Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Felipe C.

Rigonan and Concepcion R. Rigonan

G.R. No. 127540 17 October 2001

Facts:

Paulina Rigonan owned three parcels of land located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, including a
house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who
claim to be her relatives. Petitioners Domingo, Mangabat and Capalungan who claim to be Paulina’s
closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the property by means of stealth, force and
intimidation and refused to vacate the same. Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against
petitioners in the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte, alleging their ownership of the land through the deep of sale
executed by Paulina Rigonan and since then have been in continuous possession of the properties and
introduced permanent improvements thereon. According to the petitioners, the deed of absolute sale was
void for being spurious since they inherited the three lots and the permanent improvements as nearest
surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity to Paulina. The RTC ruled in the petitioner’s favor,
declaring them the lawful owners of the contested land. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject properties and surrender possession thereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not private respondents sufficiently established the existence and due execution of the
Deed of Absolute and Irrevocable Sale of Real Property

(2) Whether or not Paulina Rigonan was competent to enter into said contract

Ruling:

Paulina Rigonan was in continuous possession of the property in this case, throwing an inverse
implication and serious doubt on the due execution of the deed of sale. The same parcels of land involved
in the alleged sale were still included in the will subsequently executed by Paulina and notarized by Atty.
Tagatag. These circumstances, taken together, militate against unguarded acceptance of the due
execution and genuineness of the alleged deed of sale.

At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and
senile, attested by the testimony that she played with her waste and urinated in bed. She died an
octogenarian barely a year when the deed was allegedly executed. The general rule is that a person is
not incompetent to contract merely because of advance years or by reason of physical infirmities.
However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person
from properly, intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights when she is undeniably incapacitated.
Antonio Medina v. CIR and CTA

Facts:

Subsequent to marriage, petitioners engaged in concessions with the government, while his wife started
to engage in business as a lumber dealer. From 1949 to 1952, petitioner sold logs to his wife. On the
thesis that the sales are null and void, CIR considered the sales by Mrs. Medina as the petitioner’s
original sales taxable under the NIRC. Petitioner filed a petition for reconsideration, revealing for the first
time the alleged premarital agreement of complete separation of property.

Issue:

Whether or not the sales made by the petitioner to his wife could be considered as his original taxable
sales

Held:

It appears that at the time of the marriage between petitioner and his wife, they neither had any property
nor business of their own, as to have really urged them to enter into the supposed property agreement.
Secondly, the testimony that the separation of property agreement was recorded in the Registry of
Property three months before the marriage, is patently absurd, since such a prenuptial agreement could
not be effective before marriage is celebrated, and would automatically be cancelled if the union was
called off. In the third place, despite their insistence on the existence of the ante nuptial contract, the
couple, strangely enough, did not act in accordance with its alleged covenants. It was not until July of
1954 that he alleged, for the first time, the existence of the supposed property separation agreement.
Finally, the Day Book of the Register of Deeds on which the agreement would have been entered, had it
really been registered as petitioner insists, and which book was among those saved from the ravages of
the war, did not show that the document in question was among those recorded therein.

The wife is authorized to engage in business and for the incidents that flow therefrom when she so
engages therein. But the transactions permitted are those entered into with strangers, and do not
constitute exceptions to the prohibitory provisions of Article 1490 against sales between spouses.

Contracts violative of the provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code are null and void. Being void
transactions, the sales made by the petitioner to his wife were correctly disregarded by the Collector in his
tax assessments that considered as the taxable sales those made by the wife through the spouses'
common agent, Mariano Osorio. In upholding that stand, the Court below committed no error.
Matabuena v. Cervantes

G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)

FACTS:

Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to
Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister,
Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”

The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at
the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.

ISSUE:

W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

HELD:

Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses
during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being
exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to
the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by
marriage.
Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun

G.R. No. L-57499 June 22, 1984

Facts:

Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas were married in 1962, with 5 children, and
were living on a house situated on a land inherited by the latter. In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family
and lived with Corazon Daguines. In 1980, Fernando sold the house and lot to Daguines, who initiated a
complaint for quieting of title. Mercedes resisted, claiming that the house and lot were conjugal properties,
and the sale was null and void for she had not consented thereto.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso
facto gave the land the character of conjugal property

(2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under
the circumstances surrounding the transaction

Held:

(1) Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is
indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the
conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since
MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale.

(2) The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was
made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home
where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of
the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. The law
emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions.
Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers
or con conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of
conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue
influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the
cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the
wig of the parties.
Rubias v. Batiller

Facts:

Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed an application for registration of the parcel of land in
question. After the war, the petition was heard and denied. Pending appeal, Militante sold the land to
petitioner, his son-in-law. Plaintiff filed an action for forcible entry against respondent. Defendant claims
the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time
immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question.

Issue:

Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law was void because it was
made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in
dispute

Held:

The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and
justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was
predicated on the sale thereof made by his father-in- law in his favor, at a time when Militante's
application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was
pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.

Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs
certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring
such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction,"
as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers
and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law.

Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase
(e.g. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges,
fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article
1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz,
Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning."

Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by
ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or
ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers
grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators
(Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by
means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the
circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to
exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the
first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the
service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained
may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its
execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract."
RUBIAS VS. BATILLER G.R. No. L-35702 (May 29, 1973)

FACTS:
Philippine Trust Co. v. Roldan

G.R. No. L-8477. May 31, 1956

Facts:

Mariano Bernardo, a minor, inherited 17 parcels of land from his deceased father. Respondent, Mariano’s
step-mother, was appointed his guardian. As guardian, she sold the 17 parcels to Dr. Ramos, her brother-
in-law, for P14,700. After a week, Dr. Ramos sold the lands to her for P15,000. Subsequently, she sold 4
out of 17 parcels to Emilio Cruz. Petitioner replaced Roldan as guardian, and two months thereafter, this
litigation sought to declare as null and void the sale to Dr. Ramos, and the sale to Emilio Cruz.

Issue:

Whether the sale of the land by the guardian is null and void for being violative of the prohibition for a
guardian to purchase either in person or through the mediation of another the property of her ward

Held:

Remembering the general doctrine that guardianship is a trust of the highest order, and the trustee cannot
be allowed to have any inducement to neglect his ward’s interest, and in line with the court’s suspicion
whenever the guardian acquires ward’s property we have no hesitation to declare that in this case, in the
eyes of the law, Socorro Roldan took by purchase her ward’s parcels thru Dr. Ramos, and that Article
1459 of the Civil Code applies.
PAULINO VALENCIA v. ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Adm. Cases Nos. 1302, 1991-04-26

Facts:

On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint against
Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. Paulino, thereafter,
filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals
alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition
was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in
this case has already become final and executory. On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of
the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973.

Issues:

Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil
Code.

Ruling:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another:

(5) xxx this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to
curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of
loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of... this prohibition would constitute malpractice

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of
judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there
is some contest or litigation over it in... court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the
judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81).

Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition.

Principles:

Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the
judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus,
purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in... this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491
and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
LUIS PICHEL vs. PRUDENCIO ALONZO

G.R. No. L-36902

January 30, 1982

Facts:

Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of land designated as Lot 21 of
Subdivision Plan Psd-32465 of Balactasan, Lamitan, Basilan City in accordance with RA 477. The award
was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on 27January 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto,
Alonzo was proved to have alienated the land to another, in violation of law. In 1972, Alonzo’s rights to
the land were reinstated. On 14 August 1968, Alonzo and his wife sold to Pichel through a “deed of sale”
all the fruits of the coconut trees which may be harvested in the land for the period, from 15 September
1968 to 1 January 1976, in consideration of P4,200.00. Itwas further stipulated that the vendor’s right,
title, interest and participation herein conveyed is of his own exclusive and absolute property, free from
any liens and encumbrances and he warrants to the Vendee good title thereto and to defend the same
against any and all claims of all persons whomsoever. Even as of the date of sale, however, the land was
still under lease to one Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the sale, in
the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid by Pichel directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the
clutches of the latter. Pending said payment Alonzo refused to allow the Pichel to make any harvest. In
July1972, Pichel for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale in his favor, caused the harvest
of the fruit of the coconut trees in the land. Alonzo filed an action for the annulment of a “Deed of Sale”
before the CFI Basilan City. On 5 January 1973, the lower court rendered its decision holding that
although the agreement in question is denominated by the parties as a deed of sale of fruits of the
coconut trees found in the vendor’s land, it actually is, for all legal intents and purposes, a contract of
lease of the land itself; an encumbrance prohibited under RA 477. The court thus held that the deed of
sale is null and void, and ordered Alonzo to pay back Pichel the consideration of the sale in the sum of
P4,200 with interests from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid, and Pichel to pay the sum of
P500.00 as attorney’s fees; with costs against Pichel. Hence, the petition to review on certiorari was
raised before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the lower court and
entered another dismissing the complaint; without costs.

Issue: Is the contract of sale valid?

Held: Contract of sale valid, essential elements valid

The document in question expresses a valid contract of sale as it has the essential elements of a contract
of sale as defined under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code. Article1458 provides that “by the contract of
sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent,” and that “a
contract of sale maybe absolute or conditional.” The subject matter of the contract of sale are the fruits of
the coconut trees on the land during the years from 15 September 1968 up to 1 January1976, which
subject matter is a determinate thing.

Things having potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale

Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a potential existence may be the object of the
contract of sale. A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is
reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already
in existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and the title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing
comes into existence. A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed.
Case of Luis Pichel vs. Prudencio Alonzo

G.R.No. L- 36902 30January1982

FACTS OF THE CASE:

That Prudencio Alonzo (VENDOR) executed a deed of sale for the coconut fruits of his land in Balactasan
Plantation in Lamitan, Basilan, in favor of Luis Pichel (VENDEE). The land from which the subject coconut
fruits are derived from was subjected to a cancellation of the award in 1965, due to the reason of violation
of the law that disallows alienation of land (the vendor’s rights to the land were reinstated in 1972)

The vendor and his wife sold to the vendee the fruits of the coconut trees from 1968 to 1976 for
consideration of 4,200. Even during the date of sale, the land was still leased to one Ramon Sua, and it
was part of the agreement of the sale that the sum of 3,650.00 was to be paid by the vendor to Ramon
Sua as to release the land.

The RTC decided in favor of the vendor, due to the fact that the deed of sale that was executed was
invalid, due to its supposed violation of RA No. 477, in which they equated the deed of sale executed by
the parties as a contract of lease.