Ust LMT Political Law PDF

UST LAW LAST MINUTE TIPS 2019
POLITICAL LAW
National Territory
Q: What comprises the National Territory?
A: The national territory comprises the:
1. Philippine archipelago; and

2. All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
Q: What comprises the Philippine Archipelago?
A: The Philippine Archipelago (1935 Constitution’s Philippine legal and historical territory) covers the
following territories:
1. Cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the U.S under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898
2. Defined in the Treaty of Spain and U.S. at Washington on November 7, 1900
 Cagayan;
 Sulu;
 Sibuto
3. Defined in the Treaty between U.S. and Great Britain on January 2, 1930
 Turtle and Mangsee Islands Island of Batanes
 Contemplated in the phrase “belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title”
Q: What comprises “all other territories”?
A:
1. Spratly Group of Islands (SGI);

2. Kalayaan Group of Islands;
3. Scarborough Shoal; and
4. Sabah
Q: What is an Associated State? Is it recognized in the Philippines?
A: In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional
device of former colonies on their way to full independence. The provisions of the MOA-AD indicate, among
other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does NOT contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
(Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel)
Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Q: Is the right of parents to rear their children absolute?
A: NO. While parents have the primary role in childrearing, it should be stressed that “when actions
concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the State may act to
promote these legitimate interests.” Thus, “in cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the
child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents’ qualified right to control the upbringing of their children.” As our Constitution itself
provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is
therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. As parens patriae, the State
has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children. (SPARK vs.
QUEZON CITY, G.R. NO. 22542, AUGUST 8, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE)
Q: Is compulsory military service law violative of the Constitution?
A: NO. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against
the Constitution but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to
defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the
will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men
who volunteer to enlist therein. (People v. Sosa)
State Immunity
GR: The State may not be sued without its consent. (1987 Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 3).
XPN: A State may be sued if it gives its consent, whether express or implied.
Q: UP Los Banos was sued because it failed to pay the balance of the construction cost for its new
building. It lost the case. The RTC issued a writ of execution and ordered that funds of UP be
garnished. Can UP invoke the doctrine of state immunity?
A: YES. UP is a government instrumentality. Funds of UP are government funds that are public in character.
Hence, UP funds could not be subject to execution or garnishment. Suability of the state does not
necessarily mean its liability. (UP vs. Judge Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012)
Q: The City of Bacolod ordered the closure of a Bingo operation at the SM City Bacolod for operating
without a permit. The owner of the establishment sued the City government and asked for damages. Is
the doctrine of State immunity applicable in this case?
A: YES. No consent to be sued can be implied from the mere conferment and exercise of the power to issue
business permits and licenses. Such power is not an exercise of the government’s proprietary function.
Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a governmental act. (City of Bacolod vs.
Phuture Visions, G.R. No. 190289, January 17, 2018)
Legislative Department
Party-list System
Four inviolable parameters to determine winners in the Party-list elections
1. 20% ALLOCATION – The Party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of the
members of the House including those under the Party-list;
2. 2% THRESHOLD – Only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the Party-
list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
3. THREE-SEAT LIMIT – Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, provided
that it has secured more than 2% of the total valid votes cast for a party-list system, is entitled only to a
maximum of 3 seats;
4. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION – The additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”
(See sample of computation at the last page)***
Q: Is it necessary for a party-list nominee to actually belong to the marginalized sector that he seeks to
represent?
A: NO. A nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and underrepresented status represented
by the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate of the interest and concern of the marginalized
and underrepresented sector represented is still qualified to be a nominee.
In case of political parties, which are identified by their ideology or platform of government, bona fide
membership, in accordance with the political party's constitution and by-laws, would suffice. (Atong
Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013)
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. (Article VI, Section 16 (3), 1987 Constitution)
Q: May the courts hear and decide cases involving disorderly behavior of a Member of the House of
Representatives?
A: NO. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which
the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication
by the Courts. (Osmeña vs. Pendatun, GR L-17144, October 28, 1960)
Privileges, Inhibitions, and Disqualifications

1. SALARIES of Members of Congress
a. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
Members of the Senate and HoR approving such increases.
b. Member of the Senate and House are not prohibited from receiving per diems and allowances.
c. The Congress is mandated to publish the list of expenses incurred by and paid to the each
member.
2. Parliamentary Immunities and Legislative Privilege
a. Legislators are privileged from arrest while Congress is “in session” with respect to offenses
punishable by up to 6 years imprisonment.
b. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor
offenses.
c. Legislative Privilege is where no member shall be questioned or held liable in any forum other
than his/her respective Congressional body for any debate or speech in Congress or in any
committee thereof.
d. Such accountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker’s speech or utterance is made outside
sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the due functioning of the legislative
process. (In other words they are only protected in the Plenary Hall and not outside of the Walls
of Congress)
3. Inhibitions and Disqualifications
a. No Senator/ member of the HoR may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals or quasi/judicial and other administrative bodies.
b. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with or any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including GOCC or its subsidiaries during his term of office.
c. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Incompatible Office and Forbidden Office

Incompatible Office is where no member of the Senate or the HoR may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries, during his term WITHOUT forfeiting his seat.
Forbidden Office is where the member of Congress cannot be appointed to any civil office in the government
that has been created or the emoluments thereof have been increased while he was incumbent in the
legislature. But such ban from being appointed last only for the duration of the term for which the member of
Congress was elected.
Appropriation and Realignment

Doctrine of Augmentation:
GR: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations.
XPN: The following may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations:
1. President;
2. President of the Senate;
3. Speaker of the House of Representatives;
4. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and
5. Heads of Constitutional Commissions. (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 25[5]; Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No.
71977, February 27, 1987 and Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Pork Barrel System
The collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds,
primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government.
Q: Why is the PDAF declared unconstitutional?
A: The enforcement of the national budget is a function constitutionally assigned to the Executive branch of
government. The Legislative branch of government should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive.
Congress may still exercise its oversight function. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be
confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference
and/or assumption of executive functions. (GRECO BELGICA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA, G.R. NO.
208566, NOVEMBER 19, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE)
Q: Why is the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) declared unconstitutional?
A: The Court declared that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, the cross-border transfers, and the
funding of projects outside the General Appropriations Act (GAA) under the guise of the DAP were
unconstitutional. (Maria Carolina Araullo vs. Benigno Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
Legislative Inquiries and Oversight Functions
Q: The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee sent a subpoena to Former Bureau of Customs Commissioner
Nicanor Faeldon requiring him to appear in the investigation being conducted by the said Senate
Committee with regard to the TARA system in the BOC. But Faeldon refused to attend the hearing on
the ground that there is already a case pending with the Office of the Ombudsman. Is he correct?
A: NO. The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should
not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Thus, the former Customs Commissioner Faeldon is not correct in refusing to
attend the investigation proceeding on the ground that criminal and civil cases involving the same issues are
pending in courts. (Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007)
Power of Impeachment
Q: Is the power of impeachment subject to judicial review?
A: NO. The power to impeach is essentially a non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by Congress
only within the limits of the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution.
Impeachable Officers:
1. President
2. Vice President
3. Members of the Supreme Court
4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
5. Ombudsman
One-year bar rule
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another may not be filed against the same official within
the one-year period. The one-year bar rule is reckoned from the time the complaint is forwarded to the
Justice Committee of the House of Representatives. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one
impeachment proceeding so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties.
Also, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to
its main work of law-making.
Difference between Quo Warranto and Impeachment
QUO WARRANTO IMPEACHMENT
Initiated 1. Solicitor General, or a public 1. Initiated by any person sponsored by a

by prosecutor, when directed by member of the House; and
the President; or 2. Initiated by any House member.

