G.R. No.

L-47822 December 22, 1988 he had habitually offered trucking services to the public; in not
exempting him from liability on the ground of force majeure; and in
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,  ordering him to pay damages and attorney's fees.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA, respondents. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and
held that respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of
Vicente D. Millora for petitioner. freight "as a casual
occupation — a sideline to his scrap iron business" and not as a
Jacinto Callanta for private respondent. common carrier. Petitioner came to this Court by way of a Petition
for Review assigning as errors the following conclusions of the Court
 
of Appeals:
FELICIANO, J.:
1. that private respondent was not a common carrier;
Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying
2. that the hijacking of respondent's truck was force majeure; and
up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Upon gathering
sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring 3. that respondent was not liable for the value of the undelivered
such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler cargo. (Rollo, p. 111)
trucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. On the
return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with We consider first the issue of whether or not private respondent
cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to differing Ernesto Cendana may, under the facts earlier set forth, be properly
establishments in Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged characterized as a common carrier.
freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial
rates. The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:

Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman a Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
(Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from offering their services to the public.
a warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to petitioner's
establishment in Urdaneta on or before 4 December 1970. The above article makes no distinction between one
Accordingly, on 1 December 1970, respondent loaded in Makati the whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods
merchandise on to his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on a truck or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity
driven by respondent himself, while 600 cartons were placed on (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids
board the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada, making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
respondent's driver and employee. transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner, since the truck which offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We
truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo. think that Article 1733 deliberaom making such distinctions.

On 6 January 1971, petitioner commenced action against private So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732
respondent in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, demanding may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service,"
payment of P 22,150.00, the claimed value of the lost merchandise, under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as
plus damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner argued that private amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common
respondent, being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise the carriers set forth in the Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b)
extraordinary diligence required of him by the law, should be held of the Public Service Act, "public service" includes:
liable for the value of the undelivered goods.
... every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or
In his Answer, private respondent denied that he was a common control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or
carrier and argued that he could not be held responsible for the value limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and
of the lost goods, such loss having been due to force majeure. done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad,
street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for
On 10 December 1975, the trial court rendered a Decision 1 finding freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and
private respondent to be a common carrier and holding him liable for whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any
the value of the undelivered goods (P 22,150.00) as well as for P class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries
4,000.00 as damages and P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees. and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight
or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant,
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, respondent urged that the trial ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light,
court had erred in considering him a common carrier; in finding that heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system,
wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless It is important to point out that the above list of causes of loss,
broadcasting stations and other similar public services. ... (Emphasis destruction or deterioration which exempt the common carrier for
supplied) responsibility therefor, is a closed list. Causes falling outside the
foregoing list, even if they appear to constitute a species of force
It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly majeure fall within the scope of Article 1735, which provides as
characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back- follows:
hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan,
although such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below diligence as required in Article 1733. (Emphasis supplied)
commercial freight rates is not relevant here.
Applying the above-quoted Articles 1734 and 1735, we note firstly
The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held that the specific cause alleged in the instant case — the hijacking of
no certificate of public convenience, and concluded he was not a the carrier's truck — does not fall within any of the five (5) categories
common carrier. This is palpable error. A certificate of public of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. It would follow, therefore,
convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the that the hijacking of the carrier's vehicle must be dealt with under the
Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability provisions of Article 1735, in other words, that the private respondent
arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof
requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing of extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent.
regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience
or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities Petitioner insists that private respondent had not observed
of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary extraordinary diligence in the care of petitioner's goods. Petitioner
certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public argues that in the circumstances of this case, private respondent
policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for should have hired a security guard presumably to ride with the truck
failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements. The carrying the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk. We do not believe,
business of a common carrier impinges directly and intimately upon however, that in the instant case, the standard of extraordinary
the safety and well being and property of those members of the diligence required private respondent to retain a security guard to ride
general community who happen to deal with such carrier. The law with the truck and to engage brigands in a firelight at the risk of his
imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety own life and the lives of the driver and his helper.
and protection of those who utilize their services and the law cannot
allow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely The precise issue that we address here relates to the specific
facultative by simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and requirements of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
authorizations. over the goods carried in the specific context of hijacking or armed
robbery.
We turn then to the liability of private respondent as a common
carrier. As noted earlier, the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over goods is, under Article 1733, given additional specification not
Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of only by Articles 1734 and 1735 but also by Article 1745, numbers 4,
public policy" 2 are held to a very high degree of care and diligence 5 and 6, Article 1745 provides in relevant part:
("extraordinary diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of
passengers. The specific import of extraordinary diligence in the care Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered
of goods transported by a common carrier is, according to Article unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
1733, "further expressed in Articles 1734,1735 and 1745, numbers 5,
xxx xxx xxx
6 and 7" of the Civil Code.
(5) that the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or
Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are
omissions of his or its employees;
responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following (6) that the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves,
causes only: or of robbers who donot act with grave or irresistible threat, violence
or force, is dispensed with or diminished; and
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or
calamity; (7) that the common carrier shall not responsible for the loss,
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; destruction or deterioration of goods on account of the defective
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; condition of the car vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in
(4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the the contract of carriage. (Emphasis supplied)
containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority. Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible
— and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility
— even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where This Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
such thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, assails the August 24, 2005 Decision[2] and the February 20, 2006
violence or force." We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No.
of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are 86599. However, per Resolution[4] of this Court dated August 30,
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is 2006, the instant petition shall be treated as a Petition for Review on
attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." Certiorari under Rule 45 of the same Rules.

In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by Factual Antecedents
private respondent which carried petitioner's cargo. The record shows
that an information for robbery in band was filed in the Court of First On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint
Instance of Tarlac, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 198 entitled for Unlawful Detainer,[5] docketed as Civil Case No. 330, against
"People of the Philippines v. Felipe Boncorno, Napoleon Presno, petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and
Armando Mesina, Oscar Oria and one John Doe." There, the accused daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
were charged with willfully and unlawfully taking and carrying away Dalaguete, Cebu.[6] Respondent alleged that she is the absolute
with them the second truck, driven by Manuel Estrada and loaded owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
with the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk destined for delivery at (OCT) No. P-27140[7] issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5)
petitioner's store in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The decision of the trial 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by
court shows that the accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, Teresita Salvador;[8] that petitioners acquired possession of the
threat, violence or force. 3 Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest;[9] and
armed with firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her,
its cargo but also kidnapped the driver and his helper, detaining them petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.[10]
for several days and later releasing them in another province (in
Zambales). The hijacked truck was subsequently found by the police In their Answer,[11] petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural
in Quezon City. The Court of First Instance convicted all the accused tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio,
of robbery, though not of robbery in band.  4 entered the subject land with the consent and permission of
respondents predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana
In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote
reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the
carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to Salvador siblings.[12] Since there is a tenancy relationship between
recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian
against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over
liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, the case and not the MTC.[13]
provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of
extraordinary diligence. On July 10, 2003, the preliminary conference was terminated and the
parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers
We, therefore, agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals together with the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence to
that private respondent Cendana is not liable for the value of the support their respective claims.[14]
undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely
beyond private respondent's control. Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision[15]
DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 3 August finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between
1977 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. the parties, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
SO ORDERED.
Based on the facts presented, it is established that defendant Lucia
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ,- Rodriguez and her husband Serapio Rodriguez were instituted as
versus- agricultural tenants on the lot in question by the original owner who
was the predecessor-in-interest of herein plaintiff Teresita Salvador.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, and TERESITA The consent given by [the]original owner to constitute [defendants]
V. SALVADOR, as agricultural tenants of subject landholdings binds plaintiff who as
successor-in-interest of the original owner Cristino Salvador steps
G.R. No. 171972 June 8, 2011 into the latters shoes acquiring not only his rights but also his
obligations towards the herein defendants. In the instant case, the
DECISION consent to tenurial arrangement between the parties is inferred from
the fact that the plaintiff and her successors-in-interest had received
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
their share of the harvests of the property in dispute from the
Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the defendants.
person alleging it.
Moreover, dispossession of agricultural tenants can only be ordered [28] Failing to do so, petitioners are liable to pay damages.[29] Thus,
by the Court for causes expressly provided under Sec. 36 of R.A. the CA disposed of the case in this manner:
3844. However, this Court has no jurisdiction over detainer case
involving agricultural tenants as ejectment and dispossession of said
tenants is within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Board (DARAB). WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is
([S]ee Sec. 1(1.4) DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure[.]) hereby rendered by us SETTING ASIDE, as we hereby set aside, the
decision rendered by the RTC of Argao, Cebu on June 23, 2004 in
Civil Case No. AV-1237 and ORDERING the remand of this case to
the MTC of Dalaguete, Cebu for the purpose of determining the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant complaint is amount of actual damages suffered by the [respondent] by reason of
hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. the [petitioners] refusal and failure to turn over to [respondent] the
possession and enjoyment of the land and, then, to make such award
SO ORDERED.[16] of damages to the [respondent].

Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. SO ORDERED.[30]

AV-1237, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu,
Branch 26.[17] Issues

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] remanding I.

the case to
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH
the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
relationship exists between the parties. IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF THE
Petitioners moved for reconsideration[19] arguing that the purpose of SUBJECT LAND.
a preliminary hearing was served by the parties submission of their
respective position papers and other supporting evidence. II.

On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed WHETHER X X X SUCH RULING OF THE COURT OF
the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003. The fallo of the new APPEALS HAS FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS AND IS
Decision[20] reads: SUPPORTED WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.[31

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Petitioners Arguments

Decision dated September 10, 2003 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Dalaguete, Cebu, is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners contend that under Section 5[32] of Republic Act No.
3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
IT IS SO DECIDED.[21] tenancy may be constituted by agreement of the parties either orally
or in writing, expressly or impliedly.[33] In this case, there was an
Respondent sought reconsideration[22] but it was denied by the RTC implied consent to constitute a tenancy relationship as respondent and
in an Order[23] dated August 18, 2004. her predecessors-in-interest allowed petitioners to cultivate the land
and share the harvest with the landowners for more than 40 years.[34]
Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review[24] with the CA,
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 86599. Petitioners further argue that the CA erred in disregarding the
affidavits executed by their witnesses as these are sufficient to prove
Ruling of the Court of Appeals the existence of a tenancy relationship.[35] Petitioners claim that
their witnesses had personal knowledge of the cultivation and the
On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of
sharing of harvest.[36]
respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the
parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her Respondents Arguments
predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy relationship.[25]
The CA likewise gave no probative value to the affidavits Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners are not
agricultural tenants because mere cultivation of an agricultural land
of petitioners witnesses as it found their statements insufficient to does not make the tiller an agricultural tenant.[37] Respondent insists
establish petitioners status as agricultural tenants.[26] If at all, the that her predecessors-in-interest merely tolerated petitioners
affidavits merely showed that petitioners occupied the subject land occupation of the subject land.[38]
with the consent of the original owners.[27] And since petitioners are
occupying the subject land by mere tolerance, they are bound by an Our Ruling
implied promise to vacate the same upon demand by the respondent.
The petition lacks merit.
Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case. for the determination of the amount of damages due respondent is
proper.
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are
present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the Respondent is entitled to the fair rental value or the reasonable
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; compensation for the use and occupation of the subject land.
5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee.[39]

