Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                

7 - Pacoy To Chan

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 27

 Pacoy v.

Cajigal – homicide to murder to homicide, disregard of rank


 Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan – pakyaw contract, no public bidding, 3019 change in mode
 Kummer v People – homicide, change in date of commission of crime
 Calme vs. Cort of Appeals – crime committed on vessel
 People vs. Grey – murder, wrong use of injunction, “political persecution”
 Yakult Philippines vs. Court of Appeals – batang nabangga ng yakult van
 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People – employer cannot appeal on behalf of employee
 Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada – estafa and bp22 at the same time
 Lo Bun Tiong vs. Balboa – bp 22, double recovery, forum shopping
 Ricarze vs. Court of Appeals – caltex case, estafa
 Gosiaco vs. Ching – 8million invested to ASB, bp22
 Salazar vs. People – anamer, cavans of rice, estafa
 Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan – governor, ra 3019, 8 years, speedy disposition
 Simon vs. Chan – bp22, litis pendentia

Case Name Pacoy v. Cajigal

- An Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:

o That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his
armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which
caused his instantaneous death.

- With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.4

- However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order, 6 likewise dated
September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having
qualified the crime to Murder.

o Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and
instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The
accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the
correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."

- The date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel
for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide
case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to
enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.

- Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant
Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly
indicted and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when
the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder
in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.

WON the order of amendment was valid – YES.

- The argument of petitioner is not plausible.

o Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his express
consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The
petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide without his express consent is
equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the
petitioner in Double Jeopardy.

- Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:

- First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this
purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag is instructive, viz:

o The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second
paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.

o It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before
or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial
change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information
must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of
the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the
accused has to plead anew to the new information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the
information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution
requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

- In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or
a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves
the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an
amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct
and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

- There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the
second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in,
the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the
latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of
the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

- In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not
a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.

- While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made was in
the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word
"Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended
Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide,
as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any
qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from "Homicide" to
"Murder" as purely formal.21
WON the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from homicide to murder and
subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide – NO.

- Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides: (i) That the
accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.

- Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:

o SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

- Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first.

- As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

o It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further
prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

- Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his express
consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.

o Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which
terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of
acquittal.

o The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court and Section 19, Rule
119.

o Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly
different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second
information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

o Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the
amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same
original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word
"Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
WON there is GAD on the part of the judge when he ordered that the original information for homicide stands – NO.

- A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a
generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected
himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide.

- The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not present,
considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent

Case Name Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan

- An Information charged both petitioners with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue
injury to the government, reads:

o The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses QUINTIN B.
SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:

o That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
public officials, being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one
another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw
Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and Urdaneta,
Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(₱48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(₱97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the
government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and thereby awarding said
contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.

- Sandiganbayan granted petitioners’ Motion to Quash and dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution
to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of the crime
charged."

- Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information  charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by
giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government.

o The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as
follows:

o That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of
Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B.
SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and
committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring
and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the
late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and
non-accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a
Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-
Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00)
Philippine Currency, without the benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government
and public interest.

- Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation which was strongly opposed by the prosecution.

o The failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation before the filing of the second
Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different offense –that is,
violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of
the first Information.

o They argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment
in the new information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary
investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a
prima facie cause to file the case.

WON the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would warrant a new or another preliminary investigation – NO.

- Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
which reads: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

- The essential elements of the offense are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

- In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:

o R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer
should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the
disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as
aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however
indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either
mode or under both.

o The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of statutory construction that "The
word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive
word."16

- Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The Information charged the same
offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified.
While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 17 provides that there are two (2) acts or modes
of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving
any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a
distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either mode 18 or under both should both modes concur.19
- Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag, 20 ruling that, "in substitution of information another preliminary
investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is not applicable to the present
case because, as already stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the offense
charged.

- Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v. Vivar, 21 that failure to conduct a new
preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a
statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of petitioners’ claim for a new
investigation, however, did not deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case
discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.

- Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial amendments warranting a new
preliminary investigation, the same must likewise fail.

o Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first Information, and conferring
unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of
violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury to conferring
unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the
Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw
Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta,
Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the
same.

- To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan. 22 The
same is inapplicable to petitioners’ case. In Matalam, there was indeed a substantial amendment which entitled the
accused to another preliminary investigation. The recital of facts constituting the offense charged therein was definitely
altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by the petitioner was the illegal and
unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, whereas in the amended information, it is
the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. In the case at bar, there is no substantial
amendment to speak of. As discussed previously, the Information in Criminal Case No. 26319 was already dismissed
by the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners’ Motion to Quash. As such, there is nothing more
to be amended.

- The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson, 23 where it was written:

o The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the
filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be
no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a
criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies
or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new
preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A
new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged
under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new
criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal
liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal . The accused must be
accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.

- No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification in the nature of the charged
offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
petitioners.

Case Name Kummer v. People

- Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the petitioner.
Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo."
o The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his left hand, shot
Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long. Malana, who was with Mallo and who witnessed the
shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the
petitioner leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to fall flat on the
ground.

- Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with her co-accused, she
scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. At that point, the petitioner uttered,"Johan, patay na,"
in a loud voice. The petitioner and her co-accused putdown the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallo’s
feet and pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house. Thereafter, they returned to the house
and turned off all the lights.

- The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner’s house and informed her that Mallo had
been found dead in front of her house.

- The prosecution filed an information for homicide against the petitioner and Johan.

o The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children, Johan, Melanie and
Erika, were already asleep in the evening. She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being
thrown at their house, a gun report, and the banging at their door.

o Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s Army prevalent in their area, and
sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them, Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired
it twice outside to scare the people causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however, with a stone
hitting the window and breaking the glass; another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted Johan
to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to
sleep.

- The RTC found the prosecution’s evidence persuasive based on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon
Cuntapay and Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the
positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the petitioner’s right hand, as well as the
corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to find both the petitioner and Johan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

- Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the recognizance of his father,
Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner
appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA.

- The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the discrepancies between the
sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions
are minimal and reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor lapses and are therefore not
substantial. The petitioner’s positive identification by the eyewitnesses as one of the assailants remained unrefuted. The
CA, moreover, held that proof of motive is only necessary when a serious doubt arises on the identity of the accused.
That the writer of the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not necessarily make
the decision erroneous.

WON a change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a formal
amendment, thus, no arraignment is required – YES.

- The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which she was convicted. The
petitioner’s argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on amendment and misconception on the
necessity of arraignment in every case.

o Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the plea
but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the
rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:
 Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

 However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.

- If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and underscore ours]

- A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal
than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment
would not alter the nature of the offense.

- The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a
defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when
any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended. 22

- It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed
except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. 24 The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time
as near as to the actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the information will permit. Under the
circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.

- An amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since
the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent
amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not
charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.

- Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment in
the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent
with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the commission of the crime
of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the
offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.
Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of
defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The
effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.

Case Name Calme v. CA

 Wenefredo Calme and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal.
o They allegedly threw him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland passenger ship owned and operated
by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City.
 Calme impugned the Oroquieta RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged through a MOTION TO QUASH which,
however, was denied by Judge Celso Conol of RTC.
 Calme’s petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied due course and dismissed by the CA.
 His subsequent motion for reconsideration of said decision was also denied in the CA.
 Arguments by Calme:
o Because the alleged crime took place while the vessel was in transit, the general rule laid down in par. (a) of
Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision in determining
the proper venue and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) (now Section 14) thereof since the exact location where
the alleged crime occurred was known.
o Even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs, Oroquieta City would still be excluded as a proper venue because the
reckoning point for determining the venue under the aforementioned paragraph is the first port of entry or the
municipalities/territories through which the ship passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No.
400.
o The proper venue should be Siquijor because, according to the Marine Protest filed by the vessel’s captain,
Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt. Magallanes)
received the report that "a passenger jumped overboard."