2. Person claiming to be entitled
to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another
Initiated A person who usurps or unlawfully 1.

against holds or exercises a public office or
position 1. President
2. Vice President
3. Members of the Supreme Court
4. Members of the Constitutional
Commissions
5. Ombudsman
Governing Rules of Court Constitution
law
Electoral Tribunals
Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals
Their jurisdiction begins only after a candidate has become a member of the HOR or Senate. It begins when
there is concurrence of the following:
1. a valid proclamation of COMELEC;

2. a proper oath before the Speaker of the HoR or the Senate President on the day of the opening
session; and
3. valid assumption of office.
Executive Department
Q: In what instances may the Vice President succeed as President or Acting President?
A:
1. Death
2. Resignation
3. Permanent disability
4. Removal from office
5. Conviction in an impeachment trial
6. If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President shall assume office
7. The President transmits a letter to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office
8. Members of cabinet transmit a letter to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Q: President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC
and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
Does the executive order usurps the legislative power to create office?
A: NO. The President has continuing authority to reorganize the executive department under Sec. 31 of E.O.
292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. In Domingo v. Zamora, the Court gave the rationale behind the
President’s continuing authority. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need
of every President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” The President
merely organized his office. (Prospero A. Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
196425, July 24, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe)
Power of appointment
Q: Does the Office of the President have jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally created Office
of the Ombudsman?
A: NO. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos
and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but
seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.
The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked
to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally
and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties.
The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not
as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office.
(Emilio A. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)
Midnight Appointments
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety (Sec. 15, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution).
The prohibition on appointments under Section 15, Article VII only include those in the executive
department. Those in the Supreme Court are NOT included in said prohibition.
Appointment Powers of the President
1. Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
2. Officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution
a. Regular members of the JBC
b. Chairman and commissioners of Constitutional commissions
c. VP as Cabinet member
d. Members of SC and judges of lower courts
e. Ombudsman and his deputies
3. Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
4. Officers of the Government whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
Whether Subject to CA Confirmation
Group 1: YES [subject], except VP as Cabinet member [not subject]

Group 2: NO [not subject], except 2a and 2b [subject]
Group 3: NO [not subject]
Group 4: NO [not subject]
Types of Appointments
1. Regular 2. Ad Interim 3. Temporary or acting
Permanent Permanent Possesses some (but not all) of

the qualifications or any of the
disqualifications
Made by President while Made by President while Congress Does not enjoy security of
Congress is in session is not in session tenure
Takes effect only after Takes effect immediately Cannot be validly confirmed by
confirmation by the CA CA
Once approved, continues until Terminates if (a) disapproved by

the end of the appointee’s term CA or (b) by-passed by Congress
Confirmation comes first before Appointment comes first before

appointment confirmation
4. Permanent 5. Career 6. Non-career
Possesses all of the qualifications Based on merit and fitness, usually Not based on merit and fitness,
and none of the disqualifications done through competitive exams but some other considerations
Enjoys security of tenure
Required to be submitted to CA
for confirmation
Appointments made by Congress
The Supreme Court ruled that even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress
may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick
his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one
individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
Military powers
BASIS CALLING OUT SUSPENDING THE MARTIAL LAW (ML)

PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
Character Most benign and Involve curtailment and Involve curtailment and
involves ordinary police suppression of civil suppression of civil
action rights and individual rights and individual
freedom freedom
Whenever it becomes Only when there is Only when there is

When may the necessary to prevent or actual invasion, actual invasion,
President resort to suppress lawless rebellion, and public rebellion, and public
this power? violence, invasion, or safety requires it. safety requires it.
rebellion.
President must act 1. Time limit of 60 days; 1. Time limit of 60 days;

within permissible
constitutional 2. Review and possible 2. Review and possible
boundaries or in a revocation by Congress revocation by Congress;
manner not constituting 3. Review and possible 3. Review and possible
Limitation grave abuse of nullification by the SC nullification by the SC
discretion.
But generally, president

has full discretion
Actual use to which YES. Limited to the YES. Limited to the

President puts the determination of determination of
Subject to judicial
armed forced NOT whether the President whether the President
review?
subject to judicial had sufficient factual had sufficient factual
basis. basis.
The "sufficiency of factual basis test"
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to
determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases. As Commander-in-Chief, the
President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these
powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient
factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the
President at the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
Events that happened after the issuance of the proclamation, which are included in the written report, cannot
be considered in determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since these happened after the President had already
issued the proclamation. (Lagman v. Medialdea)
Guidelines in the declaration of martial law
1. There must be an Invasion and when public safety requires it; or

2. There must be Rebellion and public safety requires it.
Duration: Not more than 60 days following which it shall be automatically lifted unless extended by Congress.
Duty of the President to report to Congress: within 48 hours personally or in writing.
The authority of Congress to affirm or revoke or allow the lapse or extend the effectivity of proclamation: by
majority vote of all its members voting jointly. (IR-PS-60-48-jointly)
Q: May the President, in the exercise of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would
require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to
those solutions which the present laws allow? Explain.
A: If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting
peace in Mindanao, then he must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions
that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. So long as the President limits himself
to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendment and
revision, his mere recommendation need not be construed as unconstitutional act. Given the limited nature of
the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, he cannot guarantee to any third party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she
could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested (Province of North Cotabato v. GRPs Peace panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No.
183591, October 14, 2008).
Executive clemency
1. Pardoning Power – Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution). Limitations on this power are as
follows:
a. does not apply in cases of impeachment (Ibid.)
b. there must first be conviction by final judgment (Ibid.)
c. not applicable to legislative contempt
d. not applicable to election offenses without favorable recommendation of COMELEC (Sec. 5, Art.
IX-C)
2. Amnesty - He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
PARDON AMNESTY
Concurrence of Congress is not required Concurrence of a majority of all the members of

Congress
Conviction by final judgment is required May be granted even without prior conviction or final
judgment
May mean forgiveness but not forgetfulness Erases whatever shade of guilt there was
Frees the individual from all the penalties and legal

disabilities imposed upon him by the sentence
Restores to him all civil and political rights

Previous admission of guilt is not required A previous admission of guilt (Vera v. People)
Usually extended to individuals convicted of common Extended to group of individuals charged of political
crimes offenses
Private act of the President Official act of the President
Powers pertinent to foreign relations

The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In
the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Vinuya v.
Romulo)
Judicial Department
Requisites of Judicial Review
1. Actual case or controversy

