Pls 1502 Study Guide

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PLS1502/1/2018–2019
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Acknowledgement
I would like to acknowledge Mogobe B. Romosa for his contribution to previous editions of
this study guide.
Although every effort has been made to trace the copyright holders of quoted material,
this has not always been possible. Should any infringement have occured, the publisher
apologises and undertakes to amend the omission in the event of a reprint.
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CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION iv
Study unit 1: Defining African philosophy 1

1.1 Introduction and learning outcomes 1
1.2 The controversy of the term “Africa” 2
1.3 Africanity of African philosophy 7
1.4 Philosophicality of African philosophy 8
1.5 Summary 9
1.6 Primary reading – Imbo 11
1.7 Further Reading (see Appendix 1 for list of Readings) 11
Study unit 2: Discourses on Africa 12
2.2 The term “discourse” 12
2.3 Discourses on Africa 13
2.4 Prescribed readings 16
2.5 Further Reading (see list in Appendix 1) 22
Study unit 3: Trends in African philosophy 23
3.1 Introduction and outcomes 23
3.2 What is a trend? 23
3.3 The most general classification of African philosophy:
language 25
3.4 Wiredu’s classification 27
3.5 Nkombe and Smet’s classification of African philosophy 27
3.6 H Odera Oruka’s four trends in African philosophy 28
3.7 Conclusion 30
3.8 Further Reading (see Appendix 1) 30
Study unit 4: Philosophical anthropology 31
4.2 African cosmology 31
4.3 Two poles of African anthropology 32
4.4 Prescribed reading: Kwame Gyekye 33
4.5 Conclusion 37
Study unit 5: Morality in African thought 39
5.2 The distinction between morality and ethics 40
5.3 Prescribed readings: JAI Bewaji – “Ethics and morality
in the Yoruba culture” 41
5.4 Conclusion 43
PLS1502/1 (iii)
1 INTRODUCTION
Welcome to the module, Introduction to African Philosophy (PLS1502)!
We hope that you will find this course interesting, meaningful and challenging.
The PLS1502 module is offered by the Discipline of Philosophy, which forms part
of the Department of Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology, in the School
of Humanities at Unisa.
This is an introductory module to African philosophy. You are about to embark on

a study of philosophy arising from the African experience or focused upon it. We
wish to emphasise that this is African philosophy. In addition, it is philosophy proper
that you will be studying. It is therefore important that you adopt the only correct
attitude towards African philosophy, namely, that it is a field of study that demands
your serious intellectual attention, and will demand intellectual rigour from you.
1 OVERVIEW OF THE MODULE

This module will be useful to students of all disciplines of all colleges.
• Those who achieve this module will be able to think critically and creatively about
Africa and her experiences.
• Learners who enrol in this module will be introduced to a systematic reflection on
the African experience of the world.
• Introduction to African philosophy exposes learners to the history of the emergence
of African philosophy.
• Learners will explore critically what it means to be human in the African culture
and what constitutes “right” or “wrong” in the African experience.
OUTCOMES AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

Outcomes Assessment Criteria
• Learners will be able to understand • Attempt to answer the question: What is

and explain an inclusivist definition of (African) philosophy?
philosophy and correlate it with the • Analyse concepts such as Africa, African,
exclusivist definition. philosophy and African philosophy.
• Show that philosophising is a human
activity open to all rational animals in
the world.
• Learners will be able to identify, evaluate • Various criteria are used to decide who
and critique various criteria used for may qualify to be an African and who
delineating or describing who or what may not.
an African is. • Implications of transcending the
geographical space of Africa in defining
“African”.
(iv)
• Learners will be able to identify and • Various approaches and trends to African
critique the different approaches and philosophy are analysed in order to
trends to African philosophy attempt a comprehensive understanding
of African philosophy.
• Compare and contrast different
approaches to African philosophy
• Learners will be able to understand • Different moral values and norms are
and explain the African conceptions of discussed from an African perspective.
“morality” and “a person,” and contrast • Some theories of “man” from an African
them to the Western conceptions. perspective are critically evaluated.
• Comparisons are drawn between African
and Western conceptions of “man” and
“morality.”
Link with other modules
BREAKDOWN OF MODULE
This module consists of two parts. Part one deals with African philosophy and its
scope and trends, and has three study units. Part two deals with issues and themes
in African philosophy and has two chapters.
• Study unit 1 explores the term “African philosophy’ in its particularity and
universality. It specifically problematises the term “Africa”, showing how the term
is imposed from outside and not used self-referentially by the so-called Africans.
• Study unit 2 critically analyses some of the discourses on Africa. It exposes the
ethnocentrism, especially the Eurocentrism endemic in discourses about Africa
and Africans. It then proposes how African and Western philosophical discourses
can coexist.
• Study unit 3 outlines various trends and approaches adopted by African
philosophers in the study of the discipline of African philosophy.
• Study unit 4 discusses philosophical anthropology. This is discourses on what
it means to be a human being in the African culture and traditions. The chapter
focuses specifically on the communitarian dimension of being a person in the
African culture.
• Study unit 5 discusses morality in African thought. It describes broad principles
on what it means to be a good and bad person.
PLS1502/1 (v)
The diagram below gives a schematic overview of our module:
PART I
African philosophy and its
scope and trends
Study unit 1 Study unit 3

Study unit 2
Defining African Trends in African
Discourses on Africa
philosophy philosophy
PART II
Issues and themes in African
philosophy
Study unit 4 Study unit 5

Philosophical Morality in African
anthropology thought
Link with other modules
This module links up with two other modules in our discipline, namely, African
Ethics and Politics (PLS2602) and Advanced African Philosophy (PLS3703).
The module is placed at the very beginning of modules in African philosophy. It
forms the overall introduction to African philosophy. Accordingly, some of the
themes introduced in this module will be discussed in some detail in PLS2602 and
PLS3703. However, this does not suggest that PLS1502 is an overall prerequisite for
registering for PLS2602 and PLS3703 by all students. But students who take African
philosophy as a major subject need to follow these modules in a progressive order.
(vi)
1 STUDY UNIT 1
1 Defining African philosophy
1.1 Introduction and learning outcomes

African philosophy must be studied within the broader context of world philosophies.
There are different kinds of philosophies in the world, namely: African, Arabic,
Chinese, Indian, Western and many others.
However, this module focuses on African philosophy. We are going to show in this
chapter that what makes philosophy African, among other things, is the African
experience from which African philosophy proceeds. In other words, African experi-
ence forms a “pre-text” of this philosophy. Hence a minimum knowledge of African
History will be an added advantage in the study of African philosophy. Please note
that we will not confine the term “Africa” or “African” to its geographical meaning.
This implies that for our purpose, “Africans” are people located in the continent of
Africa and in diaspora.
There are numerous and varied ways to approach the question, “What is African
philosophy”? Based on linguistic considerations, the term “African philosophy” sug-
gests that “African Philosophy is, at the same time, basically philosophical and typically
African” (Osuagwu, vol 4:28). But what do the two words, namely, “philosophical”
and “African” mean? It is the purpose of this chapter to explore the meanings of the
two component parts of the term “African Philosophy” and to illustrate that they
bear, respectively, the particular and universal dimensions of Philosophy. Further,
in this chapter we also seek to problematise the term “Africa” by arguing that the
term was imposed on Africans by explorers of Africa.
PLS1502/1 1
LEARNING OUTCOMES
When you have completed this chapter, you should be able to:
(a) Uncover assumptions about Africa and her people as conceived by some
Europeans.
(b) Critique ethnocentrism in general and Eurocentrism in particular.
(c) Interrogate the populist and exclusivist definition of philosophy.
(d) Interrogate the meaning of the term “Africa” in its historical context.
(e) Underscore the problematic of “names” and “naming”.
(f) Explore the complexities of “African identity”.
(g) Give the most basic definition of African philosophy.
1.2 The controversy of the term “Africa”

The linguistic, historical and philosophical meaning of the term “Africa” and “Af-
rican” in its adjectival form is by no means beyond dispute. The nature and signifi-
cance of the dispute are not just simple matters of academic curiosity that so often
solidifies into academism that we often find in academic sphere. On the contrary,
the nature and significance of the dispute ultimately pertains to questions of natural
and historical justice. For this reason the term “Africa” must be problematised, in
spite of its popularity in everyday usage. The indigenous peoples of the continent
designated geographically as “Africa” may therefore not take it for granted whenever
others refer to them as “Africans”, or when they refer to themselves as such.
Think about why the term “Africa” might be controversial. Have you ever thought about problema-
tising the name of the continent?
If you haven’t, take a few minutes to reflect on the history of the continent, using the following questions:
• Who named the continent?

• What influenced the naming of the continent?
• What is the connotation, today, of the term “Africa”?”
Although the geographical meaning of the term “Africa” is widely accepted as settled,
questions and problems arise as soon as expressions such as “Arab Africa”, “Maghreb
Africa” or “sub-Saharan Africa” are used. These expressions manifest the historical
meaning of Africa as well as indicate the multiple dimensions of the term “Africa”.
Let us now turn to one way in which the term “Africa” can be examined, namely,
as the name of a geographical location.
It is reasonable to accept the geographical meaning of “Africa”: Africa, from the