In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists

between the parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits
We must, however, clarify that the only damage that can be
of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. In her affidavit,[40] petitioner
recovered [by respondent] is the fair rental value or the reasonable
Lucia declared that she and her late husband occupied the subject
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The
land with the consent and permission of the original owners and that
reason for this is that [in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases],
their agreement was that she and her late husband would cultivate the
the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession;
subject land, devote it to agricultural production, share the harvest
hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the
with the landowners on a 50-50 basis, and at the same time watch
[respondent] could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
over the land. Witness Alejandro Arias attested in his affidavit[41]
caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not
that petitioner Lucia and her husband, Serapio, have been cultivating
the damages which [she] may have suffered but which have no direct
the subject land since 1960; that after the demise of Serapio,
relation to [her] loss of material possession.[49]
petitioner Lucia and her children continued to cultivate the subject
land; and that when respondents predecessors-in-interest were still WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 24,
alive, he would often see them and respondent get some of the 2005 Decision and the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
harvest. The affidavit[42] of witness Conseso Muoz stated, in Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 86599 are AFFIRMED. This case is
essence, that petitioner Lucia has been in peaceful possession and ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete,
cultivation of the subject property since 1960 and that the harvest was Cebu, to determine the amount of damages suffered by respondent by
divided into two parts, for the landowner and for petitioner Lucia. reason of the refusal and failure of petitioners to turn over the
possession of the subject land, with utmost dispatch consistent with
The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not
the above disquisition.
sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy.
SO ORDERED.
As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking.[43]
Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was [G.R. No. 131481, March 16 : 2011] BUKLOD NANG
submitted to show that respondents predecessors-in-interest MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC., PETITIONER, VS.
consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Self-serving E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC., RESPONDENT. [G.R. No.
statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the 131624] DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
landowner; independent evidence is necessary.[44] PETITIONER, VS. E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of
harvest. The affidavits of petitioners neighbors declaring that DECISION
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the
harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners should have presented receipts LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest[45]
and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari,
landowners.[46] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by the
Buklod ng Maqbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. (Buklod) and the
As we have often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an Department of Agrarian Regorm (DAR), assailing the Decision[1]
agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural dated March 26, 1997 and the Resolution[2] dated November 24,
tenant.[47] It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 40950.
agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites
of agricultural tenancy.[48] The Court of Appeals declared the parcels of land owned by E.M.
Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON), located in Barangay Langkaan,
In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of Dasmariñas, Cavite (subject property), exempt from the coverage
harvest between the parties. Consequently, their defense of of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), thus,
agricultural tenancy must fail. The MTC has jurisdiction over the nullifying and setting aside the Decision[3] dated February 7, 1996
instant case. No error can therefore be attributed to the CA in and Resolution[4] dated May 14, 1996 of the Office of hte President
reversing and setting aside the dismissal of respondents complaint for (OP) in O.P. Case No. 5461.
lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC
Quoted hereunder are the facts of the case as found by the Court of This conversion conforms with the approved Development Plan of
Appeals: the Municipality of Dasmariñas Cavite ".

Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted

neighboring property of the National Development Company (NDC)
At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land into an industrial estate to be managed through a joint venture
(303.38545 hectares) which from part of a larger expanse with an scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall
area of 372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to
Cavite. Originally owned by the MAnila Golf and Country Club, he remain at the NDC property, with three (3) hectares each. However,
property was aquired by the [herein repondent EMRASON] in 1965 the size of the NDC property turned out to be insufficient for both the
for the purpose of developing the same into a residential subdivision demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the
known as "Traveller's Life Homes". government's commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this
commitment, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was thus
Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite, tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby areas. The
acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264, otherwise known as DAR earmarked for this purpose the subject property of
the "Loval Autonomy Act", enacteed Municipal Ordinance No. 1, [EMRASON].
hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No. 1, enitled "An Ordinance
Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for On August 29, 1990, then OAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out
Violation Thereof." the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew
protest from [EMRASON]. All told, these notices covered 303.38545
In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for hectares of land situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas,
an authority to convert and development its aforementioned 372- Cavite owned by [EMRASON].
hectare property into a residential subdivision, attaching to the
apllication detailed development plans and development proposals In the meantime, [EMRASON] filed with the Department of Agrarian
from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Pasig, Metro
Corporation. Acting thereon the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Manila, separate petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above
Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A notices. Collectively docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92,
(Ordinance "No. 29-A, for brevity), approving [EMRASON's] these petitions were subsequently referred to the Office of the
application. Ordinance No. 29-A pertinently reads: Regional Director, Region IV, which had jurisdiction thereon. In his
referral action, the Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator directed the DAR
"Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the application for Region IV, through its Operations Division, to conduct a hearing
subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two (372) and/or investigation lo determine whether or not the subject property
Hectares situated in Barrios Bocal and Langkaan, named as is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
Traveller's Life Homes. and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition.

Resolved that the Municipal Ordinance regarding subdivision Forthwith, the DAR regional office conducted an on-site inspection
regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by of the subject property.
the subdivision ".
In the course of the hearing, during which [EMRASON] offered
Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed Exhibits :'A" to "UU-2" as documentary evidence, [EMRASON]
to proceed with property development. received another set of notices of acquisition. As lo be expected,
[EMRASON] again protested.
It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision
project suffered delay owing to the confluence of events. Among On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through
these was the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a decision declaring as null
to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property
of Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation. covered thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion
No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP. The dispositive portion
On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
of the decision reads, as follows;
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect,
ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and ''WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing x x x, considering that
distribution. the notices of acquisition dated August 29, 1990 relative to the 39
hectares partly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19298;
On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas,
notices of acquisition all dated April 3, 1991 relative to the
Cavite addressed a letter to [EMRASON], stating in part, as follows:
131.41975 hectares partly covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
"In reply to your letter of June 2, 1988, we wish to clarify that the Nos. x x x; notices of acquisition all dated August 28, 1991 relative
Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite, has approved the development lo the 56.9201 hectares covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
of your property situated in Barrios Bukal and Langkaan, x x x; and notices of acquisition all dated May 15, 1992 relative to
Dasmariñas, Cavite, with a total area of 3 72 hectares, more or less, the 76.0456 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. xx, all
into residential, industrial, commercial and golf course project. located at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite and owned by
petitioner EM RAMOS and SONS, INC. are null and void on the
ground that the subject properties are exempted from CARP coverage [EMRASON] failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 152,
pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, therefore, the dated December 16, 1968, and
aforesaid notices of acquisition be cancelled and revoked. "

The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary

Franklin Drilon, clarified that lands already converted to non- The certification of the Human Settlements Regulatory
agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by Commission (HSRC) in 1981 and the Housing and Land Use
CARP. Regulatory Board (HLRB) in 1992 that the property of [EMRASON]
is agricultural".
On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu
propio elevated the case to the Office of the Agrarian Reform
Secretary, it being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision
ran contrary to the department's official position "to pursue the Undaunted, [EMRASON] interposed a motion for reconsideration,
coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to followed later by another motion whereunder it invited attention to
qualified beneficiaries particularly the Langkaan farmers in legal doctrines involving land conversion recently enunciated by no
fulfillment of the commitment of the government to deliver to them less than the Office of the President itself.
the balance of thirty-nine hectares x x x".

On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary Ernesto

On May 14, 1996, the [Deputy Executive Secretary Corona] came out
Garilao [(DAR Secretary Garilao)] issued an order, the decretal
with his second challenged issuance denying [EMRASON's]
portion of which partly reads:
aforementioned motion for reconsideration x x x.[5]
"WHEREFORE, in the interest of law and justice, an order is hereby
rendered:
From the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration by the OP,
1. Affirming the Notices of Acquisition dated August 29, 1990, April
EMRASON filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals,
3, 1991, August 28, 1991 and May 15, 1992 covering 303.38545
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40950.
hectares of the property owned by the E.M. RAMOS & SONS, INC,
located at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite x x x;

xxxx On July 3, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO),[6] which enjoined then DAR Secretary
3. Directing the OAR field officials concerned to pursue (he coverage
Ernesto Garilao and Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
under RA 6657 of the properties of E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. for
from implementing the OP Decision of February 7, 1996 and
which subject Notices of Acquisition had been issued.
Resolution of May 14, 1996 until further orders from the court. On
SO ORDERED". September 17, 1996, the appellate court issued a Resolution[8]
granting the prayer of EMRASON for the issuance of a writ of
Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been preliminary injunction. The writ of preliminary injunction[9] was
denied by the [DAR Secretary Garilao] in his subsequent order of actually issued on September 30, 1996 after EMRASON posted the
January 6, 1993, [EMRASON] appealed to the Office of the required bond of P500,000,00.
President where the recourse was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5461.
The DAR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President, through herein Resolution dated September 17, 1996 of the Court of Appeals, with
respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona [(Deputy the prayer that the writ of preliminary injunction already issued be
Executive Secretary Corona)], rendered the herein assailed decision x lifted, recalled and/or dissolved.
x x, dismissing [EMRASON's] appeal on the strength of the
following observation: At this juncture, the DAR had already prepared Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject property to
"To recapitulate, this Office holds that [EMRASON's] property has farmer-beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction
remained AGRICULTURAL in classification and therefore falls issued by the Court of Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs.
within the coverage of the CARP, on the basis of the following:br> Buklod, on behalf of the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the
subject property, filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, wherein
[EMRASON] failed to comply with the mandatory requirements and it moved that it be allowed to intervene as an indispensable party in
conditions of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, specifically, CA-G.R. SP No. 40950; that the writ of preliminary injunction be
among others, the need for approval of the National Planning immediately dissolved, having been issued in violation of Section 55
Commission through the Highway District Engineer, and the Bureau of the CARL; and that the Petition for Review of EMRASON be
of Lands before final submission to the Municipal Council and dismissed since the appropriate remedy should have been a petition
Municipal Mayor; for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
On March 26, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, to approve the application for
Decision. subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two (372)
Hectares situated in Barrios Bocal and Langkaan, named as
Travellers Life Homes "approved the application for subdivision or
the conversion of the 372-hectare area into residential, while the
The Court of Appeals allowed the intervention of Buklod because second, reading -
-the latter's participation was "not being in any way prejudicial to the
interest of the original parties, nor will such intervention change the "Resolved that the Municipal Ordinance regarding subdivision
factual legal complexion of the case." The appellate court, however, regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by
affirmed the propriety of the remedy availed by EMRASON given the subdivision " provides that the subdivision owner/developer shall
that under Section 5 of Supreme Court Revised Administrative follow subdivision regulations, it will be noted further that the second
Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, appeals from judgments or resolution already referred to the [EMRASON's] property as
final orders of the OP or the DAR under the CARL shall be taken to "'subdivision", suggesting that the Municipal Council already
the Court of Appeals, through a verified petition for review; and that considered as of that moment [EMRASON's] area to be for
under Section 3 of the same Administrative Circular, such a petition residential use.
for review may raise questions of facts, law, or mixed questions of
facts and law. Another requirement which [EMRASON] allegedly failed to comply
with is found in Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 152, series of 1968,
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON which pertinently provides -
because the subject property was already converted/classified as
residential by the Municipality of Dasmariñas prior to the "1. All Municipal Boards or City Councils, and all Municipal
effectivity of the CARL. The appellate court reasoned: Councils in cities and municipalities in which a subdivision
ordinance is in force, shall submit three copies of every proposed
For one, whether or not the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Cavite had subdivision plan for which approval is sought together with the
in place in the early seventies a general subdivision plan is to us of no subdivision ordinance, to the National Planning Commission for
moment. The absence of such general plan at that time cannot be comment and recommendation ".
taken, for the nonce, against the [herein respondent EMRASON]. To
our mind, the more weighty consideration is the accomplished fact This Court is at a loss to understand how [EMRASON] could be
that the municipality, conformably with its statutory-conferred local expected to heed a directive addressed to local government legislative
autonomy, had passed a subdivision measure, I.e., Ordinance No. 1, bodies. From a perusal of the title of A.O. No. 152, it is at once
and had approved in line thereto, through the medium of Ordinance obvious from whom it exacts compliance with its command, thus:
No. 29-A, [EMRASON's] application for subdivision, or with like "REQUIRING THE MUNICIPAL BOARDS OR CITY COUNCILS
effect approved the conversion/classification of the lands in dispute AND MUNICIPAL COUNCILS TO SUBMIT PROPOSED
as residential. Significantly, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, ORDINANCES AND SUBDIVISION PLANS TO THE
Cavite, in his letter of September 23, 1988 to [EMRASON], clarified NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION FOR COMMENT AND
that such conversion conforms with the approved development plan RECOMMENDATION, BEFORE TAKING ACTION ON THE
of the municipality. SAME, AND TO FORWARD A COPY OF THEIR APPROVED
SUBDIVISION ORDINANCES TO THE SAID COMMISSION".
For another, the requirement prescribed by the cited Section 16[a] of
Ordinance No. 1 relates to the approval in the first instance by the To be sure, [EMRASON] cannot be made to bear the consequences
National Planning Commission of the final plat of the scheme of the for the non-compliance, if this be the case, by the Municipal Council
subdivision, not the conversion from agricultural to residential itself. of Dasmarinas, Cavite with what A.O. 152 required. A converse
As [EMRASON] aptly puts it: proposition would be antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play.[11]

