Differences in Corporate Governance Structures From Country Perspectives
Differences in Corporate Governance Structures From Country Perspectives
Differences in Corporate Governance Structures From Country Perspectives
In the UK, the majority of public companies voluntarily abide by the Code of Best Practice on
corporate governance. It recommends there should be at least three outside directors and the
board chairman and the CEO should be different individuals.Japan’s corporate boards are
dominated with insiders and they are primarily concerned with the welfare of (parent company)
to which the company belongs.China has colossal corporate structures where businesses have
parent, grandparent and even great-grandparent companies. Each level has a board and
Communist Party officials usually have a seat. In India, the founding family members usually
hold sway over the board.
Korean manufacturers’ strategy is to grow as rapidly as possible and do this by borrowing money
from banks. As a result, the government holds sway over their corporate governance structure
through the banks. This relationship gives the Government influence over the company, while
the company has a say in government issues and Korean corporate governance.
Finally, the French corporate governance structure often attracts criticism for involving a
complex network of public sector organisations, large businesses and banks. However, this
ensures the French excel at collaborative projects between business and Government. For
example, France leads the world in the production of nuclear reactors and high-speed trains.
In all the perspectives corporate governance tries to ensure good governance that is conducive
for the shareholders, stakeholders, society, organization and for the economy at large along with
following repercussions:-
Reputation — good governance delivers good products, which, in turn, lead to good
business performance. The reputation of a company can make or break it in the market.
The need for a competent financial sector is important to stimulate and support economic growth
through efficient resource allocation. The financial system also enhances growth by pooling risks
and facilitating transactions (World Bank, 1989). The role of financial sector in economic growth
is even greater in developing countries as their tolerable margin of errors in resource allocation is
small1 . Different cross-country studies support the idea that countries with efficient and strong
financial markets experience higher rates of economic growth. As our banking sector have huge
impact on our economy so maintaining good governance of our financial institution is must. The
number of bank failures and financial crises during the last two decades raises questions on the
competency of the governance practices of the banking system. The undesirable banking
practices such as poor risk diversification, inadequate loan evaluation, fraudulent activities were
as much responsible as other macroeconomic factors in causing banking crises which shook the
financial systems of countries such as Bangladesh, Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, Philippines,
Spain, Thailand etc (Sundararajan and Balino, 1991). Winkler (1998) insists that the quality of
corporate governance of banking institutions determines the success of the financial
development. Absence of proper monitoring and control mechanism cripples the potential good
effect of financial development on the economic growth. The fact that banking companies are
allowed to collect deposit and utilize them for profit making activities, could create opportunities
of moral hazards.
Reference
Arun, T.G. and J. Turner (2002) ‘Public Sector Banks in India: Rationale and Prerequisites for
Reform’, Annal of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 73, No. 1.
Arun, T.G. and J. Turner (2003) ‘Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing Economies:
Concepts and Issues’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp.371-
377.
Beasley, M.S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review. 71 (4). 443-465