ALTERATION OF TITLE JURISPRUDENCE

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G.R. No. L-21312             November 22, 1924

G.R. No. 142601             October 23, 2006

G.R. No. L-12691             February 27, 1959

G.R. No. 167120               April 23, 2014

G.R. No. 180614               August 29, 2012

G.R. No. 156995               January 12, 2015

G.R. No. L-12603             March 25, 1960

G.R. No. 157714               June 16, 2009

G.R. No. 186375               June 17, 2015

G.R. No. 202805

G.R. No. 157367               November 23, 2011

G.R. No. 163530               March 9, 2011

G.R. No. L-10676             March 29, 1958

G.R. No. L-18339             June 29, 1962

. No. 152445             July 4, 2008

CAMBRIDGE REALTY AND RESOURCES CORP., petitioner,

vs.
ERIDANUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CHITON REALTY CORP., respondents.
There is one serious flaw that the trial court committed: its failure to require the court-appointed
surveyors - considering that there are quite a number of irregularities in the certificates of title of
the parties - to conduct an extensive investigation of the titles of the parties.

The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of
geodetic engineering. The very reason why commissioners were appointed by the trial
court, upon agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of
the titles in conflict with each other. Given their background, expertise and experience,
these commissioners are in a better position to determine which of the titles is valid.
Thus, the trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions

It was the duty of the trial court, considering the magnitude and extent of the issues presented
and the questions that arose from a careful examination of the parties' respective certificates of
title, to have required the appointed surveyors of the DENR to investigate and trace the parties'
respective titles, conduct a comprehensive survey, study and analysis of the boundaries,
distances and bearings thereof, and submit an exhaustive report thereon. Given their expertise
and experience, they would have been able to satisfactorily perform the required task. Yet the
court did not. As a matter of fact, the services of the government surveyors were not even
secured by court initiative; the trial court even threatened to do away with the testimonies of the
state surveyors when their presence in court could not be guaranteed. It was through the auspices
of the respondents that they were brought to court. To make matters worse, the parties did not
even pay the required fees for the survey; the court did not compel them.

In overlapping of titles disputes, it has always been the practice for the court to appoint a
surveyor from the government land agencies - the Land Registration Authority or the DENR - to
act as commissioner. Given that the trial court here did not, we are now left to make do with the
two-page report of the state surveyors and decide the case with what evidence is made available
to us by the parties' respective expert witnesses as well, which - for the most part - must be
received with caution as their testimonies are understandably self-serving.

The crux of the matter, however, lies in ascertaining whether there really is overlapping
of boundaries of the properties of the movants for intervention and that of the private
respondent. As We scrutinize carefully the claim of each party based on survey readings
and plottings appearing on the plans submitted as annexes, We find that the same have
not passed the rigid test of accuracy and authenticity as should be determined by
precision instruments duly verified by accredited surveyors. Indeed, each claim may
appear to be as good and self-serving as the other. And since the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, the veracity and correctness of the alleged overlapping is better left to those
scientifically qualified, trained and experienced and whose integrity is beyond question
and dispute.77 (Italics supplied)

The present petition calls only for the settlement of the overlapping issue, barring direct and
collateral attacks on each of the parties' respective certificates of title, which require different
proceedings for the ventilation thereof.78

Xx
A case of overlapping of boundaries or encroachment depends on a reliable, if not accurate,
verification survey; barring one, no overlapping or encroachment may be proved successfully,
for obvious reasons. In the wake of the majority expert opinion that by changing the tie or
reference point from a PLS to a BLLM 1 monument, a corresponding effect on the survey occurs
- which can include a change in boundaries and, at worst, an overlap - the Court is not prepared
to declare that an accurate survey of the respondents' properties has been made as to be a proper
basis of the present claim of encroachment or overlap.

Xxx

An example lies precisely in the area of land boundary disputes. The first step in the resolution of
such cases is for the court to direct the proper government agency concerned (the Land
Registration Authority,89 or LRA, or the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, or
DENR) to conduct a verification or relocation survey and submit a report to the court,90 or
constitute a panel of commissioners for the purpose.91

G.R. No. 165863               April 10, 2013

ALBERT CHUA, JIMMY CHUA CHI LEONG and SPOUSES EDUARDO SOLIS AND
GLORIA VICTA, Petitioners,
vs.
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., Respondent.