● WON the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense – YES. Where the crime was actually committed is
immaterial. When the crime happened on a vessel in transit, the applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section
14), Rule 100.

- Par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 100:


o Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry of any municipality or territory through which
the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
- The exact location where the alleged offense was committed was not duly established.
o The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain
was informedof the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the same
area.
o In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred
while the vessel was in transit.
 "In transit" simply means "on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to
another. In the course of transportation."
- Act No. 400 is not applicable.
o The said Act specifically provides, among other things, that for crimes committed within the navigable
waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province in which the vessel shall come after the commission
of the crime.
o Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.
 Under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI of any province into which the ship or
water craft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the commission
thereof.
 The present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the proper court of the first port of entry or
of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage . . ."
 The provision of said Act vesting jurisdiction in the province where the vessel shall come after the
commission of the crime is not carried in the present Rule.
o It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provision of the law or rule is clear and unequivocal,
its meaning must be determined from the language employed. It must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
 The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in determining its true
meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it. In fact, it does not
seem that the provision of Act 400 was carried into the present rule, as it is now worded.
Case Name People v. Grey

- An Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son,
respondent Francis Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge municipal
government, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Gandara, Samar. The Information was accompanied by
other supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

- Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.

o The Secretary of Justice dismissed the petition for review and respondents’ counter charge of perjury . He
found no error to warrant the modification or reversal of the prosecutor’s resolution. The Secretary of Justice
ruled that the evidence adduced against respondents was sufficient to establish probable cause for the offense
charged.

o Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied on January 30, 2007.

- Meanwhile, RTC Branch 41 Presiding Judge Rosario Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

o Judge Bandal found the prosecution’s evidence to be insufficient to link respondents to the crime charged.

o She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence that would show that accused
were the assailants or that they conspired, confederated, or helped in the commission of the crime charged.

- The prosecution then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and a motion for the inhibition of Judge
Bandal. The judge inhibited herself but denied the motion for reconsideration.

- Thereafter, the provincial prosecutor filed a petition for change of venue before this Court, attaching thereto a letter
from the victim’s wife expressing fear for her life and that of the other witnesses.

o The prosecution withdrew their motion for change of venue before this Court, citing financial difficulties in
bringing witnesses to Manila.

- Respondents opposed the motion and prayed that all proceedings be suspended until after the May 14, 2007 elections.

- However, on February 19, 2007, respondents filed their own petition for change of venue before this Court, alleging
that the presiding judge who took over the case, Judge Roberto Navidad, was a pawn in the political persecution being
staged against them.

o This Court denied the petition for lack of merit and directed Judge Navidad to hear the case with dispatch.

- Accordingly, Judge Navidad proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the existence of probable cause, and, in an
Order dated February 20, 2007, ruled that the finding of probable cause was supported by the evidence on record. He
then issued warrants of arrest against respondents and all but one of their co-accused.

- Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA, alleging that Judge Navidad gravely
abused his discretion, and seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction. 

o They alleged that the filing of the murder charges against them on the basis of perjured statements coming
from their political opponents’ supporters "smacks of political harassment at its foulest form." 

o Respondents pointed out that the criminal complaint was filed barely two months after Joseph Grey declared
his intentions to challenge incumbent Congressman Reynaldo S. Uy, a former ally, in the May 2007
congressional elections.

o Likewise, respondents claimed that one of the witnesses, Urien Moloboco, who executed an affidavit before
the Provincial Prosecutor, was the subject of an Alias Warrant of Arrest for murder issued by the RTC of
Gandara, Samar on June 26, 2006, and, hence, was a fugitive from the law at the time of the filing of the
criminal complaint against respondents.

o Respondents maintain that the fact that Moloboco was not arrested when he executed his affidavit before the
prosecutor, spoke of the power and clout of the witness’ protectors.

- The CA Eighteenth Division issued a TRO on March 13, 2007. After oral arguments, the CA issued a Decision
ordering that warrants of arrest be set aside, and dismissing the criminal case without prejudice.
o Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for him to personally determine the existence of
probable cause. 

o Nowhere in the assailed Order did Judge Navidad state his personal assessment of the evidence before him
and the personal justification for his finding of probable cause.

 It found that the judge extensively quoted from the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor
and the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, and then adopted these to conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause.

 The CA held that the Constitution commands the judge to personally determine the existence of
probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest.

o The Information was not supported by the allegations in the submitted affidavits. 

 It pointed out that the Information charged respondents as principals by direct participation, but the
complaint-affidavit and supporting affidavits uniformly alleged that respondents were not at the
scene of the shooting.

o The allegations in the complaint-affidavit and supporting affidavits were insufficient to establish probable
cause. It said that there was nothing in the affidavits to show acts that would support the prosecution’s theory
that respondents were also charged as principals by conspiracy.

WON the CA correctly granted the TRO – NO.

- It is an established doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest
requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society.

- However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court have laid down exceptions to this rule, among which are:

o To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused

o When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions

o When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub[-]judice

o When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority

o Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation

o When double jeopardy is clearly apparent

o Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense

o Where there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

o Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance

o When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied

o Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners
- Respondents insisted that political persecution by their political rivals was the underlying reason for the filing of
criminal charges against them, and used this as basis for asking the appellate court to stop the proceedings in the trial
court.

o Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances, political persecution or political motives may
have impelled the filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals. But this Court has also ruled that
any allegation that the filing of the charges is politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a
criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support the charges.

o In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence before him, determined
that there was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution, based on the
affidavits presented by complainant and her witnesses, found probable cause to file the criminal Information.
This finding of the Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.

o To establish political harassment, respondents must prove that the public prosecutor, not just the private
complainant, acted in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a scheme that could have no
other purpose than to place respondents in contempt and disrepute. It must be shown that the complainant
possesses the power and the influence to control the prosecution of cases.

o Likewise, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to justify the
nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been sufficiently established nor
substantial evidence presented in support thereof.

o Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have adduced absolutely no proof of the perceived
political persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have not shown any evidence of such a grand
design. They have not alleged, much less proved, any ill motive or malice that could have impelled the
provincial prosecutor, the judge, and even the Secretary of Justice to have respectively ruled in the way each
of them did. In short, respondents are holding tenuously only on the hope that this Court will take them at
their word and grant the relief they pray for. This Court, however, cannot anchor its ruling on mere
allegations.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 8, 2007 and Resolution dated
October 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Permanent Injunction is hereby
DISSOLVED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Samar, dated February 20, 2007, is hereby
REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Samar, is DIRECTED to proceed with hearing, and to decide
Criminal Case No. 4916 with dispatch.

Case Name Yakult v. CA

- A five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was
sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.
- Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries.  
- A complaint for damages was subsequently filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against
Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
- In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the
sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of
the suit. 
- Although said defendants appealed the judgment, they nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case.
o Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence
of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code.  
o Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a
separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made.
- In a decision dated November 3, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration
thereof filed by petitioners was denied on January 30, 1990.  Hence this petition.
WON a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed can prosper even if there was no reservation to file a
separate civil action – YES.

- Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
o "SECTION 1.  Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
o Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
o A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others.  The institution of, or the reservation of the right
to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
o The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.
o In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
o When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
o In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.  (1a)"
- Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively to the present case.
- Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
o Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
o It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
- In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately.   Neither
has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action.   However, the civil action in this case was
filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge
presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was
awarded.
o The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a  quasi delict as
defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows: "ART. 2176.  Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.   Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
o The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
- Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless
since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the
criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with
the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its
evidence.

Case Name Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines v. CA

- Accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages.
- The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities
of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
- Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired
and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the
notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
- Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court –
DISMISSED.
- The CA also DISMISSED the appeal.
o The institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus,
once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability
as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
o To allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the
accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by
the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil
liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employer’s
subsidiary liability.

WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused – NO.

- Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
o “In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
o “Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified
in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn;
and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have
given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees.”
- Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
o “The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.”
- Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
o Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
 “When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
 Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted
in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability
of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the
basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
o Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
 The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
 The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
 The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.
o What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict
per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may --subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in
the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
- The employer cannot appeal on behalf of the employee.
o The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are
not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may
assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot
act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
o Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which
they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
o In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
o To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify
or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the
final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
o The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
- Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1)
they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3)
that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the
latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.
o The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be based
on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination
may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has been
pronounced; and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
- Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its liability
has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability.
The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
employer ipso facto attaches.
- The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-
employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the
concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
Case Name Rodriguez v. Ponferrada

- On 10 December 2001, the Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office found PROBABLE CAUSE to charge respondent for ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as
amended by PD 818 and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
- As a consequence thereof, separate informations were separately filed against herein [p]etitioner before proper [c]ourts,
for Estafa and [v]iolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
o The informations for [v]iolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against herein [p]etitioner were filed and raffled
to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
o The informations for [e]stafa cases against herein [p]etitioner were likewise filed and raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
- Petitioner through counsel filed in open court before the [p]ublic [r]espondent an 'Opposition to the Formal Entry of
Appearance of the Private Prosecutor' dated 14 June 2002.
- Noting petitioner's opposition to the private prosecutor's entry of appearance, the RTC held that the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1) waives the
civil action, (2) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (3) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.  
Considering that the offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior to the filing of the
BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear and intervene
in the proceedings.

WON a [p]rivate [p]rosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled [e]stafa
cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is
also subject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases – YES.
- Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal case pending before the MTC for violation
of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa now pending before
the RTC.   She hinges her theory on the following provisions of Rules 110 and 111 of the Rules of Court:
o "SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. -- Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense."
o "SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
o "The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation”
o "When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
o "(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
o "Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are
not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
o "Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions."
- Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following
instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor
of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil
indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit
has already been instituted.   In any of these instances, the private complainant's interest in the case disappears and
criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor.8   None of these exceptions apply to the
instant case.   Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the estafa suit.
- True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for estafa and another for
violation of BP 22.   But every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the offended
party, who has sustained only a single injury.  
- Banal v. Tadeo:
o "Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that 'Every
man criminally liable is also civilly liable' (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code).   Underlying this legal
principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the
society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the
individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.  
o However, this rather broad and general provision can be misleading in its implications especially where the
same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law
allows a separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it
is intimately intertwined.  
o While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.  
 What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair
or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.  
 Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.   Damage or injury to
another is evidently the foundation of the civil action.   Such is not the case in criminal actions for,
to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless
of whether or not it also causes material damage to another.  
- Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil
actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution.   In the crimes of both estafa and
violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the
institution of a civil action without need of election by the offended party.   As both remedies are simultaneously
available to this party, there can be no forum shopping.
Case Name Lo Bun Tiong v. Balboa

- Vicente Balboa filed with the RTC of Manila a civil action for Collection of Sum of Money against petitioners. The
amount sought covers three post-dated checks issued by petitioner Caroline Siok Ching Teng (Caroline), as follows:

o Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57546 dated December 30, 1996 for P2,000,000.00

o Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57547 dated January 15, 1997 for P1,200,000.00

o Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57548 dated January 31, 1997 for P1,975,250.00 –

o or a total of P5,175,250.00.

- Separate criminal complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. No. 22) were filed against Caroline before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 10), covering the said three checks.

- The RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners liable.

- Thereafter, the MTC acquitted Caroline of the offenses charged for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The MTC, however, found Caroline civilly liable in favor of respondent for the amounts covered by
these checks.

- Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the MTC Decision praying for the deletion of the award of civil indemnity,
but it was denied by the MTC. Thus, Caroline appealed to the RTC.

- In the meantime, petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on appeal the RTC Decision.

o CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

- Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but this was denied.

- The RTC as an appellate court, rendered its Decision, modifying the MTC Decision by deleting the award of civil
damages.

- The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners) now charge Vicente Balboa (respondent)
with forum shopping.

WON the CA decision should be reconsidered and the RTC decision be dismissed as they constitute forum-shopping –
NO.

- Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the
supposition that one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.

- There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who
represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is
founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in
the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.
- Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.: There is identity of parties and causes of action
between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal
case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the civil action so as to prevent
double payment of the claim.

- Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corp. v. Demetria: The civil case for the recovery of the amount covered by the
bouncing checks was also ordered dismissed.

- In Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 effective September 16, 1997, which
provides:

o 1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

- This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

o (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

o Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are
not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

o Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

- The foregoing, however, are not applicable to the present case.

o The cases were filed prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997.
Thus, at the time of filing of Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, the governing
rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:

 SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

o Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is
necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or
(2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal
complaint. 

 Since respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case No. 97-
82225 may proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no forum
shopping to speak of.

- Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No.
22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case.
- Moreover, the RTC already deleted the award of civil damages in the criminal case. Records do not disclose that appeal
had been taken therefrom. There is, therefore, no double recovery of the amounts covered by the checks or unjust
enrichment on the part of respondent.

Case Name Ricarze v. CA

Case Name Gosiaco v. Ching

- Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested ₱8,000,000.00 with ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was
loaned to ASB for a period of 48 days with interest at 10.5% which is equivalent to ₱112,000.00.

- In exchange, ASB through its manager Ching, issued DBS checks for ₱8,000,000.00 and ₱112,000.00 respectively.

o The checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against DBS Bank Makati Head Office branch.

o ASB acknowledged that it owed petitioner the abovementioned amounts.

- Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to deposit the two (2) checks.

o However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop
payment order and for insufficiency of funds.

- Petitioner informed respondents about the dishonor of the checks and demanded replacement checks or the return of the
money placement but to no avail.

- Thus, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MeTC of San Juan against the
private respondents.

o The MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not absolve her from civil liability. The MTC ruled
that Ching, as a corporate officer of ASB, was civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks.

- Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the RTC on the ground that the MTC
failed to hold ASB and Roxas either jointly or severally liable with Ching. On the other hand, Ching moved for a
reconsideration which was subsequently denied. Thereafter, she filed her notice of appeal on the ground that she should
not be held civilly liable for the bouncing checks because they were contractual obligations of ASB.

o The RTC rendered its decision sustaining Ching's appeal. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s ruling which denied
the motion to implead ASB and Roxas for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. The RTC also exonerated
Ching from civil liability and ruled that the subject obligation fell squarely on ASB. Thus, Ching should not
be held civilly liable.

- Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA on the grounds that the RTC erred in absolving Ching from civil
liability; in upholding the refusal of the MTC to implead ASB and Roxas; and in refusing to pierce the corporate veil of
ASB and hold Roxas liable.

o The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and stated that the amount petitioner sought to recover was a loan
made to ASB and not to Ching. Roxas’ testimony further bolstered the fact that the checks issued by Ching
were for and in behalf of ASB.

o ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case since it is not a natural person and in the case of Roxas, he
was not the subject of a preliminary investigation.
o Lastly, the CA ruled that there was no need to pierce the corporate veil of ASB since none of the requisites
were present.

WON a corporate officer who signed a bouncing check civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22 – NO

- B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

o Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons, who actually signed the
check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

- When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be held personally liable for violating
a penal statute. 

o The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or property,
draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the
check on presentment.

o Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the principle that he cannot shield
himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his personal act.

- The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly liable when
he is convicted.

WON Ching can file a civil action against ASB – YES.

- In the various stages of this case, petitioner has been proceeding from the premise that he is unable to pursue a separate
civil action against ASB itself for the recovery of the amounts due from the subject checks. From this premise,
petitioner sought to implead ASB as a defendant to the B.P. Blg. 22 case, even if such case is criminal in nature.

o Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as an accused or defendant in
the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the litigation of the civil aspect thereof.

- Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations against a debtor-corporation
cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure.

o Nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical
person on whose behalf the check was issued.

o What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civil action against the natural person charged with
violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.

- In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check in behalf of a corporation
stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil Code.

o B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused this criminal liability of the signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the
corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil
liability not from the corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf.

o Prior to the amendments to our rules on criminal procedure, it clearly was permissible to pursue the criminal
liability against the signatory, while going after the corporation itself for the civil liability.

- However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal liability attaching to the bounced
check be pursued jointly, the previous option to directly pursue the civil liability against the person who incurred the
civil obligation–the corporation itself–is no longer that clear.
o In theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case for B.P. Blg. 22 should not affect the
civil liability of the corporation for the same check, since such implied institution concerns the civil liability
of the signatory, and not of the corporation.

o B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil
liability of the corporation for the amount represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the
signatory arises from the wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the account,
while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check or the
consideration for its execution.

- Under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is
only the civil liability of the signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action
against the signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute.

o In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine whether or not the signatory had signed the
check with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the bank account, while in the civil case the
trial court should ascertain whether or not the obligation itself is valid and demandable.

o The litigation of both questions could, in theory, proceed independently and simultaneously without being
ultimately conclusive on one or the other.

Case Name Salazar v. People

- Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao.

o As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant a check drawn against the
Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000.

o Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners’ assurance that it was a good check.

- The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because
it was drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the
Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was
returned with the word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).

- An Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario
with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City.

o That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent
to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN
TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481,
dated October 15, 1996, in the amount of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO, and accused ANAMER D.
SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said check as payment of 300 cavans of rice obtained from J.Y.
BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at that time said check was issued
and endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover
the amount called for therein and without informing the payee of such circumstance; that when said check
was presented to the drawee bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and refused payment
for the reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED; that despite demands, accused failed and refused and still fail and
refuse to pay and/or make arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the damage and prejudice of said
J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION.
- The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private
complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase.

o The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario,
for the purpose of defrauding the private complainant.

o In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who
remained at large.

o As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not
synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d).

- Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the
decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court – DENIED.

WON she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not
civilly liable to the private respondent – YES.

- According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

o SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.

 The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

 When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.

 Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

 Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

 No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.

o (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

 Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
 Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this
Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Case Name Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan

- Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) for three (3) full terms.
o During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’
subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.
- The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint from People’s Graftwatch, requesting for
assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the amount
of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.
- The Office of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report which
upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. 
- The assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Cañares (Cañares) prepared a Resolution finding probable cause
against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act,” and recommended the filing of the corresponding information.
- Petitioners alleged that they learned about the Resolution and Information only when they received a copy of the latter
shortly after its filing with the SB.
- Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases
was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint
was instituted.
o Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela’s motion.
- Sandiganbayan:
o The SB denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash for lack of merit.
 The preliminary investigation against petitioners was actually resolved by Cañares one (1) year and
four (4) months from the date the complaint was filed.
 Complying with internal procedure, Cañares then prepared the Resolution and Information for the
recommendation of the Miro and eventually, the final approval of the Casimiro.
 As these issuances had to undergo careful review and revision through the various levels of the said
office, the period of delay of over six (6) years – cannot be deemed as inordinate  and as such,
petitioners’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
- Petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration similarly arguing that the SB erred in making a
distinction between two time periods, namely: (a) from the filing of the complaint up to the time Cañares prepared the
resolution finding probable cause against petitioners; and (b) from the submission of the said resolution to the Acting
Ombudsman for review and approval up to the filing of the Information with the SB.
o In this regard, petitioners averred that the aforementioned periods should not be compartmentalized and thus,
treated as a single period.
o Accordingly, the delay of eight (8) years of the instant case should be deemed prejudicial to their right to
speedy disposition of cases.
- The SB, however, denied the foregoing motions in its Resolution for lack of merit.