geographical point of view, does not mean Asia, Latin America, Europe, North
America or the Middle East. Yet the reasonableness of accepting the geographical
meaning is questionable on two grounds:
• The first point of contention that we can raise is that from the point of view of
natural history. We learn that all the continents of our planet Earth were once
a single, compact, undivided whole, called Pangea. According to geologists, our
planet with its geographical divisions did not always exist as such. The geographical
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divisions evolved over millennia. At a particular point in the course of the
evolutionary process the separation into the various continents of the Americas,
Africa, Asia and Europe (as well as numerous islands) occurred by natural means.
Not nature as such, but human beings – though part of nature too – gave specific
names to the continents, which leads us to our second point of contention.
• The naming of the continents is therefore the second ground on which we may
question the reasonableness of accepting the geographical meaning of “Africa”.
This ground forms the bridge between understanding the term “Africa” as a
purely geographical term and the historical meaning of “Africa”. In the course of
political and social history human beings gave names to various African regions,
which were changed from time to time. For example Northern Rhodesia was
renamed Zambia, Tanganyika was renamed Tanzania, Southern Rhodesia was
renamed Zimbabwe, South West Africa was renamed Namibia, but South Africa
was not renamed Azania. The point is to introduce you to the idea that the study
of the natural sciences does to some extent help explain why certain changes
occurred at a particular time, why they will recur or why they will not happen
again. The study of the human sciences – and, for our purposes, political and social
history in particular – explains why, for example, the Kingdom of Basutoland
was renamed Lesotho. Accordingly, the geographical meaning of “Africa” must
be complemented by the historical meaning.
From the above it is reasonable to suspect that perhaps the name “Africa” arose at
a particular time under specific historical circumstances. Regarding the historical
meaning, we read the following:
In antiquity, the Greeks are said to have called the continent Libya and the Romans
Africa, perhaps from the Latin aprica (sunny), or the Greek aphrike (without cold). The
name Africa, however, was chiefly applied to the northern coast of the continent, which was
in effect regarded as a southern extension of Europe. The Romans, who for a time ruled
the North African coast, are also said to have called the area south of their settlements,
Afriga, or the Land of the Afrigs – the name of a Berber community south of Carthage.
Another explanation occasionally offered is that the name applied to a productive region
of what is now Tunisia meant Ears of Corn. The word Ifriqiyah is apparently the Arabic
transliteration of Africa (“Encyclopaedia Britannica” 1974:117).
From this citation we note three things:
First, the Mediterranean provided a platform for cultural interaction between and
among the Romans and the Greeks and the peoples of what was later to be called
North Africa. It was also the platform for cultural interaction between and among
the Romans and the Greeks, the peoples of “North Africa” and the Arabs. It is in
the course of this cultural interaction in the Mediterranean cultural space that the
name Africa emerged; first with regard to the northern part of the continent only
and later applied to the whole continent as it is today.
Secondly, in terms of the interaction and relations between the Greeks and the
Romans on the one hand and the peoples of “North Africa” on the other, it is clear
that the name “Africa” is a description of the Greek and Roman experiences of the
continent’s climate. In view of the Roman “rule” of “North Africa” and the “set-
tlements” the Romans had established there, it is reasonable to infer that the name
Africa was not given by the continent’s indigenous, conquered inhabitants. On the
contrary, it is a description based initially on the Roman conquest – “Carthago
delenda est”, Carthage has been destroyed – of “North Africa”. (Does the name of
the Roman general Scipio Africanus come to mind?) Over time, this description
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became part of the everyday vocabulary of the peoples of southern Europe. It later
spread to other parts of Western Europe, including England. The conquest of Africa
through the unjust wars of colonisation then reaffirmed this description, making it
possible to speak of Africa as if it comprised only one ethnic group of people hav-
ing a single common culture. The name Africa therefore ought to be questioned.
According to Ali Mazrui (1986:25, 29, 38):
[T]he name Africa may have originally been either Semitic or Greco-Roman ... [T]he
application of the name in more recent centuries has been due almost entirely to Western
Europe. ... [W]e should question Europe’s decisions about boundaries of Africa and the
identity of Africans.
Names and naming comprise one of the on-going problems about the identity of
Africa. Most African countries changed their names at independence – for example
Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. This name changing illustrates the on-going
problem. The situation that gave rise to the name changing is comparable to that of
a child who lived for a long time with foster parents who deliberately and system-
atically concealed the fact that they were not the child’s biological parents. Surely,
when the child ultimately discovers its biological parents, its relationship with the
foster parents will change for better or worse? The same is true of its relationship
with its newly discovered biological parents. The term “Africa”, applied to the entire
continent, could have had a different significance if the “Afrigs” were responsible
for its reference to the entire continent. Against this background, the discovery that
“Africa” is not only a description by an outsider but also an imposition by the same
outsider generates many problems. One of the problems is that it is rather funny
that the study of “African” philosophy simply means the study of “sunny” or solar
philosophy! No doubt anyone interested in the impact of a climate “without cold”
on the philosophy of a people living in such a climate may propound a theory about
that climate. But this is not the same thing as the philosophy expressed by the peo-
ples of this climatic region in their own right. In other words, it is one thing to talk
about the philosophy of the Bantu, the San or the Akan peoples and quite another
to theorise on solar philosophy. This is not an idle point because some of the critics
of “African” philosophy argue that it is impossible to speak of such a philosophy,
precisely because the peoples of Africa belong to complex and diverse ethnic groups.
Of course, the critics take the meaning of the term “Africa” for granted, whereas
we in this instance do not. Similarly, they accept the term “European” philosophy
or the “European” Union at face value.
Thirdly, the term “Africa” speaks more of the West European historical experience
with the peoples of the continent and much less of these peoples’ experience of their
own self-understanding. In other words, the history of “Africa” is mainly the history
of the West European experience of “Africa” and only incidentally the story of the
peoples of the continent about themselves. Let us take one example to illustrate this.
In the sixth volume of Encyclopaedia Britannica (1974:461) under the rubric “History
of Egypt” we read:
The Eg yptians were a practical people, and they reveal through the products of their arts
and crafts their particular genius. In classical times these early Eg yptians were also credited
by the Greeks with great knowledge and wisdom; but the evidence provided by Eg yptian
writings does not support this Greek opinion. It is probable that Greek travellers in Eg ypt,
impressed by the grandeur and antiquity of the monuments of the land and misled by the
accounts of past ages given to them by their priestly guides, grossly misinterpreted the evidence
4
and jumped to unwarranted conclusions. Unlike the Greeks, the Eg yptians were not philo-
sophically inclined, intellectually inquisitive, or prone to theorising ...
First, the author here contradicts “Greek opinion” on facts which he or she does not
care to bring to light – except to refer to them vaguely as “Egyptian writings”. The
second problem is that not only “Greek travellers” visited and sojourned in Egypt,
but also people from other parts of the world. Nor was it only the “priestly guides”
who passed on information about Egyptian “knowledge and wisdom”. In fact, some
of the “priestly guides” actually received their priestly training from the Egyptians.
For this they had to stay in Egypt for much longer than a fleeting visit. Aristotle, by
his own admission (Metaphysics 1.1981b:14–24), acknowledged the Egyptian origin
of the sciences of mathematics and astronomy. Apparently, it is testimony like this
which the author of the entry cited either ignores deliberately or denies. He or she is
by no means alone in this approach. Even Copleston, a towering figure in the history
of Western philosophy, has shown similar disregard and implicit denial of first-hand
testimony from the ancient Greeks. Commenting on this, Osuagwu (1999:87, 94,
95, 96) argues thus:
Copleston totally rejects a historical and scientific African philosophy of ancient Black
Eg ypt and its subsequent influence on and relation with early Greek philosophy ... F.C.
Copleston (1907–1985), an American Catholic clerg yman, is a typical 20th century Eu-
ropean representative of the view which denies and severs all historical philosophical links of
ancient Eg ypt with Greece and Rome ... Furthermore, Copleston would not accept even the
personally documented testimonies of the ancient Greek philosophers ... If Copleston ignores
the personal and first hand literary testimonies of ancient Greek philosophers, he would
certainly be less ready to accept the secondary reports of later past authors like Herodotus ...
It goes without saying that the author of the encyclopaedia entry just cited falls
within the same category as Copleston. Both the entry in Encyclopaedia Britannica and
Copleston’s rejection, denial, disregard or even misinterpretation of ancient black
Egypt arrogate philosophy and reason exclusively to the West. The will to appro-
priate impels the author of the Encyclopaedia Britannica entry to assign “wisdom” but
not thought or reason to ancient black Egypt. The same will to appropriate reason
permits the author to give himself or herself the licence to ascribe, later in the same
paragraph of the above citation, “magic” to the body of knowledge of ancient black
Egypt. This will to appropriate reason as the exclusive quality and right of the West-
ern European is one of the robust pillars of Western philosophy.
Aristotle’s definition of the human being as “a rational animal” seems to have inspired
the philosophy of colonisation and has survived decolonisation. In effect, the no-
tion that humanity is exclusively Western is alive in our time, although in somewhat
more subtle manifestations. Please study Ramose’s essay “The struggle for reason
in Africa” (2002) against this background.
Once you have worked through the second learning unit entitled “Discourses on
Africa”, you will understand why and how some people still continue to raise one
or both of the following questions:
• Is there an African philosophy?

• Can there be an African philosophy?
In his celebrated essay on these questions in relation to Latin America, and indeed
colonised peoples the world over, Bondy has argued that these are by no means
empirical questions. On the contrary, they are based on doubt that the African, the
PLS1502/1 5
Amerindian and the Australasian are also genuine and authentic members of the
“rational animal” category. Bondy (1986:240–243) argues:
Where is the cause, the determining complex of this condition of Hispanic America as an
entity and also of each of its constituent nations? If we are aware that this condition is not
peculiar to Hispanic American countries, but is largely similar to that of other communities
and regional groups of nations, belonging to what today is called the Third World, then it is
clear that, to explain it, we must utilize the concept of underdevelopment, with the correla-
tive concept of domination. ... Philosophy in Hispanic America has a possibility of being
authentic in the midst of the unauthenticity that surrounds and consumes it, and to convert
itself into the lucid awareness of this condition and into the thought capable of unleashing
the process to overcome it. It must be a mediation about our anthropological status and from
our own negative status, with a view to its cancellation. Consequently, Hispanic American
philosophy has before it – as a possibility of its own recuperation – a destructive task that,
in the long run, will be destructive to its current form. It must be an awareness that cancels
prejudice, myths, idols; an awareness that will awaken us to our subjection as peoples and our
depression as men. In consequence, it must be an awareness that liberates us from the obstacles
that impede our anthropological expansion, which is also the anthropological expansion of
the world. It must be, in addition, a critical and analytical awareness of the potentialities
and demands of our affirmation as humanity.
You should read works such as the following in the light of this argument: The African
origin of civilization (Diop 1974), The African origin of Greek philosophy (Onyewuenyi 1993),
Philosophie Africaine de la periode Pharaonique 2780–330 avant notre êre (Obenga 1990),
Great African thinkers (Van Sertima 1984), Black women in antiquity (Van Sertima 1986),
Black Athena (Bernal 1991), and Black Athena: ten years after (Van Binsbergen 1997).
As mentioned above, you will find full bibliographical details of these publications
in the list of references at the end of this study guide. It is important to note that
Onyewuenyi, Cheikh Anta Diop, Obenga and especially Osuagwu take the meaning
of the term “science” for granted. Yet it is precisely “science” that gave rise to the
problems in African history in general and the history of philosophy in particular. It
is therefore necessary to examine the meaning of “science” as a prelude to espousing
the African perspective on history in general and the history of philosophy in par-
ticular. For example, “science” is not “neutral”, as it purports to be. Nor is it entirely
“objective” and free of attachment to specific values. In the light of this, to take the
concept of “science” for granted means admitting there is nothing problematic about
the definition of “science” by others on behalf of Africa. Once this admission is
made, by assuming the concept of “science” is unproblematic, it is clear that African
philosophy is yearning for some space – to be integrated into the already existing
body of “science”. Its philosophers demand to be allowed to do “science” just like
those who defined it on behalf of Africans. But this is contrary to the demand to
speak for oneself in one’s own right. Therefore we need to critically examine the
meaning of “science” and determine its meaning according to the exigencies of the
African experience as a critique of the concept of “science”. We may extract two
crucial points from the preceding paragraph. One is that, for Bondy, the affirmation
of our “humanity” means that the question “Can there be a Latin American philoso-
phy?”, or, for that matter, “Can there be an African philosophy?” is pre-eminently
an ontological, not an empirical question. It is predicated on the premise that the
defect in the ontology of the Amerindian, the African and the Australasian lies in
the putative fact that, by their very nature, these peoples do not qualify for the status
of “rational animal”. A counter to this is indeed the ethical/political imperative to
6
affirm their humanity, which is to leave no doubt that any ontological defect stands
in the way of these peoples to qualify as “rational animals”.
Another point is that the disregard, rejection or misrepresentation of the histories

and cultures of the indigenous peoples of the continent known today as Africa points
out a problem with the writing and presentation of “African” histories and cultures.
This is the problem pertaining to historiography, the writing and presentation of
history. The problem here is that the standard of “objectivity” was not allowed to
prevail. Instead, it was subjected to the writers’ interests. The result was and, to a
very large extent remains, the disfigurement and distortion of the image and identity
of the indigenous peoples of the continent known today as Africa. This aspect is
discussed, for example, in the introduction as well as the first chapter of the first
volume of UNESCO’s eight-volume General history of Africa (1978–1993). The point
of the discussion is to underline the need to deal with the disfigurement as well as
the distortion of the African identity. It is, in other words, the recognition of the
ethical-political duty to put the record straight by assuring that the indigenous peo-
ples speak for themselves in their own right. On this basis it may not be necessary
to abolish the term “Africa”. The retention of the term shall, however, not exclude
specific foci such as the Rwandan Bantu Philosophy of Being, the Akan Conceptual
Scheme, the Yoruba Concept of a Person, the Human Person and Immortality in
Ibo Metaphysics, and the philosophy of Ubuntu.
1.3 Africanity of African philosophy

The Africanity of African philosophy refers to the specificity or particularity of
philosophy. Africanity is a set of characteristics that distinguish African philosophy
from Western or India or Chinese philosophies.
According to Osuagwu (African historical reconstruction, vol 1:30) Africanity of African

philosophy includes the “geo-ethno-technological” factors. These factors of Afri-
canity refer to a set of members: to the person, place, time event or actions, culture,
language, doctrine and method, involved in the philosophic enterprise (ibid).
In other words, what makes philosophy African is a variety of factors. Osuagwu

then identifies four factors:
(a) The ethno-African: identifies an African author or authors by origin or nature,

by birth, ancestry, tribe, physiology, colour, and culture.
(b) The geo-temporal African: qualifies the African space and time within which
African philosophy is typically occurring. The African geo-temporality is by
immediate physical placement within the African continent, or by remote
spatial presence anywhere else where the African finds himself or itself.
(c) The lego-African: qualifies and expatriate author or issue which becomes Af-
rican by virtue of a civil, an ecclesiastical or academic law which empowers
or mandates him or it.
(d) The techno-African: identifies an expatriate African who becomes an African
philosopher by interest or preoccupation, enterprise, research, literature,
doctrine undertaken or produced. It clearly identifies any work produced as
African philosophy (ibid:30–31).
PLS1502/1 7
Another African author who has made us to think about what it means to be African
is Professor Ali Mazrui. In the newspaper article in the Daily Monitor (Dec. 12, 2009),
Mazrui distinguishes between two types of Africans:
We must distinguish between Africans of the blood and Africans of the soil. Africans of the
blood are defined in racial and genealogical terms; they are identified with the black race.
Africans of the soil, on the other hand, are defined in geographical terms; they are identified
with the Africans continent in nationality and ancestral location.
Mazrui identified two more categories of Africans:
However, most Ghanaians, Nigerians and Ugandans are both Africans of the blood, genea-
logically belonging to the African race, and Africans of the soil, geographically located in, or
belonging to, the African continent … F.W. de Klerk and other white South Africans are
Africans of the soil by adoption. This also applies to East Africans of Indian or Pakistani
ancestry. They are indeed Africans of the soil by adoption (ibid).
It would have been more helpful had Mazrui clarified further on the last class of
Africans. Nonetheless his four classes give some food for thought. Do you agree
with him on the four classes? Substantiate your position.
According to Osuagwu, any philosopher or any philosophy influenced by one or more of the factors
above, qualifies to be regarded as African. Do you agree with him? Why do you agree? Alterna-
tively, why do you disagree?
Do you agree with Mazrui’s classification of “classes of Africans”? Why? Why not?
Summary table of classes of Africans:
Osuagwu Mazrui
Ethno-African Africans of the blood

Spatio-temporal African Africans of the soil
Lego-African Africans of both the blood and the soil
Techno-African Africans of the soil by adoption
1.4 Philosophicality of African philosophy

Let us now look at the term “philosophy”. The term “philosophy” is derived from
the Greek language, philosophia which means literally the love of wisdom. The fact
that this particular term is derived from the Greek language does not necessarily
mean philosophy originated in Greece. Chinese philosophy and ancient Egyptian
philosophy, for example, are known to be much older than the philosophy that is
specifically associated with Greece and that has since come to be known as Western
philosophy. By this observation we wish to underline the point of the origin of the
term philosophy, especially as a particular historical tradition.
First, it is important to recognise that to be genuine lovers of wisdom we must pay

attention to and question every experience. Questioning experience involves the
attitude of not taking knowledge and truth claims for granted. Instead, these are
questioned so that they proffer arguments for support. For the philosopher, argu-
mentation – in the form of the specialist study of logic – is as necessary as water is
to fish. Argumentation is actually necessary for every branch of study. The lawyer,
8
for example, must engage in argumentation not just because it is interesting to ar-
gue. On the contrary, the lawyer is interested in argumentation as a means to the
particular end of resolving disputes as justly and equitably as possible. Similarly, the
philosopher’s interest in and involvement with argumentation is intended to ascertain
that the knowledge and truth claims that we make are justified and reliable. This is
vitally important because it is imprudent to base our lives on untested knowledge
and truth claims. Also, it is certainly not wise to actually conduct our day-to-day
lives on the basis of untested knowledge and truth claims.
Philosophy then, properly understood, is the love of wisdom – if you translate

philosophy from the original Greek, it literally means “the love of wisdom”. This
means the quest to attain reliable knowledge and to act out such knowledge in rel-
evant situations of practical life, is of vital importance when doing philosophy. So the
wisdom of philosophy resides in knowledge based on argumentation pertaining to
the why, the what, and the how of experience. Understood in this way, philosophy is
necessarily part of being a human being – as an individual and as part of a group. Of
course, the problem arises as soon as the term “philosophy” assumes the restricted
meaning of a scientific or professional discipline. The definition and meaning of
philosophy in this context continues to be contentious among and between various
philosophies, especially the African and the Western philosophies. This is precisely
the context as well as the underlying theme running through this module.
Contrary to the view expressed above, Osuagwu (African historical reconstruction, vol
1:29) holds that the philosophicality of African philosophy makes African philosophy
a strictly formal and scientific discipline. He argues as follows:
(a) African philosophy ought to be formally understood and undertaken.