"x x x the final plat or final plan, map or chart of the subdivision is As for the other requirements which EMRASON purportedly failed
not a condition sine qua non for the conversion x x x as the to comply with, the Court of Appeals held that these became
conversion was already done by the Municipal Council of obligatory only after the subject property was already converted to
Dasmariñas, Cavite. Municipal Ordinance NO. 29-A merely non-agricultural, to wit:
required that the final plat, or final plan x x x of the subdivision be
done in conformity with Municipal Ordinance No. 1, the same to be Foregoing considered, this Court holds that everything needed to
followed by (he subdivision itself. [EMRASON] therefore did not validly effect the conversion of the disputed area to residential had
have to undertake the immediate actual development of the subject been accomplished. The only conceivable step yet to be taken relates
parcel of lands as the same had already been converted and declared to the obtention of a conversion order from the DAR, or its
residential by law. x x x " (Petition, pp. 17 and 18). predecessor, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR.) under its
rather intricate procedure established under Memorandum Circular
[EMRASON's] pose has the merit of logic. As may be noted, No. 11-79. But then, this omission can hardly prejudice the [herein
Ordinance No. 29-A contained two (2) resolutory portions, each respondent EMRASON] for the DAR7MAR guidelines were
interrelated to, but nonetheless independent of, the other. The first promulgated only in 1979, at which time the conversion of
resolution, reading - [EMRASON's] property was already a fait accompli.
Like the conversion procedure set up under Memorandum Circular The Court of Appeals further observed that the subject property has
No. 11-79, the revised methodology under the CARL cannot also be never been devoted to any agricultural activity and is, in fact, more
made to apply retroactively to lands duly converted/classified as suitable for non-agricultural purposes, thus:
residential under the aegis of the Local Autonomy Act. For, as a rule,
a statute is not intended to affect transactions which occurred before
it becomes operational (Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, Vol. I, 1983 ed.; p. 23). It is worthy to note that the CARL defines "agricultural lands" as
And as the landmark case of Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of "lands devqtedto agricultural activity x x x and not classified as
Agrarian Reform, 225 SCRA 278, teaches: mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial lands" (Sec.
3[c]). Guided by this definition, it is clear that [herein respondent
EMRASON's] area does not fall under the category of agricultural
lands. For, let alone the reality that the property is not devoted to
"Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the some agricultural activity, being in fact unirrigated, and, as implied in
coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non- the decision of the DAR Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, without
agricultural uses prior to the effectively of CARL by government duly instituted tenants, the same had been effectively classified as
agencies other than respondent DAR x x x. residential. The bare circumstance of its not being actually
developed as subdivision or that it is underdeveloped would not alter
the conclusion. For, according to Natalia, what actually determines
the applicability of the CARL to a given piece of land is its previous
xxxx classification and not its current use or stages of development as non-
agricultural property.

Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,

respondent DAR is hound by such conversion. It was therefore error As a pragmatic consideration, the disputed area, in terms of its
to include the underdeveloped portions x x x within the coverage of location in relation to existing commercial/industrial sites and its
CARL". major economic use, is more suitable for purposes other than
agriculture. In this connection, this Court notes that the property is
situated at the heart of the CALABARZON, and, as Annex "C" of the
It may be so, as the assailed decision stated, that in Natalia the lands petition demonstrates, lies adjacent to huge industrial/commercial
therein involved received a locational clearance from the Housing complexes. The San Miguel-Monterey meat plant, the NDC-
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB, formerly the Human Marubeni complex and the Reynolds Aluminum plant may be
Settlement Regulatory Commission [HSRC], as residential or mentioned. For sure, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite,
commercial, a factor [EMRASON] cannot assert in its favor. This obviously cognizant of the economic potential of certain areas in the
dissimilarity, however, hardly provides a compelling justification not Municipality of Dasmariñas has, by Resolution No. 105, series of
to apply the lessons of Natalia. This is because the property involved 1988. declared defined tracts of lands in the Municipality of
in this case, unlike that in Natalia, underwent Dasmariñas as "industrial-residential-institutional mix."[13]
classification/conversion before the creation on May 13, 1976 of the
HSRC, then known as the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (P.D. No. 933). Furthermore, what is recognized as the As a last point, the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of a writ of
HSRC's authority to classify and to approve subdivisions and preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the OP
comprehensive land use development plans of local governments Decision dated February 7, 1996 and Resolution dated May 14, 1996,
devolved on that agency only upon its reorganization on February 7, viz:
1981, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 648 known as the
Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Section 5
of the same executive order invested the HSRC with the above
classifying and approving authority. In fine, the property of As a final consideration, we will address the [herein petitioners] OAR
[EMRASON] went into the process of conversion at the time when Secretary's and Buklod's joint concern regarding the propriety of the
the intervention thereon of the HSRC, which was even then non- preliminary injunction issued in this case. They alleged that the
existent, was unnecessary. Shortly before the creation of the HSRC, it issuance is violative of Section 55 of the CARL which reads:
would appear that to provincial, city, or municipal councils/boards, as
the case may be, belong the prerogative, albeit perhaps not exclusive,
to classify private lands within their respective territorial jurisdiction
and approve their conversion from agricultural to residential or other "SEC. 55. No Restraining Order or Preliminary
non-agricultural uses. To paraphrase the holding in Patalinghug vs.
Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 554, once a local government has,
pursuant to its police power, reclassified an area as residential, that Injunction. - No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
determination ought to prevail and must be respected.[12] issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against
the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any
case, dispute, controversy arising from, necessary to, or in connection
with the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation Aggrieved, Buklod and DAR filed the instant Petitions, which were
of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform". consolidated by this Court in a Resolution[16] dated August 19,
(Underscoring added.) 1998.

As will be noted, the aforequoted section specifically mentions the In G.R. No. 131481, Buklod raises the following arguments:
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) of which the DAR
Secretary is the Vice Chairman, or any of its duly designated
agencies as protected from an injunctive action of any court. These
agencies include the PARC Executive Committee, the PARC 1] THE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE INVOKED BY [EMRASON]
Secretariat, which the DAR Secretary heads, and. on the local level, AS CONVERSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
the different Agrarian Reform Action Committees (Sees. 41 to 45, ENACTED ON JULY 9, 1972 BY THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
R.A. No. 6657). OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE IS IMPOTENT BECAUSE THE
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE IMPOSED CONDITIONS WHICH
[EMRASON] NEVER COMPLIED. NO COMPLIANCE NO
CONVERSION.
From the records, there is no indication that the [petitioner] Agrarian
Reform Secretary acted vis-a-vis the present controversy for, or as an
agency of, the PARC. Hence, he cannot rightfully invoke Section 55
of the CARL and avail himself of the protective mantle afforded by 2] AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED ORDINANCE WAS
that provision. The PARC, it bears to stress, is a policy-formulating ENACTED, A LAND REFORM LAW WAS ALREADY IN
and coordinating body (Sec. 18. E.O. 229, July 22, 1987) without EFFECT GRANTING SECURITY OF TENURE TO THE
express adjudicatory mandate, unlike the DAR Secretary who, as FARMERS SO THAT A LANDOWNER CANNOT
department head, is "vested with primary jurisdiction to determine ARBITRARILY CONVERT AN AGRICULTURAL LAND INTO
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive A DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION WITHOUT COMPLYING
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS (R.A. 3844).
reform" (Sec. 50. R.A. 6657). Thus, it is easy lo accept the
proposition that the [petitioner] Agrarian Reform Secretary issued his
challenged orders in the exercise of his quasi-judicial power as 3] A MERE MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE CANNOT NEGATE
department head.[14] LAND REFORM RIGHTS GRANTED TO THE FARMERS BY
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT UNDER R.A. 3844 AND
SUBSEQUENT LAWS. LAND REFORM LAW BEING A SOCIAL
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed: LEGISLATION IS PARAMOUNT.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED. 4] LAND REFORM IS A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR
Accordingly, the challenged decision dated February 7, 1996 and the THE BENEFIT OF THE LANDLESS FARMERS SO THAT THE
resolution of May 14, 1996 of the Office of the President in O.P. LAND REFORM LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AND
Case No. 5461 are hereby NULLIFIED, VACATED and SET APPLIED IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
ASIDE, and the notices of acquisition issued by the Department of OF RELIEVING THE FARMERS FROM THEIR POVERTY AND
Agrarian Reform covering the 372-hectare property of the [herein BONDAGE. THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THIS
respondent EMRASON] at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO FAVOR THE LANDLORD
Cavite declared VOID. [EMRASON].

The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on September 5] THE COURT OF APPEALS ISSUED A RESTRAINING
30, 1996 is hereby made permanent.[15] ORDER/INJUNCTION AGAINST THE CLEAR PROHIBITION IN
THE CARL (SEC. 55 RA 6657) AND SO FAR DEPARTED FROM
THE USUAL COURSE OF BY REFUSING TO GRANT THE
PETITIONER FARMERS A HEARING INSPITE OF THE
Buklod and DAR. filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY RA 7902 (SEC. ]).[17]
of the foregoing Decision but both Motions were denied by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution dated November 24, 1997.