Jimmy and Albert manifested that they filed a petition for the correction of entries in their
respective titles before the then CFI of Cavite and that the said court granted their petition. The
records, however, failed to show sufficient proof that Jimmy and Albert faithfully complied with
the basic notice requirement under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, which provides as follows:

Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. — No erasure, alteration, or amendment

shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order
of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that a new interest not appearing
upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the
name of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married,
or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs
or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has
been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any
other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all
parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, x x x. [Emphases
supplied]

The above provision requires that all interested parties must be duly notified of the petitioner’s
application for amendment or alteration of the certificate of title. Relief under the said legal
provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.43

Xx

The petitioners argue that an overlapping of titles was established by their evidence. Surveys and
sketch plans46 were presented showing the relative positions of the subject properties as well as
their history47 which were traced all the way back to their mother title, OCT No. 1020. Moreover,
the Bureau of Lands, through the Chief of its Technical Services Section, Engr. Venezuela,
identified the subject properties using the technical descriptions in TCT Nos. T-88467 and T-
88468 in a verification survey conducted in compliance with the order of the trial court. His
Report, dated July 1, 1980, stated that there was an overlapping between the subject properties
and the property described in the respondent’s OCT No. O-644. The report showed that of the
9,287 square meters of land comprising Lot 2-A-3 Psd-110980 (TCT No. T-88468), 5,628 square
meters were overlapped by the respondent’s OCT No. O-644, while 7,489 square meters of the
9,288 square meter of Lot 2-A-4 (TCT No. T-88467) were overlapped by OCT No. O-644. This
report was the basis of the Certification, dated February 14, 1995, of the LRA, to the effect that
Lots 1 and 2 situated in Barrio Niog, Bacoor, Cavite, decreed in LRC Case No. N-557, Record
No. N-30647 under Decree No. N-112239 issued on January 4, 1967 in favor of the respondent,
were parcels of land covered by OCT No. O-644, and when plotted in the municipal index sheet
through its tie line, would fall inside subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-99697, Lot-2-A, which
included the subject properties.

Xxx

These defects are very material that it cannot be argued that they are just clerical in nature. The
flaws in their titles are major defects that cannot just be dismissed as typographical and
innocuous. The defects pertain to the essential core of a title and definitely affect their integrity.
Being significantly defective, these cannot serve as indubitable and valid bases for a clear and
convincing delineation of the metes and bounds of the properties. The Court already debunked
this argument in its April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027. Thus:

Petitioners would minimize the import of the defects in their titles by describing them as
"clerical." The plea does not persuade for the self-contradictions in petitioners' titles infract their
integrity. Errors that relate to the lots' mother title, their technical descriptions and their locations
cannot be dismissed as clerical and harmless in character. With these errors, the titles of the
petitioners do not deserve the sanctity given to torrens title. These errors precisely created and
cast the cloud of doubt over petitioners' titles and precipitated the case at bench.48

Xxx

The properties, presently in possession of San Diego, are located in Barrio Niog, as described in
their titles. Although Barrio Talaba and Barrio Niog are adjacent to each other, their respective
boundaries are clearly defined and delineated from the plans, maps and surveys on record. It has
not been shown, so far, that the said barrios were one and the same at some point in time. Basic
is the rule that a person, who claims that he has a better right to the property or prays for its
recovery, must prove his assertion by clear and convincing evidence and is duty bound to
identify sufficiently and satisfactorily the property.50

Xxx

The verification survey is unreliable

Like the petitioners’ titles, the Court finds the verification survey conducted by Engr. Venezuela
of the Bureau of Lands unreliable. It is so because Engr. Venezuela admitted that his table survey
was merely based on the technical description of the defective titles. Naturally, an overlapping
would be expected on this basis. Again, the Court reiterates its position in this regard which
appears in its April 22, 1994 Decision in G.R. No. 105027. Thus:

To be sure, these defects were judicially admitted by the petitioners. They attached their
defective titles to their complaints in the trial court. As aforestated, their titles showed on their
very face that they covered lots located in Barrio Talaba, municipality of Bacoor whereas the lots
of private respondent are in Barrio Niog of the same municipality. The two barrios are one and a
half kilometers away from each other. Likewise, the face of their titles show that they emanated
from OCT No. 1898 or from Lot 1 constituting the northern portion of Juan Cuenca's property
before its subdivision. Nonetheless, the technical descriptions of the lots appearing in their titles
were lifted from OCT No. (1020) RO-9 or from Lot 2 forming the southern portion of Juan
Cuenca's land. No less than petitioners' witness, Eng. Venezuela, confirmed these blatant defects
when he testified, thus:

BY ATTY. VASQUEZ: (to the witness)

Xxx
His attempt to reconcile the defects and inconsistencies appearing on the faces of petitioners'
titles did not impress the respondent court and neither are we. His opinion lacks authoritativeness
for his verification survey was not made on the land itself. It was a mere table survey based on
the defective titles themselves.53 [Emphasis supplied]

G.R. No. 202414               June 4, 2014

JOSEPHINE WEE, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD MARDO, Respondent.