2. Locus Standi
3. Raised at the earliest opportunity
4. Constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case
Moot Questions
Q: The Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, issued a resolution requiring PSBank to disclose
information on Chief Justice Corona’s alleged foreign currency deposit. PSBank filed a Petition for
Certiorari to nullify the said resolution arguing that such deposits are confidential under RA 6426.
Meanwhile, the impeachment proceedings have been terminated and CJ Corona executed a waiver
against confidentiality of all his bank accounts.
Considering the supervening events, may the Supreme Court still pass upon the merits of the petition?
A: NO. The supervening conviction of CJ Corona, as well as his execution of a waiver against the
confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in peso or foreign currency, has rendered the present
petition moot and academic. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial
relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
(PSBANK vs. SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT, G.R. NO. 200238, NOVEMBER 20, 2012 PERLAS-BERNABE)
Exceptions to the mootness principle
(a) When there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

(b) When the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved;
(c) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and
(d) When the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (ISAAA. vs. GREENPEACE, PERLAS-
BERNABE)
Safeguard of judicial independence
Supervisory Powers of the Supreme Court over the JBC Council

Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the JBC Council is created under the supervision
of the Supreme Court. Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing
of compliance with its rules.
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of
oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and
the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials
see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone,
but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They
have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. (Jardeleza vs. Sereno, G.R. No.
213181, August 19, 2014).
Administrative Supervision of the Supreme Court
Administrative Supervision by the SC over Courts
Q: Can the Office of the Ombudsman entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a
judge’s certification submitted to the Supreme Court?
A: NO. Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the
Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties. Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. (Maceda v. Vasquez, 1993)
Q: Elaine and Patricia took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) and passed. At
the time of the PBET, Elaine and Patricia were public school teachers under the supervision of the
DepEd. Later on, Patricia transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong City as Court Interpreter. In
December 2017, Elaine went to the CSC to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During the
course of the transaction, a CSC personnel noticed that she did not resemble the picture of the
examinee in the Picture Seat Plan. Upon further probing, it was confirmed that it was Patricia who
took and passed the examinations under the name Elaine. A case for Dishonesty was filed against
Elaine and Patricia before the CSC. Patricia is now questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over her. She
argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme
Court. The CSC, however, argued that it has jurisdiction over her since the offense was committed
when Patricia was still a teacher. Rule on the contention of the CSC.
A: Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the SC, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment in the Judiciary. Thus, CSC does not have jurisdiction over an
employee of the judiciary for acts committed while said employee was still in the executive branch. (Ampong
v. CSC, G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008)
Procedural rule-making
Q: Under Sec. 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have the power to
"promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts xxx." Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 provides that "any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining."
Patricio, a user who was charged with alleged sale of shabu but who wants to enter a plea of guilt to a
charge of possession, questions the constitutionality of Sec. 23 on the ground that Congress
encroached on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under Sec. 5, Article VIII. He argues that
plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and is within the exclusive constitutional power of the Court.
Is Patricio correct? Explain your answer. (2016 BAR)
A: YES. In the recent case of Estipona vs. Lobrigo, the Court declared Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 as
unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. (Salvador Estipona vs. Hon.
Frank Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Rights to Life, Liberty, and Property

Due Process
1. Requisites in Student Disciplinary Proceedings:

a. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
b. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired;
c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. (ADMU v. Capulong)
NOTE: The requisites also apply in student disciplinary proceedings in the Philippine Military.
(Cudia v. PMA)
2. Due Process in Deportation Proceedings – Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of
the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of
such person to due process should not be denied. Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation
nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
The issuance of warrants of arrest, arrests without warrant and service of warrants should be in
accordance likewise with Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; search warrants
issued by the CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; and so
the matter of bail, motion to quash, and trial, among others. (Lao Gi v. CA)
Administrative vs. Judicial due process
BASIS ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL
Essence Opportunity to explain one’s side A day in court
Usually through seeking a reconsideration of Submission of pleadings and oral

Means the ruling or the action taken, or appeal to a arguments
superior authority
Required when the administrative body is Both are essential:

Notice and
exercising quasi-judicial function. (PhilCom-Sat
Hearing 1. Notice
v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989)
2. Hearing
Searches and Seizures
Instances of a valid warrantless search (2000, 2009, 2015 Bar)

1. Visual search is made of moving vehicles at checkpoints;
2. Search is an incident to a valid arrest;
NOTE: An officer making an arrest may take from the person:

a. Any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the offense
b. Was the fruit thereof
c. Which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping
d. Which might be used as evidence in the trial of the case
3. Search of passengers made in airports;

4. When things seized are within plain view of a searching party (Plain View Doctrine);
5. Stop and frisk (precedes an arrest);
6. When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently;
NOTE: Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. [Caballes v
CA, 373 SCRA 221 (2002)] (2015 Bar)
In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the contents of his pocket. (Alcaraz v. People, G.R.
No. 199042, November 17, 2014)
7. Customs search; and
8. Exigent and emergency circumstances. (People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716, July 6, 1994)
Freedom of Expression
Four aspects of freedom of speech and press

1. Freedom from censorship or prior restraint – see discussion on prior restraint, pg. 27.
2. Freedom from subsequent punishment to publication – see discussion on subsequent punishment, pg. 28.
3. Freedom of access to information regarding matters of public interest – Official papers, reports and
documents, unless held confidential and secret by competent authority in the public interest, are public
records. As such, they are open and subject to regulation, to the scrutiny of the inquiring reporter or
editor. Information obtained confidentially may be printed without specification of the source; and that
source is closed to official inquiry, unless the revelation is deemed by the courts, or by a House or
committee of the Congress, to be vital to the security of the State.
4. Freedom of circulation – Refers to the unhampered distribution of newspapers and other media among
customers and among the general public. It may be interfered with in several ways. The most important
of these is censorship. Other ways include requiring a permit or license for the distribution of media and
penalizing dissemination of copies made without it, and requiring the payment of a fee or tax, imposed
either on the publisher or on the distributor, with the intent to limit or restrict circulation. These modes
of interfering with the freedom to circulate have been constantly stricken down as unreasonable
limitations on press freedom (Chavez v. Gonzales G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008).(2014 Bar)
NOTE: There need not be total suppression; even restriction of circulation constitutes censorship.
Free Speech Theories
1. Deliberative democracy – includes the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the
right to criticize government actions.
2. Market place of ideas – free speech should be encouraged.
3. Self-expression – free speech enhances human dignity and is a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment.
4. Marker for group identity.
5. Protection for individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses.
6. Safety valve – nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence (Diocese of Bacolod
v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, cited in Cruz and Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2015 Ed., p.
474).
Q: Can the COMELEC regulate the expression made by the Diocese of Bacolod, the latter being private
citizens?
A: NO. COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by the Diocese of Bacolod. The tarpaulin
was not paid for by any candidate or political party. There was no allegation that the Diocese coordinated
with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted
the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is an election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group. (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G. R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, cited in Cruz and
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2015 Ed., p. 474).
Q: Distinguish content-based regulation from content-neutral regulation. Which of the two is presumed
to be unconstitutional? Explain.
CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION CONTENT-BASED RESTRAINT
Merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one The restriction is based on the subject matter of the
that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction
well-defined standards. determines the test by which the challenged act is
assailed with.
Q: Distinguish void-for-vagueness from overbreadth doctrine. Which of the two is presumed to be

unconstitutional? Explain.
VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE

A statute or act suffers from defect of vagueness Decrees that governmental purpose to control or
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at regulations may not be achieved by means which
its meaning and differ as to its application. It is sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: 1) it the area of protected freedoms
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
conduct to avoid; and 2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
government muscle.
Freedom of Religion
Q: Sec. 5.23 of the Reproductive Health Law-IRR provides that skilled health professional such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. Is this provision unconstitutional?
A: YES. This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction
why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other
conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they
belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014).
Benevolent Neutrality Approach
The “wall of separation” is meant to protect the church from the State. It believes that with respect to
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance (Estrada v.
Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006)
Freedom of Religion over Contractual Rights
The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter
must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several
occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred
position in the constitutional system. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal
right and liberty, 34and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must
yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified,
and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, G.R.
No. L-25246, September 12, 1974).
Q: In his letters addressed to Chief Justice Puno, Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of
Justice of Quezon City is being utilized as a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table,
images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. Valenciano believed
that such practice violated the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a
sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. Valenciano also prayed that rules be
promulgated by the Court to put a stop to the holding of Catholic masses, or any other religious
rituals, at the QC Hall of Justice and in all other halls of justice in the country.
(a) Does the holding of masses at the QC Hall of Justice violate the principle of separation of Church
and State?
(b) Was there a violation against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion?
A:
a) NO. Allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent to a fusion of Church and State. The
State adopts a policy of accommodation as a recognition that some governmental measures may not be
imposed on a certain portion of the population for these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As
long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the
State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is merely a case of accommodation.
First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating
that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees
attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and
volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no government funds are
being spent because the lightings and air-conditioning continue to be operational even if there are no
religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has
it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses has
not prejudiced other religions.
b) NO. The basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the sole purpose of
supporting the Roman Catholics.
The basement is also being used as a public waiting area for most of the day and a meeting place for different
employee organizations. The use of the area for holding masses is limited to lunch break period from twelve
(12) o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the afternoon. The masses run for just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is,
therefore, clear that no undue religious bias is being committed when the subject basement is allowed to be
temporarily used by the Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people
and for other purposes. Thus, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property
devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its
primary purpose.
What the law prohibits the use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting
any church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the
furtherance of a particular church. It does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when
the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately
to the public in general. (Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice
Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)
Lemon Test
A test to determine whether an act of the government violates the non-establishment clause.
To pass the Lemon test, a government act or policy must:
1. Have a secular purpose;

2. Not promote or favor any set of religious beliefs or religion generally; and
3. Not get the government too closely involved (“entangled”) with religion. (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, June 28, 1971)
Right to Travel
Q: Following the campaign of President Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several
local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors
through police operations. It was alleged that Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional since it violates
the fundamental right of minors to travel. Is the curfew ordinance unconstitutional?
A: YES. The State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided, that they: (1) serve the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of
juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor’s movement and
activities during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or
getting involved in crimes and criminal activities.
As to the second requirement, that the limitation “be provided by law,” our legal system is replete with laws
emphasizing the State’s duty to afford special protection to children. As parens patriae, the State regulates
and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors’ exercise of their rights.
Even if the right to travel is a fundamental right, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify
restrictions even if made against a fundamental right. (SPARK vs. QUEZON CITY, G.R. NO. 22542, AUGUST 8,
2017, PERLAS-BERNABE)
Q: Several criminal complaints were filed against former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA)
before the DOJ. In view thereof, DOJ Sec. De Lima issued Watchlist Orders (WLO) pursuant to her
authority under DOJ Circular No. 41 which was issued pursuant to the rule-making powers of the DOJ
in order to keep individuals under preliminary investigation within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Subsequently, GMA requested for the issuance of Allow Departure Orders (ADO) so that
she may be able to seek medical attention abroad. Before the resolution of her application for ADO,
GMA filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO seeking to annul and set aside DOJ Circular
No. 41 and WLOs issued against her for being unconstitutional. A TRO was issued but GMA was
prevented from leaving the country. Is DOJ Circular No. 41 unconstitutional for being a violation of the
right to travel?
A: YES. The DOJ has no authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to travel
through the issuance of WLOs and HDOs (Hold Departure Orders). There are only three considerations that
may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public health. Further, there
must be an explicit provision of statutory law or Rules of Court providing for the impairment.
DOJ cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of movement imposed by the circular on the ground that it is
necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the preliminary investigation of the complaints. There is no
authority of law granting it the power to compel the attendance of the subjects of a preliminary investigation
pursuant to its investigatory powers. Its investigatory power is simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately, not
broad enough to embrace the imposition of restraint on the liberty of movement. (Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No.
197930, April 17, 2018)
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Purely Mechanical Acts Not Included
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it
may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right
against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act. (Dela Cruz vs. People G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014)
Examples of purely mechanical acts
1. A woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine
her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920])
2. An accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from
his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was
contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912])
3. To expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917])
4. To have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas,
25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921])
5. To be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body
to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])
Writ of Amparo
Definition of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
"Extrajudicial killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" means the arrest, detention, or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. (Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851)
Q: When they arrived at NAIA, spouses Santiago were informed that they were transferred to another
flight. While making a formal complaint, the spouses noticed a man, later identified as Ramon Tulfo,
taking pictures of them. Raymart confronted Ramon. A brawl thereafter ensued.
Days after the incident, Raffy, Ben, and Erwin Tulfo, brothers of Mon, aired on their TV program
comments against the spouses and threatened to retaliate. Terrified, the spouses filed before the RTC
a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against them. Will the petition prosper?
A: NO. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was intended to address cases involving extralegal killings and/or
enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners’ amparo petition
does not allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the
senses above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a broad invocation of respondents’ purported
violation of their right to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any showing of direct or
indirect government participation. (SPOUSES SANTIAGO vs. RAFFY TULFO, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 205039,
OCTOBER 21, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE)
Q: Atty. Ladaga, Atty. Librado-Trinidad and Atty. Zarate’s names were included in the Order of Battle
List (OB List) which contains the names personalities in Davao City supposedly connected to
the CPP-NPA. They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said list, they become easy
targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings a real threat to their life, liberty and
security. They alleged that the OB List is a military hit-list as there have already been three (3) victims
of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the OB List. Thus, the petitioners
filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.
Does the totality of evidence satisfy the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule?
A: NO. The mere inclusion of one’s name in the OB List, without more, does not suffice to discharge the
burden to establish actual threat to one’s right to life, liberty and security by substantial evidence. In the
context of the Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of
the case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed. In this case, no substantial evidence of an actual
threat to petitioners’ life, liberty and security has been shown to exist.
The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security must be actual, and not merely one
of supposition or with the likelihood of happening. And, when the evidence adduced establishes the threat to
be existent, as opposed to a potential one, then, it goes without saying that the threshold requirement of
substantial evidence in amparo proceedings has also been met. Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in the
context of the Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of
the case, can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. (IN MATTER
OF PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA: LILIBETH O.
LADAGA vs. MAJ. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, G.R. No. 189689, NOVEMBER 13, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE)
Q: Five (5) department heads of the provincial government of Cagayan appeared before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee as resource persons in the investigation being conducted by the said
committee with regard to the alleged mis-use of the excise taxes collected from Tobacco companies in
the province.
These resource persons were cited in contempt and ordered detained indefinitely because they
refused to provide answers to the questions of the lawmakers (since most of them said they could no
longer remember the facts). These resource persons then applied for a Writ of Amparo to protect
them from alleged actual and threatened violations of their rights to liberty and security of person.
a.) Should the Writ of Amparo be issued? Explain.