WON the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated
– YES.

- A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) which provides: SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
- Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
- Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the
following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
- Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their
criminal case had been violated.
o The preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete.
 There is no complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman
approves the investigating officer’s recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to
dismiss the complaint.
 Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners were
not terminated upon Cañares’ preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but
rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB.
 In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years
after the filing of the complaint.
o The above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case largely remains unjustified.
 The Court equally denies the SB’s ratiocination that the delay in proceedings could be excused by
the fact that the case had to undergo careful review and revision through the different levels in the
Office of the Ombudsman before it is finally approved, in addition to the steady stream of cases
which it had to resolve.
 Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions
involved in the case or any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal work activity –
any of which have not been adequately proven by the prosecution in the case at bar – there appears
to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved
the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners.
o Petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases.
 They could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because they were unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going.
 They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only
after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with
the SB on June 19, 2009. 
 In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already
been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the
case altogether.
 Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners’ duty
to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman’s
responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its
mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it.
o The Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings
against them.
 Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution of
the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable
that petitioners’ constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been
violated.
 For the SB’s patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence surrounding the
matter, the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied the quashal of the
Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set aside and the criminal case against
petitioners be dismissed.
- While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal of the petitioners, it does not
necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a
subsequent case which the Province may opt to pursue.
o Based on the violation of petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases as herein discussed, the present case
stands to be dismissed even before either the prosecution or the defense has been given the chance to present
any evidence.
o Thus, the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed committed the
acts or omissions from which any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court. 
o Absent this pronouncement, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on
the delict if only to recover the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to petitioners’ alleged
malfeasance.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010 of
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered
to DISMISS Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of the Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases of
petitioners Rafael L. Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas, and Jose Ma. G. Amugod, without prejudice to
any civil action which the Province of Negros Occidental may file against petitioners.

Case Name Simon v. Chan


- The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information
charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22.
o That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value
Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of P336,000.00 said
accused  well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the
amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
- More than three years later, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the
collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
- The MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment and implemented through the sheriff attaching a
Nissan vehicle of Simon.
- Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff's attachment bond for damages, pertinently
averring:
o On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the
instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
- The MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon's urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff's attachment
bond for damages, dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
o For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2)
cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
o A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the criminal case for violation
of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action being
asserted, which is the recovery of P336,000.00.
o In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts, are identical.
o Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff's submission that the herein case for sum of money is one
based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the
Rules.
- Chan's motion for reconsideration was denied
- The Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chan's complaint.
- Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review, challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
o The CA promulgated its assailed decision,  overturning the RTC.

WON Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was an independent civil action – NO.

- Surely, it could not have been the intent of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party
defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many
cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit.
- However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP
22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
o Section 1. (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
o Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party.
It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In
no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
- The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-
00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable.
o The retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. 
o Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering
that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure,  except that in criminal cases, the
changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what
is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.
o Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right,
because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
- Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
o Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines
shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
 1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily
include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed or recognized.
- The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia
Dynamic Electrix Corporation, thus:
o This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually
use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages,
the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon
being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is
expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored
checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases,
one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the
policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit
the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after
the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the
civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil
and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the
amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
Where petitioners' rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions
for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.
- The CA's reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez to give due course to the civil action of Chan
independently and separately of  Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. 
o DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a
prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may
result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of
the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable.
 In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil
action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code, as DMPI Employees has allowed. 
 In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the
reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the
issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation, supra.
- To repeat, Chan's separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation
of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted
provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.

WON the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila barred the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in
Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia – YES.

- For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is
necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the
existence of the third becomes nil.[28]
- A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis
pendentia are attendant.
o First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00,
that is, Chan and Simon, are the same.
o Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both
alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby
indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought
were founded, were identical in all respects.
o Thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan
would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
- It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis
pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the
MeTC.

You might also like