VOID ANG SECOND REGISTRATION

For said reason, the order of the RTC directing the Administrator of LRA to issue a
corresponding decree in petitioner’s name is null and void. A land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier
land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the
principle behind the original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.7

Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence either of judicial or administrative

proceedings, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.8 The certificate
of title cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession. Neither can it be defeated
by prescription. As provided under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation
of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

REMEDY

Petitioner argued that the rule on indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud
and misrepresentation. In this case, she alleged that the respondent fraudulently registered the
subject property under her name after she (respondent) had already sold a portion thereof to her
(petitioner). By virtue of the deed of sale, petitioner insists that she is considered to be the real
owner of the subject parcel of land.

The Court finds no merit in petitioner’s argument. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the issue of
the validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.9 A
certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally. This rule is provided under Section 48 of PD
1529 which states that:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. ― A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

In Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,10 it was stated that it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as
to whether title was procured by falsification or fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for
fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack
must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot
be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.

In this case, the petitioner is contesting the indefeasibility of title on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation. Applying the abovementioned doctrine, even assuming that the petitioner’s
allegations are true, the same are considered as collateral attacks, and such must be raised in an
action expressly instituted for such purpose and in a proper proceeding.

Thus, in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals,11 it was ruled that an application for registration of an
already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title. The title may be challenged
only in a proceeding for that purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already
registered in the name of another person. After one year from its registration, the title is
incontrovertible and is no longer open to review.

Remedy of the petitioner is to file a separate proceeding such as an action for specific
performance or for reconveyance

Petitioner further argues that considering the registration of the said land under respondent’s
name was fraudulently secured, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put an end to the
long pending dispute between the parties, the courts below should have ordered the
reconveyance of the subject land to her as its rightful owner.

Petitioner advances the theory that by virtue of the fraudulent registration of a subject property,
respondent is a trustee of an implied trust for her benefit, being the real owner of the subject
property, as she had validly acquired the same from respondent through an absolute deed of sale.

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade. The issue of fraudulent alienation raised in the second
application for registration of the subject property is collateral attack which should be directly
raised in a separate proceeding filed for such purpose. It cannot be entertained in this proceeding.
In several cases, the Court has ruled that an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.12

The RTC was, thus, correct in denying petitioner’s "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Pleading and to Admit Attached Supplemental Complaint For Reconveyance." Allowing it
would not have been permissible because the application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land already registered is a collateral attack itself. It is settled that an application for
registration of a parcel of land already covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral attack,
not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title.13

Registration, however, does not deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title or ownership which is represented
by such certificate. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The fact that a person was
able to secure a title in his name did not operate to vest ownership upon him of the subject land.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it
is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein.1âwphi1 It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it
be used as a shield for the commission of fraud: neither does it permit one to enrich himself at
the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real prope1iy may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or
that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.14

The remedy of the petitioner is to file a separate proceeding or action to protect her alleged
interest. As she claimed that she bought the subject property for value from the respondent as
evidenced by a deed of sale, she can file an action for specific performance to compel the
respondent to comply with her obligation in the alleged deed of sale and/or an action for
reconveyance of the property. She can also file an action for rescission. Needless to state,
petitioner must prove her entitlement because the respondent claims that the sale was falsified.

Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322, which states
that in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and
equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of
any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.15 It is an action in personam available to a
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's
name.16 It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no
longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the
rightful owner.17 Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value.18

November 20, 2017

G.R. No. 198647

SN ABOITIZ POWER-MAGAT, INC., Petitioner

vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALFONSO LISTA, IFUGAO, represented by the Municipal
Mayor, Respondent
In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the
following allegations for the sufficiency of cause of action: (1) that the claimant is the owner
of the subject land prior to the issuance of the title to the defendant; and (2) that fraud or
mistake was perpetrated in obtaining said title over the subject land.20

Verily, it is necessary that the claimant, who seeks to annul the patent and title, should have a
pre-existing right of ownership over the subject property as the claim of ownership is an element
thereof. In the absence of which, the claim of relief does not exist, which makes the case
dismissible.21

In this case, it is apparent, based on the amended complaint, that respondent municipality does
not claim ownership over the property, to wit:

Xxx

Under the aforequoted provision, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1.) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2.)
when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3.)
when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate of any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4.) when the name of any person on the certificate has
been changed; (5.) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the
marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be
affected; (6.) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not
conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7.) when there is reasonable
ground for the amendment or alteration of title.25

Such relief under said provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or
there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest, otherwise
the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case
where the incident properly belongs. The issues are limited to those which are so patently
insubstantial as not to be genuine issues.26

Proceedings under this provision are summary in nature, contemplating insertions of mistakes
which are only clerical, but certainly not controversial issues.27