b.) Can Congress cite a person in contempt and detain him indefinitely? Explain.
A:
a) NO. the privilege of the Wirt is a remedy available only to victims of EJKs and enforces
disappearances or threats of similar nature. It is designed to guarantee the right tot lfe, liberty, and
security of persons. (Agcaoili v. Farinas)
b) Congress may cite persons in contempt and order them detained. But the detention cannot be
indefinite. The detention should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which
the said power is invoked or when Congress adjourns sine die. If Congress decides to extend the
period of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a witness beyond the duration of the
legislative inquiry or after it has already adjourned, then it may file a criminal case under the existing
statute or enact a new law to increase the definite period of imprisonment. (Arvin Balag v. Senate,
GR No. 234608, July 3, 2018)
Citizenship
Q: Not all citizens of the Philippines are natural-born. What is the relevance of the status of being a
natural-born Filipino citizen?
A: There are public offices/government positions that requires a Filipino citizen to be have natural-born
status.
Government positions requiring natural-born status
1. President;
2. Vice-President;
3. Members of Congress;
4. Justices of Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts;
5. Ombudsman and his deputies;
6. Members of Constitutional Commissions;
7. Members of the Central Monetary Authority;
8. Members of the Commission on Human Rights.
Effect of use of foreign passport; Maquiling doctrine
Use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. The renunciation
of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the
next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of
all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. (Maquiling v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)
Q: Can a candidate for an election use his foreign passport after executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation?
A: NO. Because the using of the foreign passport after executing an Affidavit of Renunciation would negate the
qualification of being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the RP. (Arnado v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 210164, August 18,2015)
Foundlings
A foundling is a deserted or abandoned infant; a child without a parent or guardian, its relatives being
unknown. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
Foundlings are natural-born citizens
First, it is “highly probable” that Poe is born of Filipino parents because more than 99% of the population in
Iloilo in 1960 and 1970 were Filipinos.
Second, foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. The Court used as basis the following
international treaties: (1) the UDHR; (2) the UNCRC; (3) the ICCPR; (4) the 1930 Hague Convention; and (5)
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. From the foregoing international documents, the
Court adopted the view that the Philippines obligated itself “to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no
child is stateless.” (Candelaria and Santos, 2016, Nationality, Citizenship, and Foundlings as Pronounced in Poe-
Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, Ateneo Law Journal)
Third, the deliberations x x x [of] the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
[However, the enumeration did not include foundlings,] x x x because their number was not enough to merit
specific mention. (Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
REQUISITES OR LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON THE CREATION OR CONVERSION OF MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS
1. Plebiscite requirement – Must be approved by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
such purpose in the political unit or units directly affected (Local Government Code, Sec. 20).
NOTE: The residents of the mother province must participate in the plebiscite to conform to the
constitutional requirement (Tan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986; Padilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
103328, October 19, 1992).
2. Income requirement – Must be sufficient and based on acceptable standards to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions, commensurate with the size ofits population
as expected by the LGU concerned.
Average annual income for the last consecutive year should be at least:
a. Province – P 20M
b. Highly Urbanized City – P 50M
c. City – P 100M (R.A. 9009 amending Sec. 450 of LGC)
d. Municipality – P 2.5M
NOTE: Income under the 1991LGC pertains to all funds of the LGU including the Internal Revenue
Allotment. However, under R.A. 9009 which deals with the conversion of a municipality into a component
city, the funds must be internally-generated.
3. Population requirement – determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the LGU concerned. The required minimum population shall be:
a. Barangay – 2,000
XPN: Barangays located in:

i. Metro Manila – 5,000
ii. Highly urbanized cities – 5,000
b. Municipality – 25,000
c. City – 150,000
d. Highly Urbanized Cities – 200,000
e. Province – 250,000
4. Land requirement - Must be contiguous, unless it is comprised of two or more islands, or is separated by a
LGU independent to the others. It must be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions, and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities. Area requirements are:
a. Barangay –may be created out of a contiguous territory(LGC, Sec. 386)
b. Municipality – 50 sq. km.(LGC, Sec. 442)
c. City – 100 sq. km.(LGC, Sec. 450).
d. Province – 2,000 sq.km. (LGC, Sec. 461)
NOTE: Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by:

a. The Department of Finance (Income requirement);
b. NSO (Population requirement); and
c. The Lands Management Bureau of DENR (Land requirement) [LGC, Sec. 7(c)]
Depending on the type of LGU created, the presence of all the requirements of Population (P), Land Area (LA),
and Income (I) may vary (Sections 461, 450, 442, 386, 1991 LGC)
Barangay P and LA
City P and Y, or Y and LA
Province P and Y, or Y and LA

Municipality P and LA and Y
Highly Urbanized City P and Y
(Agra, A.C. Amicus Imperiorum Locorum, 2016)
ELECTION LAW
Candidacy
Q: In 2010, Joseph Dimapilis was elected as Punong Barangay. In 2013 he ran again for re-election. He
filed his COC and declared under oath that he is eligible for the office that he seeks to be elected.
Ultimately, he won in the said election and was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay of
Brgy. Pulung Maragul.
In 2009, however, Dimapilis was dismissed from service as Kagawad of the same Barangay after being
found guilty of Grave Misconduct by the Ombudsman which also carried an accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
COMELEC Law Department filed a petition for Disqualification against Mr. Dimapilis because he was
barred from running in an election.
(a) Is Dimapilis eligible to run for public office?
(b) Can COMELEC motu propio bar Dimapilis from running for public office?
A:
(a) NO. A person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for the
position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification
under the law. Verily, perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving
eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public
office at the time he filed the same.
(b) COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office. Under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The COMELEC will be grossly
remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it
does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special
disqualification by virtue of a final judgment. (JOSEPH DIMAPILIS vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 227158, APRIL 18,
2017, PERLAS-BERNABE)
Jurisdiction of COMELEC
Q: What is the jurisdiction of COMELEC?
A: It has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective local government officials. It has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by the trial courts and also cases involving elective barangay officials
decided by the Trial Courts. (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2 par. 2)
NOTE: All of the decisions and final orders/ rulings of COMELEC involving municipal and barangay officials
shall be immediately executory and not appealable.
Q: Whether or not the HRET is the proper venue for the filing for the petition for declaring a nuisance
candidate where the winning candidate is not the person subject to be declared as a nuisance
candidate?
A: NO, it is the COMELEC who has jurisdiction over said cases. The HRET was correct in not exercising its
jurisdiction because challenging a nuisance candidate must have been filed before the COMELEC or the Court
in order that to cancel its COC. (Tanada vs. HRET, Tan and Tanada, G.R. No. 2170712, March 1,2016)
Q: Pichay was convicted of 4 counts of Libel and he declared in his 2013 COC that he was not convicted
any crimes involving moral turpitude. Did he commit misrepresentation of his eligibility?
A: YES. He misrepresented his eligibility in his COC because he knew that he had been convicted by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus his representation that he was eligible for elective
public office constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office. (Ty
Delgado v. HRET, G.R. No. 219603, January 26,2016)
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q: Concepcion Daplas, the OIC Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance, failed to
declare the following properties in her SALN:
(a) A 1993 Mitsubishi Galant sedan;
(b) Her stock subscription in KEI Realty and Development Corp; and
(c) Several real properties in Cavite.
Does her failure to declare said properties constitute as an administrative offense of Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8(A) of RA 6713 which warrants the penalty of dismissal
from service?
A: NO. Petitioner is guilty of mere negligence for having failed to accomplish her SALN properly and
accurately.
The element of intent to commit a wrong is required under both the administrative offenses of Dishonesty
and Grave Misconduct to warrant dismissal from service.
Failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and would
normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, mere non-declaration of the required
data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent
to conceal the truth or to make false statements.
In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration
results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from
other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions.
(CONCEPCION C. DAPLAS vs. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, G.R. NO. 221153, APRIL 17, 2017, PERLAS-
BERNABE)
Accountability of Public Officers

Q: What is the Condonation Doctrine?
A: Condonation Doctrine holds that offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally
held not to furnish cause for removal. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms,
and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija; G.R. No. L-
11959, October 31, 1959)
However, the condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability
as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law.
The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped
off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a
mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. (Carpio-Morales v. CA; G.R. Nos.
217126-27, November 10, 2015)
NOTE: The abandonment of the condonation doctrine shall be applied prospectively. It cannot be applied to
cases which occurred prior to the decision of the SC in the Carpio-Morales vs. CA case. It can only be applied
to cases which occurred after November 10, 2015.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving
question within the jurisdiction of an administrative body prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal where the:
1. Question demands administrative determination requiring special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal;
2. Question requires determination of technical and intricate issues of a fact;
3. Uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with purposes of the regulatory statute administered
On the other hand, the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies calls for resorting first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction and
must first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before the same may be elevated
to the courts of justice for review.
Premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a prerequisite for judicial review; it is a condition precedent which must be complied with.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Sources of international law
Primary Sources:
• International conventions or treaties
• Customary international law
• General principles of law recognized by civilized nations
Subsidiary Sources:
• Judicial decisions; and
• Teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of various nations
Hard law
Means binding laws. To constitute law, a rule, instrument or decision must be authoritative and prescriptive.
In international law, hard law includes treaties or international agreements, as well as customary laws. These
instruments result in legally enforceable commitments for countries (states) and other international subjects.
Soft law
These are non-binding rules of international law. Soft law is of relevance and importance to the development
of international law because it:
1. has the potential of law-making, i.e. it may be a starting point for later ‘hardening’ of non-binding
provisions (e.g. UNGA resolutions may be translated into binding treaties);  
2. may provide evidence of an existing customary rule;  
3. may be formative of the opinio juris or of State practice that creates a new customary rule;  
4. may be helpful as a means of a purposive interpretation of international law;  
5. may be incorporated within binding treaties but in provisions which the parties do not intend to be
binding;  
6. may in other ways assist in the development and application of general international law.  
NOTE: The importance of soft law is emphasized by the fact that not only States but also non-State actors
participate in the international law-making process through the creation of soft law. Nevertheless, soft law is
made up of rules lacking binding force, and the general view is that it should not be considered as an
independent, formal source of international law despite the fact that it may produce significant legal effects.
Q: In the 1920s, Norway occupied and claimed as its own parts of Eastern Greenland, a territory
previously claimed by Denmark. A Danish diplomatic representative asked Norway’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs about the country’s intentions toward Eastern Greenland. The Minister replied that
Norway did not intend to contest Danish sovereignty over the whole of Greenland. However, Norway
continued to occupy East Greenland into the 1930s. This led Denmark and Norway to agree to take the
case to the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1933. Will the statement of the Norway’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs bind its country even if their Constitution does not empower the Minister
to make such statement? Explain.
A: YES, a country is bound by the declaration given on its behalf by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
declaration made by the diplomatic representative of a foreign power is binding upon the country the
Minister represents. (Court of Int’l Justice, 1993, PCIJ)
Q: The President entered into an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the United
States. Under EDCA, U.S. military forces are authorized to have access to and conduct activities within
certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. The EDCA was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary since it merely implements earlier
concluded treaties – the Mutual Defense Treaty (MTD) and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) –
which already allowed the establishment of U.S. bases in Philippine territory.
Rene challenged the constitutionality of EDCA on the ground that agreements concerning foreign
military bases should be embodied in a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate as required under the
Constitution.
a. Distinguish treaty from executive agreement.
b. Should EDCA, an agreement concerning the authorization of foreign military base in the
Philippines, be embodied in a treaty?
b. Can the President enter into an Executive Agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
without the approval of the Senate?
A:
a.) The concurrence of [Senate] is required by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties", which are,
however, distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into without such
concurrence. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961)
b.) NO. The constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided
by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a
treaty. Since the EDCA did not concern the issue of the initial entry of military bases, troops, or facilities,
reliance on said provision does not hold water. (Rene Saguisag vs. Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, G.R. No.
212426, January 12, 2016)
c.) YES. The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if
(a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it
merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty. The EDCA may be embodied in an executive agreement
given that it merely implements the VFA and MDT. (ibid)
Q: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law becomes part of domestic law through
incorporation or transformation. Explain the difference between two (2) modes.
A: Doctrine of incorporation means that the rules of international law form part of the law of the land and
no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. This is
followed in the Philippines.
Doctrine of transformation, on the other hand, requires legislative action to make the treaty enforceable in
the municipal sphere. Generally accepted rules of international law are not per se binding upon the state but
must first be embodied in legislation enacted by the lawmaking body and so transformed into municipal law.
This doctrine runs counter Art. II, Sec. 2, of the 1987 Constitution.
Q: What is the Right of Innocent Passage
A: Right of innocent passage means the right of continuous and expeditious navigation of a foreign ship
through the territorial sea of a State for the purpose of traversing that sea without entering the internal
waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal water or proceeding to or from internal
waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility. The passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
Q: What are the extent and limitations of Right of Innocent Passage
A:
1. Extends to ALL ships – merchant and warships

2. Submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag
3. Nuclear-powered ships, ships carrying nuclear and dangerous substances must carry documents and
observe special safety measures
Ruling in re: The West Philippine Sea case
a. China’s claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible with the detailed allocation of
rights and maritime zones in the Convention: that China had historic rights to resources in South
China Sea waters, such rights were extinguished when the Convention entered into force to the
extent that they were incompatible with the Convention’s system of maritime zones.
b. Between the Philippines and China, there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to
resources, in excess of the rights provided by the Convention, within the sea areas falling within
the ‘nine-dash line’.
c. All high-tide features in the Spratly Islands are legally “rocks” that do not generate an exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf.
d. The Convention does not provide for a group of islands (such as the Spratly Islands) to generate
maritime zones collectively as a unit.
e. China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights with respect to its exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf: China had a) interfered with Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed
Bank, b) purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels within the Philippines’ exclusive
economic zone, c) protected and failed to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within the
Philippines’ exclusive economic zone at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, and d)
constructed installations and artificial islands as Mischief Reef without the authorization of the
Philippines.
f. Chinese law enforcement vessels had repeatedly approached the Philippine vessels at high speed
and to cross ahead of them at close distances, creating serious risk of collision and danger to
Philippine ships and personnel.
China breached its obligations under the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972), and Article 94 of the Convention concerning maritime safety.
Q: Does artificial island generate its own EEZ?
A: NO. Artificial islands do not generate maritime entitlements. Under UNCLOS, an island is a “naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” Thus, it is not entitled to a
territorial sea and contiguous zone or other maritime rights. (Philippines vs. China, ITLOS, July 12, 2016)
Q: Does coastal state have sovereign rights over exclusive economic zone?
A: YES. Exclusive economic zone gives the coastal State sovereign rights over all economic resources of the
sea, sea-bed and subsoil in an area extending not more than 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline from
which the territorial sea is measured. (UNCLOS, Articles. 55 & 57)
NOTE: The coastal State has no sovereignty over the EEZ. What the coastal State only has are sovereign
rights, jurisdictional rights, and other rights under the Law of the Sea Convention.
Q: What is the difference between sovereignty and sovereign right?
A: Sovereignty means that there are no other existing superior rights and power. It is the full right and
power of a governing body over itself, without any interference from outside sources or bodies.
Sovereign rights, on the other hand, is the right to explore and exploit, conserve and manage the living and
non-living resources.
Q: Differentiate International Humanitarian Law (IHL) from Human Rights Law.
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Application
Situations of armed conflict only. Applicable at all times in war and peace alike.
Permissibility of derogation
No derogations are permitted under IHL because Some human rights treaties permit governments
it was conceived for emergency situations to derogate from certain rights, in situations of
namely armed conflict. public emergency.
Purpose
Aims to protect people who do not or are no Tailored primarily for peacetime,and applies to
longer taking part in hostilities. The rules everyone. Their principal goal is to protect
embodied in IHL impose duties on all parties of a individuals from arbitrary behavior by their own
conflict. governments.
Consequence to states
Obliges states to take practical and legal States are bound by human rights law to accord
measures, such as enacting penal legislation and national law with international obligations.
disseminating IHL.
Applicable mechanisms
Provides for several mechanisms that help its Implementing mechanisms are complex and,
implementation. Notably, states are required to contrary to IHL include regional systems.
ensure respect also by other states. Provision is Supervisory bodies, e.g. the UN Commission on
also made for inquiry procedure, a Protecting Human Rights (UNCHR), are either based on the
Power mechanism, and the International Fact- UN Charter or provided for in specific treaties.
Finding Commission. In addition, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) The UNCHR have developed a mechanism of
is given a key role in ensuring respect for the special rapporteurs and working groups, whose
humanitarian rules. task is to monitor and report on human rights
situations either by country or by topic. Its role is
to enhance the effectiveness of the UN human
rights machinery and to build up national,
regional and international capacity to promote
and protect human rights and to disseminate
human rights texts and information. Human
rights also provide for the establishment of
committees of independent experts charged with
monitoring their implementation. Certain regional
treaties (European and American) also establish
human rights courts.
Q: Adova and Rotania have a legal dispute concerning the border between the two countries. At one
point the situation escalates and Rotania threatens to enforce its rights through bombing parts of
Adova. As a response, Adova decides to bomb military strategic targets in Rotania. Discuss the attack
of Adova on Rotania in the light of public international law.
A: This question is about the use of force. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits states to use (or to threat
with the use of) force against other states. There are only two exceptions to the prohibition. Firstly, a state is
allowed to use force against another state when the state is authorized by the UN Security Council. Secondly, a
state is allowed to use force against another state in light of self-defense.
In this case, there is no authorization by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, a self-defense claim can only
be justified if it meets the criteria of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the criteria of customary law. There
needs to be an armed attack, the response should be proportional and necessary and the Security Council
should be informed. Students need to evaluate the criteria and realize the problem is that Rotania has not
attacked Adova but merely treated to attack Adova. This concerns the debatable concept of anticipatory self-
defense.
Q: Mr Zelaya was removed from office as President of Honduras by the army and judiciary of
Honduras. Subsequently, elections were held and President Porfirio Lobo was elected. A large
Honduran community lives in Nicaragua supporting Zelaya. This community disagrees with the
removal of Mr. Zelaya from office and with the outcome of the recent election. As a response, they
have been demonstrating peacefully in front of the Honduran Embassy for 5 days. The police have
been monitoring the demonstrations. However, at one point the crowd becomes more violent and
they manage to enter the premises and cause substantial damage. A day after, the Nicaraguan
authorities decided to send extra forces to the Embassy to stop the violence and arrest the protesters.
Can Nicaragua be held accountable under international law for the damages caused to the Honduran
Embassy?
A: This question is about the application of the Tehran Hostages case of the ICJ to the facts of the case. Within
the Tehran Hostages case the ICJ established two different phases for state responsibility. The first phase
refers to the inaction of the Iranian government with regard to their obligations to protect the embassy of the
United States. Iran was held responsible for its omission to protect the embassy of the United States, seeing
the fact that they were fully aware of their obligations, they had the means at their disposal to perform their
obligations and failed completely to comply with these obligations. The second phase of the Tehran Hostages
case refers to the acknowledgment and approval of the Iranian authorities of the acts exercised by the
students. This led to the conclusion of the ICJ that the actions taken by the students were now translated into
acts of that State, Iran was held responsible for its own actions. The students had become agents of the
Iranian State for whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible.
In this case, it concerns the first phase. Applying this to the case, one can conclude that Nicaragua omitted to
protect the premises of the embassy. The police was present at the demonstrations when they deterred only
the day after the Nicaraguan authorities decided to send extra forces.
Q: When is “humanitarian intervention” permissible?
1. if the SC determines that massive violations of human rights occurring within a country constitute a threat
to the peace; and
2. SC then calls for or authorizes an enforcement action to put an end to these violations. (Sarmiento, 2007)
Principle of Specialty
Under the principle of specialty, a fugitive who is extradited may be tried only for the crime
specified in the request for extradition and included in the list of offenses in the extradition treaty.
(US vs. Rauscher, 119 US 407) If he is charged with any other offense committed before his escape, the
state of refuge- and not the accused- has a right to object; nevertheless, the prosecution will be
allowed if the extraditing state agrees or does not complain. (Sawali, 2018)
For purposes of the extradition, the requesting state must establish the following six (6) elements, namely:
a. there must be an extradition treaty in force between the HKSAR and the Philippines;
b. the criminal charges that are pending in the HKSAR against the person to be extradited;
c. the crimes for which the person to be extradited is charged are extraditable within the terms of the
treaty;
d. the individual before the court is the same person charged in the HKSAR;
e. the evidence submitted establishes probable cause to believe that the person to be extradited
committed the offenses charged; and
f. the offenses are criminal in both the HKSAR and the Philippines (double criminality rule).
(Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Muñoz, GR No. 207342)
What is the postliminy theory or jus postliminium?
When a foreign power occupies a state and exercises the powers of government, the political laws of the said
state are deemed automatically suspended but the former government automatically comes to life and will be
in force and in effect again upon the re-establishment of the former government. (Taylor, International Law, p.
615.)
Q: Who is a refugee?
A: Any person who is outside the country of his nationality or the country of his former habitual residence
because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a political group or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or, if he has no nationality, to
return to the country of his former habitual residence.
Refugees v. Internally displaced persons
Refugees are people who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside the country of his
nationality, are unable or owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that
country, or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of their former habitual residence as a
result of such events, are unable or, owing to such fear are unwilling to return to it (United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 Sec. A par. 2).
While internally displaced persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes, suddenly or
unexpectedly in large numbers as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human
rights, or natural or man-made disaster, and, who are within their territory of their country (Analytical Report
of the United Nations’ Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, February 14, 1992)
Concepts in Public International Law
a. Obligations Erga Omnes - An obligation of every State towards the international community as
a whole. All states have a legal interest in its compliance, and thus all States are entitled to invoke
responsibility for breach of such an obligation. (Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction, ICJ
1970)
Examples:
i. Outlawing of acts of aggression
ii. Outlawing of genocide;
iii. Basic human rights; and,
iv. Protection from slavery and racial discrimination.
b. Jus Cogens- Literally means “compelling law.” A norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.
Examples:
i. Outlawing of acts of aggression
ii. Outlawing of genocide;
iii. Basic human rights;
iv. Protection from racial discrimination;
v. Prohibition against slavery and slave trade, piracy, and torture.
c. Ex Aequo et Bono – The concept of ex aequo et bono literally means “according to the right and
good” or “from equity and conscience.” A judgment based on considerations of fairness, not on
considerations of existing law, that is, to simply decide the case based upon a balancing of the
equities. (Brownlie, 2003). For the ICJ to decide a case using this principle, the parties to the case
must agree thereto.
d. Opinio Juris- The conviction of a state that it is following a certain practice as a matter of law
and that, were it to depart from the practice, some form of sanction would, or ought to fall on it.
e. Pacta Sunt Servanda- International agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
A state which has contracted a valid international agreement is bound to make in its legislation
such modification as may be necessary to ensure fulfillment of the obligation undertaken.
f. Retorsion- It is an unfriendly act which may be taken by one state against another. It may be in
response to an internationally wrongful conduct or an unfriendly act but which is nonetheless
lawful.
g. Right of Innocent Passage - It means navigation through the territorial sea of a State for the
purpose of traversing the sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal
waters, or making for the high seas from internal waters, as long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State [UNCLOS, Arts. 18 (1)(2), 19(1)].
h. Principle of Non-Refoulment - It is a principle which prohibits contracting states to expel or

