Libel/Tort

1. NY Times vs. Sullivan

o The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements,
even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are
made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless
disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case
collapsed.

2. Vasquez vs. CA
o Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official
conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made
with actual malice—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not

3. Hustler Magazine vs. Falwell

o In order to protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern, public figures and officials may NOT recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publication without showing in addition
that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with
“actual malice”, i.e. with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. This standard is necessary to give adequate breathing
space to the freedoms protected by the 1st amendment.

4. Newsweek vs. IAC

o Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or a class, it is
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual
in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to
him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.

5. Beauharnais vs. Illinois

o The State of Illinois cannot be denied of the power to punish utterance directed at a
defined group, unless the utterance is a willful and purposeless restriction unrelated
to the peace and well-being of the State.

6. MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines

o Group libel does NOT give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual unless
it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter. In this case, the
group was so large that: (1) No reasonable reader would take the statements as so
literally applying to each individual member; and (2) Limitation on liability would
safeguard freedom of speech and expression.
o (Dissent) The case is not about libel but about tortious conduct. The offensive act
need not identify the plaintiff as the object of humiliation. What is important is to
 prove that the plaintiff suffered mental and emotional distress because of what he
read, saw and that the statement is given to a group for which he belongs.

7. SC Administrative Circular No. 08-2008

Compelled Speech
1. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. vs. FCC
 Subsequent decisions of FCC laid down a two-fold policy: (1) Personal attack doctrine
– When a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a public issue, it is
required that the individual attacked must be offered an opportunity to respond;
and (2) Fairness doctrine – Issues must be presented with coverage of competing
views. It must be ensured that both sides are presented.
 It is the right of the viewers and listeners, and NOT the right of the broadcasters
which is paramount. The First Amendment seeks to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas. It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. This
right may not be abridged by the Congress or FCC.

2. Miami Herald Publishing Co. vs. Tornillo

 Florida's “right of reply” statute violated the First Amendment. The right of reply
law restricted the Miami Herald's free speech because it prevented the newspaper
from saying whatever else it wanted. The law “exacts a penalty on the basis of the
content” of the paper. The penalty would be the time, materials, and newspaper
space required to publish a candidate's reply. As a result, “editors might well
conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore…political and
electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced.”

3. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. vs. FCC

 The must-carry provisions were designed to serve three interrelated, important
governmental interests:
i. Preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast televisions;
ii. Promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity
of sources; and
iii. Promoting the fair competition in the television programming market
 The must-carry provisions do not burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the governmental interest they promote.

Overbreadth and Void-for-Vagueness

1. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
 The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines only apply to free speech cases. The
theory is that a facial challenge is allowed for vague and overbroad statutes because
of its possible “chilling effect” on protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred, and grievances left
 to fester because of the inhibitory effect. The same rationale does not apply to penal
statutes precisely because criminal statutes are meant to have an “in terrorem”
effect. In a facial challenge is allowed for this reason, then we may just as well not
enact penal laws.
 Vagueness and overbreadth challenges in the free speech context typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
are typically invalidated only “as applied” to a particular defendant.

2. David vs. GMA

 Overbreadth doctrine is NOT applicable. First, it is an analytical tool developed for
testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. PP 1017 is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. Second, facial invalidation of
laws is considered manifestly strong medicine, to be used “sparingly and only as a
last resort” and is “generally disfavored”. Last, a facial challenge on the ground of
overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may
be valid.
 Void-for-vagueness is also NOT applicable.

Sexually Explicit Expression

1. Pita vs. CA
 Useless case.
 Under the Clear and Present Danger test, the Government has not discharged the
burden of proof required to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature. They were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the materials
to be pornography; and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure by
way of a search warrant.
 Steps in confiscating materials:
o Apply for issuance of search warrant.
o Determine the materials that are obscene and pose Clear and Present
Danger.
o The judge will determine whether or not the materials are obscene (case-to-
case basis and upon sound discretion).
o If there is a probable cause, issue the search warrant.

2. Gonzales vs. Kalaw-Katigbak

 Another useless case.
 The test to be used is: WON to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest.

3. People vs. Padan

 An actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness has no
redeeming feature. There is no room for art in it. One can see nothing in it but clear
 and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and
causing as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting
influence specially on the youth of the land.

4. People vs. Kottinger

 Pictures which depict the non-Christian inhabitants as they actually live, without
attempted presentation of them in unusual posture or dress, are not offensive to
chastity, or foul or filthy. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community
would not be shocked by photographs of this type.

5. Miller vs. California

 Obscene material can be regulated by the State, subject to these guidelines:
i. Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standard
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest;
ii. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
iii. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.

6. Paris Adult Theater I vs. Slaton

 The state has legitimate interest in regulating commercialized obscenity in public
places, even assuming it is feasible to enforce safeguards against exposure to
juveniles and passerby. It has the power to make a morally neutral judgment that
the public exhibition or commerce of such obscene material has a tendency to injure
the community as a whole, to endanger public safety or to jeopardize the right to
maintain a decent society.

7. Ashcroft vs. Free Speech Coalition

 The Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) prohibits speech despite its serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. If films etc., contain a single graphic
depiction of sexual activity within the statutory definition, the possession of the film
would be subject to severe punishment without inquiry into the work’s redeeming
value. For this reason, CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity because it lacks
the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standard
prohibited by the definition of obscenity.

8. Schad vs. Mount Ephraim

 When a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn
and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest. The Court must not
only assess the substantiality of the governmental interests asserted but also
determine whether those interests could be served by means that would be less
intrusive on activity protected by the First Amendment.

9. American Booksellers Association vs. Hudnut

  The ordinance impermissibly discriminates on the basis of point of view
(pornography as a practice that discriminates against women). It discriminates on
the ground of the content of the speech. Speech treating women in the approved
way- in sexual encounters premised on equality, is lawful no matter how sexually
explicit. Speech treating women in the disapproved way- as submissive in sexual
matters or as enjoying humiliations- is unlawful no matter how significant the
literary, artistic, or political qualities of the work taken as a whole.

10. FCC vs. Pacifica Foundation

 The Court has never held that prurient appeal is an essential component of indecent
language. Prurient appeal is an element of obscene, while indecent normally
pertains to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.
 The content of the broadcast was vulgar, offensive and shocking. It is not entitled to
absolute constitutional protection. Moreover, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children and one broadcast is all that is necessary to affect them. Hence, the
government’s interest in protecting the well-being of the youth and in supporting
the claims of parents to authority in their own household justified the regulation
of expression otherwise protected.

11. Ashcroft vs. American Civil Liberties Union

 If the audience is comprised of different communities with different local
standards, the defendant bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on
obscene messages. Because Congress has narrowed the range of content restricted
by COPA (Child Online Protection Act) in a manner analogous to Miller’s definition of
obscenity, the Court conclude that any variance caused by that statute’s reliance on
community standards is not substantial to violate the First Amendment.