SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 139596 - January 24, 2006]

CHARLES CU-UNJIENG, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

UNI0N BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

By this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Charles Cu-Unjieng seeks

the reversal of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 8177-B-UDK, entitled Charles Cu-Unjieng, plaintiff-appellant v.
Union Bank of the Philippines, et al., defendants-appellees, to wit:

1. Resolution1 dated May 10,1999, dismissing, for non-payment of docket

and other lawful fees, petitioner's appeal from an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan which dismissed his complaint for
specific performance and damages against respondent Union Bank of the
Philippines and others; andcralawlibrary

2. Resolution2 dated July 30, 1999 which denied petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration and ordered expunged the appeal brief thereto attached.

The facts:

Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) is the owner of a parcel of

agricultural land with an area of 218,769 square meters situated in Barangay
Sta. Maria, San Miguel, Bulacan and registered in its name under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. TC-1062 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.

Sometime in January 1994, UBP caused the posting on the bulletin boards of
its branch offices of a three-page list of acquired realty assets available for
sale to interested parties. Included in said list was the aforementioned parcel
of land, offered to be sold for P2,200,000.00.

Petitioner, through a letter3 dated April 11, 1994 and addressed to Joselito P.

Valera, manager of UBP's Acquired Assets Department, offered to buy the
subject property for a lesser amount of P2,078,305.50, payable as follows:
50% as down payment with the balance to be paid in equal monthly
installments over a period of two (2) years. Petitioner explained that his offer
for an amount lesser than UBP's asking price was on account of five (5)
tenants occupying the subject land who were allegedly
demanding P500,000.00 to voluntarily vacate the same.
As proof of his interest to buy theproperty, petitioner tendered PCIB Check
No. 565827 for P103,915.27, purportedly representing 10% of the 50% down
payment as earnest money or deposit. UBP acknowledged receipt thereof by
way of Union Bank Receipt No. 495081 dated April 11, 1994.

On August 30, 1994, petitioner wrote a follow-up letter to UBP inquiring on

the status of his offer to buy the subject premises.4

Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the manager of UBP's Acquired
Assets Department advised petitioner that his offer to purchase is yet to be
acted upon because the bank was still awaiting the opinion of its legal
division regarding the sale of "CARPable" agricultural assets acquired by the
bank.5

As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioner's offer as shown by the fact that in
another letter6 dated December 19, 1994, the bank informed petitioner that
his offer could not be favorably acted upon on account of the legal division's
opinion that sales of lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law without prior Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approval are
considered null and void. Accordingly, UBP advised petitioner to pick up the
refund of his P103,915.27 "earnest money" at the bank's disbursing unit.

Unable to accept UBP's rejection of his offer, petitioner, through counsel,

made a formal demand7 for the bank to comply with its obligation to transfer
and deliver the title of the subject property to him by executing the proper
deed of conveyance, under the terms and conditions set forth in his April 11,
1994 offer.

Responding thereto, UBP, thru its counsel, Atty. Luzano, in a letter8 dated

July 19, 1995, reiterated the bank's rejection of petitioner's offer as "the land
being carpable could only be disposed of by the bank either thru Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS) or compulsory acquisition, the procedure of which is
outlined in Sec. 16" of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.

It was against the foregoing backdrop of events that, on February 6, 1997, in

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Malolos, Bulacan, petitioner filed his
complaint9 in this case for Specific Performance and Damages against UBP,
impleading as co-defendant in the suit the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 80-M-97 and raffled to Branch 9 of the court, the
complaint principally sought UBP's compliance with an alleged perfected
contract of sale between it and petitioner relative to the parcel of land in
question. More specifically, the complaint prays for a judgment ordering UBP
to:
a) accept payments from the plaintiff [petitioner] for the sale of the Property
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the letter dated 11 April
1994;

b) execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the Property covered by TCT No. TC
1062 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bulacan upon the plaintiff's
full payment of the amount of Two Million Seventy Eight Thousand Three
Hundred Five & 50/100 (P2,078,305.50), failing in which, the deputy sheriff
should be ordered to execute such deed and the Registry of Deeds to cancel
the title of the Bank and issue a new one in favor of the plaintiff;

c) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as

moral damages;

d) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as

exemplary damages;

e) pay plaintiff the sum of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) as

attorney's fees; andcralawlibrary

f) pay the costs of the suit.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise respectfully
prayed for.

After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated September 1,

1998,10 upon a finding that no perfected contract of sale transpired between
the parties, dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of sufficient cause of
action, thus:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the

laws/jurisprudence applicable thereon, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint in the above entitled case for want of sufficient
cause of action as well as the defendant's counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees for lack of proof to warrant the same.

However, defendant Union Bank of the Philippines is ordered to reimburse

plaintiff Charles Cu-Unjieng the amount of P103,915.27 representing the face
value of PCIBank Check No. 565827 tendered by the latter to the former as
purported "earnest money", with interest thereon at the prevailing rates of
interest periodically bestowed by UBP to its savings depositors from April 11,
1994, through the succeeding years, and until the full amount thereof shall
have been delivered to the plaintiff.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed with
the trial court a Notice of Appeal11 therein making known that he is taking an
appeal from the adverse decision to the CA. Acting thereon, the trial court
issued an Order12 directing the elevation of the records of the case to the CA,
whereat petitioner's appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-UDK.