return (“refouler”) a refugee in any matter whatsoever to the frontiers of territories whiere his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of
particular social group or political opinion. (1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 33 par 2)
i. Precautionary Principle - In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach

shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. (Principle 15, Rio
Declaration)
In our jurisdiction, the principle involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full
scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental
effect. In such an event, the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action
or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment.
The principle shall only apply if there is the concurrence of three elements:
1. uncertainty;
2. threat of environmental damage; and
3. serious or irreversible harm
j. Persistent Objector Rule - If during the formative stage of a rule of customary international law a
State persistently objects to that developing rule it will not be bound by it. Once a customary rule has
come into existence, it will apply to all States except any persistent objectors. However, an objecting
State, in order to rely on the said rule, must:
1. raise its objection at the formative stage of the rule in question;

2. be consistent in maintaining its objection;
3. inform other States of its objection. This is particularly important with regard to a rule which
has been almost universally accepted. If a State remains silent, its silence will be interpreted as
acquiescence to the new rule.
NOTE: The burden of proof is on the objecting State.

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UST LAW LAST MINUTE TIPS 2019

Q: What comprises the National Territory?

A: The national territory comprises the:

1. Philippine archipelago; and

Q: What comprises the Philippine Archipelago?

Q: What comprises “all other territories”?

1. Spratly Group of Islands (SGI);

Q: What is an Associated State? Is it recognized in the Philippines?

Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Q: Is compulsory military service law violative of the Constitution?

Four inviolable parameters to determine winners in the Party-list elections

(See sample of computation at the last page)***

Privileges, Inhibitions, and Disqualifications

Incompatible Office and Forbidden Office

Appropriation and Realignment

GR: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations.

Pork Barrel System

Q: Why is the PDAF declared unconstitutional?

Q: Why is the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) declared unconstitutional?

Legislative Inquiries and Oversight Functions

Q: Is the power of impeachment subject to judicial review?

One-year bar rule

Difference between Quo Warranto and Impeachment

QUO WARRANTO IMPEACHMENT

Initiated 1. Solicitor General, or a public 1. Initiated by any person sponsored by a

the President; or 2. Initiated by any House member.

Initiated A person who usurps or unlawfully 1.

Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunals

1. a valid proclamation of COMELEC;

Appointment Powers of the President

Whether Subject to CA Confirmation

Group 1: YES [subject], except VP as Cabinet member [not subject]

1. Regular 2. Ad Interim 3. Temporary or acting

Permanent Permanent Possesses some (but not all) of

Once approved, continues until Terminates if (a) disapproved by

Confirmation comes first before Appointment comes first before

4. Permanent 5. Career 6. Non-career

Enjoys security of tenure

Appointments made by Congress

BASIS CALLING OUT SUSPENDING THE MARTIAL LAW (ML)

Whenever it becomes Only when there is Only when there is

President must act 1. Time limit of 60 days; 1. Time limit of 60 days;

But generally, president

Actual use to which YES. Limited to the YES. Limited to the

The "sufficiency of factual basis test"

Guidelines in the declaration of martial law

1. There must be an Invasion and when public safety requires it; or

Duty of the President to report to Congress: within 48 hours personally or in writing.

Concurrence of Congress is not required Concurrence of a majority of all the members of

Frees the individual from all the penalties and legal

Restores to him all civil and political rights

Private act of the President Official act of the President

Powers pertinent to foreign relations

Requisites of Judicial Review

1. Actual case or controversy

Exceptions to the mootness principle

(a) When there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

Safeguard of judicial independence

Supervisory Powers of the Supreme Court over the JBC Council