(b) It should be a systematic and critical enterprise of the human reason in the interpretative
search and discovery of the primordial and essential or substantial meaning of things as they
are in themselves.
(c) It must be undertaken, first and foremost, by professional individuals or groups for whom
philosophy is a community agenda for a community purpose.
Osuagwu holds that “[philosophy] must be undertaken, first and foremost, by professional individu-
als or groups for whom philosophy is a community agenda for a community purpose”. Do you agree
with Osuagwu? Why or why not?
1.5 Summary
Strictly speaking, what African philosophy is, depends on the trend or approach that
one is following. We will elaborate on this in chapter 3 of this study guide. Be that as
it may, it is worth attempting at least a minimalist definition of African philosophy.
According to Kwasi Wiredu, a Ghanaian philosopher, African philosophy must

be distinguished from African traditional worldviews. When this has been done,
then African philosophy is the philosophy that is being produced by contemporary
African philosophers (Wiredu 1980:36). Because of this, it is still in the making.
This implies that as a formal and academic discipline, African philosophy is recent.
To be more precise, African philosophy is post-colonial. However, this does not
mean that in the pre-colonial period there was no philosophising taking place in the
African continent. Study unit 3 of this study guide will throw more light on this in
the discussion of Trends of African philosophy.
PLS1502/1 9
Tsenay Serequeberhan, an Eritrean philosopher, gives a more concrete definition
of African philosophy. He argues that the focal point of African philosophy must
be “… Africa’s own lived historicality and broken heritage/tradition” (in African
philosophy: the essential readings [1991:13]). He further argues that such a philosophy
must be textually based:
In other words, the literature of African philosophy is a body of texts produced by

Africans (and non-Africans) directed at philosophically engaging African problems
and/or documenting the philosophies of African peoples (ibid).
Serequeberhan’s conception of African philosophy emphasises the following:
(a) African philosophy is philosophy if it is written. Thus, orality cannot be phi-

losophy. This point raises eye-brows especially for those of us who are familiar
with the Western philosopher, Socrates, who presented his philosophy orally.
(b) African philosophy should not be abstract. It should reflect on verities of his-
tory in an attempt to resolve and explain problems experienced.
(c) Authorship of African philosophy is broader. It is open to non-Africans. In
consideration that we live in a globalised world, this point makes more sense.
It also corroborates Osuagwu’s criteria for determining an African philoso-
pher (see 1.4 above).
Serequeberhan’s definition of African philosophy is closer to Paulin Hountondji’s.

Hountondji is one of the most prominent Francophone African philosophers, and
one of the most prolific writers on African philosophy. He is also one of the earliest
and one of the severest critics of ethno-philosophy. He describes African philosophy
as “a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described as
philosophical by the authors” (in Alienated literature). The difference between Houn-
tondji and Serequeberhan revolves around the authorship of African philosophy.
Hountondji limits the authorship of African philosophy to Africans alone while
Serequeberhan keeps it open to non-Africans as well.
In conclusion we can say that African philosophy is a systematic search for truth
and meaning arising from Africa’s experience of reality. We must bear in mind that
African experience does not make philosophy any less rigorous or scientific. It simply
particularises or localises philosophy. In this chapter we attempted to define African
philosophy, by looking at, firstly, the controversy regarding the term “Africa”. This
then led us to think about the Africanity of African philosophy, which necessitated
that we also look at the philosophicality of African philosophy. In the next chapter,
called “Discourses on Africa”, we will look how Africans and non-Africans have
discussed Africa, and the people that reside in Africa. In particular, we will gain a
better understanding of ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism.
Hountondji’s definition of African philosophy may be problematised as follows:
• Who are Africans?

* Hountondji does not supply us with criteria for identifying who an African is.
• Why does he confine philosophy to written texts only?

* Does this mean Socrates (the early Greek philosopher) was not a philosopher, as he did not
write anything?
How do you think Hountondji can answer these problems?
10
1.6 Primary reading – Imbo
Your prescribed reading for this study unit is an extract from a chapter by Samuel
Imbo, with the title, How is African philosophy to be defined?
Please read this extract carefully.
SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS
Please go to the “Self-assessments” tab on the left of your myUnisa page
and complete these self-assessment questions for study unit 1. These ques-
tions will not be marked, but will be useful for your own revision.
(1) Does the idea of solar philosophy make sense?

(2) Does it make sense to retain the term “Africa” even though it was initially an
imposition?
(3) Critically assess Osuagwu’s definition of an African.
(4) What do you think of Mazrui’s definition of an African? Where do you agree
and disagree with him?
(5) Summarise in your own words, the meaning of the term “philosophy”?
(6) What are the different branches of philosophy?
(7) What is post-modernism? How does post-modernism criticise Western
philosophy?
(8) Give a definition of African philosophy.
(9) Summarise in your own words some of the “politics” of defining African
philosophy.
(10) What is the meaning of the question: “Can there be an African philosophy”?
1.7 Further Reading (see Appendix 1 for list of Readings)
PLS1502/1 11
2 STUDY UNIT 2
2 Discourses on Africa

In this unit, the philosophical arguments on and about Africa and Africans are dis-
cussed. These arguments can also be seen as constitutive of discourses on Africa.
In fact, this unit can be seen as a defence of the existence and the reasonableness of
African philosophical thinking. Furthermore, the myths and ideological justification
of the inhumanity of the Africans is rebutted. The chapter deals with the work of two
eminent African philosophers, namely Emevwo A Biakolo and Mogobe B Ramose.
These two scholars are critical of Eurocentrism in the evaluation of African thinking.
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(a) Uncover assumptions about Africa and her people conceived by some
Europeans.
(b) Critique ethnocentrism in general and Eurocentrism in particular.
(c) Understand cross-cultural categories for cognition that are often used to dis-
tinguish the African way of being from the European way of being.
(d) Understand and appreciate that rationality is a gift that cuts across cultures.
2.2 The term “discourse”

To understand this section you need to understand the key term, “discourse”. Dic-
tionary definitions alone will not suffice for a proper understanding of this term.
You should, however, see dictionary definitions as important clues in helping you to
acquire a satisfactory understanding of this term – and indeed any other term that
you come across. A proper understanding of a concept involves at least two elements:
meaning as content and meaning in context. Let us explain.
In the first instance, we understand meaning as content. The Merriam-Webster Diction-

ary gives several meanings of the term “discourse”. (You choose to search for the
meaning of discourse because you know that it is the singular form of “discourses”.)
These meanings are: (1) “the capacity of orderly thought or procedure; rationality:
(2) verbal interchange of ideas; conversation: (3) formal and orderly and usually
extended expression of thought on a subject.”1 The question that arises from the
dictionary definition is this: Which of the three meanings is most appropriate to use
when philosophically discussing the discourses that take place about Africa? It might
be useful to use a subject dictionary to get a good idea of what the word “discourse”
means in a philosophical context. According to the Dictionary of critical theory, discourse
can be understood as “[a] specific form of language use shaped and determined by
1 This defi nition can be found in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary at <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/discourse>
12
situational rules and context … In critical theory, it is Michel Foucault who has done
the most to develop this concept. In his work, discourse is expanded to include the
operation of power: Foucault asks who has the right to use a particular discourse,
what benefits accrue to them for using it, how is its usage policed, and where does
it derive its authority from?” (Bunchanan 2010).
We can thus see that discourse is not simply what is said about a certain topic, or the
ideas that people have about a particular subject. Discourse carries power – those
who control the discourse, control what people believe about those subjects.
Of the different meanings provided above, the last two are the most appropriate to
use in a philosophical context. In this unit, therefore, we discuss the formal, orderly
and extended debates that occur around Africa and try do understand the power
relations that arise from this discourse. You are thus in a position to understand and
expect that in reading this section you will discover and learn about philosophical
arguments focused on Africa.
How do you understand the word “discourse”? Some of the synonyms of the word are “dialogue”,
“conversation” and “debate”.
Now, think about what you have learnt in the first unit of this study guide. Reflect on the possible
discourse that might arise from “conversations” about Africa.
2.3 Discourses on Africa

In this unit, we focus our attention of post-colonial African philosophy. Post-colonial
African philosophy is built on the premise that knowledge of and the truth about
Africa is experienced by Africans, and therefore ought to be understood by Africans
themselves. During colonialisation, the non-African colonisers often constructed
distorted and unreal images of Africans. These unreal images contained false, one-
dimensional ideologies of Africans and, problematically, some of these ideas are still
pervasive after the end of colonialism.
In this unit, we will focus on both the content and the structure of the various essays
so that the content illuminates the structure of the argument and the structure in
turn explains the content. In other words, the content will be clarified in the light
of the structure and the structure will be explained on the basis of the content. It
should be clear then that we do not intend to give you just a summary of the vari-
ous essays. In pursuit of our approach we will pose questions designed to help you
understand the issues involved. We now turn to our prescribed readings.
Post-colonial philosophy, then, emphasises the necessity of Africans exercising
their right to speak for themselves and construct their own identities, as opposed
to being defined by the often distorted or unreal images portrayed without their
consent by non-Africans. In expressing knowledge and proclaiming the truth about
Africa, Africans question similar claims and proclamations. African thinkers test
the truthfulness of knowledge claims and imagined truths about Africa presented by
non-Africans. In some cases they actually show such claims and truths to be false.
This means then that the two essays (of Biakolo and Ramose) discussed in this
chapter must be understood as a dialogue between Africans and non-Africans. The
dialogue takes one of the following forms. It may be a direct focus on the thinking
of a particular philosopher on a specific subject. Alternatively, it may be a direct focus
on a specific philosophical trend. So the dialogue is specifically between African
and Western philosophies. This is not accidental. Although the Arab conquest of
PLS1502/1 13
Africa is a recognised fact, it is also true that the colonisation of Africa by the West
replaced and perfected the Arab conquest. Though the colonisation of Africa by
the West did not completely eliminate the Arab presence and influence on Africa,
it certainly was and continues to be relatively dominant.
The ensuing dialogue between African and Western philosophies is not limited to
Africa’s historical experience since colonisation. This dialogue extends to the pre-
colonial period as well. This extension need not always be immediate and direct.
The pre-colonial period can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it serves as the
background against which statements of Africa were made. Secondly, it is also the
resource that we may use for the verification or falsification of claims to knowledge
and truth by non-Africans. In this sense, then, the pre-colonial and post-colonial
historical experience of Africa is the context in which “discourses on Africa” unfolds.
Philosophy forms an integral part of this discourse in the sense that participation in
the knowledge and truth debate is distinctively philosophical.
One could question why it is important to think philosophically about the discourses
in Africa. There are three main reasons. Firstly, it is important to review ideas. Sec-
ondly, one has to critique these views. Finally, one has to reconstruct ideas. These
three reasons will now be discussed in more depth.
Review
When one reviews an idea, it means that one examines it anew, or appraises at it
from a different angle. Those authors that deal discourses in Africa, reconsiders the
anthropological arguments about and judgments concerning Africa and her people.
Furthermore, in this process, these thinkers analyse and examine the ideologies of
colonialism in order to lay bare the fallacies and misconceptions that exist on Africa.
If we read Biakolo’s essay, “Categories of cross-cultural cognition and the African
condition” (2002), then we can see how he examines the misjudgements made by
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Lévy-Bruhl claim that Africans can be characterised as savage,
pre-logical, perceptual, oral and religious beings. Lévy-Bruhl contrasts these ideas
with the perception of the European people as civilised, logical, conceptual, textual
and scientific people.
As philosophers, we have to do more than simply review ideas. In the second in-
stance, we need to critique ideas.
Critique
Once we have reviewed ideas, we need to be critical of these ideas. For instance,
the theorists that you are reading in this course did not simply examine ideas, but
they evaluated and raised criticisms against these ideas. Take, for instance, Ramose’s
essay “The struggle for reason in Africa” (2002). In this essay, he questions the com-
monly held view by the colonisers that only rationality is the distinguishing factor
of humans. The colonisers used this Aristotelian definition of “man” to discount
African, Amerindians and Australasians as “human”, as these people were seen as
devoid of reason.
In the first instance, we can thus see that the African thinkers critique restrictive and
narrow definitions of “man”. In the second instance, they critique Eurocentrism.
Eurocentrism is the idea that Western or European understandings and interpreta-
tions of the world are the most important or dominant ways of engaging with the
world. It means that European and Americans ways of being and doing are the
“yardsticks” by which all other people in the world are measured. The experience of
14
non-Europeans or non-Westerners becomes automatically discounted, overlooked
and ignored as a result.
Finally, the African thinkers critique the division of the world that places at the
centre the European and Western civilisation, and the rest of the world at the pe-
riphery. This idea is represented in the diagram below. It shows that the African,
Latin American and Asian people are placed around the centre.
Once we are critical of ideas and of concepts, we need to move further along yet.
We need to reconstruct ideas.
Reconstruct
Once we have reviewed and critiqued the ideas about Africa and Africans, we can
move forward to reconstruction. The thinkers that you are encountering in this
course argue for a new worldview, in which a plurality of cultures is affirmed and
promoted and a quest for a new and true humanity is advanced.
Having thus established that the essays discussed under the rubric “Discourses on
Africa’s focus on post-colonial African philosophy”, we can now consider them
one after another. In the examination of these essays, we shall take the following
method, as shown in the diagram below. This is a good way for you to engage with
philosophical essays too.
PLS1502/1 15
Why do you think it is important to reassess ideas about Africa?
Can you imagine what South Africa would be like if people like Steve Biko and Nelson Mandela
never questioned the apartheid regime?
2.4 Prescribed readings

There are two readings prescribed for this unit of the study guide. The first one
is the essay by Emvwo Biakolo, a Nigerian philosopher, with the title “Categories
of cross-cultural cognition and the African condition” (2002). The second one is
by Mogobe Ramose, a South African philosopher, with the title “The struggle for
reason in Africa” (2002). What follows then is analysis of both essays. These must
be read together with each essay.
Before you read the prescribed essay in depth, have a brief look at the five categories
that Biakolo proposes.
• What could they possibly mean?