In G.R. No. 131624, the DAR ascribes the following errors on the
part of the Court of Appeals:
I. Local Autonomy Act of 1959 - in effect when the Municipality of
Dasmariñas approved Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A - merely
delegated to cities and municipalities zoning authority, to be
understood as the regulation of the uses of property in accordance
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT with the existing character of the land and structures. It was only
RULED THAT THE MUNICIPALITY OF DASMARIÑAS, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
CAVITE, WAS AUTHORIZED, UNDER THE LOCAL Government Code of 1991, which extended to cities and
AUTONOMY ACT, TO CLASSIFY AND/OR RECLASSIFY municipalities limited authority to reclassity agricultural lands.
LANDS CONSIDERING THAT WHAT WAS CONFERRED
THEREUNDER WAS ONLY ZONING AUTHORITY, THUS,
RENDER THE EXERCISE THEREOF BY THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE, ULTRA VIRES; DAR also argues that even conceding that cities and municipalities
were already authorized in 1972 to issue an ordinance reclassifying
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural, Ordinance No. 29-A of
the Municipality of Dasmariñas was not valid since it failed to
II. comply with Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, Section
16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 of the Municipality of Dasmarinas, and
Administrative Order No. 152 dated December 16, 1968, which all
EVEN ASSUMING, IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI, THAT THE required review and approval of such an ordinance by the National
AUTHORITY TO CLASSIFY AND RECLASSIFY LANDS IS Planning Commission (NPC). Subsequent developments further
POSSESSED BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, STILL THE necessitated review and approval of Ordinance No. 29-A by the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), which later
CONSIDERED THE ALLEGED PASSAGE OF ORDINANCE NO. became the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
29-A OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF DASMARIÑAS,
CAVITE, AS A VALID MEASURE RECLASSIFYING SUBJECT
AGRICULTURAL LAND TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USE DAR further avers that the reliance by the Court of Appeals -on
CONSIDERING THAT THE SAID APPROVAL OF THE Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform[19] (Natalia
SUBDIVISION, PER LETTER OF THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, Realty case) is misplaced because the lands involved therein were
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH EXISTING RULES AND converted from agricultural to residential use by Presidential
REGULATIONS ON THE MATTER AND, THEREFORE, Proclamation No. 1637, issued pursuant to the authority delegated to
NONCOMPLYING AND INEFFECTUAL; AND the President under Section 71, et seq., of the Public Land Act.[20]

III. Buklod adopts the foregoing arguments of DAR. In addition, it

submits that prior to Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, there were already
laws implementing agrarian reform, particularly: (1) Republic Act
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
APPLIED THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE in effect since August 8, 1963, and subsequently amended by
NATALIA REALTY CASE DUE TO SUBSTANTIAL Republic Act No. 6389 on September 1.0, 1971, after which it
DISSIMILARITY IN FACTUAL SETTING AND MILIEU.[18] became known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms; and (2) Presidential
Decree No. 27, otherwise known as the Tenants Emancipation
Decree, which took effect on November 19, 1972. Agricultural land
could not be converted for the purpose of evading land reform for
At the crux of the present controversy is the question of whether the there were already laws granting farmer-tenants security of tenure,
subject property could be placed under the CARP. protection from ejectment without just cause, and vested rights to the
land they work on.

DAR asserts that the subject property could be compulsorily acquired

by the State from EMRASON and distributed to qualified farmer- Buklod contends that EMRASON failed to comply with Section 36
beneficiaries under the CARP since it was still agricultural land when of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, which provided that the conversion
the CARL became effective on June 15, 1988. Ordinance Nos. 1 and of land should be implemented within one year, otherwise, the
29-A, approved by the Municipality of Dasmariñas on July 13, conversion is deemed in bad faith. Given the failure of EMRASON to
1971 and July 9, 1972, respectively, did not reclassify the subject comply with many other requirements for a valid conversion, the
property from agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to subject property has remained agricultural. Simply put, no
reclassify lands is an inherent power of the National Legislature compliance means no conversion. In fact, Buklod points out, the
under Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as subject property is still declared as "agricultural" for real estate tax
the Public Land Act, as amended, which, absent a specific delegation, purposes. Consequently, EMRASON is now estopped from insisting
could not be exercised by any local government unit (LGU). The that the subject property is actually "residential."
 area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must
prevail."
Furthermore, Buklod posits that land reform is a constitutional
mandate which should be given paramount consideration. Pursuant to
said constitutional mandate, the Legislature enacted the CARL. It is a
basic legal principle that a legislative statute prevails over a mere EMRASON points out that Ordinance No. 29-A, reclassifying the
municipal ordinance. subject property, was approved by the Municipality of Dasmariñas
on July 9, 1972. Executive Order No. 648, otherwise known as the
Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC
Charter) - which conferred upon the HSRC the power and duty to
Finally, Buklod questions the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a review, evaluate, and approve or disapprove comprehensive land use
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the distribution of the subject and development plans and zoning ordinances of LGUs - was issued
property to the farmer-beneficiaries in violation of Section 55 of the only on February 7, 1981. The exercise by HSRC of such power
CARL; as well as the refusal of the appellate court to hold a hearing could not be applied retroactively to this case without impairing
despite Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7902,[21] prescribing the vested rights of EMRASON. EMRASON disputes as well the
procedure for reception of evidence before the Court of Appeals. At absolute necessity of submitting Ordinance No. 29-A to the NPC for
such a hearing, Buklod intended to present evidence that the subject approval. Based on the language of Section 3 of the Local Autonomy
property is actually agricultural and that Buklod members have been Act of 1959, which used the word "may," review by the NPC of the
working on said property for decades, qualifying them as farmer- local planning and zoning ordinances was merely permissive.
beneficiaries. EMRASON additionally posits that Ordinance No. 1 of the
Municipality of Dasmariñas simply required approval by the NPC
of the final plat or plan, map, or chart of the subdivision, and not of
the rcclassification and/or conversion by the Municipality of the
EMRASON, on the other hand, echoes the ruling of the Court of
subject property from agricultural to residential. As for
Appeals that the subject property is exempt from CARP because it
Administrative Order No. 152 dated December 16, 1968, it was
had already been reclassified as residential with the approval of
directed to and should have been complied with by the city and
Ordinance No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmariñas on July 9,
municipal boards and councils. Thus, EMRASON should not be
1972. EMRASON cites Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank
made to suffer for the non-compliance by the Municipal Council of
and Trust Co.[22] (Ortigas case) where this Court ruled that a
Dasmarinas with said administrative order.
municipal council is empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act
of 1959.
EMRASON likewise reasons that since the subject property was
already reclassified as residential with the mere approval of
Ordinance No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmarinas, then
Still relying on the Ortigas case, EMRASON avows that the
EMRASON did not have to immediately undertake actual
Municipality of Dasmariñas, taking into account the conditions
development of the subject property. Reclassification and/or
prevailing in the area, could validly zone and reclassify the subject
conversion of a parcel of land are different from the implementation
property in the exercise of its police power in order to safeguard the
of the conversion.
health, safety, peace, good order, and general welfare of the people in
the locality. EMRASON describes the whole area surrounding the
subject property as residential subdivisions (i.e., Don Gregorio,
Metro Gate, Vine Village, and Cityland Greenbreeze 1 and 2 EMRASOK is resolute in its stance that the Court of Appeals
Subdivisions) and industrial estates (i.e., Reynolds Aluminum correctly applied the Natalia Realty case to the present case since
Philippines, Inc. factory; NDC-Marubeni industrial complex, San both have similar facts; the only difference being that the former
Miguel Corporation-Monterey cattle and piggery farm and involves a presidential fiat while the latter concerns a legislative fiat.
slaughterhouse), traversed by national highways (i.e., Emilio
Aguinaldo National Highway, Trece Martirez, Puerto Azul Road, and
Governor's Drive). EMRASON mentions that on March 25, 1988, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite passed EMRASON denies that the Buklod members are farmer-tenants of
Resolution No. 105 which declared the area where subject property the subject property. The subject property has no farmer-tenants
is located as "industrial-residential-institutional mix." because, as the Court of Appeals observed, the property is unirrigated
and not devoted to any agricultural activity. The subject property was
placed under the CARP only to accommodate the farmer-tenants of
the NDC property who were displaced by the NDC-Marubeni
EMRASON further maintains that Ordinance No. 29-A of the Industrial Project. Moreover, the Buklod members are still
Municipality of Dasmariñas is valid. Ordinance No. 29-A is undergoing a screening process before the DAR-Region IV, and are
complete in itself, and there is no more need to comply with the yet to be declared as qualified farmer-beneficiaries of the subject
alleged requisites which DAR and Buklod are insisting upon. property. Hence, Buklod members tailed to establish they already
EMRASON quotes from Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals[23] have vested right over the subject property.
(Patalinghug case) that "once a local government has reclassified an
EMRASON urges the Court not to consider issues belatedly raised by
Buklod, It may be recalled that Buklod intervened in CA-G.R. SP
No. 40950 just before the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in said More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:
case. When the appellate court promulgated its Decision on March
26, 1997 favoring EMRASON, Buklod filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said judgment, to which EMRASON, in turn,
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted
filed a Comment and Opposition. In its Reply to the aforementioned
to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
Comment and Opposition of EMRASON, Buklod raised new factual
lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of
matters, specifically, that: (1) EMRASON has not even subdivided
this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
the title to the subject property 27 years after its purported
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by
reclassification/conversion; (2) EMRASON never obtained a
law, the specific limits of the public domain;
development permit nor mayor's permit to operate a business in
Dasmarinas; and (3) the farmer-tenants represented by Buklod have
continuously cultivated the subject property. There was no cogent or
valid reason for the Court oi' Appeals to allow Buklod to present (b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as
evidence to substantiate the foregoing allegations. The DAR Region determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
IV Hearing Officer already conducted extensive hearings during
which the farmers were duly represented. Likewise, Buklod raises for
the first time in its Petition before this Court the argument that the
Tenants Emancipation Decree prescribes a procedure for conversion (c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable
which EMRASON failed to comply with. for agriculture; and

Lastly, EMRASON defends the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless
writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950. Section 55 of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
of the CARL is inapplicable to the case at bar because said provision
only prohibits the issuance by a court of a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction "against the PARC or any ol^ its duly authorized or
A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national
designated agencies." As the Court of Appeals declared, the PARC is
land use plan shall be instituted by the Department of Agrarian
a policy-formulating and coordinating body. There is no indication
Reform (DAR), in accordance with the Local Government Code, for
whatsoever that the DAR Secretary was acting herein as an agent of
the purpose of properly identifying and classifying farmlands within
the PARC. The DAR Secretary issued the orders of acquisition for
one (1) year from effectivity of this /Vet. without prejudice to the
the subject property in the exercise of his quasi-judicial powers as
implementation of the land acquisition and distribution." (Emphases
department head.
supplied.)

The Court, after consideration of the issues and arguments in the

Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the
Petitions at bar, affirms the Court of Appeals and rules in favor of
definition of agricultural land that is subject to CARP to "land
EMRASON.
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land."
CARP coverage limited to agricultural land

The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the
Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 particularly CARP, the subject property should have already been reclassified as
defines the coverage of the CARP, to wit: residential prior to said date.

SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 The Local Autonomy Act of 1959
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
The Local Autonomy Act of 1959, precursor of the Local
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That
Government Code of 1991, provided;
landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and
below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to
qualified beneficiaries.
SEC. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or subdivision of the subject property for residential purposes, had also
city councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal reclassified the same from agricultural to residential.
district councils. - x x x

Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police

xxxx power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is
defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically
arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of
Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. — Any provision needs.[26]
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City
Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are
hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the The Court gave a more extensive explanation of zoning in Pampanga
approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Bus Company, Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac,[27] thus:
Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National
Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning.
(Emphases supplied.)
The appellant argues that Ordinance No. 1 is a zoning ordinance
which the Municipal Council is authorized to adopt. McQuillin in his
treaties on Municipal Corporations (Volume 8, 3rd ed.) says:
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the Municipal Council of
Dasmariñas approved Ordinance No. 1 on July 13, 1971, which laid
down the general subdivision regulations for the municipality; and
Resolution No. 29-A on July 9, 1972, which approved the application Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings
for subdivision of the subject property. according to districts or zones. It is comprehensive where it is
governed by a single plan for the entire municipality and prevails
throughout the municipality in accordance with that plan. It is partial
or limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the
The Court observes that the OP, the Court of Appeals, and even the municipality or to certain uses. Fire limits, height districts and
parties themselves referred to Resolution No. 29-A as an ordinance. building regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or use
Although it may not be its official designation, calling Resolution No. regulation that are antecedents of modern comprehensive zoning, (pp.
29-A as Ordinance No. 29-A is not completely inaccurate. In the 11-12.)
Ortigas & Co. case, the Court found it immaterial that the then
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declared certain lots as part of
the commercial and industrial zone through a resolution, rather than
an ordinance, because: The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of
comprehensive or general zoning, refers to governmental regulation
of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. This
regulation must and does utilize classification of uses within districts
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy as well as classification of districts, inasmuch as it manifestly is
Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision impossible to deal specifically with each of the innumerable uses
ordinances or regulations" for the municipality. Clearly, the law docs made of land and buildings. Accordingly, (zoning has been defined
not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. as the confining of certain classes of buildings and uses to certain
Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it localities, areas, districts or zones.) It has been stated that zoning is
certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the regulation by districts of building development and uses of
the word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter oi' fact the property, and that the term "zoning" is not only capable of this
same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law definition but has acquired a technical and artificial meaning in
to the contrary notwithstanding x x x."[25] (Emphases supplied.) accordance therewith. (Zoning is the separation of the municipality
into districts and the regulation of buildings and structures within the
districts so created, in accordance with their construction, and nature
and extent of their use. It is a dedication of districts delimited to
Zoning and reclassification particular uses designed to subserve the general welfare.) Numerous
other definitions of zoning more or less in accordance with these
have been given in the cases, (pp. 27-28.)[28]
Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL provides that a parcel oi^ land
reclassified for non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 shall no
longer be considered agricultural land subject to CARP. The Court is According to Section 1(b) of Ordinance No. 1, "[s]ubdivision means
now faced with the question of whether Resolution No. 29-A of the the division of a tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, sites or
Municipality of Dasmariñas dated July 9, 1972, which approved the other divisions for the purpose, whether immediate or future, o[f| a
sale or building development. It includes resubdivision, and when
appropriate to the context, relates to the process of subdividing as to
the land of territory subdivided." Subdivision ordinances or Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of
regulations such as Resolution No. 29-A, in relation to Ordinance No. agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department
1, constitute partial or limited zoning, for they are applicable to a of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of
specific property in the city or municipality to be devoted for a specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
certain use. agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion, x x x. (Italics supplied.)

Section 9 of the Public Land Act - cited by the DAR and Buklod as
the purported delegation by the National Legislature of the power to
reclassify - is immaterial to the instant cases. Said provision reads: Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands
to agricultural use.[31]

SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the

lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be Under the present Local Government Code, it is clear that the
classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are authority to reclassify agricultural lands primarily resides in the
destined, as follows: sanggunian of the city or municipality. Said provision reads in full:

(a) Agricultural; Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may,
through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting
public hearing for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive disposition in the following cases: (X) when the land ceases to be
purposes; economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land
shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the
following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen

The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture percent (15%);
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the
classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and
in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities,
(Emphasis supplied.)
ten percent (10%); and

The power delegated to the President under the aforequoted provision

(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%):
of the Public Land Act is limited to the classification of lands of the
Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian
public domain that are alienable or open to disposition. It finds no
reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six
application in the present cases for the simple reason that the subject
hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The
property involved herein is no longer part of the public domain. The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the
subject property is already privately owned and accordingly covered
said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other
by certificates of title.
purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.

The concept that concerns this Court in the instant cases is the
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
reclassification of agricultural lands. In Alarcon v. Court of Appeals,
recommendation of the National Economic and Development
[29] the Court had the occasion to define and distinguish
Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in
reclassification from conversion as follows:
excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
 and the land use plan is enacted through a zoning ordinance. Thus,
zoning and planning ordinances take precedence over
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing reclassification. The reclassification of land use is dependent on the
laws, continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use zoning and land use plan, not the other way around.
plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary
and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided,
That the requirements for food production, human settlements, and
industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the It may, therefore, be reasonably presumed that when city and
preparation of such plans. municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an
area or district in their cities or municipalities as residential,
commercial, or industrial zone, pursuant to the power granted to them
under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, they were, at
(d) When approval by a national agency is required for the same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for
reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. non-agri cultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation of and
Failure to act on a proper and complete application for compliance with their zoning ordinances. The logic and practicality
reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall behind such a presumption is more evident when considering the
be deemed as approval thereof. approval by local legislative bodies of subdivision ordinances and
regulations. The approval by city and municipal boards and councils
of an application for subdivision through an ordinance should already
be understood to include approval of the reclassification of the land,
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing,
covered by said application, from agricultural to the intended non-
amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No.
agricultural use. Otherwise, the approval of the subdivision
6657. (Emphases supplied.)
application would serve no practical effect; for as long as the
property covered by the application remains classified as agricultural,
it could not be subdivided and developed for non-agricultural use.
Prior to the Local Government Code of 1991, the Local Autonomy
Act of 1959 was silent on the authority to reclassify agricultural
lands. What the earlier statute expressly granted to city and municipal
A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal
boards and councils, under Section 3 thereof, was the power to adopt
boards and councils, as to include the power to accordingly reclassify
zoning and subdivision ordinances and regulations.
the lands within the zones, would be in accord with the avowed
legislative intent behind the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, which was
to increase the autonomy of local governments. Section 12 of the
DAR and Buklod insist that zoning is merely the regulation of land Local Autonomy Act of 1959 itself laid down rules for interpretation
use based on the existing character of the property and the structures of the said statute:
thereon; and that zoning is a lesser power compared to
reclassification so that the delegation of the former to the local
government should not be deemed to include the latter.
SEC. 12. Rules for the interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act. -

Such arguments are easily refuted by reference to the definitions of

1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall be
zoning and reclassification earlier presented herein, which support a
liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to
more extensive concept of zoning than that which DAR and
the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local
BUKLOD assert.
government and it shall be presumed to exist.

By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange,

2. The general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of
prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political
doubt so as to give more power to local governments in promoting
jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also
the economic condition, social welfare and material progress of the
on the future projection of needs. To limit zoning to the existing
people in the community.
character of the property and the structures thereon would completely
negate the power of the local legislature to plan land use in its city or
municipality. Under such circumstance, zoning would involve no
planning at all, only the rubber-stamping by the local legislature of 3. Vested rights existing at the time of the promulgation of this law
the current use of the land. arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on
one hand and a third party on the other, should be governed by the
original terms and provisions of the same, and in no case would this
act infringe existing rights.
Moreover, according to the definition of reclassification, the specified
non-agricultural use of the land must be embodied in a land use plan,
 morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Moreover, the regulation by local legislatures of land use in their
respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning and reclassification
is an exercise of police power. In Binay v. Domingo,32] the Court
recognized that police power need not always be expressly delegated, Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
it may also be inferred: health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of
the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of conditions. (Sangalang, el al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the
largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" and comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the
"Salus populi est suprema lex" Its fundamental purpose is securing enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of
the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our
social system rests. (16 C.J.S., p. 896) However, it is not confined
within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions;
it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations
(Sangalang, el al. vs. IAC, supra).
(Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a
valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of xxxx
police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from
the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a
general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers
within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power
reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been general terms to underscore its all-comprehensiveness. Its scope,
construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62 the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
corporations are as much delegated powers as arc those conferred in assuring the greatest benefits.
express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional
fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been
creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28
said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide
N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental
for the real needs of the people in their health, safely, comfort, and
agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends
enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a
to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus,
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied
the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39
with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
Phil. 102).
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened
to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation
clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128).
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.[33]
such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, (Emphases supplied.)
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
Based on the preceding discussion, it cannot be said that the power to
property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And
reclassify agricultural land was first delegated to the city and
under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall
municipal legislative bodies under Section 26 of the Local
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
Government Code of 1991. Said provision only articulates a power of
therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance
local legislatures, which, previously, had only been implied or
such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve
inferred.
 The Court concurs with the analysis of the Court of Appeals that
Resolution No. 29-A actually contains two resolutions. The first
Compliance with other requirements or conditions reads:

Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance, which, upon its approval Resolved, As it is hereby Resolved to approve the application for
on July 9, 1972, immediately effected the zoning and reclassifying of subdivision containing an area of Three Hundred Seventy-Two
the subject property for residential use. It need not comply with any Hectares (372) situated in barrio Bocal and Langkaan, named as
of the requirements or conditions which DAR and Buklod are Travellers Life Homes.[37] (Efriphasis supplied.)
insisting upon.