As things would have it, in the herein first assailed Resolution dated May
10, 1999, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal for nonpayment of the
required docket and other lawful appeal fees, to wit:

For failure of the appellant [petitioner] to pay the docket and other lawful
fees (Sec. 4, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED.13

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto his appellant's

brief. However, in a subsequent Resolution dated July 30, 1999,14 the
appellate court denied the motion and even expunged from the record the
appellant's brief thereto attached:

Acting on the motion of the plaintiff-appellant [petitioner] for a

reconsideration of the Resolution of May 10, 1999, which dismissed the
appeal for the reason stated therein, and considering the opposition
interposed thereto by defendant-appellee [respondent] Union Bank of the
Philippines and it appearing that the filing of the notice of appeal of
November 5, 1988, was not accompanied by the full and correct payment of
the corresponding appellate court docket and other lawful fees, and for such
tardiness of more than four (4) months, the Court resolved to DENY the
motion for reconsideration and the attached brief thereto
ordered EXPUNGED.

In Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, the Supreme Court, citing Rodillas v.
Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702 aptly said:

xxx the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be
accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. In other
words, the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an
appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final
and executory, and deprives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal. This requirement
of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is
an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would
become final and executory, as if no appeal was filed at all.

SO ORDERED.

Undaunted, petitioner is now with us via the present recourse seeking a

relaxation of procedural rules and ultimately the reversal and setting aside of
the assailed twin resolutions of the appellate court.

Petitioner would have the Court view his failure to pay the appeal docket
fees on time as a non-fatal lapse, or a non-jurisdictional defect which the CA
should have ignored in order to attain substantial justice. Further, petitioner
passes the blame to the RTC clerk of court who allegedly made the
erroneous computation of docket fees.

We are not persuaded.

Doctrinally entrenched is the pronouncement that the right to appeal is

merely statutory and a party seeking to avail of that right must comply with
the statute or rules.15

Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees
shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record
or the record on appeal.

Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other legal fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional,16 noncompliance with which is fatal to an appeal. For, to stress,
appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege.17

An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must
be made within fifteen (15) days from notice.18 And within this period, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to
the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from.

Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full payment of docket
fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate
court does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby rendering
the decision sought to be appealed final and executory.19

For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4, Rule
41, supra, is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(c) of
Rule 50, to wit:

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed

by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
following grounds:

xxx

c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as
provided in section 4 of Rule 41; xxx

This Court has invariably sustained the CA's dismissal on technical grounds
under the aforequoted provision unless considerations of equity and
substantial justice present cogent reasons to hold otherwise. True, the rules
may be relaxed but only for persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a
litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure.20 So it is that in La Salette College v. Victor
Pilotin,21 we held:

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of

appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified
by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary
period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such
power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound
discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as
with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances

Then, too, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v.

Mangubat,22 we held that late payment of docket fees may be admitted when
the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying
the required fees. Mactan, however, cannot be a source of comfort for herein
petitioner. For there, the appellate docket fees were paid six (6) days after
the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Unlike in Mactan, payment of the
appellate docket fees in this case was effected by petitioner only after four
(4) months following the expiration of the reglementary period to take an
appeal.

With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket
fees was belatedly made four (4) months after the lapse of the period for
appeal, it appears clear to us that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over
petitioner's appeal except to order its dismissal,23 as it rightfully did. Thus,
the September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of
finality and became executory by operation of law.

We must emphasize that invocation of substantial justice is not a magical

incantation that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
rules. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed. So it must be here.

WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed resolutions dated May

10,1999 and July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino (ret.) with Associate Justices
Salome A. Montoya (ret.) and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring; CA Rollo,
p. 9.
2
 SC Rollo, pp. 6-7.
3
 Folder of Exhibits, Annex C.
4
 Ibid, Annex E.
5
 Ibid, Annex F.
6
 Ibid, Annex G.
7
 Ibid, Annex I.
8
 Folder of Exhibits, Annex "J."
9
 Record, pp. 1-7.
10
 Record, pp. 215-227; Penned by Judge D. Roy A. Masadao, Jr.
11
 Record, p. 251.
  Record, p. 253.
12

 CA Rollo, p. 9.
13

 CA Rollo, pp. 60-61.

14

 Raymundo Villamor and Wenefreda Villamor v. Heirs of Sebastian

15

Tolang, G.R. No. 144689, June 9, 2005.

 Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 208 (2000).

16

 Badillo v. Tayag, 400 SCRA 494 (2003).

17

 Rule 41, Section 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

18

 Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., 429 SCRA 439 (2004), citing

19

Alfonso v. Andres, 390 SCRA 465 (2002).

 Ibid.
20

 418 SCRA 381, 387 (2003).

21

 312 SCRA 463 (1999).

22

 Far Corporation v. Renato Magdaluyo, Antonio Valdez, and Rolando

23

Chua, 443 SCRA 218 (2004).