• Do you think they are accurate?
• Are there perhaps other categories that Biakolo can add?
2.4.1 “Categories of cross-cultural cognition and the African condition” –

E Biakolo
Statement of the question:
Biakolo (2002: 38) identifies a problem. That is, he realises that a critical question
was how the Western World thought about the “other”. The “other”, in this case, was
the non-Caucasian races. Since the fifteenth century, the Western World has come
into contact with these non-Caucasian races, and tried to make sense of the people
that seemed so foreign to them.
Biakolo’s investigation thus serves two purposes. Firstly, he wants to present and
analyse the descriptions provided by the Western world in order to make sense of
the non-Caucasian races. Secondly, Biakolo wants to determine whether the answers
provided by the Western world are useful to illuminate and understand the African
condition. “Cross-cultural cognition” is understood as the question about the mean-
ing and function of knowledge, in this case, across Western and African cultures
and the subsequent ideas about the “African condition”.
Thesis to be defended
Western cross-cultural paradigms provide no key to understanding and knowing

the African past and present. Instead, they have served the colonisation of Africa
well and continue to ensure the exploitation of Africa.
Approach and method
Biakolo’s approach is to study specific texts attributed to particular thinkers from the
Western world. The author identifies the categories of cognition that each thinker
or group of thinkers are associated with. Five categories are identified: savage vs
civilised; pre-logical vs logical; perceptual vs conceptual; oral vs written; religious
vs scientific. Then the study proceeds to show how and why the specific texts are
interconnected, even if they deal with different categories of cognition or knowledge.
16
(a) Savage vs civilised
Biakolo submits that before Lévy-Bruhl, the division between savage and civilised
was the dominant Western paradigm in understanding the “other”. The African
was seen as “savage” and the Westerner as “civilised”. The savage African was seen
as unable to have individual genius, whereas the civilised Westerner was capable of
possessing individual genius. In 1871 Henry Morgan even went as far as designating
different levels of savagery (Lower Savagery, Middle Savagery, Upper Savagery, Lower
Barbarism, Upper Barbarism and Civilisation). The only society that attained the
level of “civilisation” in this framework was the Euro-American society, attributed
to their ability of writing and a phonetic alphabet (Biakolo 2002:38).
The debate that supported the above assertion was that between the monogenists
and the polygenists. The story of creation according to the Christian Bible was the
basis for the debate. The monogenists argued that “god” created only one race, and
that only this race was truly human. The polygenists argued that if “god” created
many races, then all the other races were not given the same soul.2 One implication
is that other races were inferior to Westerners. Another is that, because of their
inferiority based on their sub-humanity, it was rational and justified to treat those
races as subhuman beings – for example, by colonising and enslaving them. When
he appeared on the scene, Lévy-Bruhl made a paradigm shift by introducing the
categories of “pre-logical” and “logical” (Biakolo 2002:39).
(b) Pre-logical vs logical

Lévy-Bruhl focused on what he called the psychological foundations of primitive
culture, and this marked a turning point in the understanding of the “other”. He
was not freed completely from the ideology of inferior versus superior human be-
ings because he also regarded the “other” as “undeveloped people”. He described
these peoples’ material culture and way of life as manifestations of the “pre-logical
mentality”: a mentality which does not have a logical character (Biakolo 2002:39).
Instead, it is a mentality which simply associates one thing with another, even when
associations are logically impossible. This mentality is thus the mentality of “par-
ticipation” in being. It is incapable of standing back and looking logically at being
from a distance. According to Lévy-Bruhl it is precisely the indifference to logic of
the “underdeveloped peoples”, their submission to the “law of participation” which
must now be used as the key to understanding these peoples. Also, for Lévy-Bruhl,
the family, kinship relations and mode of production in societies of the “underde-
veloped peoples” was just the material expressions of the group’s mentality rather
than the individual. Lévy-Bruhl, as summarised by Biakolo (2002:40), thought that:
Primitive culture is participated in collectively, it is a shared reality. The idea of individual,

and, by implication, dissident, grasp or assessment of reality, individual creativity, and so
on, runs counter to the ethos of primitive culture.
In the light of the above, Biakolo (2002:40) observes that taking the cue from Lévy-
Bruhl’s theory, the French created two types of African. One was elevated to civilisa-
tion through assimilation into French culture and the other was abandoned at the
level of the savage. Nonetheless the state had to deal with the “savage” as well. The
British, on the other hand, relying on functionalist anthropology, allowed the Africans
some degree of independence provided this was exercised according to the precepts
2 See the subheading “Spiritual racism” in section 1.2 of the essay “The struggle for reason in Africa”
(2002).
PLS1502/1 17
and within the parameters determined by the British “master”. Biakolo described
this as the situation of “cultural conquest”. He then suggests it succeeded to some
extent because the natives’ religion was replaced with the conqueror’s religion and
the entire educational system of the conquered was pushed aside and ignored. The
result was that accepting the religion and the education of the conqueror became
the prerequisite for entry into political and social life (Biakolo 2002:41).
(c) Perceptual vs conceptual

Claude Lévi-Strauss introduced the categories, “perceptual” and “conceptual” as a
response to Lévy-Bruhl. His purpose was to show that the “primitive mind” was
logical and that its conceptual schemes were structured in orderly fashion. For Lévi-
Strauss the “primitive mind” was “magical” whereas that of the “civilised” Westerner
was “scientific”. According to Biakolo,
… Lévi-Strauss argued, however, that primitive man [sic] had a genuine scientific spirit
and logical-categorical abilities, as can be seen in his [sic] nominal and classificatory systems
and his myths. He admits that these modes of knowledge-acquisition are not necessarily the
reserve of any one culture. Yet, fundamental differences exist between civilized and primitive
cultures” (Biakolo 2002:41).
The difference is that mythical thought borrows from a diversity of sources whenever
it expresses itself. The point is that the sources are limited and mythical thought has
to rely only on them because it cannot conceive or contrive alternatives (Biakolo
2002:41). Lévi-Strauss calls the process the “bricolage”. Bricolage is a thought pat-
tern which conserves knowledge by means of the reorganisation of what is already
known. Thus it remains perceptual. By contrast, the conceptual method of knowledge
acquisition and construction opens up new possibilities of knowledge by extension
and renewal.
Biakolo (2002:41) then makes the following critical remark: Lévi-Strauss’s reluctance
“to identify any culture with a mythical or scientific spirit poses a problem and
not merely a moral one”. The structuralist thesis is that all life and culture present
themselves in binary form. The thesis has a clear universalist thrust – “all”. Yet it is
circumscribed and limited only to individuals within cultures. Why is the binarism
not extended among cultures as well? If the extension is allowed, then it will be seen
that all forms of the organisation and articulation of knowledge are binary. This in
effect means that knowledge is tied to place and race (Biakolo 2002:41–42).
On this basis Lévi-Strauss may be described as an adherent of the binary view of

racial and cultural forms of knowledge. Furthermore, Biakolo (2002:42) tests the
claim that myth and science are dichotomous orders. The test is focused on the re-
lationship between the dichotomous orders. Is the relationship to be characterised
as a subordinate or a superordinate one? This question serves to show that “the
selection of the terms of a paradigm are coloured ideologically” (Biakolo 2002:42).
(d) Oral vs written

Some scholars argue that Western civilisation owes its origin to writing. Without
the invention of writing there could not have been Western civilisation. Writing,
as a new method of communication, had some consequences. Before the invention
of writing, humans relied on speech. Time was an important point of reference in
the sense that speech was often linked to a particular event or events. However,
this linkage with regard to events that had already happened relied exclusively on
18
memory. There was thus a living interconnection of time and memory. With the
introduction of writing, a shift occurred. Memory was no longer very important
because what had to be remembered was readily available in the form of writing. The
ability to retrieve the memorable in turn demanded a focus on the space occupied
by the written word. It thus displaced the focus on the event in relation to time.
How knowledge was presented after the invention of writing differed from that of
knowledge presentation through the spoken word (Biakolo 2002:42).
Due to the primary focus on the event, the oral word often took the form of a story,
a descriptive narrative of the event. No doubt analysis and interpretation of the
event occurred, but these were – in general – not as pronounced as the narration
itself. Oral cultures then leant towards tradition and conservatism: traditional in
the sense that they are conveyed from one generation to the other and conservative
in the sense that what is conveyed by tradition remains almost unchanged over a
long period of time. Thus oral cultures are participative. Following the invention
of writing, presentation of written knowledge was dominated by description, defini-
tion and analysis, according to Biakolo (2002:42). Discussions based on this model
of knowledge presentation tend to be abstract. They are more the expression of an
individual than a communal understanding of issues.
Biakolo (2002:43) then proceeds to question the above in the light of some scholars’
arguments. One of his questions reads as follows: The writing of history takes into
account a number of factors in the reconstruction of the past. Yet in this case the
argument is that only one item – writing – is the cause of Western civilisation. Is this
claim not rather odd from the historiographical point of view? Another question is:
It is commonly assumed that we owe the alphabet to the Greeks. However, studies
by Gelb have demonstrated that this assumption is invalid. Biakolo (2002:43) argues
also that if writing is the basis of civilisation then those who belong to the mind-set
of the written civilisation are precluded from having access to oral consciousness.
Do they not remain trapped in the culture of writing without the possibility of
stepping out of it?
Furthermore, Biakolo (2002:44–45) notes that the distinction between orality and
literacy (the written word) has been elaborated on in such a manner that only the
literary has been elevated to the status of “science” and civilisation. Contrary to this
position, Biakolo argues, that there is no scientific basis for the claim that writing is
the essence of culture. Therefore the distinction between the written and the spoken
word should not be exaggerated.
(e) Religious vs scientific

Here Biakolo (2002:45) focuses on the question: May we say “primitive thought”
is rational at all? Three positions are distinguishable: (1) “primitive thought” is ir-
rational, illogical and unscientific, (2) “primitive thought” is rational and logical
but not scientific, or, alternatively, it is rational but illogical and unscientific, and
(3) “primitive thought” is as rational as scientific thought within its own cultural
context. Biakolo (2002:45) suggests that Robin Horton takes all three positions into
account in his works. Even though Horton holds that African traditional thought
and scientific thought are analogous, one crucial distinction remains, which is the
closedness of African thought which “neither understands nor tolerates alternative
thought” (Biakolo 2002:46). As such, African thought is still perceived to be lacking
in logic and philosophy.
PLS1502/1 19
Biakolo then urges us to consider the criteria of science (2002:46). He is critical of
the seemingly “objective” rules that scientists abide by. Even the Popperian solution
to the problem of science falls short of satisfactory (Biakolo 2002:46). It seems that
“the very foundations of scientific and logical rationality turn out to be no more
than intuition or convention” (Biakolo 2002:46).
Biakolo concludes that in the final analysis “science” is no more than a human conven-
tion. In the language of postmodern philosophy, science may be described as faith,
a grand belief in a particular model of knowledge construction and presentation.
Conclusion
Biakolo has considered the arguments for and against the five categories. (Please note
here Biakolo’s uneasy shift from “category” to “paradigm”, creating the impression
that the two are synonymous. They are not synonyms and he appears to be aware of
this, though his usage suggests the opposite.) He concludes that the “cross-cultural
paradigms” are actually obscure efforts to come to grips with the African condi-
tion. They provide no access to understanding either the past or the present of
Africa. They have served great uses in the colonisation and exploitation of Africa,
as Mudimbe suggests. But they provide no key to the knowledge of Africa. On the
contrary, their perpetuation merely serves to repeat the outdated myth of Africa as
the “white man’s burden”. It is important to note that Biakolo arrives at this conclu-
sion on the basis of the following procedure: He presents Westerners’ arguments
with regard to their understanding of the cognitive potentialities of the “other”, in
this case the African. He has, presumably as an African, shown the strengths and
weaknesses of these arguments. In doing so, the voice of the African was articulated
by him only, despite his mention of Mudimbe. He refers to the “African condition”
without actually describing and explaining what this condition means. Therefore it is
doubtful whether his conclusion is entirely sustainable. But remember that Biakolo’s
aim was to identify Western ways of knowing and interpreting the “other” – in this
case the African.
After you have worked through Biakolo’s reading discuss the following:
• The distinction between science and religion is often very contentious.