It is manifest, even from just a plain reading of said resolution, that

DAR and Buklod aver that Resolution No. 29-A was not reviewed the application for subdivision covering the subject property was
and approved by the NPC, in violation of the line in Section 3 of the categorically and unconditionally approved by the Municipality of
Local Autonomy Act of 1959, stating that "[c]ities and municipalities Dasmarinas. As a consequence of such approval, the subject property
may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters is immediately deemed zoned and reclassified as residential.
pertaining to planning and zoning." Consideration must be given,
however, to the use of the word "may" in the said sentence. Where
the provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory
but discretionary. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, Meanwhile, the second resolution in Resolution No. 29-A states:
opportunity, permission and possibility.[34] The use of the word
"may" in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature and generally
permissive only. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
Resolved, that this municipal ordinance regarding subdivision
construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a
regulations existing in this municipality shall be strictly followed by
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
the subdivision.[38] (Emphases supplied.)
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[35]
Since consultation with the NPC was merely discretionary, then there
were only two mandatory requirements for a valid zoning or
subdivision ordinance or regulation under Section 3 of the Local Significantly, this second resolution already refers to a "subdivision,"
Autonomy Act of 1959, namely, that (1) the ordinance or regulation supporting the immediately executory nature of the First resolution.
be adopted by the city or municipal board or council; and (2) it be The municipal ordinance which the subdivision must follow is
approved by the city or municipal mayor, both of which were Ordinance No. 1, the general subdivision regulations of the
complied with byl Resolution No. 29-A. Municipality of Dasmarinas. Most provisions of Ordinance No. 1 laid
down the minimum standards for the streets, roadways, sidewalks,
intersections, lots and blocks, and other improvements in the
subdivision, with which the final plat must comply or conform.
Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 of the Municipality of
Irrefragably, the review of the final plat of the subdivision calls for a
Dasmariñas likewise mentions the NPC, to wit:
certain level of technical expertise; hence, the directive to the
Municipal Mayor to refer the final plat to the NPC, through the
Highway District Engineer, for comments and recommendation,
a. Final plat of subdivision - As essential requirements before a before the same is approved by the Municipal Council, then the
subdivision is accepted for verification by the Bureau of Lands, the Mayor.
final plat of the scheme of the subdivision must comply with the
provision of this ordinance. Application for plat approval shall be
submitted to the Municipal Mayor and shall be forwarded to the
In relation to the preceding paragraph, Administrative Order No. 152
National Planning Commission thru the Highway District Engineer
dated December 16, 1968 required city and municipal boards and
for comment and/or recommendations, before action is taken by the
councils to submit proposed subdivision ordinances and plans or
Municipal Council. The final approval of the plat shall be made by
forward approved subdivision ordinances to the NPC. The OP
the Municipal Mayor upon recommendation of the Municipal
imposed such a requirement because "it has come to the attention of
Council by means of a resolution. (Emphasis supplied.)
[the] Office that the minimum standards of such ordinances regarding
design, servicing and streets, and open spaces for parks and other
recreational purposes are not being complied with[.]"[39] Review by
The aforementioned provision of Ordinance No. 1 refers to the final the NPC of the proposed subdivision plan was for the purpose of
plat of the subdivision. The term plat includes "plat, plan, plot or determining "if it conforms with the subdivision ordinance."[40]
replot."[36] It must be distinguished from the application for
subdivision.
It is apparent that Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 and
Administrative Ordinance No. 152 contained the same directive: that
the final plat of the subdivision be reviewed by the NPC to determine b. Review, evaluate and approve or disapprove comprehensive land
its conformity with the minimum standards set in the subdivision use development plans and zoning ordinances of local government;
ordinance of the municipality. A closer scrutiny will reveal that and the zoning component of civil works and infrastructure projects
Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 and Administrative Order No. 152 of national, regional and local governments; subdivisions,
related to the duties and responsibilities of local government and condominiums or estate development projects including industrial
NPC officials as regards the final plat of the subdivision. There is no estates, of both the public and private sectors and urban renewal
evidence to establish that the concerned public officers herein did not plans, programs and projects: Provided, that the land use
follow the review process for the final plat as provided in Section Development Plans and Zoning Ordinances of Local Governments
16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 and Administrative Order No. 152 before herein subject to review, evaluation and approval of the commission
approving the same. Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of shall respect the classification of public lands for forest purposes as
Court, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly certified by the Ministry of Natural Resources: Provided, further, that
performed. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a the classification of specific alienable and disposable lands by the
presumption that public officers performed their official duties Bureau of Lands shall be in accordance with the relevant zoning
regularly and legally and in compliance with applicable laws, in good ordinance of: Local government where it exists; and provided,
faith, and in the exercise of sound judgment.[41] And - just as the finally, that in cities and municipalities where there are as yet no
Court of Appeals observed - even if it is established that the zoning ordinances, the Bureau of Lands may dispose of specific
accountable public officials failed to comply with their duties and alienable and disposable lands in accordance with its own
responsibilities under Section 16(a) of Ordinance No. 1 and classification scheme subject to the condition that the classification of
Administrative Order No. 152, it would be contrary to the these lands may be subsequently change by the local governments in
fundamental precepts of fair play to make EMRASON bear the accordance with their particular zoning ordinances which may be
consequences of such non-compliance. promulgated later. (Emphases supplied.)

Although the two resolutions in Resolution No. 29-A may be related Neither the Ministry of Human Settlements nor the HSRC, however,
to the same subdivision, they are independent and separate. Non- could have exercised its power of review retroactively absent an
compliance with the second resolution may result in the delay or express provision to that effect in Letter of Instructions No. 729 or
discontinuance of subdivision development, or even the imposition of the HSRC Charter, respectively. A sound cannon of statutory
the. penalties[42] provided in Ordinance No. 1, but not the annulment construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never
or reversal of the first resolution and its consequences. retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made
manifest either by the express terms oi' the statute or by necessary
implication. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that: "Laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." Hence, in
The Court again agrees with the Court of Appeals that Resolution No. order that a law may have retroactive effect, it is necessary that an
29-A need not be subjected to review and approval by the express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing
HSRC/HLURB. Resolution No. 29-A was approved by the should be understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore,
Municipality of Dasmarinas on July 9, 1972, at which time, there was it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our
even no HSRC/HLURB to speak of. actions without no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has
no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it
is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive
effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to
The earliest predecessor of the HSRC, the Task Force on Human
some legal provisions.[44]
Settlements, was created through Executive Order No. 419 more than
a year later on September 19, 1973. And even then, the Task Force
had no power to review and approve zoning and subdivision
ordinances and regulations. Subsequent zoning ordinances

It was only on August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of Still by the authority vested upon it by Section 3 of the Local
Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to submit Autonomy Act, the Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmariñas
their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement subsequently enacted a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, ratified by
systems, and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for the HLURB under Board Resolution No. 42-A-3 dated February 11,
review and ratification. 1981 (1981 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmarinas). Upon
the request of the DAR, Engr. Alfredo Gil M. Tan, HLURB Regional
Technical Coordinator, issued a certification[45] dated September 10,
1992 stating that per the 1981 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of
The HSRC was eventually established on February 7, 1981. Section
Dasmarinas, the subject property was within the agricultural zone.
5(b) of the HSRC Charter43 contained the explicit mandate for the
HSRC to:
Does this mean that the subject property reverted from residential to It is true that protection of vested rights is not absolute and must yield
agricultural classification? to the exercise of police power:

The Court answers in the negative. While the subject property may be A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern
physically located within an agricultural zone under the 1981 certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmarinas, said property may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
retained its residential classification. legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to
Ihose already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested
rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals,
According to Section 17, the Repealing Clause, of the 1981 peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of Dasmarinas: "AH other people, x x x.[48]
ordinances, rules or regulations in conflict with the provision of this
Ordinance are hereby repealed: Provided, that rights that have vested
before the cffectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired."
Nonetheless, the Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmariñas in this case, in
its exercise of police power through the enactment of the 1981
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, itself abided by the general rule
In Ayog v. Cusi, Jr.,[46] the Court expounded on vested right and its and included in the very same ordinance an express commitment to
protection: honor rights that had already vested under previous ordinances, rules,
and regulations. EMRASON acquired the vested right to use and
develop the subject property as a residential subdivision on July 9,
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the 1972 with the approval of Resolution No. 29-A by the Municipality
new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution of Dasmarinas. Such right cannot be impaired by the subsequent
allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not enactment of the 1981 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' Dasmarinas, in which the subject property was included in an
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in agricultural zone. Hence, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariflas had
constitutional law. been continuously and consistently recognizing the subject property
as a residential subdivision.[49]

"All right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present interest" Incidentally, EMRASON mentions Resolution No. 105, Defining and
(16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, Declaring the Boundaries of Industrial and Residential Land Use Plan
to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the in the Municipalities of Imus and Parts of Dasmariflas, Carmona,
existing law" (12 C.J.S. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or Gen. Mariano Alvarez, Gen. Trias, Silang, Tanza, Naic, Rosario, and
interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no Trece Martires City, Province o[ Cavite, approved by the
longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite on March 25, 1988. The
15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502). Sangguniang Panlalawigan determined that "the lands extending from
the said designated industrial areas would have greater economic
value for residential and institutional uses, and would serve the
interest and welfare for the greatest good of the greatest number of
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A people."50 Resolution No. 105, approved by the HLURB in 1990,
state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the partly reads:
enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or
by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
Tracts of land in the Municipality of Carmona from the People's
Technology Complex to parts of the Municipality of Silang, parts of
the Municipalities of Dasmariñas, General Trias, Trece Martires
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses City, Municipalities of Tanza and Naic forming the strip of land
the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural traversed by the Puerto Azul Road extending two kilometers more or
justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an less from each side of the road which are hereby declared as
innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society, industrial-residential-institutional mix. (Emphases supplied.)
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny
(16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).47 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no question that the subject property is located within the
afore-described area. And even though Resolution No. 105 has no
direct bearing on the classification of the subject property prior to the
CARL - it taking effect only in 1990 after being approved by the This is not the first time that the Court made such a ruling.
HLURB - it is a confirmation that at present, the subject property and
its surrounding areas are deemed by the Province of Cavite better
suited and prioritized for industrial and residential development, than
agricultural purposes. In the Natalia Realty case, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 dated
April 18, 1979 set aside land in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San
Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal, as townsite areas. The
properties owned by Natalia Realty, Inc. (Natalia properties) were
CARP exemption situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. The
developer of the Natalia properties was granted the necessary
clearances and permits by the PJSRC for the development of a
subdivision in the area. Thus, the Natalia properties later became the
The Court reiterates that since July 9, 1972, upon approval of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Following the effectivity of the CARL
Resolution No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmarinas, the subject on June 15, 1988, the DAR placed the undeveloped portions of the
property had been reclassified from agricultural to residential. The Antipolo Hills Subdivision under the CARP. For having done so, the
tax declarations covering the subject property, classifying the same as Court found that the DAR committed grave abuse of discretion, thus:
agricultural, cannot prevail over Resolution No. 29-A. The following
pronouncements of the Court in the Patalinghug case are of particular
relevance herein:
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes
The reversal by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's decision was "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
based on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential. It is our considered view, however, that a tax declaration residential, commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the
is not conclusive of (he nature of the property for zoning purposes. A Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural
property may have been declared by its owner as residential for real lands" arc only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural
estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial zone. lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential
A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of lands."
property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination
of a property for zoning purposes.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of

the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered
xxxx as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use.
They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion
in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in
The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is question continue to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision,
commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened by albeit at a snail's pace, x x x The enormity of the resources needed for
the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the questioned developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this
area as commercial or C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential
was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
government has reclassified an area as commercial, that
determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the
commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
thru the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-
convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio agricultural uses prior to the eifectivity of CARL by government
Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still a agencies other than respondent OAR. In its Revised Rules and
residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to
constitutes a "commercial purpose," as gleaned from Ordinance No. Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined ''agricultural land" thus -
363.[52] (Emphases supplied.)

"x x x Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity

Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential land by as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
virtue of Resolution No. 29-A dated July 9, 1972, it is no longer Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
agricultural land by the time the CARL took effect on June 15, 1988 predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning
and is, therefore, exempt from the CARP. ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (BLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15
June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."
 of Local Government and Community Development; (f) the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission which issued a location
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, clearance, development permit, Certificate of Inspection and License
respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to Sell to the LDC/private respondent: and, (g) the Housing and Land
to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision Use Regulatory Board which also issued to the respondent CAI/LDC
within the coverage of CARL. a license to sell the subdivision lots." (Emphases supplied.)

Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by Noticeably, there were several government agencies which
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion that lands reclassified and converted the property from agricultural to non-
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which agricultural in the Pasong Bayabas case. The CARL though does not
the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite specify which specific government agency should have done the
purposes "to be developed as human settlements by the proper land reclassification. To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one
and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural
meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657." Not being by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when
deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL. the CARL took effect. All similar actions as regards the land
[53] (Emphases supplied.) subsequently rendered by other government agencies shall merely
serve as confirmation of the reclassification. The Court actually
recognized in the Pasong Bayabas case the power of the local
government to convert or reclassify lands through a zoning
That the land in the Natalia Realty case was reclassified as residential
ordinance:
by a presidential proclamation, while the subject property herein was
reclassified as residential by a local ordinance, will not preclude the
application of the ruling of this Court in the former to the latter. The
operative fact that places a parcel of land beyond the ambit of the Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 2264, amending the Local Government
CARL is its valid reclassification from agricultural to non- Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt
agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, not zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with
by how or whose authority it was reclassified. the National Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes,
defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land
uses as present and future projection of needs. The power of the local
government to convert or reclassify lands to residential lands to non-
In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[54]
agricultural lands rcclassificd is not subject to the approval of the
(Pasong Bayabas case), the Court made the following findings:
Department of Agrarian Reform. Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657
relied upon by the petitioner applies only to applications by the
landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of lands previously
Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Acl No. 6657. agricultural lands refer to placed under the agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years
lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not from its award. It docs not apply to agricultural lands already
classified as industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands converted as residential lands prior to the passage of Rep. Act No.
which are arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial, 6657.[56] (Emphases supplied.)
industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that
it covers all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised
At the very beginning of Junto v. Garilao,[57] the Court already
thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But
declared that:
long before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had
already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-
agricultural or residential land by the following administrative
agencies: (a) the Bureau of Lands, when it approved the subdivision Lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial or
plan of the property consisting of 728 subdivision lots; (b) the residential before June 15, 1988 - the date of effectivity of the
National Planning Commission which approved the subdivision plan Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) - are outside the
subdivided by the LDC/CAI for the development of the property into coverage of this law. Therefore, they no longer need any conversion
a low-cost housing project; (c) the Municipal Council of Carmona, clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).[58]
Cavite, when it approved Kapasiyahang Blg. 30 on May 30, 1976; (d)
Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella, on July 3, 1979, when
he granted the application of the respondent for the development of
the Hakone Housing Project with an area of 35.80 hectares upon the The Court then proceeded to uphold the authority of the City Council
recommendation of the Agrarian Reform Team, Regional Director of of Bacolod to reclassify as residential a parcel of land through
Region IV, which found, after verification and investigation, that the Resolution No. 5153-A, series of 1976. The reclassification was later
property was not covered by P.D. No. 27, it being untenanted and not affirmed by the HSRC. Resultantly, the Court sustained the DAR
devoted to the production of palay/or corn and that the property was Order dated September 13, 1994, exempting the same parcel of land
suitable for conversion to residential subdivision: (e) by the Ministry from CARP Coverage.
 Issues belatedly raised

The writ of preliminary injunction

Buklod sought to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950, then pending

before the Court of Appeals, by filing a Manifestation and Omnibus
Any objection of Buklod against the issuance by the Court of Motion in which it argued only two points: (1) the writ of preliminary
Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining then DAR injunction be immediately dissolved for having been issued in
Secretary Garilao and Deputy Executive Secretary Corona from violation of Section 55 of the CARL; and (2) that the Petition for
implementing the OP Decision of February 7, 1996 and Resolution of Review of EMRASON be dismissed for being the wrong remedy.
May 14, 1996 during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 40950, had
been rendered moot and academic when the appellate court already
promulgated its Decision in said case on March 26, 1997 which made
the injunction permanent. As the Court held in Kho v. Court of It was only after the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated
Appeals[59]: March 26, 1997 unfavorable to both DAR and Buklod did Buklod
raise in its Motion for Reconsideration several other issues, both
factual and legal,[61] directly assailing the exemption of the subject
property from the CARP. The Court of Appeals refused to consider
We cannot likewise overlook the decision of the trial court in the case said issues because they were raised by Buklod for the first time in its
for final injunction and damages. The dispositive portion of said Motion for Reconsideration.
decision held that the petitioner does not have trademark rights on the
name and container of the beauty cream product. The said decision
on the merits of the trial court rendered the issuance of the writ of a
preliminary injunction moot and academic notwithstanding the fact Buklod persistently raises the same issues before this Court, and the
that the same has been appealed in the Court of Appeals. This is Court, once more, refuses to take cognizance of the same.
supported by our ruling in La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, to wit:

As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought

before the lower tribunal for its consideration. Higher courts are
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings
which may be granted at any time after the commencement of the nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first
action and before judgment when it is established that the plaintiff is time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal.[62] The
entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint shows issues were first raised only in the Motion for Reconsideration of the
facts entitling such reliefs xxx and it appearing that the trial court had Decision of the Court of Appeals, thus, it is as if they were never duly
already granted the issuance of a final injunction in favor of raised in that court at all. "Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first
petitioner in its decision rendered after trial on the merits xxx the time on appeal, entertain these issues, for to do so would plainly
Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered violate the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process. The Court
moot and academic. An injunction issued by the trial court after it has reiterates and emphasizes the well-settled rule that an issue raised for
already made a clear pronouncement as to the plaintiffs right thereto, the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the
that is, after the same issue has been decided on the merits, the trial lower court is barred by estoppel.[63]
court having appreciated the evidence presented, is proper,
notwithstanding the fact that the decision rendered is not yet final
xxx. Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary
Indeed, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question
injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the
may be raised for the first time on appeal. Though not raised below,
decision rendered on the merit of the main case for injunction. The
the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
merit of the main case having been already determined in favor of the
considered by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage.
applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases
The said court may also consider an issue not properly raised during
to have any force and effect, (italics supplied)
trial when there is plain error. Likewise, it may entertain such
arguments when there are jurisprudential developments affecting the
issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of public policy.
La Vista categorically pronounced that the issuance of a final [64] Buklod, however, did not allege, much less argue, that its case
injunction renders any question on the preliminary injunctive order falls under any of these exceptions.
moot and academic despite the fact that the decision granting a final
injunction is pending appeal. Conversely, a decision denying the
applicant-plaintiffs right to a final injunction, although appealed,
Nonetheless, even when duly considered by this Court, the issues
renders moot and academic any objection to the prior dissolution of a
belatedly raised by Buklod are without merit.
writ of preliminary injunction.[60]
Contrary to the contention of Buklod, there is no necessity to carry contained the one-year time frame within which conversion should be
out the conversion of the subject property to a subdivision within one carried out.
year, at the risk of said property reverting to agricultural
classification.

More importantly, Section 36(1) of the Code o[ Agrarian Reforms

would apply only if the land in question was subject of an agricultural
Section 36(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, in effect since leasehold, a fact that was not established in the proceedings below. It
August 8, 1963, provided: may do well for the Buklod members to remember that they filed
their present Petition to seek award of ownership over portions of the
subject property as qualified farmer-beneficiaries under the CARP;
and not payment of disturbance compensation as agricultural lessees
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.— under the Code of Agrarian Reforms. The insistence by Buklod on
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, the requisites under Section 36(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform
of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and Code/Code of Agrarian Reforms only serves to muddle the issues
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been rather than support its cause.
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if
after due hearing it is shown that:

Buklod likewise invokes the vested rights of its members under the
Agricultural Land Reform Code/Code of Agrarian Reforms and the
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate Tenants Emancipation Decree, which preceded the CARP. Yet, for
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the the Buklod
landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his members to be entitled to any of the rights and benefits under the said
rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the laws, it is incumbent upon them to prove first that they qualify as
land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than five agricultural lessees or farm workers of the subject property, as
hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the defined in Section 166(2)[65] and (15)[66]of the Code of Agrarian
lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one Reforms; and/or they are tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands
agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: primarily devoted to rice and corn, under a system of share-crop or
Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land lease tenancy, and are members of a duly recognized farmer's
himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such cooperative, as required by the Tenants Emancipation Decree. None
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it of these determinative facts were established by Buklod.
shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have
the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions; xxx.
(Emphasis supplied.) Buklod counters that it precisely moved for a hearing before the
Court of Appeals so that it could present evidence to prove such
facts, but the appellate court erroneously denied its motion.

On September 10, 1971, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was

amended and it came to be known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms.
After its amendment, Section 36(1) stated: The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err on this matter.

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon In the recent case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison,[67] the
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited Court expounded on the rules on intervention:
for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion 10
harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The
years. permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention lo give to the court
the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
intervention, thus:
At the time Resolution No. 29-A was enacted by the Municipality of
Dasmarinas on July 9, 1972, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was
already in effect. The amended Section 36(3) thereof no longer SECTION 1. Who may intervene, - A person who has a Icga) interest
in the mailer in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected The factual matters raised by Buklod in its Motion for
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the Reconsideration of the March 26, 1997 Decision of the Court of
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to Appeals, and which it sought to prove by evidence, inevitably
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the changes "the factual legal complexion of the case." The allegations
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the of Buklod that its members are tenant-farmers of the subject property
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intcrvenor's who acquired vested rights under previous agrarian reform laws, go
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. against the findings of the DAR Region IV Hearing Officer, adopted
by the DAR Secretary, the OP, and Court of Appeals, that the subject
property was being acquired under the CARP for distribution to the
tenant-farmers of the neighboring NDC property, after a
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be determination that the latter property was insufficient for the needs of
filed al any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A both the NDC-Marubeni industrial estate and the tenant-farmers.
copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, these new claims of Buklod are beyond the appellate

