Section 11: Free Access and Adequate Legal Assistance

Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi Re exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc.

Doctrine: Who may be an indigent litigant? - The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted
provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent
litigant. The Good Shepherd, being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. As a juridical person, therefore,
it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

Facts:
Mr. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation wrote to the Chief Justice asking if the
Courts can grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same option
granted to indigent people provided in OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141. The court replied by
saying that it cannot grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd the same exemption from payment of
legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged
people.

Issue: Whether the Good Shepherd Foundation may be exempt for legal and filing fees being a
foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged.

Ruling: No. Good Shepherd cannot be exempt.

The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art.
III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate
legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the
Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was
defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.

In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated
rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court.

Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one
who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished to him. The amount of
the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on
any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as
an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other
lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within
the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to
such other sanctions as the court may impose.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that
only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd, being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its
members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all
kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption
from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no
moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person's poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can suffer.

There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a juridical
person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for indigent and
underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid documentation
requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the
fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too time-
consuming and wasteful for the courts.

In view of the foregoing, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from
legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people.

Re: Letter dated 18 April 2011 of Chief Prosecutor Persida Acosta

Doctrine: The exemption granted to PAO’s clients cannot be extended to the payment of sheriff’s
expenses - Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 exempts PAO’s clients from the payment of “docket and other
fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies” is beyond cavil. However,
contrary to Atty. Acosta’s claim, a plain reading of the said provision clearly shows that the exemption
granted to PAO’s clients cannot be extended to the payment of sheriff’s expenses; the exemption is
specifically limited to the payment of fees,
Facts: This case stemmed from the letter of Atty. Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of the PAO to the Office
of the Court Administrator. In the said letter, Acosta sought a clarification as to the exemption of PAO’s
clients from the payment of sheriff’s expenses, alleging that PAO’s clients in its Regional Office in Region
VII are being charged with the payment of sheriff’s expenses in the amount of P1,000.00 upon the filing of
a civil action in court. She claimed that sheriff’s expenses should not be exacted from PAO’s clients since
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 94062 (R.A. No. 9406) specifically exempts them from the payment of
docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies.

In its report and recommendation, the OCA maintained its position that PAO’s clients are not exempted
from the payment of sheriff’s expenses; it stressed that the P1,000.00 sheriff’s expenses are not the same
as the sheriff’s fee fixed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and, hence, not covered by the
exemption granted to PAO’s clients under R.A. No. 9406. The OCA further alleged that the grant of
exemption to PAO’s clients from the payment of sheriff’s expenses amounts to disbursement of public
funds for the protection of private interests. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Atty. Acosta’s
request for exemption of PAO’s clients from payment of sheriff’s expenses be denied.

Unperturbed, Atty. Acosta filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the imposition of sheriff’s
expenses on PAO’s clients is contrary to the language, intent and spirit of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406
since sheriff’s expenses are considered as fees “incidental to instituting an action in court.” Further, she
claimed that the said imposition on PAO’s clients would hinder their access to the courts contrary to the
mandate of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.

Issues:1) Whether the sheriff’s expenses are covered by the exemption granted to PAO’s clients
 2) Whether said imposition on PAO’s clients would hinder their access to the courts contrary to
the mandate of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution would in effect fetter their free access to
the courts

Ruling: 1) No. Sheriff’s expenses are not covered by the exemption.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 exempts PAO’s clients from the payment of “docket and other fees incidental
to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies” is beyond cavil. However, contrary to Atty.
Acosta’s claim, a plain reading of the said provision clearly shows that the exemption granted to PAO’s
clients cannot be extended to the payment of sheriff’s expenses; the exemption is specifically limited to
the payment of fees, i.e., docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action.

The term “fees” is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges or services.
Viewed from this context, the phrase “docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action” refers to the
totality of the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In particular, it includes filing or
docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees,
stenographer’s fees and commissioner’s fees. These are the fees that are exacted for the services
rendered by the court in connection with the action instituted before it.

Sheriff’s expenses, however, cannot be classified as a “fee” within the purview of the exemption granted
to PAO’s clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406.

2) No. It is not against the mandate of the Constitution.

The Court, heeding the constitutional mandate of ensuring free access to the courts and adequate
legal assistance to the marginalized and less privileged, hereby authorizes the officials and employees
of PAO to serve summons, subpoena and other court processes pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. The authority given herein by the Court to the officials and employees of PAO shall be
limited only to cases involving their client.

Authorizing the officials and employees of PAO to serve the summons, subpoenas and other court
processes on behalf of their clients would relieve the latter from the burden of paying for the
sheriff’s expenses despite their non-exemption from the payment thereof under Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9406.

Sec 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court

Section 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his
family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished to him. The amount of the
docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any
judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the
trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a
person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

NOTES:
An indigent is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
necessities for his family.

The applicant need not be a pauper, the fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is
no answer to his statement that he has no sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs.
(Acar vs Rosal)

If one is authorized to litigate as an indigent, such authority shall include an exemption from the payment
of:
1. Docket fees
2. Other lawful fees; and
3. Transcript of stenographic notes.
The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a
lien on any judgement rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

While the Rule allows an ex parte application and hearing to litigate as an ex parte application and
hearing to litigate as an indigent, at any time before the judgement is rendered by the trial court, any
adverse party may contest the grant of the authority to a party to litigate as indigent. (1 RIANO, supra at
241)

If the court should determine after the hearing that the party declared as indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by
the clerk of court.

If the application for exemptions meets the salary and property requirements under Sec 19 of Rule 141,
the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or
both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead the court should apply the
indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the
prayer for exemption. (Sps. Algura vs City of Naga)

Only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. (Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi
Re exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.)

*A certificate of indigency must be attached to the pleadings issued either by the Barangay in which the
party is a resident or the DSWD.