G.R. No. L-22266        December 29, 1924

DEFECT SA PLAN MEANS DEFECT SA TITLE (KAHIT NA MAS NAUNA REGISTRATION)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/aug2017/gr_211845_so_2017.html
In case of double registration where land has been registered in the name of two persons, priority
of registration is the settled rule. In the 1915 en bane case of Legarda v. Saleeby,2the Court
stated:

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original
parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original
certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater
right, title, or interest than his vendor, that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only.
Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee
of the owner of the later certificate.3(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Legarda was concerned more with the issue of ownership than with the issue of possession:
To bar transferees of the "second or later original certificate of title" from ever having a right of
ownership superior to those who derive their title from the "earlier or first original certificate of
title," Legarda ruled that the "innocent purchaser [for value]" doctrine should not apply because
"[w]hen land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and
all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world."14 However, that notice is constructive
and not actual.

If Legarda is strictly and uniformly applied, then holders of transfer certificates of title
emanating from the "second or later original certificate of title" or any person deriving any
interest from them can never be buyers in good faith.

I am not advocating in this dissent that the Legarda doctrine on double registration or titling be
abandoned or overturned. I submit that it is and remains controlling in that respect. Rather, I take
the position that a wholesale, indiscriminate, blind application of the constructive notice doctrine
espoused in Legarda without regard to the peculiar factual circumstances of each case may not
be the best approach to dispense justice.

Dizon v. Rodriguez15did not involve double registration.1âwphi1 It involved titled lots which are
"actually part of the territorial waters and belong to the State."16While the Court ruled that "the
incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the
land thus covered is not capable of registration,"[[17]] the Court nonetheless upheld the CA' s
finding of possession in good faith in favor of the registered owners until the latter's titles were
declared null and void, viz.:

DAMAGES

e Court, in De Villa v. Trinidad,19 while it cited Legarda, did not apply the constructive notice
doctrine in determining whether necessary and useful expenses may be recovered by a transferee
of the "second original certificate" and reckoned the said transferee's bad faith from the filing of
the complaint, viz.:
We have laid the rule that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering
the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between original parties and
in case of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the
person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who rely on
the second certificate. The purchaser from the owner of the later certificate and his successors,
should resort to his vendor for redress, rather than molest the holder of the first certificate and his
successors, who should be permitted to rest secure in their title. Consequently, since Original
Certificate of Title No. 183 was registered on January 30, 1920, De Villa's claim which is based
on said title should prevail, as against Trinidad's whose original title was registered on November
25, 1920. And from the point of equity, this is the proper solution, considering that unlike the
titles of Palma and the DBP, De Villa's title was never tainted with fraud.

xxxx

The facts and circumstances, however, do not call for assessment of damages against appellants
until after the filing of the present suit on January 26, 1962 for only then could they be positively
adjudged in bad faith in view of their knowledge that there was an adverse claimant to the land.

Trinidad's repossession of the land on March 2, 1961 cannot be deemed in bad faith as it was
pursuant to a court order legally obtained, and as his possession before that time was in good
faith.

Appellant does not question the specific amounts of the damages20awarded in De Villa's favor
and the same, at any rate, is borne out by the records. Said damages, however should be offset
against the value of whatever necessary and useful expenses and improvements were made or
incurred by Trinidad with respect to the land, provided that in the case of useful expenses or
improvements these were made or incurred prior to the filing of the present action. Such
reimbursable amount due to Trinidad must, therefore, first be determined before the aforesaid
award of damages in De Villa's favor can be executed. And its determination shall be by way of
supplementary proceedings in aid of execution in the lower court.21

LEGIT SAME CASE;USE THIS

August 9, 2017

G.R. No. 211845

PEN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and LAS BRISAS RESORT CORPORATION,

Petitioners,
vs.
MARTINEZ LEYBA, INC.,, Respondent
FACTS:

Martinez sought the services of a licensed geodetic engineer to survey the boundaries of its land.
The verification survey plan Vs.,Q4,Q0034, which was approved by the Regional Technical
Director for Lands of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), revealed
that the building and improvements constructed by Las Brisas occupied portions of Martinez's
lands: 567 square meters of Lot No. 29, Block 3, (LRC) Pcs. 7305; a portion of 1,389 square
meters of Lot No. 30, Block 3, (LRC) Pcs.

On 24 November 1994, Martinez sent a letter to Las Brisas demanding the latter to cease and
desist from unlawfully holding portions of Martinez's land occupied by Las Brisas structures and
improvements. Despite the said demand, no action was taken by Las Brisa.

On 24 March 1997, Martinez filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Cancellation of Title and
Recovery of Ownership with Damages against Las Brisas before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-4386. The case was raffled to, and heard by,
Branch 71 thereof x x x.

ISSUES SINABI

The issues sought to be resolved x x x can be read in the respective memorandum [sic] submitted
by the parties.

For the plaintiff, the statement of issues are as follows:

1. Whether x x x the Certificate of Title of the defendant overlapped and thus created a cloud on
plaintiff T.C.T. Nos. 250242, 250243, 250244, covering lots nos. 29, 30, and 31, block 3 (LRC)
PCS-7305, which should be removed under Article 476 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

2. Whether x x x defendant's T.C.T. No. 153101 should be cancelled insofar as it overlapped

Lots 29, 30 and 31, Block 3, (LRC) PCS- 7305;

3. Whether x x x the defendant is a builder in bad faith and is liable for the consequence of his
acts;

4. Whether x x x the plaintiff is entitled to collect actual or compensatory and moral damages in
the amount of ₱5,000,000.00, exemplary damage in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00, nominal
damage in the amount of ₱l,000,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of ₱300,000.00,
exclusive of appearance fee of ₱3,000.00 per hearing or unferome [sic] attended.

RIAL COURT

Clearly this is a valid complaint for quieting of title specifically defined under Article 476 of the
Civil Code and as cited in the cases of Vda. De Angeles v. CA, G.R. No. 95748, November 21,
1996; Tan vs. Valdehuesa, 66 SCRA 61 (1975).
As claimed by the plaintiff, defendant's T.C.T. No. 153101 is an instrument, record or claim
which constitutes or casts a cloud upon its T.C.T. Nos. 250242, 250243, and 250244. Sufficient
and competent evidence has been introduced by the plaintiff that upon plotting verification of the
technical description of both parcels of land conducted by Geodetic Engineer Ricardo Cruz, duly
approved by the Regional Technical Director of Lands of the DENR that Psu-234002, covered
by defendant's T.C.T. No. 153101 overlapped a portion of 567 square meters of Lot No. 29 x x x,
a portion of 1,389 square meter of Lot No. 30 x x x covered by plaintiff's T.C.T. Nos. 250242,
250243and 250244, respectively. Surprisingly, defendant has not disputed nor has it adduced
evidence to disprove these findings.

It was likewise established that plaintiffs T.C.T. No[s]. 250242, 250243 and 250244 emanated
from O.C.T. No. 756, which was originally registered on August 14, 1915, whereas, from
defendant's own evidence, its T.C.T. No. 153101 was derived from O.C.T. No. 9311, which was
originally registered on September 14, 1973, pursuant to Decree No. D-147380, in LRC Case
No. N- 7993, Rec. No. 43097.

Plaintiffs mother title was registered 58 years ahead of defendant's mother title. Thus, while
defendant's T.C.T. No. 153101 and its mother title are apparently valid and effective in the sense
that they were issued in consequence of a land registration proceeding, they are in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, and unforceable [sic] insofar as it overlaps plaintiffs prior and
subsisting titles.

xxxx

In the cases of Chan vs. CA, 298 SCRA 713, de Villa vs. Trinidad, 20 SCRA 1167, Gotian vs.
Gaffud, 27 SCRA 706, again the Supreme Court held:

'When two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land, in whole or
in part, the earlier in date must prevail and in cases of successive registrations where more than
one certificate of title is issued over the same land, the person holding a prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. '

Xxxx

RTC RULING

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against 1he defendant
as follows:

1. Quieting its T.C.T. Nos. 250242, 240243 and 250[2]44, and removing the clouds thereon
created by the issuance of T.C.T. No. 153101 insofar as the said titles are overlapped by the
T.C.T. No. : 153101;

2. Ordering the cancellation or annulment of portions of T.C.T. No. 153101 insofar as it overlaps
plaintiff's T.C.T. No. 250242, to Lot 29, Block 3, (LRC) Pcs-7305; plaintiff's T.C.T. No. 250243
to Lot 30, Block 3 (LRC) Pcs- 7305; and plaintiff's [TCT] No. 250244 to Lot 31, Block 3, (LRC)
Pcs-7305;

3. Ordering the defendant to vac1.ite and turn over the possession of said portions in favor of the
plaintiff: and to remove the building or structures it has constructed thereon at its own expense
without right to indemnity [therefor]; to allow the plaintiff to appropriate what the defendant has
built or to compel the defendant to pay for the value of the land encroached upon;

4. Ordering the defendant to pay moral damages to the plaintiff in thy amount of ₱ 1,000,000.00;
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 and attorney's fees in 1he amount of
₱100,000.00.

5. Ordering the defendant to pay for the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.14

COURT RULING:

he Court denies the Petition.

Under the Manual on Land Survey Procedures of the Philippines, on Verification Surveys,
particularly, it is provided, thus:

Section 146. The Regional Technical Director for Lands may issue order to conduct a
verification survey whenever any approved survey is reported to be erroneous, or when titled
lands are reported to overlap or where occupancy is reported to encroach another property. xxx

xxxx

Section 149. All survey work undertaken for verification purposes shall be subject of verification
and approval in the DENR~LMS Regional Office concerned and shall be designated as
Verification Surveys (Vs). x x x

Pursuant to these provisions, respondent caused its property to be surveyed, and on May 23,
1996, the Regional Technical Director of Lands approved the verification survey under
Verification Survey Plan Vs-04-000394.22 This Verification Survey Plan revealed that
petitioners encroached on respondent's land to the following extent:

a. A portion of 567 square meters of Lot No. 29, Block 3, (LRC) Pcs-7305, covered by
respondent's TCT-250242. This is the portion where the petitioners built a riprapping.

b. A p01tion of 1,389 square meters of Lot No. 30, Block 3, (LRC) Pcs-7305, covered by
respondent's TCT 250243. This is the portion where the petitioners had constructed an old
building.
On this basis, respondent filed Civil Case No. 97·"4386. Respondent's main evidence is the said
Verification Survey Plan V s-04-000394, which is a public document. As a public document, it is
admissible in evidence even without further proof of its due execution and genuineness,23 and
had in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict the same, there must be evidence
that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, otherwise the document should be
upheld,24 The certification and approval by the Regional Technical Director of Lands signifies
the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan."25

Although "[i]n overlapping of titles disputes, it has always been the practice for the [trial] court
to appoint a surveyor from the government land agencies [such as] the Land Registration
Authority or the DENR to act as commissioner,"26 this is not mandatory procedure; the trial
court may rely on the parties' respective evidence to resolve the case.27 In this case, respondent
presented the results of a verification survey conducted on its lands. On the other hand,
petitioners did not present proof like the results of a survey conducted upon their initiative to
contradict respondent's evidence; nor did they move for the appointment by the trial court of
government or private surveyors to act as commissioners. Their sole defense is that they acquired
their land in good faith and for value; but this does not squarely address respondent's claim of
overlapping.

For the RTC and CA, respondent's undisputed evidence proved its claim of overlapping. This
Court agrees. As a public document containing the certification and approval by the Regional
Technical Director of Lands, Verification Survey Plan Vs-Q4-000394 can be relied upon as
proof of the encroachment over respondent's lands. More so when petitioners could not present
contradictory proof.

Xxx\

, on the question of laches, the CA correctly held that as owners of the subject property,
respondent has the imprescriptible right to recover possession thereof from any person illegally
occupying its lands. Even if petitioners have been occupying these lands for a significant period
of time, respondent as the registered and lawful owner has the right to demand the return thereof
at any time.

Jurisprudence consistently holds that ‘prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land
covered by the Torrens system' because 'under the Property Registration Decree, no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.

Under Section 47 of the Property Registration Decree, or Presidential Decree No. 1529, "(n)o
title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession."
G.R. No. 164356               July 27, 2011

HEIRS OF MARGARITO PABAUS, namely, FELICIANA P. MASACOTE, MERLINDA

P. CAILING, MAGUINDA P. ARCLETA, ADELAIDA PABAUS, RAUL MORGADO
AND LEOPOLDO MORGADO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF AMANDA YUTIAMCO, namely, JOSEFINA TAN, AND MOISES,
VIRGINIA, ROGELIO, ERLINDA, ANA AND ERNESTO, all surnamed YUTIAMCO,
Respondents.

The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of geodetic
engineering. The very reason why commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon
agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an evaluation and analysis of the titles in conflict
with each other. Given their background, expertise and experience, these commissioners are in a
better position to determine which of the titles is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on their
findings and conclusions.25

However, in overlapping of titles disputes, it has always been the practice for the court to appoint
a surveyor from the government land agencies – the Land Registration Authority or the DENR –
to act as commissioner.26 In this case, the trial court appointed a private surveyor in the person of
Engr. Estaca who actually conducted the relocation survey while the two other surveyors chosen
by the parties expressed their conformity with the finding of encroachment or overlapping
indicated in the Relocation Plan27 submitted to the court by Engr. Estaca. Said plan showed that
the area in conflict is on the northeastern portion wherein petitioners’ OCT No. P-8649
overlapped with respondents’ title (OCT No. O-104) by 15,675 square meters.

G.R. No. 164356               July 27, 2011

HEIRS OF MARGARITO PABAUS, namely, FELICIANA P. MASACOTE, MERLINDA

P. CAILING, MAGUINDA P. ARCLETA, ADELAIDA PABAUS, RAUL MORGADO
AND LEOPOLDO MORGADO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF AMANDA YUTIAMCO, namely, JOSEFINA TAN, AND MOISES,
VIRGINIA, ROGELIO, ERLINDA, ANA AND ERNESTO, all surnamed YUTIAMCO,
Respondents.
Survey is the process by which a parcel of land is measured and its boundaries and contents
ascertained; also a map, plat or statement of the result of such survey, with the courses and
distances and the quantity of the land.28 A case of overlapping of boundaries or encroachment
depends on a reliable, if not accurate, verification survey.29 To settle the present dispute, the
parties agreed to the conduct of a relocation survey. The Manual for Land Surveys in the
Philippines (MLSP)30 provides for the following rules in conducting relocation surveys:

Section 593 - The relocation of corners or re-establishment of boundary lines shall be made
using the bearings, distances and areas approved by the Director of Lands or written in the lease
or Torrens title.

Section 594 - The data used in monumenting or relocating corners of approved surveys shall be
submitted to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. New corner marks set on the
ground shall be accurately described in the field notes and indicated on the original plans on file
in the Bureau of Lands. (Italics supplied.)

Q Do you agree with me Mr. Witness that in order to locate the missing corners to proceed with
the relocation survey, you have to make a point of reference?

A Yes.

Q And that point of reference is found in the title itself?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you agree with me that the point of reference is BLLM?

The MLSP laid down specific rules regarding tie lines, point of reference and overlapping of
adjoining titled lands. In this case, records failed to disclose that the basis for relocating the
missing corners was submitted to the Bureau of Lands (now Land Management Bureau) for
verification and approval as required by Section 594. This is crucial considering that the court-
appointed commissioner is a private surveyor and not a government surveyor from the LRA or
LMB-DENR. It bears stressing that in every land dispute, the aim of the courts is to protect the
integrity of and maintain inviolate the Torrens system of land registration, as well as to uphold
the law; a resolution of the parties’ dispute is merely a necessary consequence.33

On the part of petitioners, their only evidence to support their opposition to the claim of
encroachment by the respondents is the cadastral map which indicated the boundary of
respondents’ property at the south of petitioners’ lot. But as admitted by Engr. De Casa, during
the cadastral survey they conducted from 1986 to 1996, they did not send a written notice to the
landowner Amanda Yutiamco and that she plotted the boundaries of her property based merely
on a tax declaration because the cadastral survey team failed to obtain copies of OCT No. O-104
and TCT No. T-1428 from the Registry of Deeds.34 The MLSP specifically required that
relocation of boundary lines is to be made using the bearings, distances and areas approved by
the Director of Lands or indicated in the Torrens titles. Hence, said cadastral map is not
competent proof of the actual location and boundaries of respondents’ Lots 1 and 2, Psu-
213148.1awphi1

Indeed, we have ruled that if the land covered by free patent was a private land, the Director of
Lands has no jurisdiction over it. Such free patent and the subsequent certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto are a nullity.35 The aggrieved party may initiate an action for cancellation of
such title. In the recent case of De Guzman v. Agbagala,36 the Court reiterated:

The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no
legal effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land - as when there is a prima facie proof of
ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants - is not affected by the
issuance of a free patent over the same land, because the Public Land [L]aw applies only to lands
of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that
have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership. Consequently, a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate
issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered by it is really a part of the disposable land
of the public domain.37

Considering, however, that the claim of overlapping has not been clearly established, it is
premature to declare the free patent issued to Margarito Pabaus null and void. Instead, the Court
deems it more appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for the conduct of a
verification/relocation survey under the direction and supervision of the LMB-DENR. In the
event that respondents’ claim of encroachment of 15,675 square meters is found to be correct,
the corresponding adjustment in the metes and bounds of petitioners’ property should be
reflected in OCT No. P-8649 which title will then have to be partially, not totally, voided and the
corresponding amendment as to the precise area and technical description of Lot 2994, PLS 736
be entered by the Registry of Deeds.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 10, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
65854 and Judgment dated October 8, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 1
in Civil Case No. 4489 are SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the said RTC which is
hereby directed to order the Land Management Bureau of the DENR to conduct
verification/relocation survey to determine overlapping of titles over Lots 1 and 2, Psu-213148
and Lot 2994, PLS 736 covered by OCT No. O-104, TCT No. T-1428 and OCT No. P-8649,
respectively, all of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Agusan del Norte.

March 11, 2015

G.R. No. 160728

QUIETING OF TITLE
he New Civil Code provides the basis for an action for Quieting of Title. The specific provision
reads as follows:

ARTICLE 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or
any interest therein.

In Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio,43 the Court explained the
nature of and requisites under this remedy in the following manner:

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or
uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine
the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their
proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not
disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any
desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.

xxxx

Thus, the cloud on title consists of: (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be
quieted. x x x. (Citations omitted.)