• What do you make of the distinction in general?
• What kind of activity qualifies as science?
• Who decides on the criteria of scientificity and determines on that basis what is “scientifically”
appropriate?
2.4.2 “The struggle for reason in Africa” – MB Ramose

Before reading the text, think about Aristotle’s definition of “man as a rational
animal”. Then ponder the following:
• What could Aristotle possibly have meant with his definition?

• What is reason, and why do Africans need to struggle for it?
Statement of the question
Why and how was the concept of reason used to justify colonisation and to pursue
its aims to (1) conquer and proselytise the conquered, (2) conquer and wrongfully
dispossess the conquered of their freehold interest in their territory (disseise), and
assume sovereignty over them, (3) impose unilaterally, and on behalf of the con-
20
quered, the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth (in short, “kill knowledge”
– commit “epistemicide”)?
Thesis to be defended
The restrictive interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the human being as a rational

animal may not be justified on ontological, ethical, political and juridical grounds.
Approach and method
Aristotle defined the human being – “man” – as a rational animal. Colonisation

used this definition in the restrictive sense only, so that reason was the exclusive
quality and preserve of the Western “man”. Other “man”-like (human-like) animals
deserved to be colonised because, though they looked human, they were not human
beings proper – by virtue of the fact that they did not have the quality of reason.
This ontological defect imposed on the coloniser implied the putative ethical duty
to conquer, proselytise, disseise and commit “epistemicide” of the colonised. This
imagined duty was actually translated into practice. In the process, a challenge arose
from within. Bartolomeo Las Casas questioned the wisdom and justice of colonisa-
tion on the basis that proselytisation was intended for human beings only. Since the
colonised did not fall within the definition of “human beings”, it was meaningless,
unwise and unjust to colonise them and pursue the aims of colonisation. A debate on
this point ensued between Las Casas and Sepulveda. The end of this debate resulted
in the papacy departing specifically from the papal bulls of Romanus Pontifex, Dum
Diversas and Inter Caetera Divinae, by issuing the bull Sublimis Deus. This papal
bull declared expressly that “all men are rational animals”. In effect it removed the
contradiction between colonisation and proselytisation. At the same time it justified
colonisation and reaffirmed its original aims. But the wide interpretation of Aristo-
tle’s “man is a rational animal” did not eradicate the conviction that the African, the
Amerindian and the Australasian are not rational animals. Consequently, the theory
and practice of racism continued to get philosophical backing, exemplified in the
philosophies of La Peyrere´, Kant, Locke, Hume and Hegel. In our time the tradi-
tion is manifest in the “Bell Curve Wars” in the United States, for example, as well
as in post-April 1994 South Africa. It is important to emphasise that the Spanish are
the only colonisers from the West known to have allowed an ethical debate on the
morality of colonisation. This by itself did not halt Spanish colonisation. However
it is testimony to Spain’s moral sensitivity about colonisation.
Conclusion
The author concludes that despite apparent gains made, for example in the domain
of international politics through the appointment of Kofi Annan as the first sub-
Saharan African Secretary General of the United Nations Organisation, the struggle
for reason in Africa is far from over. The conviction lives on among a great majority
of the posterity of the coloniser that the statement “man is a rational animal” was
indeed not spoken of the African, the Amerindian and the Australasian. Instead of
trying to persuade the posterity of the coloniser to recognise and understand the folly
of their conviction, the author urges the formerly colonised to construct knowledge
and define truth on the basis of their experience as human beings second to none
in their humanity.
PLS1502/1 21
(1) Give a critical exposition of any one of the “cross-cultural” categories of cogni-
tion discussed by Biakolo.
(2) Give your own understanding of the “African condition” and relate it to only one
of the “cross-cultural” categories of cognition.
(3) What is a “discourse on Africa” and what is its purpose in this module?
(4) The boundary between reason and unreason, rational and irrational, was as
decisive for colonisation as the boundary between “civilisation” and “barbarism”.
Is it the case that bounded reasoning – reasoning on the basis of drawing
boundaries – always leads to unfair discrimination and injustice?
(5) Do you agree that reason is the distinctive quality of a human being?
(6) Is dialogue necessary for philosophy?
2.5 Further Reading (see list in Appendix 1)
22
3 STUDY UNIT 3
3 Trends in African philosophy
3.1 Introduction and outcomes

The aim of this unit is to introduce you to different approaches and classifications
of African philosophy. These approaches are indicative of the fact that African phi-
losophy is a vast field of study. The different frameworks and approaches are however
based on methods used in each approach. It also needs to be mentioned that each
of these approaches and frameworks has been developed and arrived at through
rigorous argumentation. Further, the matter is not settled as to how many trends
there are and what those trends are. There is an on-going dialogue on the matter.
We shall begin this chapter by defining what a trend is. Then, we shall outline the
most general classification of African philosophy, followed by Wiredu’s and Nkombe’s
and Smet’s classifications. We will then end the chapter by a detailed presentation of
Oruka’s classification – a classification which is regarded among African philosophers
as the classic delineation of African philosophy.
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(a) Outline various approaches classifications of African philosophy.

(b) Compare and contrast all of the approaches to African philosophy.
(c) Assess the strengths and weaknesses of each of the approaches discussed.
(d) Understand and appreciate the diversity of methods in African philosophy.
3.2 What is a trend?

Often when we speak of a “trend” we may mean “fashion”, for example the New
Look of the 1940s, or the miniskirt of the 1960s. “Trend” with this connotation
can, however, seldom be linked to rational argument. It relies mostly on the tastes
and aesthetic inclinations of designers and the appeal of designs to those who have
to wear those clothes. This is not the case with philosophy.
Ask yourself the following questions:
• Why is it necessary to think of typologies of approaches?

• Why is it necessary to classify approaches if it is such an open-ended endeavour?
PLS1502/1 23
Philosophers differ in the way in which they develop their philosophies:
(1) They differ about what constitutes a philosophical problem and about how
these problems are to be formulated (eg “What is the mind?” vis-à-vis “How
does the concept “mind” function?”).
(2) They also differ about their fields of interest and the relative importance of
these. For example, some see metaphysics as “primary philosophy”, others
reject metaphysics as “bewitchment by language” preferring to start from our
knowledge of the world, and still others see our ethical interests as the driving
force behind philosophical work.
(3) Philosophers further differ about the appropriate methods to be used to deal
with these problems (eg conceptual analyses vis-à-vis existential or historical
analyses), and they differ about the nature and status of suggested solutions
to problems, and the authorities to be followed in doing philosophy.
We describe these differences as different approaches in philosophy. And the im-

portant thing to realise is that different philosophers do not pick their approaches
on the basis of psychological inclination, but they argue for their positions.
It is possible to group individual approaches together in terms of similarities and

overlaps in spite of serious individual differences. In the course of your studies you
will meet the vastly different approaches. Of course, different classifiers have their
own philosophical interests and use different criteria for their classifications, with
the result that philosophers and philosophies and thus philosophical approaches
are grouped in different ways. The criteria used for such classifications differ in
many respects and this is one of the controversies in philosophy. For example, are
geographical criteria philosophically relevant? Does it really make philosophical
sense to talk of German, French or American philosophy? Some classifications, for
example those of rationalism, empiricism and idealism are criticised because they
give epistemology the central place in philosophising. And so we can go on. In the
light of these considerations it stands to reason that some such classifications are
accepted more widely or used more frequently in the philosophical fraternity than
others. That is why it is also necessary to take note of criticism of such classifications.
Philosophy is a vast field. There are philosophies in different parts of the world;
when we look at the philosophical activity in a region, we find that in different pe-
riods people thought differently about themselves and the world. Even if we take a
particular period, we find different approaches. What is more, we may find similar
trends in different parts of the world. Classification is one way for the human being
to get a grip on reality (in this case the reality of ways of reflecting about reality).
In short classification is a way of coping with a variety of different ways to give
meaning to life and the world. So a particular label can help us to understand that
we are dealing with a certain kind of approach. With the danger of losing sight of
important nuances, labels are a useful form of shorthand to cope with insights which
will otherwise be impossible to oversee and make something of. This is particularly
important in teaching and learning philosophy. References to trends are, in general,
easy for the outsider to understand – lists of definitions and references to individu-
als are not necessary. We may compare such classifications to maps which not only
chart territories but, in doing so, help travellers to find their way. There are therefore
different approaches to and classifications of philosophical activity in Africa.
24
3.3 The most general classification of African philosophy: language
The first way of classifying philosophies in Africa, of which you have to take note,
is one based on language. Languages will always be a challenge in Africa. One of
the legacies of colonialism is the place of the colonial languages (English, French,
Portuguese and German particularly) as a means of inter-group communication in
the former colonies. In this module we limit ourselves to the English and French
traditions. It speaks for itself that philosophers from the French-speaking countries
will link with the French culture and philosophy and likewise in the case of African
philosophers from English-speaking colonies. Thus, the most general classification
of African philosophy is Anglophone African philosophy and Francophone African
philosophy.
Before reading further, ponder the following:
How important is language in the study of philosophy? Does it make a difference in which language
one reads, or indeed, writes philosophy? You can relate this discussion back to our multilingual society.
Anglophone African philosophy
This philosophy is propounded by philosophers from previously English colonial

lands in Africa. It emerged from a more turbulent intellectual climate than its Fran-
cophone equivalent. It is influenced by the analytical style of philosophising, which,
according to Wiredu (2004:99) provide for a more narrow conception of philosophy
than its Continental counterpart.
Anglophone African philosophy emerged partly in reaction to Placide Tempels’ La

Philosophie Bantoue, especially after the latter was translated into English in 1959. Early
philosophers of this trend were critical of the ethnocentrism (and Eurocentrism
in particular) of many Western philosophers which was expressed in what became
known derogatively as the “primitive” mentality of Africans. Accordingly, African
philosophers embarked on an “apologetic” philosophy, explaining alternative world-
views of African people.
Generally one can identify a two-fold movement in Anglophone African philosophy.

The first movement is a reaction against colonialism. As a result African philosophical
discourses in this movement were dominated by ideological and political postures
which were intended to lead to the decolonisation of Africa. The following philoso-
phers and politicians were at the centre stage of this struggle:
• Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana)

• Julius Nyerere (Tanzania)
• Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia)
• Leopold Senghor (Senegal)
• Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria)
• Sekou Toure (Guinea), and many others.
The second movement is the struggle for the professionalisation of African philoso-
phy. Through this movement departments and conferences of African philosophy
were opened. Some of the leading figures in this movement were the following:
• John Mbiti (Kenya)

• Odera Oruka (Kenya)
• Kwasi Wiredu (Ghana)
• Kwame Gyekye (Ghana)
PLS1502/1 25
• Dismas Masolo (Kenya)
• Emmanuel Eze (Nigeria)
• Mogobe Ramose (South Africa)
• Barry Hallen (USA)
For further reading, see Barry Hallen’s “Contemporary Anglophone African phi-
losophy: a survey” (2004:99–148) in Blackwell’s companion to African philosophy.
Francophone African philosophy
According to Irele there are two perspectives that dominate philosophical thought
and discourse in contemporary French-speaking Africa: the question of identity and
the dilemma of modernity.
On the question of identity: Since the era of colonialism Africans have struggled
to understand themselves and their place in the world. Colonialism was seen as a
violent confrontation between Europe and Africa which led to an emotional re-
sponse concretised in negritude. In the post-colonial era the policy of assimilation,
together with the characterisation of Africa and Africans in European literature (eg
the novels of Loti, Hegel’s philosophical works, de Gobineau’s ethnological specu-
lation and Levy-Bruhl’s ethnological work culminating in The primitive mind), led to
alienation – which became the dominant theme in Francophone African literature
and which culminated in the problem of identity as a central philosophical theme.
Negritude developed as an answer to this identity crisis. It is an attempt to postulate
a black racial identity founded upon an original African essence. It played an impor-
tant polemical role. Negritude is, however, not the only philosophical perspective
of importance in French-speaking Africa. This is clear from the criticism against
negritude. The framework is challenged – is negritude a valid concept? Is this an
acceptable rendition of the African’s world-view? Is it still relevant? The foundation
on which it is built is challenged.
On the question of the dilemma of Modernism: Irele alludes to “a continuing

crisis of African consciousness”. Colonialism caused a crisis for Africans but the
end of this system did not end the crisis. Philosophers could not ignore the crisis,
which meant an extension of the terms of the debate so as to include the African’s
experience of modernity. This brought reflection in Francophone Africa closer to
philosophical activity in Europe. On the one hand, in the direction of critical involve-
ment, African philosophers critically evaluate the Western tradition of philosophy
and its historical consequences as well as its transformation potential in the African
context. On the other, European philosophers also reflect on modernism, on the
fundamental human issues raised by the impact of modern technological civilisation,
which means that there is common ground between the two traditions which is
exploited. We can conclude that Irele started by identifying two main philosophical
streams, and ended by claiming that “the movement of ideas of the French-speaking
African intelligentsia demonstrates the plurality of African discourse”.
Other features which are prominent in Francophone African philosophy: The fol-
lowing are discussed by Irele:
(a) Ethno-philosophy:
Father Tempels – a Flemish-speaking Belgian – published a very controversial book,
with the title Bantu philosophy. The book had a tremendous influence on the develop-
ment of African philosophy. Irele also pays some attention to Alexis Kagame, an
26
African follower of Tempels. According to ethno-philosophy we have to look for
African identity in the African’s view of reality. According to Irele, the historical
school, as expounded by Cheikh Anta Diop, looks for it in ancient history.
(b) The critique of Africanist discourses:
Irele presents VY Mudimbe, a philosopher who is critical of all Africanist discourses

because they do not face what he sees as the main problem in post-colonial Africa:
that of coping with modernism. According to him they do not face the problem of
the relationship between discourse (thinking) and modernity in Africa. In short,
because Africans are not involved with scientific and technological development, they
are not part of scientific (modernist) discourse and thinking; therefore modernity is
problematic for them. Modernity is a problem because epistemological (knowledge)
colonialism has not ended yet.
3.4 Wiredu’s classification

Kwasi Wiredu distinguishes between traditional and contemporary African philosophy.
Traditional African philosophy
Traditional African philosophy has a communal as well as an individualised com-

ponent. Access to it can be gained through proverbs, maxims, tales, myths, lyrics,
poetry, art, and the like. Examples of philosophers in this area are Nkiru Nzegwu,
Ajume H Wingo, and others.
Contemporary African philosophy
Contemporary African philosophy is still evolving. It is a professional and academic

philosophy which is mediated through books, journals, classroom teaching, and
conferences. It embraces Anglophone as well as Francophone African philosophy. Its
philosophers include Wiredu, Gyekye, Hountondji, Ramose, Masolo, Serequeberhan,
Tempels, Kagame, Oruka, Bewaji, Okere, and many others.
3.5 Nkombe and Smet’s classification of African philosophy

Another taxonomy is that of Oleko Nkombe and Alfons J Smet (1978), who distin-
guishes four trends:
Ideological trends, involving philosophers geared primarily to improving the po-

litical and cultural situation of African peoples.
Traditional philosophy which is the recognition of works of philosophy in traditional

Africa. This trend examines philosophical elements in their various manifestations and
systematically elaborates on them as repositories of wisdom and esoteric knowledge.
The critical school – they react to theses and projects of the first two trends and
to Western conceptions of science and philosophy.
The synthetic current involves philosophers who use the hermeneutical method
to solve problems.
PLS1502/1 27
3.6 H Odera Oruka’s four trends in African philosophy
The text of Oruka is titled “Four trends in postcolonial African philosophy.”
What follows below is a brief analysis of Oruka’s text. Please read this together with
the text itself. Our analysis is preceeded by some guiding questions.
Ethnophilosophy
In a short paragraph, answer the following question: Oruka says that ethnophilosophers have to
contrast African philosophy with European philosophy. Why? How do they see these differences,
according to him?
Ethnophilosophy and philosophic sagacity
How do ethnophilosophy and philosophic sagacity differ?
Oruka worries that sagacity might fall back into ethnophilosophy, and thus are open to the same
worries. Do you agree?
Nationalist-ideological philosophy
How does Oruka define Nationalist-ideological philosophy? Why does he find this a necessary
category in his classification?
Think about South Africa and our political context here. On what basis should a social theory for
Africa in general, and South Africa in particular, be constructed, according to nationalist-ideological
philosophers? Do you agree?
Professional philosophy
How, according to Oruka, do the professional African philosophers see the relationship between
African and European philosophy?
One criticism against professional African philosophers is that they are not African philosophers.
What do you think of this criticism? Are the two categories mutually exclusive?
When studying Oruka’s classification, keep in mind that he comes from the English-
speaking side and does not represent Francophone African philosophy in his clas-
sification. The classification by this Nairobian philosopher Odera Oruka of different
approaches in African philosophy into broader trends is well known, and gives rise
to heated controversy. He uses a four-fold classification: (1) ethnophilosophy (ideas
of philosophers who try to reconstruct a traditional Bantu or indigenous world-
view), (2) sage philosophy (ideas of African sages on selected philosophical issues),
(3) nationalist-ideological philosophers (ideas of politicians on the social, cultural
and economic reconstruction of African countries in a post-colonial era), and (4)
professional philosophy (ideas of professionally trained students and teachers of
philosophy in Africa). Schematically, it may be represented as follows:
28
As already mentioned, Oruka’s classification enjoys support by most African phi-
losophers. For that reason our prescribed text for this chapter will be taken from
Oruka’ works.
Analysis of text
This article dates from 1978. Oruka revised it a few times, but we decided to use the
original version. On the one hand, this version made quite an impact when Oruka
first read it as a paper at a conference and published it. It was widely discussed and
praised or criticised, and it had a marked influence on the development of African
philosophy because it provided a framework for the study and discussion of African
philosophy. Its categories are still in use today. Thus it is a historical piece, but also
an influential piece with which students of African philosophy should come into
contact. It has its shortcomings. The different approaches are dealt with in an abstract
way – Oruka does not give examples and thus does not classify specific philosophers.
This leads to a further problem, that of who belongs where in his categories. For
example “négritude” looks as if it belongs under ethnophilosophy, but Senghor can
be seen as a professional philosopher. The category of professional philosophy as
such may be questioned because it is a different kind of category from the others
and too hospitable – different approaches are put there in spite of radical differences.
With this goes another point. Oruka clearly operates from a specific view of the na-
ture of African philosophy. According to him there is no radical difference between
European and African philosophy – philosophy remains philosophy irrespective
of where it is practised. This is of course not a generally accepted view. This view
explains the position of professional philosophy. Oruka is actually distinguishing
between philosophy and what he sees as quasiphilosophy or non-philosophy in Africa.
Some philosopher objects to Oruka’s implicit condemnation of ethnophilosophy as
quasi-philosophy. They think that ethnophilosophers “can present to the discourse
of African philosophy both interesting and useful material on which to draw for
analyses of the traditional and cultural manifestations of African existence”. They
indirectly suggest that the ethnophilosophy category should have had the more
positive label of cultural philosophy.
Furthermore, at the time when this article originally appeared, sage philosophy was
not much of a trend. Oruka’s important publications on the topic appeared later. In
this respect the article was not descriptive, as it was supposed to be. But in spite of
all these and other criticisms it remains a publication worthy of note. Seeing that the
article is short and its content supposed to be descriptive and thus not that difficult,
we shall not work through it section by section.
PLS1502/1 29
3.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, in this learning unit we examined different approaches and classifica-
tions of African philosophy. We firstly examined the linguistic classification, where
after we moved on to Wiredu, Nkombe and Smet and Oruka’s classifications. We
have now completed the first part of this module, which dealt with defining the
scope of and trends within African philosophy. We now move on the second part,
which deals with issues and themes in African philosophy, namely philosophical
anthropology and morality.
(1) What according to you are the most important trends in African philosophy?
(2) How does Oruka define each of the four trends and what are his reasons for
including each of them in his classification?
(3) Outline and evaluate Oruka’s views on the nature and scope of African
philosophy.
3.8 Further Reading (see Appendix 1)
30
4 STUDY UNIT 4
4 Philosophical anthropology

This learning unit is the first in the second half of this module under the heading
of “Issues and themes in African philosophy”.
“One of the most persistent problems in philosophy, almost as old as the enterprise
itself, is the nature of self, its status and its place in nature” (Okolo 2004:247). The
purpose of this learning unit is to delve in one of the metaphysical problems in
philosophy – the problem of “self” but from an African philosophical perspective.
In other words, this unit wishes to investigate what it means to be human in the
African culture. Our prescribed reading for this chapter will be Kwame Gyekye’s
essay, “Person and community in African thought”.
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(a) Give a basic description of what it means to be a “person” in the African culture.
(b) Strike a balance between individuality and communality in your definition of
a human person.
(c) Critique Kwame Gyekye’s essay on “Person and community in African culture”.
(d) Assess if Gyekye was able to save the individuality of a person in his attempt
to describe a conception of a person.
Before you start with this unit, ponder the following questions:
What is “the self”? Is it your personality? Or is it defined in the way that you interact with the people
around you? Or is it defined only by your thoughts and feelings, inaccessible to those around you?
4.2 African cosmology

African anthropology can be best understood when located within African cosmology
or ontology. Cosmology is the study of the universe in its totality, and by extension,
humanity’s place in it. But since cosmology in some quarters studies the natural
order of the universe, and accordingly excludes the supernatural order, it is more
appropriate to speak of ontology as the proper location of African anthropology.
Ontology may be defined as the study of the nature of being or reality in general,
as well as of the basic categories of being and their relations. Ontology deals with
questions concerning what entities exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities
can be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities
and differences. Philosophically, ontology is the branch of metaphysics concerned
with the nature and relations of being. It is the study of being manifesting itself as
a multiplicity as well as a pluriformity of beings.
PLS1502/1 31
The African cosmos is divided into two inter-penetrating and inseparable, yet distin-
guishable parts, namely, the world of spirits and the world of matter, whose beings
are arranged in a hierarchical order. In this order, one may distinguish between the
invisible and visible realms. According to Okolo, whose model slightly resembles
that of Tempels in his thesis of forces, the beings of the hierarchy, in a descending
order are the following: God; Ancestors; Spirits; humans; animals; plants and inani-
mate beings. The Akan scheme shares a lot of similarities with the Igbo and Bantu
schemes with the exception of charms and amulets in the spiritual realm, whose
purpose is to help human beings to ward off misfortune that may come in their way.
But, these beings on the hierarchy are not just “substances” – standing on their
own–as is the case in Aristotelian (theory of beings) metaphysics. In the African
cosmology the beings of the hierarchy are dynamic and hence forever in motion.
The beings are interconnected with one another so that there is an interaction of
all by all. The African universe is therefore like a spider web with a network of rela-
tions in which one part affects and is affected by another part. African ontology is
therefore a unitary ontology in that it promotes a holistic view of reality whereby
material and non-material phenomena are viewed as ontological equals, constantly
interacting with one another. Further, a person is understood to be inseparably em-
bedded in a network of relations, first with other human beings, and secondly, with
the other beings of the hierarchy. The idea of unitary ontology makes it impossible
for Africans to compartmentalise reality. Reality is one and hence viewed in a holistic
manner. The logic of “part” and “whole” is at work in this ontology. No “part” may
be understood in isolation from the “whole” and vice versa.
A point to ponder … :
How do you think the African cosmolog y and ontolog y influence African philosophy?
4.3 Two poles of African anthropology

The intra-personal pole: But in him/herself, who or what is the human person? In most
philosophical anthropologies, a human person is conceived as a composite substance,
made up of body and soul. In Western philosophical anthropologies, this view raised
many philosophical problems as philosophers attempted to understand the very nature
of these two entities and how the two co-exist. In African philosophy, the problem
of the nature of both substances and their coexistence does not arise. What arises is
the concern on how to maintain a healthy balance between one’s bodily (material)
and spiritual needs. The concern stems from the belief that persons who are overly
concerned about their bodily well-being at the expense of the spiritual dimension of
their being, are in fact not in touch with their real selves, and are likely to care less
about other persons. Gbadegesin corroborates this view as follows: “The idea is that
a selfish person is concerned with the well-being of his/her body only (as opposed
to the spirit). This suggests that if human beings were to be concerned with their
spirits, they would not be selfish” (Gbadegesin:175). That a human person is body-
soul implies that they are more than just a body or material entity. A human person
is enlivened by a principle that has its origin from a being beyond this world. That,
in itself shows the dignity and preciousness of the human person. Thus, failure to
maintain a balance between one’s physical and spiritual needs has ethical implications.
The inter-personal pole: According to the African view of a person, a person is not only
related to himself. A person is not an isolated, individuated being. A human being is
in an ontological relationship with other human beings and also with the rest of the
32
hierarchy of beings and as such is only “real” in relationship with others (Tempels).
According to Shutte, who draws from Tempels and Mbiti, a human only exists by
being shared (Shutte:28). Without others or the community, the individual’s existence
is almost incomplete (Mbiti). The human person is therefore never an independent
and an isolated being. He or she is always “a being-with-others,” or “a person-in
relation-to-others”. He or she is essentially social – a being-in-community (Tom
Mboya & Julius Nyerere). According to Gbadegesin (p 175)
…persons are therefore not construed as atomic individuals. A person whose existence and
personality are dependent on the community is expected in turn to contribute to the continued
existence of the community … the crown of personal life is to be useful to one’s community.
The meaning of one’s life is therefore measured by one’s commitment to social ideals and com-
munal existence” (Gbadegesin:175).
That a person is a being-in-community is not collectivist thinking. For a human be-

ing the community is a pre-condition for his or her full self-realisation (Dussel:186).
Thinking about these two poles of African anthropolog y, ask yourself the following questions:
• Is this different or similar to Western conceptions of the individual?

• Do you agree with Gbadegesin on the meaning of an individual’s life?
4.4 Prescribed reading: Kwame Gyekye

The text of Kwame Gyekye is with the title “Person and community in African
thought”.
What follows below is a brief analysis of Gyekye’s text. Please read this together
with the text itself.
Discuss the following among yourselves:
Menkiti and Gyekye
What do you make of the tension between Menkiti and Gyekye at this point? Write a short para-
graph explaining the tension in your own words.
My community
Think about your relationship with your community. How big is the influence of you on your com-
munity, and of your community on you? Now, think of children in your community. Does your com-
munity view them as full persons? If so, why? If not, what is the difference? By what principles does
your community judge the moral status of children?
RSA’s Constitution and communitarianism
Take a second to reflect on South Africa’s Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights. What
role do rights play in South Africa, and how does that relate to the communitarianism espoused
by many Africans?
Immanuel Kant and Gyekye
In the reading, it is stated that Gyekye seems to adopt Immanuel Kant’s ethical approach. Do a
search in The “Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy” and summarise Kant’s ethical position. Think
about how it relates back to Gyekye’s position.
PLS1502/1 33
Analysis of text
In view of the different approaches to the problem of personhood and community

in African thought, Gyekye finds it necessary to clarify some commonalities and
differences among the different approaches within communitarianism, thus open-
ing the way for further debate in this area. Although Gyekye focuses his analysis on
Menkiti’s ideas he pauses to consider the ideas of those he calls radical communitar-
ians, such as Nkrumah, Senghor and Nyerere. Gyekye does not consider the com-
munity as the alpha and omega in determining personhood. Without playing down
the importance of the community, Gyekye brings into the debate the problem of
rights. His primary concern is with the space that is given to the human person for
the exercise of his or her individual rights within the terrain of communitarianism.
He examines the question of rights in relation to duties.
So, let us first look at Menkiti’s ideas. The picture Menkiti paints about the relation-
ship between the community and the individual, forms the basis of Gyekye’s criti-
cism of Menkiti. As far as Gyekye is concerned, “Menkiti maintains that the African
view asserts the ontological primacy, and hence the ontological independence, of
the community”. According to Menkiti, the African view supports the following
notions: (1) “it is the community that defines the person as person”; (2) “personhood
is acquired”; (3) “personhood is something which has to be achieved, and is not
given simply because one is born of human seed”; (4) “personhood is something at
which individuals could fail”.
Gyekye critiques Menkiti’s way of examining personhood in African thought – in

which the primary focus is on the community as opposed to the individual – as un-
necessarily overemphasised. In Gyekye’s opinion, emphasis is done at the expense
of many other equally important human features.
One of Gyekye’s main concerns is the risk of failing to see the bigger picture if
everything is narrowed down to the community. According to Gyekye, Menkiti’s
approach makes the community an all-powerful structure in such a way that anybody
who functions outside it may run the risk of being punished by failure to achieve
personhood. Gyekye’s concerns become clear when he writes:
A person is by nature a social (communal) being, yes; but he/she is by nature other things
as well (i.e. a person possesses other essential attributes). Failure to recognise this may result
in pushing the significance and implications of a person’s communal nature beyond their
limits, an act that would in turn result in investing the community with an all-engulfing
moral authority to determine all things about the life of the individual person. One might
thus easily succumb to the temptation of exaggerating the normative status and power of the
cultural community in relation to those of the person, and thus obfuscating our understanding
the real nature of the person.
Menkiti attempts to show the acquisition of personhood in African thought by

referring to the use of the neutral pronoun “it” to refer to children and new-borns,
but not to adults.
Here Gyekye criticises him on the point that he has not investigated how the neutral
pronoun “it” is used in a number of African languages. According to Gyekye, it is
Menkiti’s hasty attempt to show that children and new-borns are not persons yet
(the community has not yet conferred personhood on them) that makes him use
a non-African language (English) as the basis of his argument. He further points
out that if Menkiti had examined how the neutral pronoun “it” functions in some
34
African languages, he would not have arrived at the above conclusion. In Menkiti’s
attempt to consolidate his argument about acquisition of personhood, he argues that
“the relative absence of ritualized grief over the death of a child in African socie-
ties” further proves that the community does not confer personhood on a child.
Menkiti points to the elaborate burial ceremony and ritualised grief following the
death of an older person in African societies as a counterexample. The reason for
the reaction being so different in the two cases is that the community has already
conferred personhood status on the older person.
However Gyekye rejects Menkiti’s point of view, stating different reasons for elabo-
rate burial practices when older people die. Gyekye refers to the Akan people, who
believe excessive demonstrations of grief over the death of a child may result in (1)
the mother becoming infertile or (2) the dead child being driven away, thus inhibiting
reincarnation and rebirth. Gyekye states his rejection of Menkiti’s approach as follows:
... no distinctions as to personhood can be made on the basis of the nature and extent of
ritualized grief over the death of a child or of an older person. A human person is a person
whatever his/her age or social status. Personhood may reach its full realization in com-
munity, it is not acquired or yet to be achieved as one goes along in society. What a person
acquires are status, habits, and personality or character traits: he/she, qua person, becomes
the subject of the acquisition, and being thus prior to the acquisition process, he/she cannot
be defined by what he/she acquires. One is person because of what one is, not because of
what one has acquired.
The above citation shows that Menkiti’s attempt to portray personhood in African
thought as “processual” does not hold. Remember that for Menkiti personhood “is
not given simply because one is born of human seed”. Now, by arguing that chil-
dren and new-borns go through the “process” of becoming persons, Menkiti denies
personhood to children and new-borns But as Gyekye argues, a human person is a
person regardless of age. In short, Gyekye rejects the processual view of personhood.
According to Gyekye, some morally important expressions in the Akan language –
for example “He (or she) is not a person” – are intended to suggest that an individual
has failed to show the expected moral virtues in his or her conduct.
As Gyekye argues, these expressions suggest “a conception of moral personhood; a

person is defined in terms of moral qualities or capacities: a human person is a being
who has a moral sense and is capable of making moral judgements”.
But Gyekye believes this conception of a person does not nullify the case of children
or infants as persons. The fact that children or infants are not yet considered as moral
agents does not rule out the fact that “they are morally capable in potentiality”. As
children grow, they reach a stage in their lives when they become moral agents and are
capable of making moral judgments. Taking moral capacities as a point of departure
in explaining personhood does not necessarily imply that the community confers
personhood, warns Gyekye. As he points out, the community plays a limited role in
a person’s moral life because moral capacities are not conferred by the community.
One of the issues on which Gyekye does not agree with Menkiti is that personhood
is something at which individuals could fail. For Gyekye it is not personhood, but
social status, at which individuals could fail. One of the main goals of Gyekye’s es-
say is to dispel the myth that in an African setting, human persons have no lives of
their own. Despite being “a communitarian being by nature, the human person is,
also by nature, other things as well”. For Gyekye, the human person has rational-
ity which gives him/her the opportunity to make moral judgments. Therefore the
PLS1502/1 35
human person is capable of choice. Because individual persons are born within
a communal structure does not necessarily mean they cannot question some of its
practices. The capacity to assert themselves gives them the opportunity to question
and even to reject some practices.
In clarifying this point further, Gyekye argues as follows: The development of hu-
man, that is communal culture, results from the exercise by individual persons of this
capacity for self-assertion; it is this capacity which makes possible the intelligibility
of autonomous individual choice of goals and life plans.
Gyekye’s approach – a restricted or moderate communitarianism – gives a compre-

hensive account of the self as a communal as well as an autonomous being. Gyekye
regards himself as a moderate communitarian thinker, because for him personhood
is not entirely “defined by membership of the community”. According to Gyekye,
the moderate or restricted communitarianism recognises the self as “a communal
being and as an autonomous, self-determining, self-assertive being with a capacity
for evaluation and choice”.
The moderate view differs from Menkiti’s view, because the latter gives the com-
munity “an all-engulfing moral authority that determines all things about the life
of the individual person”. In his discussion on the doctrine of rights, Gyekye argues
that there is a place for rights in moderate communitarianism. This idea comes into
play because “rights belong primarily and irreducibly to individuals; a right is a right
of some individual”. For Gyekye “the respect for human dignity, a natural or fun-
damental attribute of the person which cannot, as such, be sat nought by the com-
munal structure, generates regard for personal rights”. Gyekye explicitly points out
that radical communitarianism does not allow for rights because it gives priority
to the community over the individual person. But in the case of moderate com-
munitarianism, recognition of the self as “an autonomous, self-determining entity
capable of evaluation and choice and as a communal being” shows that it would
be immoral not to allow rights. Gyekye is of the idea that the community’s cultural
development and success rests on the realisation that it is important to allow for the
exercise of individual rights.
These are some of the reasons that motivate Gyekye to consider moderate com-
munitarianism as a viable option as compared with radical communitarianism.
But despite its recognition for individual rights, the communitarian structure also
focuses attention on other communal values for the good of society as a whole. As
Gyekye points out, communitarianism will not separate “rights from the common
values of the community ... conferring on them a pre-eminent status”. Therefore
Gyekye argues that “in the communitarian political morality, priority will not be
given to rights if doing so will stand in the way of attaining a more high ranked
value or a more preferable goal of the community”. At this stage it becomes clear
that rights will always have a place in the communitarian theory, although they will
not be held as absolute.
As we have already noted, Gyekye states that communitarianism will not give pri-
ority the individual rights. But he is emphatic that “duties that individual members
have or ought to have toward others will be given priority”. The doctrine of duties
becomes clear when Gyekye writes: Concerned, as it is, with the common good or
the communal welfare, the welfare of each and every member of the community, com-
munitarianism will, perhaps undoubtedly, consider duty as the moral tone, as the
supreme principle of morality. By “duty” I mean task, service, conduct, or function
that a person feels morally obligated to perform in respect of another person or other
36
persons. The duties, which some members of the community feel they owe others
by reason of our common humanity and should demonstrate in practice, are such
as the duty to help others in distress, the duty not to harm others, and so on. The
success of communitarianism in advancing duties such as caring for one another will
depend, to a greater extent, on not being obsessive about individual rights, argues
Gyekye. An individualistic system like the Western system does practise the above
duties, but with less success – because the system itself is, according to Gyekye,
obsessed with individual rights. Responding to the question why duties are given
priority over rights, Gyekye takes the position that this is required by “the demands
of the relational character of the person in the wake of his [sic] natural sociality”.
Gyekye explains further when he writes:
The sociality of the person immediately makes him/her naturally oriented to other persons
with whom he/she must live in relation. Living in relation with others directly involves a
person in social and moral roles, duties, obligations, and commitments which the individual
person must fulfil. The natural relationality of the person thus immediately plunges him/her
into a moral universe, making morality an essentially social and trans-individual phenom-
enon focused on the well-being of others. Our natural sociality then prescribes or mandates
a morality that, clearly, should be weighted on duty, i.e. on that which one has to do for
others. One of the priorities of the communitarian structure is to promote communal living.
As Gyekye maintains, the success of communal living depends on the realisation

of each community member that he or she has the moral responsibility to actively
care for the needs of others. This care has to show itself when members of the com-
munity pursue their duties. Gyekye says that “the social and ethical values of social
well-being, solidarity, interdependence, cooperation, compassion, and reciprocity
... primarily impose on the individual a duty to the community and its members”.
He seems to adopt Kant’s ethical approach, who encourages the carrying out of
duty for duty’s sake. Gyekye states that you should carry out your duty not because
someone has a right against you, but because you consider the person worthy of
moral consideration.
As we have already shown, communitarianism embraces rights – which alone should

indicate that, by prioritising duties over rights, communitarianism does not imply
rights are not important. Gyekye is emphatic that
… in the light of the overwhelming emphasis on duties within the communitarian moral
framework, rights would not be given priority over the values of duty and so would not be
considered inviolable or indefeasible: it might on this showing, be appropriate occasionally
to override some individual rights for the sake of protecting the good of the community itself.
The emphasis on duty does not imply that one should focus on caring for the needs
of others without considering one’s own needs. Communitarianism encourages
striking a balance between your needs and the needs of others.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined philosophical anthropology in African thought. Spe-
cifically, we looked at the relation between the self and the other, the individual
and the community. By reading Gyekye’s article, we came to understand that it is
by no means a clearly solvable metaphysical problem, and that different thinkers
approach it differently. In the next chapter, we examine African morality, which
PLS1502/1 37
looks at the moral guidelines that constrain this relationship between the individual
and the community.
(1) How does radical communitarianism differ from moderate communitarianism?

(2) Does Gyekye succeed in his attempt to show us that there is a place for the
exercise of individual rights in moderate communitarianism?
(3) Explain the signifi cance of duties over rights in Gyekye’s version
of communitarianism.
(4) What is the role of the community in both radical and moderate communitarianism?
38
5 STUDY UNIT 5
5 Morality in African thought

Morality, behaviour according to, or in terms of norms and codes on how one ought
to behave in given circumstances, is an important (if not necessary) component of
human existence. In any society, certain deeds, actions and forms of behaviour are
acceptable and thus commended while others are unacceptable, about which people
are warned and/or punished. Even though different societies have different norms
and practices, the idea of good (acceptable) and bad behaviour is universal. It speaks
for itself that such an important aspect of life will be the topic of many and different
kinds of discussions in any group or community. “Why/Why not this or that?” is a
general and important question, and reasons, good or bad, for moral prescriptions,
judgments and expectations are given in all parts of the world. In this regard the
relationship between morality, on the one hand, and religion, human nature, ration-
ality, culture and individual make-up, on the other, is important. Accounts of this
relationship between morality and religion differ. In this learning unit we introduce
you to moral thinking particularly with reference to the African context. We attempt
to give you some insight into the basic framework of morality, and moral discourse
in Africa. Two key issues figure prominently in these discussions: African humanism
and the idea of communitarian ethics. We say that in Africa we have a particular
approach to morality, an approach in which the community as such and the indi-
vidual’s embeddedness in the community is crucially important. At the end of your
studies you should be able to explain how morality and moral evaluation function
in these communities, in other words to account for moral thinking in Africa. To
say that a particular approach characterises African moral discourse does not imply
that African morality is a closed book for the outsider. Attempting to describe and
account for moral thinking in Africa show that these issues are general in nature.
Moral thinking concerns questions like:
• Exactly what is involved when we make a moral judgment?

• How should we view moral education and punishment?
• What is the role of religion, culture, traditions and history in morality and moral
discourse?
• How do we differentiate between moral utterances on the one hand and
descriptions, facts and scientific theories on the other?
These are only a few of many questions. In short, an introduction to African moral
thinking is to a large extent an introduction to moral thinking in general. Seen in
this way, we can say that a further aim of this learning unit is to give you an idea of
moral thinking in general. Your studies should sensitise you to differences among
cultural groups with respect to morality and moral discourse, but also enable you to
see them for what they are. These differences form a basis for serious misunderstand-
ings and disagreements, but there is enough common ground to make discussion
and mutual understanding possible. Further, your studies should give you an idea
of how to handle this kind of discussion.
PLS1502/1 39
LEARNING OUTCOMES
(a) describe what morality is

(b) explain what ethics is
(c) discuss how Bewaji approaches the foundations of African morality
(d) differentiate at an elementary level, between African and Western moral thinking
Discuss the following ideas with your classmates:
• Think about your own life and your own behaviour.

• Do you have a very clear idea of your ethical principles? If you do, what are these principles?
Why are they better principles to follow rather than other principles?
• Or do you rather act according to “gut feeling”? If so, how do you know when you are doing
the “right” thing?
• Can you think of other examples of actions that are constrained by ethical behaviour?
5.2 The distinction between morality and ethics

The words morality and ethics are sometimes used interchangeably. So we have
to ask the following question: Are the words morality and ethics synonyms? For
the purpose of this discussion, it is important to make a basic distinction between
the two words. Read the following pdf-attachment to understand the distinction
between the two words more comprehensively.
• Make a table with two columns, one for African ethics and one for Western ethics.
• Think of three similarities, and write them down.
• Now, write down three differences.
A closer analysis of the two words, ethics and morality, show that they are closely
related in terms of their original meaning. In one of his works, Moral philosophy in
African context, Joseph A Ilori (1994:40) argues that “moral” comes from the Latin
moralis and “ethics” from the Greek word ethos. In their original meaning, the two
words meant “the custom or way of life”. Ilori explores this point further when he
argues that there is a tendency in today’s world to use “morals” and “morality” to
refer to the conduct itself, and “ethics” and “ethical” to refer to the study of moral
conduct or the system or code that is followed. When Ilori searches for morality
in the philosophic tradition, he concludes that the conception of morality in this
sphere has been more comprehensive. His point becomes clearer when he says (Ilori
1994:5): “While the everyday idea of the moral is based on conformity to a specified
and limited code of conduct, the comprehensive definition extends the concept to
include every area of human experience”.
According to the broad view, moral judgements are not limited to such particular
concerns as sexual relations, gambling, drinking, and murder, but are relevant also to
such matters as choice of friends, selection of occupation, and manner of pursuing
it, participation in civic affairs, and decisions about recreation.
It appears that by considering every area of human experience in his attempt to clarify
morality, Ilori points out that the human life is a moral life. Ilori (1994:5) goes further
to point out the defining characteristics of the moral as follows. Firstly, the moral is
in the realm of decision. There is no morality without a choice among alternatives.
Thus morality is concomitant of freedom. Secondly, the moral concerns values. The
40
moral problem is to decide between alternative possibilities on the basis of their
respective values. A moral choice is a decision for the better alternative, while an
immoral choice is a decision for the inferior alternative. The choice between equally
valuable possibilities is morally neutral. Ilori (1994:5) contends that “the definition
of morality [referring] to [a] deliberate decision among alternative values locates the
moral in the person rather than in the act”. The above point clarifies the commonly
held assumption that morality relates to particular acts. Hence sexual offences, steal-
ing and murder are accounted as immoral deeds, while sobriety, honesty, faithfulness
and gentleness are regarded as moral.
Our introductory remarks in this chapter bring to the fore the following points:
• Instead of promoting the autonomous individual, morality in African thought

tends to focus on the communal nature of human society. An act is viewed as
good provided it enhances both the good of society and the individual. Principles
such as personhood, Ubuntu and humanising of economic action reflect this
approach. Human solidarity and harmony in social relationships are some of the
important elements of morality that are promoted in African thought.
• Morality in African thought is organic in nature, in the sense that it grows within
the community and permeates every sphere of communal life. Morality manifests
itself in daily communal life and activities, in which members of the community
carry out their different roles. What is good or evil is articulated by the community
within the parameters of its own experience; hence African proverbs are significant
in articulating and preserving these experiences. The Akan saying onipa na ohia
(it is a human being who has value) hinges on Akan (African) experience. In
the above context it can be argued that morality in African thought is concrete.
In traditional Africa, morality does not have an abstract source but grows from
within, because communities themselves are the makers of morality.
• Some of the concepts that are presented and argued have universal significance,
despite their being originally African concepts. A good example is the following:
if the concept of Ubuntu is applied anywhere in the world, it acquires a universal
dimension. But having said that, we should understand that being universally
applicable does not necessarily nullify Ubuntu’s particular dimension. As such,
we can conclude that Ubuntu as concept displays both particular and universal
features.
5.3 Prescribed readings: JAI Bewaji – “Ethics and morality in the

Yoruba culture”
The text of John Ayetunde Bewaji is titled “Ethics and morality in the Yoruba culture”.
Once you are done working through the reading discuss the following topics:
Definitions of moral concepts
Write down a one sentence definition on each of the following moral concepts, as found in the Yoruba
culture and discussed by Bewaji:
Ese, eewe, abuku, aimo and egbin.
PLS1502/1 41
Ethics and policies
What role do you think African conceptions of right and wrong behaviour influences key
political role players and the decisions in policy that they make?
Can you think of policies in South Africa that have distinct African moral values as a paradigm?
Analysis of the text
What follows below is a brief analysis of Bewaji’s text. Please read this together with
the text itself. The essay is easy and straight-forward.
Bewaji begins his essay by pointing out the significance of a code of morality in all
societies. He asserts that any code of moral norms is intended for “the adjustment of
interests among individuals for attaining the general well-being of the community”
(page 54). But he also accounts for what makes African and non-African moral
systems different. Then he announces the purpose of his essay, namely, an analysis
of the foundations of African morality.
Main points of the essay
Bewaji debunks the common fallacies about African morality. He mentions them
as follows:
• Moral obligations in African morality are social rather than individual.

• Morality in Africa has a religious foundation. This is based on the view that
Africans are religious in all things.
Then he makes two very important points in relation to African morality:
• The first one is that the basis of morality in Africa is human welfare, and not
to earn reward from some divine or metaphysical being. However, he hastens
to point out that there is a relationship between religion and morality in Africa.
They both play a social cohesion role and also bring order in society. Thus, even
religion has humanistic interests.
• The second is that ethics permeates all spheres of life in African societies. In fact
even the gods and ancestors are expected to be ethical in their conduct.
The last part of the essay discusses ethical concepts in the Yoruba philosophy and
culture. However, this discussion is preceded by enlisting of virtues of a morally
upright person. Bewaji is also emphatic in pointing out that such virtues are rewarded
by society. For instance, a virtuous person is respected by all in society.
Among the many moral concepts in the Yoruba culture, only the following are
discussed:
• Ese: infractions against the Supreme Being, deities, ancestors as well as other
people (Bewaji 2004:58).
• Eewe: things that are prohibited by the Supreme Being, which could lead to
sanctions (Bewaji 2004:58).
• Abuku: the “blemish” acquired when acting against moral expectations (Bewaji
2004:58).
• Aimo: the lack of knowledge (in the epistemic sense), also, ignorance as a liability
(in the moral sense) (Bewaji 2004:58).
• Egbin: caution against moral decadence (Bewaji 2004:58).
42
Bewaji concludes the essay by highlighting important issues discussed in the body
of the essay.
5.4 Conclusion
From this learning unit, we can see that there are differences and similarities between
African and Western conceptions of ethics. Ethics, as the study of morality, gives
guidelines on how to decide between right and wrong actions. In African ethics there
is a definite focus on the community and the individual’s place therein, as defined
by his/her interaction with the broader community.
(1) What is the difference between ethics and morality?

(2) What is the moral foundation of an African ethic according to Bewaji?
(3) Is it possible to strike a balance between interests of individuals and of a com-
munity in African ethics?
(4) What is the difference between Western and African ethics?
PLS1502/1 43
APPENDIX 1
1.8 Further Reading

Bernal, M. 1987. Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civiliza-
tion. Rutgers: University Press.
Diop, CA. 1974. The African origin of civilization. 1st edition, vol 1. New
York: Hill.
Obenga, T. 1990. Philosophie Africaine de la pe´riode Pharaonique 2780–
330 avant notre eˆre.
Onyewuenyi, I.C. 1993. The African origin of Greek philosophy. Nsukka:
University of Nigeria Press.
Osuagwu, I.M. 1999. African historical reconstruction. Imo State, Nigeria:
Amamihe Publications.
Van Binsbergen, W.M.J. (ed). 1997. ‘‘Black Athena: ten years after,’’ in Dutch
Archeological and Historical Society. Hoofdorp: The Netherlands.
Van Sertima, I (ed). 1986. Great African thinkers. New Brunswick: Transaction.
2.5 Further Reading

Biko, Steve B. 2002. ‘Black Consciousness and the quest for a true humanity’
in Philosophy from Africa: a text with readings, 2nd ed. by Coetzee,
P.H. and Roux, A.P.J. (eds). Oxford U.P.: Cape Town.
Oruka, Odera H. 2002. ‘Ideology and culture’ in Philosophy from Africa: a
text with readings, 2nd ed. by Coetzee, P.H. and Roux, A.P.J. (eds).
Oxford U.P.: Cape Town.
Serequeberhan, T. 2002. ‘The critique of Eurocentrism and the practice of
African philosophy’ in Philosophy from Africa: a text with readings,
2nd ed. by Coetzee, P.H. and Roux, A.P.J. (eds). Oxford U.P.: Cape
Town.
Wa Thiong’o, Ngugi. 2002. ‘Moving the centre: towards a pluralism of
cultures’ in Philosophy from Africa: a text with readings, 2nd ed. by
Coetzee, P.H. and Roux, A.P.J. (eds). Oxford U.P.: Cape Town.
3.8 Further Reading

Irele, A, et al. 2010. The Oxford Encyclopedia of African Philosophy,
vol. 1 & 2. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wiredu, K. 2004. Blackwell Companion to African Philosophy. Malden:
Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
44
4.6 Further Reading: Bibliography
Gbadegesin, S. 2002. The Yoruba concept of a person: Énìyàn in Philoso-
phy from Africa: a text with readings, 2nd ed. by Coetzee, P.H. and
Roux, A.P.J. (eds). Oxford U.P.: Cape Town.
Okolo, C.B. 2002. Self as a problem in African Philosophy in Philosophy
from Africa: a text with readings, 2nd ed. by Coetzee, P.H. and Roux,
A.P.J. (eds). Oxford U.P.: Cape Town.
5.5 Further Reading: Bibliography

Ilori, J.A. 1994. Moral philosophy in African context. 2nd edition. Zaria:
Ahmadu Bello University Press.
Coetzee, P.H. 2002. Particularity in morality and its relation to community
in Philosophy from Africa: a text with readings, 2nd ed. by Coetzee,
P.H. and Roux, A.P.J. (eds). Oxford U.P.: Cape Town.
Wiredu, K. 2002. The moral foundations of an African culture in Philosophy
from Africa: a text with readings, 2nd ed. by Coetzee, P.H. and Roux,
A.P.J. (eds). Oxford U.P.: Cape Town.
Ramose, M.B. 2002. The ethics of ubuntu in Philosophy from Africa: a
text with readings, 2nd ed. by Coetzee, P.H. and Roux, A.P.J. (eds).
Oxford U.P.: Cape Town.
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Study unit 1: Defining African philosophy 1

Welcome to the module, Introduction to African Philosophy (PLS1502)!

This is an introductory module to African philosophy. You are about to embark on

1 OVERVIEW OF THE MODULE

OUTCOMES AND ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

• Learners will be able to understand • Attempt to answer the question: What is

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Study unit 1 Study unit 3

Study unit 4 Study unit 5

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1.1 Introduction and learning outcomes

1.2 The controversy of the term “Africa”

• Who named the continent?

It is reasonable to accept the geographical meaning of “Africa”: Africa, from the

From this citation we note three things:

• Is there an African philosophy?

Another point is that the disregard, rejection or misrepresentation of the histories

1.3 Africanity of African philosophy

According to Osuagwu (African historical reconstruction, vol 1:30) Africanity of African

In other words, what makes philosophy African is a variety of factors. Osuagwu

(a) The ethno-African: identifies an African author or authors by origin or nature,

Mazrui identified two more categories of Africans:

Ethno-African Africans of the blood

1.4 Philosophicality of African philosophy

First, it is important to recognise that to be genuine lovers of wisdom we must pay

Philosophy then, properly understood, is the love of wisdom – if you translate

(a) African philosophy ought to be formally understood and undertaken.

According to Kwasi Wiredu, a Ghanaian philosopher, African philosophy must

In other words, the literature of African philosophy is a body of texts produced by

Serequeberhan’s conception of African philosophy emphasises the following:

(a) African philosophy is philosophy if it is written. Thus, orality cannot be phi-

Serequeberhan’s definition of African philosophy is closer to Paulin Hountondji’s.

Hountondji’s definition of African philosophy may be problematised as follows:

• Who are Africans?

• Why does he confine philosophy to written texts only?

How do you think Hountondji can answer these problems?

Please read this extract carefully.

(1) Does the idea of solar philosophy make sense?

1.7 Further Reading (see Appendix 1 for list of Readings)

2.1 Introduction and learning outcomes

2.2 The term “discourse”

In the first instance, we understand meaning as content. The Merriam-Webster Diction-

2.3 Discourses on Africa

2.4 Prescribed readings

• What could they possibly mean?

2.4.1 “Categories of cross-cultural cognition and the African condition” –

Western cross-cultural paradigms provide no key to understanding and knowing

Approach and method

(b) Pre-logical vs logical

Primitive culture is participated in collectively, it is a shared reality. The idea of individual,

(c) Perceptual vs conceptual

On this basis Lévi-Strauss may be described as an adherent of the binary view of

(d) Oral vs written

(e) Religious vs scientific

• The distinction between science and religion is often very contentious.

2.4.2 “The struggle for reason in Africa” – MB Ramose

• What could Aristotle possibly have meant with his definition?

Statement of the question

The restrictive interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the human being as a rational

Approach and method