyine would
have to treat properties, if he admitted that there were any, as like in
dividuals, as objects, existing in the same sense. Peirce's distinction of
existence and reality allows him to admit universals while stressing
their difference from individuals.
In order to avoid ontological commitment to properties Qyine shuns
second-order quantification and treats the 'F', 'G'... etc. of first order
predicate calculus not as genuine variables but as 'schematic letters'.
Peirce would hold that one was already commited to the reality of

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396 S. HAACK

properties by allowing the truth of the instances of schema

'Ox) (Fx vFx)'. It is notable that Strawson also protests from
time, contra Qjiine, that he cannot see why one isn't already
to properdes in allowing the truth of, say, 'Mary is pretty an
witty', even before one resorts to second order quantifica
'Mary has all the properties desirable in a date'. It woul
altogether misleading, I think, to describe Strawson's position
in Peirce's sense. (Strawson, however, although he allows the r
universals, regards individuals as ontologically prior ; so he
extreme a realist as Peirce, who stresses universals over part
Their ideas a realist as Peirce, who stresses universals over par
Their ideas of priority also differ relevandy).
One well-known modern nominalist would, oddly enou
parently count as 'nominalistic platonist' by Peirce's standar
man takes the central claim of nominalism to be the thesis th
dividuals exist (or, are real), and the main effect of this is tha
settheoretical in favour of mereological constructions. He ha
jection to abstract entities, provided they are treated as indiv
fact, the atoms of the construction in The Structure of Appe
qualia, which are repeatable sensory qualities. (For further d
of some of the idiosyncrasies of Goodman's nominalism, see H
(ii) singular terms and the existence of individuals.
Q^iine believes that singular terms — definite descriptions
names, even demonstratives — are eliminable ; names and demon
stratives are to be replaced by co-referential definite descriptions, ar
tificially constructed along the lines of 'the x which socratises' if
necessary, and the definite descriptions are to be contextually defined
as in Russell's theory of descriptions. He uses the thsis of the
eliminability of singular terms as an argument for his criterion of on
tological commitment : ontology cannot reside in the singular terms,
since they are eliminable, and so must lie, instead, in the bound
variables. One odd feature of this line of argument is that, as Qjaine is
well aware, bound variables are also eliminable, in favour of com
binatory operators on predicates ; yet Qpine does not draw the conclu
sion that ontological commitment lies in the predicates. Anotheris that
while, in order to find a suitable co-referential predicate to form a
definite description from a name, Qpine has to resort to such artificial
predicates as 'socratises', he has also, in order to hold that the singular

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 397

term has genuinely been eliminated, to insist that these pr

though informally explained as meaning ' = a', where
corresponding name, are, strictly speaking, primitive and
able.
Now in Peirce the thesis of the existence of individuals is
connected with the admission of genuinely singular te
equivalent to any descriptive expression. Peirce argues
descriptive expression is less than fully determinate. Qyine
difficulty by means of artificial predicates ; but this is at t
being able to guarantee that they apply to just that item to
corresponding name refers only by means of an argument
peals to the equivalence of a-ises' to ' = a', an appeal whi
sistence that 'a-ises' is unanalysable makes anomalous. On
comparison with Strawson's position is instructive. Strawson
cepting the reality of universals, attributes ontological pri
dividuals ; and he also strenuously insists, contra Qpin
meliminability of singular terms. For his arguments for the
priority of individuals depends on the status of singula
paradigm logical subjects, which a reduction of singular
descriptive expressions would threaten.
(iii) dispositions.
Physicalist views in the philosophy of mind come in two
the behaviourist, which proposes to analyse apparent ref
mental states and processes in terms of overt behaviou
materialist, which proposes to identify mental with neuroph
states and processes. Analogously, one can distinguish two
'reductionism' about dispositions in general : the behaviour
would analyse the hardness of a diamond in terms of
behaviour, and the materialist, whiv would analyse the har
diamond in terms of its overt behaviour, and the materialis
would analyse it in terms of inner structure. These might
'outer' and 'inner' reductionism, respectively. Peirce's disag
with James concerns the feasibility of the outer redu
dispositions, about which, after his rejection of the 'red
tence' analysis of dispositions, Peirce is sceptical.
Qyine maintains a reductionis view of the second, inner k
of [1973], elfter a discussion of Ryle's treatment of disp
irreducible and Carnap's attempt to analyse dispositions via

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398 S. HAACK

reduction conditionals, Qjiine proposes the view that disposi

the inner molecular structures of the substances which poss
The usefulness of the dispositional idiom, according to Qjiin
the fact that we may not know what molecular structure, spe
disposition is ; while we are in ignorance of its specific char
dispositional idiom is an indispensible device for referr
commitally to whatever molecular structure is concerned. D
terms are thus, for Qpine, in principle eliminable from
language for a finished science, though indispensable in d
such a science. This avoids some difficulties in Qpine's
suggestion straight-forwardly to analyse, eg., 'x is soluble in
'(Ky) (y is like x in molecular structure and y dissolves', to wh
objected that there could be dispositions never manifested b
the things which possess them. See Qjiine, [i960], p. 224
[1974]. In [1974] Qjiine offers an account of the relation bet
outer and the inner approaches (') : the behavioural and the
are regarded as different levels of explanation, the latt
'deeper'. This is why Qyine regards disposidonal talk as indi
in the development of a theory, but dispensable, eventually,
of causal explanation in terms of micro-structure, in c
theory.
It might seem that Qpine's position could be regarded as analogous
to James's nominalist view of dispositions, and Mellor's to Peirce's
realist view. But Peirce manifests some sympathy with the idea that
dispositions might be identified with the inner structure of the things
which have them, at least in his discussion of the identification of
probabilities with propensities of dies, etc. And if these hints, which
are certainly quite consistent with his rejection of outer reductionism,
were developed, the upshot might be much like the view Qjiine
proposes. And such a development would also yield at least a par dal
reconciliation with James. Their disagreement would be, not whether
dispositions are reducible, but whether they are reducible to outer
behaviour, or to inner structure.

Princeton University/University of Warwick.

(9) The account Qpine offers applies to mental dispositions ; it is clear that he would
approve its extension to dispositions in general.

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 PRAGMATISM AND ONTOLOGY 399

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