G.R. No. 111141 March 6, 1998

MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and
ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.

CLOUD QUIETING; NOTE WALANG OVERLAPPING

Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. 24 The ground or reason for
filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding." Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius,
these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these
reasons may not be considered valid for the same action. 25

Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no
other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that
an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title
over the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents
herein), together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered
the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.

He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees. He prayed that, aside from
issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired
laborers from intruding into the land, the court should declare him "the true and absolute
owner" thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast
on his title to the property were private respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion
into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an
action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.

When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have
become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer
alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, "in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously
and fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of his land which
extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural
and common boundary between the properties." 26 Moreover, during the hearing of the
case, petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing
what he considered as the boundary of his property which private respondents
perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this regard, the following
pronouncements of the Court are apropos:

Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. 24 The ground or reason for
filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be "an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding." Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius,
these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these
reasons may not be considered valid for the same action. 25

Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no
other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that
an "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" beclouded the plaintiff's title
over the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents
herein), together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered
the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.

He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney's fees. He prayed that, aside from
issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired
laborers from intruding into the land, the court should declare him "the true and absolute
owner" thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast
on his title to the property were private respondents' alleged acts of physical intrusion
into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an
action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.

When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have
become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer
alleged, among other matters, that petitioner, "in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously
and fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of his land which
extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural
and common boundary between the properties." 26 Moreover, during the hearing of the
case, petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing
what he considered as the boundary of his property which private respondents
perceived as actually encroaching on their property. In this regard, the following
pronouncements of the Court are apropos:

. . . (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an

action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the
claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some
of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is
limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners' interest or
title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is
appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership
may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the
"instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be
introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period
prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within
the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which
proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out. 27
Xxx

Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in
accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended
by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original
field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of
property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. 41 A survey plan not
verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due
execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence
without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the
courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it
subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the
conclusions of
G.R. No. 95748 November 21, 1996

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES, respondents.

In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that
there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's
title to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly
misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that
respondent Court erred in holding that there was "no . . . evidence of any
muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, . . .", and that there were, as
a matter of fact, two such contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of Partition
executed by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners'
father and predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares in the
inherited property were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing
the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject
property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way
constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the
uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and fix the boundary
between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court, "(i)n fact, both plaintiffs and
defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated June
8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted (sic) to them
and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly
measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant "which is apparently
valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable" and which constitutes a cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence

enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not
the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in an action for quieting of
title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the
purpose of settling a boundary dispute. The precedent on this matter cited
by the respondent Court in its Decision is herewith reproduced in full: 10

In Ashurst v. McKenzie (1890) 92 Ala. 484, 9 So. 262, where

the complainants' predecessor in title and the defendant had,
during their occupancy, destroyed and obliterated the boundary
line between their adjoining tracts of land, and there was now a
dispute as to its location, it was held that a bill did not lie to
remove a cloud on the complainants' title. The court said:
"There is no allegation or evidence of any muniment of title,
proceeding, written contract, or paper showing any color of title
in the defendant, which could cast a shadow on the title of
complainants to any part of the land; there is no overlapping of
description in the muniments held by either. The land of
complainants and defendant join. The line which separates
them is in dispute and is to be determined by evidence aliunde.
Each admits that the other has title up to his line wherever it
may be, and the title papers of neither fix its precise location.
So that there is no paper the existence of which clouds the title
of either party, and nothing could be delivered up and canceled
under the decree of the court undertaking to remove a cloud.

September 2, 2015

G.R. No. 186204

SPOUSES ROMEO T. JAVIER and ADORINA F. JAVIER, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES EV ANGELINE PINEDA DE GUZMAN and VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN,
ARNEL PINEDA, EDGAR PINEDA, HENRY PINEDA and REGINO RAMOS,
Respondents.
ikewise, the MTCC and the CA are correct that the meat of the controversy between herein
parties is the actual boundaries or the metes and bounds of their respective lots. On this matter,
Manalang v. Bacani5 is quite instructive:

x x x a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an

ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A
boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration
or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The
defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the
expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the
plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.6

Opposing possessory rights over certain areas of adjacent lots, arising from claims of ownership
thereof, cannot be resolved in a summary action such as an ejectment suit.7 The issues involved
in such a controversy should be fully threshed out in an action like accion reivindicatoria,8
especially when plaintiff fails to establish actual prior possession. In a much earlier ruling of this
Court, it was already held therein that "[i]f [a party] is indeed the owner of the premises subject
of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership
thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an
accionreivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of
unlawful detainer or forcible entry."9