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, being within the primary
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not jurisdiction of the DAR. As Section 50 of the CARL, as amended,
originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject reads:
matter, come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose
their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single
judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among,
the persons involved. SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or Resources (DENR).
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the
claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding. The interest,' which entitles one to intervene,
must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate In fact, records reveal that Buklod already sought remedy from the
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal DARAB. DARAB Case No. IV-CA-0261, entitled Buklod nang
operation and effect of the judgment.[68] Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, rep. by Edgardo Mendoza, et at. v.
E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., et al., was pending at about the same
time as DARAB Case No. lV-Ca-0084-92, the petition of
EMRASON for nullification of the notices of acquisition covering
To apply the rules strictly, the motion of Buklod to intervene was the subject property. These two cases were initially consolidated
filed too late. According to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil before the DARAB Region IV. The DARAB Region IV eventually
Procedure, "a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before dismissed DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92 and referred the same to
rendition of judgment by the trial court." Judgment was already the DAR Region IV Office, which had jurisdiction over the case.
rendered in DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92 (the petition of Records failed to reveal the outcome of DARAB Case No. IV-CA-
EMRASON to nullify the notices of acquisition over the subject 0261,
property), not only by the DAR Hearing Officer, who originally
heard the case, but also the DAR Secretary, and then the OP, on
appeal.
On a final note, this Court has stressed more than once that social
justice - or any justice for that matter - is for the deserving, whether
he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true
Buklod only sought to intervene when the case was already before that, in case of reasonable doubt, the Court is called upon to tilt the
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in the exercise of its balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly
discretion, still allowed the intervention of Buklod in CA-G.R. SP extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give
No. 40950 only because it was "not being in any way prejudicial to preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the
the interest of the original parties, nor will such intervention change rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served
the factual legal complexion of the case."[69] The intervention of for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.[70]
Buklod challenged only the remedy availed by EMRASON and the Vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important
propriety of the preliminary injunction issued by the Court of because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
Appeals, which were directly and adequately addressed by the property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also
appellate court in its Decision dated March 26, 1997. entitled to protection.[71]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Review filed by the Buklod Nang primarily an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school
Magbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. in G.R. No. 131481 and the was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to
Department of Agrarian Reform in G.R. No. 131624 are hereby develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those
DENIED. The Decision dated March 26, 1997 and the Resolution who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future
dated November 24, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP development of that part of the Philippines. On January 16, 1958 the
No. 40950 are hereby AFFIRMED. President of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia,
"upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53, of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No.
SO ORDERED. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the
Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future
campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080
G.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the
petitioner under OCT Nos. 160, 161 and 162. 1
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS
PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner, In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for
registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several
vs. tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition
claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was
BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE, titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401
REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS hectares to 3,080 hectares.
AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO),
respondents. In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was less than
3,000. By 1988, the student population had expanded to some 13,000
students, so that the school community has an academic population
(student, faculty and non-academic staff) of almost 15,000. To cope
CAMPOS, JR., J.: with the increase in its enrollment, it has expanded and improved its
educational facilities partly from government appropriation and
partly by self-help measures.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules True to the concept of a land grant college, the school embarked on
of Court to nullify the proceedings and decision of the Department of self-help measures to carry out its educational objectives, train its
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) dated students, and maintain various activities which the government
September 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision the decision * of the appropriation could not adequately support or sustain. In 1984, the
Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program
the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land
suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the Central Mindanao resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees.
University (CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in the This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP for brevity) for program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five
distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical
jurisdiction. training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate
4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays
This case originated in a complaint filed by complainants calling
the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The
themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers
contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish
Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the leadership of Alvin
houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a
Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU, before the Department
collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no
of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the
landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty
CARP.
and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-
disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to
From the records, the following facts are evident. The petitioner, the
utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology
CMU, is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the
and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within
state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as
the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to
a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon in early 1910, in response to the
augment their salaries. The location of the CMU at Musuan,
public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. It expanded
Bukidnon, which is quite a distance from the nearest town, was the
into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was
proper setting for the adoption of such a program. Among the
transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the
participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao,
provincial capital of Bukidnon.
Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and
In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus at other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU
Musuan, until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The
other complainants who were not members of the faculty or non-
academic staff CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the
participants in this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua complaint.
became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-
business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private
known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries
losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the
personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous
this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri- portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for
business project, Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order
No. 17, the re-organization law of the CMU. The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the
respondents DARAB and the Court of Appeals, raised the following
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a issues:
self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-
IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the 1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and
spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and
in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the coverage of land under the CARP.
faculty and the staff.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2 among serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
the CMU, the CMU-Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and
and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would affirming the decision of DARAB.
provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1)
In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the
calendar year. The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and
DARAB, complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants
specialists to assist in the preparation of project proposals and to
of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or
monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would
portion of the CMU situated at Sinalayan, Valencia, Bukidnon and
pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and P1,000 per hectare as
Musuan, Bukidnon, consisting of about 1,200 hectares. We agree
participant's land rental fee. In addition, 400 kilograms of the produce
with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under
per year would be turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The
the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al.,
participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or member of
pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
their family to establish any house or live within vicinity of the
Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It
relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff
was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would
(participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from
exist as a result of the Agreement.
the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU
Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in
and staff members who were still employed with the CMU and was consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants
not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of by the CMU. Again, the agreement signed by the participants under
1987, to cushion the impact of the discontinuance of the rice, corn the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees,
allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants. and the CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.

Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that
Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Participation To the CMU- they are landless peasants. This allegation requires proof and should
Income Enhancement Program, 3 a former employee would be not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a landless peasant.
grouped with an existing selda of his choice and provided one (1) The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very
hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1) calendar year. He would responsible position was separated from the service on account of
pay the land rental participant's fee of P1,000.00 per hectare but on a certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of the
charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the
prohibitions as those imposed on the CMU employees. It was also moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so
expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the
a result of the Agreement. record to show that they are landless peasants.

The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants
were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served were originally authorized or given permission to occupy certain
with notices to vacate. areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose — to carry out
certain university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn pursuant to its avowed purpose of giving training and instruction in
and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or agricultural and other related technologies, using the land and other
separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school resources of the institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their
entry into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written
consent of the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a (b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific
specific purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and limits ad determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized
and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. (c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or
A person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith suitable for agriculture; and
the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of
some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
title to the land, is a squatter. 4 Squatters cannot enter the land of regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised
another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the thereon.
CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under
Sec. 10 EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. — Lands actually,
Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks,
of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and
wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding
may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian
grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites
reform. Any such person who knowingly and wilfully violates the
and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by
above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or
public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and
fine at the discretion of the Court.
seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal
the CARP. colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government
and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with
The questioned decision of the Adjudication Board, affirmed in toto eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
by the Court of Appeals, segregating 400 hectares from the CMU developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (Emphasis
land is primarily based on the alleged fact that the land subject hereof supplied).
is "not directly, actually and exclusively used for school sites,
because the same was leased to Philippine Packing Corporation (now The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the
Del Monte Philippines)". land area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently,
actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its
In support of this view, the Board held that the "respondent present educational program with its present student population and
University failed to show that it is using actually, really, truly and in academic facility — overlooking the very significant factor of growth
fact, the questioned area to the exclusion of others, nor did it show of the university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU,
that the same is directly used without any intervening agency or which is a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the
person", 5 and "there is no definite and concrete showing that the use need for a vast tract of agricultural land and for future programs of
of said lands are essentially indispensable for educational purposes". expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the
6 The reliance by the respondents Board and Appellate Tribunal on same manner as land grant colleges in America, a type of educational
the technical or literal definition from Moreno's Philippine Law institution which blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of
Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, may give the ordinary reader unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-West.
a classroom meaning of the phrase "is actually directly and What we now know as Michigan State University, Penn State
exclusively", but in so doing they missed the true meaning of Section University and Illinois State University, started as small land grant
10, R.A. 6657, as to what lands are exempted or excluded from the colleges, with meager funding to support their ever increasing
coverage of the CARP. educational programs. They were given extensive tracts of
agricultural and forest lands to be developed to support their
The pertinent provisions of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural technology
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, are as follows: and scientific research. Funds for the support of the educational
programs of land grant colleges came from government
Sec. 4. SCOPE. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of appropriation, tuition and other student fees, private endowments and
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources. 7 It was in this same
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in spirit that President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476,
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229 including other withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of
3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough resources
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program: and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural educational
institution, to develop and train future farmers of Mindanao and help
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
attract settlers to that part of the country.
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest of
mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the In line with its avowed purpose as an agricultural and technical
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, school, the University adopted a land utilization program to develop
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by and exploit its 3080-hectare land reservation as follows: 8
law, the specific limits of the public domain;
No. of Hectares Percentage
a. Livestock and Pasture 1,016.40 33 utilization of said areas to carry out its own research and agricultural
experiments.
b. Upland Crops 616 20
As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be
c. Campus and Residential sites 462 15 necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to
resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its
d. Irrigated rice 400.40 13 needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was
given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals
e. Watershed and forest reservation 308 10
has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter,
f. Fruit and Trees Crops 154 5 unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU
has no real for the land.
g. Agricultural
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the
Experimental stations 123.20 4 DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
3,080.00 100%
(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
The first land use plan of the CARP was prepared in 1975 and since
then it has undergone several revisions in line with changing (2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific
economic conditions, national economic policies and financial limits as determined by Congress;
limitations and availability of resources. The CMU, through
Resolution No. 160 S. 1984, pursuant to its development plan, (3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its
adopted a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and lawful owner, the CMU;
productivity program called the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project"
(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657
(CMU-KSSP). The objectives 9 of this program were:
because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and
1. Provide researches who shall assist in (a) preparation of found to be necessary for school site and campus, including
proposal; (b) monitor project implementation; and (c) collect and experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for
analyze all data and information relevant to the processes and results establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers.
of project implementation; (Emphasis supplied).

2. Provide the use of land within the University reservation Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that
for the purpose of establishing a lowland rice project for the party of the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving
the Second Part for a period of one calendar year subject to the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to
discretionary renewal by the Party of the First Part; agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the
coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those
3. Provide practical training to the Party of the Second Part on which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
the management and operation of their lowland project upon request necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for
of Party of the Second Part; and setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production
centers, etc.
4. Provide technical assistance in the form of relevant
livelihood project specialists who shall extend expertise on scientific Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate
methods of crop production upon request by Party of the Second Part. the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled
school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered
In return for the technical assistance extended by the CMU, the segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the
participants in a project pay a nominal amount as service fee. The school to be necessary for its purposes. The CMU has constantly
self-reliance program was adjunct to the CMU's lowland rice project. raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has
questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing case at bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to
Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the establish that the fact that the DARAB had no jurisdiction, it made
CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing the adjudication now subject of review.
Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development
Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the Philippine Packing Whether the DARAB has the authority to order the segregation of a
Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program, with portion of a private property titled in the name of its lawful owner,
the direct participation of faculty and students. Said contracts with even if the claimant is not entitled as a beneficiary, is an issue we feel
the Philippine Packing Corporation and others of a similar nature we must resolve. The quasi-judicial powers of DARAB are provided
(like MM-Agraplex) were made prior to the enactment of R.A. 6657 in Executive Order No. 129-A, quoted hereunder in so far as
and were directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the pertinent to the issue at bar:
CMU as an educational institution. As soon as the objectives of the
agreement for the joint use of the CMU land were achieved as of Sec. 13. –– AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD —
June 1988, the CMU adopted a blue print for the exclusive use and There is hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
under the office of the Secretary. . . . The Board shall assume the
powers and functions with respect to adjudication of agrarian reform uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority
cases under Executive Order 229 and this Executive Order . . . and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.

Sec. 17. –– QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR. — The The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it
DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions
jurisdiction over all matters including implementation of Agrarian from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main
Reform. vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field
of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and development of
Section 50 of R.A. 6658 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as this country.
follows:
It is the opinion of this Court, in the light of the foregoing analysis
The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and and for the reasons indicated, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. . . . Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. We hereby declare the
decision of the DARAB dated September 4, 1989 and the decision of
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision
Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the DARAB has of the quasi-judicial body, as null and void and hereby order that they
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the be set aside, with costs against the private respondents.
implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the
same law as any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether SO ORDERED
leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to

agriculture. 10

In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not
share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the
"segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four
Hundred hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and
directed the DAR Regional Director to implement its order of
segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian
dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as
beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants or
leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU
land was without legal authority. w do not believe that the quasi-
judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than
ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the
complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the
quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not
entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous
interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private
property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregation
400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the
complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous
assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under
the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what
was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief
prayed the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed
for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.

The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among
the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In
this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must
still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU
land reservation which can be made available to landless peasants,
assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP
beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had
been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet